Testimony
of Daniel Fried
Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Eurasian Affairs
before the
House
Foreign Affairs Committee
Subcommittee
on Europe and the
Subcommittee
on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade
May 3,
2007
Do the
United States and Europe Need a Missile Defense System?
Chairman Wexler, Chairman Sherman, Ranking
Member Gallegly, Ranking Member Royce, members of the Subcommittees, thank you
for giving me the opportunity to appear before you again. Today, I will speak about our missile
defense plans for Europe, focusing on the
regional issues, while Assistant Secretary John Rood will focus on the more
technical and performance issues related to missile defense.
I will start by asserting that the strategic context
we face today is radically different than that prevailing during the Cold
War. We face the possibility that some
of the world’s most threatening and unstable regimes can develop and deploy
lethal nuclear arsenals and the ballistic missiles to deliver them to Europe
and even the United States.
In the Cold War, classic deterrence theory held that
near-absolute vulnerability and reliable retaliatory capability – so-called
Mutual Assured Destruction – provided security stability. Others, especially in the 1980s during the
debate over President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, argued that
defenses were in fact a better answer to the strategic nuclear challenge of the
time. That debate was never settled; my
point is that this debate is no longer relevant and should not be carried
forward to the early 21st century.
We face threats of a different kind and need different answers
unencumbered by heated arguments of the past.
The missile and nuclear threat from Iran is
developing. That country already
possesses hundreds of medium range Shahab-3 and short-range ballistic
missiles. Iran is developing follow-on
medium range systems that will be capable of reaching targets in southeast
Europe. Iran has expressed its intent to
develop space launch vehicles (SLVs), which is cause for some concern given the
similarities between SLV technology and that found in longer-range ballistic
missiles. The Intelligence Community
estimates that Iran could
develop long-range missiles capable of reaching all of Europe and the United States
by 2015 if it chooses to do so.
Iran’s worrying development of a threatening capability is
matched by threatening rhetoric, including direct threats to Europe. As an example, let me offer recent remarks by
Iranian President Ahmadinejad made last October 20 in Tehran. Referring to possible war between Israel
and the Palestinians, he stated, “We have advised the Europeans that the
Americans are far away, but you are the neighbors of the nations in the
region. We inform you that the nations
are like an ocean that is welling up, and if a storm begins, the dimensions
will not stay limited to Palestine,
and you may get hurt.”
There may be other threats that
develop in the region of the Middle East or
elsewhere. As Defense Secretary Gates
told European Allies and the Russians last week, we must think twenty years
ahead, and consider the threats we may face.
Diplomatic efforts may help reduce these threats and
even prevent some of them from arising altogether. We hope for the best and indeed are engaged
in intensive diplomacy with our European allies and Russia intended to change
Iran’s current nuclear development plans.
We may succeed, and this is the best course. But we may not succeed.
We have in any event a responsibility to defend the
American people and our allies. In this
context, limited missile defense makes sense.
It does not substitute for deterrence, but in a situation where we may
face smaller threats from countries more radical and potentially more dangerous
than was the Soviet Union, it allows for a
wider, more flexible range of options to respond to a potential attack should
deterrence fail.
Let me stress that the system we are contemplating is
nowhere as ambitious as was the missile defense plans of the Cold War. It is limited, fitting the threats we may
face. And the new strategic environment
is not hypothetical, but emerging in our time.
The importance of defenses and multiple options was evident last summer
when we activated our fledgling defense system for the first time in response
to the North Korean missile launch preparations.
Developing a missile defense system does not mean that
the United States
is abandoning an emphasis on non-proliferation.
Indeed, putting a missile defense system in place could help our
non-proliferation efforts as effective defenses reduce incentives for states to
acquire missiles in the first place.
The missile defense system that we are proposing to
place in Europe – in cooperation with Poland and the Czech Republic – would
provide an extra layer of protection against possible missile attacks not only to
the United States, but also to NATO allies and other European friends. The goal is to field a system that is capable
of enhancing protection of the United States that also has the benefit of protecting
Europe.
Transatlantic security is indivisible. As we learned the hard way in the 20th
century, if Europe is not secure, the United States is not secure. We cannot have U.S. security decoupled from that
of our NATO allies. We cannot take a
unilateral or isolationist approach to security. We need a common level of protection from
threats for the United States and for our European allies.
The threat is real, and the system we are proposing is
practical. Testing has demonstrated that
the limited missile defense system we are proposing works. Since 2001, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
has had 27 successful hit-to-kill intercepts out of 35 attempts. And 15 of the last 16 flight tests have been successful.
The proposed system calls for fielding 10 interceptor
missiles in Poland and a
radar facility in the Czech
Republic. These would be for purely defensive purposes
– to counter missile threats from the Middle East, particularly Iran. They have no offensive capability. Indeed, the ballistic missile defense
interceptors carry no explosive warheads of any type, but rely instead on their
kinetic energy to collide with and destroy incoming warheads. Moreover, the silos constructed for the
deployment of defensive interceptors are substantially smaller than those used
for our offensive missiles. We have no
plans to modify these silos in the future, and any conversion would require
extensive modifications, thus precluding the possibility of covertly converting
the interceptor silos for use by offensive missiles.
We have made a formal offer to begin
negotiations with both Poland and the Czech Republic. They have accepted our offer; Assistant Secretary
Rood will lead the first round of negotiations, which are scheduled to begin in
late May. Basing these missile defense
assets in Europe presents the United States
with an opportunity to deepen our
strategic relationships with Poland
and the Czech Republic. Mutually agreeing to deploy a limited
capability on the territory of two important NATO Allies would extend defensive
coverage to their populations and territory, and to most of Europe as a whole.
We have consulted intensively with the Poles and
Czechs on these issues; Secretary Gates was in Poland last week and I accompanied
him. The Poles and Czechs will have
questions about the system, and we will have answers. The Poles and Czechs will want to make sure
that their national security is increased as a result of any deployment that
takes place. We look forward to
discussing with both these allies the nature of current and potential threats
to their security from any quarter and how we can address them together.
I said earlier that we did not believe in unilateral
security. Indeed, we have on multiple
occasions over several years consulted and cooperated with our Allies and
friends on missile defenses within both NATO and the NATO-Russia Council
(NRC). President
Bush made it a priority to offer to extend coverage to our friends and Allies
and deployed forces. We have also been
working on theater missile defenses within NATO and the NRC for some time now
and have made progress.
NATO’s work on missile defense has focused on three
activities: the Active Layered Theatre
Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program, technical work to support decisions
on possible missile defense for the protection of NATO territory and population
centers, and cooperation with Russia on Theater Missile Defense (TMD).
In 2005, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved the
ALTBMD program, a NATO-funded Command and Control structure integrating sensors
and missile defense interceptors which will be provided by member nations. This system is focused on the protection of
NATO deployed forces against ballistic missiles with a range of up to 3,000 km
(shorter-to-medium range missile defense).
NATO plans to an initial capability to defend its forces by 2010; a
fully operational system capable of protecting areas against missiles up to
3,000 km is planned for the 2015-2016 timeframe.
NATO has also begun to explore options to protect the Alliance against the full
range of ballistic missile threats, including long-range missiles. At the 2006 Riga Summit, NATO Heads of State
and Government noted the conclusions of the Missile Defense Feasibility Study,
which found that missile defense for NATO territory is technically feasible
within the assumptions and limitations of the study. Now that the U.S.
is proposing a long-range missile defense system in Europe, NATO is assessing
how the U.S.
plan could work with NATO missile defense.
We have had three senior-level NATO and NRC
discussions on U.S. missile
defense plans in Europe within the past six
months. Our most recent discussions were
on April 19 in Brussels and last week in Oslo at the level of
Foreign Ministers, where I accompanied Secretary Rice.
A great deal has been said and written about Russia’s
reaction to our plans. As we have stated
publicly and privately, the system poses no threat to Russian security. The interceptors do not have the capability
to be used against Russia’s
strategic forces. Moreover, ten defensive
missiles would be of no use against Russia’s hundreds of missiles and
thousands of nuclear warheads. The
Russians know this.
We have consulted with Russia on this issue on numerous
occasions and at very high levels, starting last year. We have recently intensified our
consultations with Russia, and President Bush offered to President Putin
U.S.-Russian cooperation on missile defense.
Two weeks ago my colleague Assistant Secretary of
State John Rood and DoD Deputy Assistant Secretary Brian Green traveled to
Moscow and offered Russia a detailed proposal for such cooperation. He can explain this to you in more
detail. In Moscow last week, Secretary Gates expanded on
this proposal, and made clear to the Russian leadership that we were prepared
to address their concerns about our program and plans.
Although Russia
remains wary of U.S.
missile defense plans, I believe that we have made
significant progress within NATO and the NRC in explaining the security rationale
for the system, its technical capabilities, what it can do against Iranian
capability in particular, and what it cannot do against the Russian arsenal.
Our most recent consultations have been
well received. After the April 19 NRC
meeting, NATO Secretary General Jaap de
Hoop Scheffer told reporters that “there is a shared threat perception” and
that “Allies agree that a threat from ballistic missiles exists.” He also stated that, “There is a shared desire
that any U.S. system should be complementary to any NATO missile defense
system.” The missile defense assets we
propose to deploy in Europe have been designed
to be complementary to any future NATO ballistic missile defense system. We welcome NATO cooperation in missile
defense, particularly in addressing the short-range threats that Europe faces
from the Middle East.
At last week’s meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Oslo there was near unanimity
in support of missile defense from our NATO allies. Minister after Minister acknowledged that a
genuine problem exists, a genuine security threat that missile defense is
designed to address. Allies support
further NATO work on the subject and supported our offers to cooperate with the
Russians. During his press statement on
April 26, Secretary-General de Hoop Scheffer noted that U.S. missile defense
plans do not upset the strategic balance of Europe. He stated, “It is
clear that there is a full understanding between the allies that the plans in
the framework of the third site cannot, and will not, and do not upset the
strategic balance in Europe. There was a lot of support for the
wide-ranging United States
proposals vis-à-vis our Russia
partners for closer cooperation on missile defence.” De Hoop Scheffer also publicly stated that
U.S. offers of missile defense cooperation to the Russians were “very forward
leaning and open.”
I said earlier that security is indivisible. The location of the proposed defense
installations in Poland and
the Czech Republic is
optimal for covering the most Alliance
territory possible. We are currently
working with NATO to explore how a U.S. long-range missile defense
system could work with NATO missile defense systems.
The U.S. proposed system is designed to counter
long-range threats from the Middle East and would be able to protect all NATO
countries facing such threat. However, some Allied countries could
still face threats from shorter and medium-ranged missiles. For these countries to be protected, they
would require short- and medium-range missile defense systems. These systems are more mobile than the system
we are proposing to build in Europe and can be deployed relatively quickly if a
need should arise.
Again, U.S.
and NATO efforts are complementary and could work together to form a more
effective defense for Europe. We
would be able to link NATO systems with the ones we plan to deploy in order to
ensure interoperability. We have raised
this idea of cooperation with NATO and hope that the alliance will agree to it.
In sum, we have made progress with our European
allies, with NATO, and potentially with Russia
about our proposed missile defense system in Europe. NATO agrees that the threat of ballistic
missiles is real and is currently debating its next steps on missile
defense. Discussions with Russia
continue; we have proposed various opportunities for cooperation on missile
defense and are awaiting their considered response. We believe that a missile defense system in
Europe would greatly increase the overall security of Europe.
Thank you for your attention. I appreciate the opportunity to be here and I
look forward to your questions.