In
the Matter of
ESPIRIDION QUIROZ,
Petitioner |
HUDBCA
No. 86-1424-F415
(Claim No. 7-64253643-0) |
|
H. Thomas Hirsch, Esquire
Nunley & Hirsch
Suite 112-C
2817 Parkway
Odessa, Texas 79762 |
For
the Petitioner |
|
Herbert L. Goldblatt, Esquire
Room 10240
U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development
Washington, D.C. 20410 |
For
the Secretary |
DECISION and ORDER
By letter dated March 4, 1986 and received and filed by this Board
on March 11, 1986, counsel for the Petitioner has requested reconsideration
of the Decision and Order issued January 17, 1986 in this matter.
That Decision and Order authorized the Secretary of the U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development to refer Petitioner's debt to the
Internal Revenue Service in accordance with 31 U.S.C. §3720A for
offset against any refund which is owing to the Petitioner with
respect to his 1985 income tax return.
As a basis for the request for reconsideration, counsel for Petitioner
submits "that there are two things wrong with your order," i.e.,
(1) since the subject note "went into default on January 15, 1980
[, t]he four statute (sic) of limitations has run which no longer
makes it an enforceable debt"; and (2) Petitioner "is now married
to a different lady," and "[i]f the government attempts to take
the 1985 tax return, the government will be taking property belonging
to the new Mrs. Quiroz who is not indebted to the government."
The United States Government is not bound by a state statute of
limitations in this action. 31 U.S.C. §3716 states that the head
of an agency or his designee may, after attempting to collect a
claim from a person arising from the activities of the agency, collect
the claim by means of administrative offset, except that no claim
under this statute that has been outstanding for more than ten years
may be collected by means of administrative offset. Since this claim
has not been outstanding for more than ten years, it is not barred
by the applicable federal statute of limitations.
The Secretary is not prohibited from referring Petitioner's debt
to the Internal Revenue Service for offset simply because the Petitioner's
marital status has changed. Nothing in the pertinent statute prohibits
the Internal Revenue Service from proceeding to offset a debtor's
income tax refund simply because the debtor elects to file a joint
tax return with a spouse instead of an individual tax return.
The Petitioner has failed to assert sufficient grounds in support
of his motion for reconsideration. The Decision and Order issued
in this matter on January 17, 1986 is affirmed.
DAVID T. ANDERSON
Administrative Judge
March 11, 1986
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