|
Home > Electronic Reading Room > Document Collections > Reports Associated with Events
> Event Notification Reports
> 2003
> November 19
Event Notification Report for November 19, 2003
|
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
11/18/2003 - 11/19/2003
** EVENT NUMBERS **
|
|
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
|
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 40005 |
Rep Org: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
Licensee: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
Region: 4
City: SAN JOSE State: CA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JASON POST
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
|
Notification Date: 07/18/2003
Notification Time: 12:13 [ET]
Event Date: 07/18/2003
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2003
|
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
|
Person (Organization):
JACK FOSTER (NRR)
ANIELLO DELLA GRECA (R1)
JOHN MADERA (R3)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
|
Event Text
PART 21 REPORT INVOLVING IMPACT OF FUEL CHANNEL BOW ON CONTROL ROD BLADES
The following is a portion of text received as a fax:
"July 18, 2003
"MFN 03-045
"Subject: 60 Day Interim Notification: Impact of Fuel Channel Bow on Control Rod Blade Deviations
"Reference: Letter from Jason Post (GENE) to USNRC, 'Interim Surveillance Program for Fuel Channel Bow Monitoring', MFN 03-030 Revision 1, April 30, 2003
"This communication is to inform you that GE Nuclear Energy (GENE) has been evaluating a potentially reportable condition (PRC) on the impact of fuel channel bow on control rod blades. The original channel bow evaluation for increased fuel channel - control rod blade interference did not consider previously evaluated deviations in the control rod blade. Channel bow can cause increased deflection and stresses in control rod blades, which must be considered in control rod blade deviation evaluations. The PRC evaluation is limited to control rod blades delivered to those plants identified in the referenced letter, where an interim surveillance plan for channel bow monitoring is recommended, because those are the only plants where there is a concern about increased fuel channel - control rod blade interference.
"As described in the referenced letter, it was determined that BWR/6 and BWR/4 & 5 C-lattice plants with Global Nuclear Fuel (GNF) thick/thin channels potentially have increased channel bow that can cause fuel channel control rod blade interference. An interim surveillance program was provided to augment the surveillance requirements in the plant Technical Specifications until other actions, which mitigate or limit the potential for control rod - fuel channel interference due to channel bow can be identified and implemented. This surveillance program provides early indication of potentially degraded operational performance and assurance that action is taken before reaching excessive levels of control rod interference. This surveillance plan is limited to BWR/6 and BWR/4&5 C-lattice plants with GNF thick/thin channels and GENE control rods. There have been no indications of excessive interference on BWR/2, 3 and 4 D-lattice plants, and as a result, they are excluded from the interim surveillance program.
"The PRC evaluation was initiated by GENE on May 19, 2003. GENE will not have completed the evaluation by July 18, 2003, when the 60 day evaluation period expires. Therefore, GENE is submitting this 60 Day Interim Notification under 10CFR21.21(a)(2) to inform the NRC that we are working on the issue, and to commit to report the results
of the evaluation no later than September 23, 2003."
GE Nuclear Energy has identified the following as affected plants: Clinton, Nine Mile Point 2, Fermi 2, Grand Gulf, River Bend, Limerick 1 & 2 and Perry 1.
*****UPDATE ON 9/24/03 AT 0055 FROM POST TO LAURA*****
GE submitted its 60 day update letter which indicated no change from previously submitted information.
* * * UPDATE ON 11/18/03 @ 2115 BY JASON POST TO GOULD * * *
This communication is to inform you that GE Nuclear Energy (GENE) has completed the evaluation of the potentially reportable condition (PRC) identified in References 2 and 3 and has concluded that it is NOT a Reportable Condition under 10CFR21.
Channel bow can cause increased deflection and stresses in control rod blades. The impact of channel bow on as-designed control rod blades was considered when the surveillance program identified in Reference 1 was developed_ However, the evaluation did not consider known control rod blade deviations from as-designed conditions that had previously been addressed. The evaluation to determine the impact of channel bow on control rod blade deviations, as reported to the NRC in References 2 and 3, has now been completed. The evaluation concluded that the increased loads from channel bow do not impact the structural integrity of control rods with known deviations from as-designed conditions. Therefore, it does not produce a significant safety hazard or lead to violation of a technical specification safety limit.
As described in the Reference 1 letter, it was determined that BWR/6 and BVVR/4 & 5 C-lattice plants with Global Nuclear Fuel (GNF) thick/thin channels are potentially susceptible to increased channel bow that can cause increased fuel channel - control rod blade interference. A surveillance program is recommended per Reference 1 for the
potentially susceptible 8 plants listed above. This evaluation examines known deviations from the as-designed condition for original equipment manufactured (OEM) control rod blades and for "DuraLife" and "Marathon" replacement blades in the potentially susceptible plants.
The PRC evaluation was initiated by GENE on May 19, 2003. GENE reported the results of the evaluation for OEM blades and "DuraLife" replacement blades in Reference 3. GENE has now completed the evaluation applicable to "Marathon" replacement blades. These evaluations indicate that there is no change from the previous information provided in Reference 1. Therefore, GENE is submitting this Final Notification to inform the NRC that the evaluations have been completed, and to report the GENE conclusion that this is NOT a Reportable Condition per 10CFR21.
References:
1. Letter from Jason Post (GENE) to USNRC, "Interim Surveillance Program for Fuel Channel Bow Monitoring", MFN 03-030 Revision 1, April 30, 2003
2. Letter from Jason Post (GENE) to USNRC, "60 Day Interim Notification: Impact of Fuel Channel Bow on Control Rod Blade Deviations," MFN 03-045, July 18, 2003
3. Letter from Jason Post (GENE) to USNRC, "60 Day Interim Notification: Impact of Fuel Channel Bow on Control Rod Blade Deviations," MFN 03-103, September 23, 2003
Notified Reg 1 RDO(Rogge), Reg 3 RDO(Lipa), Reg4 RDO(Kennedy), and NRR(Foster)
See related events #39634 and 39806 |
|
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
|
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 40184 |
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE MICKLOW
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
|
Notification Date: 09/19/2003
Notification Time: 20:49 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2003
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2003
|
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
|
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
|
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
N |
0 |
Cold Shutdown |
0 |
Cold Shutdown |
Event Text
UNANALYZED CONDITION
While shutdown in Mode 5, containment recirculation sump 'B' was inspected for sump screen bypass flow paths in accordance with the requirements of NRC Bulletin 2003-01. Inspection results showed that approximately 25 square inches of space is available for recirculation flow to bypass the sump screens. This condition has the possibility of affecting the containment spray, safety injection and residual heat removal systems. The plant is stable in a refueling outage at approximately 95 degrees F, with normal residual heat removal in service and loop levels at 72 inches.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 11/18/03 @ 1356 BY RICHARD KAPP TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION
The licensee is retracting this event after performing an extensive evaluation had determined that equipment required to mitigate the event, though found to be in a degraded condition, would have performed their functions. This event has been discussed with the NRC Resident Inspector and he was informed of the event retraction.
Notified Reg 1 RDO(Rogge) |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 40293 |
Rep Org: OR DEPT OF HEALTH RAD PROTECTION
Licensee: GEORGIA PACIFIC, INC.
Region: 4
City: Tualatin State: OR
County:
License #: ORE 90950
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: EDWIN WRIGHT
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
|
Notification Date: 11/03/2003
Notification Time: 19:15 [ET]
Event Date: 11/03/2003
Event Time: 12:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2003
|
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
|
Person (Organization):
MARK SHAFFER (R4)
E. WILLIAM BRACH (NMSS)
|
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
A Troxler Model 3440 Moisture Density Gauge, S/N 34418 (8 millicurie Cs-137; 40 millicurie Am-241/Be) was stolen from the back of a pickup truck sometime between 2000 PST 11/02/03 and 1200 PST 11/03/03 at an employee's apartment complex in Tualatin, OR. The gauge was locked in its case and the case was chained to the truck at the time of the theft.
The licensee notified the Tualatin, OR police department. The State Dept. of Radiation Protection will be issuing a press release.
* * * UPDATE FROM WRIGHT TO GOTT AT 1025 EST ON 11/18/03 * * *
The Troxler Gauge was found behind a discount store and reported to the Tualatin, OR police on 11/17/03 at 1800 PST. The gauge was retrieved by the Oregon State Department of Radiation Protection. The gauge is intact.
Notified R4DO (Kennedy) and NMSS (Hickey). |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 40323 |
Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: NO FRILLS SUPERMARKET
Region: 4
City: OMAHA State: NE
County:
License #: GL0189
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRUDY HILL
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
|
Notification Date: 11/14/2003
Notification Time: 13:12 [ET]
Event Date: 11/14/2003
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/14/2003
|
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
|
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
ROBERTO TORRES (NMSS)
|
Event Text
LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS
The State of Nebraska reported that one of their licensees could not account for 12 tritium exit signs during their annual inventory check. The signs were manufactured in 05/87 and 11 contained 25 curries each of tritium and 1 contained 50 curies. All activities were measured at date of manufacture. Remodeling of the store occurred during the period between the previous inventory check and the current inventory. The licensee has contacted the general contractor, but the location of the exit lights is still unknown. They may have ended up in the landfill. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 40328 |
Facility: NORTH ANNA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JAY LEBERSTIEN
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
|
Notification Date: 11/18/2003
Notification Time: 10:03 [ET]
Event Date: 11/17/2003
Event Time: 11:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2003
|
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
|
Person (Organization):
JOHN PELCHAT (R2)
|
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
SIGNIFICANT LEAK IN FIRE PROTECTION HEADER
"This is notification of a Special Report in accordance with Technical Requirement 7.1.1 of the North Anna Technical Requirements Manual.
"On November 17, 2003, at 1150 hours, the Main Control Room observed the start of all fire pumps and receipt of associated alarms. An investigation determined that a significant leak in the fire protection header occurred outside the protected area. The cause for the fire protection header leak has not been determined. In an effort to isolate the leak, two of the three fire pumps had to be shut down and the third pump was isolated. The leaking portion of the fire protection header was isolated by 1313 hours. The running fire pump was then used to refill and pressurize the fire protection header. By 1420 hours, the fire protection system had been returned to normal."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 40329 |
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PHIL CHASE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
|
Notification Date: 11/18/2003
Notification Time: 10:47 [ET]
Event Date: 11/18/2003
Event Time: 04:35 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2003
|
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
|
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
|
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY
"On 11/18/03 at 0435 EST, it way discovered that the ENS phone system was inoperable when the NRC was unable to contact the Limerick Generating Station Control Room for a routine plant status update. The NRC was able to contact the Limerick Control Room via a normal station telephone. The cause of the communication loss was investigated and determined to be an ENS phone in TSC that was "off the hook". The TSC ENS phone had a headset connected that was inadvertently turned on and resulted in the busy signal when the NRC attempted to call. The TSC ENS phone headset was turned off restoring the communication line. Communications were verified with the NRC at 0459 via the ENS phone. This condition is being reported as an 8 hour notification per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for loss of offsite communications capability."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 40330 |
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY TODD
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
|
Notification Date: 11/18/2003
Notification Time: 11:05 [ET]
Event Date: 11/17/2003
Event Time: 16:04 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2003
|
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
|
Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2)
|
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
N |
0 |
Refueling |
0 |
Refueling |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
| 3 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
FITNESS FOR DUTY
A vendor supervisor was determined to be under the influence of illegal drugs during a random fitness for duty screening. The vendor supervisor's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the HOO for additional details.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 40331 |
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RICHARD KAPP
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
|
Notification Date: 11/18/2003
Notification Time: 13:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2003
Event Time: 15:44 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2003
|
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
|
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
|
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
N |
0 |
Refueling |
0 |
Refueling |
Event Text
INVALID PARTIAL SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING AT GINNA
"On September 27, 2003, at 1544 hours Eastern Daylight Savings Time, while In a refueling outage, R.E. Ginna Nuclear Station experienced a momentary invalid partial Safety Injection (SI) signal to the "A" train. The invalid signal was the result of an error made while placing a jumper across a relay during a 24 month surveillance. The invalid partial SI signal caused the following systems to actuate: "A " train Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI), "A" train Diesel Generator (DG), trip of MCC G1, full opening of Service Water (SW) AOV-4561 to the containment recirculation fans, and the opening of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) core deluge valve MOV-852A. Each individual actuation was complete, the "A" DG started and functioned as designed, and all support systems functioned properly. The individual slave timers fed from the SI relay did not actuate. The most probable cause of this was the momentary nature of the partial SI signal."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 40332 |
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RICHARD KAPP
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
|
Notification Date: 11/18/2003
Notification Time: 14:02 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2003
Event Time: 02:16 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2003
|
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
|
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
|
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
N |
0 |
Cold Shutdown |
0 |
Cold Shutdown |
Event Text
INVALID SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING AT GINNA
"On October 8, 2003, at 0216 hours Eastern Daylight Savings Time, while in a refueling outage, R.E. Ginna Nuclear Station experienced an invalid "B" train Safety Injection (SI) signal. The invalid signal was the result of an error made while establishing pretest requirements during a 24 month surveillance. The invalid SI signal caused the °B" train Diesel Generator (DG) to actuate. The "B" DG started and functioned as designed, and all support systems functioned properly."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 40333 |
Facility: PALISADES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: DANIEL MALONE
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
|
Notification Date: 11/18/2003
Notification Time: 14:11 [ET]
Event Date: 11/18/2003
Event Time: 11:07 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2003
|
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
|
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
|
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
LICENSEE MADE OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO AN OIL SPILL
A notification was made to the Pollution Emergency Alert System (PEAS) and Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) due to an oil spill. This occurred during activities associated with replacing a transformer that is located in the owner controlled area, when oil within the transformer spilled to the ground. The quantity of oil was approximately n75 gallons. The spill was contained to the soil and never reached the surface water. Cleanup is in progress.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 40335 |
Facility: HADDAM NECK
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE HEYL
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
|
Notification Date: 11/18/2003
Notification Time: 18:01 [ET]
Event Date: 11/18/2003
Event Time: 17:14 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2003
|
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
|
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
|
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
N |
0 |
Decommissioned |
0 |
Decommissioned |
Event Text
LICENSEE MADE A NOTIFICATION TO THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
Approximately 1 quart of transmission oil spilled from a privately owned vehicle onto the soil at the lower parking area which is about 200 yds from the industrial area(old PA). No oil went into the water and cleanup is in progress. The licensee made an off site notification to the state of Connecticut
Licensee notified Reg 1 |
| Fuel Cycle Facility |
Event Number: 40336 |
Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
Region: 2
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County: NEW HANOVER
License #: SNM-1097
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001113
NRC Notified By: EARL SAITO
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
|
Notification Date: 11/18/2003
Notification Time: 18:52 [ET]
Event Date: 11/18/2003
Event Time: 15:55 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2003
|
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
RESPONSE-BULLETIN
|
Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2)
JOHN GREEVES (NMSS)
|
Event Text
24 HR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 DUE TO CRITICALITY CONTROLS DEGRADATION
At approximately 3:55 p.m. on November 18, 2003, the storage of miscellaneous items was noted in a hood in the chemical area. The items included valves, small diameter pipes, and other objects wrapped in plastic.
The criticality safety basis for the hood is based upon not exceeding the UO-2 limit and the geometry of the objects in the hood. Since the geometry control is based upon only a single type of process component in the hood (e.g.: a limited number of 1" valves, or a maximum length of 1" pipe), the as found condition was not consistent with the documented analysis (only one type of component can be processed at a time).
An assay confirmed less than 4 killograms uranium was contained in the components. Therefore, the mass limit was not exceeded. The mass control was not violated and no unsafe condition existed. The situation was corrected in less than four hours.
This condition is reported within 24 hours pursuant to NRC bulletin 91-01 due to a degradation of criticality controls.
Activities in the affected area have been suspended and the equipment tagged out until an investigation to determine the root cause and necessary corrective actions has been completed. |
|
