

Public Key Parameter Rules

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NIST

What are PK Parameters

- Constants used in public key computation
 - publicly known
 - carefully chosen
 - same parameters can be used with many keys & certificates
 - but need not necessarily be the same for all certificates and keys

Three DSS Parameters

- p , a prime modulus
 - $2^{L-1} < p < 2^L$ for $512 \leq L \leq 1024$ and L a multiple of 64
- q , a prime divisor of $p-1$
 - $2^{159} < q < 2^{160}$
- g , which has order q , mod p
 - $g = h^{(p-1)/q} \text{ mod } p$, where h is any integer with $1 < h, p-1$, such that $h^{(p-1)/q} \text{ mod } p > 1$

Three DSS Parameters

- Are large numbers
 - p is 512 to 1024 bits
 - q is 160 bits
 - g is 512 to 1024 bits
- total of 1184 to 2208 bits
- Substantial storage & bandwidth cost to replicate in every certificate

Why Do We Need the Rules

- Increase security
 - prevent parameter substitution attacks
- Improve interoperability
 - avoid different assumptions
- Improve performance
 - inheritance can save a lot of bandwidth
 - parameters are not repeated in every certificate

Parameters and X.509

- X.509 standard is confusing
 - three places in certificate where syntax permits parameters to be stated
 - only one of these is “secure”
 - parameter substitution attack may be possible if certificate using system gets parameters from wrong place


AlgorithmIdentifier

- AlgorithmIdentifier syntax defines the algorithm and states parameters
- There are three occurrences of AlgorithmIdentifier in an X.509 certificate

AlgorithmIdentifier
algorithm
parameters

::= SEQUENCE{
ALGORITHM.&id({SupportedAlgorithms}),
ALGORITHM.&Type ({SupportedAlgorithms}
{ @algorithm}) OPTIONAL }

X.509 v3 Certificate



The \$64 Question

- Which of the three do we use to validate a digital signature?
- X.509 text doesn't state this clearly and directly
- The answer matters
 - see Chokhani paper
 - <http://www.cygnacom.com/docfiles/dsaflaw.zip>

The Wrong Answers


- Can't use parameters in SIGNED itself
 - not within the protected envelope & circular
- Can't use signature in a certificate to validate that same certificate
 - circular

The Right Answer

- We get the parameters needed to validate a signature from the same place we get the public key used to validate that signature: the `subjectPublicKeyInfo` field of the *signer's* certificate.


Signature Validation

- Public key used to validate a signature comes from the signer's certificate



Certification Path


- Alice can verify Bob's signature by verifying a chain of certificates starting from one issued by a Certification Authority (CA) she trusts (and whose public key she knows)



Alice trusts CA1


Certification Path

- A somewhat more mechanical view



Certification Path


- A more detailed mechanical view



Parameter Inheritance

- What if parameters field in certificate subjectPublicKeyInfo field is null?
- Proposed answer: Inherit parameters from those used in the previous stage of the certification path
 - X.509 is silent on this subject

Parameter Inheritance



Mixed Algorithms

- CA's and subject's algorithm may differ
 - can use RSA to sign a certificate with a DSS public key
- Change of algorithm blocks parameter inheritance
 - if algorithm in subjectPublicKeyInfo field is different than algorithm used to sign certificate, parameters must be explicitly stated

Where are We Going?

- Getting parameter rules included in
 - PKIX
 - MISSI specifications
 - ISO TC 68 Draft
 - MISPC
 - X9.57 footnote
 - too late to change normative text