Summary: Following a trial by jury, plaintiffs moved for a new trial and for sanctions pursuant to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The grounds for both motions were alleged violations of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court denied the motion for a new trial. The court, however, granted the motion for Rule 37 sanctions finding a willful violation of Rule 26. As a sanction, the court foreclosed the defendant from recovering trial costs.
Case Name: Gjerswold v. American Linen
Case Number: A2-94-117
Docket Number: 321
Date Filed: 1/13/98
Nature of Suit: 365
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
| Keith A. Gjerswold and Dorothy Gjerswold,
American Linen Supply Company, a Delaware Corporation; American Uniform Company, a Minnesota Corporation; Steiner Corporation, a Nevada Corporation; Graniteville Company, a South Carolina Corporation,
Richard W. Schnellbach
American Linen Supply Company, a Delaware Corporation; American Uniform Company, a Minnesota Corporation; Steiner Corporation, a Nevada Corporation; Graniteville Company, a South Carolina Corporation,
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) ) ) ) ) ) Civil No. A2-94-117 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Civil No. A2-94-118 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) |
O R D E R
Before the court are plaintiffs' motions for a new trial and sanctions pursuant to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (docket ## 310 & 311). Defendant American Linen resists both motions.
I. NEW TRIAL
Plaintiffs move for a new trial on the grounds that the defendants committed several violations of the Rules of Civil Procedure governing discovery. According to plaintiffs, defendants', specifically American Linen's, discovery abuses affected their case preparation and the outcome of the trial, and thus, a new trial is necessary. Defendant American Linen argues that a new trial is not necessary because: 1) it did not violate Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and 2) even if it did violate Rule 26, that violation did not affect the outcome of the trial.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has outlined the standard this court must follow when addressing motions for new trial: "The district court has discretion to grant or deny a new trial based on its reading of the evidence. However, the trial court cannot usurp the functions of a jury. The district court can only disturb a jury verdict to prevent a miscarriage of justice." See Beckman v. Mayo Foundation, 804 F.2d 435, 439 (8th Cir. 1986)(citations omitted); White v. Pence, 961 F.2d 776, 781 (8th Cir. 1992). The Eighth Circuit has further stated that when discovery abuses are the grounds for the motion for a new trial, the decision to grant or deny the motion for a new trial is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. See Buchholz v. Rockwell Int. Corp., 120 F.3d 146, 148 (8th Cir. 1997).
Based on the evidence presented during trial and the court's review of the file and the arguments of both parties, the court finds that the defendants in this case have violated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing discovery. Specifically, the court finds that the defendants' failure to disclose the existence of a second camera angle from Test 21 conducted in Texas was a violation of Rule 26. Although the evidence presented during trial indicates that American Linen was not the primary actor in the abuse of the discovery rules, it nonetheless is a responsible party. The court is not convinced, however, that American Linen's violation of the discovery rules resulted in a "miscarriage of justice" during trial. The jury was informed of the defendants' conduct with regard to Test 21 and the jury was able to view and consider the video footage from the second camera angle. Therefore, the court is of the view that the result at trial would not have been any different absent American Linen's discovery abuse and a new trial is not warranted.
II. RULE 37 SANCTIONS
In addition to moving for a new trial based on defendants' violations of the discovery rules, plaintiffs also move for Rule 37 sanctions. Rule 37(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
A party that without substantial justification fails to disclose information required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1) shall not, unless such failure is harmless, be permitted to use as evidence . . . any witness or information not so disclosed. In addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the court, on motion and after affording an opportunity to be heard, may impose other appropriate sanctions. In addition to requiring payment of reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, these sanctions may include any of the actions authorized under subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of subdivision (b)(2) of this rule and may include informing the jury of the failure to make the disclosure.
Rule 37(c)(1) is a relatively new addition to the Federal Rules of Evidence. Thus, there is very little case law interpreting its provisions. However, it is clear that the purpose of the Rule was to put teeth into the rules governing disclosure of evidence. See Wright, Miller & Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2289.1 (1994). Additionally, it is clear from the Eighth Circuit precedent in this area that the district court has a great deal of discretion in deciding when sanctions are appropriate and what type of sanction is reasonable under the circumstances. See, e.g., Baker v. General Motors Corp., 86 F.3d 811, 816 (8th Cir. 1996).
As previously noted, this court finds that American Linen's failure to disclose the existence of a second camera angle from Test 21 was a violation of Rule 26. This court also finds that the violation of Rule 26 was not substantially justified. Instead, the failure to disclose the second camera angle appears to have been a deliberate attempt by all of the defendants to keep the potentially damaging test results from the plaintiffs. Nor was the Rule 26 violation harmless in this court's opinion. It is clear that the plaintiffs would have benefited from an earlier disclosure of the second camera angle in their case preparation. Therefore, the court finds that the defendants', and specifically American Linen's, willful failure to disclose the second camera angle from Test 21 requires some sort of sanction.
Plaintiffs request a new trial, as well as attorney's fees and costs, as a sanction for American Linen's conduct. However, as previously noted, the court finds that a new trial is not necessary nor appropriate in this matter. Instead, the court finds that a monetary sanction is more appropriate and just. Additionally, the court finds that requiring American Linen to forfeit any recoverable trial costs is more appropriate and just than imposing an arbitrary sum as a sanction. Therefore, the court will not grant American Linen any trial costs as a sanction for its violation of Rule 26.1
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs' motion for a new trial is DENIED (docket #311), and plaintiffs' motion for Rule 37 sanctions is GRANTED (docket #310). As a sanction, American Linen is hereby foreclosed from an award of trial costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this ___ day of January, 1998.
RODNEY S. WEBB, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
1. The court has considered plaintiffs' request for a new trial and sanctions based on the failure to disclose the still photographs from the defendants' testing in Texas and the same is denied. The court has also considered American Linen's request for permission to file a cross-motion for sanctions and the same is also denied. This has been a long case full of discovery disputes for which none of the parties can be proud. However, the court considers only the Test 21 violation worthy of comment and action.