________________________________ September 11, 1997 ________________________________ GSBCA 14147-RELO In the Matter of PAUL D. BERKOWITZ Paul D. Berkowitz, Grand Canyon, AZ, Claimant. C. Bruce Sheaffer, Comptroller, National Park Service, Department of the Interior, Washington, DC, appearing for Department of the Interior. DeGRAFF, Board Judge. Claimant who occupied housing within the Grand Canyon National Park is not entitled to be reimbursed for temporary quarters subsistence expenses. Quarters within the park that were suitable for housing on an indefinite basis were not temporary. Paul D. Berkowitz is an employee of the National Park Service, Department of the Interior (NPS). In June 1995, the NPS authorized Mr. Berkowitz to relocate from Herndon, Virginia, to Grand Canyon National Park, Arizona, in connection with a permanent change of station. The travel authorization issued by the NPS states that Mr. Berkowitz was authorized to incur necessary expenses in accordance with applicable laws and regulations, including expenses for temporary quarters [not to exceed] 30 days. The NPS later agreed to reimburse Mr. Berkowitz for a total of 120 days of temporary quarters subsistence expenses (TQSE). Before Mr. Berkowitz left for Arizona, the NPS told him that the Grand Canyon National Park was constructing additional park housing units and that he would be first on the list to receive one of those units, due to his seniority. When Mr. Berkowitz arrived at Grand Canyon National Park on July 24, 1995, he moved into dormitory style quarters at the Albright Training Center (the training center). The training center is located within the boundaries of the Grand Canyon National Park, and is administered by the Washington office of the NPS. Mr. Berkowitz occupied an apartment in the training center pursuant to a quarters assignment agreement that provided that the NPS would deduct rent from Mr. Berkowitz s paycheck for the quarters, and that the NPS would maintain the quarters. The agreement also provided that occupancy would end when Mr. Berkowitz s employment in the park ended, unless previously terminated at the option of either Mr. Berkowitz or the NPS. Although the NPS expected that a new housing unit would become available for Mr. Berkowitz in October 1995, construction of the additional park housing units was delayed. Mr. Berkowitz remained in the training center until April 1, 1996, when a housing unit became available. When Mr. Berkowitz submitted his claim for reimbursement for 120 days of TQSE, the NPS did not process the claim for payment. The NPS explains that the employee who prepared Mr. Berkowitz s travel authorization was not aware that the policy of the Grand Canyon National Park is not to authorize reimbursement of TQSE for employees who are waiting for park quarters. The NPS does not view the training center as temporary quarters, and so does not believe that Mr. Berkowitz should be reimbursed for temporary quarters subsistence expenses. In Charles J. Robinson, GSBCA 13693-RELO, 97-1 BCA  28,692, we considered a claim for TQSE nearly identical to this one. In our decision, we explained that the regulatory definition of temporary quarters includes lodging obtained from private or commercial sources for the purpose of temporary occupancy. 41 CFR 302-5.2(c) (1995). For Grand Canyon National Park employees, this would be either housing located a great distance from the park, or a hotel or motel within the park. We explained that park employees stay in some type of park housing until their tour of duty at the park is finished, and so it is not especially meaningful to speak of a permanent residence in park housing. We decided: In the absence of some compelling factor, such as the dwelling-space assignment being too small for a family, we consider that the Park Service properly viewed any of the park s quarters suitable for housing on an indefinite basis to be permanent for the purposes of the regulatory definition of temporary quarters. 97-1 BCA at 143,301-02. If the decision in Robinson applies to Mr. Berkowitz s claim for TQSE, we must deny the claim. Mr. Berkowitz says that his claim and Mr. Robinson s claim are dissimilar because he moved to Grand Canyon National Park pursuant to a change in duty station, while Mr. Robinson went to the park due to a transfer or change in position. Actually, both Mr. Robinson and Mr. Berkowitz made permanent changes of station to the park. Mr. Berkowitz also says that the training center is not Grand Canyon National Park housing, because it is administered by the NPS Washington office. This makes no difference in the resolution of Mr. Berkowitz s claim, because our decision in Robinson was not based upon who administered Mr. Robinson s housing. Mr. Berkowitz contends that his quarters in the training center were not suitable for housing on an indefinite basis, as were Mr. Robinson s quarters, because the training center staff regularly asked when he would be moving. Even though the training center staff asked Mr. Berkowitz when he would be leaving, this does not mean that the training center quarters were unsuitable for housing on an indefinite basis. In fact, Mr. Berkowitz stayed in those quarters indefinitely, until other quarters became available, and there is no indication that the quarters were unsuitable for Mr. Berkowitz. Mr. Berkowitz points out that the quarters assignment agreement states that the NPS assigned quarters to Mr. Berkowitz and then states (in handwriting) until permanent housing becomes available. Mr. Berkowitz also points to a memorandum that the NPS wrote in order to extend the time that the agency would pay for storage of Mr. Berkowitz s household goods; the memorandum called Mr. Berkowitz s training center quarters temporary. Neither the quarters assignment agreement nor the memorandum suggests that it was written with TQSE in mind, and so neither document establishes whether Mr. Berkowitz was entitled to be reimbursed for TQSE. We see no material distinction between Mr. Berkowitz s claim for TQSE and the claim for TQSE presented in Robinson. Mr. Berkowitz s training center quarters were suitable for housing on an indefinite basis and so were permanent for the purposes of the regulatory definition of temporary quarters. We agree with the agency s decision not to pay the claim. _______________________________ MARTHA H. DeGRAFF Board Judge