Evaluation of the Tucson Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression Program

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with

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Program and Evaluation Background

Introduction

In 1994, in accordance with Sections 281 and 282 of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Act of 1974, as amended, the U.S. Department of Justice developed a collaborative process to respond to America's gang problem (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1994). OJJDP wanted to implement a comprehensive approach of gang prevention, intervention, and suppression through local programs around the country. Five cities – Bloomington-Normal (McLean County), Illinois; San Antonio, Texas; Mesa, Arizona; Tucson, Arizona; and Riverside, California – were selected and awarded funds for periods of four or five years to develop and conduct a series of coordinated efforts to assess the nature and extent of the local gang problem, and to plan and implement comprehensive, community-wide programs.

The comprehensive initiative also provided funding for technical assistance, and for an evaluation of the development and impact of these programs. This report of the Tucson Project is the fifth of a series of evaluations of the five programs.

History

Youth gangs were in existence and had been troublesome for many decades in large cities, among them Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, New York City, Philadelphia, Detroit, San Antonio, and Cleveland (Miller, 2001). Youth gang violence, gang-related drug activities, and other forms of gang crime became increasingly prevalent in cities and towns of varying sizes,

and in rural areas as well. Violence was increasingly lethal in several of the larger cities, particularly in Los Angeles and Chicago in the late 1980s and throughout much of the 1990s. Drive-by shootings claimed the lives of rival gang members as well as those of innocent bystanders. Entrepreneurial gang members also became active in the distribution of illegal drugs. A range of other types of organized group crimes committed by youth was also prevalent.

A disturbing trend during the 1980s and 1990s was the emergence (or re-emergence) of the gang problem in large- , mid- , and small-sized cities, in suburban areas, small towns, rural areas and on Indian reservations, in almost all 50 states, Puerto Rico and the territories. However, the specific scope, nature and severity of the gang problem in those jurisdictions were not clearly determined. Successful approach(es) for addressing the problem were not evident, at least based on "hard" data.

In an early national survey of law-enforcement agencies, officials in 91% of the 79 largest U.S. cities reported the presence of youth gang problems (Curry, Fox, Ball and Stone, 1992). It conservatively estimated that during 1991 there were 4,881 gangs, with nearly 250,000 gang members. An estimated 780,200 gang members were active in 28,700 youth gangs in 1998. This was a decrease from 1997's figures of 816,000 gang members and 30,500 gangs (National Youth Gang Center, November, 2000). In 1996, 1997, and 1998, Curry, Maxson, and Howell examined gang homicide trends in 1,216 cities with populations greater than 25,000. A total of 237 cities reported both a gang problem and at least one gang-related homicide for each of these years. However, relatively few of the cities, excepting Los Angeles and Chicago, reported large numbers of gang homicides (Curry, Maxson and Howell, 2001).

The characteristics of the gang problem – including such terms as gang, gang member,

and gang incident – have not been clearly or consensually defined. A street gang or youth gang, for program and policy-development purposes, may be differentiated from adult crime gangs, prison gangs, motorcycle gangs, drug gangs, tagger groups, racist and terrorist groups, or even minor delinquent groups. Nevertheless, categories of gangs, crime organizations, threat or delinquent groups can be connected. What generally distinguishes the youth gang are group symbolism and cohesion, identification with turf, a commitment to violence and (increasingly) drug use and drug selling, and a range of both minor and serious delinquent activity.

Most active youth-gang members are between the ages of 12 and 20, sometimes younger or older. While gangs comprise mainly males, females increasingly are identified as gang members, often in separate cliques or groups. Female gang members tend to be less violent than males, less chronically delinquent, and less committed to the gang. Youth in the same gang may engage in variable patterns of delinquent behavior, and usually have different statuses in, and degrees of attachment to, the gang, which vary over time. Gang youth, as identified in police data, generally come from low-income, minority, disrupted or problem families from particular, often racially/ethnically-segregated neighborhoods. The definition of a gang, a gang member and a gang incident may vary from state to state, or city to city, and may depend on: 1) whether the youth has been identified as a member of a defined criminal gang, or associates with gang members and/or is on a police gang-membership or gang-associate list; or 2) gang-motivated incident criteria, i.e., the youth has been involved in an a delinquent or criminal event involving certain distinctive gang characteristics, such as drive-by shooting, intimidation, retaliation, use of symbols, signs, public disturbances and graffiti (Klein, 1995; Spergel, 1995). The definitions incorporated in state law often become a basis for increased law-enforcement activity and more

severe justice-system processing. The gang-membership definition generally results in identification of larger numbers of youth as gang members than does the gang-motivational definition (Maxson and Klein, 1990).

Some progress has been made in describing and explaining the gang problem. We know little about why gang problems arise and develop in some cities and not in other, apparently similar cities. Very little progress has been made in learning or demonstrating how to deal with the problem successfully. In recent decades, law enforcement has been the dominant agency attempting to control or resolve the problem, which nevertheless continues to develop and spread in sometimes cyclical, seemingly unpredictable ways. Increasingly, policy makers, program operators, and researchers have concluded that the youth-gang problem is highly complex, and that therefore a better-informed and coordinated effort is required from key community and public-agency groups to correctly identify and target problem gangs and gang youth, and then to develop an appropriately interrelated approach to successfully address the problem. It is possible that more systematically addressing the gang problem, and carefully researching program process and effect, will also provide improved knowledge about the nature and scope of the problem.

Preliminary Efforts

In 1987, OJJDP funded The Juvenile Gang Suppression and Intervention Program, a research and development initiative to investigate and describe conditions that perpetuate the youth-gang problem, and to develop a model for local community efforts to reduce it. Literature reviews, national surveys, site visits, conferences, reports, intervention and technical assistance models were produced (Spergel and Chance, 1992). The reports of that R & D program

concluded that the gang problem varied somewhat from community to community, but that it was a result of a combination of interactive factors: poverty, rapid population movement, racism, segregation and social isolation of minority groups, weak family structure, adolescent youth in crisis, the development of youth-gang subcultures, and, in particular, community disorganization, or fragmentation of levels and types of community efforts to address the problem (Spergel, 1995).

A model approach was developed based on the notion that local institutions had to better coordinate their efforts and target particular community sectors and unsatisfactory organizational arrangements, as well as particular gangs, gang members and youth highly at risk of gang involvement (Ibid, 1995). In 1994, OJJDP solicited applications for, and subsequently launched, the five-site demonstration and test of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program (the "Comprehensive Gang Program"). A comprehensive evaluation, training and technical-assistance effort, and the creation of a national advisory board were to be closely related to the set of demonstration programs (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1994).

Theory

The Comprehensive Gang Program Model derives from Community Social Disorganization theory and, to some extent, from theories such as Differential Association, Opportunity, Anomie, Social Control and Community Organization. The community-based program model builds on the ideas and research of Battin-Pearson, Thornberry, Hawkins and Krohn (1998), Bursik and Grasmick (1993), Cloward and Ohlin (1960), Cohen (1980), Curry and

Spergel (1988), Haynie (2001), Hirschi (1969), Klein (1971, 1995), Kobrin (1951), Kornhauser (1978), Markowitz, Bellair, Liska and Liu (2001), Merton (1957), Morenoff, Sampson and Raudenbush (2001), Sampson (1991), Sampson and Groves (1989), Sampson and Laub (1993), Shaw and McKay (1972), Spergel (1995), Sullivan and Miller (1999), Sutherland and Cressey (1978), Suttles (1968), Thrasher (1927), Veysey and Messner (1999) and Zatz (1987).

Gang-problem communities (or segments of communities) are viewed as comprising two overlapping types – chronic and emerging. The first is characterized by an established, marginalized population and a long-term, serious gang problem. The second is characterized by a recently-arrived, less-marginalized population and a less serious gang problem. Scope, duration, and severity of both adult and juvenile crime, including gang crime, tend to be greater in the chronic than in the emerging gang-crime communities or their segments. Turf-based gang violence and drug-crime markets, although not always closely related, seem to be more prevalent in chronic gang-problem communities; a range of minor offenses, less serious violence and increasing drug-crime activities seem to be more prevalent in emerging gang-problem communities. The nature of the gang problem and the response to it are also based on state, city or community perceptions of the problem and their level of concern, as well as on the nature of organizational and political interests in addressing the problem.

Organized crime and youth-gang crime are often better developed and interrelated – and integrated across local communities and the city – in chronic than in emerging gang-problem communities. Local conventional institutions may or may not be weaker in emerging gang-crime communities, but they are better integrated with conventional institutions of the city or the larger community. Fear and moral panic may lead to a special defense against and control of

newcomer, low-income, minority populations in emerging gang-crime communities (Cohen, 1980; Zatz, 1987). Levels of victimization due to violence are still lower in emerging gang-crime communities, but higher in chronic gang-crime communities.

Socialization of youth to the gang in the chronic gang-problem community is more likely to occur because of the presence of established criminal organizations, weak or conflicted policies of conventional agency systems, extensive alienation of low-income, minority populations and lack of social opportunities (Venkatesh, 1999). Youths' access to illegitimate opportunities and organized gangs may not be as well-developed in the emerging gang-problem community, where legitimate opportunities may be relatively more available, and pressures against illegitimate behaviors may be greater (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960).

Social-intervention and suppression strategies are poorly integrated in chronic gang-problem communities. The police pay more attention to serious gang crime, while social agencies and grassroots organizations are mainly interested in youth who are at risk and not necessarily those who are gang-involved or committing crimes. Suppression and intervention strategies are carried out in a manner unrelated to each other in local community contexts. In emerging and chronic gang-problem communities, social intervention and suppression strategies are somewhat better-integrated when targeted to youth committing less-serious gang offenses. In both chronic and emerging gang-problem communities, the schools, the justice system and social-service agencies often seem to overreact to or deny the presence of low-income, minority youth who are gang-member offenders.

In the chronic gang-problem community, particularly for those youth committed to the gang lifestyle, greater responsibility may be necessary at the city or county level for mobilizing

and changing local and area-wide entrenched institutions, coordinating strategies and efforts, and developing and extending resources to control and reduce serious gang problems. In the emerging gang-problem community, particularly for youth at risk and those less committed to the gang lifestyle, greater capacity may be available at the local neighborhood or community level for mobilizing and integrating less-well-developed local institutions, focusing on the coordination of prevention and social-intervention strategies addressed to less-serious gang problems. However, chronic and emerging gang-problem sectors of a community or region may overlap and interact, and therefore variable strategies, targets, and institutional arrangements may be required over time.

The Comprehensive Gang Program Model

The OJJDP Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program Model consists of three sets of interrelated components: *program elements*, *strategies*, and *implementation principles*, all directed to the nature and scope of the gang problem and related demographic, socioeconomic, organizational and other local community factors (Chart 1.1). Coordinated policies, programs, and worker efforts have to take place at individual-youth, organization, and community levels. Ideally, all components of the Model have to be present, and developed effectively in order for a substantial reduction of the gang problem to occur.

Program Elements

A series of program structures and processes are necessary to implement the Model,

which require a steering committee, lead-agency management, an interagency street team (including youth outreach workers), grassroots involvement, social services, criminal-justice participation, school participation, and employment and training.

The Steering Committee has to engage the leadership of the community – including the mayor's office, city council, police and probation departments, other public agencies, local schools and grassroots and community-based organizations – in a comprehensive effort consisting of gang-problem assessment and analysis, policy planning, strategy development, acquisition of resources, pilot-program implementation and refinement, and implementation of the Model. The adaptation of the Comprehensive Gang Program Model requires local government support, justice-agency (preferably police) leadership, criminal-justice-system coordination and modification of policy, as well as front-line collaborative involvement of community-based youth agencies, schools, businesses and employment sources, local grassroots groups (particularly churches and neighborhood groups), and even of former gang members themselves. The Steering Committee has to bring key community leaders together in a cohesive structure, with the encouragement and support of the mayor, city council or city administrator to guide the general development of the Gang Program and its approach, one which will both protect the community and target delinquent gang-involved and highly-at-risk youth for purposes of social development and suppression.

Lead-Agency Management. A lead agency has to be selected to develop, manage and coordinate the various elements of the Comprehensive Gang Program Model. Such an organization must have a background of work with gang-involved or highly at-risk gang youth, and a broad understanding of their needs and problems. It should have the capacity to mobilize

its own agency resources as well as those of other agencies and non-profit organizations to enlist grassroots support, and develop additional resources to sustain the Program. A police department (preferably), but possibly a public school system, community mental-health agency, probation department, or a special youth authority may be positioned to undertake leadership and/or responsibility for interorganizational and program development. Much depends on the lead agency's commitment to the approach – consisting of outreach and broad, well-balanced social services and community participation as well as suppression/social control targeted to highly at-risk and delinquent gang youth.

A special requirement is that the lead agency have not only sufficient management capability, but interest and experience in dealing with the gang problem, as well as an understanding of and genuine commitment to the comprehensive, community-wide gang-program approach. The normal bureaucratic impulse to acquire and use resources to meet established organizational interests and services-provision must be restrained. It is inappropriate for an agency or a consortium of agencies to "buy into the approach," and simply to "split the pie," so that they continue to do what has usually been done, only now with additional resources. The lead agency must be truly committed to a different institutional and community-participatory approach, which ensures that appropriate policy and practices are developed to truly implement the Model.

The Interagency Street Team should comprise direct-service personnel (especially police, probation, outreach youth workers and case managers, as well as school officials and community organizers) who will continually interact with each other in regard to ongoing assessment of youth and gang situations, service and activity planning and collaboration, and contacting gang-

involved and/or highly-at-risk youth and their families. The team and their agencies must address specific neighborhood contexts and situations that influence the behavior of targeted gang youth. The outreach or street team is the direct-service component of the Gang Program. Its members are in communication with local groups and neighborhood residents, and it operates during day-time as well as evening and late night hours, on weekends, and during crisis times.

The outreach youth worker has an especially important role to play. He may be a former influential gang member from the neighborhood, now with a conventional work record and fully identified with the norms and values of legitimate society, yet still sensitive to the current needs and problems of the local youth-gang sub-society and culture. He should be someone who is "streetwise" and able to relate comfortably to the targeted youth. His knowledge is essential to the assessment of the nature of youth-gang problem situations, and the facilitation of the outreach efforts of the rest of the staff. Qualified and trained outreach youth workers – in collaboration with other team members – can provide appropriate access to youth-gang members and their families, help define the gang problem, and serve as mediators between the gang, the family, and established local community and institutional sectors. While the use of outreach youth workers has inherent risks, the benefits to program outcome outweigh these risks.

Grassroots Involvement. Key parts of the community that must be involved in the Comprehensive Gang-Program approach are: 1) established agencies such as police, schools, key governmental organizations, and other local agencies concerned with the interests of the local and larger community; and 2) the grassroots community, comprising family, neighborhood groups, block clubs, political associations, citizen groups, churches, and other organizations whose members tend to live and interact more often with local citizens, including gang youth in

the area.

Established social and criminal-justice agencies often set key program policies (affecting the lives of the residents) which are primarily based on the values and interests of the middle-class community or the city at large, and often control access to opportunities for education and jobs. Grassroots organizations tend to focus on social support, social control, crisis intervention and socialization issues more directly related to the expressed needs of the local (usually lower-income) minority population. Neighborhood groups may also be weak, ephemeral, and in conflict with each other over limited resources.

Communication and interaction between the various parts of the community in respect to the gang problem are often characterized by ambivalence, avoidance or antagonism as certain problems or issues are denied, exaggerated, and become a source of conflict. A gang-problem community is usually characterized not only by a lack of resources, but also by a lack of sufficient interdependence and cooperation between certain established agencies and grassroots organizations. Grassroots elements must collaborate with each other (as well as with established agencies), participate in determining the direction of the program, and assist in the operation of the program street team.

Social Services. A variety of social-service activities have to be provided to gang-involved program youth and their families, including any younger siblings who may be at high risk of gang membership and delinquent behavior. Targeted program youth often require crisis intervention and referral, and/or direct help with school, employment, and drug-use problems, as well as with gang-related controls and personal-development issues. Social services should also be provided to targeted youth (and to some degree their families) who may need assistance with

housing, public aid, health care, family dysfunction and conflict-resolution, immigration, racism, and other problems which directly affect gang youth or may be conducive to their gang behavior.

The street team provides front-line, initial and often sustaining services to gang-involved and gang-at-risk youth, especially the difficult task of referring and sustaining gang youth in mental-health and specialized drug or treatment services, which may not be available or accessible to begin with. The outreach youth worker and other team members – police, probation, the school teacher or disciplinarian, the neighborhood organizer – as well as lead-agency staff are interactively responsible for social support and control services for gang youth. Each member of the team must share some responsibility for a complementary and/or similar approach to the youth's and community's gang problem.

Criminal-Justice-System Participation. Police (including gang detectives, community-police and youth-division, school-resource and narcotics officers), juvenile and adult probation, juvenile and adult parole, and prosecutors and judges must be knowledgeable about the specific scope and nature of gang-crime in the target area, and participate appropriately in the community's response to it. They must also be closely identified with the Comprehensive Gang Program. Police and probation especially need to be concerned with the valid social control and suppression of the targeted youth, mainly those who are delinquent and gang-involved. They must be careful not to target and label as gang members those youth who are not at high risk for gang involvement. Judicial authority, prosecution, detention and other justice-system elements must support the street team through graduated sanctions, in such a way as to facilitate the youth's social development and rehabilitation as well as to protect the community.

Police and probation administrators must encourage, if not require, the street-level

officers to collaborate with each other as well as with other members of the street team (including outreach youth workers, teachers and job-development personnel) in an integrated social-development and social-control approach. The police have a special responsibility to accurately assess the gang problem, and especially to refer youth for services, as well as to address the gang problem in as balanced and rational a way as possible (in terms of short- and long-term effects), especially recognizing the close connection between the gang problem, race/ethnic issues, family concerns, political pressures and conflicting community interests.

School Participation. Principals, teachers, and disciplinarians of regular public, parochial, and alternative (community, opportunity) schools are key components of the Comprehensive Gang Program Model. Schools, already overwhelmed with a range of educational, social and financial problems, are generally reluctant to deal with the gang problem other than by transferring, suspending, or expelling disruptive youth. The Steering Committee and Lead-Agency Administrator have to facilitate better understanding of the problem, and (especially) persuade and assist school personnel to modify their schools' "zero-tolerance" practices that can serve only to alienate and eliminate gang-involved and at-risk youth from a positive learning experience. The street team should participate in the life of the school, and assist school staff in addressing gang-related issues, thereby encouraging better development and use of educational opportunities by gang youth. Targeted youth need to be mainstreamed, to the extent possible, within the context of an enriched and controlled regular school environment, so that they will receive a fully appropriate education to prepare them for productive life course and career development.

The use of alternative schools may or may not be the best way to address the educational

and behavioral problems of gang youth. Special tutorial assistance and collaborative arrangements with social agencies and therapeutic programs may assist gang youth to remain in regular school, and to make better use of educational opportunities. If the youth is referred to an alternative school, a high-quality educational program (often with therapeutic and effective controls) must be provided, with a firm commitment by the school administrator to return the youth to a mainstream school as soon as possible. Outreach youth workers have a special responsibility not only to help program youth make the best use of available learning resources, but to advocate on his/her behalf, mediate conflicts with teachers, and assist school staff in better understanding the nature of gang pressures on program youth which arise from situations and crises both inside and outside the school. Outreach youth workers, police and probation officers may be able at times to control or neutralize some of these pressures.

Employment and Training. Obtaining a job is critical to the transition of youth from the gang to legitimate, productive and satisfying adult roles. Adolescent (particularly older-adolescent) gang youth regard a job as a sign of meaningful entry into the conventional adult world, and to the social status and economic rewards it brings. It is often a more acceptable and desirable opportunity than returning to school (and overcoming obstacles to school achievement). Getting and holding a full-time job is a significant step for the youth, one which indicates he no longer needs the gang, nor has the time and motivation to associate with gang members and participate in gang life. Success on the job may be a basis for returning to school. Jobs and work-skills training often provide a legitimate and satisfying basis for leaving the gang. Education and job development can be combined through creative arrangements between school, business and industry.

The youth worker and the job developer are key personnel responsible for motivating youth to participate in training programs and get jobs, and helping them sustain a job once employed. A major task of the job developer is contacting employers and training institutions to facilitate access to job and training opportunities for gang youth. Special arrangements may be required to open up jobs for youth who may at first be marginal workers. Special incentives (such as tax breaks) may be necessary to enable employers to hire gang youth. Neighborhood residents, former gang members, and the youth's family are sources of information about hiring opportunities, and can be a stimulus to gang members to seek employment. Steady girlfriends or wives also play an important part in urging gang youth to get a job, sustaining him on the job, and keeping him away from gang activity.

Steps in the Approach

The steps in the implementation of the Comprehensive Gang Program Model (Chart 1.2) are as follows:[1]

- The community leadership, including those in established agencies and grassroots groups, the mayor's office and political leaders, as well as business leaders and the media must acknowledge that a youth-gang problem exists.
- The Steering Committee, including criminal-justice and youth agencies, schools, and other major public, nonprofit, and faith-based organizations, together with grassroots groups, must: conduct an assessment of the nature and scope of the youth-gang problem in the identified target community where gang crime (particularly violence and often drug

[1] Adapted from OJJDP Gang-Free Schools and Communities Initiatives 2000.

selling) is most prevalent; develop and use appropriate definitions or descriptions of a delinquent/criminal gang, a gang member, or a youth who is at risk of gang membership; select which particular gangs are to be targeted; and identify the organizations available to address the gang problem in its various interrelated aspects. A special assessment team, including university researchers, should assist in this process. The researchers have responsibility for assessing program development and evaluating individual-youth and area outcomes of the program.

- Once the Steering Committee is established, a process is undertaken in which a set of goals and objectives is determined, with the assistance and involvement of the lead agency and community leaders at influential and grassroots levels. The goals and objectives must address the identified gang problem and its causal factors (based on the results of the assessment), and be refined over time as a better understanding of the gang problem and what organizations are doing about it emerges. Because of the lack of effective communication, congruence of operations, or meaningful interaction of key organizations and community agencies and groups, special meetings with resulting documentation describing organizational roles, responsibilities, and issues will be necessary.
- The key goals of the program must be the reduction of youth-gang crime in relation to the social-development of gang youth and those youth at high risk for gang involvement. This is to be accomplished by improving the capacity of the community groups and agencies to address the problem through the application of interrelated strategies of community mobilization, opportunities provision, social intervention, suppression, and

organizational change and development, targeted to the particular gang problem.

- The Steering Committee, the lead agency and community leaders (perhaps involving changing personnel and the addition of agencies and community groups) must interact with each other over time to produce and sustain relevant and increasingly effective programming, i.e., strategies, services, tactics and procedures consistent with the Comprehensive Gang Program Model, particularly its five "core strategies" (see below).
- The Steering Committee and community leaders, as indicated above, must develop an effective ongoing process that assesses the operation, outcome and impact of the program, preferably through systematic evaluation procedures. If program results are positive – i.e., gang crime is absolutely or relatively reduced – then sufficient resources must continue to be provided to sustain program activity and development, and especially to institutionalize its structure and assure long-term funding.
- The process of program development, intervention and attempting to cope with the youth-gang problem not only contributes to a determination of whether the Model has been appropriately applied, but to an ongoing assessment and understanding of the basic nature and changing scope of the problem.

Strategies

The Comprehensive Gang Program Model is multi-faceted, involving multi-layered, interacting strategies addressed to individual youth, family members, gang peers, agencies and the community. It is based on theory, research and practice which proposes that the gang problem is systemic, and is a response to rapid social change, lack of social-development

opportunities, poverty, institutional racism, existing criminal organizations and opportunities, and also to the fragmentation and inadequacy of approaches to the problem across multiple organizations. The five core Model strategies and their associated cultural elements are as follows:

Community Mobilization

- Key established organizations – police, probation, social agencies, schools, manpower agencies, community organizations (including local-agency and grassroots groups), as well as churches, block clubs, and political groups, along with local residents and even former gang members – must be involved and advise on problem definition, analyses, policies, planning, and program measures to be undertaken. These efforts should be developed and coordinated by the Steering Committee and the lead agency. This is not easy to consummate successfully, and requires judgement, selectivity, and the participation of the variety of organizations and community groups that should be involved within the framework and purposes of the Model.
- A Steering Committee made up of representatives of key established agencies and community organizations (including grassroots groups and faith-based organizations, as well as political and governmental leaders) is closely involved in the development of program policies and practices, across agencies and community groups, in support of the operation of the multi-disciplinary street team. Key established agencies will generally have to modify policies and practices to support the work of the street team and achieve the objectives of the Model. The lead agency takes special responsibility for aiding

agency administrators and community group leaders to cross organizational boundaries, and getting the Steering Committee to take collective ownership of the comprehensive-program initiative.

- The lead agency along with the Steering Committee initiates, develops, and maintains interagency communication and relationships across agencies and community groups. A special challenge is modifying established law-enforcement, school, and governmental policy to include the participation of faith-based and grassroots groups, as well as former youth-gang members, in the Steering-Committee process. Awareness of population change and sensitivity to the neighborhood and its culture, its varied organizational interests, the needs of gang youth, and the concerns and complaints of local residents, are essential issues for consideration in the operation of the Steering Committee, the street team, and the lead agency. The multi-disciplinary street team must participate in Steering-Committee discussions, and assist in a broad array of community and neighborhood gang-program-focused development efforts which may evolve from Steering-Committee considerations.

Again, it is essential that the lead agency genuinely "buy into" 'the Comprehensive Gang Program Model, and not use the presence or superficial development of the Steering Committee as a "cover" for obtaining additional resources to pursue its own particularistic organizational objectives.

Social Intervention

- The street team, especially the youth outreach-worker staff, must collaborate with social-

service agencies, youth agencies, grassroots groups, schools, and faith-based and other organizations in directly providing gang and highly at-risk youth with appropriate combinations of prevention, intervention and control services, depending on individual-youth and community needs. Gangs and their members are different, and change over time; differential diagnoses and treatment/intervention-planning must continually occur. All gang-involved youth should not necessarily be provided with the same pattern or dosages of social controls and services, or even with highly-coordinated services or worker contacts. Issues of labeling youth as "gang involved" or "highly at risk for gang involvement" should be carefully addressed.

- Street outreach services focus simultaneously on protecting community citizens (including gang youth) from gang crime, enforcing the law, serving the interests and needs of targeted youth and their families, and on assuring the linkage of youth to social services and the case-coordination of these services.
- Group activities are carefully developed so as not to cohere delinquent or gang youth to each other. Primary attention is on individualized youth needs, and the interests of gang-involved and highly-at-risk youth which, if met, contribute to their better transition and attachment to mainstream institutions of school, training and employment, and to association with non-gang peers.
- Sensitivity to the influence of gang norms and values, and street-team skill in the use of group, community and situational structures and processes are important, particularly at times of crisis when violent and serious criminal behavior is likely to occur and has to be prevented and controlled.

- A clear, mutually-understood and accepting relationship between the street team (including the youth outreach worker), the individual youth and the gang must be established so that the youth and the gang clearly understand the purpose of the program, the nature and scope of the team's operation and the interdependent roles of team members.
- Social intervention and social control should not be restricted to a 9 AM to 5 PM agency-based workday routine of making contact and assisting youth with social-development needs, school attendance, and meeting justice-system reporting requirements. Outreach (including social intervention) focuses on contacts with youth in the neighborhood, at home, and in hangouts during evenings, on weekends, and in crisis times, and continually and consistently persuading youth to assume their legitimate obligations to the neighborhood and the larger society.
- The staffing of the social-intervention component is not a simple matter. Outreach youth workers must be qualified by a high order of understanding of the local gang culture and community, social maturity, and the ability to establish appropriate relationships not only with gang youth on their turf but with criminal-justice and social-agency personnel. Often a combination of former gang influentials and trained or professional youth workers or social workers comprises the most appropriate staffing arrangement to conduct social-intervention activities.

Provision of Social Opportunities

- Access to opportunities, especially for further education, training, and jobs must be

provided to gang youth and those at high risk of gang involvement. Such access has to be structured, and supported through the collective policy and administrative efforts of the Steering Committee, the lead agency and other local community agencies, and the implementation activities of the street-level team.

- The members of the Steering Committee should be in a position to provide special and/or additional and sustained access to opportunity systems in their own agencies and across organizations, in order to better mainstream program youth into legitimate society. Appropriate arrangements have to be made to avoid segregating gang youth from mainstream society in the course of providing opportunities to them.
- The street team (especially the outreach youth workers and case managers) serves to mediate relationships and modify exclusionary policies and practices of agencies, so that targeted youth have access to and are carefully prepared to make use of educational and training programs and jobs. In this process, agency, school, and employment personnel must be willing and prepared to modify their practices, and to assist these vulnerable youth who have special needs and social limitations. Social-control and social-intervention tactics have to be carefully integrated in this process.
- The street team collaborates with local residents and families, as well as with grassroots groups, businesses, schools, and social-agency personnel in the provision of, and access to, opportunities for gang-involved and highly at-risk youth.
- The opportunity-needs of siblings, parents and peers of program youth are also addressed, to the extent possible, particularly as the fulfillment of those needs may assist in facilitating the transition of program youth to non-delinquent and non-gang roles.

- Of special importance is encouragement of the contributions of businesses, industry, government, and legislators in providing improved access to school, job, and training opportunities for lower-income and minority (including gang) youth, in part through not excluding those youth who may have criminal records. Opportunities should be provided, with appropriate social-control and social-support measures.

Suppression/Social Control

- The development of formal and informal procedures of social control in order to hold youth accountable for their behavior is integral to a comprehensive approach to gang youth. Highly-targeted sweeps and interdiction of gang youth about to engage in (or who have actually engaged in) criminal acts may be appropriate. However, labeling as gang members those youth who are not gang members, and simply targeting (or "profiling") minority youth for a whole range of minor and questionable offenses, are inappropriate. Social control must be based on an understanding of the gang youth's behavior and his context, the scope of agency responsibility, mutually-positive communications, respect for youth, some level of youth accountability, and law-enforcement discretion in use of suppression tactics, and must focus on youth who are involved, or may be involved, in serious delinquent behavior.
- Controls or suppression measures are broadly conceived, and range from arrest and warnings to behavior-modeling, advice, counseling, crisis-intervention and positive attention paid to youth interests and needs by members of the street team. Carefully structured arrangements may be required in which activities such as recreation, athletic

events, holiday and family celebrations, cultural and ethnic events, group meetings, or conflict-mediation sessions can be provided, involving police, probation, youth workers and the gang youth together in sharing mutual or communal experiences, obligations and benefits. At the same time, information-sharing by all team members about serious criminal acts by gang members is required so that offenders are accurately identified, lawfully arrested and prosecuted.

- Suppression involves the street team organizing neighbors to patrol neighborhoods, encouraging them to report criminal acts to the police, making sure that gang youth show up for probation or parole interviews and court appearances, as well as getting gang youth not to hang on the streets, not to incur neighborhood disapproval, and to help clean up litter and remove graffiti.
- Social control also requires the defense of gang youth from false accusation and prosecution, illegal harassment and/or brutal treatment by police officers, and defending or vouching for youth in court when they are falsely accused or brought in for violations of local laws (which themselves may prove to be illegal and/or unconstitutional). The street team, the lead-agency administrators, Steering-Committee members and community leaders must not only directly and indirectly contribute to the suppression of unlawful (especially serious) criminal behavior, but to the modification of criminal-justice-system policies and practices that unjustly target and criminalize and/or punish gang youth.
- Descriptions of the nature and scope of gang crime, especially gang incidents, must be carefully developed, and appropriate data collected, managed, and used. Accurate and

meaningful gang information should be routinely collected and shared among members of the street team and the Steering Committee – with due regard to issues of confidentiality – as a basis for ongoing diagnosis and assessment of the community gang problem and the development of effective policies and programs.

- Special commitments by police administrators to accept the Model, and special training sessions for gang specialists or team police to implement the Model correctly, may be required to assure that police and criminal-justice personnel participate in the Comprehensive Gang Program. The purpose of the Program is not simply to assist police or probation to acquire intelligence in order to make better arrests, but also to train the police to refer troublemakers and troubled gang youth to social and mental-health agencies, when appropriate.
- Suppression, along with social intervention, opportunities-provision and relevant organizational change, should be viewed as part of an interrelated and interdependent community-building process focused on reducing gang crime and safeguarding the community. The lead agency, the members of the street team and the Steering Committee share responsibility for carrying out the suppression or social-control functions critical for building a "good" community, one of benefit to gang-involved youth as well as to other citizens of the local and larger communities. Not all gang members are likely to be or to become delinquents and/or serious offenders. Most gang youth in gang-crime communities will normally grow out of their delinquent and/or criminal gang involvement.

Organizational Change and Development

- Organizational change and development underlie the strategies of the Comprehensive Gang Program Model. Local institutions must change, and local agency and community-group procedures must be developed both to reduce gang crime and to interactively meet the social and control needs of gang youth. Single-minded law enforcement or enhanced preventive and treatment services alone may be ineffective and even exacerbate the gang problem.
- Positive change in individual youth-gang-member behavior may occur naturally in due course, but can be hastened and facilitated through interdisciplinary and collaborative activities by the team of workers within a context of agency and local community support for the Model. The activities of street-team personnel, community groups and agencies may have to be modified to achieve a more generalist mission, e.g., the police take some responsibility (and the probation officer even greater responsibility) for social intervention, the outreach workers assist with suppression of serious crime and violence, and the community organizers encourage distrusting, fearful neighborhood residents to communicate with the police about gang-crime incidents, and collaborate with law enforcement on better ways to address the problem.
- Organizational policies, practices, and worker responsibilities have to become more community-oriented, even communal, taking into consideration the particular interests, needs, and cultural backgrounds of local residents, including those of the targeted gang youth themselves. Panicked and punitive responses to the gang problem by old-time members of the community, together with elitist, bureaucratic, non-community-oriented

agency approaches to gang youth, are counter-productive.

- Administrative arrangements, special training, and close supervision of staff must be established so that each type of worker knows and understands what the other street-level workers are doing in the community, in order to develop mutually respectful and effective collaborative roles.
- Appropriate measures must evolve for data sharing, interactive social intervention, suppression-planning and other implementation activities. Not all types of data about youth gang-member activities have to be shared, nor all types of team-member activity planned together; only those that significantly contribute to and impact the achievement of program objectives and goals.
- Data systems and case management are established so that contacts and services provided by all members of the street intervention team can be documented and monitored for effective targeting and ongoing assessment of youth, program planning, and measuring program service quality and effects. These data then become the basis for evaluating outcomes at individual, gang, program, agency, interagency, and community levels.

Program Implementation Principles

A special set of principles guides the practice of the various organizations, community groups, and staffs in the implementation of the Model strategies. These principles constitute the way to develop, successfully carry out, and ultimately sustain the Comprehensive Gang Program Model.

Targeting

It is critically important that the Steering Committee and lead agency select the right neighborhoods, gangs and youth in the community who account for the gang problem, and that they identify the organizations addressing (or which should be addressing) the problem. This includes identifying the most significant aspects of the gang problem, based on careful ongoing assessments of gang situations, the specific youth involved, and the locations and contexts of gang activities. There are many cultural and organizational myths which create obstacles to appropriate identification and assessment of the gang problem. Police may claim that the gang problem is pervasive throughout the whole city, when in fact gang incidents, gang hangouts, and where gang youth live tend to be concentrated only in certain parts of a community. Youth agencies may claim they are serving at-risk or gang-involved youth, when they are not. Schools committed to "zero tolerance" and rigid suspension policies for minority youth who may (or may not) be gang members can contribute to the development of the gang problem.

A careful assessment of the gang problem from a street-based as well as an agency-based perspective is necessary to determine which gangs and gang members are most involved in serious crime (including drug selling and violence), where and when the gang offenses are being committed, and what specific community situations and changed organizational policies and practices are critical to understanding and addressing the specifics of the problem. It is important not only to regard the gang problem as systemic, but to focus on the most serious aspects of the problem. Hardcore youth, including key gang leaders and influentials, are the critical focus of initial attention, in order to develop access to other gang members and, ultimately, focus on gang activity by at-risk youth.

Unfocused violence-prevention, general public-health approaches, non-targeted suppression, and reactive citizen demonstrations (such as neighborhood marches or protest meetings) may be useful for particular agency- or community-cathartic purposes, but may be of little value for problem-solving and positive community development in regard to the gang problem. Ceremonial meetings by interagency coalitions may also become devices to avoid dealing with the problem. Responses based strictly on political interests, narrow agency missions, political opportunism, professional turf considerations, ignorance of the details of the gang problem, and impulsive collective action are to be avoided.

Balance of Strategies

Once the specific problem(s), target area(s), target gang-youth, and involved institutions' or agencies' policies and practices are identified, a set of balanced strategies must be considered and operationalized. Dominance of particular strategies in regard to program development may be inappropriate. One type of program service and/or set of control activities will not be suitable for all circumstances or for all youth. There are varying community gang-problem situations. Different gang youth have different commitments to the gang life, and varying degrees of troublesome problems during the course of their careers. Targeting only hardcore gang youth for suppression, younger gang youth or wannabees for prevention services, and "creaming" selected youth for jobs are not consistent with the Model. A differential mix and dosage of multiple strategies is required for different circumstances and specific categories of program youth at different times.

An imbalanced strategy may result in a dominant suppression approach, which

contributes to excessive imprisonment of youth who could have been readily served in the community with a combination of treatment, opportunities-provision and graduated sanctions. An imbalanced strategy may serve to label at-risk (especially minority) youth as gang members and make them more subject to arrest for minor offenses (or even non-offenses). An approach which focuses only on recreation and group activities may increase gang cohesion, and the solidification of delinquent norms, and may not meet the longer-term socialization and community-integration needs of alienated gang youth.

An appropriate mix of agency and grassroots participation is extremely important. A basic goal of the Model – to improve community capacity to address youth-gang crime – cannot be achieved unless critically important organizational and community-based components are involved in the program's development. The Model is not served if established social or youth agencies or law-enforcement organizations participate only to carry out their traditional non-targeted approaches. On the other hand, if the program is primarily based on grassroots participation, adequate resources may not be available to organize, implement, sustain, or institutionalize the approach. Community-building and social integration relevant to the gang problem across different community sectors have to take place.

Intensity (Dosage) of Services/Contacts

Dosage refers to the duration, frequency and continuity of particular worker contacts, services and strategies carried out for different categories of youth. An optimum dosage may be necessary for a positive outcome. However, a balance of appropriate strategies, types of workers and worker contacts is also required. The nature of specific services and contacts may be more

important than the amount or intensity of services or contacts provided. Coordination among team workers in relation to particular types of youth may be more important than the specific range or intensity of services or strategies provided by each of them. Once the youth begins to make progress, it may be beneficial for him to disassociate himself from the program. The particular purpose and appropriate intensity of relationships of particular workers with different types of youth are important in predicting outcome for different categories of youth in the program.

Continuity of Services/Contacts

The same worker or the same combination of workers providing services and contacts for a substantial period of time may have more influence in determining positive outcome than different workers contacting particular youth for only short periods of time. Continuity of personalized, positive contact is important, particularly for gang delinquent youth who have special needs for social support and control, and for building trusting relationships with adults. Gang youth are often distrustful of adults and exploitive of relationships with them. They may view workers as undependable, rejecting, hostile, or easily manipulated. It takes a good deal of time for the worker(s) to develop a positive working (controlling and helping) relationship with certain gang youth. Service interruption and lack of continuity of contact may result in further alienation of the youth, and interfere with the program's plan for his or her rehabilitation. A return to, or intensification of, gang behaviors may result from the absence of (or undependable contacts with) a worker during periods of crisis, which the youth may not be able to manage on his own. An accessible and responsive worker whom the youth trusts and needs at such junctures

may be critically important.

Commitment

The Comprehensive Gang Program Model challenges existing agency policies and procedures and professional specialization norms. The development of new knowledge and skills may create extra work pressures and distress, at least in the transition period to newer approaches. Commitment on the part of key community leaders and program operators to the promise and the validity of the approach, however, may not come as quickly as it does to the operational street staff. Appropriate Steering-Committee, lead-agency-management and supervisory commitment have to be developed. Lead-agency administrators and supervisors and Steering-Committee members may not be fully aware of the challenges faced by street-team workers, of the special needs for support (and sometimes controls) in their outreach activities, or (particularly) of the problems and frustrations of outreach youth workers in carrying out their work on the streets. Steering-Committee members and program administrators must persevere in their collaborative interagency and program-support efforts. They must periodically renew their commitment to the Comprehensive Gang Program approach through special meetings and conferences.

Work with gang youth and gang problems is complex, difficult and frustrating. Gang youth are often undependable, elusive, and hostile in their relationships with adults and peers, and require a high level of effort, firmness and sensitivity by workers to a variety of factors. The team workers on the street have to develop multidimensional skills. Traditional agency, school, and other institutional staff may not be interested in, prepared for, or have sufficient resources to

work with troublesome gang youth. Street-team, lead-agency-administrator, Steering-Committee and associated-agency staff efforts together must be reinforcing, and combine to introduce an integrated world of real opportunity, social support, and constraints for gang youth.

In the final analysis, the commitment of political and community leaders to the value of the program should be based on solid evidence of the reduction of gang crime, along with governmental and political support to assure the continuing commitment of Steering-Committee members, program administrators and staff to the Comprehensive Community-Wide Gang Program Model.

Chart 1.1
Comprehensive Gang Program Model
Goal 1: Improve Community Capacity to Address Youth Gang Crime
Goal 2: Reduce Gang Crime



Chart 1.2
Comprehensive Gang Program: Process Model
Steps in the Application of the Approach



OJJDP Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression Program
(Adapted from Candice Kane)

Chapter 2

Evaluation Issues and Problems

We do not attempt to review the literature on gang (or gang violence) prevention, intervention, or suppression programs. A growing list of such reviews exists (Curry, 1995; Decker, 2003; Howell, 2000; Klein, 1995; Mihalec, Irwin, Elliott, Fagan and Hansen, 2001; Reed and Decker, 2002; Sivilli, Yim and Nugent, 1995; Spergel, 1995). Gang programs in earlier decades generally emphasized single-strategy approaches to gang prevention, social intervention, crisis intervention, community organization, street work, interagency coordination, or community organization. Evaluations of these programs suggested negative, indeterminate, or in a very few cases limited positive results (Howell, Egley and Gleason, 2000). Community-based gang programs were said to fail for a range of reasons: poor conceptualization, vague or conflicting objectives, weak implementation, organizational-goal displacement (particularly by police and youth agencies), interagency conflict, politicization, lack of sustained effort, insufficient resources, etc.

The evidence that a particular approach, or in some cases a combination of approaches, does or does not work, however, may be due not only to program design or implementation, but also to the failures of public policy and the limitations and weaknesses of evaluation research methodologies (Curry, 1995). Gang-program approaches assessed as successful may not necessarily be sustained, and those assessed as failures but consistent with community myth and traditional agency interests may continue to flourish. Evaluation research has probably had little or no impact on gang-program development, and has not contributed to the creation of alternate

or modified approaches to the gang problem. This may be due to the complexity of issues and operations of community-based gang programs, and to the difficulties of designing and implementing the necessary complex evaluations of such programs in the community.

Ideally, program-evaluation models require experimental or quasi-experimental designs and rigorous procedures, but these cannot easily be applied in the real world of gang-context, gang-program development, policy changes and difficult-to-observe program operations. Evaluation research is expected to be objective, and preferably independent of program operations. However, the complex, difficult and often politicized nature of community-based gang programming requires not only an objective but an interdependent and sustained relationship among evaluation and program personnel from program start (or even conception) to finish. This relationship characterizes the best of classic community-based gang program researches (Gold and Mattick, 1974; Klein, 1968, 1971; Miller, 1962), limited as they were by present-day methodological and statistical considerations.

Below, we discuss briefly the elements of gang research methodology which we believe are essential for effective evaluation of gang-programs, and which we have had to address in our present evaluation of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program.

Cooperation with Program Operators and Data Managers

Project directors and program operators are prone to distrust gang researchers, who may have insufficient knowledge of their program's operations, interests and constraints. Gang project or program directors are under conflicting pressures to accommodate program

development to the interests and needs of funders, community residents, steering committees or advisory boards, partner programs or agencies (including criminal-justice and social-service agencies), as well as the media, government officials, politicians, and the program youth themselves. This is particularly so in the case of a demonstration program which is not expected to last more than four or five years.

Program operators generally regard evaluators as a necessary evil (since they may affect the flow of funding for the program) and as costly in terms of time and effort which they believe should be directed instead to ongoing program or agency operations. Evaluations not only interfere with program operations, but overburden information systems (to the extent they exist). Program administrators can be skilled at avoiding, or partially complying with, evaluator requests for data; and even when pressured or compelled to comply, may provide incomplete or inadequate data for evaluation purposes. The gang-program administrator's interest and desire to comply with the evaluation-research's design and need for data are tempered by his agency's need to survive in a limited-resource environment.

Gang-program operators tend to be over-stressed by the complexity, frustration and unpredictability of community-based gang-program operations. They may be subjected to a pervasive sense of impending program failure. They tend not to know much about gangs or gang youth, or how or whether they can conduct a community-wide or street-based program that will provide clearly positive results. On the other hand, the evaluator also enters the chaotic, community gang-problem arena without sufficient understanding of complex inter-agency/community-group relationships and conflicts, and the diverse interests of the various influential actors associated with the program. These actors usually control various kinds of

program-process or outcome data essential to the achievement of research-evaluation objectives.

The evaluator therefore must expend considerable effort to understand local-agency, community and program contextual factors and establish a basis for positive relationships with those who control data sources. The commitments and procedures for access to evaluation data have to be negotiated and often renegotiated. The gang-program evaluator (and his associates) has to engage key program-related personnel as soon as possible, and regard them not only as providers of data but in fact as partners in the development of a successful evaluation. Reliable and valid data have to be obtained so that findings are objective and meaningful to key agency and community constituents, funders, program operators, and the research community.

Research Design

Good program evaluation ideally should be designed to assess program process, individual gang-member outcome, and the program's impact on the gang and the community, based on an explicit (hopefully well-developed) program model which is theoretically relevant and operationally practicable. The program evaluator's primary purpose is not to test a theory, but to test a program model which usually contains elements of several theories. Gang programs in the real world cannot be encompassed by one set of theories or policy interests. This is a particularly difficult challenge for social scientists, including criminologists, who are often more interested in testing particular theoretical propositions than describing the specific nature and determining the effects of a program model, especially a comprehensive program model.

Funders are often interested in testing policy, which is not usually clearly formulated and embodied in the projects they support. Program managers are concerned mainly with matters of

program development which contribute to their agency's value – economic, political and organizational. A consensus must be reached in the funder+program operator+evaluator relationship as to acceptable goals and specific objectives of the program to be tested. This process may drag on a long time, with consensus and satisfaction among those involved never fully achieved.

The purposes, program components, objectives and activities that reduce gang-delinquent behavior, especially violence, need to be specified and agreed upon by the program operator, key influentials and the evaluator: what key-agency services and worker contacts are to be provided, for which types of youth, how and for what purposes (i.e., what project activities are expected to produce what intended results). Research variables, i.e., independent, mediating, outcome, and control factors (e.g., youth demographics, gang-membership status and delinquency characteristics), must be articulated and related to the program model, as well as conditioned by the reality of program structure and operation. Ultimately, the main job of the evaluator is to know what the program components are, what they are intended to do, and what they in fact do. This process occurs through ongoing dialogue, mutual accommodation between the project operator and evaluator, and research observations. The evaluator+program-operator relationship determines what and how evaluation-design procedures for data collection and analysis are implemented and related to the program model. Obviously, some flexibility has to be built into the implementation of both the program and evaluation models. The researcher and program operator set initial ground rules, but still have to negotiate continually to accommodate the needs of both program and evaluation implementation in a complex, open-community and interagency context.

At the present time, community-based gang program evaluation research is not fully experimental research, in which all elements are (ideally) rigidly controlled. At best, it is quasi-experimental, with room for limited change in research design and modification of program practices.

Technical Assistance

An intermediary may be required to assure that informed and focused program development is initiated and sustained, while meeting the needs of the program operator and serving the interests of the funder and the evaluator. Ideally, the technical-assistance team is established to warrantee or monitor the investment of the sponsor or funder and guide program development, i.e., provide knowledge and expert assistance to the program operator. While the technical assistant mainly assists the program operator, he also helps the evaluator, the program operator and the funding agency work together on the application and testing of the program model.

The program and evaluation models have to be effectively articulated and sustained. Additions, gaps, failures, and changes in program operations have to be identified and accepted as early as possible, and accounted for. The evaluator and the technical assistant have a special responsibility, along with the funder, to monitor and control the integrity of the program model for research purposes. This complexity of relationships, which can handicap mutual understanding and effective implementation of the program model, is to a considerable extent avoided when the program operator and the evaluator are the same person, when the evaluator and the technical assistant are partners with the program operator in the development of the

program model, and/or when the funder or sponsor of the program is knowledgeable and strongly identified with the evaluator's conception of the program model and its implementation.

Start-Up Problems

Program-Youth Selection. An initial problem in the implementation of the Comprehensive Gang Program Model arises when youth selected are not representative of the expected program universe, i.e., they are not gang members or youth clearly at high risk for gang involvement. The problem may be compounded because the program operator and the evaluator often do not know what the characteristics of gang youth in the community truly are until a sufficient number of youth have actually entered the program. Procedures for who is eligible for, and admitted to, the program may not be adequately developed, accepted, or clearly communicated to program staff and/or referring agencies. Conflicting views may arise early as to who is or should be eligible for the program. Certain gang or highly at-risk youth may not be available or easily recruited, or even allowed into the program.

Sources of reliable information about target-youth characteristics (e.g., gang membership) may not be available at the start of the program. Police, probation, schools, or in-house-oriented youth workers may not know the identity and location of gangs, the specific character of their activities, and which youth identified or associated with the gang are at what level of risk. Gang-related information about youth referred to the program ideally should be obtained from multiple sources: official police records, established youth agencies, neighbors, local community groups, family members, peer groups, and former and (especially) present gang members themselves. Constraints of law, police practice, community attitudes, and level of program

interviewer/researcher skill may not make this a simple task.

The evaluator must know as soon as possible which youth are selected in terms of age, race/ethnicity, gender, justice-system background and gang-membership status, as well as why they are referred to the program, and by whom. We know from previous research that gender, age, race/ethnicity, and prior arrests of youth may be critical factors in determining eligibility for the program, and expected outcomes. Females are less likely than males to be serious or chronic delinquents, or gang members. Younger gang youth, 12 to 14 or 15 years of age, are more likely to show increasing levels of gang delinquency than older gang youth; gang members tend to be more seriously and chronically delinquent than associate gang members.

The research or theoretical interests of the evaluator may deter him from a close examination of who these youth are, and why they got into the program. He may be less interested in the types of youth who should be in the program (based on the program model) than in the specific characteristics of youth or gangs which may be more useful to his own ongoing research or theory development. He may focus too much on hardcore or at-risk youth, females rather than males, or the psychological or structural characteristics of gangs, and insufficiently on the nature and selection of youth consistent with the program model. The acquisition of simple, basic data (on age, gender, race/ethnicity, and – as soon and reliably as possible – gang-membership status and offense or arrest history) for youth who enter the program is essential for program-development and evaluation purposes. These data become the basis for comparison-youth sample selection, and the control variables in multivariate analyses of program outcome.

Gang-Membership Status and Prior Delinquency. Extensive research indicates there is a

very close relationship between gang membership and the youth's delinquent behavior, especially during the youth's active gang-membership phase. Obviously, the evaluator's task is to determine to what extent the youth is a gang member as well as a delinquent (and what types of delinquency he or she commits) in order to match criteria for selection into the program. Each of these two, complex factors must be considered as variables, yet they may not be known to program staff, and not necessarily clearly revealed even by gang youth themselves. A key proposition not recognized or accepted by many policy and program operators, or even by researchers, is that not all gang youth are or will become delinquent, and not all delinquents are or will be gang members. Certain non-delinquent and non-gang delinquent youth may respond worse to the program in terms of outcome than gang youth who may be less delinquent and less committed to the gang life. Most community-based gang programs probably deal with a varied sample of gang and non-gang, delinquent and non-delinquent youth.

Multiple sources of data from field observations, youth self-reports, police records, and program-worker reports may be required to determine eligibility of youth for the program, and may condition outcome. Consistency of findings about the nature and level of gang identification and delinquency provides validity as to how the youth is to be classified. Delinquency and gang-involvement scales may have to be developed. Different types of delinquency and different patterns of peer association should be identified and addressed prior to and over the course of the youth's involvement in the program. Gang youth may change their configurations or patterns of offending (from concentration on disorderly conduct or interpersonal violence to relatively more criminal-gain behavior, including drug selling), or may build legitimate careers.

Sampling. Typologies of gangs and gang youth abound (Klein, 1995; Spergel, 1995; Fagan, 1989; Spergel and Wa, 2003). The nature and purpose of the program and some assessment of the community's actual gang problem should determine the gang and/or pre-gang youth universe from which to select the program sample. Characteristics of the universe of gangs and youth at-risk and their location in a particular community may be based on police, other criminal-justice, school, youth-agency, and media information, and occasionally on community surveys. The youth referred to a gang program may or may not be representative of gang youth, or youth highly at risk for gang involvement known to the police or other agencies in the community.

In earlier decades, youth in community gang programs were selected based on field or street observations of, and work with, particular gangs and their membership. Based on these observations, youth in specific gangs were the primary targets of service, research and evaluation. Recently, program youth appear to be recruited more often from existing youth or social agencies, probation, school, and correctional caseloads. This may reflect the increased prevalence and dispersion of the youth-gang problem, or a lack of familiarity with the gang problem in its street context by established agency personnel and researchers.

Another essential task of the evaluator in quasi-experimental research is to select a comparison-group sample, i.e., non-served gang youth with characteristics similar or equivalent to program youth. However, as suggested earlier, both the program operator and evaluator may not clearly know *a priori*, up front, or even during the program period what the gang or delinquency characteristics of program youth are. A time lag usually exists between the selection of program and comparison youth. Finding, selecting and interviewing appropriate comparison

youth may not be easy. Police, probation, and youth agencies may have insufficient information about the characteristics of gang youth selected for the program, and even less information about appropriate comparison gang youth, where they are located and how they are to be contacted. Comparison gang youth often tend to be less delinquent or problematic than program youth. When a community-wide consortium establishes a gang program, it usually tries to focus on the most eligible gang youth, and sometimes gang members in the most gang-problematic neighborhood. Known gang youth arrested for very serious crimes and/or violence tend not to be eligible for community-based gang programs – they are usually confined.

Probably the best solution to the problem of obtaining or developing similar (let alone equivalent) samples in the open community (other than random selection which may be possible under certain conditions, not discussed here) is to use several types of comparison groups, if funding permits. Co-arrestee gang members from the same gangs are often similar; youth from other or the same-named gangs in an equivalent gang area in the same city may be sufficiently comparable. Individual program youth may be used as their own controls, matched for an earlier and equivalent age period when they were not served, i.e., using a growth-curve model for analysis purposes. This option assumes that community contexts, gang patterns, and police practices have been comparable during the pre-program and program periods, which may not be the case. Usually, there are insufficient numbers of non-served comparison youth available in the program or comparison areas for analysis purposes. Researchers may select a comparison group from a comparable city, but this may create special problems for analysis unless community-context factors are controlled. Appropriate measurement and multivariate analytic techniques can, within limits, compensate for not randomly selecting program and comparison youth from

the same community universe.

Sources of Data and Data-Collection Instruments

Multiple sources of data and multiple units or levels of analysis are essential in community gang-program research. Gang- and community-level gang incident or arrest data, as well as observations of field situations are important for interpreting and explaining individual-level findings, and their possible relationship to aggregate or field findings. Researcher-field-observation, police-arrest or individual-youth-interview data alone may not be a sufficient basis for evaluation of program impact. Interviews, field observations and police and agency-worker program records of individual youth together, as well as gang and community-level data, are required to measure program-effect patterns. The classic use of either field observations or area-level police data as a primary basis for determining program effects and theory development, unrelated to what the worker(s) do with particular youth, is not adequate for policy or program evaluation research (Decker, 2003; Klein, 1971; Miller, 1957; Short and Strodtbeck, 1965). Data-collection and analytic methods to determine the effects of gang programs on individual youth in relation to changes at the gang-as-a-unit and community levels are yet to be adequately developed.

Program-Process Data. Special worker-service or program-tracking devices have to be created to describe the key program activities or worker contacts provided to, and/or received by, program youth. Existing agency records (whether police, probation, or social-agency) may be insufficient for purposes of testing the program model. Evaluation of comprehensive gang programs must

develop commonly understood terms for use across different agencies, community groups and staffs. Unique worker agency-related roles and missions have to be taken into consideration. The problem of collecting data from workers or agency records is further compounded when information derived from multiple sources across multiple agencies has to be integrated.

Common definitions of program measures must be established, since services or contacts may have different meanings and purposes for different agencies and worker disciplines. The nature of collaboration or coordination among workers and agencies in the provision of services and controls has to be viewed as an important program variable. The changing patterns of coordination of different worker contacts may be an important measure of program development, with effect on program outcome. The variety of measures developed to obtain data on meaningful program effects also has to include types and dosages of services provided by the different workers.

Measurement. The need to integrate data sets, to control for differences in background between program and comparison youth, and the differences in program-exposure period – all create formidable measurement problems in community-based, gang-program research. Meaningful connections across variables have to be established. The use of factor-analytic procedures may not be sufficient. Key program-model concepts and propositions are critically important as a basis for selection of and combining variables or interaction terms, and interpretation of findings. Appropriate scales may be required to reduce ratio or interval data to ordinal or nominal-level data, especially when program and comparison-youth characteristics are highly disparate and sample size is small.

Special measures or indices have to be created to test program model effects. For example, a gang-involvement scale may have to be conceptualized and specific items introduced to measure change over time, not only in terms of the youth's original gang- or non-gang-membership status, but in terms of an associated or causal cluster of items such as rank in the gang, level of gang participation, time spent with gang friends, gang victimization, gang-membership status of parents or siblings, etc.

Analysis. Differences in findings of key characteristics of program and comparison youth have to be related to the specific effects of the program. Whether the program or parts of the program are successful or unsuccessful in predicting or accounting for differences for program youth compared to the non-served sample may best be determined through the use of multivariate analytic procedures such as General Linear Modeling and Logistical Regression. Such analyses may still be unconvincing unless other sources of data using both the same and different units of analysis (such as gang, agency, program-structure, and community-level arrest changes) are available to throw light on and connect the reasons for, or consequences of, the individual-level change findings. In other words, the analysis of program effects based on individual-level findings may not be sufficient to determine what the program accomplished or failed to accomplish unless there is some evidence of related effect at gang-as-a-unit and community levels.

The congruence of findings in the relationship of the same or similar variables using different sources of data (e.g., youth self-reports, police arrest data, field observations and agency progress reports) and different units of analysis (group, community-level), and their

possibly-reciprocal relationships, are the bases for making judgements about the value of the program. Furthermore, researcher quantitative observations and program-operator qualitative observations, as well as theory and prior research findings, provide reference points against which to measure the reliability and validity of the findings, and to aid in their interpretation. The limitations and degrees of rigor of the different program-related evaluation analyses have to be duly acknowledged.

The Evaluation Model

The Tucson program evaluation examined the nature of project implementation and the services and contacts provided to individual youth, based on the requirements of the Comprehensive Gang Program Model. It examined individual-youth outcome in relation to the nature and scope of services and contacts provided by different workers, and to a limited extent the impact of the program on gang and non-gang crime at the community level. Available qualitative and quantitative data from different sources were examined at different levels of analysis to determine the value of the program model as developed and tested in Tucson.

The Evaluation Model was based on a relationship of factors which condition and/or interact with and influence each other, beginning with context (including community social-disorganization factors) and ending with changes-in-crime factors at the individual-youth, gang, and community levels. Ideally, a variety of intermediate factors (such as organizational relationships, program structure, services and worker contacts provided, changes occurring in youth life-course/life-space behaviors and law-enforcement policies and practices) should have been identified, and the direction and strength of their influence analyzed (Chart 2.1).

I. Community Social-Disorganization Factors

Certain ecological, economic, social, and cultural conditions or changes created the community circumstances favorable to the development of the gang problem, which included groups of youth engaged in violence, drug selling and other criminal activities. The generating circumstances included: the rapid movement, expansion, and/or shift of population (particularly of low-income minority groups) into the program area, and the relative decline of a stable, middle-class, often non-minority population; the concentration of a large adolescent male minority population weakly integrated into basic socialization, educational and employment systems in the community; and the development of criminal structures as alternate opportunity systems.

II. Organizational and Interorganizational Factors

Local institutions were unable to accommodate the interests and needs of a population that required increased access to services, social and economic opportunities, and controls on youth who were in gangs and at high risk for gang membership. Key city, county, and local governmental and non-governmental interests and leadership were not able adequately to coalesce to address these problems, without the guidance, constraint and aid of public resources. Key mandated organizations and strategies had to be included in the development of a comprehensive program. To what extent and how they were included, and the nature of change, if any, in strategies and practices directed to the gang problem, had to be assessed. Organizational and interorganizational factors would determine the way the program evolved and developed.

III. Program-Implementation Structures

A steering committee had to be established, containing representatives of Model-mandated organizations including criminal-justice and social agencies, grassroots and community-based groups, business and religious groups, and with the support and leadership of local governmental officials to set and advise on policy for the program. A program structure was then to evolve from and/or be closely related to the steering committee, which would be responsible for implementing the program with its interrelated strategies of community mobilization, social intervention (including outreach youth services), provision of social opportunities, suppression/social control, and organizational change and development in the selected community. A key component of the program structure was to be an interagency, interdisciplinary street team to target youth, both gang-involved and those at high risk.

IV. Services and Worker Contacts

A street team of police, probation officers, outreach youth workers, case managers, and others was to target eligible youth referred to the program from court, police, schools, youth agencies, neighbors, and even fellow gang members. The team was to collaboratively provide a range of services, social opportunities, and controls for the targeted youth.

V. Changes in Youth Circumstances and Behaviors

The key objectives of the street team, within the framework of steering-committee and program leadership and direction, was to change the criminal behavior (particularly violence) of program youth to more pro-social behavior patterns, while protecting established community life

and property, especially by reducing the youth's gang involvement, facilitating his school achievement and conformity to school rules and responsibilities, and providing access to training and jobs. Increased resources and access to treatment services for the youth and his family, additional social and cultural opportunities, as well as appropriately targeted suppression services were to be provided interactively.

VI. Individual-Youth Outcome

Changes in the life space and life course of program youth due to program activities were expected to result in a reduction of criminal behavior, particularly violence and drug selling and drug use. The evidence of the success or failure of the program at the individual-youth level was to be a reduction, increase, or no-change in the youth's self-reported offenses and official arrests, compared to similar youth not exposed to the program.

VII. Law-Enforcement Policy and Practice

Effective participation by police and probation officers on the street team, and the involvement of criminal-justice administrators on the steering committee, were expected to contribute not only to greater understanding of target-community and family social problems, greater collaboration with social-agency functions, and better understanding of program-youth problems, but also to improved intelligence regarding the gang problem and better-targeted surveillance and control of program-youth behaviors. This was to lead to better prevention and suppression of the area gang problem, and relatively lower rates of arrests of program and area gang youth. The nature and extent of police-department leadership and staff involvement in the

program could be key determinants of the way the Model was adopted, and resulting change or non-change in the scope of the problem at individual, gang, and area levels.

VIII. Gang-as-a-Unit Crime Change

Program effects at the individual-youth level were expected to result in gang-level behavioral changes (such as gang size and the reduction of violence) depending on the degree to which program youth were representative of active gangs, the structure of the established gangs, and the extent to which program workers reached out to targeted gang youth and their gangs in the neighborhood.

IX. Target-Area Outcome Crime Change

Changes in target-area crime, particularly gang-related violent incidents, were contingent upon changes in (and/or control of) program-youth behavior, and especially related gang-as-a-unit behavior. It was expected that the program would directly and powerfully influence program youth behavior, but also (less directly and powerfully) contribute to change in gang-as-a-unit behavior. These changes were expected also to have an effect on the rates of gang and (possibly) non-gang crime generally in the area.

Implementing the Evaluation

The evaluations of the Comprehensive Gang Program Model across the five sites – Mesa, Tucson, Riverside, San Antonio, and Bloomington-Normal – were simultaneous, complex and interrelated (but not interdependent), requiring extensive collaboration among local project

personnel, local evaluators and technical-assistance and national-evaluation teams, within the general guidelines set by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and aided by the suggestions of a National Advisory Board. Major problems of research design, program modification and implementation, data collection, sample development, and analysis had to be addressed and resolved at the various stages of the evaluations. The National Evaluator, at the University of Chicago, was responsible for overall research design, instrument development, coordination of data collection and management within and across sites, interim and final analyses, and reports. The National Evaluator had no responsibility for program implementation at the particular sites, and limited direct responsibility for the selection of the program- and comparison-youth samples, but he did implement certain data-collection procedures. The Local Evaluator at each site was selected and funded by the local Project Director, under guidelines formulated by the National Evaluator and OJJDP.

Problems

Solutions to evaluation problems were dependent in large measure on the satisfactory resolution of program-development issues, e.g., getting the program off the ground, understanding the Model and how to implement it, and accepting required data-collection procedures at the local sites. Not all components of the Model were adopted or adequately implemented by the local site operators; not all procedures for local data collection were followed. Difficulties of data collection were not fully anticipated. Different program and evaluation problems were encountered at each site; some were fully resolved, some were not.

The problems of insufficient understanding and acceptance of the Model by the local sites

were largely handled by OJJDP management and technical-assistance staff, but also involved the National Evaluator. Much of the early problem of Model implementation and local-evaluation data collection surfaced around the issue of who was to be selected for the program. At first, some of the local Project Directors assumed that focus of the program was prevention and early intervention, i.e., targeting at-risk, usually younger youth who were not yet gang members, or those with less serious police records. Some of the key organizations at various sites assumed that the funds they received were to help them keep doing what each organization separately had been doing all along, not necessarily targeting gang youth or coordinating their efforts with other organizations. This misconception was substantially resolved over time.

None of the lead agencies had experience in developing a program combining social-service and suppression activities. The initial applications to OJJDP may not have clearly articulated the criteria for the selection of youth into the program. None of the agencies and only one of the Local Evaluators had the experience and sufficient know-how to reach gang delinquents on the streets. Grassroots organizations, neighborhood groups or former gang members with access to gangs or gang youth were generally not involved in program planning or implementation. The programs generally were based on referrals of gang youth on probation (mainly juvenile probation) who were not serious offenders. Schools often referred youth who were suspended or expelled, or who were regarded as troublesome, but not necessarily seriously gang-involved or at high risk for gang involvement. Relatively few youth were referred through the efforts of outreach youth workers or police.

Selecting Comparison Areas and Youth Samples

The selection and interviewing of comparison-youth samples would require extensive efforts, particularly by the Local Evaluators. A comparable gang-problem community, where the program was not established, had to be chosen. It was not always clear which areas contained comparable youth, and comparison samples could not be selected until substantial numbers of program youth were in the Project and their characteristics identified. At four of the five sites, another area of the same city was selected; at the fifth site, another similar city (or set of twin cities) was chosen. Each Local Evaluator had his or her own research interest, which sometimes was similar or complementary to the evaluation mission of the National Evaluator, sometimes not. There were changes of Local Evaluators at two of the sites. The local Project Director, while accountable for the selection and funding of the Local Evaluator, did not necessarily provide him with access to sources of data, sometimes not even data on youth in the lead-agency program or in other Project-related agencies.

Data Collection

A variety of continuing obstacles had to be overcome. The original plan for data collection included: individual-youth surveys of 100 program and 100 comparison youth to be administered by Local Evaluators at annual interview periods; detailed program-service records of contacts by workers with each youth, to be gathered every three months by the different program workers at each site; and complete police arrest and confinement histories for all program and comparison youth, to be collected by Local Evaluators with the aid of Project administrators. With the help of the National Evaluator, these expectations were met. The effort

to obtain official school records and misconduct histories for each program and comparison youth had to be aborted because of the unavailability of such records, and the lack of complete attendance or grade records. Gang-as-a-unit and area-level crime data on all gangs were generally obtained from gang-crime police and crime analysts in the program and comparison areas. Organization surveys were also collected by the National Evaluation staff directly from 20-25 administrators of key agencies and organizations addressing the gang problem in the program and comparison areas.

The data collected also included: on-site observations of program operations by Local and National Evaluation staff; periodic interviews of Project staff; minutes of Steering-Committee and cluster (multi-site, Project-staff) meetings; summaries of monthly telephone conferences with key program staff from each site; reviews of yearly funding applications, progress reports and records of special communications by each site with OJJDP; and, lastly, program-performance measures based on interviews with key local-agency and Steering-Committee personnel at the end of the 4- to 5-year program periods. Site visits by the National Evaluation staff were made two or three times per year. Periodic visits to the National Evaluation office in Chicago were also made periodically by some site Project Directors and Local Evaluators to provide information and resolve evaluation issues.

In many respects, data collection represented the most difficult and time-consuming part of the evaluation process, extending well into the data-organization, cleaning, and data-analysis phases. Problems of data reliability were sometimes not discovered until later in the program, often at the data-cleaning and analysis stages of the Evaluation. Missing and incorrect data were discovered belatedly and corrected at considerable expense of time and effort to Project staff and

Evaluators. These issues – resolved in due course – contributed to the delay in the production and delivery of final, highly reliable and valid Evaluation reports.

Chart 2.1

Evaluation Model
(Comparison-Area Components = I, II, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX)



Chapter 3

Program and Comparison Areas and the Gang Problem

In this chapter, we describe the demographic and socioeconomic contexts of the gang problem in the program and comparison areas. Our description of the gang problem is limited by the lack of detailed data on the problem within the boundaries of the program and comparison areas; we depend heavily on perceptions of informants – mainly the police.

The Program and Comparison Areas

Tucson, in Pima County, located in southern Arizona just north of the Mexican border, was the second largest city in the State, with a population of 405,390 in 1990. It had long been a city with a great diversity of racial and ethnic groups and cultures. While non-Hispanic whites were still the largest group (almost 61%, compared to 25% nationally), the city's minority, Hispanic population had increased to 35.7% by 2000, compared with about 13% nationally.[1] Tucson had a very high proportion of Hispanic population (mainly of Mexican origin), which was expected to increase in the years ahead.

Tucson's major industries in 2000 were educational, health, and social services (23.2%), retail trade (12.5%); arts, entertainment, accommodation, and food services (11.4%); and professional, scientific, management, administration, and waste-management services (10.8%). While the general breakdown of industry was similar to that of the United States as a whole, Tucson had significantly less of a manufacturing sector (8.6%) compared to the nation as a whole

[1] City of Tucson Planning Department, 2002. *Census 2000. The Basics*, p. 5.

(14.1%).[2]

In 1995, the Tucson Project originally included only the Las Vistas/Pueblo Gardens neighborhoods, but it expanded to include Western Hills and South Park in 1996 (the second year of Project operations). The comparison area, Elvira, was also expanded to include Desert Hills. Both areas were small, about 1½ square miles each, and both were located in the southern part of the city, somewhat distant from central-city commercial and cultural life.

Demographic and Socioeconomic Profiles of the Program and Comparison Areas

The youth gang problem was largely a function of the concentration of low-income, minority, often newly-arrived populations in the program and comparison areas. In the following, we summarize the generally similar demographic and socioeconomic characteristics (and changes over time) of the program and comparison areas, in contrast to the city as a whole, between 1980 and 1990 (Table 3.1 and 3.2).

Population. In contrast to the city of Tucson's overall population increase from 330,537 to 405,390 (22.6%) between 1980 and 1990, the program areas had a much smaller increase – from 11,293 to 11,743 (4.0%); and the comparison area population actually declined in the same period – from 8,749 to 8,217 (-5.2%) (U.S. Census). It is important to note that the absolute numbers in the program and comparison areas are relatively small, and are more statistically sensitive to population percentage increases and decreases.

[2] Ibid, p. 27.

Race/Ethnicity. In 1990, while the Hispanic population (mainly of Mexican origin) comprised 28.9% of the total population in Tucson as a whole, it comprised 60.6% of the population in the program area, and 73.4% in the comparison area. However, the Hispanic population had grown only 40.0% in Tucson, but increased by 12.0% in the program and comparison areas. The white (non-Hispanic) population had dropped in Tucson (-5.2%), but more in the program (-7.6%) and comparison (-14.6%) areas. The program and comparison areas continued to become increasingly Hispanic and decreasingly non-Hispanic white. The population of other racial/ethnic groups was small (less than 2%) in the city as well as in the program and comparison areas, except for the African-American population in the program area (16.4% – only slightly less than the non-Hispanic white population – 18.7%).

Age. While there was evidence of a similar aging of population in the city and the program and comparison areas, particularly for the 65-years-and-over sector, there were greater differences in percentages of the various youth populations. For example, the under-20-year-old group made up 32.4% of the city-wide population in 1990, while it comprised 41.5% of the population in the program area and 42.2% in the comparison area. This disproportionate youth population was the context for a potentially greater youth gang problem in the program and comparison areas, relative to the city as a whole.

Education. The level of educational attainment in 1980 and 1990 was much lower in the program and comparison areas than in Tucson as a whole. High school graduation rates for 25-year-olds and over in 1990 were 50.1% in the program area and 59.1% in the comparison area,

but much higher (78.6%) in the city. The city high school drop-out rate was 67% for Hispanic youth, and higher for gang youth in the program and comparison areas.

In one high school that served many of the youth from the program area, 51.0% of youth age 13 and 14 years were suspended freshman (First-Year OJJDP Funding Application, September, 1994). A good deal of tension existed at some of the high schools. Security personnel, police officers and mediation teams from some of the social agencies (including the Project's lead agency, Our Town) were used to quell conflicts between newcomer, Mexican-youth arrivals and established local Mexican-American youth groups, who were often gang members.

Local program-area police officers noted that jobs were no longer available for youth. Opportunities to join the military had largely disappeared for youth without high school degrees. "Poor kids, including gang youth, ended up in prison to obtain opportunities." The local police officers also claimed that the key problem was the lack of recreational facilities. The city had "withdrawn its interest in kids and became more interested in meeting the social and recreational needs of older folks" (Spergel Site Visit, December, 1995).

Income and Poverty. Between 1980 and 1990, median family income dropped from $22,753 to $22,022 (-3.2%) in the program area, and even more sharply in the comparison areas – from $35,721 to $28,548 (-20.0%). Average median family income increased slightly for the city as a whole – from $31,168 to $31,706 (1.7%) – between 1979 and 1993 (U.S. Census).

The percentage of families that fell below the poverty level grew from 10.2% to 14.4% in the city as a whole, but the rate of increase was greater in the program area – from 21.9% to

28.6% – and even greater in the comparison area – from 8.7% to 23.1%. The poverty rate in 1990 was twice as high in the program area, and almost as high in the comparison area, as in the city as a whole. The unemployment rate in 1990 was 16.6% in the program area and 10.6% in the comparison area, but only 8.3% in the city as a whole. Female-headed households comprised less than 20.0% in the city as a whole, but about 25% in the program and comparison areas. The growth in housing units was smaller in the program and comparison areas than in the city overall.

Our Town's first funding application noted that "Tucson was identified as a city with a chronic gang problem. Las Vistas and Pueblo Gardens [originally targeted] were considered by the Tucson Police Department to be among the worst sections of Tucson ..." (First Year OJJDP Funding Application, September, 1994). The increasing segregation of a minority Hispanic (mainly Mexican-origin population), high rates of unemployment, reduced family income, and increased poverty rates combined with a substantial level of female-headed households and the presence of a relatively large youth population could have provided the basis for social and economic disorganization and the development of a youth gang problem in the program and comparison areas in 1990.

Crime and the Gang Problem

The scope of the crime and gang problem in the program and comparison areas was not adequately determined because of the non-availability of specific gang-related police statistics, disaggregated on a particular neighborhood basis. Nevertheless, some crime statistics and estimates of the gang problem on a larger area basis were available. The 1993 reported crime-incident rate for the south side of Tucson, which included the program area, was much higher

than for the rest of the city, particularly in regard to homicides, other violent offenses, drive-bys, domestic violence, child abuse/neglect and drug offenses.

A Gang Unit Lieutenant and Sergeant reported that youth gangs existed in certain parts of the city for decades. Barrio feuds were present at least since the 1950s, but serious violence did not exist prior to the 1980s. The Gang Unit officers spoke of trying to separate hardcore from peripheral gang youth. Car clubs developed in the mid-1980s and caused a good deal of trouble, including shootings. Car club members cooperated with police; in fact, police supervised the car clubs for a while, and serious gang activities then subsided. The problem of gangs in its more serious form started up again with the arrival of the CRIPS and the Bloods in the mid-1980s. The most serious violence occurred in the early 1990s (Spergel, December, 1996 Site Visit Notes).

The second-year Tucson funding application noted that the city had "traditional barrio gangs which have been around for generations." An important difference between Tucson gangs and gangs in other urban areas was that Tucson gangs, at least for a period of time in the early 1980s and 1990s, were interracial. Many Hispanic street-gang members claimed Blood and CRIP gang affiliation because of their common residence in particular parts of the city. But this pattern declined as gang affiliation became based on race and ethnicity. "The Texas Brown Pride, Mexican Pride, Surenos (Spanish for Southerners) and Sur Trece (Spanish for South Thirteen) are being used to proclaim alliance with ... ethnicity. Most of the current gang conflict involved Hispanic youth who still claimed Blood affiliation rather than Brown Pride or Sureno affiliation" (Second-Year OJJDP Funding Application, June, 1996).

The scope and severity of the gang problem – in the city as a whole, but not in particular

neighborhoods – appeared to be somewhat determined. In the Mayor's 1995 annual state-of-the-city speech he declared that "Tucson has seen a frightening increase in crime – especially violent crimes." He reported that there were more than 100 homicides, and one of every five victims was under the age of 18 years (Ibid). However, police estimates were that not more than 12% to 15% of crime in the city was gang-related (Kane, Field Visit December, 1995). A Gang Unit officer noted that there had been an average of about 50 homicides a year in the city, with 80 in a recent peak year, and that 10 to 15 of those could be categorized as gang-related (Spergel Site Visit, December, 1996). Furthermore, it was not clear whether juvenile arrests (or adult arrests) and/or gang arrests were going up or down, based on data provided in Tucson's first-year funding application. Juvenile arrests citywide decreased from 395 in 1994-1995 to 386 in 1995-1996, and gang arrests decreased from 254 to 241 in the same period. However, an increase in assaults citywide was also reported during the first seven months of 1995, compared to the same period in 1994 (Second-Year OJJDP Funding Application, June, 1996). During 1993, Tucson had a monthly average of 20 crimes involving gang shootings or suspected gang shootings; they increased to a total of 232 during the first seven months of 1994. During the first quarter of 1996, about 48.0% of the juvenile court incident-referrals from Las Vistas were gang members or suspected gang youth. Forty-one percent (41.0%) of the drug incidents and 56.4% of the violent incidents were attributed to gang members.

While gangs and gang members were said to be mobile across neighborhoods, the Pima County Juvenile Court indicated that 220 out of 226 offenses were committed by youth residing in the target area in 1994-1995 (Second-Year OJJDP Funding Application, June, 1996). According to statistics of the Tucson Police Department, Gang Intelligence Team Mission

(GITM), there were 2 gang-related homicides in the program area and 4 aggravated assaults in 1995 (Ibid). One community-policing officer claimed that drive-bys were a near nightly occurrence, and that assaults were common, even if homicides were few. On the other hand, the same officer stated that junk cars were more of a concern to the community than gangs. He was also aware of crack houses, which the police were watching. Beat officers were trying to move gang members out of the neighborhood as part of the citywide Safe Streets initiative (Spergel Site Visit, December, 1996). Where they were supposed to be moved was not clear.

Characteristics of the Gangs

The characteristics of gang members were also not clearly specified. The program and comparison areas consisted mainly of subsets of three clusters of gangs – several still racially and ethnically mixed:

Bloods: Western Hills Posse, 36 Street (Tre 6), Vista and South Park Family

CRIPS: Manzanita Lynch Mob, North 4th Ave, PJs, 22nd Street Tiny Dukes, Westside Project CRIPS

Hispanic: Barrio Centro, Barrio Hollywood, Barrio Libre, Barrio Vista Carson (California), Hanover Gardens (Second-Year OJJDP Funding Application, June, 1996).

Police Gang Unit members (including 3 detectives and 6 officers serving mainly as investigators) believed that the average gang member was about 21 years old. Most gang members were local, except for African-American gangs. Las Vistas was considered the most gang-infested area; however, Elvira (the comparison area) may have contained the most-serious gang problem (Spergel Site Visit Notes, December, 1996).

Based on gang intelligence data, to what extent the gang problem citywide was a juvenile or young-adult problem was not clear. There were 1,685 gang members identified citywide (5.0% were reported to be in the Las Vistas area). Citywide, only 287 (17.0%) were reported to be 17 years and younger, the rest were estimated to be 18-20 years (39.4%) and 21-25 years (41.8%). The average age of gang members known to the police was said to be 21 years (Ibid). Only 99 gang members were identified in the program area and 70 in the comparison area; fewer were juvenile gang members in the program area (11.1%) and slightly more in the comparison area (21.4%).

The Hispanic gangs in the program and comparison area appeared to be more involved in intergang conflict with each other. There was relatively more drug selling by youth or among young adults in the African-American gangs than in the Hispanic gangs, although there may have been more connection between Hispanic prison gangs and Hispanic street gangs in regard to drug selling. Gangs did not appear to be highly structured. Leadership was not centralized, and gang members could have close friends in different gangs. When conflicts occurred, it was often through drivebys or ad hoc confrontations at bus stops, gas stations, shopping areas, and restaurants. On the other hand, the first Project Coordinator noted that youth didn't ordinarily hang out on the streets, but rather at each other's houses, at the park or the Boys or Girls Clubs (Monthly Conference Call, January, 1997).

It was apparent that a good deal of reliable and consistent information on the nature and scope of the gang problem was not available, either to the police or the Project. It was possible that the Tucson Police Department's requests for laptop computers may have been more to increase knowledge in the city about crime and gangs than to perform Project-related activities.

Our Town, the lead agency, seemed to have little familiarity or direct experience with the gang problem.

After an incomplete attempt at a community assessment of the gang problem, Our Town reported:

> "... Until recently, the largest problem most communities [in Tucson] faced was gang denial. Capturing statistical data for gang crime was inconsistent because basic definitions were not standardized. The Tucson Police Department Gang Interdiction Unit began tracking gang data in January 1990" (Second-Year OJJDP Funding Application, June, 1996).

Table 3.1
Selected Demographic Characteristics of the Program and Comparison Areas and the City of Tucson

Population	1980	1990	%[a]	1997[b]	1980-1997 %[c]	
Tucson	330,537	405,390	22.6	456,821	38.0	
Program Area	11,293	11,743	4.0			
Comparison Area	8,749	8,297	-5.2			

Race/Ethnicity (%)[d]	Tucson			Program Area			Comparison Area		
	1980	1990	%[a]	1980	1990	%[a]	1980	1990	%[a]
White	68.9	63.7	-5.2	26.3	18.7	-7.6	35.8	21.2	-14.6
Black	3.6	4.1	0.5	22.6	16.4	-6.2	1.0	1.4	0.4
American Indian	1.3	1.2	-0.1	2.0	1.9	-0.1	1.1	2.5	1.4
Asian/Pacific Is.	1.1	2.0	0.9	0.4	2.1	1.7	0.6	1.2	0.6
Other	0.2	0.1	-0.1	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.2
Hispanic Origin	24.9	28.9	4.0	48.6	60.6	12.0	61.4	73.4	12.0
Mexican (% of Hispanic)	90.6	90.6		93.8	95.2	1.4	95.9	96.5	0.6
Sex	1980	1990	%[a]	1980	1990	%[a]	1980	1990	%[a]
Females	51.7	51.3	-0.4	51.3	50.6	-0.7	51.5	50.2	-1.3
Males	48.3	48.7		48.7	49.4		48.5	49.8	
Sex Ratio (M/100 Females)	95.0	94.8		95.0	97.6		94.2	99.2	
Age (%)	1980	1990	%[a]	1980	1990	%[a]	1980	1990	%[a]
Under 10	13.7	14.4	0.7	23.0	21.2	-1.8	24.0	18.6	-5.4
10-14	6.9	6.3	-0.6	9.6	10.3	0.7	11.1	13.2	2.1
15-19	9.6	7.7	-1.9	10.0	9.8	-0.2	10.7	10.4	-0.3
20-24	12.7	10.3	-2.4	10.9	6.5	-4.4	7.0	6.3	-0.7
25-34	18.0	19.0	1.0	17.3	16.1	-1.2	16.5	17.4	0.9
35-64	27.6	29.7	2.1	23.3	28.4	5.1	26.3	28.4	2.1
65+	11.7	12.6	1.9	5.9	7.7	1.8	4.4	5.7	1.3

[a] Indicates the percentage change which occurred from 1980 to 1990.

[b] Indicates the population of Tucson in 1997, based on population projections by the City of Tucson Planning Department.

[c] Indicates the percentage change which occurred from 1980 to 1997.

[d] The category White does not include Hispanics (identified as Spanish Origin in the 1980 Census) who also identified themselves as Black, American Indian, Asian, and Other. The category Mexican is the percentage of those Hispanics who identified themselves as being of Mexican ancestry.

Table 3.2
Selected Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Program and Comparison Areas and of the City of Tucson

Education (% 25/25+ years)	Tucson			Program Area			Comparison Area		
	1980	1990	%[a]	1980	1990	%[a]	1980	1990	%[a]
Less than 9th Grade	14.9	9.4	-5.5	39.3	28.5	-0.8	42.5	18.1	-24.4
HS Graduate	72.7	78.6	5.9	50.4	50.1	-0.3	57.5	59.1	1.6
Some College	21.0	25.9	4.9	14.0	17.8	3.8	14.6	18.7	4.1
Bachelor's Degree[b]	19.2	12.7		5.2	2.3		2.0	2.6	0.6
Graduate/Professional Degree	---	8.0		---	1.5		---	1.9	
Income	1980	1990	%[a]	1980	1990	%[a]	1980	1990	%[a]
Median Family Income (79/89 in 1993 dollars)	31,168	31,706	1.7	22.753	22,022	-3.2	35,721	28,548	-20.0
Median Household Income (79/89 in 1993 dollars)	25,239	25,343	0.4	20,773	20,116	-3.2	34,628	26,903	-24.6
Female-Headed Households (%)	15.7	19.7	4.0	21.8	26.2	4.4	10.6	23.6	13.0
Families Below Poverty (%)	10.2	14.4	4.2	21.9	28.6	6.7	8.7	23.1	14.4
Employment	1980	1990	%[a]	1980	1990	%[a]	1980	1990	%[a]
Labor Force (# workers)	155,210	201,391	29.8	4,668	4,753	1.8	5,938	3,643	-38.6
Civilian	152,737	196,051	28.4	4,584	4,729	3.2	5,853	3,618	-38.2
Non-civilian	2,473	5,340	116.0	84	24	-71.4	85	25	-70.6
Unemployment (%)	6.5	8.3	-1.8	10.8	16.6	5.8	9.7	10.6	0.9
Residence (%)[c]	1975	1985	%[d]	1975	1985	%[d]	1975	1985	%[d]
Same House	43.5	41.5	-2.0	45.6	53.1	7.5	62.4	58.8	-3.6
Different House/Same County	22.5	27.9	5.4	21.6	28.3	6.7	24.8	25.0	0.2
Outside County, State, Etc.	34.0	30.6	-3.4	32.8	18.6	-14.2	12.8	16.2	3.4

[a] Indicates the percentage change which occurred from 1980 to 1990.

[b] Bachelor's Degree in the 1980 Census is defined as 4 or more years of college education; in th e1990 Census it refers only to those who received a bachelor's degree.

[c] Percentage of persons age 5 and over who reported in the 1980 and 1990 Censuses where they had lived 5 years earlier, i.e., in 1975 and 1985 (respectively).

[d] Indicates the percentage change which occurred from 1975 to 1985.

Table 3.2 continued
Selected Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Program and Comparison Areas and of the City of Tucson

Housing	1980	1990	%[a]	1980	1990	%[a]	1980	1990	%[a]
Number of Units	137,249	183,338	33.6	3,626	3,942	8.7	2,361	2,740	16.0
Total Occupied	125,266	162,685	29.9	3,381	3,507	3.7	2,304	2,450	6.3
Owner-Occupied (%)	47.9	42.0	-5.9	57.0	53.3	-3.7	2,304	2,450	6.3
Renter-Occupied (%)	39.5	48.4	8.2	32.4	41.7	9.3	15.9	35.3	19.4
Other (%)	12.6	9.6	-3.0	10.6	5.0	-5.6	2.5	4.0	1.5

Chapter 4

Development of the Project

A comprehensive community-wide approach to the youth gang problem did not develop in Tucson. Existing organizational, interorganizational, and community interests and structures prevented the adoption or appropriate adaptation of the OJJDP Model. The lead agency, Our Town Family Center (OTFC/Our Town), was primarily – almost exclusively – interested in the delivery of social services. The Tucson Police Department (TPD) preferred to become only peripherally involved in support of the program, and key community agencies and grassroots organizations were not substantively engaged in the development of the Project. The Project became an effort to meet the needs of program youth mainly within the framework of the existing Our Town services.

The context for many of the Project's problems was evident early on, at the time of a series of OJJDP orientation meetings conducted in Kansas City in June 1995, just prior to the development of the Tucson Project's structure, planning, and program operations. The Tucson agency representatives expressed a primary interest in "provider participation by community agencies and leaders on the development of a task force, a mission statement and a way to act in resolution of the gang problem." They discussed problems of information-sharing and definitions pertaining to the local gang problem, and also expressed concern about the fragmentation of agency relations and lack of knowledge about the gang problem. The issues and concerns raised were:

- There was no system of formal linkages or flow of information among agencies and

community groups, and even within organizations, in respect to the gang problem;

- State, county and city government and the schools had different definitions of the gang problem;
- No database existed on the nature and scope of the gang problem. There had been no systematic collection of gang data (particularly across agencies), no analysis of data on the overall problem, and no general sharing of information about the gang problem;
- There was a need for community mobilization, particularly in respect to developing interagency and community support for addressing the gang problem;
- Knowledge of which agencies and organizations were working with gang youth, a commitment to working with gang youth, and development of knowledge and consensus on ways to work with gang youth were specifically needed (Meeting Notes of National Evaluation Staff Meeting, Kansas City, June 6, 1995).

Most of these concerns and issues were never adequately addressed in the course of the four years of operation of the Tucson project.

Prior to the award of OJJDP funds, there appeared to be no history of mobilization specifically to address the gang problem. The TPD had earlier organized coalitions of agencies, schools, ministerial groups and community groups to assist in neighborhood reclamation, i.e., controlled suppression of crime. These efforts involved mainly activities by the police "to eliminate drug dealers" and enforce curfews. The efforts helped mainly to suppress gang activities (First-Year OJJDP Funding Application, September, 1994).

The TPD also had organized a community-policing effort in the Las Vistas/Pueblo

Gardens area – the original program area. It conducted a community cleanup and leadership-training activities, assisting community members to access resources and services, but there was apparently little coordination of such efforts across agencies. In 1995, a separate citywide coalition of agencies was formed, known as TASK 1 (Taking a Stand for Kids) – a consortium of many organizations with interests in violence and the gang problem in the program area as well as other parts of the city – which Our Town attempted to utilize as the Project's Steering Committee. There was talk of incorporating TASK 1 into the Mayor's Task Force on Youth Violence – an even broader consortium of organizations including justice-system agencies. Somehow a few of these agencies became associated with the Our Town Project.

TASK 1 submitted a proposal to the City of Tucson to fund a series of programs targeted to at-risk and gang-involved youth in an area larger than the target neighborhoods. The services to be provided included social and recreational activities, vocational training and job placement, enhanced educational opportunities, family counseling, and neighborhood improvement and beautification. The application was accepted, but funded at a reduced level. The agencies involved included La Frontera,[1] Our Town Family Center, the Boys and Girls Club and Youth Development. Each was to expand its ongoing services, but there was no provision for coordination of their efforts. These three organizations later became contract agencies under the OJJDP Gang Program Grant, with Our Town as the lead agency (Quarterly Report to OJJDP, June-September, 1995). Although the TPD, the Pima County District Attorney's Office, and the Probation and Parole Departments were associated with the TASK 1 structure and efforts, they did not become closely involved in their operations.

[1] A child and family-treatment agency.

However, the TASK 1 agencies took on a social-development mission of interest primarily to social-service agencies, which Our Town adopted for its own purposes ....

> "to develop and implement a comprehensive program for gang prevention, intervention, and suppression that will mobilize the multi-disciplinary leadership of the community. We will provide an environment that is safe and productive. We will encourage positive lifestyles and the growth of a healthy self-esteem. We will develop networks of resources. We will change lives by providing opportunities in education, employment, training, support services, safe housing and leadership development" (Second-Year OJJDP Funding Application, June, 1996).

After the OJJDP grant was awarded, problems quickly arose as to how to integrate the interests of the various agencies and consortia concerned with youth violence and youth development in Tucson. The relationship of TASK 1 to the Steering Committee was not clarified, nor was the leadership role of Our Town accepted by local neighborhood leaders. One of the leaders of the Las Vistas Neighborhood Association expressed frustration and raised questions about the head of Our Town, who was accused of having a history of starting and then abandoning projects in the program area.

At TASK 1 meetings in early 1996, questions were raised by representatives of various agencies as to what TASK 1's purpose was, and especially what its relationship to Our Town and the OJJDP Gang Project was to be. There was growing unease about the lack of full involvement by the TPD and other criminal-justice agencies. Was TASK 1 and/or the Gang Project to have

mainly a social-development focus? One member of TASK 1 stated "we are still waiting to hear from TPD how they will support the Project." A question was also raised as to how TASK 1 would relate to the Mayor's Task Force.

At a meeting of TASK 1 in February 1996, the chairperson announced his resignation, since his agency would be working on the Our Town Gang Program Grant, and he "did not want to have a conflict of interest." One member of Task 1 "agreed that we need to start separating from the grant ... we are not an appendage to the Our Town grant." Another TASK 1 agency representative "supported the idea that TASK 1 was originally supposed to be broader than a therapeutic community; there is nothing wrong with this, but TASK 1's focus needs to be broader and we need funding."

A transition team was organized that suggested TASK 1 break from Our Town to ensure its own identity. The split would enable TASK 1 to be independent of Our Town, allow for gang-program monies to be spread across all the agencies, provide money for a part-time coordinator, and allow for more organizational structure. "This split would be an amicable business arrangement. It was proposed and accepted that a transition committee be formed with the task of coordinating and reorganizing TASK 1 with the goal of becoming a more structured and formalized group with less dependence on Our Town Family Center ..." (TASK 1 March 20, 1996 Meeting Minutes, in Second-Year OJJDP Application, June, 1996).

At the same time, the Mayor's Task Force on Youth Violence – comprising criminal-justice and other agencies and community leaders – seemed to be taking a different, more suppression-oriented approach to the gang problem than either the TASK 1 or Our Town leadership. Minutes of Task Force meetings of February 6 and February 20, 1997 were included

in Our Town's Third-Year Funding Application, July, 1997. The Chief of the TPD was reported to be investigating the possibilities of adopting the Boston Gun Control Model as a basis for getting police officers and probation officers to partner together to address Tucson's youth homicide rate.

The Mayor's Task Force made reference to the use of "gang veteranos" (older, less-active gang members) in some of the gang-problem neighborhoods. They were reported to have considerable influence and "should be utilized to be positive leaders in their barrios. They could provide job counseling, basic work-place rules and etiquette training, and information on tattoo removal. In doing this the 'veteranos' would be helping their younger counterparts become productive members of society" (Ibid). Included in the Mayor's Task Force agenda were such issues as:

- Police/Probation-Officer Partnerships
- "Veteranos"
- Civilian Conservation Corps
- Alternative Education Sites
- Promoting Volunteerism on School Campuses

It appeared that there were three consortia of agencies, community groups, and schools meeting separately, with different purposes and agendas. Many of the same agencies were variably involved in the three consortia. TASK 1 was preparing to address the interests and needs for services of a wide assortment of youth, probably not simply gang or at-risk youth; Our Town was interested in providing its services to gang youth and youth at risk of gang

involvement; and the Mayor's Task Force was interested in addressing general issues of youth violence citywide.

Our Town Family Center Agency (OTFC/Our Town)

Our Town, founded in 1949 by volunteers whose task was to visit and assist probationers, was a social-service agency with a tradition of, and considerable influence in, the development of services citywide, as well as in the program area. It appeared to be continually expanding under strong and resourceful leadership. The staff had grown from 30 in 1990 to 180 in 1995. Our Town was engaged in the provision of a variety of services – in the program area and throughout the city – including family-crisis services, programs for runaways, suicide prevention, mental-health services, sheltered care, independent living arrangements, and services to female prostitutes, as well as general case-management services. They were interested in mediating problems in school settings around parent-child, teacher-teacher, and child-teacher conflicts, some of which included gang issues. Mediation-training was provided to various school personnel. Our Town's Director reported it had outreach workers in the neighborhoods, and was also engaged in community-organization services. The agency had close relationships with the nearby Boys and Girls Club, and referred clients for services to a variety of agencies, particularly to La Frontera, a family agency (Spergel Site Visit Notes, December, 1998).

Our Town had special interests in prevention and early-intervention programs, but little experience in dealing on a neighborhood basis with gang youth who were juvenile offenders. Only one of its staff, who was not involved in the OJJDP Gang Project, appeared to have some prior experience working with gang youth in the neighborhood. Motivation on the part of agency

leadership and staff to establish a special, broad-based interagency outreach program addressed to gang-involved youth was not clearly evident in this contact with the National Evaluators. Our Town was willing accept referrals of youth into its existing service arrangements. To what extent a relationship would be established with a variety of organizations – including grassroots organizations, employment agencies, schools, criminal-justice agencies (particularly police) – specifically in relation to the youth gang problem was uncertain, despite claims in the First-Year Funding Application (Ibid).

Our Town stated that the goal of its project was "to develop a comprehensive gang prevention, intervention and suppression program for two neighborhoods located in Tucson ... A coalition has formed to address the problem. The coalition involves a broad spectrum of members from probation, police and city and county, government, as well as private citizens. The coalition plans to utilize the juvenile justice model design referred to as a 'Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression' program" (First-Year OJJDP Funding Application, September, 1994).

In the remainder of this chapter we explore Our Town's development of the Project's structure (i.e., the creation of a coalition of agencies, particularly the Steering Committee, to guide the program) and its utilization of the justice system, particularly the integration of the Tucson Police Department into program operations.

Development of the Project Structure

Steering Committee

Our Town did not develop an adequately-functioning Steering Committee to guide the

Project in its development and activities during its four-year period of operations. Our Town leadership apparently did not clearly understand or accept the nature and purpose of the Steering Committee, especially the need for other agencies and community groups to identify with or become part of the Project. Our Town administrative staff may have conceived of the Steering Committee as a group of other agencies whose purpose was to assist Our Town in providing its services to targeted youth. The Steering Committee was regarded by Our Town staff as an arrangement of individuals and representatives of organizationas closely related to the interests of the program neighborhood.

> "Our goal is to the staff of the Advisory Committee with local decision makers from local government and organizations who have specific impact on the target neighborhood. These individuals will include residents of neighborhood associations, community activists, local businessmen and, moreover, individuals from the religious community and social service organizations who provide services to the target neighborhood" (Progress Report, January-March, 1997).

Our Town never accepted the idea of the Project as a collaborative, cross-agency project assisting at policy and administrative levels to develop and implement the OJJDP Model in Tucson. The Steering Committee, whether at the local neighborhood-organization or established-agency level, was primarily supposed to show up at meetings and lend support to the programs carried out by Our Town, with a few agencies serving as contractors in the provision of services. The notion of a community-wide coalition of agencies collaboratively addressing the community's gang problem was not developed.

During the four-year Project period, the Steering Committee functioned spasmodically, almost as a volunteer committee of Our Town to legitimize its OJJDP grant. The chairman and leader of the Steering Committee was also the original Project Director. He left the position with Our Town and the Project in the second year of Project operations to become principal of an alternative school. Still closely identified with the interests of Our Town, he apparently retained his chairmanship of the Steering Committee, which met only infrequently. The Agency Director of Our Town was present at the occasional Steering-Committee meetings only when OJJDP administrators attended.

There were occasional efforts to use the TASK 1 group or the Mayor's Task Force on Youth Violence as a kind of Steering Committee. In a progress report for the last quarter of 1996, Our Town vaguely reported "plans are underway to revitalize TASK 1 by incorporating it into the Mayor's Task Force on Youth Violence. An Advisory Committee for the OJJDP gang grant is being formed made up of persons associated with the target area" (Quarterly Report, Year Two, October 1-December 31, 1996). A few months later the National Technical Assistance Consultant commented on Our Town's efforts to build a Steering Committee, as follows:

> "This project has never had its own Steering Committee. At the outset, it was an offshoot of a group with a broader focus, then part of a new initiative started by the Mayor. [The former Project Director] and the [Agency Director] are now thinking the Project needs its own 'advisory' group. We indicated a strong committee task force which included local community representatives was key to effective community mobilization" (C. Kane Memo to I. Spergel, March 30,

1997). "[The former Project Director] is acknowledging the need for a Steering Committee to provide feedback to staff, and down the road to advocate for the Project (C. Kane Memo to I. Spergel, October 24, 1997).

In January 1998, Our Town staff called a meeting of representatives of agencies that had some involvement with the Project. OJJDP administrators, the National Technical Assistance Consultant, and the Local and National Evaluators, as well as Our Town staff attended. There was little expressed reaction to OJJDP's and the Technical Assistance Consultant's presentations about the purpose and nature of the federal initiative. There seemed to be a general lack of interest in the Project, and little expression of their desire to participate in either the Steering Committee or the program, other than on a limited and pro forma basis. In the few comments by persons present from the local agencies, there was little clarity about how to go about implementing the Project Model, and a good deal of "floating uncertainty or anxiety by the OTFC staff." At the end of the meeting, the National Evaluator commented that the group seemed to be potentially more of an advisory group to Our Town than an institutional board. The former Project Director, who chaired the meeting, half-heartedly agreed. (Report by I. Spergel of Steering Committee Meeting, January 9, 1998).

The Our Town Progress Report of the same meeting indicated a different view about results of the meeting. It stated:

"In January, Tucson held the first Steering Committee meeting. The discussion ... encouraged the group to examine what issues they may have to enable us to do our work more effectively" (Progress Report, January-March, 1998). It listed the Steering-Committee

members: Catalina High School, Principal; Tucson Police Department, Chief; Pima County Criminal Justice Court Center, Director; Outreach County Attorney's Office Liaison; La Frontera, Director of Substance Abuse Services; Boys and Girls Club, Associate Director; Tucson Urban League, Assistant Director; Esperanza Agency, Therapist; Utterbach Elementary School, Principal; Cavette Elementary School, Principal; Project Yes, Director; Quail Enterprises, Director [also the Local Our Town Project Evaluator]; State Corrections Department of Parole (Juvenile Division), Supervisor; Local Councilman's Office, Aide; principal of another local school.

Community Mobilization

Toward the end of the third year of Project operations, the OJJDP Program Manager invited Our Town's Agency Director to submit a proposal for fourth-year funding to implement the OJJDP Gang Program Model. One of the areas identified for Project-implementation effort was community mobilization.

> "A great deal of effort is required to further develop the Steering Committee and integrate local agencies and neighborhood groups into the development of the project. How much actual improvement and support by Steering Committee members other than demonstrated by Probation is unclear [Probation was primarily responsible for referring youth to the program.] A weakness in community mobilization has been lack of staff capacity and commitment in the community mobilization effort ..." (Letter from the OJJDP Program Manager to the Our Town Agency Director, July 17, 1998).

In its fourth-year funding application in August, 1998, Our Town stated its intention of "expanding the membership, commitment and role of the Steering Committee." In its appended Quarterly Report (April-June, 1998), Our Town indicated that "a plan for revitalizing the Steering Committee meetings will be devised. Those who have not attended will be contacted to give continued support to attend and participate in the meetings."

However, in their April 1999 field visit to the Project, a National Evaluation staff member and the National Technical Assistance Consultant also attended a Steering-Committee meeting on April 15, 1999, and made the following comments in their report:

> "The Friday morning Steering Committee meeting was not well attended. Police and Prosecutor's officers were late. No one came from Probation or the schools. There were representatives of Parole and service agencies [those with contracts to provide services to program youth]. Those who came seemed interested. We participated in discussions about expanding the membership, shifting ownership of the Project from Our Town to partner agencies, and how to build more support for the Project" (C. Kane Memo to I. Spergel, re: Tucson Site Visit, April 16, 1999).

The National Evaluation staff member noted that ... "little or no ownership of, or a personal accountability towards, the Steering Committee [was made]. On a few occasions, members made references such as 'your' meeting and 'your goals' (meaning Our Town Family Center's)" (L. Ollendorff, Report of Tucson Site Visit, April 15-16, 1999).

In its fifth-year funding application (not granted), Our Town stated:

"A Steering Committee has increased its commitment during Year Four, moving from quarterly to monthly meetings beginning in February 1999 ... The Committee works to secure ongoing funding for the Project for Year 6 and beyond ... The Steering Committee will expand its role to take on more of the problem-solving and decision-making related to day-to-day activities of the Project.

... Attendance at the meetings has been down for the last year and some of the members have little or no input into the Project. [Also] agencies currently represented on the Committee need to be ... someone that can be consistent .. To date, the Steering Committee has done very little policy setting, problem solving, or future planning" (Fifth-Year OJJDP Funding Application, July, 1999).

Neighborhood Organization. In its original funding application, Our Town stated it would develop a coalition of social-service agencies, schools, justice-system agencies and grassroots organizations, as well as a survey of "residents of the neighborhood and involve them immediately in the Project to insure that the Project meets their particular needs" (First-Year OJJDP Funding Application, September, 1994).

Our Town did establish a Drop-In Center in its first year of program operations (i.e., the second funded Project year). It rented a house belonging to a local community activist who had recently retired. The house had been used by an older African-American lady as a small center to provide limited services, and young neighborhood children had been involved in recreation activities there (Quarterly Report, January-March, 1997). Its purpose would be to "provide youth and residents a local, safe, and accessible place to meet with Project staff to address their needs.

The center will be used primarily by youth enrolled in the program and secondarily by neighborhood residents" (Report #2, October-December 1996, in Second-Year OJJDP Funding Application, June, 1996). The facility was to become an outpost office for Project youth workers and case workers. In actuality, however, it was little used by neighborhood residents or program youth.

> "The grassroots neighborhood organization in the program area did not appear to be actively involved in the program and with community mobilization ... the target neighborhood comprised of four individual neighborhoods poses a special problem in dealing with issues of community mobilization. In the past two of the smaller neighborhoods have stagnated because of local activists holding personal grudges. By using surveys and selecting a broad number of individuals it is hoped to avoid the frustration that cloud progress and excludes participation for many residents" (Fourth-Year OJJDP Funding Application, August, 1998).

The Project neighborhood-organization worker did undertake a survey of 65 local residents and organizations, which served more to inquire about delinquency and gang conditions in the area than as a prelude to involving local organizations in the work of the Project. The neighborhood-organization worker continued to attend local neighborhood-association meetings. It was not clear how the survey and attendance at neighborhood-organization meetings was related to Project purposes and efforts (Fourth-Year Quarterly Progress Report, October-December, 1998).

Among his criticisms of the Our Town program, the OJJDP Program Manager noted that "an adequate level of grassroots involvement in the development of the program had not been demonstrated" (Letter from Program Manager to Our Town Agency Director, July 17, 1998). Our Town's application for fifth-year funding further noted that "community members have not been involved in the Steering Committee" and "there has not been a large amount of feedback from the community to the Project" (Fifth-Year OJJDP Funding Application, July, 1999).

In sum, although the Our Town Project had letters of support from a variety of organizations in order to file various applications for OJJDP funding, attempts at forming an effective Steering Committee did not succeed. The Steering Committee was hardly more than an intermittent, visiting advisory committee. The Committee met irregularly, with changing membership participation; at one period it did not meet for nearly a year. Our Town Administration used the quasi-existence of the Steering Committee to show that they had some interest in broader community-agency support, but, nevertheless, they would strictly control allocation of OJJDP funds and the development of the Project.

Tucson Police Department Collaboration

In his July, 1998 letter to the Our Town Agency Director, the OJJDP Program Manager also indicated that the second of his major concerns with the Project was law enforcement. Another major structural problem was the limited (and probably the absence of) major interest, cooperation and collaboration on the part of the Tucson Police Department (TPD). This affected the development of the Project. The reasons for the TPD's not fully supporting the Project were unclear. There may have been lack of priority for the gang problem in Tucson (relative to other

law-enforcement concerns) and a lack of law-enforcement resources, combined with insufficient knowledge about the scope and severity of the gang problem and what to do about it.

The TPD Chief provided letters of support for the Our Town Project's first application for OJJDP funding. He stated that he (as did the Pima County District Attorney) supported Our Town's application, which "will address gang prevention and family intervention" (First-Year OJJDP Funding Application, September, 1994). The TPD also indicated its interest in participating in the "TASK 1 meetings and appropriate subcommittees" (Letter of Support for Second-Year OJJDP Funding Application, June, 1996). In the TPD's letter of support for Our Town's fourth-year funding application, it stated it "will continue to be active in its participation in TASK 1 meetings and subcommittees as appropriate .. We are supporting Our Town Family Center and its efforts in the gang project" (Fourth-Year OJJDP Funding Application, August, 1998).

The Police Gang Unit was interested in better information about gang problems, but its main task was suppression. It was especially interested in assessment issues and strengthening its data-gathering capacity, and particularly in improving its computer technology systems. The TPD also believed that "an integrated approach of enforcement, prevention and education was important" (Second-Year OJJDP Funding Application, June, 1996).

In 1996, the original Our Town Project Director was asked by the Police Chief to sit on the TPD's Steering Committee, and to look at police information technologies in particular (Progress Report, January-March 1997). In the following Quarterly Progress Report, Our Town noted that they "purchased 10 laptops for TPD to enable ...the detectives of the gang unit to be able to access their ... database while on the streets" (Progress Report, April-June, 1997).

Nevertheless, the level of involvement of police personnel in the Project's operations was of key concern to the OJJDP Program Manager. He traveled to Tucson in May, 1998 to discuss the "level of involvement of the [TPD's] gang unit officer assigned to the Project team ... the detective's role has been limited to infrequent contact with only a few of the youth targeted ... contacts are not very substantive ... due to the detective's work schedule (weekdays 9 am – 5 pm) ... his primary assignment was to investigate gang crimes [generally] occurring in the target area" (C. Kane Memo to I. Spergel, Site Visit, June 5, 1998).

The TPD's Assistant Chief responded positively to the Program Manager's visit, and noted that a tactical officer might be a "better fit" with the Project than a gang intelligence officer. The Assistant Chief observed that the Department's tactical team did not exist when the Project began, and that the TPD was short-staffed at the present time, but a change might take place. Following the site visit, the OJJDP Program Manager and Technical Assistance Consultant stopped by to see the Pima County District Attorney, who at first misunderstood the purpose of the visit; he thought it was an offer of funds (Ibid). Following the visit "a tactical officer was assigned to the Project ... Project senior staff were invited to participate in weekly TPD intelligence meetings and [police] officers assigned to the Project could attend Project case staffings" (Fourth-Year OJJDP Funding Application, August, 1998).

Project Crisis and Termination

A crisis occurred in relation of the TPD's collaboration with the Evaluation of the Project. It became evident that the TPD would not or could not provide aggregate-level incident data (gang and/or non-gang) for the program and comparison areas during the pre-program

period because of the high costs involved (Letter of Local Evaluator to the TPD Assistant Chief, April 2, 1999). The provision of such data had been agreed to by Our Town and the TPD in the original negotiations for award of funding for the Project. At about the same time, the National Evaluation staff member also noted that ...

> "Tucson officers in the city and county" seem to be increasingly suppression-oriented towards gang members and criminals in the community. Over the past year, the Tucson Police Department has increased the use of police sweeps throughout the city. Furthermore, ... Pima County District Attorney's Office has advocated the implementation of the ... 'Criminal Eviction Assistance Program' which allows landlords to give renters a 'notice of immediate eviction' within a 24-hour period. Activities that lead to eviction can include gang activities and any other crime activity that disturbs the neighborhood" (L. Ollendorff, Tucson Site Visit, April 15-16, 1999).

In support of Our Town's application for fifth-year OJJDP funding, the TPD said it "would not support the gang program if the two funded positions at the TPD (Tactical Officer and Crime Analyst) weren't fully funded by the Project" (C. Kane Memo to I. Spergel, July 2, 1999). Earlier (June 28, 1999), the new Chief of Police had indicated in a letter to the Our Town Agency Director:

> "... After careful consideration, I regret to advise you that the Police Department will not be in a position to provide any direct support for this grant in the coming year. While I am appreciative of your ongoing efforts, staffing and

fiscal concerns preclude our continuing involvement.

We nevertheless, look forward to continuing our effective working relationships with Our Town in other programs that serve the community. Thank you for considering us for involvement in this grant effort ..."

The Agency Director of Our Town made a last ditch effort to save the Project. She met with the Mayor after the TPD Chief sent a letter saying he could not support the Project in terms of the fifth-year grant application. The Mayor made a call to the Chief and then called the Agency Director, saying basically the matter was out of his hands. There was nothing he could do... (OJJDP Program Manager's E-Mail to Technical Assistance and National Evaluation Staff, July 15, 1999).

Some progress had been made in implementing a service program, but existing Our Town Project operations had not been sufficiently changed to accommodate the essential structure and purpose of the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Program Model. Adequate collaboration with the TPD had not developed. The Steering Committee minutes of the Spring, 1999 meeting stated that "the most significant change [of the Project structure in relation to the Model] has been TPD inviting OTFC to participate in weekly Gang Task Force Meetings where youth enrolled in the program are discussed" (Steering Committee Meeting Minutes, April 16, 1999).

In a memo to the OJJDP Project Manager in regard to Tucson's application for fifth-year funding, the National Evaluation Director noted:

"The application reveals a serious lack of cooperation from the Tucson Police Department; inability by Our Town to develop effective community

mobilization .. the Project has been mainly an extension of the social service program of Our Town ... Based on a conversation with [the Our Town Agency Director] .. July 12, 1999 ... I believe Our Town has no serious expectation of an OJJDP award for fifth-year funding ... The Director of the Project was budgeted for 10% of time for the proposed fifth year, and only 25% in prior years ... How adequate can the program be developed when the Agency Director meets once a week with the Project Program Coordinator?..." (I. Spergel Memo to OJJDP Program Manager, July, 1999).

The Deputy Administrator of OJJDP wrote to the Agency Director of Our Town Family Center on August 5, 1999, saying that they would not approve its fifth-year application for funding to continue the Project.

"It is with regret that I must inform you that OJJDP will decline the option to provide extended support to the Tucson Gang Project (Las Vistas/Pueblo Gardens).

The primary reason for this decision is due to the Tucson Police Department's (TPD's) decision to discontinue its gang suppression support for the Project due to 'staffing and fiscal concerns' as cited in [Tucson Police Chief's] letter to you of June 28, 1999 ... Without support of the TPD, Tucson will be unable to implement this model or sustain the program."

Chapter 5

Organizations' Perceptions of Crime and Program Performance Assessments

We attempted to measure changes in perceptions of gang and non-gang crime among representatives of Project-related organizations, and changes in their own organizations' program strategies, between the first and third year of Project operations. These changes could possibly indicate the nature and extent to which the Model strategies were adapted by the key organizations who were participating in and/or affecting the development of the Project. We also assessed the extent to which Model structural elements, strategies, and principles-of-practice were achieved, based on the views of those community and agency leaders closest to the program at the end of the Project period, and also on the observations of local Tucson Project-related personnel and the National Evaluators. In this report, we provide findings comparatively across the five demonstration sites, with focus on the Tucson Project. Based on these findings, we saw no evidence of a positive effect on program-youth and area gang-related criminal behaviors.

Organization Survey (Rolando V. Sosa)

The purpose of the survey of the Project-related organizations was to discover whether and how the executives' or administrators' (and sometimes supervisors') perceptions of gang and non-gang crime – and their own programs' strategies about the gang problem in their areas – changed between the first and third years of the Project period. Representatives of key organizations were interviewed at each of the five national Project-demonstration sites. Surveys

were conducted in the first and third years of the Project, i.e., the latter part of 1996 and early months of 1997, and again in the latter part of 1998 and the early months of 1999. The Project Lead-Agency Administrator at each site provided a list of local organizations and contact persons at the initial (Time I) survey, and the list was revised or updated at the follow-up (Time II) survey. During the Time-I survey, representatives of 132 organizations across the five sites were interviewed; representatives of 104 organizations were interviewed during the Time-II survey. At Time II, several organizations were either no longer active or related to the program, some didn't respond to the survey, and several new organizations were added. Organization representatives interviewed at both Time I and Time II generally represented relatively more continually-active Project participants. Several of the organizations responding to the Time-II survey were only peripherally involved in the program at Time I, but had become more active by Time II.

Representatives of 19 Tucson Project-related organizations completed (or partially completed) interviews at both Time I and Time II (somewhat fewer than the average for the five sites as a whole: 20.8). The same respondent at a particular organization did not necessarily complete both the Time-I and Time-II survey. The 19 organizations in Tucson completing the survey at both Time I and Time II were:

Tucson Police Department

Pima County District Attorney's Office

Pima County Juvenile Court Center

Pima County Juvenile Probation

Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections (Juvenile Parole)

Our Town Family Center

Boys and Girls Club

La Frontera Family Treatment Agency

Utterback Family Resource and Wellness Center

Catalina High School

Utterback Middle School

Rincon High School

Townsend Middle School

Vail Middle School

Citizen and Neighborhood Services

City Councilman's Office

Tucson Mayor's Office

Youth Works

Peebee

Four new agencies were added at Time II, and administered a combined Time-I/Time-II survey. The same personnel in fourteen of the nineteen organizations responded at both Time I and Time II. The persons who represented their organizations at both the Time-I and Time-II interviews were more influential in the implementation of their agencies' Project-related service components than those interviewed only at Time I or Time II.

Crime Problems. Respondents across the five Project-demonstration sites were able to

differentiate gang and non-gang delinquency or crime without difficulty. In general, gang crimes of all types were regarded as a more serious community problem than non-gang crimes, both at Time I and Time II. At Time I, gang crime was regarded as a serious program-area problem at three of the five sites, including Tucson, and fell significantly at time II – to the level of moderately-serious – at two of the sites, but not in Tucson (Table 5.1).

Across all of the sites, gang drug-crime was generally regarded as the most serious of all types of crime at both Time I and Time II. Drug and serious-violence crime (gang and non-gang) were viewed by Tucson respondents as at a higher level of severity compared to all the other sites, both at Time I and Time II. The level of severity of non-gang serious violence had significantly increased only in Tucson at Time II. Gang property-crime was also viewed as serious. In general, all types of crime, gang and non-gang, were viewed as more serious in Tucson than at any of the other sites. In general, there was less evidence of a perception of change for the better in levels of gang and non-gang crime in Tucson compared to other Project sites.

Gang Problems Affecting the Organizations. In the organization survey we asked not only how serious the gang problem was in the program area, but also how serious it was as confronted by the particular organization in its particular operations. Each organization might have experienced the gang problem differently in terms of its own varied purposes, and the scope and nature of its operations.

On average, all organizations at each site felt that the gang problem it was directly confronting was becoming less serious; three sites, including Tucson, felt it had significantly

improved. At Time I, the gang problem was perceived as getting worse in Tucson (perhaps more so than at other sites), but improving significantly at Time II (Table 5.2).

Implementation of Program-Related Strategies. At both Time I and Time II, organization respondents were asked to rate the general effectiveness of the Gang Program Model strategies in addressing the gang problem across their respective program communities. The strategies were specified under the categories of *community mobilization*, *social intervention*, *provision of social opportunities*, *suppression*, and *organizational change and development*. Community mobilization was identified as particularly important in the first years of the Project across all the sites. A great deal of attention was directed to its component strategies or substrategies: coordination in defining the gang problem; coordination in information sharing; community participation and planning. Defining the gang problem was regarded as particularly important in Tucson. Community participation and planning was also important. Only in Tucson at Time I was there a less-than-average agreement about what should be done about the gang problem, but there was improvement at Time II.

At Time II, organizations at the various sites (including Tucson) viewed their community-mobilization strategies as "fair" to "good" in respect to coordination in defining the gang problem, sharing information, and community participation and planning – and as generally improving, particularly in respect to information-sharing. There was a general perception across sites (but not Tucson) of some decline in community participation, particularly citizen participation. Community participation and planning had improved slightly, but remained at a "fair" to almost "good" level. At Time II, the suppression strategy was generally regarded as

"good" or close to "good" across the sites (including Tucson). The implementation of the strategies of social intervention and social-opportunities provision was seen as "fair" to "good" at all sites (including Tucson). However, social intervention was rated at a higher level than social-opportunities provision, but was still seen as only "fair" or "average" across all sites (including Tucson) (Table 5.3). Access to employment opportunities was worse in Tucson compared to the other sites at Time II – at the "poor" to "fair" level.

In sum, Tucson organization respondents perceived the gang problem to be a serious one at Time I, and still almost as serious a problem at Time II. More progress was made in the perception of a reduction of gang violence than in the gang drug problem, which was perceived as a very serious problem in Tucson and the other sites. Tucson respondents saw the gang problem their organizations were facing as very serious at Time I, though it was perceived as somewhat improving at Time II. They perceived that their strategies of community participation/planning and interagency coordination in respect to information-sharing were average, but getting better. Suppression by law enforcement was perceived as close to a "good" level, at both Time I and Time II. Tucson respondents perceived some slight progress between Time I and Time II in their provision of social opportunities (particularly employment training and placement), and in social intervention or social services for gang youth. Overall, Tucson representatives generally perceived their success in addressing the gang problem as at a lower level than at other program sites. They scored lower than other sites on 16 of 18 measures of organizational perception of quality of community strategies to address the gang problem.

Project Performance Indicators (Lorita A. Purnell and Elisa Barrios)

In the final months of the Project, the National Evaluators asked key Project-related agency administrators, Steering-Committee members and local community leaders to assess how well the local Projects did in respect to certain OJJDP Model standards. A series of 17 performance-rating scales derived from the Comprehensive Gang Program Model were used to measure the assessments. In Tucson, six agency and local Project-related personnel supplied the ratings, including the first and second Project Directors of the Our Town Family Center, the Local Evaluator, a Supervisor of the Department of Juvenile Correction (Parole), a Supervisor of La Frontera (a treatment agency), and a representative of Tucson Youth Development. Assessments were also made by two senior members of the National Evaluation team who were closely involved with the Project (having visited and observed program operations on several occasions).

The rating scales covered the key Model category indicators: the *program elements* – team approach, Steering Committee, grassroots involvement, youth outreach, criminal justice, school participation, employment/training, lead-agency management; the *program strategies* – community mobilization, social intervention, opportunities provision, suppression/social control, organizational change and development; and the *program implementation principles* – targeting, balance, intensity, continuity, commitment. (There were varying numbers of subcategories for each of the major categories). The scale for each subcategory was: 0 = no good; 1 = poor; 2 = fair; 3 = good; 4 = very good. The largest numbers of subcategories were in four major categories: lead-agency management, suppression/social control, criminal-justice, and schools. Missing responses were mainly due to the raters' lack of knowledge about particular aspects of

the Project operations (Table 5.4).

The scores for subcategories of major categories were first summed and averaged for all respondents (not counting missing scores). The scores of the 6 Tucson-Project raters and the 2 National Evaluators were each averaged separately, then combined (without weighting) and compared. The score for all 8 raters together was 2.4, in the lower half of the "fair" range. The scores of the 6 local Project respondents were in the upper "poor" range (2.9); the scores of the 2 National Evaluators were slightly below the "poor" range (1.9). However, no police or probation representatives completed the survey, so we have some questions about the representativeness and completeness of the Tucson performance-indicator responses.

Of special interest was the difference in the scores of the Tucson-Project and National-Evaluation raters; the Project's ratings were consistently higher (2.88; "fair") than the National Evaluators' (1.92; "poor"). However, when we used score rankings, the Tucson-Project and National-Evaluator rankings were almost identical. The Tucson-Project and National-Evaluator rankings closest at the higher end of the performance scale were: targeting, youth outreach, and social intervention. The rankings closest at the lower end were: Steering Committee, grassroots involvement, employment and training, and opportunities provision. The rankings furthest apart were: organizational change and development, balance, and criminal justice.

Thus, there was relative consistency across the high and low rankings of the two groups of respondents – national and local – but at different levels. Both Tucson-Project and National-Evaluator raters, in addition to agreeing on what factors or criteria were relatively "best" in the program, also indicated which were relatively "worst." The rankings were largely consistent with field observations of events during the program period, except that the National Evaluators

perceived that the Project had done much more poorly than the Tucson-Project raters believed in respect to balance of strategies and changing organizational policies, as well as collaboration with the criminal-justice system, especially the police.

Table 5.1
Organization Survey
Mean Ratings[a] of the Seriousness of Gang and Non-Gang Crime in Program Area
By Site and By Time Period

Type of Crime[b]	San Antonio (n=12)		Tucson (n=18)		Mesa (n=17)		Bloomington-Normal (n=24)		Riverside (n=15)		Total[c] (N=86)	
	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II
Gang												
Total	**4.27**	**3.61***	**4.27**	**3.97**	**3.66**	**3.09***	**3.07**	**3.11**	**4.00**	**3.29**	**3.74**	**3.36*****
Serious Violence	4.32	3.45	4.40	3.92	3.55	3.08*	3.25	3.10	3.66	3.39	3.76	3.35***
Other Violence	4.27	3.50*	4.21	4.07	3.62	2.85*	3.07	2.93	3.88	3.46	3.72	3.30***
Drugs	4.33	4.04	4.50	4.38	3.94	3.62	3.85	4.04	4.13	4.15	4.11	4.04
Property	4.27	3.76*	4.00	3.64	3.47	3.06	2.41	2.53	3.70	3.35	3.41	3.16*
Non-gang												
Total	**2.93**	**2.95**	**3.15**	**3.37**	**2.87**	**2.31**	**2.39**	**2.40**	**3.06**	**2.45**	**2.81**	**2.64**
Serious Violence	2.89	2.60	2.63	3.09*	2.54	2.11	2.31	2.15	2.68	2.35	2.55	2.41
Other Violence	2.55	2.80	3.14	3.43	2.82	2.03*	2.18	2.11	2.88	2.35*	2.67	2.47
Drugs	3.09	3.36	3.72	3.91	3.47	2.88	3.21	3.31	3.67	3.53	3.43	3.39
Property	3.11	3.41	3.21	3.19	3.16	2.43*	2.29	2.33	3.10	2.70	2.89	2.71

For differences between time periods: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.

Instruments: Time I and Time II Organization Surveys
Evaluation of "The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program"
School of Social Service Administration
The University of Chicago
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[a] Rating Scale: 1=No Problem; 2=Small Problem; 3=Moderate Problem; 4=Serious Problem; 5=Very Serious Problem.

[b] The survey asked: "For each crime, please rate how serious a crime problem you think exists in [specific program area for each site] in the last 6 months." Specific crimes were: **serious violence** – robbery, battery without a weapon, battery with a weapon, drive-by shootings; **other violence** – threats/intimidation, possession of a knife, possession of a gun; **drugs** – selling drugs and using drugs; and **property** – vandalism/graffiti, breaking and entering, car theft.

[c] Number of organizations providing a valid response; the total number of organizations completing a survey at both Time I and Time II was 104.

Table 5.2
Organization Survey
Seriousness of the Gang Problem Experienced by Organizations
By Site and By Time Period: Mean Ratings

Survey Item	San Antonio (n=13)		Tucson (n=15)		Mesa (n=17)		Bloomington-Normal (n=23)		Riverside (n=15)		Total (N=83)[a]	
	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II
Gang Problem Experienced by Organization[b]	1.92	2.23	1.33	2.13**	1.59	2.12**	1.74	2.35**	1.87	2.67	1.69	2.30***

For differences between time periods: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.

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[a] Number of organizations providing a valid response; the total number of organizations completing a survey at both time periods was 104.

[b] Rating Scale: 1=Became Worse; 2=Stayed About the Same; 3=Became Better. In the Time I Organization Survey, the question was: "**Over the last 3 years**, would you say the youth gang problem experienced by your organization has become worse, stayed about the same, or become better?" In the Time II Organization Survey, the question differs only in reference to the time period: "**Over the last year**, would you say the gang problem experienced by your organization has become worse, stayed about the same, or become better?"

Table 5.3
Organization Survey
Perceptions of the Success of Program Strategies Concerning the Gang Problem
By Site and By Time Period: Mean Ratings[a]

Strategy	San Antonio (n=13)		Tucson (n=21)		Mesa (n=17)		Bloomington-Normal (n=25)		Riverside (n=19)		Total[b] (N=95)	
	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II
Community Mobilization												
Coordination: Organizations Defining the Gang Problem	**3.81**	**3.62**	**3.53**	**3.78**	**3.53**	**3.56**	**3.70**	**4.07**	**3.20**	**3.53**	**3.55**	**3.74**
Agreement On What a Gang Is	4.23	3.95	3.84	3.95	3.76	3.76	3.80	4.28	3.53	3.92	3.82	3.99
Agreement On Which Individuals Are Gang Members	3.77	3.69	3.68	4.00	3.59	3.71	3.64	4.00*	3.00	3.44	3.53	3.78
Agreement On What A Gang Incident Is	3.46	3.69	3.63	3.89	3.76	3.47	3.88	4.12	3.16	3.58	3.61	3.79
Agreement On What Should Be Done About The Youth-Gang Problem	3.77	3.23	2.90	3.35	3.00	3.29	3.48	3.88	3.16	3.18	3.25	3.41
Coordination: Organization Information- Sharing	**3.38**	**3.25**	**3.08**	**3.44**	**3.06**	**3.53**	**3.33**	**4.27***	**2.69**	**3.36**	**3.11**	**3.64*****
Sharing Information About Criminal Actions Of Specific Gang Youth	3.77	3.38	3.30	3.60	3.24	3.65	3.38	4.38*	2.81	2.42	3.27	3.73
Sharing Information About Service Needs Of Specific Gang Youth	3.08	3.17	2.89	3.42	2.88	3.41	3.20	4.16*	2.66	3.26	2.95	3.55
Community Participation and Planning	**2.88**	**2.31**	**2.79**	**2.84**	**3.03**	**3.00**	**3.68**	**3.72**	**2.72**	**2.61**	**3.08**	**2.98**
Citizen Action Regarding Gangs	3.23	2.23	2.67	2.81	3.00	2.82	3.52	3.32	2.45	2.42	2.99	2.78
Community Planning Regarding Gangs	2.54	2.38	2.90	2.86	3.06	3.18	3.84	4.12	3.00	2.79	3.16	3.15

For differences between time periods: * p<.05; ** p<.01; and *** p<.001.

[a] Rating Scale: 1=Poor; 2=Fair; 3=Average; 4=Good; 5=Excellent.

[b] Number of organizations providing a valid response; the total number of organizations completing a survey at both time periods was 104.

Table 5.3 (continued)
Organization Survey
Perceptions of the Success of Program Strategies Concerning the Gang Problem
By Site and By Time Period: Mean Ratings [a]

Strategy	San Antonio (n=13)		Tucson (n=21)		Mesa (n=17)		Bloomington-Normal (n=25)		Riverside (n=19)		Total [b] (N=95)	
	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II
Social Intervention	**2.62**	**2.85**	**3.00**	**3.15**	**3.06**	**3.29**	**3.60**	**3.64**	**2.42**	**3.84**	**2.99**	**3.28***
Local Service-Agency Programming To Deal With The Gang Problem	2.62	2.85	3.00	3.15	3.06	3.29	3.60	3.64	2.42	3.84	2.99	3.28*
Social Opportunities	**2.31**	**2.38**	**2.39**	**2.47**	**2.47**	**2.79**	**2.35**	**2.85**	**2.32**	**2.81**	**2.37**	**2.69***
Employment Opportunities For Gang Youth	2.23	2.08	1.95	2.15	2.06	2.35	1.83	2.46	1.62	2.38	1.93	2.28*
Access To Education Programs For Gang Youth	2.38	2.69	2.80	2.85	2.88	3.24	2.88	3.25	3.14	3.22	2.84	3.07
Suppression	**3.83**	**3.58**	**3.95**	**3.95**	**3.82**	**4.00**	**4.40**	**4.48**	**3.37**	**3.84**	**3.92**	**4.01**
Law Enforcement Efforts Regarding Gangs	3.83	3.58	3.95	3.95	3.82	4.00	4.40	4.48	3.37	3.84	3.92	4.01

For differences between time periods: * p<.05; ** p<.01; and *** p<.001.

Instruments: Time I and Time II Organization Surveys
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Table 5.4
Assessment Summary
Model Performance Indicators – Mean Scores and Rank[a]

Indicator	Project-Related Personnel		National Evaluators		Combined	
	Mean Score	Rank	Mean Score	Rank	Mean Score	Rank
Team Approach	2.73	8	1.91	4	2.32	4.5
Steering Committee	2.03	18	.59	18	1.31	18
Grassroots Involvement	2.12	16	1.17	16	1.65	17
Youth Outreach	3.25	2	2.03	3	2.64	2
Criminal Justice	2.62	12	1.68	7	2.15	9.5
School Participation[b]	2.19	17	1.28	14	1.74	15
Employment/Training [a]	2.44	14	1.00	17	1.72	16
Lead-Agency Management	2.66	10	1.48	12	2.07	11
Community Mobilization	2.33	15	1.50	10.5	1.92	14
Social Intervention	3.06	3	2.17	2	2.62	3
Suppression/Social Control	2.98	4	1.65	8	2.32	4.5
Organizational Change and Development	2.73	8	1.22	15	1.98	12
Targeting	3.58	1	3.00	1	3.29	1
Balance	2.63	11	1.75	5.5	2.19	7
Intensity	2.83	5	1.75	5.5	2.29	6
Continuity	2.73	8	1.63	8	2.18	8
Commitment	2.80	6	1.50	10.5	2.15	9.5
Totals	2.88		1.92		2.40	

[a] Scale: 0 = No Good; 1 = Poor; 2 = Fair; 3 - Good; 4 = Very Good

[b] These 2 program elements comprise the program strategy of *opportunities provision*.

Chapter 6

Research Method: Data Management, Measurement and Analysis

The Evaluation attempted to answer two interrelated questions: 1) how, and to what extent, was the Comprehensive Community-Wide Gang Program Model implemented?; and 2) did the Tucson program contribute to a reduction in youth gang crime relative to comparable youth not served, particularly at the individual-youth level, and possibly at the program-area level? We addressed the first question in the previous chapters in terms of the Project's origin and structure, the development of its response to the gang problem, and the extent to which the program elements, strategies, and principles were adapted in a manner consistent with the OJJDP Model.

We now move to a discussion of the more specific nature of program services, worker contacts, and arrest outcomes (and to some extent self-report outcomes) for individual youth. Before we proceed, however, we need to describe the research methods used, i.e., research design (including the instruments employed to gather data) and the resolution of problems we encountered in data collection and analysis to obtain our findings, first at the individual level and (in a later chapter) at the gang and area levels. We pay special attention to data-collection, data-integration and sample-comparability problems, and the procedures used to overcome many of them.

At the start of the program, we planned for a sample at each site of 100 program youth and 100 comparison youth, identified as delinquent gang members (or youth at high risk of gang involvement) and whom we would be able to interview at least twice. The youth were expected

to be mainly between the ages of 12 and 20 years at program entry, predominantly male (but with a substantial number of females), mainly Latino and/or African-American and (to a lesser extent) non-Hispanic white, Asian, and/or Native American. We expected the samples to reflect the nature of the gang-delinquency problem at each of the selected sites, based on community and agency perceptions, and especially on police arrest data. Equivalent gang-problem program and comparison areas, and equivalent program and comparison youth were to be chosen by local Project and Evaluation personnel, based on criteria consistent with the Comprehensive Gang Program Model, i.e., focusing on gang-involved youth who had arrest records or were at high risk for arrest. Many of these expectations were met.

Data Management

A great deal of extra and unanticipated research time and effort was involved in resolving data issues, especially data-reliability. The time needed to determine the reliability and accuracy of data extended into the analysis period. We often discovered discrepancies in information about a particular youth obtained from different sources, e.g., probation and police. We describe how these problems were resolved under the following headings: *data collection*, *collaboration*, *data-infrastructure development*, *accessing and transferring data*, and *sample comparability*.

Data Collection

Our key individual-level data-collection instruments were the Individual Gang-Member Survey for program and comparison youth, the Worker Tracking Form for program youth only, and police arrest histories for both program and comparison youth (interviewed and non-

interviewed). Somewhat simpler and shorter forms were used to collect data on program exposure (i.e., dates of entry to and exit from the program) and risk period (i.e., the amount of time the youth spent in detention or corrections and was not at risk for crime activity or arrest in the community).

After youth (and/or parental) informed consents were obtained, the Individual Gang-Member Survey was administered to Tucson program and comparison youth by interview staff of the Local Evaluator, Quail Enterprises, Inc. The hour-long interview requested information from the youth regarding: demographics (gender, race/ethnicity, age); gang activity; school performance; employment; leisure time and friends; crime and fear in the neighborhood; the youth's neighborhood relationships; gang-membership status; gang structure, size, and activities; family composition and relationships; self-reported delinquency; self-reported arrests; criminal-justice experience; and the nature of his or her response to program activities and worker contacts. Information on self-esteem and alienation was also gathered. The interviews were administered at least two times, at intervals approximately one year apart – Time I and Time II. However, while 106 of the 126 program youth completed a Time-I interview, only 92 completed a Time-II interview; all of the 101 comparison youth completed a Time-I interview, but only 51completed a Time-II interview. The re-interview rate was 86.8% for program youth and 50.5% for comparison youth. Without criminal-justice, local-agency or other sources of assistance, it was extremely difficult for the Local Evaluator to obtain Time-II comparison-youth interviews.

A program-services tracking form was completed by each Project worker having contact with each program youth. Basic socio-demographic information was collected, as well as the

dates of the youth's contacts with the worker, average number and duration of contacts with the youth, the Project workers' perceptions of the youth's gang-membership status, reasons for the youth being in the program, sources of referral, types of services the worker provided, types of referrals made, the workers' perceptions of their own helpfulness in providing services to youth, and which other Project workers were contacted in servicing program youth. The Worker Tracking Form was completed on a quarterly basis for each individual program youth contacted by the Project worker (mainly probation officers, case managers, outreach youth workers and police).

The local-site police Crime Analyst and/or Local Evaluator collected the entire police history of each program youth and comparison youth in the Tucson police records, whether the youth was interviewed or not, and whether the program youth had a worker-tracking record or not. The criminal history included information on all juvenile and adult arrests, warrants or suspect cases: dates and locations of arrests; home addresses of the youth; gang-involvement characteristics; arrest charges; nature of weapons used; brief description of each arrest incident; disposition of the incident; and whether the youth was placed in custody. In Tucson, as at the other four demonstration sites, police histories included <u>all</u> of the youth's contacts with the police, prior to his/her program entry and updated through the end of the youth's program period (and the equivalent period for comparison youth).

<u>Collaboration</u>

The implementation of the research design was influenced by the structure of the Evaluation. Those directly involved in the Evaluation included a National Evaluation team at the

University of Chicago, Local Evaluators at each of the five sites, program and evaluation management staff of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice, and a National Advisory Board. A Technical Assistance team was closely associated with, if not integrated into, the complex program/research Evaluation structure. The National Evaluation was directed by the Principal Investigator from the School of Social Service Administration, University of Chicago. He and his team were responsible for the design consistency and quality control of the Evaluation, including sampling frames, data-collection instruments, and management of the Evaluation across the local sites. Local Project personnel administered program- and comparison-youth interviews, collected individual police arrest histories, and completed worker-tracking records. The National Evaluation team, with the aid of local agency personnel, collected community-crime, census, gang-as-a-unit, program-performance-indicator, organization-survey and qualitative, on-site observational and other data. All individual-level and aggregate-level data were processed, cleaned, and analyzed by the National Evaluation staff in Chicago.

The OJJDP Special Emphasis and Research and Development Divisions' Program Managers and other OJJDP administrative staff played significant roles in the development and coordination of the program and the Evaluation research. OJJDP staff worked to assure the proper implementation of the Model. Most importantly, they assisted and pressured the Local Evaluators and Project Directors to complete their Evaluation-related assignments in conformity with the National-Evaluation and Program-Model requirements. The OJJDP staff mediated conflicts that arose between National Evaluators, Local Evaluators and local program staff. On the other hand, the National Evaluators helped resolve differences at some sites between local

program staff and Local Evaluators, who were not always in close communication and collaboration with each other, particularly in respect to the collection of individual gang-member-survey data. Collection of worker-tracking data from service providers, particularly from probation and police, presented special problems for the National Evaluation staff.

Collaboration between local program-development and Local Evaluation staffs was structured (to an extent) into the combined local-program and Evaluation budgets. Local Evaluation funding came out of the local-site's program budget, as determined by the local Project Director. The National Evaluation and Technical Assistance staffs were also closely integrated; their functions were carried out by some of the same people, although funded from different budgets. Since the Model and ways to implement it were developed at the University of Chicago, the Principal Investigator took primary responsibility for the National Evaluation; the Co-principal Investigator of the Evaluation took primary responsibility for Technical Assistance tasks. Both worked in close collaboration with each other.

A National Advisory Board was established, comprising three national experts in the areas of gang research and gang-program development. The Advisory Board met annually with OJJDP Program and Research Managers and the National-Evaluation and Technical-Assistance teams to advise on research design, review Evaluation objectives and procedures, assess Evaluation progress, and recommend modification of Evaluation strategies. They also participated in selected cross-site, program-leadership meetings. However, the Advisory Board was not directly involved in the development of local-program and/or Local-Evaluation procedures, or resolution of specific problems that arose therefrom.

Data-Infrastructure Development

Relevant information had to be collected and data-processing systems developed at the local level to provide the National Evaluators with useful data that would be comparable across sites. It was not always clear on what basis certain youth were included in the program and others not, what the relevant gang and non-gang characteristics of the youth were, how the youth's problems were diagnosed, what activities or treatments were appropriate, etc. Youth-and-family and other social agencies, as well as some probation departments, did not collect the kind of systematic identifying, contact or service-provision data that would be useful for cross-site National-Evaluation purposes. There was also a special problem in regard to gathering gang-incident or offense data from police sources. The definition and procedures for collection of these data at the individual-youth or community levels were not established prior to the beginning of the Project periods.

The definition of a gang incident at some of the sites may simply have referred to a situation involving a drive-by shooting or graffiti. A gang incident at most sites was essentially a criminal event in which an identified gang member had been involved. The police departments at the different sites had to develop procedures for specifically identifying a gang or non-gang-related incident; whether a gang incident was based on gang function or purpose, or whether it was based simply on the youth's identification as a gang member. A gang incident was usually based on the involvement and identification of a subject – offender or victim – who was classified by various (law-enforcement) agencies as a gang member. Local police data systems had to be designed or redesigned to accommodate both national and local operational definitions, and data-collection and data-organizing procedures.

A further problem was clarification of whether individual youth in the police files were suspects, offenders, or arrested on a warrant. A suspect might not necessarily be arrested, yet could be regarded as equivalent to an arrestee in some sites. Also, a warrant arrest did not necessarily mean that a new crime or incident had occurred; the youth may simply have violated a probation condition. In Tucson (as at the other sites), the problems of interpreting police data were resolved by using only individual-youth arrests, and not suspect or warrant cases.

The collection of aggregate or community-level police data created additional problems for the local police Crime Analyst and/or Local Evaluator. It required the realignment of police beats and districts for criminal-incident or arrest-reporting purposes, and using program and comparison-area boundaries determined by the National Evaluation, further specified by where program and comparison youth hung out, their residence locations, and where they were arrested.

Aggregate-level arrest or incident data at the area level were not provided in Tucson, although they were at the other four sites. The Tucson Police Department claimed that reorganizing police districts to match program and comparison areas, and especially obtaining pre-program-period arrest data were too costly and required additional resources. Such resources – money and manpower, other than originally agreed to – were not available from the Tucson Police Department or Our Town Family Center.

Accessing and Transferring Data

Data Sources. Access to data sources at the local sites was closely related to the problem of developing appropriate data systems which would be useful to both the Local and National Evaluators. The data were often located in different sections or bureaus of police departments

(e.g., juvenile, adult, and drug-crime units), which might have to be accessed separately to obtain a complete youth arrest history. Arrest dispositions also might only be located at court centers, corrections departments or detention centers, and not in police records; criminal-case data were sometimes available in computerized form, sometimes only in hard copy; the police and sheriff dealing with the same youth in the program or comparison area might not customarily share data; police crime analysts and court clerks were generally reluctant to provide access to case records to outsiders. Access to confinement information about youth was also difficult to obtain from probation, court or corrections systems.

Criminal-justice data were particularly difficult to access and use for cross-site comparison purposes. Special arrangements had to be made through local police chiefs, chief probation officers, and sometimes presiding judges to accommodate Local and National-Evaluation needs. Official data systems varied; offense codes differed at each site. Data were sometimes provided in a local-police computer format and submitted on a disk. These data often contained local-classification errors which had to be corrected as well as converted to the National Evaluation system. Software systems might be different and incompatible across the Police-Department, Local-Evaluator, and National-Evaluation operations. Police-department data systems changed over time, and different local data analysts could not always readily access data from their own departments' systems. Errors in data transfer from local police Crime Analysts to Local Evaluators, and then to the National Evaluators, were numerous.

Interviews. Interviewing gang youth and those at high risk of gang involvement presented another series of problems. Local interviewers were often students and women with middle-class backgrounds who had little familiarity with gang youth or gang-problem

neighborhoods. Many of the interviewers were fearful of contacting youth at their homes or in public areas, particularly in the evening or on weekends. Interview locations that assured privacy, safety, and some comfort for both the youth and the interviewers were difficult to arrange. Interviewing youth at local Project offices, where police or probation staff might be present, was inappropriate. Special skills, sensitivity, and Spanish-language ability were also often required to adequately explain the purpose of the research and obtain informed consents from the youth (and a parent, if the youth was a juvenile). Contacting and obtaining informed consents from comparison youth was particularly difficult at some sites. Considerable effort was required to reestablish contact with a youth in the open community to obtain second or third interviews. As time went on, the youth might no longer have contact with the Project or with the comparison area's "broker", intermediary organizations, or with the Local Evaluator.

Worker-Contact Data. Obtaining permission from agency directors – and cooperation from their Project-related workers – to complete program-process data (i.e., standardized worker-service or contact-activity records from the different types of workers) proved to be another formidable challenge. Project-related agencies had their own systems of recordkeeping, and their workers did not welcome the additional bureaucratic burden of keeping extra records. It was difficult for police or probation to understand why the recordkeeping they did for their own agencies was not sufficient for Project purposes. Some of the workers did not believe the National Evaluation Worker Tracking Form was adequate enough to document all that they were doing in the Project.

Cooperation and Training. Inherent in the process of obtaining good data was not only training local data collectors, but also developing cooperation with local Project management

staffs. Local Evaluators and their data collectors not only had to have aid from Project staff and permission from the justice system to access different existing local-agency data sources – whether police, court, or school records – but required training in how to use such local sources. National-Evaluation staff provided special training in the use of the Individual Gang-Member Survey for the data collectors at each of the local sites.

Sample Comparability

A major challenge was establishing comparability of gang-involved and highly gang-at-risk youth in the program and comparison areas. We needed to find non-program-served, comparable youth from a comparable gang-problem area or community. We expected that Local Evaluators could identify such communities and would have sufficient know-how and skill to obtain interviews from such youth. Police sometimes provided information on comparable gang-problem areas, but finding specific youth (or groups of youth) to match program youth was no easy matter.

Ideally, the nature and scope of the youth-gang problem, and specific information about the youth-gang population in both the program and comparison areas, should have been known before each site's program was implemented and the Evaluation developed. This was not the case. The details of program-youth gang-membership status, gang structure, gang process, and the delinquency problems in the program areas were just beginning to be known to program personnel and the Local Evaluators as the Projects were starting up. There was usually less specific knowledge of the gang problem and the gang population in the comparison-area communities than in the program-area communities. While it was not clear how representative

program youth were of the general youth-gang population in the program areas, at least gang youth characteristics in the program areas ordinarily would become known over time, which was not as often the case in the comparison areas.

Measurement

We had to overcome problems of: 1) not-clearly matched samples; 2) different police-arrest practices in different local city jurisdictions or across cities; 3) erratic timing of interviews; 4) missing worker-tracking data (especially from the early days of the program); and 5) different time periods for collection and integration of various types of data. Nevertheless, while the collection of youth-specific data from different sources initially made for extra National-Evaluation staff burdens, it served to indicate gaps and contradictions in the data, and allowed the National-Evaluation staff to go back to Local-Evaluation and program personnel to supplement the data, and develop reliable, accurate and relevant information.

Mismatched Samples. While youth in the program and comparison samples were usually 12 to 20 years of age, both samples sometimes contained a few youth who were older than 20 years. We included all of these youth in the analyses. (Generally, there were no youth in our samples under 12 years of age.) To facilitate age comparisons between program and comparison samples, we adjusted for specific youth-age differences by placing youth in three general age categories – 14 years and under, 15 to 17 or 18 years, and 18 or 19 years and over – depending on the age distribution at the sites, and especially when state criminal law specified the age cut-off between juvenile and adult status. In general, program and comparison youth at each site were mainly

between 14 and 18 years of age, male, Latino (Mexican-American), to some extent African-American, and to a very limited extent non-Latino white, Native American, and Asian-American.

Erratic Timing of Interviews. Program youth were not always administered a Time-I interview immediately when they came into the program. In a few cases, Time-I interviews took place before the program officially began, but generally they were administered at any time within the first three months of the youth's entering the program. The interval between the Time-I and Time-II interviews of program youth was generally a year to a year-and-a-quarter, but a handful of youth were administered Time-II interviews slightly before the end of the 1-year interval, or slightly after the 1¼-year interval. We tested (or compared) youth interviewed at somewhat different Time-I and Time-II periods; in all cases, the differences in interview intervals did not significantly affect outcome findings.

Comparison youth were generally interviewed at a slightly later time period than were program youth. Comparison youth had to be matched to program youth by gender, and their ages had to be adjusted to match those of program youth at the time of the program youth's entry into the program. In addition, criminal-history periods of comparison youth had to be matched to those of individual program youth, using age, gender, program-entry date and length of time in the program (see Matching Youth Samples, below).

Missing Worker-Tracking Data. Another research problem was not simply that certain workers were reluctant to complete the Worker Tracking Form describing the kinds of services they provided to youth, and/or the contacts they made with other workers around program youth. At

some sites, worker-tracking did not commence until several months after the program had been underway. For the period prior to worker-tracking data collection, we sometimes had no detailed evidence of services or worker contacts provided to specific youth. However, we did have relatively accurate official program-entry dates, criminal histories, and youth-confinement records for all program youth, as well as the youth's own record of services received (from the Individual Gang-Member Survey). We were able to determine statistically whether earlier, non-recorded program-services data would have made a difference in outcomes for program youth during the matched program and pre-program periods. They did not.

Different Arrest Patterns Across Areas. We learned belatedly that arrest and gang-member-identification procedures and practices of police in the program and comparison areas might differ. The police in one area might arrest youth for certain status offenses and not for others, or they could be more pro-active in identifying gang youth and arresting them for a different range of offenses or crimes (minor or major) in one area of the city than another, or in different and/or comparable cities. This could explain why frequency of arrests varied among program and comparison youth across the five demonstration sites. Based on interview and self-reported offense data, and controlling for key youth characteristics (e.g., school performance, employment, family structure, household income, personal problems, use of or selling drugs), the youth samples from the program and comparison areas might be similar in other ways, but might differ because of differing police-arrest practices. This proved to be a special problem when comparison youth came from a different city than program youth, rather than just from a different area of the same city.

The best we could do to show that an adequate match existed between the Project and comparison-youth samples was to use different sources of gang-membership-identification and outcome data (i.e., Project-agency worker perceptions, and youth self-report and police offense and arrest data – sometimes in separate multivariate analyses), and test whether similar, or explainable, change patterns would emerge. We could also examine trends within the program and comparison areas, and compare similarities and differences at the individual-youth arrest and gang-offense levels with those at the gang-as-a-unit and general-community levels.

Different Time Periods for Data Collection. Ideally, all of the data at the individual-youth level (gang-member-survey, worker-tracking, police-arrest, program-exposure, and confinement-period) should have been integrated into one data set. But this assumed that the data-collection time frames for each youth would match, i.e., that interviews, services provided, worker contacts, police arrests, and program exposure covered the same periods for each youth. They did not.

Official police data at some sites covered a longer period than the interview interval or even the program period. The police arrest-history period was selected to include both a matched pre-program and program exposure period. The total program worker-tracking period was about 3 years; the interval between the Time-I and Time-II interviews was usually shorter – 1 to 1¼ years – and generally represented only a part of the total program and criminal-history periods. Our preferred analysis time period became the longer, police arrest-history period, matched to program-exposure and equivalent pre-program-exposure periods.

Analysis

In order to identify any program-youth-outcome changes that might be due to Project effects, we established that the youth had to be in the program a minimum of one month. Detailed program-service, program-exposure, police-history, and to some extent self-reported offense data would be the source for determining the Project's success or failure in the prevention, intervention, and suppression of delinquency and crime, particularly at the individual-youth level. At some of the sites, we analyzed the data in different stages, moving from large-sample analyses with less extensive data, to more complex and richer analyses using smaller youth samples. Ordinarily, the sequence of steps in our approach were:

1. Compare the effects of the program on program youth relative to similar youth not in the program, over similar periods of time. While the advantage of this approach was the utilization of the longest period of possible Project effect, it did not include detailed data on characteristics of program youth obtained from worker-tracking and interview records. All we could do was control for age, gender, race/ethnicity, for whether the youth (or Project personnel) said he had been a gang member, and for pre-program arrests and confinement periods. We determined effects of the program on youth using the outcome variables of *changes in total arrests*, *serious violence arrests*, *total violence arrests* (serious and less serious), *property arrests*, *drug arrests*, and *other arrests* (usually for minor offenses) in a series of multivariate analyses.

2. Compare arrest changes for program youth between the pre-program and program periods, especially to identify successful program-service efforts. If there were differences in arrest outcomes for program youth relative to comparison youth (which there were not in

Tucson), compare the effects of the program on youth using not only police-arrest change data, but also specific worker-tracking service and contact data. These program service/contact variables were indicators of key elements of the Model strategy at the individual-youth level. We used the same control, dependent and independent variables as we did in the analysis described in the paragraph above.

3. As in (1) above, compare the possible effects of the program (now using self-report data instead of police arrest data) and the general or imputed (but non-detailed) program-exposure effects during the 1 to 1¼ -year period between the Time-I and Time-II interviews. The advantage of this approach lay in using the youth's self-reported offenses (including specific gang-related behaviors) as well as contextual data (neighborhood, family, gang, etc.) more extensively over the six-month-prior-to-Time-I and six-month-prior-to-Time-II interview periods, 1 to 1¼ years apart. Again, controlling for age, gender, race/ethnicity, gang-membership status and pre-program self-reported offenses, we looked for differences over time in total offenses, serious violence offenses, total violence offenses, property offenses and drug-selling offenses. Limitations in measuring change were the short interview-interval period and the small size of the samples, particularly the comparison sample at Time II. We were only partially able to carry out this part of the analysis in Tucson.

4. Compare the effects of the patterns of program services and contacts on program youth and introduce mediating variables derived from the interview findings, such as *changes in youth neighborhood and life-space/life-course characteristics* (e.g., gang-membership status, gang involvement, size of the gang, school participation and employment). The key outcome variable was *changes in number of police arrests,* assuming that mediating change factors in the Time-

I/Time-II interview intervals were related to outcome based on differences between the pre-program and program arrest periods. Similar control and outcome variables using police arrest data were employed. We were interested in the effects of the program variables (e.g., individual and family counseling services, suppression, etc.) on the mediating variables, and finally in the effects of the changes in the mediating variables on the changes in the outcome variables for different program youth. This analysis would be particularly useful depending on whether there were significant differences already found in the analyses conducted above. We did not carry out this part of the analysis in Tucson.

Matching Youth Samples (Kwai Ming Wa)

Our analysis strategies depended on establishing equivalency in the program and comparison-youth samples. We had to make sure that our comparison youth – and those program youth with no worker-tracking records and less than one month of services/contacts – were adequately matched on key demographics (especially age and gender) and program-exposure time to those of our program youth who had tracking records and a month or more of services/contacts. Special assessment and matching procedures were required.

Our total sample in Tucson consisted of 227 youth. We compared the program and comparison samples, concentrating on the program youth with worker-tracking records and a month or more of services/contacts (N = 126), and the comparison youth with no worker contacts or services (N = 101). Only 106 of the 126 program-sample youth were interviewed at Time I; all 101 of the comparison-sample youth completed a Time-I interview. Police arrest histories (which covered the entire [longer] program and pre-program periods) were more relevant, time-

wise, than interviews (which covered the shorter program period only), and were used as a basis for measuring delinquency-pattern changes.

The purpose of the matching procedure was to establish appropriate program and pre-program periods in which to compare youth from the two samples on gender, age, and length of program exposure. The objective was to match comparison youth who had arrest records with program worker-tracked youth who had arrest records. This would provide each comparison youth with a hypothetical program entry and exit date, determined by the matched program-youth's entry and exit dates. The number of arrests could then be counted for both program and comparison youth in equivalent program and pre-program periods. When a youth had no arrest history, the estimated length of time in the program (or its equivalent), whether long or short, had no effect on the arrest-count procedure. Arrests in the program and pre-program periods would always sum to zero.

We identified a sample of youth who had arrests before July 1, 1999 (i.e., the end of the Project period) – 111 worker-tracked program youth with one month or more of program exposure, and 68 comparison youth. In our analyses, we focused on those youth arrested in the matched program and pre-program periods only (program youth n = 110; comparison youth n = 67). Almost all youth (whether program or comparison) with arrests histories had arrests in the program and/or pre-program period (they may also have had arrests in the prior-to-pre-program or post-program periods as well); 88.17% of program youth but only 67.3% of comparison youth had arrests in the matched program and pre-program periods.

The specific matching strategy was to pair comparison youth with arrests with program-worker-tracked youth with arrests, by gender and also by age (closest birthday), on a one-

comparison-youth to one-program-youth basis. (Generally, the birthdays of the matched comparison and program youth occurred within a month or two of each other.) The comparison youth without arrests in the program and pre-program periods were matched to the remaining program youth (worker-tracked, with and without arrests) on the basis of gender and age. The inclusion of all youth with no arrests would not have been useful in further analyses of changes affecting the total samples, since there were many more comparison youth than program youth without arrests.

Chapter 7

Selected Characteristics of Program and Comparison Youth

In this chapter, we present a picture of program and comparison youth mainly in the pre-program period and/or at the Time-I interview. We focus on single-dimensional descriptive characteristics of youth: demographics, arrests, self-reports, gang-membership status, probation/parole status, confinement experience, and selected behaviors such as drug use and drug selling. These differences are statistically controlled in our later multivariate analyses. The nature and scope of Project-worker contacts and services to program youth, and their effects on some of these characteristics, are also described in the following chapters.

Our discussion covers 227 youth – 126 youth who participated in the Project and received services, and 101 comparison youth. We use data from several sources – the Individual Gang-Member Survey, the Project's worker-tracking records, and Tucson's Police and Probation Department' records – to describe our three sub-samples: program youth with worker-tracking records (N = 122), program youth with no worker-tracking records (N = 4), and the comparison youth (N = 101). Only 106 program youth, but all 101 comparison youth completed a Time-I Individual Gang-Member Survey. Tucson Police Department and Pima County Probation Department records were searched to obtain data on all 227 youth.

Demographic Characteristics

Gender. Males were the majority in our samples. Of the total sample (N = 227), 70.5% were male and 29.5% were female. The gender distribution was fairly similar across the two

samples: comparison (71.3% males; 28.7% females) and program (69.8% males; 30.2% females) (Table 7.1).

Race/Ethnicity. Latinos (Mexican-American) comprised the large majority of youth in the comparison sample (79.2%), with a smaller group of African-Americans (12.9%), followed by a slightly smaller group of youth of other race/ethnic backgrounds (7.9%). Latinos (Mexican-American) comprised the bare majority of youth in the program sample (50.0%), followed by a substantial group of African-Americans (41.3%) and youth of other race/ethnic backgrounds (8.7%). The composition of youth in the "other" race/ethnic category was somewhat more Native-American than non-Latino White or Asian-American, in both samples (Table 7.2).

Age. The ages of youth were categorized into three groups: under 14, 15 and 16, and 17 and over. The 14-and-under group was the largest (50.2%) of the total sample, and much larger in the comparison sample (63.4%) than in the program sample (39.7%). The 15- and 16-year-old group was larger in the program sample (51.6%) than in the comparison sample (31.7%). The 17-and-over group was the smallest age group in both samples (program sample = 8.7%; comparison sample = 5.0%). We note that age is a very important predictor of future arrests during the adolescent period; younger adolescents are more likely to increase their arrests than older adolescents.

The program and comparison samples contained particularly young youth; 33.7% of the comparison sample and 23.0% of the program sample were 13 years old. The Tucson samples were the youngest of any of the five demonstration sites. There were only 2.0% of the comparison youth and 5.6% of the program youth who were 19 to 21 years old (Table 7.3).

Arrest Histories

Arrest histories were obtained from the Tucson Police Department for all program and comparison youth who were arrested in the city of Tucson. The histories covered all the youth's arrests[1] prior to June 30, 1999 (when the Project ended). Youth were generally arrested in the police district where they lived or their gang hung out.

The focus of our Evaluation was on arrest-pattern changes at the individual-youth level between the matched pre-program and program periods (based on the length of time the program youth was in the program, and the equivalent period for matched comparison youth; see Chapter 6). A few youth were arrested only in the period prior to the pre-program period. Most youth were arrested across a variety of periods, particularly the program and pre-program periods. Most important, far more of the program youth had arrest records (93.6%) than did comparison youth (60.3%).

Arrest Patterns. Of the total 227 youth, only 179 (78.9%) are included in this chapter's descriptive analysis of youth arrested in the pre-program and/or program periods, and sometimes in the prior-to-pre-program or post-program periods. (Our focus in later multivariate analyses is on differences between the pre-program and program periods only.) However, it is important to indicate patterns and profiles of arrests of the sample youth in all of the periods, and to demonstrate that our pre-program-period and program-period arrest findings are representative of the frequencies and types of arrests of the sample youth across their entire arrest histories to date.

More program youth (93.2%) had arrest histories than comparison youth (70.3%). Only a

[1] The eight types of arrest charges are categorized as: serious violence, total violence, drugs, property, weapons, public disturbance, alcohol, other. See Appendix A for a complete list of charges.

small percentage of program youth (29.1%) had no arrests in either a prior-to-pre-program, pre-program, program or post-program period, while very few program youth (6.4%) had no arrests across all periods. In all periods, there were more program youth (85.7%) than comparison youth (48.5%) arrested, particularly in the pre-program period (Table 7.4).

Furthermore, while program youth tended to cluster in the categories of medium-/high-frequency arrests, comparison youth tended to cluster in the categories of no/low arrests in the pre-program period. While only 17.5% of program youth had no arrests in the pre-program period, 55.5% of comparison youth had no arrests in the pre-program period. Also, 31.8% of program youth had 4 or more arrests in the (matched) three-year pre-program period, while only 9.9% of comparison youth had 4 or more arrests in that period. Program youth were more likely to be chronic offenders (Table 7.5).

A greater percentage of program youth than comparison youth were arrested for each category of offense in the pre-program period. This was particularly so for serious violence (18.3% versus 4.4%), public disturbance (33.7% verus 22.2%), and drug offenses (25.0% verus 17.8%). Furthermore, program youth were more likely to be arrested for multiple categories of offenses than were comparison youth. Arrests across the different offense categories were higher for program youth (2.3 per youth) than for comparison youth (1.8 per youth). Program youth were responsible for (or at least involved in) 27.8% more arrests than comparison youth in the pre-program period (Table 7.6).

A specialization effect towards more violence and drug offenses persisted for program youth across all arrest periods – prior-to-pre-program, pre-program, program, and post-program. The percentage of arrests for violence-and-drugs, and for violence or drugs alone, tended to be

considerably greater as a proportion of total arrests (85.6% for program youth versus 69.0% for comparison youth). On the other hand, the percentage of arrests for all other types of offenses – excluding violence and drugs – was greater as a proportion of total arrests for comparison youth (31.0%) than for program youth (14.4%) (Table 7.7).

Probation/Parole and Confinement Histories

We obtained information on the probation/parole status and confinement experiences of comparison and program youth, both from youth interviews at Time I and/or Time II and from the Pima County Juvenile Court Center. More program youth (74.5%, n = 79) were on probation or parole than comparison youth (42.6%, n = 43), regardless of interview time period. Only 4 program youth and 5 comparison youth had been on parole, but 2 program youth had been both on parole and probation at the Time-I interview.

A higher proportion of program youth with arrest records in the pre-program and/or program periods (n = 111) had confinement experience, (i.e., incarceration or detention) than did comparison youth (n = 68) – almost three times as many program youth (53.1%, n = 59) as comparison youth (19.1%, n = 13). Program youth also spent more time in detention and correctional institutions: 15.3% of program youth but only 4.4% of comparison youth spent more than 10.0% of time in confinement during the pre-program and program periods (Table 7.8).

Gang-Membership Status

There were some interesting differences in gang-membership patterns between program and comparison youth. Based on self-reports at the Time-I interview (and confirmed by worker-

tracking data), fewer program youth were gang members (52.4%) or associate gang members (28.6%) than comparison youth (58.4% gang members; 41.6% associate gang members). The key difference was that a substantial number of program youth (19.1%) declared they were non-gang youth; no comparison youth said they were not gang members (Table 7.9). Furthermore, there appeared to be limited differences in the levels or progression of gang membership between the two samples over time. At the Time-I interview, fewer program youth (49.1%) than comparison youth (57.4%) said they were former gang members, while slightly more comparison youth (29.7%) than program youth (25.5%) reported they had always been active as gang members (Table 7.10). In Chapter 9, we examine whether the program had a differential effect on youth who were gang members, gang-member associates or non-gang youth, and in Chapter 10, whether the Project was associated with a change in the gang-membership status, per se, of program youth.

Drug Selling, Drug Use and Alcohol Use

Distinctions between drug use and drug selling among program and comparison youth were somewhat apparent and, again, may have reflected different levels of youth commitment to certain types of delinquent behaviors, and consequent arrest patterns. At the Time-I interview, a higher percentage of comparison youth (35.0%) than program youth (23.6%) said they were selling drugs, but a slightly higher percentage of program youth (59.4%) than comparison youth (54.5%) said they were using drugs. Program youth were relatively more likely to have been involved in arrests for violence, and comparison youth for illegal drug activity, in the pre-program period (Table 7.11).

Drug Selling. There were some differences in the kinds of drugs the youth admitted selling and the scope of their drug-selling activities. The primary drug sold was marijuana. Of those selling drugs, slightly more comparison youth (80.0%) said they sold marijuana than program youth (72.0%); more comparison youth (64.7%) than program youth (40.0%) sold cocaine; more program youth reported selling crack (60.0%) than comparison youth (34.3%). These differences may be accounted for by the different racial/ethnic configurations of the samples. More of the program youth were African-American, and perhaps had better access to market and distribution sources of crack. Comparison youth (17.1%) were more likely than program youth (8.3%) to have reported selling methamphetamines, possibly for similar reasons. Fewer youth in both samples sold other kinds of drugs. The range of drugs sold was clearly wide for both samples.

Drug Use. There was somewhat less difference in patterns of drug use. Almost all youth who said they used drugs used marijuana (comparison = 98.2%; program = 96.8%). Cocaine-use was slightly more prevalent for comparison youth (31.5%) than program youth (22.6%). A larger proportion of comparison youth (25.9%) had access to and used LSD than did program youth (9.5%). Although crack was not widely used, more program youth (4.8%) used it than did comparison youth (1.9%). A considerable number of program youth (11.1%) and comparison youth (7.4%) sniffed glue.

Alcohol Use. A higher proportion of youth in both samples said they consumed alcohol more than any kind of drug (comparison youth = 67.0%; program youth = 65.1%). A higher proportion of youth in both samples answered the questions about alcohol use than drug use.

Frequency of Selling/Use. More comparison youth than program youth responded to

frequency questions about selling drugs (program n =9; comparison n = 35) and using drugs (program n = 26; comparison n = 54); we are not sure why. Of special interest was that while almost 4 times as many comparison youth indicated they sold drugs about 18 days a month, a much smaller number of program youth indicated they were selling drugs 15 days of the month. It was apparent that drug selling was a more important activity for comparison youth than program youth.

Drug-use frequencies were equivalent in both samples (comparison youth = 16 days per month; program youth = 15 days per month). Alcohol use was slightly heavier for comparison youth (8 days per month) than for program youth (6 days per month). Use of drugs was more frequent than use of alcohol in both samples. Of special interest is that while program youth were more often serious offenders, we could argue that comparison youth were more often committed to using and selling drugs. Furthermore, more comparison youth (63.4%) were under 14 years of age than program youth (39.7%).

Summary

The large majority of youth in the two samples (N = 227) were males (70.5%). Slightly more males were in the comparison sample (71.3%) than in the program sample (69.8%). Although youth in both samples were mainly Latino (Mexican-American), they predominated more in the comparison sample (79.2%) than in the program sample (50.0%). African-Americans were a much larger subsample in the program sample (41.3%) than in the comparison sample (12.9%). There were very high proportions of younger youth (14-years and younger) in both samples, but particularly in the comparison sample (63.4%) compared to the program

sample (39.7%). Relatively few youth were 17-years and over in either the program sample (8.7%) or the comparison sample (5.0%).

Program youth were considerably more delinquent than comparison youth (based on arrest and more-extensive confinement records). Ninety-three and six-tenths percent (93.6%) of the program youth, but only 60.3% of the comparison youth, had arrest records. Program youth had been arrested more often. More program youth (55.6%) compared to comparison youth (19.8%) had chronic arrest records, i.e., 2 or more arrests in the pre-program period alone.

Of special note was the different patterns of offenses for which program and comparison youth were arrested in the total criminal-history arrest period (prior-to-pre-program, pre-program, program, and post-program). While 85.6% of program youth had arrests for violence/drugs (including violence/no drugs and drugs/no violence), only 69.0% of comparison youth had these arrests. Drug arrests were relatively more frequent for program youth (35.7%) than for comparison youth (19.8%). On the other hand, property arrests and "other" arrests (excluding violence and drug arrests) were more frequent for comparison youth (31.0%) than for program youth (14.4%).

Self-report data indicated that more comparison (35.0%) youth were involved in selling drugs than program youth (23.6%). Patterns of drug use were similar for both samples. Slightly more program youth (59.4%) than comparison youth (54.5%) used drugs. Both samples of youth said they were using and selling drugs every other day in the month. There was more-frequent use of drugs than alcohol. The principal drug used was marijuana; the principal drugs sold were marijuana and powdered cocaine. The problem of drug-use was more serious among younger comparison than program youth.

More program youth (74.5%) than comparison youth (42.6%) had probation/parole experience, and more program youth (53.1%) than comparison youth (19.1%) had detention and/or correctional-institution experience (and for longer periods of time).

There were some unexpected differences in patterns of gang- and associate-gang-membership status in the two samples. At the Time-I interview, more program youth reported they were non-gang youth (19.1%) than did comparison youth (0%).

Table 7.1
Demographic Characteristics of Youth Samples (N = 227)

Gender

Youth Sample	Male	Female	Total
	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)
Comparison	72 (71.3)	29 (28.7)	101 (44.5)
Program	88 (69.8)	38 (30.2)	126 (22.5)
Total	160 (70.5)	67 (29.5)	227 (100.0)

Table 7.2
Demographic Characteristics of Youth Samples (N = 227)

Race/Ethnicity

Youth Sample	African-American	Latino (Mexican-American)	Other[a]	Total
	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)
Comparison	13 (12.9)	80 (79.2)	8 (7.9)	101 (44.5)
Program	52 (41.3)	63 (50.0)	11 (8.7)	126 (55.5)
Total	65 (28.6)	143 (63.0)	19 (8.4)	227 (100.0)

[a] Comparison Sample: non-Latino white (n = 2), Native-American (n = 5), Asian-American (n = 1); Program Sample: non-Latino white (n = 3), Native-American (n = 6), Asian-American (n = 3).

Table 7.3
Demographic Characteristics of Youth Samples (N = 227)

Age Categories at Program Entry

Youth Sample	14 and Under[a]	15 to 16	17 and Over[b]	Total
	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)
Comparison	64 (63.4)	32 (31.7)	5 (5.0)	101 (44.5)
Program	50 (39.7)	65 (51.6)	11 (8.7)	126 (55.5)
Total	114 (50.2)	97 (42.7)	16 (7.1)	227 (100.0)

[a] There were 63 youth under 14 years old: in the comparison sample, 3 youth were 11 years old, 11 were 12 years old, and 20 were 13 years old – totaling 34 youth under 14 years of age; in the program sample, 1 youth was 9 years old, 5 were 11, 9 were 12, and 14 were 13 years old – totaling 29 youth under 14 years of age.

[b] There were 9 youth over 18 years: in the comparison sample, 1 youth was 19 years old and 1 was 20 years old – totaling 2 youth over 18 years of age; in the program sample, 2 youth were 19 years old, 4 were 20, and 1 was 21 years old – totaling 7 youth over 18 years of age.

Table 7.4
Number of Youth Arrested (N = 227)

Prior-to-Pre-Program, Pre-Program and Program Periods

Youth Sample	Arrest Period				Total
	Prior-to-Pre-Program-Period Only	Pre-Program and Other Periods	Program-Period Only	No Arrests	
	n (%)	n (%)	n (%)	n (%)	n (%)
Comparison	3 (3.0)	49 (48.5)	19 (18.8)	30 (29.7)	101 (44.5)
Program	7 (5.6)	108 (85.7)	3 (2.4)	8 (6.4)	126 (55.5)
Total	10 (4.4)	157 (69.2)	22 (6.7)	38 (16.7)	227 (100.0)

Table 7.5
Total Arrest-Frequency Category

Pre-Program Period Only

Youth Sample	Arrest-Frequency Category							
	0 = None		Low = .1 to1.9		Medium = 2 to 3.9		High = 4 and higher	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Comparison (N = 101)	56	55.5	25	24.8	10	9.9	10	9.9
Program (N = 126)	22	17.5	34	27.0	30	23.8	40	31.8
Total (N = 227)	78	34.4	59	26.0	40	17.6	50	22.0

Table 7.6
Arrests by Type of Offense[a]
Comparison and Program Youth[b]

Pre-Program Period

Arrest Category [c]	Comparison Youth (N=45)		Program Youth (N=104)	
	n	% [d]	n	% [c]
Serious Violence	2	(4.4)	19	(18.3)
Less-Serious Violence	17	(37.8)	42	(40.4)
Drugs	8	(17.8)	26	(25.0)
Property	23	(51.1)	58	(55.8)
Weapons	1	(2.2)	4	(3.9)
Public Disturbance	10	(22.2)	35	(33.7)
Alcohol	3	(6.7)	8	(7.7)
Other	17	(37.8)	49	(47.1)
Total Arrests[e]	81	(100.0)	241	(100.0)

[a] The type of offense refers to the eight categories of arrest charges for which youth were arrested (see Appendix A).

[b] Excludes 4 program youth with no worker-tracking records, and their matched comparison youth.

[c] The sum of youth arrested in these eight categories does not equal the total number of youth who were arrested in the pre-program period. If a youth was arrested more than once for the same or different types of offenses, he was recorded each time in the different arrest categories.

[d] Percentage of youth who were arrested in a particular arrest category.

[e] *Total arrests* is the sum of youth arrested in the eight offense categories. The same youth may have been arrested more than once in the same category, or in several categories.

Table 7.7
Arrest Patterns of Youth Samples (N=227)

All Arrest Periods[a]

Youth Sample	Violence[b]/Drugs	Violence/No Drugs	Drugs/ No Violence	No Drugs/No Violence[c]	No Arrests	Total
	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N %
Comparison	14 (13.9)	29 (28.7)	6 (5.9)	22 (21.8)	30 (29.7)	101 (44.5)
Program	31 (24.6)	56 (44.5)	14 (11.1)	17 (13.5)	8 (6.4)	126 (55.5)
Total	45 (19.8)	85 (37.5)	20 (8.8)	39 (17.2)	38 (16.7)	227 (100.0)

[a] All youth were classified by type by arrests, regardless of whether arrests occurred in prior-to-pre-program, pre-program, program or post-program periods.

[b] Includes serious and less-serious violence arrests

[c] Includes arrests for all types of offenses excluding violence and/or drugs.

Table 7.8
Confinement Experience – Youth with Arrests (N = 179)

Pre-Program and/or Program Periods

Youth Sample	% Confinement [a]				Total Youth
	None	<0.1	0.1 to 0.24	>=0.25	
	n (%)	n (%)	n (%)	n (%)	n (%)
Comparison	55 (80.9)	10 (14.7)	2 (2.9)	1 (1.5)	68 (38.0)
Program	52 (46.9)	42 (37.8)	11 (9.9)	6 (5.4)	111 (62.0)
Total	107 (59.8)	52 (29.1)	13 (7.3)	7 (3.9)	179 (100.0)

[a] The ratio of days in detention and/or incarceration to days at risk in the program and/or pre-program period.

Table 7.9
Gang-Membership Status of Youth (N = 227)

From Time-I Self-Report Data or Worker-Tracking Data[a]

Youth Sample	Non-Gang Youth	Gang Member	Associate Gang Member	Total
	n (%)	n (%)	n (%)	N (%)
Comparison	0 (0.0)	59 (58.4)	42 (41.6)	101 (44.5)
Program	24 (19.1)	66 (52.4)	36 (28.6)	126 (55.5)
Total	24 (10.6)	125 (55.1)	78 (34.4)	227 (100.0)

[a] If the self-report and worker-tracking data differed, the self-report data were used.

Table 7.10
Gang-Membership Status and Gang Activity of Youth
Time I Interview[a] (N=227)

Youth Sample	Non-gang Youth	Former Gang Member	Active Six Months Prior to Interview	Active in Past Six Months	Always Active	Unknown	Total
	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N %
Comparison w/ Interviews	0 (0.0)	58 (57.4)	10 (9.9)	3 (3.0)	30 (29.7)	0 (0.0)	101 (44.5)
Program w/ Interviews	20 (18.9)	52 (49.1)	7 (6.6)	0 (0.0)	27 (25.5)	0 (0.0)	106 (46.7)
Program w/o Interviews	4 (20.0)	0 (9.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	16 (80.0)	20 (8.8)
Total	24 (10.6)	110 (48.5)	17 (7.5)	3 (1.3)	57 (25.1)	16 (7.1)	227 (100.0)

[a] For those program youth (n=20) who were not interviewed, no specific gang activity or change-status is reported. However, program youth could be identified as either a gang member or non-gang youth from the worker-tracking data (see Table 7.9).

Table 7.11
Type of Drug Selling/Drug Use

Youth Interviewed at Time I (N = 207)

Type of Drug	Drug Selling				Drug Use			
	Comparison (n = 100)		Program (n = 106)		Comparison (n = 101)		Program (n = 106)	
	Response = yes and no (n)	% yes	Response = yes and no (n)	% yes	Response = yes and no (n)	% yes	Response = yes and no (n)	% yes
Any Drug	(100)	35.0	(106)	23.6	(101)	54.5	(106)	59.4
Marijuana	(35)	80.0	(25)	72.0	(55)	98.2	(63)	96.8
Cocaine	(34)	64.7	(25)	40.0	(54)	31.5	(62)	22.6
Crack	(35)	34.3	(25)	60.0	(54)	1.9	(63)	4.8
Heroin	(35)	0.0	(25)	0.0	(54)	1.9	(63)	1.6
Methamphetamine	(35)	17.1	(24)	8.3	(54)	5.6	(63)	6.4
PCP	(35)	5.7	(24)	0.0	(54)	3.7	(63)	3.2
LSD	(35)	3.1	(24)	8.3	(54)	25.9	(63)	9.5
Glue	—	—	—	—	(54)	7.4	(63)	11.1
Gas	—	—	—	—	(54)	1.9	(63)	1.6
Other	(32)	3.1	(24)	(4.2)	(50)	4.0	(58)	3.2
Alcohol					(100)	67.0	(86)	65.1

Chapter 8

Program Services and Worker Contacts

(Rolando V. Sosa)

Introduction

The OJJDP Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program was based on the assumption that not only the individual youth, but the community and its organizations and programs were involved in both the creation and the solution (or amelioration) of the youth gang problem. The Comprehensive Gang Program Model was based on concepts of community disorganization and lack of socio-economic opportunities. It assumed that key organizations in the community were not adequately coordinated in developing an appropriate program-approach of worker contacts and services, and that sufficient resources might not have been available to target gang-involved or highly gang-at-risk youth. A truly comprehensive approach was necessary, one which included different types of agencies and local groups concerned with and/or closely related to gang youth, their families, and to those at highest risk of gang delinquency. The Model required that agencies and grassroots groups develop and refocus their programs to better target youth, particularly through an appropriate combination of coordinated school, job, counseling, and suppression activities.

The Projects at the five Model demonstration sites were not only expected to mobilize agency and grassroots elements, but to establish outreach contacts with targeted gang youth who were partially, and not interactively, served and socially controlled. From a structure and process

perspective, the Model required not only a steering committee of community leaders and the involvement of representatives of key organizations, but also an outreach team consisting of street-level workers from the key organizations and community groups concerned with the youth-gang problem. The community direct-service or contact team should include police officers, probation officers, outreach youth workers and case managers, as well as teachers, manpower workers and specialized treatment workers. In particular, probation and police officers should be interested in providing social support as well as suppression. Outreach youth workers should come from the same gang neighborhoods and be able to assist youth with social support, e.g., crisis intervention, access to drug treatment and family counseling, as well as referral for training, jobs, and further education.

The workers were to target selected youth from certain gangs and gang segments. The youth were expected to be gang members who were chronic delinquents, gang associates, and youth at high risk for both gang membership and delinquency. The Project team was to implement program strategies – particularly social services, provision of social opportunities, and suppression – in an interrelated and balanced manner. Agency services would have to be modified and coordinated, with emphasis on outreach. Worker services and contacts would extend over a period of months or years, with intensive and frequent contacts with hardcore gang-delinquent youth. The workers were expected to be skilled both in working with gang youth and agencies, as well as highly committed to implementing the Model.

In Tucson, the Comprehensive Gang Program Model was not as well developed as it could have been. Probation officers were the primary source of referral of youth to the program during the Project period, followed by Our Town – the lead agency. The program was primarily

social-service in its orientation, with focus on early intervention for younger youth. Outreach youth workers and case managers were the key providers of services and contacts; probation/parole officers and to some extent treatment-agency workers were less collaboratively involved. The participation of police and neighborhood or grassroots organizations in the work or direction of the program was even more limited.

A targeting question was whether the Project in fact worked more with gang-at-risk and less-delinquent youth than with seriously gang-delinquent youth. The majority of youth in the program did not have a history of serious violence or drug arrests. Youth with fewer arrests were generally provided with more services than those who had more arrests. Outreach youth workers were not street-based; they generally confined their services and contacts to youth referred to the program by juvenile probation officers. Coordination of Project-worker, police, and probation contacts and services was not fully developed. Outreach youth workers and case managers took almost all responsibility for services to program youth, and for initiating contacts with workers of other agencies on their behalf.

The Worker Tracking Form

The major instrument for obtaining data regarding services to and contacts with program youth by the different Project workers was the 12-page Worker Tracking Form. It contained mainly closed-ended, check-off items, but also some open-ended questions. Each worker was expected to classify and summarize the nature and scope of his/her direct contacts with program youth and the services provided (including referral services) during each three-month calendar quarter. An accounting of coordinated contacts was also very important, i.e., which other

workers (both Project workers and workers from outside Project-related agencies, e.g., schools and treatment agency workers) were contacted in regard to the youth. This information measured the nature and level of coordination of efforts in regard to particular youth, a key indicator of the collaboration component of the Comprehensive Gang Program Model.

The Worker Tracking Form requested the following types of information from the worker: identification of the worker and his organization; identification of the youth; the youth's demographics (age, race/ethnicity, etc.) and gang affiliation (along with rank in the gang); the dates of worker contact with the youth (first contact after program entry, first and last contact in the reporting period); number and types of contacts with the youth; types of services provided; referrals made on behalf of the youth; a rating of the youth's progress; identification of services or referrals felt by the worker to be most helpful to the youth; and observations and ratings by the worker regarding the youth's degree of involvement in various gang and non-gang delinquent activities during the reporting period.

Fifty-five (55) services or activities of workers were identified, and then classified into 8 major service/activity categories for analytic purposes: case planning, group-oriented services, individual counseling, family counseling, school-related services, job-related services, suppression, and material support. Project probation officers, police and outreach youth workers and various other Project-affiliated workers from outside agencies were the principal workers expected to supply services to or have contacts with youth. At the Tucson site, Worker Tracking Forms were completed mainly by outreach youth workers, probation officers, and case managers, and to a limited extent by Project police officers and contracted treatment-agency workers. No other types of workers (even though sometimes closely involved in providing services and

contacts to program youth) completed the Tracking Forms.

Project strategies were indicated by specific categories of services and contacts, for example: *social intervention* – individual counseling, group discussion and family counseling (including crisis intervention); *social opportunities provision* – vocational or job-related and/or education-related services such as job placement, school placement, GED program and continuing education; *suppression* – arrest, probation, parole, confinement, detention, monitoring, surveillance. The strategy of *community mobilization* or interagency collaboration at the direct-service or worker-contact level was indicated at the level of the worker's coordinated contacts, i.e., referrals, planning, and activities with each other in relation to a particular youth. The strategy of *organizational change and development* at the aggregate level was indicated by the program's focus on the different types and combinations of services and contacts the Project developed over time.

Forms Completed. One-thousand and ninety-eight (1,098) Worker Tracking Forms for 125 program youth were completed during the Tucson Project period. (One additional youth appeared in program-entry records, but no information was available on the length of his stay in the program, or any services provided to him.) Outreach youth workers began to complete forms in January 1997, when program operations started.

We included all 125 youth with worker tracking records in the aggregate-level program service/contact analysis. However, only 111 of these youth were provided with Project services and contacts for one month or more during the program period. Of the 125 youth, 106 completed a Time-I gang-member interview. Our analysis revealed that there was little difference in the characteristics of youth, or in the scope or nature of services and contacts provided to youth,

whether they were interviewed or not.

A total of 5,097 services were provided, and 13,541 worker contacts made (probably underestimates) to the 125 program youth during the 3½-year program period, 1996-1999. An average of 8.7 Worker Tracking Forms were completed for each of the 125 youth. Eight outreach youth workers and four case managers completed 727 (66.2%) forms; six juvenile probation officers completed 131 (11.9%); two juvenile parole officers completed 17 (1.6%); one police officer and one police detective with the TPD Gang Unit completed 81 (7.4%); and one clinician and two counselors from local treatment and community-based youth agencies completed 142 (12.9%) forms.

We believe the content of the forms provided an adequate basis to analyze the effects of different patterns of worker services and contacts for all youth in the program. The Tracking Forms, in addition to program-youth entry and exit records, were independent data sources accounting for youth and the length of time they were in the program.

Sources of Referral to the Program, and Youth Characteristics

All youth (N = 125) who participated in the program were included in the aggregate-level program-services and worker-contacts analysis, whether they were interviewed or not. Almost three-quarters of the youth (74.4%) were referred to the program by Juvenile Probation officers; 15.2% by Our Town workers (from youth already in their own agency program); and 8.0% directly by families in the community. Almost all youth (96.8%) entered the program in the first 2 ½ years of Project operations (Table 8.1).

The program comprised mainly males (69.6%) (females =30.4%). The youth were

primarily Latino (Mexican-origin) (48.0%), but there were also substantial numbers of African Americans (40.0%). Other racial/ethnic groups represented were American Indians (4.8%), non-Latino whites (2.4%), Asian Americans (1.6%), and youth who claimed a bi-racial background (3.2%). The two largest age groups were the 15- to 17-year-olds (49.6%) and the 10- to 14-year-olds (41.6%); the 18- to 21-year-olds were the smallest group (8.0%) (Table 8.2).

Dosage of Services and Worker Contacts

Youth were in the program for an average of 20.8 months (median = 19.4 months). They were provided with more contacts than services, at least based on the worker-tracking reports. On average, youth were provided with 5.3 contacts and 2.0 services per month. While a variety of workers had contacts with youth, relatively few of the contacts were coordinated contacts. On average, less than one (0.9) of the approximately five worker contacts per youth per month were coordinated contacts. Workers from Our Town operated pretty much on their own (Table 8.3).

Types of Services Provided, and Change Patterns Over Time

The primary services or activities were case planning (24.1%) and group counseling (20.3%). Considerably less individual counseling (13.9%) and family counseling (29.8%) occurred than would have been expected and (perhaps) required, given the young age of most youth and their extensive arrest backgrounds. Job services (4.1%) and school services (8.5%) were least often provided. Moderate amounts of suppression services (13.8%) and material support (12.6%) were also given (Table 8.4).

More youth were provided services in the latter part of the program than in the first part.

However, relatively more services per youth were provided in the earlier part of the program, particularly individual counseling, family counseling, job and school services, and even suppression activities. More case planning and group counseling were made available in the latter years of the program. The quality of services differed between the early and latter parts of the Project's duration. In the second half of the program, more youth were provided with less services, which tended to be less individualized. The greatest decrease occurred for suppression services, from 20.1% of total services in the first six months of program operations, when it was the primary service offered, to 8.8% in the last six months.

The greatest number of services to the most youth over the 3½-year program were provided by Our Town outreach youth workers and case managers (28.8 services per youth), followed by probation officers (17.0 services), treatment-agency personnel (13.0 services), and police (3.9). The outreach youth workers and case managers primarily provided case planning (28.2%), and group (23.6%), school-related (11.0%), and job-related services (5.7%). The probation officers mainly provided suppression (57.0%) and case planning (18.2%). Police said they provided significant amounts of group services (27.4%), individual counseling or advice (22.3%), and case planning (17.7%), as well as suppression services (29.1%). Treatment-agency workers provided the greatest amount of individual counseling (51.8%) and family counseling (16.6%), but the least amount of case planning (9.5%), to the fewest youth (n = 41) (Table 8.5).

Patterns of Service

Patterns of services varied somewhat based on the particular demographic characteristics and criminal histories of program youth, i.e., gender, age, race/ethnicity, gang-membership

status, pre-program arrests,[1] and pre-program confinement length.

Gender. Although there were more males (69.6%) than females (30.4%) in the program, males and females were provided with equivalent numbers of services per youth over the entire program period: 40.8 services per female, 40.7 services per male. Types of services varied. As a proportion of total services, males were provided with relatively more suppression (15.0%) than were females (11.0%), but females were provided with slightly more family counseling (4.1% versus 2.4%), individual counseling (15.7% versus 13.1%), and school services (9.2% versus 8.1%) compared to males (Table 8.6a).

Age. An important difference in the pattern of services provided to youth was based on age. Younger youth 10-14 years old were provided with relatively more services per youth (49.0) than were 15- to 17-year-olds (37.6), and more than twice as many services as the 18- to 21-year-olds (20.7). The difference in patterns of services-provision by age of youth was unexpected. The youngest age group (10-14 years) was provided with the most suppression, group counseling, and family counseling, and the least case planning and material support. The 15- to 17-year-olds were provided with slightly more case planning, material support, individual counseling and job services than the other age groups; they were provided with the least amount of suppression and job services. The oldest age group (18 to 21 years) was provided with an average amount of all types of services, compared to the other age groups (Table 8.6b).

Race/Ethnicity. The two major racial/ethnic groups receiving services were the

[1] For purposes of later analyses, we focused on arrests in the pre-program and program periods. *Pre-program arrests* refers to the total number of arrests the youth had during the pre-program period, which covered the period just prior to the youth's entry into the program, and is equivalent to the length of time the youth was in the program. However, a small number of youth (n = 16) had no arrests in the pre-program or program period, but did have arrests in the prior-to-pre-program and/or post-program periods. These youth also were provided with services; we identify them as the "excluded" group.

Latino/Mexican-American youth (n = 60) and the African-American youth (n = 50). While Latino youth were provided with slightly more services per youth (41.3) than African-American youth (38.0), there were some differences in the types of services provided. African-American youth were provided with more case-planning and job/school services, and less individual/family counseling and suppression services. More individual counseling was provided to Latino youth (16.4%) than to African-American youth (9.9%). It was difficult to compare patterns of services for youth of other race/ethnic backgrounds; so few were in the program (Table 8.6c).

Gang-Membership Status. Gang members were provided with slightly more services per youth (42.1) than were gang associates (40.9) or non-gang youth (37.0). The most important difference in pattern of suppression services provided was between gang members (15.1%) and gang associates (14.5%), compared to non-gang youth (8.5%). In other words, non-gang youth were generally provided with more non-suppression types of services, and gang associates were provided with somewhat more school-related services (Table 8.6d).

Pre-Program Arrests. There was little to distinguish the various service patterns among pre-program arrestee groups. Youth with pre-program arrests generally were provided with more services. Youth with 0 pre-program arrests were provided with 30.0 services; those with more than 0 and less than 1 pre-program arrests, 48.9; those with 1 to less than 2 pre-program arrests, 39.2; and youth with 2 or more pre-program arrests, 43.8. Youth with fewer arrests were provided with slightly more case planning and group services. Those with more arrests in the pre-program period were provided with more suppression services and slightly more individual and family counseling (Table 8.6e).

Pre-Program Confinement. Most youth had little or no history of detention or

incarceration in the pre-program period. Those with no pre-program confinement (n = 64) comprised 51.6% of youth; 27.4% (n = 34) had less than 5.0% of time in pre-program confinement; 6.5% (n = 8) had more than 5.0% but less than 10.0% of time in confinement; and 14.5% (n = 18) had 10.0% or more of pre-program time in detention or incarceration. Those youth with less confinement experience were generally provided with more services, though youth with more confinement experience were provided with slightly more case planning, material support, individual counseling and job services (but not necessarily with more suppression services). Youth with less confinement experience were provided with more group counseling and school services, but all these differences were small (Table 8.6f).

In sum, the differences in patterns of services-provision were mainly that younger youth were provided with more services than older youth (especially more suppression for the 10- to 14-year-old group), and that gang members were provided with somewhat more suppression services than gang associates and non-gang youth. Overall, there wasn't really a lot of difference in the types of services provided to youth.

Patterns of Worker Contacts

The purpose and nature of the program may have been better reflected in the pattern of worker contacts than the pattern of services provided. While there was generally limited variation in the types of services provided to different youth, substantial variation occurred in the number of contacts by the different kinds of workers with program youth of differing characteristics. This was particularly the case in regard to the differential distribution of contacts made by outreach youth workers and case managers compared to probation/parole officers, who

together had the most contacts with youth in the program. The status or role of the worker should have been critical in determining the nature and effect of this (apparently) similar service-provision.

Gender. Males were provided with more contacts per youth during the program period. Outreach youth workers and case managers had an overall higher rate of contacts with females (72.5) than with males (51.8). This contrasted with the relatively greater proportion of contacts by Project probation/parole officers with males (47.6) than with females (19.4). Treatment workers reported fewer contacts with youth, and had almost twice as many contacts (15.9) with females as with males (8.5). Police had few contacts with youth; slightly more with females (1.3) than with males (1.0) (Table 8.7a).

Age. Outreach youth workers and case managers had a higher rate of contact with youth across all age groups (particularly with 18- to 21-year-olds) than did probation/parole officers. This could have been for jurisdictional reasons restricting probation and parole officers to dealing with juveniles. Nevertheless, focus by all workers was on the youngest age group (10-14 years), which had the highest number of contacts. Probation/parole officers had relatively more contacts with 10- to 14-year-olds than with 15- to 17-year-olds, compared to outreach youth workers and case managers. Treatment workers and police focused their efforts more on the younger (10- to 14-year-old youth) than on other age groups (Table 8.7b).

Race/Ethnicity. There were more contacts with Latino youth than with African-American youth, by all types of workers. The difference was more marked for probation workers (46.4 and 30.2) than by outreach youth workers and case manager (60.1 and 52.0). It was most marked for treatment workers, who had almost 8 times as many contacts with Latinos (16.7) as with African

Americans (2.2) (Table 8.7c).

Gang-Membership Status. Project workers overall had more contacts with gang members than with gang associates, and more contacts with gang associates than with non-gang youth. However, probation/parole officers had relatively more contact with gang members (49.7); outreach youth workers and case managers were more often in contact with gang associates; police were also more often in contact with gang associates; and treatment workers more often with non-gang youth. Priority targeting of gang members was carried out only by probation/parole officers (Table 8.7.d).

Pre-Program Arrests. Overall, Project workers targeted delinquent rather than non-delinquent youth. This was particularly so for probation/parole, police officers, outreach youth workers and case managers. Nevertheless, overall priority appeared to be targeting youth who were starting their delinquent careers (as evidenced by arrests in the pre-program period); that is, youth who had arrests, but less than one arrest per year, on average, during the program period. This was particularly true for outreach youth workers, case managers and treatment workers. The most delinquent youth were relatively more often targeted for contacts by probation/parole and police officers (Table 8.7e).

Pre-Program Confinement. Again, the overall focus of contacts was on program youth with no or little pre-program confinement (i.e., detention or correctional institution) experience. Relatively more contacts by outreach workers and police were directed to youth with no or limited confinement experience. Probation workers appeared to focus their contacts on youth with some limited confinement experience in the pre-program period (Table 8.7f).

Coordinated Worker Contacts

Data from worker-tracking records permitted us to construct a *worker coordination* variable, i.e., types of coordinated contacts that each type of Project worker initiated with other types of workers, both inside and outside the Project. Coordination involved sharing information, planning complementary activities, and carrying out joint efforts in regard to particular youth. The Model required coordination of different types of workers who had different strategies with gang youth. Increased coordinated contacts was a sign of reduced community disorganization at the formal, organizational level. It indicated a balance and integration of different strategies in work with gang youth and gang situations. An increasing level of coordination was expected to result in lower levels of arrests of program youth.

There were 13, 541 worker contacts with program youth; however, only 2,217 (16.4%) of these were coordinated contacts. This suggested a somewhat low level of coordination or collaboration of workers with each other in respect to program youth. Outreach youth workers and case managers were the primary initiators of coordinated contacts with probation and police officers, school, treatment and non-Project agency workers, as well as with other workers within Our Town. Outreach youth workers and case managers accounted for almost two-thirds (65.5%) of all coordinated contacts during the 3½-year period of program operations, in contrast to probation/parole (18.2%), police (4.4%), and treatment personnel (11.9%) (Table 8.8a).

Not only were Our Town Project outreach youth workers and case managers the predominant initiators of coordinated contacts, but the primary receivers of these contacts were other Our Town staff. In other words, the outreach youth workers and case managers were mainly oriented to similar workers in their own agency. No other type of Project-related worker

was so heavily oriented to their own staff for coordinated contacts. A greater proportion of probation/parole, police, and treatment workers initiated their coordinated contacts with outreach youth workers and case managers than vice versa.

Although total worker coordinated contacts increased between the first and second halves of the program, the proportion of coordinated contacts within agencies increased, especially for outreach and treatment workers. Outreach youth workers and case managers increased their coordinated contacts with other Our Town workers from 52.8% to 70.4% of total contacts. Outreach youth workers and case managers decreased their coordinated contacts with police, probation/parole and school personnel. On the other hand, probation/parole and police workers increased their coordinated contacts with school workers, outreach youth workers and case managers (Table 8.8b-c).

Our Town workers (and also treatment-agency workers) were increasingly oriented to their own social-intervention strategies and less to a social-control or suppression strategy. Police and probation/parole workers became increasingly oriented to a social-intervention and social-opportunity strategy. Over the course of the program period, probation/parole, police, and treatment workers were increasingly committed – while Our Town outreach workers and case managers were decreasingly committed – to the collaborative Model. Our Town appeared to operate more and more on the basis of a straight social-intervention model.

Summary

The analysis of services and worker contacts provided to 125 Tucson program youth was based on data derived from 1,098 Worker Tracking Forms over the full 3½-year program period,

January 1, 1996 through June 30, 1999. (Almost ninety percent [89.6%] of youth entered the program in a two-year period between July 1996 and June 1998.) The forms (an average 8.7 per youth) were completed every three months by Project workers, mainly by outreach youth workers and case managers (66.0%), but also by probation and parole officers (13.6%), police (7.4%), and other Project-related agency workers (13.0%).

A total of 5,097 services and 13,541 direct worker contacts were provided by Project workers to program youth; 2,217 (16.4% – less than 1 in 5) of all worker contacts were coordinated contacts, i.e., involved some level of collaboration with other workers. Most youth (74.4%) were referred to the program by juvenile probation and parole officers; the remainder (15.2%) primarily by Our Town Family Center itself. On average, youth spent 20.8 months (median 19.4) in the program, and were provided with an average of 2.0 services and 5.3 contacts per month.

On average, youth were provided with slightly more services in the earlier than in the later years of the program. The percentage of services provided were: case planning (24.1%); group counseling (20.3%); individual counseling (13.9%); suppression (13.8%). Lower levels of school-related (8.5%), job-related (4.1%) and family counseling (2.9%) services were also provided. On average, outreach youth workers provided the largest number of services per youth (28.8) to the largest number of youth (n = 120), followed by probation/parole (17.0 services per youth to 55 youth), treatment workers (13.0 services per youth to 41 youth), and police (3.9 services or contacts per youth to 45 youth).

Patterns of services provided were generally similar regardless of demographic characteristics of youth. There were more than twice as many males as females in the program.

About an equal number of services per youth were provided to males and females (40.8 and 40.7); males had slightly more suppression contacts than females. Younger youth (10-14 years) were provided with more services, on average, than older youth, including slightly more suppression services. There was little difference in patterns of services based on the race/ethnicity of youth, except that Latino youth were provided with slightly more job and school-related services. Gang and associate gang members were provided with slightly more services, particularly suppression services, than non-gang youth. In general, the focus of services was on youth who had less than 1 arrest per year, on average, in the pre-program period.

The dominant characteristic of the program appeared to be early social intervention, with focus on youth who were younger and just beginning their delinquency careers. There was less difference in patterns of services provided by different Project workers than in the patterns of who they provided services to. Outreach youth workers, case managers and treatment workers had relatively more contacts with females than males; probation and parole officers were relatively more often in contact with males than females. All types of workers focused their contacts more often on younger rather than older youth. Outreach youth workers and case managers had relatively more contacts with gang associates and non-gang youth than gang members, while probation and parole officers had relatively more contacts with gang members than associate gang members.

Our Town outreach youth workers and case managers initiated coordinated (or collaborative) contacts mainly with other workers, rather than vice versa. This pattern of coordinated contacts increased as the program developed, so that by the last half of the Project period the Our Town workers' coordinated contacts were 70.4% of their total contacts. The

largest proportion of coordinated contacts by Our Town workers was with other workers in their own agency. Project workers from other agencies were relatively more likely to coordinate with Our Town workers than with their own agency personnel.

Our Town appeared to operate more on the basis of a traditional social-intervention model than the collaborative social-intervention/suppression/ social-opportunities and interagency-collaborative Model of the OJJDP Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression Program.

Table 8.1
Source of Youth Referral to Program
By Year and 6-Month Period

Source of Referral	Year and 6-Month Period percent and (n)							
	1996		1997		1998		1999	Total % (n)
	1-1 to 6-30	7-1 to 12-31	1-1 to 6-30	7-1 to 12-31	1-1 to 6-30	7-1 to 12-31	1-1 to 6-30	
Probation/Parole	6.4 (8)	11.2 (14)	22.4 (28)	16.8 (21)	16.0 (20)	0	1.6 (2)	74.4 (93)
Our Town Family Center	0	0.8 (1)	3.2 (4)	2.4 (3)	7.2 (9)	0.8 (1)	0.8 (1)	15.2 (19)
Family	0.8 (1)	0	0	1.6 (2)	5.6 (7)	0	0	8.0 (10)
Self	0	0	0	0.8 (1)	0	0	0	0.8 (1)
School	0	0	0	0	0.8 (1)	0	0	0.8 (1)
Don't Know	0	0	0	0	0.8 (1)	0	0	0.8 (1)
Total	7.2 (9)	12.0 (15)	25.6 (32)	21.6 (27)	30.4 (38)	0.8 (1)	2.4 (3)	100.0 (125)

Table 8.2
Selected Demographic Characteristics of Youth at Program Entry
By Year and 6-Month Period

Selected Demographic Characteristics [a]	Year and 6-Month Period percent and (n)							
	1996		**1997**		**1998**		**1999**	**Total % (n)**
	1-1 to 6-30	7-1 to 12-31	1-1 to 6-30	7-1 to 12-31	1-1 to 6-30	7-1 to 12-31	1-1 to 6-30	
Male	6.4 (8)	11.2 (14)	15.2 (19)	18.4 (23)	16.8 (21)	0	1.6 (2)	69.6 (87)
Female	0.8 (1)	0.8 (1)	10.4 (13)	3.2 (4)	13.6 (17)	0.8 (1)	0.8 (1)	30.4 (38)
Latino[b]	0.8 (1)	4.8 (6)	17.6 (22)	8.0 (10)	14.4 (18)	0.8 (1)	1.6 (2)	48.0 (60)
African-American	4.8 (6)	5.6 (7)	5.6 (7)	11.2 (14)	12.0 (15)	0	0.8 (1)	40.0 (50)
American Indian	0.8 (1)	0	0	2.4 (3)	1.6 (2)	0	0	4.8 (6)
Non-Latino White	0.8 (1)	1.6 (2)	0	0	0	0	0	2.4 (3)
Asian American	0	0	0.8 (1)	0	0.8 (1)	0	0	1.6 (2)
Bi-racial	0	0	1.6 (2)	0	1.6 (2)	0	0	3.2 (4)
10 to 14 years old	3.2 (4)	2.4 (3)	9.6 (12)	9.6 (12)	14.4 (18)	0.8 (1)	1.6 (2)	41.6 (52)
15 to 17 years old	4.0 (5)	7.2 (9)	16.0 (20)	10.4 (13)	12.0 (15)	0	0	49.6 (62)
18 to 21 years-old	0	2.4 (3)	0	1.6 (2)	4.0 (5)	0	0	8.0 (10)
Total[c]	7.2 (9)	12.0 (15)	25.6 (32)	21.6 (27)	30.4 (38)	0.8 (1)	2.4 (3)	100.0 (125)

[a] One youth with missing birth date was excluded from the age-category analysis; age at program entry could not be calculated.

[b] Primarily youth of Mexican ancestry.

[c] Row and column percentage totals do not sum due to rounding.

Table 8.3
Dosage of Services and Contacts to Youth (N=124)[a]

Months in Program		Total Services	Services per Youth per Month	Total Direct Contacts	Direct Contacts per Youth per Month	Total Coordinated Contacts	Coordinated Contacts per Youth per Month
Mean	Median						
20.8	19.4	5,066	2.0	13,541	5.3	2,217	0.9

[a] Excludes one youth who was in the program for less than 1 month.

Table 8.4
Number of Types of Services[a] by 6-month Period for All Youth (N=125)
(1,098 Worker Tracking Forms)

Year & 6-Mo. Period [b]	Case Planning	Material Support	Group Counseling	Individual Counseling	Family Counseling	Job Services	School Services	Suppression Services	Total Services	Number [c] of Youth	Services per Youth
1997 1	100	75	120	140	44	47	54	146	726	47	15.4
1997 2	197	170	137	161	26	46	105	120	962	69	13.9
1998 1	354	180	287	183	16	53	119	166	1358	102	13.3
1998 2	368	113	288	95	22	17	91	194	1188	104	11.4
1999 1	207	103	203	128	40	44	62	76	863	101	8.5
Totals	**1226**	**641**	**1035**	**707**	**148**	**207**	**431**	**702**	**5097**	**423**	**12.0**

Percentage of Types of Services[a] by 6-month Period for All Youth (N=125)
(1,098 Worker Tracking Forms)

Year & 6-Mo. Period [b]	Case Planning	Material Support	Group Counseling	Individual Counseling	Family Counseling	Job Services	School Services	Suppression Services	Total %
1997 1	13.8%	10.3%	16.5%	19.3%	6.1%	6.5%	7.4%	20.1%	100.0%
1997 2	20.5%	17.7%	14.2%	16.7%	2.7%	4.8%	10.9%	12.5%	100.0%
1998 1	26.1%	13.3%	21.1%	13.5%	1.2%	3.9%	8.8%	12.2%	100.0%
1998 2	31.0%	9.5%	24.2%	8.0%	1.9%	1.4%	7.7%	16.3%	100.0%
1999 1	24.0%	11.9%	23.5%	14.8%	4.6%	5.1%	7.2%	8.8%	100.0%
Totals	**24.1%**	**12.6%**	**20.3%**	**13.9%**	**2.9%**	**4.1%**	**8.5%**	**13.8%**	**100.0%**

a. Overall there were 5,097 services provided to 125 youth. Eight outreach youth workers and four case managers completed 66.0% of the forms; six juvenile probation officers completed12.0% of the forms; two juvenile parole officers completed 1.6% of the forms; one police officer and one police gang detective completed 7.4% of the forms; and one clinician and two counselors from community-based youth and treatment organizations completed 13.0% of the forms from January 1996 to June 1999 (1,098 forms).

b. Period 1 = 1/1-6/30; Period 2 = 7/1-12/31.

c. The number of youth with particular services/contacts is not exclusive of the number of youth also provided with other types of services/contacts.

Table 8.5
Number of Types of Services by Type of Worker (N=125)
(1,098 Worker Tracking Forms)

Type of Worker	Case Planning	Material Support	Group Counseling	Individual Counseling	Family Counseling	Job Services	School Services	Suppression Services	Total Services	Number [a] of Youth	Services per Youth
Outreach Workers [b]	973	581	814	347	52	198	378	107	3450	120	28.8
Probation/Parole	171	34	96	44	7	6	45	534	937	55	17.0
Police	31	5	48	39	0	0	1	51	175	45	3.9
Treatment Agency	51	21	77	277	89	3	7	10	535	41	13.0
Totals	**1226**	**641**	**1035**	**707**	**148**	**207**	**431**	**702**	**5097**	**261**	**19.5**

Percentage of Types of Services by Type of Worker (N=125)
(1,098 Worker Tracking Forms)

Type of Worker	Case Planning	Material Support	Group Counseling	Individual Counseling	Family Counseling	Job Services	School Services	Suppression Services	Total %
Outreach Workers [b]	28.2%	16.8%	23.6%	10.1%	1.5%	5.7%	11.0%	3.1%	100.0%
Probation/Parole	18.2%	3.6%	10.2%	4.7%	0.7%	0.6%	4.8%	57.0%	100.0%
Police	17.7%	2.9%	27.4%	22.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%	29.1%	100.0%
Treatment Agency	9.5%	3.9%	14.4%	51.8%	16.6%	0.6%	1.3%	1.9%	100.0%
Totals	**24.1%**	**12.6%**	**20.3%**	**13.9%**	**2.9%**	**4.1%**	**8.5%**	**13.8%**	**100.0%**

a The number of youth with particular services/contacts is not exclusive of the number of youth also provided with other types of services/contacts.

b Includes youth outreach workers and case managers.

Table 8.6a
Number of Types of Services by Gender (N=125)
(1,098 Worker Tracking Forms)

Gender	Case Planning	Material Support	Group Counseling	Individual Counseling	Family Counseling	Job Services	School Services	Suppression Services	Total Services	Number of Youth	Services per Youth
Male	868	426	739	464	84	147	289	532	3549	87	40.8
Female	358	215	296	243	64	60	142	170	1548	38	40.7
Totals	**1226**	**641**	**1035**	**707**	**148**	**207**	**431**	**702**	**5097**	**125**	**40.8**

Percentage of Types of Services by Gender (N=125)
(1,098 Worker Tracking Forms)

Gender	Case Planning	Material Support	Group Counseling	Individual Counseling	Family Counseling	Job Services	School Services	Suppression Services	Total %
Male	24.5%	12.0%	20.8%	13.1%	2.4%	4.1%	8.1%	15.0%	100.0%
Female	23.1%	13.9%	19.1%	15.7%	4.1%	3.9%	9.2%	11.0%	100.0%
Totals	**24.1%**	**12.6%**	**20.3%**	**13.9%**	**2.9%**	**4.1%**	**8.5%**	**13.8%**	**100.0%**

Table 8.6b
Number of Types of Services by Age Category (N=124)[a]
(1,096 Worker Tracking Forms)

Age Category	Case Planning	Material Support	Group Counseling	Individual Counseling	Family Counseling	Job Services	School Services	Suppression Services	Total Services	Number of Youth	Services per Youth
10-14 years old	575	293	555	347	85	57	221	416	2549	52	49.0
15-17 years old	579	313	436	338	63	135	197	269	2330	62	37.6
18-21 years old	67	34	40	21	0	15	13	17	207	10	20.7
Totals	**1221**	**640**	**1031**	**706**	**148**	**207**	**431**	**702**	**5086**	**124**	**41.0**

Percentage of Types of Services by Age Category (N=124)[a]
(1,096 Worker Tracking Forms)

Age Category	Case Planning	Material Support	Group Counseling	Individual Counseling	Family Counseling	Job Services	School Services	Suppression Services	Total %
10-14 years old	22.6%	11.5%	21.8%	13.6%	3.3%	2.2%	8.7%	16.3%	100.0%
15-17 years old	24.8%	13.4%	18.7%	14.5%	2.7%	5.8%	8.5%	11.5%	100.0%
18-21 years old	24.0%	12.6%	20.3%	13.9%	2.9%	4.1%	8.5%	13.8%	100.0%
Totals	**24.0%**	**12.6%**	**20.3%**	**13.9%**	**2.9%**	**4.1%**	**8.5%**	**13.8%**	**100.0%**

a Excludes 1 youth with 2 worker-tracking records whose age at program entry could not be determined.

Table 8.6c
Number of Types of Services by Race/Ethnicity (N=125)
(1,098 Worker Tracking Forms)

Race/Ethnicity	Case Planning	Material Support	Group Counseling	Individual Counseling	Family Counseling	Job Services	School Services	Suppression Services	Total Services	Number of Youth	Services per Youth
Latino [a]	561	302	502	405	91	85	171	358	2475	60	41.3
African American	502	236	407	188	29	94	200	246	1902	50	38.0
American Indian	62	19	27	33	5	5	9	22	182	6	30.3
Non-Latino White	36	36	25	36	10	8	12	48	211	3	70.3
Asian American	19	14	11	19	2	6	14	10	95	2	47.5
Bi-racial [b]	46	34	63	26	11	9	25	18	232	4	58.0
Totals	**1226**	**641**	**1035**	**707**	**148**	**207**	**431**	**702**	**5097**	**125**	**40.8**

Percentage of Types of Services by Race/Ethnicity (N=125)
(1,098 Worker Tracking Forms)

Race/Ethnicity	Case Planning	Material Support	Group Counseling	Individual Counseling	Family Counseling	Job Services	School Services	Suppression Services	Total %
Latino [a]	22.7%	12.2%	20.3%	16.4%	3.7%	3.4%	6.9%	14.5%	100.0%
African-American	26.4%	12.4%	21.4%	9.9%	1.5%	4.9%	10.5%	12.9%	100.0%
American Indian	34.1%	10.4%	14.8%	18.1%	2.7%	2.7%	4.9%	12.1%	100.0%
Non-Latino White	17.1%	17.1%	11.8%	17.1%	4.7%	3.8%	5.7%	22.7%	100.0%
Asian American	20.0%	14.7%	11.6%	20.0%	2.1%	6.3%	14.7%	10.5%	100.0%
Bi-racial [b]	19.8%	14.7%	27.2%	11.2%	4.7%	3.9%	10.8%	7.8%	100.0%
Totals	**24.1%**	**12.6%**	**20.3%**	**13.9%**	**2.9%**	**4.1%**	**8.5%**	**13.8%**	**100.0%**

a Primarily of Mexican ancestry.
b Includes 2 participants who were African American/Latino, and 2 who were Mexican American/American Indian.

Table 8.6d
Number of Types of Services by Gang-Membership Status (N=125)
(1,098 Worker Tracking Forms)

Gang-Membership Status[a]	Case Planning	Material Support	Group Counseling	Individual Counseling	Family Counseling	Job Services	School Services	Suppression Services	Total Services	Number of Youth	Services per Youth
Gang Member	637	347	511	401	77	118	197	408	2696	64	42.1
Gang Associate	365	184	330	161	37	52	166	219	1514	37	40.9
Non-Gang Youth	224	110	194	145	34	37	68	75	887	24	37.0
Totals	**1226**	**641**	**1035**	**707**	**148**	**207**	**431**	**702**	**5097**	**125**	**40.8**

Percentage of Types of Services by Gang-Membership Status (N=125)
(1,098 Worker Tracking Forms)

Gang-Membership Status[a]	Case Planning	Material Support	Group Counseling	Individual Counseling	Family Counseling	Job Services	School Services	Suppression Services	Total %
Gang Member	23.6%	12.9%	19.0%	14.9%	2.9%	4.4%	7.3%	15.1%	100.0%
Gang Associate	24.1%	12.2%	21.8%	10.6%	2.4%	3.4%	11.0%	14.5%	100.0%
Non-Gang Youth	25.3%	12.4%	21.9%	16.3%	3.8%	4.2%	7.7%	8.5%	100.0%
Totals	**24.1%**	**12.6%**	**20.3%**	**13.9%**	**2.9%**	**4.1%**	**8.5%**	**13.8%**	**100.0%**

[a] One youth had no self-reported gang membership status (he did not complete Time-I Individual Gang-Member Survey), so the Project-worker-reported gang-membership status was used.

Table 8.6e
Number of Types of Services by Level of Prior-to-Pre-Program and Pre-Program Arrests (N=125)
(1,098 Worker Tracking Forms)

Level of Prior-to-Pre-Program & Pre-Program Arrests	Case Planning	Material Support	Group Counseling	Individual Counseling	Family Counseling	Job Services	School Services	Suppression Services	Total Services	Number of Youth	Services per Youth
Excluded [a]	109	51	95	41	5	13	34	36	384	16	24
None [b]	55	21	50	23	3	8	22	28	210	7	30.0
Less than 1	382	194	360	256	80	60	132	199	1663	34	48.9
1 to < 2	302	143	230	130	22	40	111	197	1175	30	39.2
2 or More	378	232	300	257	38	86	132	242	1665	38	43.8
Totals	**1226**	**641**	**1035**	**707**	**148**	**207**	**431**	**702**	**5097**	**125**	**40.8**

Percentage of Types of Services by Level of Prior-to-Pre-Program and Pre-Program Arrests (N=125)
(1,098 Worker Tracking Forms)

Level of Prior-to-Pre-Program & Pre-Program Arrests	Case Planning	Material Support	Group Counseling	Individual Counseling	Family Counseling	Job Services	School Services	Suppression Services	Total %
Excluded [a]	28.4%	13.3%	24.7%	10.7%	1.3%	3.4%	8.9%	9.4%	100.0%
None [b]	26.2%	10.0%	23.8%	11.0%	1.4%	3.8%	10.5%	13.3%	100.0%
Less than 1	23.0%	11.7%	21.6%	15.4%	4.8%	3.6%	7.9%	12.0%	100.0%
1 to < 2	25.7%	12.2%	19.6%	11.1%	1.9%	3.4%	9.4%	16.8%	100.0%
2 or More	22.7%	13.9%	18.0%	15.4%	2.3%	5.2%	7.9%	14.5%	100.0%
Totals	**24.1%**	**12.6%**	**20.3%**	**13.9%**	**2.9%**	**4.1%**	**8.5%**	**13.8%**	**100.0%**

a Eight (8) youth had arrests either in the prior-to-pre-program or post-program periods; arrest records for 3 youth were missing.

b Five (5) youth had no arrests.

Table 8.6f
Number of Types of Services by Level of Pre-Program Confinement (N=124)[1]
(1,096 Worker Tracking Forms)

Level of Pre-Program Confinement	Case Planning	Material Support	Group Counseling	Individual Counseling	Family Counseling	Job Services	School Services	Suppression Services	Total Services	Number of Youth	Services per Youth
None	630	309	577	386	86	93	245	331	2657	64	41.5
< 5%	370	195	281	185	39	64	127	250	1511	34	44.4
5 - < 10%	73	44	53	40	3	13	9	20	255	8	31.9
>= 10%	143	88	111	95	19	37	49	101	643	18	35.7
Totals	**1216**	**636**	**1022**	**706**	**147**	**207**	**430**	**702**	**5066**	**124**	**40.9**

Percentage of Types of Services by Level of Pre-Program Confinement (N=124)[1]
(1,096 Worker Tracking Forms)

Level of Pre-Program Confinement	Case Planning	Material Support	Group Counseling	Individual Counseling	Family Counseling	Job Services	School Services	Suppression Services	Total %
None	23.7%	11.6%	21.7%	14.5%	3.2%	3.5%	9.2%	12.5%	100.0%
< 5%	24.5%	12.9%	18.6%	12.2%	2.6%	4.2%	8.4%	16.5%	100.0%
5 - < 10%	28.6%	17.3%	20.8%	15.7%	1.2%	5.1%	3.5%	7.8%	100.0%
>= 10%	22.2%	13.7%	17.3%	14.8%	3.0%	5.8%	7.6%	15.7%	100.0%
Totals	**24.0%**	**12.6%**	**20.2%**	**13.9%**	**2.9%**	**4.1%**	**8.5%**	**13.9%**	**100.0%**

a Excludes one youth with 2 worker-tracking records providing no information concerning pre-program level of confinement.

Table 8.7a
Number of Direct Contacts per Youth – by Gender and Type of Project Worker (N=125)
(1,098 Worker Tracking Forms)

	Type of Project Worker					Number
Gender	Outreach *	Probation	Police	Treatment	Total	of Youth
Male	51.8	47.6	1.0	8.5	108.8	87
Female	72.5	19.4	1.3	15.9	109.1	38
Totals	**58.1**	**39.0**	**1.1**	**10.7**	**108.9**	**125**

Table 8.7b
Number of Direct Contacts per Youth – by Age Category and Type of Project Worker (N=124)[a]
(1,096 Worker Tracking Forms)

	Type of Project Worker					Number
Age Category	Outreach*	Probation	Police	Treatment	Total	of Youth
10-14 years old	66.3	57.9	1.5	15.7	141.4	52
15-17 years old	57.0	30.1	0.7	8.3	96.2	62
18-21 years old	26.6	0.0	1.2	0.8	28.6	10
Totals	**58.4**	**39.4**	**1.1**	**10.8**	**109.7**	**124**

a Excludes 1 youth with two worker-tracking records whose age at program entry could not be determined.

* Includes youth outreach workers and case managers.

Table 8.7c

Number of Direct Contacts per Youth – by Race/Ethnicity and Type of Project Worker (N=125)
(1,098 Worker Tracking Forms)

	Type of Project Worker					Number
Race/Ethnicity	Outreach*	Probation	Police	Treatment	Total	of Youth
Latino [a]	60.1	46.4	1.2	16.7	124.4	60
African-American	52.0	30.2	0.8	2.2	85.2	50
American Indian	29.5	8.2	0.2	14.2	52.0	6
Non-Latino White	97.7	147.3	3.0	15.3	263.3	3
Asian American	119.0	24.0	2.5	6.5	152.0	2
Bi-racial [b]	87.0	11.3	2.0	21.3	121.5	4
Totals	**58.1**	**39.0**	**1.1**	**10.7**	**108.9**	**125**

a Primarily of Mexican ancestry.
b Includes participants who were African-American/Latino and 2 who were Mexican-American/ American Indian.

Table 8.7d
Number of Direct Contacts per Youth by Gang-Membership Status and Type of Project Worker (N=125)
(1,098 Worker Tracking Forms)

Gang-Membership	Type of Project Worker					Number
Status	Outreach*	Probation	Police	Treatment	Total	of Youth
Gang Member	56.1	49.7	1.0	10.5	117.4	64
Gang Member Associate	64.5	30.1	1.4	7.2	103.2	37
Non-Gang Youth	53.3	24.3	0.7	16.8	95.0	24
Totals	**58.1**	**39.0**	**1.1**	**10.7**	**108.9**	**125**

* Includes youth outreach workers and case managers.

Table 8.7e
Number of Direct Contacts per Youth – by Level of Prior-to-Pre Program and Pre-Program Arrests and Type of Project Worker (N=125)
(1,098 Worker Tracking Forms)

Level of Prior-to-Pre-Program & Pre-Program Arrests	Type of Project Worker					Number of Youth
	Outreach*	Probation	Police	Treatment	Total	
Excluded [a]	41.2	8.3	0.6	6.4	56.4	16
None [b]	51.6	9.1	0.3	2.7	63.7	7
Less than 1	71.4	43.5	1.2	22.9	139.0	34
1 to < 2	53.8	35.0	1.0	4.3	94.1	30
2 or More	57.8	56.7	1.4	8.3	124.1	38
Totals	**58.1**	**39.0**	**1.1**	**10.7**	**108.9**	**125**

a Eight (8) youth had arrests in either the prior-to-pre-program or post-program period; arrest records for 3 youth were missing.
b Five (5) youth had no arrests.

Table 8.7f
Number of Direct Contacts per Youth – by Level of Pre-Program Confinement and Type of Project Worker (N=124) [a]
(1,096 Worker Tracking Forms)

Level of Pre-Program Confinement	Type of Project Worker					Number of Youth
	Outreach*	Probation	Police	Treatment	Total	
None	61.1	24.3	1.3	14.0	100.7	64
< 5%	61.2	69.7	0.8	6.1	137.8	34
5 - 10%	48.5	30.3	0.8	4.5	84.1	8
>= 10%	44.9	39.8	0.9	11.3	96.9	18
Totals	**215.7**	**164.1**	**3.8**	**35.9**	**419.5**	**124**

[a] Excludes one youth with 2 worker-tracking records providing no information concerning his pre-program level of confinement.

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* Includes youth outreach workers and managers.

Table 8.8a
Coordinated Contacts
By Type of Worker and Type of Worker Contacted

Total Program Period – January 1996 through June 1999

Type of Worker Initiating Contact	Type of Worker Contacted percent and (n)						
	Police	Probation/ Parole	School	Outreach	Other[a]	Within Worker Organization	Total[b] (N)
Outreach[c]	4.8 (70)	18.7 (271)	19.9 (289)	---	23.3 (339)	33.3 (483)	65.5 (1,452)
Probation/Parole	5.4 (22)	---	25.2 (102)	28.7 (116)	23.5 (95)	17.1 (69)	18.2 (404)
Police	---	13.3 (13)	2.0 (2)	49.0 (48)	22.4 (22)	13.3 (13)	4.4 (98)
Treatment Agency	0.8 (2)	16.3 (43)	4.2 (11)	30.0 (79)	34.2 (90)	14.4 (38)	11.9 (263)
Total (N)	4.2 (94)	14.7 (327)	18.2 (404)	11.0 (243)	24.6 (546)	27.2 (603)	100.0 (2,217)

[a] The highest percentages of coordinated contacts with personnel from "other" organizations in this period were with La Frontera, Inc.(39.8%) (a nonprofit community-based behavioral health agency providing a wide variety of treatment services for children and adults) and the lead agency – Our Town Family Center (26.9%). The other 33.3% of coordinated contacts were with individuals from an assortment of agencies and institutions (e.g., Project YES, Adobe Mountain School, Boys and Girls Club, Arizona Department of Economic Security, Tucson Rotary Club, Pima County District Attorney's Office, La Esperanza).

[b] Percentages are based on the number of coordinated contacts reported in 1,098 Worker Tracking Forms for 125 program youth. An average of 17.7 coordinated contacts were provided to each youth.

[c] Includes outreach youth workers and case managers.

Table 8.8b
Coordinated Contacts
By Type of Worker and Type of Worker Contacted

First Half of Program Period – January 1996 through September 1997

Type of Worker Initiating Contact	Type of Worker Contacted percent and (n)						
	Police	Probation/ Parole	School	Outreach	Other[a]	Within Worker Organization	Total[b] (N)
Outreach	5.9 (19)	22.2 (72)	20.4 (66)	0	21.6 (70)	29.9 (97)	52.8 (324)
Probation/Parole	7.2 (13)	---	19.9 (36)	21.5 (39)	27.6 (50)	23.8 (43)	29.5 (181)
Police	0	10.0 (1)	0	30.0 (3)	30.0 (3)	30.0 (3)	1.6 (10)
Treatment Agency	0	11.1 (11)	4.0 (4)	27.3 (27)	47.5 (47)	10.1 (10)	16.1 (99)
Total (N)	5.2 (32)	13.7 (84)	17.3 (106)	11.2 (69)	27.7 (170)	24.9 (153)	100.0 (614)

[a] The highest percentage of coordinated contacts with personnel from "other" organizations in this period was with the lead agency – Our Town Family Center. The other 56.5 % of coordinated contacts were with individuals from an assortment of agencies and institutions (e.g., La Frontera, Inc., Project YES; Adobe Mountain School; Boys and Girls Club; Arizona Department of Economic Security; Tucson Rotary Club; Pima County District Attorney's Office; La Esperanza).

[b] Percentages are based on the number of coordinated contacts reported in 226 Worker Tracking Forms for 60 program youth. An average of 10.2 coordinated contacts per youth were provided to each youth.

Table 8.8c
Coordinated Contacts
By Type of Worker and Type of Worker Contacted

Second Half of Program Period – October 1997 through June 1999

Type of Worker Initiating Contact	Type of Worker Contacted percent and (n)						
	Police	Probation/ Parole	School	Outreach	Other[a]	Within Worker Organization	Total[b] (N)
Outreach	4.5 (51)	17.6 (199)	19.8 (223)	---	23.8 (269)	34.2 (386)	70.4 (1,128)
Probation/Parole	4.0 (9)	---	29.6 (66)	34.5 (77)	20.2 (45)	11.7 (26)	13.9 (223)
Police	---	13.6 (12)	2.3 (2)	51.1 (45)	21.6 (19)	11.4 (10)	5.5 (88)
Treatment Agency	1.2 (2)	19.5 (32)	4.3 (7)	31.7 (52)	26.2 (43)	17.1 (28)	10.2 (164)
Total (N)	3.9 (62)	15.2 (243)	18.6 (298)	10.9 (174)	23.5 (376)	28.1 (450)	100.0 (1,603)

[a] The highest percentage of coordinated contacts with personnel from "other" organizations in this period were with La Frontera, Inc. (41.2%), (a nonprofit community-based behavioral health agency providing a wide variety of treatment services for children and adults). The other 58.8% of coordinated contacts were with individuals from an assortment of agencies and institutions (e.g., the lead agency – Our Town Family Center, Project YES, Adobe Mountain School, Boys and Girls Club, Arizona Department of Economic Security, Tucson Rotary Club, Pima County District Attorney's Office, La Esperanza).

[b] Percentages are based on the number of coordinated contacts reported in 872 Worker Tracking Forms for 122 program youth. An average of 13.1 coordinated contacts per youth were provided to each youth.

Chapter 9

Arrest Outcomes: Program and Comparison Youth

(Kwai Ming Wa)

Introduction

In this chapter, we examine outcomes of program and comparison youth using arrest variables. We are interested in the program's effectiveness in reducing arrests for program youth relative to the comparison youth (who were not provided with services and worker contacts). We use statistical models to control for differences between program-youth and comparison-youth characteristics, and to tell us to what extent certain youth characteristics and program effects account for changes in arrest patterns during the program period compared to the pre-program period.

As we observed in earlier chapters, the Tucson Project did not substantially adopt or implement the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Program Model. It did not develop an effective Steering Committee, involving collaboration with justice-system agencies (particularly the Tucson Police Department), grassroots organizations and social agencies. It also did not develop an adequate, street-level, collaborative social-development-and-suppression team approach. The focus of the lead agency – Our Town Family Center (Our Town) – was on an early intervention program, particularly addressed to younger youth, utilizing mainly its own social services.

There were research limitations in our use of the comparison sample, which was younger than the program sample, and contained a smaller number of African Americans. Comparison youth were considerably less delinquent and had less confinement experience. Given these

limitations, we exercised great care in controlling for variations in characteristics of the samples. Multivariate statistical models were constructed to adjust for the skewness of sample characteristics. We believe the results of the analysis reflect a fair estimate of the effectiveness of the Project in reducing different types of arrests for program youth relative to comparison youth.

The General Linear models (GLM) estimated differences or changes in the mean number of arrests for program-worker-tracked youth and comparison youth between the pre-program and program periods, controlling for demographic and criminal-justice background characteristics of the youth. In the GLM models, we used six dependent (outcome) variables: *yearly total arrest changes*, which included arrests for all of the categories of offenses; *yearly total serious violence arrest changes*, which included arrests for serious violence offenses such as homicide, aggravated battery, aggravated assaults, and aggravated robbery; *yearly total violence arrest changes*, which combined arrests for serious violence and less-serious violence such as simple assault, simple battery, attempted robbery, street fighting, and intimidation; *yearly total drug arrest changes*; *yearly total property arrest changes*, and *yearly total "other" arrest changes*.[1]

The GLM models provided us with information to determine if the mean level of change in arrests decreased, increased or stayed the same – not only in the program and comparison samples, but in subsamples based on age, gang-membership status, length of time in the program (or its equivalent for comparison youth), pre-program arrest history, and confinement experience (detention and incarceration). We included all program and comparison youth with arrest

[1] Refer to Appendix A for a listing of charges for the different categories of arrests.

histories in the program and/or pre-program period in all of our analyses.[2]

The dependent (outcome) variables measured the mean yearly differences in the number of arrests for youth between the pre-program and program periods. For each of the six dependent variables in the GLM models, the number of arrests was annualized in order to control for varying numbers of arrests and confinement periods during the different program-period lengths. The program periods were matched with pre-program periods for each youth.[3] In addition to arrests, we used several control variables in our models – gender, age, race/ethnicity, gang-membership status and length of time in the program. Despite their young ages, the youth (especially program youth) had extensive confinement histories, so we also included the length of time the youth were confined in the pre-program period as an important control variable.

Eight independent variables were included in the GLM equations to explain variance in each of the six dependent (outcome) variables (except for *serious violence arrests*, where we use six independent variables because of the small number of these offenses committed and non-gang-youth arrested for them). The independent variables were: *project* – program youth with worker-tracking records and comparison youth, both interviewed at Time I; *level of pre-program yearly total arrests* for the particular category of offense[4]; *pre-program confinement length* (.0;

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[2] One program youth and 1 comparison youth were excluded from the *violence arrest change* models. We considered them to be outliers because they had very high numbers of violence arrests in the pre-program and program periods. However, they were included in all of the other arrest-change models.

[3] First, the mean number of yearly arrests was calculated using the total number of each youth's arrests during the program and matched pre-program period, divided by the length in years for each period. Second, the mean yearly change was calculated by subtracting the mean number of yearly arrests in the program period from the mean number of yearly arrests in the pre-program period.

[4] The levels or categories of pre-program yearly total arrests were ranked as follows: 1) none = no arrests; 2) low = 0.01 to 0.99 arrests; 3) medium = 1.0 to 1.99 arrests; and 4) high = 2 or more arrests.

.001 to .02; .02 to .1; .1 or more)[5]; *gender* (male and female); *race/ethnicity* (African-American, Latino, others); *age group at program entry* (14 years and under, 15 to 16 years, 17 years and over); *gang-membership status* – whether youth were gang members, gang associates, or non-gang youth; and *program length* (i.e., length of time in the program: less/more than two years).[6] Up to seven interaction terms were added to the models: *project* × *age group at program entry*; *project* × *gender*; *project* × *race/ethnicity*; *project* × *gang-membership status*; *project* × *program length*; *project* × *pre-program yearly total arrests*[7]; and *project* × *pre-program confinement length*. The following sections present the findings of the "best" GLM models to determine whether the Project had an effect in reducing arrests for program youth compared to comparison youth with similar demographic characteristics, and in similar time frames.

GLM Models

Yearly Total Arrests

In the GLM model for yearly total arrest changes – consisting of 67 comparison youth and 110 program-worker-tracked youth (N = 177) – the model explained 33.9% of the variance in the dependent variable, and was significant ($p<0.001$). Pre-program yearly total arrests ($p<0.01$), age group ($p=0.021$) and gender ($p=0.041$) were the significant variables in this model, and program length ($p=0.084$) was the marginally significant variable. The findings using the pre-program

[5] Percent pre-program confinement is determined from the ratio of days of detention and/or incarceration to length of time (measured in days) a program or comparison youth was in the program.

[6] Note that program length for comparison youth is equivalent to the program length of their matched program youth.

[7] Youth who had zero pre-program and zero program arrests ["zero-zero"] were excluded from the GLM models.

yearly total arrests variable signified a regression effect; i.e., the greater the number of pre-program-period arrests, the fewer the number of program-period arrests, and the fewer the number of pre-program-period arrests, the greater the number of program-period arrests. The age variable indicated that the youngest age group (10-14 year olds) had an increase in arrests that was significantly greater than it was for 15 and 16 year olds ($p<0.015$), and almost significantly greater than it was for 17- to 21-year-olds ($p<0.051$). However, these pattern differences occurred across combined samples of program and comparison youth, with no difference between program and comparison youth by level of pre-program yearly total arrests or by age group. The only significant subcategory difference was between two program age groups. The youngest program age group (10-14 years old) increased their level of arrests, while the 15- to 16-year-olds decreased their level of arrests, in the program period compared to the pre-program period ($p<0.006$). In other words, the program may have done a better job with 15- 16-year-olds than with the youngest age group (10- 14-year-olds), controlling for a variety of other factors (Table 9.1).

A somewhat similar pattern occurred for gender differences. There was no significant difference between program females and comparison females – both decreased their arrests; and there was no significant difference between program males and comparison males – both increased their arrest levels. The only difference was that program females did marginally better than program males ($p<0.094$). It could be that the greater number of contacts that outreach youth workers and case managers had with program females made this marginal difference.

Unexpectedly, we found that the longer the program youth was provided with worker contacts or services, the less he decreased his arrests in the program period. However,

differences in program length were not significant for comparison youth. Program length or maturation could have had some effect in either sample because the youth in both samples – especially in the comparison sample – were predominantly in the younger age groups, when delinquency rates normally were expected to increase.

Finally, we observed that while there was a decrease in yearly total arrests for program youth (LS mean = -0.34), there was less of a decrease for comparison youth (LS mean = -0.19). The difference was not statistically significant ($p<0.580$) when controlling for other factors, since comparison youth were generally younger and less delinquent in the pre-program period, and would normally be expected to increase their arrest rates more than program youth.

None of the other independent variables or any of the interaction terms were significant as main effects. In other words, the Project had no statistically significant or close-to-significant effect in accounting for a change in the patterns of yearly total arrests for program youth, and had no significant effect in reducing yearly total arrests for any subgroup of program youth.

Yearly Total Serious Violence Arrests

About 20% (n = 36) of the total samples of program and comparison youth with arrests in the program and/or pre-program periods (N = 177) had arrests for serious violence[8] (homicides, aggravated battery, aggravated assault and/or aggravated robbery): 8 comparison youth; 28 program youth. We reduced the size of our sample by eliminating 1 comparison and 1 program youth who were in the program for less than three months, and whose arrests for serious violence

[8] The levels of pre-program yearly total serious violence arrests were: 1) none = no serious violence arrests; 2) low = 0.01-0.049 arrests; 3) medium - 0.05 to 1.0 arrests; and 4) high = 1 or more serious violence arrests.

were high and concentrated, so that annualizing violence arrests would have inflated and skewed the results for the small samples in the analysis.

The GLM model for change in yearly total serious violence arrests – consisting of 7 comparison youth and 27 program youth (N = 34) – explained 80.4% of the variance in the dependent variable, and was significant ($p<0.001$). Pre-program yearly total serious violence arrests ($p<0.003$) was the only significant variable in this model (Table 9.2). We used only six independent variables and four interaction terms, eliminating the gender and gang-membership status variables, since only 1 comparison female was arrested for a serious violence offense, and 1 comparison youth was not a gang member or associate gang member. None of the variables, other than pre-program yearly total serious violence arrests, was significant, or even close to being marginally significant. The lack of significant difference may be accounted for by the fact that few youth had more than 1 pre-program-period or program-period serious violence arrest, and youth with no pre-program-period serious violence arrests had serious violence arrests in the program period. Youth with low/medium/high levels of serious violence arrests in the pre-program period decreased their serious violence arrests in the program period.

In any case, the LS mean for yearly serious violence arrests increased less in the program sample (+0.04) than in the comparison sample (+0.16). There was no statistically significant difference in serious violence arrest patterns between the program and comparison youth, but the difference between the LS mean for program youth with no pre-program serious violence arrests (+0.84) and those with low/medium/high levels of serious violence arrests (-0.75) was highly significant ($p<0.001$). In other words, the program did suppress or reduce serious violence arrests for youth with a pattern of pre-program, serious violence arrests, as well as for youth who

had no pre-program serious violence arrests.

In general there was less of an increase in serious violence arrests for program youth than for comparison youth, but the difference was not statistically significant and was primarily due to the fact that there was a greater tendency for youth with pre-program serious violence arrests to reduce these arrests, and that most of the comparison youth had no serious violence arrests, while the program youth did. In sum, the Project had no effect on change in patterns of serious violence arrests.

Yearly Total Violence Arrests

One-hundred-two (102) youth – 34 comparison youth, and 68 program youth – had histories of violence arrests (both serious and less serious)[9]. While four times as many program youth as comparison youth had pre-program serious violence arrests, only twice as many program youth had pre-program combinations of serious and less serious violence arrests. The result of the GLM model with *change in yearly total violence arrests* as the dependent variable explained 54.7% of the variance, and was significant ($p < 0.001$). Pre-program yearly total violence arrests ($p < 0.001$) was the only significant variable in this equation (Table 9.3), although gang-membership status was almost marginally significant ($p < 0.130$). The interaction term *project × pre-program yearly total violence arrests* was marginally significant ($p<0.053$). No other independent variables or interaction terms came close to being even marginally significant. However, we note that the LS mean reduction for yearly total violence arrests was

[9] The levels of pre-program yearly total violence arrests were: 1) none = no violence arrests; 2) low = 0.01 to 0.049 arrests; 3) medium = 0.05 to 1 arrests; and high = 1 or more violence arrests.

lower in the program sample (-0.23) than in the comparison sample (-0.07). Program youth (n = 22) with high levels of all kinds of violence arrests in the pre-program period reduced their arrests significantly more (p=0.014) than did comparison youth (n = 5) with similarly high levels.

There was no difference in numbers of yearly total violence arrests in the program-youth and comparison-youth subsamples based on a variety of youth characteristics. Of some interest was that program youth who were gang members did worse than program youth who were associate gang members and non-gang youth. Program gang members increased their levels of combined serious and less-serious violence arrests, while associate gang members and non-gang youth reduced theirs ($p = 0.014$). We also note that 15- and 16-year-old program youth decreased their levels of total violence arrests, while 10- 14-year-olds increased theirs ($p < 0.029$); and program youth with a program length of two years or more generally reduced their levels of total violence arrests more than youth with a program length of less than two years ($p < 0.075$).

In other words, while the Project had no significant overall effect on the reduction of both serious- and less-serious violence arrests than would have occurred without the provision of services or worker contacts, program youth generally had somewhat greater reductions in serious violence arrests than comparison youth. The statistically significant changes were only between subsamples of program youth: 15- and 16-year-olds did better than 10- 14-year-olds, non-gang youth and associate gang members did better than gang members, and those in the program for shorter periods of time did better than those in the program for longer periods. It appeared likely that the Project was somewhat effective for youth 15 and 16 years old, and for youth who were non-committed gang members and were in the program for a brief period. This kind of mixed Project effect could not be construed as successful in respect to violence reduction.

Yearly Total Drug Arrests

Over the course of the pre-program and program periods, a total of 54 youth – 15 comparison youth and 39 program youth, i.e., 30.5% of the total sample (N = 117) – were arrested on drug charges.[10] A higher percent of program youth (35.5%) than comparison youth (22.4%) had drug arrests. The GLM model for yearly total drug arrest changes explained 53.9% of the variances in the dependent variable, and was significant ($p<0.001$).

The only significant variable in the model was *pre-program yearly total drug arrest changes* ($p<0.001$), a strong regression effect. Youth in both samples who had drug arrests in the pre-program period had no (or fewer) drug arrests in the program period, and youth who had no drug arrests in the pre-program period had drug arrests in the program period. There was no difference in this pattern between program or comparison youth (Table 9.4). No other independent variable or interaction term came close to being significant, or even marginally significant. Program youth (LS mean = +0.129) increased their yearly drug arrests slightly more than comparison youth (LS mean = +0.117).

There were essentially no differences across subsample characteristics of program and comparison youth (e.g., age, gender, race/ethnicity, gang-membership status), except possibly age. All program youth 17 years and older reduced their levels of drug arrests, while all younger program youth (10-14 years and 15-16 years) increased their levels of drug arrests. While 13 program youth 14 years and younger increased their drug arrests, 8 comparison youth 14 and under decreased theirs. Also, program gang-member youth slightly decreased their drug arrests,

[10] The levels of pre-program yearly total drug arrests were: 1) none = no drug arrests; 2) low = 0.01 to 0.49 arrests; 3) medium = 0.05 to 1.0 arrests; and 4) high = 1 or more drug arrests.

while comparison gang-member youth increased theirs; this difference was not statistically significant. As with total violence arrests, the Project was not particularly effective with younger youth in reducing drug arrests.

We observed that the longer the youth was in the program, the more likely he was to have increased drug arrests; this was not the case for comparison youth. None of these differences approached statistical significance, however. In sum, the Project did not have an effect in lowering levels of drug arrests during the program period.

Yearly Total Property Arrests

A majority of youth had arrests for property crime [11] in the pre-program and/or program period (63.8%; N = 113). There was hardly any variation in percentage of property arrests between comparison youth (64.6%, n = 43) and program youth (63.6%, n = 70) over the two periods. The GLM model for yearly property arrest change explained 66.0% of the variance on the dependent variable, and was significant ($p<0.001$) (Table 9.5).

The only significant variable in the model was *pre-program yearly total property arrest change* ($p<0.001$). The pattern of change for program and comparison youth with different levels of pre-program property arrests was essentially the same in terms of regression effect. However, yearly property arrests declined slightly more for program youth (LS mean = -0.39) than for comparison youth (LS mean = -0.30). One other independent variable – gang-membership status – was marginally significant ($p<0.074$), but the differences between program and comparison

[11] The levels of pre-program yearly total property arrests were: 1) none = no property arrests; 2) low = 0.01 to 0.99 arrests; 3) medium = 1.0 to 1.99 arrests; and 4) high = 2 or more property arrests.

youth in terms of property-arrest change were minor.

While all categories of youth experienced a decrease in property arrests, the level of decline in property arrests was higher for the comparison gang-member youth than for comparison non-gang youth and associate gang members. Nevertheless, there was no evidence of significantly different patterns of change in property arrests between program and comparison youth based on gang-membership status.

Gender was the other independent variable in the model that approached some marginal significance ($p<0.188$). Females generally had greater reductions in property arrests than did males; the difference was somewhat greater between program females and males than between comparison females and males. In general, there was little difference across the two samples based on the gender characteristic.

Also, we found little difference in levels of reduction of property arrests based on age group across the two samples. However, there was a marginal statistical difference in the program sample between the oldest group, 17-21 years, and the youngest group, 10-14 years. The oldest program-youth age group had a considerably higher reduction in property arrests ($p<0.071$), and the youngest age group had the lowest level of reduction.

Finally, we note that although there were no statistical differences generally across sample subcategories, there was one notable, marginally significant Project accomplishment: for youth who were in the program for two years or more, there was a likelihood ($p=0.082$) of a somewhat larger reduction in property arrests than for youth who were in the program for less than two years.

Yearly Total "Other" Arrests

Most youth (70.6%, n =125) in both samples were arrested for a range of "other" (usually minor) offenses such as curfew violation, drinking (minors), gang loitering, resisting an officer, unlawful possession of a firearm, and status offenses; fewer were arrested for violence, drugs, or property offenses. Somewhat more program youth (75.5%, n = 83) than comparison youth (62.7%, n = 42) had such "other" arrests during the pre-program or program periods. The GLM model for *yearly total "other" arrest change* explained 43.6% of variance in the dependent variable, and was significant ($p<0.001$). The pattern of change for both samples was a reduction in "other" arrests – slightly better for comparison youth (LS mean = -0.44) than for program youth (LS mean = -0.32), but the difference was not statistically significant (Table 9.6).

There were two independent variables that were significant in the model: *pre-program yearly total "other" arrests*[12] ($p<0.001$) and *program length* ($p<0.039$). The patterns were the same for program and comparison youth. Those with more pre-program-period "other" arrests had fewer program-period "other" arrests, and those with fewer pre-program-period "other" arrests had more program-period "other" arrests. Furthermore, those program youth with less exposure to the program did better, i.e., had more of a reduction in "other" arrests than youth with a greater program-exposure period.

In general, while there was a reduction in "other" (minor) arrests for youth in both the program and comparison samples, there was little evidence that the Project contributed to this reduction.

[12] The levels of pre-program yearly total "other" arrests was ranked as follows: 1) none = no "other" arrests; 2) low = 0.09 to 0.99 arrests; 3) medium = 1.0 to 1.99 arrests; and 4) high = 2 or more "other" arrests.

Summary

We used General Linear Models (GLM) to determine whether there were differences in arrest patterns for program and comparison youth between the pre-program and program periods. Six different outcome or dependent variables were employed: *yearly total arrest changes*, *yearly total serious violence arrest changes*, *yearly total violence arrest changes, yearly total drug arrest changes*, *yearly total property arrest changes*, and *yearly total"other"* (minor offenses) *arrest changes*.

For each of the six outcome variables in the GLM models we usually used eight independent variables (and related interaction terms) to explain variance in the dependent variables; *project* – program/comparison youth; *pre-program yearly total arrests* for the particular arrest variable: *gender* – male/female; *race/ethnicity* – Latino/non-Latino; *age group at program entry* – 14 and under/ 15 to 16/ 17 and over; *gang-membership status* – gang member/ associate gang member/non-gang youth; *program length* – length of time in the program, or an equivalent period for comparison youth (2 years or more/less than 2 years); and *pre-program confinement length*. The models used included only youth who had arrests for the particular category of offense. The "best" models used were each significant ($p<0.001$).

Total Arrests. In the yearly total arrest change model there were 110 program and 67 comparison youth. The two significant main-effect variables were pre-program yearly total arrests ($p=0.001$) and age group ($p=0.021$). These factors affected both samples in similar fashion. The youth with fewer or no arrests in the pre-program period had more arrests in the program period, and youth with more arrests in the pre-program period had fewer or no arrests in the program period (a

regression effect). Younger youth (10-14 years) had the greatest increase in total arrests compared to the older age groups. In other words, the Project itself had no statistically-significant or close-to-significant effect in accounting for change in yearly total arrest patterns of youth. Such changes would have occurred anyway. The only statistically significant subcategory difference was between two program age groups: the 10- 14-year-old age group increased their total arrests, while the 15- 16-year-olds decreased their total arrests ($p=0.006$). Program females did marginally better than program males.

We observed that there was a slight but non-significant decrease in total arrests for program youth, and there was a slight increase for comparison youth. We also noted that the decrease in total arrests was slightly greater for youth in the program for a shorter rather than a longer period of time, suggesting less direct Project effect. Again, these change patterns were not statistically significant.

Serious Violence Arrests. Seven (7) comparison and 27 program youth had arrests for serious violence in the program and/or pre-program periods. The only significant independent variable in the Model was *pre-program total serious violence arrests*. There was less of an increase in serious violence arrests for program youth than comparison youth, but this difference was not significant ($p=0.67$). The difference was probably accounted for by the fact that more comparison youth than program youth had no arrests for serious violence in the pre-program period (a regression effect), and they had relatively more serious violence arrests in the program period. In other words, the Project had no effect on changing the patterns of serious violence arrests for program youth, which increased slightly during the program period.

Total Violence Arrests. The model for change in yearly arrests for all types of violence – serious and less-serious – included 68 program youth and 34 comparison youth. Again, only *pre-program yearly total violence arrests* was a significant independent variable in the equation. While there was no overall difference between program- and comparison-youth arrest outcomes, program youth had a slightly higher reduction in total violence arrests in the program period relative to the pre-program period than did comparison youth. Furthermore, the subcategory of program youth (n = 22) who had high levels of total violence arrests in the pre-program period reduced their total violence arrests significantly more than did the comparison youth (n = 5) who also had high levels of pre-program total arrests (p=0.014).

Significant changes in yearly total violence arrest levels also occurred within the program sample. Program non-gang youth and associate gang members reduced their levels of total violence arrests while gang members increased theirs (p=0.014). Further, program 15- 16-year-olds decreased their levels of total violence arrests, while the 10-14-year-olds increased theirs (p=0.029). However, youth in the program for two or more years did marginally better in reducing their total violence-arrest levels than did youth in the program for less than two years (p=0.075). Overall, the Project was not effective in reducing total violence arrests.

Drug Arrests. A higher percent of program youth (35.5%) than comparison youth (22.4%) were arrested on drug charges during the pre-program and/or program periods. Both program youth (LS mean = +0.13) and comparison youth (LS mean = +0.12) increased their drug arrests. The only significant variable in the model affecting both samples was *pre-program yearly total drug arrests*, i.e., the regression effect.

None of the other characteristics of program and/or comparison youth were statistically significant or even marginally significant in explaining drug-arrest changes. We noted that program youth were likely to increase their drug arrests the longer they were in the program. Nevertheless, the Project had no significant effect contributing either to an increase or decrease in drug arrests, other than what would have occurred without the Project.

Property Arrests. A majority of program youth (63.6%) and comparison youth (64.6%) were arrested for property crime. Both samples of youth experienced a reduction in property crime between the pre-program and program periods. Again, the only significant variable in the model was *pre-program yearly total property arrests* – the regression effect – which did not differ in the samples. Gang membership status was a marginally significant main effect (p=0.074). Property-arrest declines were greater for program and comparison youth who were gang members than for those who were gang member associates or non-gang youth.

Females tended to have a greater reduction in property arrests than males. This was particularly evident in the program sample (p = 0.188). Also, the oldest-age program youth (17-21 years) did marginally better in reducing property arrests than the youngest-age program youth (10-14 years) (p=0.071). Again, youth who were in the program for two years or more did marginally better in reducing property arrests than youth in the program for less than two years (p=0.082).

There was no evidence that the Project overall had a significant effect, positive or negative, on the decrease in property arrests for program youth, other than what would have occurred anyway. The best we could conclude was that certain categories of program youth did

better than other categories in reducing their levels of property arrests.

"Other" Arrests. The most prevalent arrests during the pre-program and/or program periods were for "other" (minor) crimes or status offenses, both for program youth (75.5%) and comparison youth (62.7%). Both program and comparison youth reduced their levels of "other" arrests. There were two significant variables as main effects in the model: *pre-program yearly total "other" arrests* ($p<0.001$) – the regression effect – and *program length* (<0.039). The longer the youth was in the program, the greater the reduction in his "other" arrests. However, the same effect occurred for comparison youth over the equivalent program period. Essentially, this represented a maturation effect, which the Project had nothing specifically to do with.

In general, none of the slight differences in changes in arrest levels between the program and comparison-sample youth were statistically significant.

Table 9.1
An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Arrests (Controlling for Yearly Total Arrests in the Pre-Program Period).

9.1(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.339)***

Source	Adjusted *df*	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Project: Comparison, Program Worker-Tracked	1	0.323	0.10	0.753
Gender: Male, Female	1	13.748	4.24	0.041*
Race/Ethnicity: Latino, Non-Latino	1	0.321	0.10	0.753
Age Group at Program Entry: 14 & under, 15 to 16, and 17 & over	2	12.841	3.96	0.021*
Gang-Membership Status: Gang Member, Gang Associate/Non-Gang Youth	1	0.587	0.18	0.671
Program Length: <2 Yr vs >=2 Yr	1	9.787	3.02	0.084
Confinement Length (%): Zero, .001 to .02, .02 to .1, > .1	3	1.266	0.39	0.760
Pre-Program Yearly Total Arrests: None, Low, Medium, High	3	18.499	5.71	0.001**
Project ×Gender	1	0.005	0.00	0.969
Project ×Race/Ethnicity	1	0.092	0.03	0.866
Project ×Age Group	2	2.534	0.78	0.459
Project ×Gang-Membership Status	1	1.703	0.53	0.470
Project ×Program Length	1	0.010	0.00	0.955
Project ×Pre-Program Yearly Total Arrests	3	2.343	0.72	0.540
Within error	154	3.240	—	—
Total	176	—	—	—

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 .

9.1(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project × Age Group Interaction

Project	Age Group	Adjust-ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)						
					i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6
Comparison	14 & under	0.358	0.430	37	1	—				*	
Comparison	15 to 16	-0.140	0.512	24	2		—				
Comparison	17 & over	-0.792	0.812	6	3			—			
Program	14 & under	0.279	0.346	44	4				—	†	
Program	15 to 16	-0.868	0.342	40	5	*			†	—	
Program	17 & over	-0.419	0.453	26	6						—

For differences between groups: *ƒ* p = .13; * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 .

9.1(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project × Gender Interaction

Project	Gender	Adjust-ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
					i/j	1	2	3	4
Comparison	Female	-0.540	0.584	17	1	—			
Comparison	Male	0.158	0.399	50	2		—		
Program	Female	-0.672	0.405	30	3			—	*ƒ*
Program	Male	0.000	0.270	80	4			*ƒ*	—

For differences between groups: *ƒ* p = 0.094, * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 .

9.1(d) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project × Program Length Interaction

Project	Program Length	Adjust -ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
					i/j	1	2	3	4
Comparison	<2 Yr	-0.441	0.483	35	1	—			
Comparison	>=2 Yr	0.058	0.487	32	2		—		
Program	<2 Yr	-0.602	0.303	63	3			—	
Program	>=2 Yr	-0.070	0.361	47	4				—

For differences between groups: * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 .

Table 9.2
An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Serious Violence Arrests (Controlling for Yearly Total Serious Violence Arrests in the Pre-Program Period).

9.2(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.804)***

Source	Adjusted *df*	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Project: Comparison, Program Worker-Tracked	1	0.038	0.18	0.672
Race/Ethnicity: African American, Latino	1	0.001	0.00	0.949
Age Group at Program Entry: 14 & under, 15 to 16, 17 & over	2	0.017	0.08	0.621
Program Length: <2 Yr vs >=2 Yr	1	0.001	0.01	0.933
Confinement: Yes, No	1	0.063	0.31	0.585
Pre-Program Yearly Total Serious Violence Arrests: None, Low/Medium/High	1	2.392	11.66	0.003**
Project ×Race/Ethnicity	1	0.000	0.00	0.982
Project ×Age Group	2	0.033	0.16	0.851
Project ×Program Length	1	0.018	0.09	0.772
Project ×Pre-Program Yearly Total Serious Violence Arrests	1	0.168	0.82	0.376
Within error	21	0.205	—	—
Total	33	—	—	—

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 .

9.2(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Serious Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project × Pre-program Yearly Total Serious Violence Arrests Interaction

Project	Pre-Program Yearly Total Serious Violence Arrests	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	N	Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
					i/	1	2	3	4
Comparison	None	0.648	0.384	5	1	—			†
Comparison	Low/Medium/High	-0.321	0.465	2	2		—	*	
Program	None	0.841	0.158	9	3		*	—	‡
Program	Low/Medium/High	-0.752	0.157	18	4	†		‡	—

For differences between groups: * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 .

Table 9.3
An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Violence Arrests (Controlling for Yearly Total Violence Arrests in the Pre-Program Period).

9.3(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.547)***

Source	Adjusted *df*	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Project: Comparison, Program Worker-Tracked	1	0.258	0.32	0.572
Gender: Male, Female	1	0.637	0.80	0.375
Race/Ethnicity: Latino, Non-Latino	1	0.377	0.47	0.495
Age Group at Program Entry: 14 & under, 15 to 16, 17 & over	2	0.436	0.54	0.582
Gang-Membership Status: Gang Member, Gang Associate/Non-Gang Youth	1	1.879	2.35	0.130
Program Length: <2 Yr vs >=2 Yr	1	0.377	0.47	0.495
Confinement Length (%): Zero, .001 to .02, .02 to .1, > .1	3	0.276	0.35	0.793
Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests: None, Low, Medium, High	3	7.667	9.57	0.000***
Project ×Gender	1	0.014	0.02	0.897
Project ×Race/Ethnicity	1	0.072	0.09	0.766
Project ×Age Group	2	0.809	1.01	0.369
Project ×Gang-Membership Status	1	1.066	1.33	0.252
Project ×Program Length	1	1.504	1.88	0.175
Project ×Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests	3	2.141	2.67	0.053
Within error	79	0.801	—	—
Total	101	—	—	—

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 .

9.3(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project × Gang-Membership Status Interaction

Project	Gang-Membership Status	Adjust-ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
					i/j	1	2	3	4
Comparison	Gang Associate/ Non-Gang Youth	-0.113	0.335	14	1	—			
Comparison	Gang Member	-0.026	0.311	20	2		—		
Program	Gang Associate/ Non-Gang Youth	-0.525	0.197	33	3			—	*
Program	Gang Member	0.074	0.185	35	4			*	—

For differences between groups: * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 .

9.3(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project × Program Length Interaction

Project	Program Length	Adjust-ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
					i/j	1	2	3	4
Comparison	<2 Yr	-0.153	0.377	16	1	—			
Comparison	>=2 Yr	0.014	0.298	18	2		—		
Program	<2 Yr	0.041	0.215	36	3			—	*ƒ*
Program	>=2 Yr	-0.493	0.206	32	4			*ƒ*	—

For differences between groups: *ƒ* p = 0.075, * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 .

9.3(d) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project × Age Group Interaction

Project	Age Group	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	N	Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)						
					i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6
Comparison	14 & under	-0.072	0.333	21	1	—					
Comparison	15 to 16	0.010	0.341	10	2		—				
Comparison	17 & over	-0.146	0.620	3	3			—			
Program	14 & under	0.095	0.214	30	4				—	*	
Program	15 to 16	-0.509	0.196	24	5				*	—	
Program	17 & over	-0.263	0.273	14	6						—

For differences between groups: ƒ p = .13; * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 .

9.3(e) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project × Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests Interaction

Project	Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	N	Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)								
					i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Comparison	None	0.632	0.397	17	1	—							
Comparison	Low	-0.247	0.538	6	2		—			*			
Comparison	Med	-0.561	0.429	6	3			—					
Comparison	High	-0.102	0.485	5	4				—				*
Program	None	1.154	0.292	16	5		*			—			
Program	Low	-0.184	0.319	14	6						—		
Program	Med	-0.402	0.241	16	7							—	
Program	High	-1.470	0.250	22	8				*				—

For differences between groups: * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 .

Table 9.4
An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Drug Arrests (Controlling for Yearly Total Drug Arrests in the Pre-Program Period).

9.4(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.539)***

Source	Adjusted *df*	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Project: Comparison, Program Worker-Tracked	1	0.001	0.00	0.971
Gender: Male, Female	1	0.027	0.05	0.824
Race/Ethnicity: Latino, Non-Latino	1	0.088	0.17	0.686
Age Group at Program Entry: 14 & under, 15 to 16, 17 & over	2	0.750	1.41	0.256
Gang-Membership Status: Gang Member, Gang Associate/Non-Gang Youth	1	0.047	0.09	0.767
Program Length: <2 Yr vs >=2 Yr	1	0.001	0.00	0.983
Confinement: Yes, No	1	0.629	1.19	0.283
Pre-Program Yearly Total Drug Arrests: None, Low/Medium/High	1	10.854	20.46	0.000***
Project ×Race/Ethnicity	1	0.013	0.02	0.877
Project ×Gang-Membership Status	1	0.425	0.80	0.376
Project ×Program Length	1	0.640	1.21	0.279
Project ×Confinement Length	1	0.666	1.26	0.269
Project ×Pre-Program Yearly Total Drug Arrests	1	0.001	0.00	0.991
Within error	39	0.530	—	—
Total	53	—	—	—

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 .

9.4(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project × Gang-Membership Status Interaction

Project	Gang-Membership Status	Adjust-ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
					i/j	1	2	3	4
Comparison	Gang Associate/ Non-Gang Youth	0.027	0.510	3	1	—			
Comparison	Gang Member	0.206	0.299	12	2		—		
Program	Gang Associate/ Non-Gang Youth	0.305	0.204	16	3			—	
Program	Gang Member	-0.047	0.181	23	4				—

For differences between groups: * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 .

9.4(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project × Program Length Interaction

Project	Program Length	Adjust-ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
					i/j	1	2	3	4
Comparison	<2 Yr	0.248	0.372	8	1	—			
Comparison	>=2 Yr	-0.015	0.389	7	2		—		
Program	<2 Yr	0.003	0.186	18	3			—	
Program	>=2 Yr	0.256	0.205	21	4				—

For differences between groups: * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 .

9.4(d) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project × Pre-Program Yearly Total Drug Arrests Interaction

Project	Pre-program Yearly Total Drug Arrests	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	N	Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
					i/	1	2	3	4
Comparison	None	0.755	0.441	7	1	—	*		*
Comparison	Low/Medium/High	-0.522	0.364	8	2	*	—	†	
Program	None	0.771	0.208	14	3		†	—	‡
Program	Low/Medium/High	-0.513	0.189	25	4	*		‡	—

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; † $p < .01$; and ‡ $p < .001$.

Table 9.5
An Analysis of Variance of Change in Total Yearly Property Arrests (Controlling for Yearly Total Property Arrests in the Pre-Program Period).

9.5(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.660)***

Source	Adjusted *df*	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Project: Comparison, Program Worker-Tracked	1	0.062	0.14	0.710
Gender: Male, Female	1	0.780	1.76	0.188
Race/Ethnicity: Latino, Non-Latino	1	0.156	0.35	0.554
Age Group at Program Entry: 14 & under, 15 to 16, and 17 & over	2	0.185	0.42	0.660
Gang-Membership Status: Gang Member, Gang Associate/Non-Gang Youth	1	1.447	3.27	0.074
Program Length: <2 Yr vs >=2 Yr	1	0.477	1.08	0.302
Confinement Length (%): Zero, .001 to .02, .02 to .1, >.1	3	0.606	1.37	0.257
Pre-Program Yearly Total Property Arrests: None, Low, Medium, High	3	12.290	27.77	0.000***
Project ×Gender	1	0.027	0.06	0.804
Project ×Race/Ethnicity	1	0.601	1.36	0.247
Project ×Age Group	2	0.390	0.88	0.418
Project ×Gang-Membership Status	1	0.517	1.17	0.283
Project ×Program Length	1	0.422	0.95	0.331
Project ×Pre-Program Yearly Total Property Arrests	3	0.132	0.30	0.827
Within error	90	0.443	—	—
Total	112	—	—	—

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 .

9.5(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project × Gang-Membership Status Interaction

Project	Gang-Membership Status	Adjust-ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
					i/j	1	2	3	4
Comparison	Gang Associate/ Non-Gang Youth	-0.076	0.287	13	1	—			
Comparison	Gang Member	-0.528	0.190	30	2		—		
Program	Gang Associate/ Non-Gang Youth	-0.327	0.148	32	3			—	
Program	Gang Member	-0.444	0.137	38	4				—

For differences between groups: * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 .

9.5(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project × Gender Interaction

Project	Gender	Adjust-ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
					i/j	1	2	3	4
Comparison	Female	-0.394	0.272	8	1	—			
Comparison	Male	-0.210	0.224	35	2		—		
Program	Female	-0.520	0.182	17	3			—	*ƒ*
Program	Male	-0.250	0.108	53	4			*ƒ*	—

For differences between groups: *ƒ* p = 0.167, * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 .

9.5(d) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project × Age Group Interaction

Project	Age Group	Adjust-ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)						
					i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6
Comparison	14 & under	-0.334	0.196	27	1	—					
Comparison	15 to 16	-0.222	0.253	13	2		—				
Comparison	17 & over	-0.350	0.427	3	3			—			
Program	14 & under	-0.150	0.163	26	4				—		*ƒ*
Program	15 to 16	-0.444	0.146	29	5					—	
Program	17 & over	-0.562	0.195	15	6				*ƒ*		—

For differences between groups: *ƒ* p = .071; * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 .

Table 9.6
An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total "Other" Arrests (Controlling for Yearly Total "Other" Arrests in the Pre-Program Period).

9.6(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.436)***

Source	Adjusted *df*	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Project: Comparison, Program Worker-Tracked	1	0.120	0.09	0.768
Gender: Male, Female	1	1.614	1.17	0.281
Race/Ethnicity: Latino, Non-Latino	1	1.815	1.32	0.253
Age Group at Program Entry: 14 & under, 15 to 16, and 17 & over	2	2.427	1.77	0.176
Gang-Membership Status: Gang Member, Gang Associate/Non-Gang Youth	1	1.032	0.75	0.388
Program Length: <2 Yr vs >=2 Yr	1	6.043	4.40	0.039*
Confinement Length (%): Zero, .001 to .02, .02 to .1, > .1	3	0.423	0.31	0.820
Pre-Program Yearly Total "Other" Arrests: None, Low, Medium, High	3	15.657	11.39	0.001***
Project ×Gender	1	0.774	0.56	0.455
Project ×Race/Ethnicity	1	2.770	2.01	0.159
Project ×Age Group	2	0.959	0.70	0.500
Project ×Gang-Membership Status	1	0.016	0.01	0.914
Project ×Program Length	1	0.738	0.54	0.465
Project ×Pre-Program Yearly Total "Other" Arrests	3	0.939	0.68	0.565
Within error	102	1.375	—	—
Total	124	—	—	—

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 .

9.6(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total "Other" Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project × Race/Ethnicity Interaction

Project	Race/ Ethnicity	Adjust -ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
					i/j	1	2	3	4
Comparison	Latino	-0.059	0.403	52	1	—			
Comparison	Non-Latino	-0.812	0.462	15	2		—		
Program	Latino	-0.358	0.229	56	3			—	
Program	Non-Latino	-0.285	0.241	54	4				—

For differences between groups: * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 .

9.6(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total "Other" Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Confinement Length Main Effect

Confinement Length (%)	Adjust -ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
Zero	-0.235	0.229	106	1	—			
.001 to .02	-0.258	0.313	26	2		—		
.02 to .1	-0.496	0.320	25	3			—	
>.1	-0.526	0.364	20	4				—

For differences between groups: * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 .

9.6(d) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total "Other" Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project × Program Length Interaction

Project	Program Length	Adjust-ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
					i/j	1	2	3	4
Comparison	<2 Yr	-0.803	0.400	35	1	—			
Comparison	>=2 Yr	-0.068	0.425	32	2		—		
Program	<2 Yr	-0.498	0.212	63	3			—	
Program	>=2 Yr	-0.145	0.252	47	4				—

For differences between groups: * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 .

Chapter 10

Aggregate Gang and Community Crime Change

Our Town Family Center's comprehensive gang project was expected to focus on coordinated, interagency and enhanced provision of community-based services and controls to delinquent youth-gang members and youth at high risk of gang membership. Our Town was primarily interested in providing services to program youth, and paid limited attention to interagency coalition-building and community involvement. An effective partnership with the Tucson Police Department in the development of the Project was not adequately developed.

Based on the Comprehensive Gang Program Model, it was anticipated that a reduction in the gang problem at the program-youth level would go along with and possibly contribute to a reduction of the problem at the gang-as-a-unit and community levels. While the findings discussed in Chapter 9 indicated that the Project did not have a significant effect on arrest patterns of program youth compared to equivalent (non-served) comparison youth, we wondered if it was still possible that there was a greater relative reduction in arrests at the gang-as-a-unit and community levels in the program area than in the comparison area, during the program period, that might be attributed to Project effects.

Our questions could not be reliably answered, however, because of the lack of arrest data at the gang-as-a-unit and specific community-area levels. These data were not availalbe for long enough periods of time, and could not be controlled for demographic characteristics, as were the individual-youth crime-change data. We had to rely on youth self-report data and police perceptions of crime-incident changes.

Youth Arrest Pattern Changes

We did not know if the arrest patterns of youth in the program and comparison samples (Table 10.1) adequately represented the arrest patterns of their gangs or gang incidents in the program and comparison areas. Program youth were more seriously and chronically delinquent, compared to comparison youth. Nevertheless, as gang youth, they could have represented different subsamples of the gang problem in the two communities. The gang problem still could have been more serious in the comparison area than in the program area.

In the pre-program period, program youth were arrested primarily for property crime (44.3%), less-serious violence (18.6%), and serious violence (11.4%); comparison youth were arrested primarily for property crime (49.0%) and drug crime (28.6%). In the program period, the patterns of arrests changed sharply for program youth. There was a drop in property crime arrests (25.4%), a drop in less-serious violence arrests (17.9%), and a sharp increase in serious violence (19.4%) and drug (20.8%) arrests.

In the pre-program and program periods, the pattern of arrests for comparison youth remained relatively unchanged. In both periods, comparison youth were arrested primarily for property crime (49.0% vs. 52.1%) and drugs (28.6% vs. 25.0%). Program youth comprised more serious and chronic offenders at both the start and the end of the program period. The Project was not associated with a benign shift in crime patterns, although it was associated with a slight, non-statistically significant reduction in total arrests.

Youth Self-Report Delinquency Changes

Self-report data were obtained for program youth (N = 92) and comparison youth (N=51)

only during the program period, at Time I (1996-1997) and Time II (1997-1998), about a year apart. From the range of incidents included in the 26-item self-report inventory (including violence, property, and drug crimes), both program and comparison youth more often reported less-serious than more-serious offenses. More comparison than program youth reported offenses, but there was little difference in the pattern of offenses reported at Time I and Time II. The pattern of reduction for the different types offenses at Time I was the same in both samples.

Nevertheless, there were interesting slight differences in drug selling, drug use, alcohol use and access to hand guns that favored program youth. The number of program youth who reported they sold drugs at Time I (n = 22) dropped at Time II (n = 17) – a 5.4% decline. The number of comparison youth who reported they sold drugs at Time I (n = 15) dropped slightly at Time II (n = 14) – a 2.0% decline. Also, the percent of program youth who said they used drugs declined more for program youth (13.0%) than for comparison youth (11.8%). On the other hand, the percent of program youth using alcohol increased 8.4%, but decreased 15.5% for comparison youth. The percent of program youth who said they had access to a handgun decreased 22.0%, more than the 15.7% for comparison youth.

Gang Membership Changes. Based on self-reports of changes in gang membership (not controlling for age), it was difficult to determine whether program or comparison youth were more or less likely to become or continue as gang members. We found that program youth were likely to become gang members, and comparison youth more likely to give up their gang affiliation. Seventeen-and- four-tenths percent (17.4%) of program youth who were not gang members at Time I became gang members at Time II, while 20.0% of comparison youth who said

they were gang members at Time I declared they were not gang members at Time II. Of youth who said they had "always been a gang member," the decline was not as great for program youth – from 24 at Time I to 11at Time II; the decline for comparison youth was greater – from 16 at Time I to 0 at Time II. Nevertheless, a greater percentage of program youth (28.9%) than comparison youth (3.8%) said they were former gang members at Time II. Program youth appeared to have a more sustained commitment to gang membership than comparison youth, but gang membership was a changing characteristic for both samples (Table 10.2).

Perceptions of Gang Size and Gang-Crime Patterns

Program and comparison youth and Tucson Police Department Officers were asked to indicated any changes in the size of gangs and the severity of gang crime in the program and comparison communities at different times during the program period. The views of the youth and police respondents did not necessarily match.

Reports by Program and Comparison Youth

Gang Size. In the Time-I and Time-II interviews, youth were asked about the size of their gangs. At Time I, program youth reported that their gangs or gang subsections were larger than did the comparison youth. At Time II, youth in both samples reported that their mean gang size had grown larger. In the program sample, male gangs or subsections grew on average from 98 to 134 members, and female gangs or subsections grew from 41 to 47 members. In the comparison sample, male gangs or subsections grew relatively larger, on average – from 55 to 106 members – and female gangs or subsections grew from 25 to 28. The increase in size was not statistically

significant within or across gangs.

Gang Crime Changes. Program and comparison youth were also asked to judge whether different types of gang crime (total crime, violence, property, and drug crime) were "no problem," a "small problem," a "moderate problem," a "serious problem," or a "very serious problem" in their communities at each time period. Gang drug crime was perceived by program and comparison youth as the most serious of all community-level gang crimes. It was viewed as either serious or very serious by almost two-thirds of all youth in the samples at Time I, and then by more than 50.0% at Time II. Similar decreases in gang violence were perceived by program and comparison youth. Program youth saw a greater reduction in gang property crime and comparison youth saw a greater reduction in gang drug crime. Nevertheless, these perceptions of patterns of gang crime and their declines over time were similar for program and comparison youth (Table 10.3).

Reports by Tucson Police

Interviews were conducted by a National Evaluator with three Tucson Police Officers – a Gang Unit officer, a supervisor, and a community-policing officer – all with knowledge of gangs and gang activities in the program and comparison areas. The interviews were conducted three times during the Project period, at nine-month intervals, between November 1998 (Time I) and May 2000 (Time III). The changes in gang size and gang crime severity were based on differences in estimates of the Officers at the Time-I and Time-III interviews. Information was obtained on gang size and the severity of gang crime in each of the gangs in the program and comparison areas. At both Time I and Time III, the Officers identified characteristics of 8 gangs

in the program area and 7 gangs in the comparison areas over time. (Four of the gangs in each of the two areas had identical names, and probably were the same gangs.)

Gang Size. The police estimated that gangs in the program area were larger than gangs in the comparison area, but both areas had generally lost gang members between Time I and Time III. Six of the eight gangs in the program area and four of the seven gangs in the comparison area were said to have lost members. The decline in total gang membership in the program area was 29.3% – from 719 to 509, which was greater than the 8.6% decline in the comparison area – from 455 to 370.

The four gangs with the same names in the program and comparison areas differed in membership size and membership change from the other gangs in the areas. Total membership of the four same-named gangs in the program area was 39 at Time I and 34 at Time III, a decline of 12.8%. Total membership of the same-named four gangs in the comparison area was larger, with a 30.4% greater decline – from 230 to 160 (Table 10.4).

Gang Crime Change. The Police Officers were asked to rate the severity of crime committed by each gang on a ten-point scale (from 0 = lowest to 10 = highest) for total gang crime, violence, property, and drugs. The ratings were totaled and averaged for all the gangs in the program and comparison areas, both at Time I and Time III. At both times, the Officers rated total gang crime and different types of gang crimes as two or more times more serious for comparison-area gangs than for program-area gangs. This was certainly not consistent with findings of the youth self-reports. Crime in the four same-named gangs in both areas was reported to be less serious than in the other two gangs. Again, drug crimes were generally rated as the most serious, and property crimes the least serious, in both areas at both time periods.

The general trend of gang crime in both areas was down at Time III. However, the level of violence was generally up for program-area gangs, especially the other gangs, but slightly down from an already low level for the same-named gangs in the program area. The highest level of violence and drug crime was for the other gangs in both areas at Time III. The four same-named gangs in the program area were reported to have the lowest level of violence and drug crime of all gangs in the two areas (Table 10.5). There was no consistency in the findings about levels of and changes in gang-crime seriousness over similar time periods based on the different sources of data. Perhaps youth and police were looking at different sectors of the gang-crime elephant.

City of Tucson Gang Crime Statistics

Tucson Police Department Uniform Crime Report (UCR) crime statistics were available on a citywide basis for the pre-program period (1992-1995) and program (1996-1999) period, although community-level police statistics were not. Also, the citywide statistics for crime incidents were not broken down by whether they were gang or non-gang-related (Table 10.6).

Total citywide Part I[1] crime counts declined by 9.0% (homicides by 7.9%; aggravated assaults by 6.4%). Part I serious non-violent crime counts also declined, at least for burglary (3.4%) and larceny (15.0%), but not for motor vehicle theft, which increased by 9.2%. The

[1] Part I offenses are crimes designated by the FBI as "most serious," including homicide, robbery, forcible rape, aggravated assault, burglary, motor vehicle theft, arson and larceny. Part II offenses are crimes designated by the FBI as "less serious," including simple assault, stolen property, criminal damage to property, fraud, embezzlement, disorderly conduct, vagrancy, runaways, curfew and loitering violations, suspicion, drunkenness, liquor law violations, drug abuse violations, weapons violations, gambling, prostitution, and several other offenses. They are compiled in terms of the number of reports made to law-enforcement agencies and the number of arrests made.

decreases in citywide Part II crime counts that might be closely associated with gang-related crime incidents did not completely match the decline in Part I counts. Part II assaults increased 12.3%, criminal damage to property increased 5.1%, and narcotics-law violations increased 17.0%. On the other hand, counts of stolen property decreased 7.2%, and weapons violations decreased 20.0%.

Still, we cannot be sure that citywide increases or decreases in Part I and Part II crime counts reflect similar changes at the program and comparison-area levels. We do not know whether crime generally increased or decreased, or by how much.

Summary

Appropriate data were not generally available to measure the influence of the Project on changes in crime at the program and comparison-community levels. We did not have aggregate community incident or arrest data on which to base a fully adequate analysis. The data we obtained provided conflicting findings as to whether crime by gangs increased or decreased in the program area relative to the comparison area, and we cannot conclude that more or less of the various types of crimes occurred in the program area relative to the comparison area during the program period. Even if we had evidence that the number of gang members and severity of gang crime decreased more in the program area than in the comparison area, we still would not be able to demonstrate that it was due to Project effects. The Project probably made no difference in changing crime behavior at the individual, gang or community levels.

Table 10.1
Arrest Change Patterns[a]
by Type of Arrests (N = 234)
Comparison Youth and Program Youth

Type of Arrest	Comparison Youth Arrests (N = 97)				Program Youth Arrests (N = 137)			
	Pre-Program Period		Program Period		Pre-Program Period		Program Period	
	n	(%)	n	(%)	n	(%)	n	(%)
Serious Violence	2	(4.1)	0	(0.0)	8	(11.4)	13	(19.4)
Less-Serious Violence	3	(6.1)	2	(4.2)	13	(18.6)	12	(17.9)
Drugs	14	(28.6)	12	(25.0)	7	(10.0)	14	(20.8)
Property	24	(49.0)	25	(52.1)	31	(44.3)	17	(25.4)
Weapons	2	(4.1)	1	(2.1)	1	(1.4)	1	(1.5)
Police Disturbance	2	(4.1)	3	(6.3)	1	(1.4)	2	(3.0)
Alcohol	1	(2.0)	2	(4.2)	2	(2.9)	1	(1.5)
Others	1	(2.0)	3	(6.3)	7	(10.0)	7	(10.4)
Total	49	(100.0)	48	(100.0)	70	(100.0)	67	(100.0)

[a] Focus of this table is on the number of youth arrested for committing particular types of crimes, not the frequency of arrests by youth for a particular crime (as in Table 7.6).

Table 10.2
Youth-Reported Gang Membership Changes
Program Youth (N = 92) and Comparison Youth (N = 50)[a]
Interviewed at both Time I and Time II

Interview Time	Non-Gang Youth				Former Gang Member				Current Gang Member				Always a Gang Member				Total Youth			
	Program		Comparison		Program		Comparison		Program		Comparison		Program		Comparison		Program		Comparison	
	n	(%)	n	(%)	n	(%)	n	(%)	n	(%)	n	(%)	n	(%)	n	(%)	n	(%)	n	(%)
Time I	16	(17.4)	0	(0.0)	47	(5.1)	26	(52.0)	5	(5.4)	8	(16.0)	24	(26.1)	16	(32.0)	92	(100.0)	50	(100.0)
Time II	0	(0.0)	10	(20.0)	66	(71.0%)	25	(50.0)	9	(9.8)	15	(30.0)	11	(17.0)	0	(0.0)	92	(100.0)	50	(100.0)
Gang Membership Change	– 100.0%		+100.0%		-28.9%		-3.8%		+44.4%		+46.7%		-54.9%		-100.0%					

[a] Fourteen (14) of the 106 program youth and 51 of the 101 comparison youth who did not complete both Time-I and Time-II interviews are not in this analysis.

Table 10.3
Youth-Reported Serious Gang Crime[a] in Community
Time I and Time II

Youth Sample	Percent Reported Serious Gang Crime							
	Total Gang Crime		Violence		Property		Drugs	
	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II
Comparison Youth Time I (N = 51) Time II (N = 46)	33.3	23.4	39.2	27.7	27.5	25.4	68.6	55.5
Program Youth Time I (N = 89) Time II (N = 84)	39.3	23.8	39.3	25.0	37.1	19.1	63.6	57.1

[a] Sample youth were asked to rate the amount of specific types of gang-related crimes present in their communities: **property** – vandalism (graffiti), breaking and entering, car theft; **violence** – robbery, threats, battery without a weapon, battery with a weapon, driveby shooting, possession of a knife, possession of a gun; **drugs** – using drugs, selling drugs; and **total** of property, violence, and drugs.

The youth were asked to categorize the amount of crime as "small", "moderate," "serious," or "very serious." The categories were combined for analysis purposes as "small", "moderate," and "serious/very serious."

Table 10.4
Police-Reported Gang Membership Change
Time I and Time III
Program and Comparison Areas

	Total Gang Membership		Percent Change
	Time I	Time II	
Sample Area Gangs			
Program (N=8)	719	509	-29.3%
Comparison (N=7)	455	370	-18.6%
Same-Named Gangs			
Program (N=4)	39	34	-12.8%
Comparison (N=4)	23	160	-30.4%
Other Gangs			
Program (N=4)	680	475	-30.1
Comparison (N=3)	225	210	-6.7

Table 10.5
Police-Reported Community Gang Crime Change
Program and Comparison Areas
Time I and Time III

	Seriousness of Crime Score[a]					
	Violence		Drugs		Property	
	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II
Area/Gangs						
Program (N=8)	2.8	3.5	4.25	3.9	0.5	0.4
Comparison (N=7)	6.1	6.0	6.1	5.7	1.1	1.1
Same-Named Gangs						
Program (N=4)	2.3	1.0	1.8	1.0	1.0	0.8
Comparison (N=4)	5.5	5.3	5.5	4.8	4.0	2.0
Other Gangs						
Program (N=4)	3.3	6.0	6.8	6.8	0.0	0.0
Comparison (N=3)	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	0.0	0.0

[a] The Tucson Police respondents rated each of the gangs on a scale of 0 to 10, with 10 being the most serious level of gang crime. Scores for all of the gangs in each area were averaged at Time I and at Time III.

Table 10.6
City of Tucson Official Crime Counts[a]
Pre-Program Period (1992-1995) and Program Period (1996-1999)

	Pre-Program Period	Program Period	Percent Change
Part I Crimes			
Total	201,694	183,560	-9.0%
Homicide	194	179	-7.7%
Aggravated Assault	13,461	12,597	-6.4%
Part II Crimes			
Other Assault	34,651	38,908	+12.3%
Narcotic Drug Laws	15,491	18,127	+17.0%
Part I and Part II Assaults	48,112	51,505	+7.1%

Source: Tucson Police Department Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics, June 2004

[a] Part I offenses are crimes designated by the FBI as "most serious," including homicide, robbery, forcible rape, aggravated assault, burglary, motor vehicle theft, arson and larceny. They are compiled in terms of the number of reports of law-enforcement agencies and the number of arrests reported. Part II offenses are crimes designated by the FBI as "less serious," including simple assault, stolen property, criminal damage to property, fraud, embezzlement, disorderly conduct, vagrancy, runaways, curfew and loitering violations, suspicion, drunkenness, liquor law violations, drug abuse violations, weapons violations, gambling, prostitution, and several other offenses. They are compiled in terms of the number of reports made to law-enforcement agencies and the number of arrests made.

Chapter 11

Executive Summary

Introduction

The Tucson Gang Project was one of five demonstrations to test the Model of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program. Our Town Family Center (OTFC), the lead agency in Tucson, submitted its application for the "Las Vistas/Pueblo Gardens Gang Project" in September, 1994. The program period of operations was from 1996 through 1999.

The Comprehensive Gang Program Model required the development of interrelated strategies of community mobilization, social intervention, provision of social opportunities, suppression and organizational change in a cluster of criminal-justice and social-service agencies, schools, and grassroots and other organizations working together to serve and control a target group of gang delinquents, as well as youth highly at risk for gang involvement. A Steering Committee of local community, city and county leaders was to be developed to advise on policy and program development. An interagency team of outreach youth workers, case managers, police, probation officers, and personnel of other social agencies was to be established to provide interrelated, appropriate services and controls to targeted youth recruited for participation in the program.

Technical assistance experts and officials of OJJDP provided substantive management advice and monitoring of the Project's implementation. University of Chicago researchers, with

the aid of a local evaluation team, conducted a process, outcome and impact evaluation of the program and its effects. The Evaluation involved comparing the effects of the Project on program youth from the target communities with equivalent, non-served youth from a comparison community in Tucson. Crime changes at the gang-as-a-unit level and across the program and comparison areas were also evaluated.

Program and Comparison Areas

In 1996, the program area of Las Vistas/Pueblo Gardens was expanded to include the nearby Western Hills and South Park neighborhood; the comparison area, also in the southern part of Tucson, included the Desert Hills and Elvira neighborhoods. The program and comparison areas were small, each about 1 or 1.5 miles square, located in the southern part of the city, distant from central city economic, commercial and cultural resources. While the population of the city had increased from 330,537 in 1980 to 405,390 in 1990 (22.6%), the population of the program area had increased from 11,293 to 11,743 (4.0%); the comparison-area population had decreased from 8,749 to 8,297 – a 5.2% loss. In 1990 the citywide population was predominantly white (63.7%), but the population of the program and comparison areas was mainly Hispanic, almost completely of Mexican origin (program area = 60.6%; comparison area = 73.4%). Between 1980 and 1990, the citywide Hispanic population had increased three times more in the program and comparison areas (12.0% each) than in the city as a whole (4.0%).

The economic status of the city and the program and comparison areas varied sharply: the 1990 median family income was $31,705 in the city, a rise of 1.7% since 1980; the median family income in the program area was $22,003, a decrease of 3.2%; and the 1990 median family

income in the comparison area was $26,903, a decrease of 20.0%. The 1990 U.S. Census indicated that 14.4% of families in the city, 28.6% in the program area, and 23.1% in the comparison area were below the poverty line.

The two areas were characterized by an increasing concentration of a low- or lower-income minority Hispanic population, and a growing youth population. The areas were ripe for the development of an increasing crime rate and a gang problem.

The Tucson Gang Problem

Specific knowledge of crime, including gang-crime statistics, was not available on a local-area basis in Tucson, but crime data on the south side of Tucson – including both program and comparison areas – were available. According to Our Town, homicides and gang drivebys in the south side of the city were reported to be much higher than in the rest of the city. According to the opinions of law-enforcement officers, youth gangs had existed in certain parts of the city for decades. Gang feuds in the barrios, including in the program and comparison areas, had existed since the 1950s, but gang violence was not serious prior to the 1980s. Serious gang violence arrived when Mexican-origin and African-American youth in low-income minority areas adopted the names of "Bloods" and "Crips."

Based on available data, it was not clear whether juvenile (including juvenile gang) arrests were going up or down in the city. According to police data, the average age of gang offenders in the city was 21 years. At the start of Project operations, 56.4% of violent incidents in the Las Vistas neighborhood were attributed to gang members, and 48% of all juveniles referred to juvenile court from Las Vistas were said to be gang members. In recent years, 10% to

15% of the 50 homicides, on average, were reported to be gang homicides. The gang problems in the program and comparison areas at the start of the program period were not consistently described. One community-policing officer claimed that drivebys were almost nightly occurrences in the program area. The same police officer also complained that junk cars were more of a concern to local residents.

The gangs and their distinctive behaviors – in the city and in the program and comparison areas – were said to be increasingly identified by particular race and ethnicity. Although some of the gangs still comprised both Latino and African-American youth, more of the strictly Latino gangs were supposed to be involved in inter-gang conflict, and relatively more of the strictly African-American gangs were said to be into drug selling. However, Project police claimed there was a close relationship between Latino prison gangs and street gangs in regard to drug selling.

Addressing the Gang Problem

City government and political leaders did not become clearly aware of and/or sufficiently concerned about the gang problem until the early 1990s. The second Our Town OJJDP Funding Application (1996) stated that "until recently the largest problem most communities faced was gang denial." State, county, and city governments and the schools each had different definitions of the gang problem. Adequate data about the nature and scope of the gang problem was not available, and no system of agency and community collaboration for addressing the problem existed. The need to work out a system of communication and formal linkages among agencies about what to do about the gang problem was never adequately addressed in the course of the program.

In the early Project years, a variety of interagency gang coalitions formed for brief periods to address the general problem of violence in Tucson, including gang-related violence in the program area. The Tucson Police Department's community-policing program had some interest in the gang problem in the program area. TASK I (Taking a Stand for Kids), a coalition of social-service agencies and community groups, was mainly concerned about crime prevention and social services for youth. The Mayor's Task Force on Violence, comprising a broad coalition of criminal-justice/social agencies and community groups, was focused on youth violence.

Our Town was part of the various organizing efforts. After receiving OJJDP funds for implementing the Comprehensive Gang Program Model, Our Town attempted to make use of the TASK I coalition of agencies as the Project's Steering Committee. The effort was ultimately unsuccessful.

Problems quickly developed early in the Project because of the inability of Our Town to integrate its own agency-service interests and those of TASK I. Our Town was interested primarily in extending and developing its existing service program to meet the social needs of the delinquent gang and at-risk youth and their families who were referred to the Project. TASK-I social and community agencies would become peripherally related to the Project over time. The Tucson Police Department (also only peripherally engaged in the development the Project) was interested mainly in resources to develop and improve its computer technology and crime-information systems. Pima County Juvenile Probation was associated with the Project mainly through referral of probationers to the program, and the nearby Boys and Girls Club provided access to its facilities for program youth.

Our Town did not develop a comprehensive approach to the gang problem. It contacted and involved a limited number of social agencies, schools, and community groups who met only sporadically to provide token support and receive information about the progress of the Project. A pro-active and sustaining Steering Committee was not established. Our Town appeared to be interested only in sustaining and/or funding an expansion of its own established services.

Community Organization Perceptions and Project Assessments of the Gang Problem in the Project Area

Leaders of 18 local organizations interested in the gang problem in the program area (including agencies contracted by Our Town to participate in the Project) were interviewed by National Evaluation staff – early in the program (Time I) and two years later (Time II). Agency administrators perceived the community's gang problem to be serious at Time I, and almost as serious at Time II. More progress was made in the reduction of gang violence than in the reduction of the gang drug problem, which still was regarded as the most serious of all gang problems. Tucson agency-administrator respondents believed that they had made some progress in the provision of social-intervention services, but the progress was limited. They saw their success at Time II as less than was the case with administrators at the other Gang-Program demonstration sites.

In assessments of Project effectiveness made by local-agency respondents as well as by the National Evaluators, the consensus was that the Project did poorly in the development of a Steering Committee, grassroots involvement and the development of improved education and employment opportunities. The Local and National Evaluators believed that the Project did best

in targeting gang youth who were serious offenders and youth who were at high risk of gang involvement, and also in providing social-intervention and outreach services, but that the Project did not develop an effective interagency service team in collaboration with police and probation officers.

Characteristics of Program and Comparison Youth

The total sample in the Evaluation analysis consisted of 126 program youth from the target area who were provided with services, and 101 comparison youth from the comparison area who were not provided with services. There were similar proportions of males and females in the analysis (program sample = 69.8% males and 30.2% females; comparison sample = 71.3% males and 28.7% females). There were fewer Latinos (50.0%) and more African-Americans (41.3%) in the program sample than in the comparison sample (79.2% and 12.9%, respectively). Similar small proportions of non-Latino whites, Native Americans and Asian Americans were in each sample. Youth in the samples were young: 14 years and under = 39.7% in the program sample and – much larger – 63.4% in the comparison sample; 15 and 16 years = 51.6% in the program sample and 31.7% in the comparison sample; 17 and over = 8.7% in the program sample and 5.0% in the comparison sample. More program (74.5%) than comparison (42.6%) youth had police arrest histories and extensive confinement records. Program youth had more serious violence arrests but fewer drug arrests in the pre-program period. Based on self-reports, there was little difference in gang membership patterns in the two samples. At the Time-I interviews, somewhat more comparison youth (100.0%) than program youth (81.9%) declared that they were gang members, but the reverse was true at Time II. Key differences in the samples

were that program youth were older and more seriously delinquent than comparison youth.

Program Services Provided

Our Town Family Center's program focused largely on the provision of services to youth by case managers and outreach youth workers. There was some use of neighboring Boys and Girls Club facilities, and occasional contacts with probation officers, police, and school staff. Emphasis was on early-intervention services for mainly younger youth.

There were 5,097 services provided, and 13,541 direct worker contacts with 125 program youth. Of the direct worker contacts, 16.4% were in coordination with other workers, mainly Our Town agency workers. Most youth were referred to the program by juvenile probation and juvenile parole (74.4%), and by workers within Our Town's program (15.3%). On average, a youth spent 20.8 months in the program and was provided with 1.9 services, 4.9 direct workers contacts, and 0.8 coordinated worker contacts per month.

Types of services provided to youth over the program period were: case planning (24.1%), group counseling (20.3%), individual counseling (13.9%), suppression (13.8%), school-related services (8.5%), job-related services (4.1%), and family counseling (2.9%). More services-per-youth were provided to youth 10-14 years old (49.0) than to the 15- 17-year-olds (37.6) or the 17-and-older youth (20.7). More services were provided to youth who had a small number of arrests than to youth who had no arrests or many arrests. In general, the program focus was on social-support services within the walls of the Our Town facility, and less on balanced social-intervention and control strategies. A team approach involving social-service and suppression-type workers in collaborative planning and action around particular youth or

gang-problem situations in the community was not developed.

Arrest Outcomes

In a series of multivariate (GLM) analyses – controlling statistically for differences in gender, age, race/ethnicity, gang-membership status, length of time in the program, pre-program arrests, and pre-program confinement periods – we found no statistically significant differences in change patterns for total arrests, serious violence arrests, total violence arrests, drug arrests, property arrests, and other (minor) arrests between program and comparison youth, between the pre-program and program periods. Program youth did slightly better than comparison youth in reducing their total arrests, total violence, property, and minor arrests, but did slightly worse in increasing their drug arrests. The most important change for both program and comparison youth was a regression effect: youth who had more arrests in the pre-program period had fewer arrests in the program period, and youth who had fewer arrests in the pre-program period had more arrests in the program period.

Focusing on program-sample effects only, there was a tendency for youth with shorter periods of time in the program to do better than those in the program for longer periods, particularly in the reduction of total arrests, serious violence arrests, drug arrests, and other minor arrests, but not of total violence or property arrests. Program youth gang members had a slight increase in arrests for violence, while non-gang youth and "wannabe" gang members had significant reductions in violence arrests. Females did somewhat better than males in reducing property arrests. None of these program subsample change patterns was statistically significant, however.

Overall, we found no Project effects that could be associated with lowering (or increasing) arrests. Similar non-Project effects were found when analyzing program- and comparison-youth self-reported offense changes during the first two years of the program period.

Aggregate-Level Community Effects

Based more on perceptual than "hard" police data, the Project appeared to have little effect in lowering gang crime in the program area relative to the comparison area. Crime, particularly serious crime, was generally declining in the city as a whole; no equivalent data was available to make the same determination at the local-community level. Nevertheless, there was statistical evidence that minor violence, criminal damage to property and especially narcotics-law violations were still increasing citywide. There were contradictory views by police and the gang youth from the program and comparison areas as to whether the size of gangs was growing or declining, although there was some agreement that gang crime, including violence, property and drug crime, was generally decreasing in both areas. These views were not consistent with citywide police statistics. Even if gang crime were declining more in the program area than in the comparison area, it was not clear that the change could be attributed to the efforts of the Project, since there had been no significant change in arrest patterns of program youth relative to comparison youth.

The Our Town Project's interrelated service, control, opportunity-provision and community-mobilization efforts were not sufficient to modify arrest patterns at the individual-youth or community-area levels.

Appendix A

Police Arrest Charges

Crime	Charges	
Serious Violence	Murder	Armed Robbery
	Attempted Murder	Armed Violence
	Manslaughter	Drive-By Shooting
	Aggravated Battery	Criminal Sexual Assault/Abuse
	Aggravated Assault	
Violence	Battery	Child Abuse
	Robbery	Street Fighting
	Kidnapping	Mob Action
	Arson	Educational Intimidation
	Assault	Hate Crime
	Home Invasion	Stalking
	Attempted Aggravated Battery	Telephone Harassment
	Attempted Robbery	Intimidation
	Hijacking/Motor Vehicle	Ethnic Intimidation
	Domestic Assault	Racial Incident
	Domestic Battery	Unlawful Restraint
	Sex Crime	Protection Order
Property	Burglary	Possession of Mislaid Property
	Auto Theft	Criminal Damage to Property
	Theft	Criminal Damage to Land
	Possession of Stolen Motor Vehicle	Criminal Damage to (Motor) Vehicle
	Receipt of Stolen Motor Vehicle	Graffiti
	Sale of Stolen Motor Vehicle	Vandalism
	Theft of Lost Property	Trespass
	Attempted Burglary	Criminal Trespass to Residence
	Attempted Theft	Criminal Trespass to Land
	Shoplifting	Criminal Trespass to Property
	Possession of Stolen Property	Criminal Trespass to (Motor) Vehicle
	Receipt of Stolen Property	Possession of Burglary Tools

Crime	Charges	
Drugs	Manufacture/Distribution/Delivery of Controlled Substance	Under the Influence of Cocaine
	Possession of Controlled Substance	Under the Influence of Meth
	Possession of Cannabis/Marijuana	Under the Influence of Cannabis/Marijuana
	Possession of Non-Narcotic Controlled Substance	Driving under the Influence of Drugs
Weapon	Unlawful Use of Weapons	Unlawful Possession of Weapons
	Aggravated Discharge of Firearm	Possession of Firearm and Ammo
	Unlawful Sale of Weapons	Unregistered Gun Carriage
	Unlawful Possession of Firearms	No FOID
Public Disturbance	Resisting/Obstructing a Peace Officer	Gang Loitering
	Disorderly Conduct	Gang Assembly
	Reckless Conduct	Unlawful Assembly
	Curfew Violation	Contempt of Court
	Loitering	Obstruction of Justice
Alcohol	Driving under the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs	Possession of Alcohol/Minor
	Sale of Alcohol/Minor	Possession of Alcoholic Beverage
	Minor Drinking	Drinking
	Intoxication of Minor	Transportation of Open Alcohol
Other	Other	Child Neglect
	Status Offense	Child Care Referral
	Attempted Suicide	Forgery
	Motor Vehicle Act	Bank Fraud
	Fraudulent/Unlawful ID	
	Contributing to Delinquency of Minor	
	Exhibitionism	
	Public Indecency	
	Maintaining a Public Nuisance	

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