No. 97-1890
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1997
SANDRA K. KERBY, PETITIONER
v.
SOUTHEASTERN PUBLIC SERVICE AUTHORITY, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT
IN OPPOSITION
MARVIN KRISLOV
Deputy Solicitor for
National Operations
ALLEN H. FELDMAN
Associate Solicitor
NATHANIEL I. SPILLER
Deputy Associate Solicitor
EDWARD D. SIEGER
Attorney
Department of Labor
Washington, D.C. 20210
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) provides compensation
and benefits to employees engaged in maritime employment who suffer injuries
"upon the navigable waters of the United States * * * including any
adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway,
or other adjoining area customarily used" by an employer in specified
longshoring and shipyard activities. 33 U.S.C. 903(a). The question presented
is:
Whether a power plant that supplies steam and electricity exclusively to
a shipyard is located in an "adjoining area" within the meaning
of 33 U.S.C. 903(a), where the shipyard is separated from the plant by fences
and a railroad spur, and employees of the plant are not routinely given
access to the shipyard.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Opinions below
1
Jurisdiction
2
Statement
2
Argument
6
Conclusion
12
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co. v. Herron, 568
F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1978)
7, 8, 11
Empire Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health
Review Comm'n, 136 F.3d 873 (1st Cir. 1998)
8
Nelson v. American Dredging Co., 143 F.3d 789
(3d Cir. 1998)
7, 9
Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432
U.S. 249 (1977)
2, 8
Parker v. Director, OWCP, 75 F.3d 929 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 58 (1996)
6
Rodriquez v. Southeastern Public Service Authority,
30 Ben. Rev. Bd. Serv. (MB) 226 (1996)
1, 3
Sidwell v. Express Container Services, Inc.,
71 F.3d 1134 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518
U.S. 1028 (1996)
4, 6, 7, 9
Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d
504 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905
(1981)
7, 8, 9, 11-12
Triguero v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 932 F.2d 95
(2d Cir. 1991)
7, 11
Wisniewski v. United States, 353 U.S. 901 (1957)
9
Statutes-Continued:
Page
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compsensation Act,
33 U.S.C. 901 et seq.:
§ 2(3), 33 U.S.C. 902(3)
2
§ 3(a), 33 U.S.C. 903(a)
2, 4, 7, 8, 9
§ 8, 33 U.S.C. 908
2
§ 9, 33 U.S.C. 909
2
Miscellaneous:
Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)
7
LHWCA Program Memorandum No. 58 (Aug. 10,
1977)
8, 9, 10
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1997
No. 97-1890
SANDRA K. KERBY, PETITIONER
v.
SOUTHEASTERN PUBLIC SERVICE AUTHORITY, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT
IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. I-V) is unpublished, but
the decision is noted at 135 F.3d 770 (Table). The decision of the Benefits
Review Board (Pet. App. VI-XXVI) is reported at 31 Ben. Rev. Bd. Serv. (MB)
6. The decision of the admin- istrative law judge (ALJ) (Pet. App. XXVII-XLIX)
is unreported, although the determinative coverage issue, decided in Rodriquez
v. Southeastern Public Service Authority (Pet. App. L-LXX), is reported
at 30 Ben. Rev. Bd. Serv. (MB) 226 (ALJ).
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on February 24, 1998. The
petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on May 22, 1998. The jurisdiction
of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATEMENT
1. The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compen- sation Act (LHWCA) provides
compensation to cov- ered employees for work-related injuries that result
in disability, and to survivors if the injury causes death. 33 U.S.C. 908,
909. A covered employee must meet a "status" requirement-i.e.,
satisfy the Act's definition of "employee," see 33 U.S.C. 902(3)1-and
have been injured at a maritime "situs." See North- east Marine
Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 264-265 (1977). The instant case concerns
the "situs" requirement, which appears in Section 3(a) of the
Act and which specifies that a disability or death is compensable only if
it
results from an injury occurring upon the navi- gable waters of the United
States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, build-
ing way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an
employer in loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling, or building a vessel).
33 U.S.C. 903(a).
2. In the 1980s, the United States Navy built a power plant to provide steam
and electricity to the Norfolk Naval Shipyard (NNS). Pet. App. LIV. The
shipyard is located on land owned by the Navy that is contiguous with a
navigable river. Id. at IX. The power plant is located on land, owned by
the Navy, that is immediately adjacent to a landward side of the shipyard.
Id. at IX, LV. A privately owned railroad spur separates the power plant
from the shipyard, and chain link fences on either side of the spur separate
the railroad spur from the Navy's two properties. Id. at LV.
In 1989, the Navy contracted with respondent Southeastern Public Service
Authority to maintain and operate the power plant. Pet. App. III-IV, IX,
LV-LVI. Respondent generates steam and electric- ity exclusively for the
shipyard, which uses all of the steam and controls a "switch yard"
on the power plant site that determines how much electricity the shipyard
will use. Id. at X & n.2, LXIII. Re- spondent's employees need a badge
or special permis- sion to enter the shipyard, however, and therefore do
not have immediate access to the shipyard by virtue of their employment
with respondent. Id. at IV, XXIV, LV.
In Rodriquez v. Southeastern Public Service Au- thority, 30 Ben. Rev. Bd.
Serv. (MB) 226 (ALJ) (1996), an administrative law judge (ALJ) determined
that the power plant operated by respondent is a covered situs for purposes
of the LHWCA. Pet. App. L-LXX. The ALJ concluded that the power plant is
located on an "adjoining area customarily used by an employer * * *
in repairing or building vessels" because the plant was built and is
owned by the Navy, is located on land owned by the Navy, and is immediately
adjacent to the shipyard. Id. at LXII-LXIII (quoting 33 U.S.C. 903(a)).
The ALJ stated that "[t]he fact that the [plant and shipyard] properties
are separately fenced off is incidental." Id. at LXIII. The ALJ also
observed that "the very purpose of the plant is to gen- erate steam
and electricity exclusively for" the shipyard, and that the Navy rather
than respondent controls the flow of steam and electricity to the shipyard.
Ibid. The ALJ concluded that NNS had "extended situs to the power plant,"
which was "stra- tegically located in an adjoining area so as to provide
vital steam and electricity to NNS." Id. at LXIV.
3. Petitioner was employed by respondent as a heavy equipment and crane
operator at the power plant. Pet. App. XXXIII. In August 1994, she sus-
tained a work-related injury. Id. at XI, XXXIII. She applied for disability
benefits under the LHWCA, asserting that she met the status and situs require-
ments for coverage. Id. at IV. Relying on the decision in Rodriquez, the
ALJ held that petitioner satisfied the Act's situs requirement. Id. at XXX-XXXI
n.2. The ALJ also concluded that petitioner satisfied the LHWCA's status
requirement and was otherwise eligible for benefits. See id. at XXXIX-XLIX;
see also id. at LXIV-LXV (Rodriquez deci- sion on status).
4. The Benefits Review Board reversed. Pet. App. XXI-XXVI. Although the
Board affirmed the ALJ's determination that petitioner satisfied the LHWCA's
status requirement, id. at XVI-XXI, it held that the injury for which compensation
was sought had not occurred at a situs covered by the Act. Based on the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Sidwell v. Express Container Services, Inc.,
71 F.3d 1134 (1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1028 (1996), the Board held
"that an area is 'adjoining' navigable waters only if it is con- tiguous
with or otherwise touches navigable waters." Pet. App. XXII. The Board
stated that "the location of [a] railroad spur and the presence of
two mutually exclusive fenced areas indicates that the two properties [i.e.,
the shipyard and the power plant] are separate and distinct from one another."
Id. at XXIV. The Board also noted that respondent's employees do not have
immediate access to the shipyard but instead need a special pass or an escort.
Ibid. Because the plant, as a separate and distinct piece of property, did
not adjoin navigable waters, the Board held that petitioner's injury at
the plant did not occur on a covered situs under the LHWCA. Id. at XXV.
5. The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. I-V. The court explained:
While the parcel of property on which the power plant is located lies adjacent
to NNS, and while NNS is located on land contiguous with the Southern Branch
of the Elizabeth River, the parcel of land on which the power plant is located
is not independently contiguous with that river or any other navigable waters.
Moreover, the property on which the power plant is located is separated
from NNS by a privately owned railroad spur, and by two chain-link fences,
which sur- round the power plant and NNS respectively, and which separate
the properties from the railroad spur, and from each other. [Respondent's]
employ- ees do not have access to NNS by virtue of their employment at the
power plant.
Id. at IV. The court concluded that "this case is con- trolled by Sidwell,"
and that the Board had "correctly applied that precedent." Id.
at V.2
ARGUMENT
The instant case presents essentially the same question as did the petitions
for a writ of certiorari in Sidwell v. Express Container Services, Inc.,
71 F.3d 1134 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1028 (1996), and Parker
v. Director, OWCP, 75 F.3d 929 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 58 (1996).
The petitioners in both of those cases sought review of Fourth Circuit decisions
holding that they had failed to satisfy the situs requirement for coverage
under the LHWCA. In our briefs in opposition filed in those cases, we stated
that if the Fourth Circuit's decisions were read to require strict contiguity
between a particular place of business and navigable waters, they would
create a conflict among the circuits and subvert the effective implementation
of the LHWCA.3 The government opposed the petitions, however, because we
did not read the pertinent Fourth Circuit deci- sions to establish such
a rigid rule, and because it was unclear whether other courts of appeals
would have reached a different outcome based on the facts pre- sented in
those cases. For basically the same rea- sons, the petition for a writ of
certiorari in the instant case should also be denied.
1. The LHWCA provides for compensation only where the claimant can establish,
inter alia, that a disability or death "results from an injury occur-
ring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining
pier, wharf, dry dock, termi- nal, building way, marine railway, or other
adjoining area customarily used by an employer in load- ing, unloading,
repairing, dismantling, or building a vessel)." 33 U.S.C. 903(a) (emphasis
added). Con- sistent with the views of the Director, Office of Wor- kers'
Compensation Programs (OWCP), the courts of appeals have generally held
that a maritime facility may be covered by the underscored language in Section
903(a) even if it is not directly contiguous to navigable waters. See, e.g.,
Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 504, 513-515 (5th Cir. 1980)
(en banc), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981); Brady-Hamil- ton Stevedore
Co. v. Herron, 568 F.2d 137, 141 (9th Cir. 1978) (Kennedy, J.); Triguero
v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 932 F.2d 95, 100-101 (2d Cir. 1991); see generally
Gov't Br. in Opp. at 8-10 & n.5, Sidwell v. Express Container Services,
No. 95-1569.
Construing the phrase "other adjoining area" in Section 903(a)
to include a parcel of land that does not itself touch navigable waters
is consistent with the statutory language. The term "area," which
is not defined in the Act, is not limited to enumerated build- ings or structures.
See Black's Law Dictionary 106 (6th ed. 1990) ("[a]rea" means
"[a] surface, a territory, a region * * * [a] particular extent of
space or surface or one serving a special purpose"); Nelson v. American
Dredging Co., No. 96-3724, 1998 WL 231063, at *8-*9 (3d Cir. May 11, 1998).
Thus, even if a particular parcel of property does not itself touch navigable
waters, it may properly be regarded as a situs covered by the Act if it
is part of a larger "area" that does. See Northeast Marine Terminal
Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 281 (1977) (pier that is part of a terminal
complex); Sidwell Gov't Br. in Opp. at 13 n.7 (quoting LHWCA Program Memorandum
No. 58, at 10-11 (Aug. 10, 1977)); Texports, 632 F.2d at 515.4
Construing Section 903(a) in this manner is consistent with that Section's
history and purposes, which indicate that the LHWCA's coverage may extend
to a maritime facility that is not itself con- tiguous to navigable waters.
See Sidwell Gov't Br. in Opp. at 13-15. That view is also consistent with
the longstanding position of the Department of Labor's OWCP, as articulated
most formally in LHWCA Program Memorandum No. 58, supra, at 10-11. By contrast,
a rigid requirement that particular places of business be directly contiguous
to navigable waters would "reenact the hard lines that caused longshoremen
to move continually in and out of coverage * * * [and] frustrate the congressional
objectives of providing uniform benefits and covering land-based maritime
activity." Texports, 632 F.2d at 514-515.
2. As we explained in our brief in opposition in Sidwell (at 15-16), we
do not believe that the Fourth Circuit has unambiguously articulated such
a rigid rule. Although the court has unequivocally held that "an area
is 'adjoining' navigable waters only if * * * it is 'contiguous with' or
otherwise 'touches' such waters," Sidwell, 71 F.3d at 1138-1139, it
has not adopted a precise definition of the term "area." The court
has stated that "some notion of property lines will be at least relevant"
in determining the scope of a covered "area," id. at 1140, but
it has not held that a business's placement beyond the fence line of a maritime
terminal would invariably exclude it from the coverage of Section 903(a).
To the contrary, the court stated in Sidwell that it was "not certain
* * * that the 1977 [OWCP] Memorandum contradicts our interpretation of
the statute." Id. at 1141-1142; see also id. at 1140 n.11 (quoting
LHWCA Program Memorandum No. 58, supra, at 10-11).5
Petitioner contends, based on the unpublished de- cision in the instant
case, that "it is now clear that the Fourth Circuit's test is based
solely on property boundaries, and places no relevance upon any functional
relationship between the properties in question." Pet. 15. We agree
that the "functional relationship" between two facilities is significant
in determining whether they are properly regarded as parts of a single "area"
that adjoins the water.6 We do not believe, however, that the court of appeals
in this case has treated functional considerations as irrelevant. The court
did not base its decision solely on the fact that "the parcel of land
on which the power plant is located is not independently contiguous with
[the Elizabeth River] or any other navigable waters." Pet. App. IV.
Rather, it also relied on the facts that "the property on which the
power plant is located is separated from NNS by a privately owned rail-
road spur, and by two chain-link fences," and that "[respondent's]
employees do not have access to NNS by virtue of their employment at the
power plant." Ibid. Thus, to the extent that its holding depended on
the lack of access of respondent's employees to NNS, the court of appeals
in this case treated the "functional relationship" (Pet. 15) between
the power plant and the shipyard as directly relevant to the question whether
the power plant is a site covered by the LHWCA.
3. The disagreement between petitioner and the court of appeals centers
not on whether the functional relationship between a particular workplace
and shoreside facilities is relevant to the "situs" inquiry, but
on what type of functional relationship is re- quired. As we read the court
of appeals' opinion in the instant case, its analysis turned on the fact
that both NNS's personnel policies and the physical layout of the relevant
properties minimized the extent to which workers would move about between
the shipyard and power plant. Petitioner contends, by contrast, that the
requisite functional relationship exists because the power plant is owned
by the Navy and "provides steam and electricity for exclusive use by
NNS at the terminal and on board ships." Pet. 17; see also Pet. App.
LXIII (ALJ in Rodriquez concludes that the power plant is a covered situs
because "the very pur- pose of the plant is to generate steam and electricity
exclusively for NNS").
Although petitioner asserts (Pet. 17) that she "would have been covered
under the Act upon appli- cation of the functional tests delineated by the
other circuits," the decisions on which she relies did not involve
factual settings comparable to that in the instant case. In each of those
cases, the claimant himself moved regularly between a ship or shoreside
facility and the workplace that was ultimately deter- mined to be a covered
situs under the LHWCA. See Brady-Hamilton, 568 F.2d at 139; Texports, 632
F.2d at 507; Triguero, 932 F.2d at 97, 101. Those factual settings directly
implicated the congressional con- cern that the LHWCA should not be implemented
in such a manner as to cause longshore workers "to move continually
in and out of coverage." Texports, 632 F.2d at 514. None of those decisions
addresses the question whether the sort of functional relationship involved
in this case-i.e., the fact that the power plant is devoted exclusively
to the production of steam and electricity for the shipyard-provides a sufficient
basis for holding the plant to be a covered situs. Absent a clear conflict
among the circuits, we con- tinue to believe that the Fourth Circuit's analysis
of the coverage question does not warrant review by this Court.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
MARVIN KRISLOV
Deputy Solicitor for
National Operations
ALLEN H. FELDMAN
Associate Solicitor
NATHANIEL I. SPILLER
Deputy Associate Solicitor
EDWARD D. SIEGER
Attorney
Department of Labor
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
JULY 1998
1 Section 2(3) of the Act defines "employee," with certain exceptions
not relevant here, as "any person engaged in mari- time employment,
including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations,
and any harbor-worker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and ship-breaker."
33 U.S.C. 902(3).
2 Because the court of appeals held that petitioner had failed to establish
that her injury occurred at a situs covered by the LHWCA, it declined to
determine whether (as the ALJ and Board had held) petitioner satisfied the
Act's status require- ment. Pet. App. V n.*.
3 We have furnished counsel for the other parties in this case with copies
of our briefs in opposition in Sidwell and Parker.
4 Courts of appeals have also held that the term "adjoining" may
be construed to mean "neighboring," so that even if a piece of
property is viewed as a distinct "area," it need not di- rectly
touch navigable waters to be "adjoining." See Texports, 632 F.2d
at 514; Brady-Hamilton, 568 F.2d at 141. Cf. Empire Co. v. Occupational
Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 136 F.3d 873, 876, 878-879 & n.2 (1st
Cir. 1998) (in applying safety regulation governing "wharves, bulkheads,
quays, piers, docks and other berthing locations and adjacent storage or
con- tiguous areas and structures," word "contiguous" could
per- missibly be construed to mean "nearby" as well as "touching")
(citing Texports).
5 As petitioner notes (Pet. 15-16), Sidwell stated that, to be an "other
adjoining area" under Section 3(a) of the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. 903(a),
an area "must be a discrete shoreside struc- ture or facility."
71 F.3d at 1139. The Third Circuit has cor- rectly rejected that interpretation
of "area" in holding that an undeveloped beach is an "other
area" under Section 3(a). See Nelson v. American Dredging Co., 1998
WL 231063, at *8-*9. The decision below does not depend upon application
of that aspect of Sidwell, however, and it is not clear that that aspect
of Sidwell was a holding. Review is also not warranted to correct possible
inconsistencies among decisions within the Fourth Circuit. See Pet. 18-24.
"It is primarily the task of a Court of Appeals to reconcile its internal
difficulties." Wis- niewski v. United States, 353 U.S. 901, 902 (1957).
6 LHWCA Program Memorandum No. 58 explains that
such facilities as "gear lockers"-buildings in which steve- doring
equipment is maintained and stored (and sometimes fabricated)-may be located
outside the fenced boundaries of a terminal. Such facilities are in practical
fact integral parts of the maritime terminal, existing and being used solely
for the loading and discharge of ships; they should be regarded as extensions
of the terminals to which they relate. Hence, although they do not themselves
adjoin the water, they are parts of terminal complexes which do, and are
within the Act.
Id. at 11 (quoted in Sidwell Gov't Br. in Opp. at 11-12.)