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<sup>\*</sup> This caption varies from the official caption, which is incorrect in certain respects. The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the official caption accordingly.

Assocs., Ltd., v. AGS Computers, Inc., 74 N.Y.2d 487, 492 (1989); see Oscar Gruss & Son, Inc. v. Hollander, 337 F.3d 186, 200 (2d Cir. 2003); Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Recovery Credit Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 13, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1996).

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In this case, the language of the agreement does not unmistakably provide for the indemnification of claims between the parties. Particularly telling are subsections 7.3(b)(i) and (ii), which provide, respectively, that Del Monte has the right to approve its indemnitees' choice of counsel in any covered claim and require Del Monte to cooperate in the defense of actions brought against indemnitees and indemnitees to procure Del Monte's consent before settling any covered claim. These provisions are typical of an agreement "which contemplate[s] reimbursement when the indemnitee is required to pay damages on a third-party claim." Hooper, 74 N.Y.2d at 492; see Oscar Gruss, 337 F.3d at 200 (finding provisions in agreement regarding indemnitee's right to separate counsel and indemnitor's rights to notice and assumption of defense show agreement was meant to cover third-party claims only). Huff's attempt to cast these provisions in a light that could justify their application here is unavailing because the test is whether the intent to indemnify is "unmistakably clear from the language of the promise," Hooper, 74 N.Y.2d at 492, not whether the agreement could be read to provide for indemnification.

Huff contends, second, that Del Monte's bylaws, which make mandatory Maryland's permissive corporate indemnification statute, Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass'ns § 2-418(b)(1) (2005), provide the indemnification sought. Section 2-418(b)(1) applies only to directors. Undeterred by the fact that it is not, and never was, a director of Del Monte, Huff maintains that it is entitled to indemnification because Del Monte actually sued Huff "by reason of [the] service" of its two board member designees. Huff rests its indemnification theory on <u>Heffernan v. Pacific</u> Donlup GNB Corp., 965 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1992). Heffernan is inapposite. In Heffernan, the Seventh Circuit concluded that even if the express language of a complaint does not reference the defendant's status as a director, he may nonetheless be entitled to indemnification if the substance of the complaint indicates he was sued "by reason of the fact that" he was a director. Id. at 372-73. As the district court aptly put it, "Heffernan most clearly stands for the proposition that where a single person, acting both as a director and as a private individual, can show that, contrary to the language of the complaint, he was sued 'by reason of' his status as a director, that person may be entitled to the indemnification due a director, assuming, of course, that he is otherwise qualified." As is the case under the Delaware statute analyzed in Heffernan,

status as a director is a prerequisite to indemnification under Maryland law. See Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass'ns § 2-418(b)(1) ("A corporation may indemnify any director made a party to any proceeding by reason of service in that capacity . . . "). Because Huff was not a director of Del Monte, it is not entitled to indemnification.

We have reviewed Huff's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the District Court for the Southern District of New York is hereby **AFFIRMED**.

FOR THE COURT:
Thomas W. Asreen, Acting Clerk

Thomas W. Asreen, Acting Clerk

By:
Richard Alcantara, Deputy Clerk