B-298734; B-298734.2, Leader Communications Inc., December 7, 2006
Decision
Matter of: Leader Communications Inc.
Inslee T. Bennett for the protester.
Maj. Kevin J. Wilkinson, and Douglas J. Thiesen, Esq., Department of the Air Force, for the agency.
John L. Formica, Esq., and James A. Spangenberg, Esq., Office of the General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.
DIGEST
1. Agency reasonably determined that the award of a contract for business support services to a firm currently performing a contract for acquisition support services did not create an organizational conflict of interest.
2. Agency’s evaluation of the protester’s proposal submitted in response to a solicitation for business support services was reasonable where the agency’s evaluated criticisms of the protester’s proposal were consistent with terms of the solicitation and the record.
DECISION
Leader Communications Inc. (LCI) protests the award of a contract
to CC&G Company[1]
under request for proposals (RFP) No. FA9451-06-R-0002, issued by the
Department of the Air Force, for business resources and support services
(BRASS) for the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), Kirtland Air Force Base
(AFB),
The RFP, issued as a competitive set-aside under section 8(a) of the Small Business Act, provided for the award of a 5-year indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract that provides for the issuance of cost-plus-fixed-fee task orders. RFP sections B039, B051. The contractor will be required to provide all personnel, services, and other items necessary to perform business reporting, analyses, and management administration support functions in support of the Directed Energy and Space Vehicle Directorates at AFRL.[2]
The RFP listed the following evaluation factors to determine the best-value proposal: past performance, mission capability, price/cost, and proposal risk. The past performance and mission capability factors were said to be equal in importance and significantly more important than the price/cost and the proposal risk factors. The mission capability factor was comprised of two equally weighted subfactors: personnel qualifications/corporate experience and management. RFP sect. M002.
By the RFP’s closing date, the agency received nine proposals, including those of LCI (the incumbent contractor on the predecessor contract to the BRASS contract, which was called the Business and Staff Support (BASS) contract) and CC&G. Agency Report (AR), Tab 23, Source Selection Decision Document, at 1. The proposals were evaluated, with CC&G’s proposal receiving ratings of “high confidence” under the past performance factor, with “blue” with “low” proposal risk ratings under both subfactors comprising the mission capability factor, at a proposed price of $17.2 million and an evaluated cost/price of $17.3 million.[3] LCI’s proposal received ratings of “high confidence” under the past performance factor, “green” with “low” proposal risk under the personnel qualifications/corporate experience subfactor of the mission capability factor, and “green” with “moderate” proposal risk under “management” subfactor, at a proposed price of $17.4 million.[4] AR, Tab 22, Evaluation Matrix; Tab 23, Source Selection Decision, at 17. The agency selected CC&G’s highest rated, lowest cost/price proposal for award.
LCI protests that CC&G should be precluded from receiving award under this solicitation because one of its joint venture partners, CAS, has an organizational conflict of interest (OCI). LCI, which asserts that its incumbent BASS contract included an OCI clause that “barred [it] from competition on any other AFRL contract,” contends that because CAS is currently performing an acquisition closeout support services (ACSS) contract for AFRL at Kirtland AFB, “fundamental fairness” requires that CC&G “be barred from participating on the BRASS Contract” because the BASS contract “was of a similar nature to CAS[’s] ACSS” contract. Protester’s Comments at 3; Protester’s Supp. Comments at 4. In this regard, the protester contends that “[a]ccess to contract sensitive information and developing requirements is an implicit part” of the ACSS contract. Protester’s Supp. Comments at 3.
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) generally
requires contracting officers to avoid, neutralize or mitigate potential
significant conflicts of interest so as to prevent unfair competitive advantage
or the existence of conflicting roles that might impair a contractor’s
objectivity. FAR sections 9.504, 9.505; Snell
Enters., Inc., B-290113, B‑290113.2,
The first group consists of situations in which a firm has
access to nonpublic information as part of its performance of a government
contract and where that information may provide the firm an unfair competitive
advantage in a later competition for a government contract. FAR sect. 9.505-4. In these “unequal access to information”
cases, the concern is limited to the risk of the firm gaining an unfair
competitive advantage; there is no issue of possible bias.
The second group consists of situations in which a firm,
as part of its performance of a government contract, has in some sense set the
ground rules for the competition for another government contract by, for
example, writing the statement of work or the specifications. In these “biased ground rules” cases, the
primary concern is that the firm could skew the competition, whether
intentionally or not, in favor of itself.
FAR sections 9.505-1, 9.505-2. These
situations may also involve a concern that the firm, by virtue of its special
knowledge of the agency’s future requirements, would have an unfair advantage
in the competition for those requirements.
The third group comprises cases where a firm’s work under
one government contract could entail its evaluating itself or a related entity,
either through an assessment of performance under another contract or an
evaluation of proposals. FAR sect.
9.505-3. In these “impaired objectivity”
cases, the concern is that the firm’s ability to render impartial advice to the
government could appear to be undermined by the relationship with the entity
whose work product is being evaluated.
Contracting officers are to exercise “common sense, good judgment, and sound discretion” in assessing whether a potential conflict exists and in developing appropriate ways to resolve it; the primary responsibility for determining whether a conflict is likely to arise, and the resulting appropriate action, rests with the contracting agency. FAR sect. 9.505; Science Applications Int’l Corp., B-293601.5, Sept. 21, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 201 at 4. Once an agency has given meaningful consideration to potential conflicts of interest, our Office will not sustain a protest challenging a determination in this area unless the determination is unreasonable or unsupported by the record. Science Applications Int’l Corp., supra. In this regard, substantial facts and hard evidence are necessary to establish a conflict; mere inference or suspicion of an actual or apparent conflict is not enough. Snell Enters., Inc., supra, at 4.
As an initial matter, we find no merit to the protester’s assertion that CC&G should have been precluded from receiving award of the BRASS contract based upon the protester’s assertion that the ACSS contract awarded to CAS in January 2006 should have included, as a matter of “fundamental fairness,” an OCI clause that would have barred CAS (and thus CC&G) from competing. The matter of whether a contract should include an OCI clause or a contractor should be precluded from a competition based upon an agency’s determination that an OCI exists that cannot be avoided, neutralized, or mitigated, is dependent upon a reasoned application of regulation and case law, rather than a competing contractor’s view of “fundamental fairness.”[5]
As noted by the agency, the protester does not argue that CAS has had access to any other firm’s proprietary data or had any “unequal access” to any other information during its performance of the ACSS contract that would have provided CC&G with an unfair competitive advantage on this RFP. Although the protester argues that CAS may gain access to a firm’s proprietary information at some point during its performance of the ACSS contract, such speculation as to the possible occurrence of such an incident in the future does not render unreasonable the agency’s determination that CC&G was eligible for the award of the BRASS contract.
The protester asserts that “developing requirements is an implicit part” of the ACSS contract, apparently suggesting that CAS may have had some input into the solicitation under which the BRASS contract was awarded to CC&G, thus creating a “biased ground rules” conflict of interest. See Protester’s Supp. Comments at 3. However, the agency points out that because “the acquisition support services of ACSS were (and currently are) not ‘on contract’ or funded. . . . CAS had no opportunity to participate in the acquisition planning, drafting of specifications, work statements or any other facet of the BRASS acquisition.” Agency Supp. Report at 2. Under the circumstances and given the protester’s failure to provide any evidence in support of its apparent “biased ground rules” allegation, we find this aspect of LCI’s protest to be without merit.
With regard to the potential for an “impaired objectivity”
OCI, the agency states that “[t]he BRASS contract does not create situations in
which CAS or CC&G would provide advice or judgments related to assessment
of its own performance.” The agency adds,
however, that it is aware that CAS, in performing its ACSS contract, may
effectively “be closing out its own orders,” in that it may perform closeout
services for the agency with regard to tasks performed by CC&G under the BRASS
contract. The agency explains that it
has considered this possibility, and has determined that because “the ACSS
closeout services are primarily administrative and do not involve advice,
judgment, evaluation or assessment of the performance of the contractor whose
contract is to be closed out,” the cognizant contracting officer determined
that there is no impaired objectivity “conflict between the ACSS and BRASS
contracts.” Agency Supp. Report at 3-4. Based upon this record, and given the
protester’s failure to substantively respond to the agency’s explanation as set
forth above, we find the agency’s determination that there was no prohibited
“impaired objectivity” conflict here to be reasonable. That is, since the work of CAS under the ACSS
contract regarding the close out of contracts is, as explained by the agency,
largely administrative and does not require subjective judgments or
evaluations, there is no basis for finding that CC&G should be precluded
from receiving the award of the BRASS contract here. See Computers Universal, Inc.,
B‑292794,
In sum, the agency reasonably found no OCI concerns regarding CAS that would bar award to CC&G.
The protester next argues that the evaluation of its
proposal under the personnel qualifications/corporate experience and management
subfactors to the mission capability factor was unreasonable and inconsistent
with the terms of the solicitation. The
evaluation of technical proposals is a matter within the discretion of the contracting
agency since the agency is responsible for defining its needs and the best
method of accommodating them. In
reviewing an agency’s evaluation, we will not reevaluate technical proposals,
but instead will examine the agency’s evaluation to ensure that it was
reasonable and consistent with the solicitation’s stated evaluation
criteria. An offeror’s mere disagreement
with the agency does not render the evaluation unreasonable. Westinghouse Gov’t and Env’tl Servs. Co.,
Inc., B-280928 et al.,
The RFP included detailed proposal preparation instructions, and required that the section of the offeror’s proposal addressing the personnel qualifications/corporate experience subfactor to the mission capability factor include, among other things, a “[d]escri[ption] of the experience, expertise and qualifications of your key personnel,” including “but not limited to program/project manager and deputy.” RFP sect. L036. The RFP provided under the mission capability factor for the evaluation of “the experience, expertise, and qualifications of the proposed key personnel relevant to the proposed efforts.” RFP sect. M002.
The agency found in evaluating LCI’s proposal under the
personnel qualifications/corporate experience subfactor to the mission
capability factor that LCI’s proposed contract manager “is qualified and has
extensive relevant experience.” AR, Tab
23, Source Selection Decision Document, at 8. The agency noted with regard to the
protester’s proposed deputy contract managers that while the protester’s
proposal provided the names of the proposed personnel, their years of
experience, and positions held, the proposal failed to “provide specific
details of [the] type or level of supervision and or management experience each
person had.”
In challenging this criticism of its proposal, the
protester does not dispute the accuracy of this assessment, but argues that it
did not provide such details in its proposal because they were not expressly requested
by the RFP. However, as referenced
above, the RFP specified that “the experience, expertise, and qualifications of
the proposed key personnel relevant to the proposed effort” would be evaluated. RFP sect. M002. Thus, it is obvious that a description of information
regarding the supervisory or management experience of the key personnel
proposed for supervisory and management positions, such as the deputy contract
managers identified in LCI’s proposal, should have been provided with the
proposal, and that LCI’s failure to provide sufficient details in this regard
could reasonably be negatively evaluated by the agency and did not constitute
an “unstated evaluation factor.” See
Network Eng’g, Inc., B‑292996,
The protester makes a somewhat similar complaint with regard to the evaluation of its proposal under the management subfactor of the mission capability factor. Here, the RFP included detailed proposal preparation instructions, and informed offerors that “[m]anagement would be evaluated to determine the degree to which the offeror demonstrates the capability to effectively and efficiently manage the same or similar contract requirements,” including providing staffing. RFP sections L036, M002.
The agency criticized LCI’s proposal of two deputy contract
managers, with one having responsibility for the Directed Energy Directorate
and the other having responsibility for the Space Vehicle Directorate, and each
having additional duties in support of the Directorates, because this
arrangement assertedly “provides the potential for inconsistencies and lack of
continuity of policies, decisions and communication.” AR, Tab 23, Source Selection Decision
Document, at 13. The protester argues
that the agency’s criticism was unreasonable because LCI’s proposed approach of
having two deputy contract managers has “been successfully and effective[ly]
used by LCI during the last six months of the [predecessor] BASS
contract.” Protester’s Supp. Comments at
7. The protester represents that this
approach was thus “field tested,” and asserts that the agency evaluators
“[k]new of the success of this approach.”
An agency’s evaluation is dependent upon information
furnished in a proposal, and it is the offeror’s burden to submit an adequately
written proposal for the agency to evaluate.
Chant Eng’g Co., Inc., B-279049; B-279049.2,
LCI also protests that the agency’s evaluation of its proposal under the past performance and cost/price factors was unreasonable. With regard to the evaluation of its proposal under the past performance factor, the protester argues that the agency failed to consider information regarding its performance of the BASS contract that should have been available to the agency through the contractor performance assessment reporting system. Protest at 4. The protester also complains with regard to its cost/price proposal that the agency erroneously concluded that it could not determine the realism of LCI’s proposed costs because the concerns that were noted by the cognizant agency cost/price analyst were assertedly unreasonable. Protest at 3-4.
Although the agency has responded in detail to LCI’s
protest here, we need not consider these aspects of LCI’s protest on the
merits. Competitive prejudice is an
essential element of every viable protest; where the record does not
demonstrate that the protester would have had a reasonable chance of receiving
award but for the agency’s actions, we will not sustain a protest, even if
deficiencies, such as an unreasonable or unequal evaluation of proposals, are
found. CAE USA, Inc., B‑293002;
B-293002.2,
LCI next protests that the agency improperly used
“subjective evaluations to apply objective ratings.” Protest at 4.
The protester asserts in this regard that the RFP’s evaluation “criteria
were not specific and the ratings could only have been based upon subjective
opinion.”
The protester’s complaint that the RFP’s evaluation
“criteria were not specific and the ratings could only have been based upon
subjective opinion” is a protest of an apparent alleged solicitation
impropriety, which should have been protested prior to the closing time for
receipt of proposals, and is therefore untimely and not for our consideration. Bid Protest Regulations, 4 C.F.R. sect.
21.2(a)(2) (2006). In any event, we note
that our Office has long recognized that subjective evaluations are not
improper. Sunbelt Properties, Inc.,
B-249969 et al.,
The protester finally points out that the initial
solicitation issued by the agency for BRASS was cancelled on
Although the agency has responded in detail to this aspect
of the LCI’s protest, we need not address it on the merits. To the extent that the protester is
challenging the cancellation of the prior solicitation based upon the
subsequent issuance of an RFP which it believes is not materially different, this
protest ground concerns a matter other than an alleged solicitation
impropriety, and therefore falls under the 10-day rule set forth in our Bid
Protest Regulations. 4 C.F. R. sect.
21.2(a)(2); S & C Constr.
The protest is denied.
Gary L. Kepplinger
General Counsel
[1] CC&G is an 8(a) joint venture of Corporate Allocation Services, Inc. (CAS); Compa Industries, Inc.; and Galactic Network Integrators, Inc.
[2]
The Directed Energy Directorate develops “directed energy technologies,” such
as high-energy lasers and high-power microwaves, and the “mission of the Space
Vehicles Directorate is to develop and transition high pay-off space
technologies supporting the war fighter while leveraging commercial, civil and
other Government capabilities to ensure
[3] Proposals could be evaluated under the past performance factor as “high confidence,” “significant confidence,” “confidence,” “little confidence,” or “no confidence,” and under the mission capability factor as “blue/exceptional,” “green/acceptable,” “yellow/marginal” and “red/unacceptable,” and as having “high,” “moderate,” or “low” proposal risk. AR, Tab 9, Source Selection Briefing, at 18.
[4] The agency found that it could not evaluate LCI’s proposal for cost realism because of a number of evaluated inadequacies in the cost proposal.
[5]
The protester’s contention that “fundamental fairness” requires that CC&G
be barred from receiving the contract is based largely upon the protester’s
view that because its BASS contract included an OCI clause that “barred [LCI]
from competing on any other AFRL contract,” CAS’s ACSS contract did or should
have included a similar OCI clause.
Protest at 2. In response, the
agency notes that the BASS and ACSS contracts are dissimilar in both nature and
scope, such that the inclusion of different OCI clauses in the respective
contracts was warranted, and that in any event, and as evidenced by the record
here, the section of the OCI clause that LCI asserts acted as a bar to its
competing for other AFRL contracts was in fact deleted by the agency from LCI’s
BASS contract after 1 year, with LCI continuing to perform the contract for 4
more years. Agency Supp. Report at 3;
Tab 6, Modification 0005 of LCI’s BASS Contract (