Documents 101-150
101. Memorandum of Conversation /1/
Washington, November 22, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Draftedby Goodby and approved in S on December 4.
SUBJECT
Meeting of the Committee of Principals/2/
PARTICIPANTS
(See Tab A)/3/
/2/In a November 22 briefing memorandum to Rusk, Foster stated that the purpose of the Principals' meeting was to discuss the situation arising from the Soviet acceptance, in a November 21 note, of the U.S. proposal, set forth in a note of November 13 following conclusion of the General Assembly debate on the nuclear test question, to resume the recessed Geneva test ban conference. (Ibid., Central Files, 397.5611-GE/11-2261) For texts of the notes, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 594 and 636-637, respectively. The conference resumed on November 28.
/3/Not printed. Among the 28 participants were Nitze (representing McNamara), Lemnitzer, and Allen Dulles.
The discussion was preceded by a briefing given by Dr. Scoville on the results of the analyses of the recent Soviet nuclear weapon test series.
Following the briefing Secretary Rusk asked Chairman Seaborg if he would care to evaluate the relative position of the US and the USSR in the nuclear weapons field in the light of the Soviet nuclear tests. Chairman Seaborg replied that it was almost impossible to give a meaningful answer to this question since there were so many factors that entered into the equation. In certain aspects of thermonuclear technology the Soviets seem to have caught up with and perhaps even surpassed the United States. The situation with respect to tactical weapons was not known. Dr. Wiesner added that it was certainly clear that the Soviet Union had improved its effective stockpiles by the recent series. Chairman Seaborg agreed and went on to ask Dr. Scoville if he would give the meeting an estimate of the length of time that the Soviet Union had been preparing for its recent series of tests. Dr. Scoville replied that the Soviet Union had probably been preparing the logistics for the series since the spring of 1961. The heavy build-up in the north probably had not begun until July 1961. Obviously design work had been vigorously prosecuted ever since 1958.
Ambassador Dean asked what the effect would be on nuclear weapons development work in the United States if the Kennedy-Macmillan offer to refrain from tests in the atmosphere were renewed. Chairman Seaborg said that it would be hard to conduct nuclear tests effectively and with sufficient speed underground and that the United States would not be ready for a test in outer space for another two years. The fact that a nuclear test ban treaty would not prevent preparations for another series of Soviet tests was the most worrisome thing, however. After another several years of preparations the Soviet Union might again start to test. Chairman Seaborg said he would be willing to freeze weapons technology at the present state in the US and USSR but he saw no clear solution to the danger of preparations for another series being carried out in the Soviet Union during the early years of the treaty. Dr. Wiesner summed up by stating that without atmospheric tests the United States could not redress everything that the Soviet Union had accomplished in its recent series but that Chairman Seaborg was also saying that this did not worry him too much.
Ambassador Dean asked whether it was not true that the United States had been experiencing difficulties in its underground testing. Chairman Seaborg replied that underground testing had been much slower than expected and that diagnostics had been much inferior. Dr. Wiesner asked whether this situation might improve to which Dr. Seaborg replied that he assumed it would.
Secretary Rusk asked whether there was any objection to the proposition that the United States should not repeat the Kennedy-Macmillan offer for an atmospheric ban without international controls and that if the Soviet Union made the offer the United States would not accept it. There was no disagreement. Secretary Rusk then said that so far the United States position had been based on the October 11 decision/4/ that a nuclear test ban treaty was still in the United States interest. Everything we had been doing was based on that assumption. Secretary Rusk thought the question should be raised now as to whether the United States would sign the US-UK draft treaty if the Soviet Union said next week that they would sign it. Mr. Bundy asked whether there were things which could be added to the treaty to prevent the kind of preparations to which Chairman Seaborg was drawing the meeting's attention. It was felt that there was nothing which could be added to the treaty to cover this point.
/4/See Document 83.
Mr. Foster said that he had envisaged Ambassador Dean's asking the Soviet delegation to respond to the latest United States proposals to which no satisfactory answer had yet been given. He saw no need to hurry the negotiations and this lack of haste would be encouraged by the fact that the United Nations Secretariat would not be able to provide the kind of service which would permit fast work in the conference. Mr. Foster also noted that on November 28 there would be a meeting of the committee established by the NSC to look into the question of nuclear testing in the atmosphere. The results of the meeting would be important in determining whether the United States would be prepared to accept in the future a test ban treaty of the kind previously advanced by us. Secretary Rusk said he believed the situation had now changed and that whereas the United States could have signed a test ban treaty immediately we were now in a position of not having had adequate consultation with Congress, and were consequently without assurance that Congress would be ready to ratify the treaty and provide funds for its implementation. Secretary Rusk therefore felt that Ambassador Dean could not be instructed to sign the draft treaty/5/ until more work had been done with Congress. Mr. Foster agreed with the assessment.
/5/Apparent reference to the April 18 U.S.-U.K. draft; see footnote 3, Document 8.
Mr. Foster then asked Dr. Scoville whether it was a fact that the more that was learned about the Soviet tests the better the tests appeared. Dr. Scoville said that the first tests which were analyzed showed only moderate improvements in Soviet technology but that the series later blossomed out into something more significant.
Secretary Rusk enquired as to what, if anything, took effect when the treaty was signed, to which Ambassador Dean replied that each of the three proposed signatory states had said they would not conduct tests underground, below the 4.75 threshold, from the date of signature for a limited period of time. The treaty itself, of course, would not come into force until it was ratified. Secretary Nitze asked whether it would not be well to consider removing completely the moratorium agreement on shots below 4.75. Mr. Foster stated that the United States had strongly supported a test ban treaty as the beginning of a process leading to disarmament but now it appears that limitations on tests might not be in our best interest; on the other hand, a change in position would undoubtedly have the most serious consequences. Mr. Foster wondered if it would not be possible to avoid taking a final decision on signing a treaty until the committee appointed by the NSC had a chance to begin its work and until we had seen what the Soviet Union's position was going to be in the test ban conference. Mr. Bohlen said that the Soviet note accepting the resumption of negotiations implied that the Soviet Union was not prepared to sign a treaty right away since it talked about events that would happen during the negotiations. Secretary Nitze said that to him there appeared to be a clear intent in the Soviet note to establish a moratorium on nuclear tests during the negotiations. Secretary Rusk replied that there should be no doubt in anyone's mind that we would not accept an unpoliced moratorium during the negotiations. The Secretary also said that Ambassador Dean should describe in no uncertain terms how the Soviet breaking of the moratorium had affected the negotiating situation.
Ambassador Dean then enquired whether it would be possible to announce the total number of Soviet shots in the recent series. Dr. Scoville replied that something like "almost fifty" could be said but not the precise number.
Mr. Foster asked whether there should be a backgrounder for the press in order to give them some information about our attitude toward the resumption of negotiations.
Mr. Nitze asked whether a revised approach to the treaty was not necessary and Chairman Seaborg said that perhaps the United States should say it wishes to amend the treaty so as to prevent preparations for testing from being carried out. Mr. Stelle suggested that the answer to this was simply to prepare for testing ourselves. Chairman Seaborg felt this was not a feasible course of action for the United States and Mr. Bundy agreed that it would be difficult for the United States to prepare to do something which it had agreed in a treaty not to do.
Dr. Wiesner said he felt that the key issue was not whether the United States was equivalent to the Soviet Union in every aspect of nuclear weapon technology but whether the United States is missing any of the things it should have for its security. Mr. Cleveland said that the United States position had been based on the understanding that the United States was so far ahead in nuclear weapon technology that it could sign a treaty to end tests. If this situation had changed perhaps some new balloon should be floated. Chairman Seaborg said he felt that the problem was would the United States be ahead if the Soviet Union once more prepared and conducted a large test series. Mr. Scoville said he felt the Soviet Union had tested everything it had and that it would take at least 6 or 9 months before they would be ready to test anything else.
As to the backgrounder for the press, Secretary Rusk said that a high level backgrounder did not appear necessary, and that the press officers could make the necessary points known to the press in the usual way.
Mr. Cleveland observed that in face of the new factors that had come to light, such as the need to inspect preparations, the United States might have to move in the direction of combining the test talks with disarmament.
Dr. Wiesner said that when the question of the nuclear test negotiations was discussed with the President he should be advised that there are many dimensions to the problem and that there are many things which we could do to off-set any imbalance.
The meeting was adjourned at 6:25 p.m.
102. Letter From the Chairman of the NSC Committee on Atmospheric Testing Policy (Seaborg) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, November 29, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing, 11/29-12/6/61. Secret; Restricted Data.
Dear Mr. President: As requested in NSC Action Memorandum No. 112 of November 13, 1961,/2/ a careful study has been made of all of the nuclear weapon test shots proposed by the weapons laboratories and by DOD for inclusion in an atmospheric test program which might be conducted over a three-month period, beginning in the spring of 1962. The proposals were reviewed in the light of the continuing objectives of our nuclear weapons program, our position vis-à-vis the USSR--taking account of the marked advances revealed by their recent test series--and our current state of readiness as adversely affected by the test moratorium. Some 49 possible test shots were reviewed, of which a minimum of 27 are recommended for inclusion in the early program.
/2/See footnote 3, Document 94.
The program under consideration has both general and specific objectives. In common with all technologies, the development of nuclear weapons combines the techniques of theoretical and experimental science with the development and design of specific devices. At each stage, data based on past experiments and tests are combined with known theory to devise new and more revealing experiments and improved devices which are subjected to experiment and the process is then repeated. At appropriate points the results are used as the basis for the design of specific weapons. The trends of the developments and the objectives and characteristics of the weapons are, of course, subject to such external factors as delivery capabilities, expected enemy countermeasures, the availability of special materials, etc.
The normal cycle of a year or so was, of course, perturbed by the test moratorium. During the three-year period the information gained from the Hardtack series was exploited about as far as it is feasible to go without further experimental checks. New weapons introduced represent the greatest extrapolations from tested configurations that it is prudent to use without further test. Understanding of the underlying principles and of the probable behavior of extrapolated arrangements was extended by calculation and analysis to the limit in the absence of additional data. Except in a few limited areas, further substantial progress would not be possible without additional experiments. The resumption of underground testing has of course made it possible to progress in those aspects of the program for which experiments and tests are feasible in that environment. There remain, however, larger and more important areas that cannot be covered in an underground program. Hence, over a major portion of weapons technology, above-ground testing is essential to any substantial future progress and recovery of momentum by the Laboratories.
Urgency is added to the need for progress by the substantial advances made by the USSR. In certain areas of the underlying technology, they have surpassed any results that we have achieved or, indeed, know how to achieve with any degree of certainty; some of their devices, notably the larger ones, go beyond our own. Even more importantly, they have a new accumulation of experimental data on which to base still further advances. Especially if exploited through still further tests, these advances could well result in drastic, and possibly decisive, changes in the relative positions of the two countries unless we too make substantial progress./3/
/3/Next to this sentence Bundy wrote a marginal note: "Spell this out."
Certain specific areas are of special military interest. Each potential adversary now has, or soon will have, a stockpile of strategic nuclear weapons such that if delivered on target, virtual destruction of the enemy would result. Increasingly, therefore, much of the future effort of each side will be directed at measures designed to prevent the delivery of enemy weapons while, at the same time, preserving the deliverability of one's own weapons in spite of the enemy's preventive measures. This game of counter and counter-countermeasures can take many forms including (1) measures for destruction of enemy weapons on base--countered by hardened bases, and mobility (aircraft in flight, Polaris submarines, mobile Minutemen, etc.); (2) anti-missile systems including the use of defensive nuclear warheads--countered by hardening of offensive missiles, by clustered warheads and/or decoys and by offensive warheads effective at greater altitudes where defensive measures are more difficult; (3) increased defensive capabilities against aircraft--countered by low level penetration, requiring rugged "lay-down" types of weapons, or by long-range air-to-ground missiles; (4) interference with radar and communications through nuclear explosions as well as by conventional means.
In general, strategic effectiveness can be enhanced by increasing the diversity of methods of accomplishing a given mission, thus complicating the defenses, and by improvements lessening the requirements on the carrier. For example, large dividends can result from improvements permitting weapons of a given destructive potential to be carried by missiles as well as by aircraft, by Minuteman or Polaris as well as by Atlas, etc.
These considerations lead to urgent requirements for (1) increased knowledge of the effects of nuclear explosions on hardened bases and on missiles and on radar and communications--as bases for designing both improved defensive measures and effective counters against enemy defenses; (2) developments leading to decreased nuclear vulnerability of our own offensive warheads; (3) decreased weight-to-yield ratios of strategic missile warheads in order to permit increased diversity and greater pre-strike mobility and to increase penetration capabilities through the use of clusters and/or decoys, through hardening of the individual missiles or through use of greater yields at higher altitudes; (4) developments increasing the effectiveness of our own defensive weapons through enhanced effects and through decreased weight-to-yield ratios, permitting longer range and higher altitude delivery at given yields or greater kill range at given weights.
In the area of tactical weapons, two considerations predominate: (1) developments permitting greater diversity of delivery methods for given missions such as developments permitting the use of simpler and more mobile launching mechanisms; enhanced effects and decreased weight and size are important here; (2) improvements and economies making possible wider deployment of tactical weapons in advance of knowledge as to places of potential need; reductions in requirements for special nuclear material per weapon are of importance in view of the large numbers that are involved. (Clearly, in this area, the number of weapons deployed is far larger than would ever actually be used.)/4/
/4/Bundy's marginal note next to this paragraph reads: "not impressive."
In view of the above considerations and our present situation, our test program can be considered under three major headings: (1) measurements of weapons effects; (2) tests of advanced concepts leading to better understanding and to markedly improved and less vulnerable weapons; and (3) tests of actual weapons incorporating substantial extrapolations from previously tested configurations so that both developmental and verification objectives are achieved.
It is clear that measurements of weapons effects must be conducted in the environment to which they will pertain and, hence, require experiments in and above the atmosphere. It is also important that many of the tests required, for example, those relating to anti-missile systems and to improvements in strategic penetration, perforce involve large yields and, hence, either cannot be conducted underground at all or only slowly, with great difficulty.
It has been our experience underground to date that such things as the mechanical difficulties of digging very deep (up to 2,000 ft.), large diameter holes (36 inches), bring into question the feasibility of using the vertical hole approach for testing yields much above 20 KT. We have proposed and did plan that yields up to 100 KT be conducted underground in tunnels; however, our experience with post-shot contamination in the tunnels at the Nevada Test Site up to this time gives us some concern that our planning in that aspect was not realistic. It is now estimated that, if feasible at all, tests of this magnitude could be conducted at a rate of not more than a very few per year, even under favorable conditions, in a given tunnel complex. In contrast, large yield devices can be tested in rapid succession in the atmosphere with relatively little advance preparation of the means of testing./5/
/5/Bundy's marginal note next to the upper part of this paragraph reads: "Of course it can be done."
A second important factor in relative capability is that of diagnostic instrumentation. For test shots which can be satisfied by relatively simple instrumentation plus good radiochemical analysis, tests in the atmosphere can be much more effective in furnishing early information than can underground experiments, at least with current techniques. This is especially important when the results of one test determine parameters to be used on a succeeding test in the same series. (In one, so far extreme, case it required almost two months to do the digging necessary to obtain an adequate radiochemical sample from a shot in the current series.) Even relatively complex instrumentation is easier for atmospheric tests if barge shots can be used.
Both time and place will influence the choice of test shots that can be included in an atmospheric test program. In accordance with your memorandum we are planning on a target date of April 1, but recognize that it may be advisable to postpone the date by a month or so, as more specific plans may require.
The choice of test site will dictate how the tests can actually be conducted. Technically the Eniwetok Proving Ground is the most desirable, extending as it does over a substantial area, with a lagoon suitable for barge shots. All of the contemplated tests could probably also be conducted, though not so well, at Christmas Island. Since Eniwetok has political difficulties and the availability of Christmas Island is at best uncertain, prudence dictates that we be prepared to test elsewhere if necessary. Fortunately, many of the proposed tests could be conducted without a highly-developed island site, although they would benefit from such a site. Some could be done by air drops probably staged from Hawaii with limited instrumentation on some small island, such as Johnston, not suitable for more extensive development; with some degradation of diagnostic information, others could be carried out by air drop over the open ocean using such instrumentation as could be carried in accompanying aircraft or on ships. However, some of the most complex experiments are of questionable feasibility except over an extended land base such as Christmas Island; in the absence of such a base, serious consideration should be given to conducting some of these above ground in Nevada. In any case, for geophysical reasons, one important test to determine the effects of a nuclear explosion on hardened missile bases could be conducted only in Nevada. A special requirement also exists in connection with rocket lifted test shots for which Johnston Island is the logical launch point because of available facilities.
It has been proposed that tests be conducted in space in order to avoid fallout. Preliminary analysis of space vehicle capability and reliability and difficulty of instrumentation indicates that it would cost approximately 100 million dollars over a 2-year period to develop such a capability and about 20 million dollars per shot thereafter. Consequently, it was not considered available for this program.
Another important consideration in planning the test series is the restraint to be placed on yield because of fallout and its political implications. The series now proposed would have a total yield of approximately [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] this compares to the recent Soviet tests totalling approximately [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. By appropriate test techniques, it should be possible, within limits, to restrict the worldwide fallout, at the cost of producing local fallout. The balance struck would be dependent on the choice of site.
In studying the proposed series of test shots, it is apparent that no great advance in weapon technology can be attributed in advance to any one proposed experiment. Indeed, it is rare that a single test shot can, by itself, lead to a major advance in nuclear weapon technology. Progress in this area is much more likely to come from a broadly based, interrelated series of experiments--some empirical in nature and some the result of careful calculations--from which one can then advance to bolder, more advanced concepts. The group of 27 tests which appears to be a minimum program must therefore be considered in the context of the gains that could be made from this group of experiments as a program, recognizing that they fall logically into three categories.
The first category covers the general area of the effects of nuclear weapons on such things as hardened missile bases, on missiles in flight, on radar and communications and on naval vessels and their equipment. It is axiomatic that weapons effects in a given environment must be understood if we are to be able to plan for the proper design of weapons to fit a particular military requirement. While there have been many nuclear tests which sought to develop information about weapons effects, it is apparent that there are still significant areas of unknowns of importance to the military use of nuclear weapons. Four tests that fall solely in the effects category appear to be feasible for inclusion in an early series, but other recommended tests will have effects implications. The area of greatest interest lies in effects at very high altitudes as they apply to AICBM defenses and to the kill capability of our own AICBM warheads. A series of five such tests has been projected, varying in yields from a [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to about [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and in altitudes from 20 Km to above 400 Km. However, practical considerations with respect to development of instrumentation techniques and related preparations make it unrealistic to plan for more than two of these shots in the short time available. It is important that preparations go forward to conduct the others, and perhaps additional ones in the next test series. The effects of antisubmarine warheads are also of interest, as are the effects of the electromagnetic pulse from a surface burst as they relate to the operational effectiveness of hardened missile bases. One each of such tests is included.
The second major category into which test proposals fall is that of advanced concepts for improving weapon effectiveness and decreasing warhead vulnerability. Advances range all the way from exploring changes in [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] design of "standard" devices through the exploring of very advanced concepts for greatly improving the efficiency of thermonuclear "burn". New ideas in thermonuclear technology promise great enhancement of the fusion-to-fission ratio [1 line of source text not declassified]. Direct practical objectives include significant reductions in the weight-to-yield ratio of all classes of offensive and defensive weapons; decreased vulnerability of our own offensive weapons; enhanced weapons effects, including progress [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and reductions in special nuclear materials, particularly for tactical and defensive warheads.
[2 paragraphs (37 lines of source text) not declassified]
Although it would certainly be desirable to include all of the proposed tests of advanced concepts, practical political considerations, and the short time available for design and fabrication of devices dictate that some of these proposals might be postponed to a later test series.
[1 paragraph (22 lines of source text) not declassified]
While the program recommended here represents the current best thinking, it must be pointed out that the underground test program particularly in the area of advanced concepts, is almost certain to produce surprises which will dictate changes in any atmospheric series which might be planned now. Accordingly, one must recognize this and retain flexibility to add, substitute, or otherwise modify the program. On the assumption that such flexibility will be possible, for example, the recommended program has not included tests proposed by the laboratories that repeat completed or scheduled underground tests, or other tests that can presumably be carried out underground; in the event of failures in the underground test program, appropriate revisions to the atmospheric series will be required. On the other hand, knowledge gained from successful underground tests may call for elimination or modification of some of the presently proposed atmospheric tests.
In addition to provisions for flexibility, current planning should provide for preparations for a second test series, about a year later, looking to more dramatic advances than are possible in an early time frame. In fact, it is essential to plan for a second series in order to accomplish the very important effects tests that could not be included in this early time scale. In looking at what test devices can be made available in the April to July period, it is apparent that we are suffering to some extent from the three-year test moratorium. During that period, while the United States was negotiating in good faith, the bulk of our nuclear weapon design effort was oriented towards devices that could be stockpiled with adequate assurance without tests. Thus, the climate was not conducive to bold, new concepts requiring experimental checks. The possibility of being able to test seemed very remote. In contrast, the available evidence indicates that from the very outset of the moratorium, the Soviets have anticipated atmospheric testing and have oriented their efforts toward significant advances requiring such testing.
In summary, it is clear that a rate of progress adequate to maintain our relative military posture can be attained only through resort to atmospheric testing; indeed, much vital information on effects and many possible technical advances, would not be realized at all through underground tests alone.
Accordingly, it is recommended that a program to consist of a minimum of 27 test shots as indicated on the attached Enclosures "A" and "B"/6/ be approved for atmospheric testing to be conducted over a period of approximately three months beginning in the spring of 1962. A description of each of the additional tests proposed for consideration by the laboratories and by the DOD, but not now recommended for inclusion in this first series, is also attached as Enclosure "C". For your information Enclosure "D" lists all known nuclear explosions conducted to date by the various countries.
6/The attachments to this letter are not printed.
Sincerely,
Glenn T. Seaborg/7/
/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
103. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/
Washington, November 30, 1961, 8:47 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/11-2861. Confidential. Drafted by Ronald I. Spiers, Director of the Office of Political Affairs in ACDA, and William G. Jones, Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs; cleared by Foster and by EUR, AF, ARA, and NEA; and approved by Cleveland.
1392. Disarmament Forum; USUN-1821./2/ You should consult with UK, France, Canadian and Italian Dels on basis of following position for next session Stevenson-Zorin talks:
/2/In telegram 1821, November 28, Stevenson stated that during a meeting with Zorin that day the Soviets "seemed desirous of agreement;" reported that agreement seemed possible on either a 5-5-8, a 5-5-7, or a 5-5-3 ratio of Western, Warsaw Pact, and neutral states in the Disarmament Committee; and asserted his preference for one of the higher numbers because a "non-aligned group of three including India, Mexico and perhaps UAR would be more likely to coalesce into a bloc which could exert pressure on West than would larger and more loosely organized group of 7 or 8." He asked for authorization to agree on 5-5-8, "or as last ditch solution" 5-5-7. (Ibid.)
1. While US believes inclusion ten additional states is preferable on basis relative numbers NATO-Warsaw countries and remaining nations of world, we would as conciliatory move be prepared, if Soviets insist, to reduce to eight number of countries to be added. This would be minimum to which we would be willing recede and we leave it to your discretion when to fall back to this position. Our impression here is that Soviets rather anxious to come to agreement and they recognize obvious attractiveness of 5-5-10 proposal if we force it into public domain.
2. These countries should be added in accordance with agreed principles of geographic representation and not on any other basis. We would suggest accordingly the addition of two Latin Americans, two Asians, two Africans, one Middle East and one non-NATO, non-Warsaw European. We believe we should reach agreement on total number to be added and geographic distribution within this number prior to further discussion of specific countries.
3. If Soviets refuse to discuss principle of number or geographic distribution without settling on specific countries, US would take position for tactical reasons that we are prepared, within this agreed framework, to have the additional countries elected by GA. This would have greater virtue of allowing states truly interested in participation to pre-sent their own candidacies and will help in securing more representative forum.
4. If necessary to obtain Soviet agreement to this procedure we prepared reach prior understanding with Soviets as to countries we ourselves would support for election. We would be prepared support Mexico and Argentina from Latin America, India and Japan from Asia, Ivory Coast and Tunisia or Nigeria from Africa, UAR from Middle East, and either Sweden, Ireland or Austria from non-NATO, non-Warsaw Europe. FYI: We could fall back to Brazil in lieu Argentina at whatever stage you deem necessary. End FYI.
Assuming Western Five agree on above position, USDel should consult with Pakistan (also Argentina prior any fall-back to Brazil) on foregoing in order that we may assess their reaction prior to actually putting it to Soviets.
In approaching Pakistan and Argentina, you should stress that as a practical matter US recognizes that no countries not mutually acceptable to both Soviets and US can be added and that GA itself would probably not support addition of countries which would result in Soviet refusal to participate in negotiations. Our aim is to avoid "troika-like" body (as in 5-5-5 or step in that direction, e.g. 5-5-3) and to gain reaffirmation principle geographic representation in disarmament bodies. You should state we prefer have countries added elected by GA, but that we may be forced to reach prior understanding with Soviets on mutually acceptable slate which we would support and that Soviets have objected to inclusion of Argentina and Pakistan.
Reporting--Agree necessary to change operative para 3 section B Soviet draft contained urtel 1826./3/ You should continue press Soviets accept formulation in US draft handed them on Nov 15./4/ We see difficulty in Mission suggestion/5/ since this has disadvantage tending highlight possible failure reach agreement "draft treaty" by June 1, 1962 and unacceptable in unrealistic linkage of "draft treaty" and date June 1, 1962. Would agree to substitute words "draft program" as contained statement principles./6/
Rusk
/3/Telegram 1826, November 28, transmitted a Soviet draft of a proposed General Assembly resolution setting up a new Disarmament Committee. The provision referred to would have requested "the Disarmament Committee to submit the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control for consideration by a Special Session of the General Assembly not later than June 1, 1962." (Ibid.)
/4/As directed by telegram 1241 to USUN, November 14, the Mission handed the Soviets on November 15 a draft based on portions transmitted in telegrams 566, September 16; 913, October 13; and 1139, November 4; all to USUN. (Ibid., 600.0012/11-961, 600.0012/9-1661, 600.0012/10-1361, and 600.0012/10-261, respectively) All are in the Supplement.
/5/Not further identified.
/6/Documentation on further negotiations with the Soviets and consultations with allies on the composition and tasking of the proposed Disarmament Committee is in Department of State, Central File 600.0012 for November and December 1961. As a result of these talks, the General Assembly passed on December 20 Resolution 1722 (XVI), setting up an 18-member Disarmament Committee composed of Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, France, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, Sweden, the United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The resolution requested that "the Committee submit to the General Assembly a report on such agreement [on general and complete disarmament] as soon as it has been reached, and in any case submit to the Disarmament Commission, not later than June 1, 1962, a report on the progress received." For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 741-742.
104. Editorial Note
Seaborg's journal for November 30, 1961, reads in part as follows:
"From 5 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. I met with President Kennedy in my capacity as Chairman of the NSC Committee on Atmospheric Testing. Bundy, Wiesner, Bill Foster, Harold Brown, Jerry Johnson, Phil Farley, John Foster, Norris Bradbury, Carson Mark, General Betts, Lee Haworth, Vice President Johnson, Roswell Gilpatric, John McCone and Spurgeon Keeny were present.
"We presented our case for atmospheric testing, using the criteria laid down by the President. Arguments emphasized the need to test the effects of weapons to develop the AICBM and to test the vulnerability of our weapons, as well as to develop an increased yield to the weight ratio so that our weapons can include protective material to decrease their vulnerability without increasing their weight. Every aspect of confining our testing to underground was explored and the consequences of our not further improving our weapons as much as the Russians were explored to see if this is a tenable position.
"The President finally concluded that the U.S. should resume atmospheric testing, but it would not be announced until shortly before we proceeded with the three-month series to begin about April 1st. The President directed that the presented list be reduced in number. He also directed us to continue negotiations with the U.K. for use of Christmas Island, although we will also use the airdrop method with some instrumentation based on Johnston Island." (Seaborg, Journal, volume 2, pages 440-441)
According to Colonel Ewell's account of the White House daily staff meeting held on December 1:
"d. Mr. Bundy said there had been a long discussion on atmospheric testing yesterday. The President was carefully non-committal. However, preparations for same are proceeding, and State has been asked to prepare some public statements to be used when a formal testing program is approved. Mr. Bundy thinks that Bill Foster will probably get the job of preparing these statements. Mr. Bundy said that the problem is that no one test is extremely important in itself, rather it is the cumulative effect. (This represents a definite shift in Mr. Bundy's understanding of this problem. Previously he has taken a very hard line that because no one test is important we shouldn't make any.) Bundy then posed the political problem: Is there any conceivable value in an atmospheric test ban which has some type of policing arrangement. He implied that he felt not, due to the possibilities for Russian chicanery, and felt that the proper ploy is to start talking about something else. What 'something else' would be was not discussed. My guess would be general disarmament." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings 9-12 61)
105. National Security Action Memorandum No. 116/1/
Washington, December 1, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 116. Secret; Restricted Data.
TO
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology
The following instructions are issued by the President as the result of a discussion on November 30./2/
/2/See Document 104.
1. The list of atmospheric tests presented in letter from the Chairman of the NSC Committee on Atmospheric Testing to the President dated November 29, 1961,/3/ is approved for the purpose of proceeding with preparations, subject to the following provisos:
/3/Document 102.
A. The list will be reviewed with a view to reduction in the numbers of atmospheric tests, in the length of time of the test series, and in the resulting radioactive fall-out. The NSC Committee on Atmospheric Testing should promptly indicate to the President which tests can best be omitted from these points of view.
B. In cooperation with the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and Dr. Wiesner, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission will at once pursue technical conversations with the British, with a view to a prompt assessment of the likelihood of British consent to effective use of Christmas Island. It will be appropriate in this connection to make available to the British the sort of information contained in the letter of November 29. Such conversations should be so conducted that the Secretary of State can pursue the matter with the British Foreign Secretary in Paris about December 11, if desirable.
C. Preparations will proceed for conducting the series both with and without Christmas Island.
D. Preparations should be based on the assumption that Eniwetok will not be available.
E. A close study and interim report will be made on the question of the practicability of using a Nevada site for a one-KT or two-KT electromagnetic effects test, and conceivably for other particularly appropriate low-yield tests.
F. The Secretary of State, or his representative, is requested to serve as Chairman of a sub-committee of the National Security Council Committee on Atmospheric Testing. This sub-committee should promptly make plans for the best possible program of explanation and justification for a resumption of atmospheric testing on the lines described in the letter of November 29 from the Chairman of the NSC Committee on Atmospheric Testing. Representatives of other agencies, such as USIA, should be added to the sub-committee at its Chairman's discretion.
G. The plans for this test series will be reviewed in the light of the President's strong desire that the whole series, if ordered, be begun and ended as soon as is consistent with sound planning and satisfactory results.
H. Plans for these tests will also be reviewed in the light of the possibility that further atmospheric testing after this series may become undesirable for political reasons.
I. The Atomic Energy Commission will give urgent attention to the expansion of its long-run capability for underground testing at levels of yield up to a megaton.
J. It must be understood that the President has reserved judgment on the final decision for or against the resumption of atmospheric testing./4/
/4/A December 1 memorandum from Gilpatric to the JCS, communicating to them the decisions reached on November 30, reads on this point: "The President has not made the decision whether or not to conduct atmospheric tests. The decision will be reached at the time it is necessary to make a public announcement or about two weeks prior to the first readiness date." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112, 8 Apr 61 (Dec 61))
McGeorge Bundy
106. Memorandum From the Representative to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests (Dean) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, December 4, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/12-461. Confidential. This memorandum was sent to the President. Another copy is in the Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Disarmament, Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations 4/28/61-3/62. Other copies were sent to Ambassador Thompson in Moscow, Stelle in Geneva, Foster, Ambassador Stevenson at USUN, McNamara, Allen Dulles, and Seaborg.
SUBJECT
Nuclear Test Ban Conference
On Thursday, November 30 I gave a lunch at the Hotel des Bergues, Geneva, for the Russian Delegation, British Delegation and United States Delegation to the Nuclear Test Ban Conference. Mr. Tsarapkin sat at my left and Mr. Godber, British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the British Delegation, sat at my right.
I steered the conversation with Mr. Tsarapkin to the question as to whether it would not be a good idea to assemble the Soviet, United Kingdom and United States scientists in an effort to review the entire treaty control machinery and to see whether we could not work out something which would be acceptable to the Soviet Union from a control standpoint and from an on-site inspection standpoint.
Mr. Tsarapkin turned to me, and, with complete cordiality but nevertheless with complete firmness, said: "Do you really want to know why we resumed nuclear testing on December 1?"
In reply I said I would be very much interested.
He said: "The sole and only reason we resumed testing was because we were concerned lest you actually were ahead of us in this field of nuclear weapons. We know that you had plans to destroy the Soviet Union and its people with the use of nuclear weapons and when we proposed to end the allied rights in West Berlin by the negotiation of a treaty with East Germany requiring the renegotiation with them of these rights, that you said you would respond if necessary by the use of nuclear weapons in connection with West Berlin, and so far we have not been able to convince you that the signing of a treaty with East Berlin and the ending of your military occupation rights in West Berlin was really realistic in 1961 as compared to 1945.
"Since we knew also that you planned to attack the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons, we decided to test. We have carried out a well planned and well executed series of tests and now we know that you are definitely not ahead of us in this field and that if you decide to use nuclear weapons, you will get a little worse than you send. You and your country might as well know that in view of the present tensions in this world, there is no possibility whatsoever of any further negotiations on the nuclear test ban agreement.
"The Soviet Union will not accept any control posts on its territory and will not under any circumstances accept on-site inspections."
He added also that: "We don't care what safeguards you place around these control posts or on-site inspections or we don't care how intelligent and reasonable you may be in attempting to work out this treaty"; and he turned to Mr. Godber and said: "I must admit Mr. Dean has been most constructive and reasonable but we just cannot accept his suggestions in view of the present tension of the world."
I briefly but pleasantly pointed out that he was wrong in thinking we wanted war or that we objected to their treaty with East Germany, but that we did insist on our rights; and kidded him a little bit about his views. I purposely tried to keep the conversation on a pleasant but firm basis.
Mr. Godber then asked a great many questions and Tsarapkin continued to reply, almost as if he were cranked up, that in view of the present state of tensions in the world that nothing could be worked out except general and complete disarmament and then of course there would be no nuclear weapons to test.
I then suggested that we might meet after the Thursday meeting.
At the conclusion of the Thursday meeting, Mr. Tsarapkin and I called on Mr. Godber in his rooms at the Beau Rivage Hotel. Mr. Godber made a strong and rather an eloquent plea to Mr. Tsarapkin for about twenty minutes to reconsider. In substance, Mr. Tsarapkin again repeated several times the substance of what he had said at lunch and he turned to me and said: "In view of the plans of your militarists to destroy the Soviet Union and its people with nuclear warfare, there just can be no effective negotiation between us no matter how constructive until general and complete disarmament has been signed, sealed and delivered. After that there will be no nuclear weapons. They will all be destroyed so there will be no problem of a nuclear test ban treaty."
I said I didn't know to whom he referred as the "militarists" but anyhow the policy of the United States is laid down by the President and not by these alleged militarists and said that I could assure him that the President of the United States and the people of the United States had no wish, intention or desire to destroy the Soviet Union by nuclear warfare and that we did want a nuclear test ban treaty and effective disarmament.
Mr. Tsarapkin said: "I know that you make that statement most sincerely but you don't know what the militarists in your country are planning."
I said: "Maybe I don't know what the alleged militarists are planning, but I do know what the President of the United States is planning and I can assure you he has no such plans and that what he was saying did not make sense."
I again appealed to him to sit down and see whether on a reasonable basis we could not examine the treaty and its annexes, and the control system or any of its provisions to see if we could not get together. Mr. Godber also made a plea along these lines.
Tsarapkin continued to repeat what he had said before with practically no variations, although he said it a great many times.
The meeting lasted about 1-1/2 hours. The tone was pleasant and not disagreeable, but as far as Tsarapkin was concerned, he seemed to regard it as a finality that there could be no purpose in negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty with controls or effective inspection and that we might as well make our plans accordingly. He said they could easily put it [the new Soviet test ban proposal]/2/ through the UNGA and that if we tested, they would test. I said an uninspected, uncontrolled moratorium was out of the question.
/2/Brackets in the source text. For details of the Soviet proposal of November 28, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 659-664 and 674-677.
He insisted that they did want general and complete disarmament, but he again repeated the substance of what Mr. Zorin had said to Mr. McCloy and me at the disarmament meetings in New York and Washington that there could be no inspection and control of armaments until general and complete disarmament had been thoroughly and completely carried out.
Both Mr. Godber and I pointed out to him that this was not a very realistic or very constructive position.
Tsarapkin said: "Call it what you will, it is a fact, and you must become realistic in view of what is going on in the world."
107. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to All Posts/1/
Washington, December 5, 1961, 6:06 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/12-561. Official Use Only. Drafted in the Public Affairs area of ACDA and approved by James E. Goodby.
CA-590. Background.
Since the resumption of the Geneva test ban talks on November 28, the Soviet Union has been pressing publicly its four point proposal to end nuclear testing. In brief, the Soviets proposed:
a) A ban on atmospheric, underwater and space tests.
b) Above ban to be policed by "national detection" systems.
c) A ban on underground tests pending agreement on a system to control such tests as a composite part of an international control system over the realization of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.
d) The treaty to become effective on signature by the US, UK, USSR and France and then to be open to adherence by all other states.
During the next few weeks we anticipate Soviet propaganda output will stress the following themes in an attempt to justify the new proposal:
1. Control of nuclear testing can only be solved under conditions of general and complete disarmament.
2. National detection systems are capable of detecting atmospheric, outer space and underwater detonations. Reliance upon this "control" technique, already proposed by the West for atmospheric tests, coupled with an agreement to ban underground tests can serve as an interim solution to the problem of nuclear testing.
3. Present tense international situation, which is radically different from 1958-59, makes any control system impossible. Controls today can only serve espionage purposes.
4. The recent moratorium was not a joint agreement such as the USSR now proposes. It was a unilateral declaration which the US abrogated in 1959 when President Eisenhower announced that the US no longer regarded itself as bound by it./2/
/2/For President Eisenhower's statement of December 29, 1959, see Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, vol. II, pp. 1590-1591.
5. Negotiations must be expanded to include France inasmuch as France is now a nuclear power and has been conducting tests on behalf of the Western bloc.
Guidance.
To counter these Soviet propaganda themes and to develop support for the US-UK position, you may wish to draw on the points noted below:
1. Unlike the Soviet Union which now repudiates it, the US continues to hold to the purpose of the Conference, i.e., the conclusion of a test ban treaty under effective international safeguards.
2. Latest Soviet proposal is not a treaty proposal. Rather, it is an invitation to sign an unverifiable paper declaration which could be violated at will.
3. In effect, the Soviet proposal calls for junking all agreements reached in the past three years and starting all over again. The US wants disarmament progress now and continues to believe that the conclusion of a test ban treaty, such as the US-UK have proposed, represents an immediate, practical step toward the goal of general and complete disarmament.
4. The proposal asks the US to place reliance solely upon Soviet promises which recent history has already shown inadequate to halt nuclear testing. In contrast, US-UK draft treaty provides for impartial control commission to administer test ban agreement and does not rely on good faith of either party.
5. The US September 3 proposal (Kennedy-Macmillan atmospheric ban proposal), which the Soviets cite as precedent for national detection system, was an effort to spare the world from fallout danger of impending series of Soviet tests--US would have taken the risk, at that time, of an unpoliced moratorium on atmospheric tests to prevent potential hazards to world population from fallout. The offer expired September 9 by its own terms and has not been reaffirmed in the present altered situation. It is obvious Soviet test series of approximately 50 detonations places the US in a position where it must give greater weight to military considerations than was the case four months ago.
6. Although it would appear that the Soviet proposals offer little hope of genuine progress, the US will remain at the Conference table in an effort to determine full implications of these proposals and whether the Soviets have any intention of reversing their present position. At the same time, the US will continue to strive for the conclusion of an effective treaty banning all nuclear tests along the lines of the US-UK draft treaty tabled April 18, 1961.
Rusk
108. Editorial Note
In his memorandum of the White House daily staff meeting on December 8, 1961, Ewell included the following item on a discussion of nuclear testing:
"There was high consternation over the article on the front page of the New York Times that leaked the results of the Russian nuclear tests analysis. Our professional non-testers were extremely upset about this. State is forming a task force, under Foster, to write a public statement, to be held in reserve, in the event we resume atmospheric testing. Schlesinger asked to be put on this task force. He complained that USIA and CIA are beginning to shift their propaganda line in preparation for possible resumption of tests and this was wrong because the President hasn't decided to resume tests. I opened my big mouth and said that I thought this was right, that it was just obvious that sooner or later we would resume testing, and that we should get ourselves in a less exposed position so that we wouldn't look so foolish when we did. This, of course, went over like an iron balloon. I also asked Bundy whether the decision to limit tests in Nevada severely was based on political or technical grounds. He said it was political, that everyone would squawk about fall-out in their milk. I said that this, to a certain extent, was nonsense, that I didn't see why we didn't go ahead and test there rather than go through involved gymnastics to find some other place. This thought was received with a notable lack of enthusiasm also. I can detect that Arthur Schlesinger is now off the right wing militarist kick and has now joined the non-atmospheric testing bleeding hearts club." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings 9-12 61) The article mentioned was in The New York Times, December 8, 1961.
109. Letter From the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (Brown) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, December 12, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 12/7-18/61. Secret; Restricted Data. Another copy is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 (8 Apr 61).
Dear Mr. President: In response to your request, I am submitting my personal views and comments on the nuclear weapons test shots proposed for inclusion in atmospheric test program during the Spring of 1962. I have taken as my point of departure the lists included in the letter to you of November 29, 1961, written by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission./2/ I participated in the generation of that statement as a member of the National Security Council Committee on Atmospheric Testing Policy, and I endorse in general the tests proposed in that letter. However, some of the tests are more important than others. I believe that test series plans should be laid out on a time scale determined by only those experiments which meet the following criteria: (a) they can be fully justified on the basis of real (though not necessarily immediate) military importance, and (b) there would be very great difficulty in performing them in other environments. The decision on whether or not to proceed should be made on the basis of these tests only.
/2/Document 102.
If an affirmative decision is made, it is likely that there will be additional useful tests arising either before or during the test series which should be included providing that (a) they do not lengthen or delay the schedule, and (b) they do not substantially increase the total fission yield of the series. What follows is my own evaluation with respect to these criteria of the weapons effects tests proposed by the Department of Defense, my estimate of the military importance of the experiments which are suggested by the Atomic Energy Commission for the purpose of weapons development, and my comments on the utility of atmospheric nuclear explosions as part of weapons systems tests.
1. The nuclear weapons effects program which the Department of Defense has developed involves high altitude, surface, and underwater tests. Not all of the important high altitude effects tests can be done in the proposed series, nor can the best possible surface (electromagnetic pulse and ground-shock) effects tests. However, I consider the high-altitude effects and surface effects experiments which can be done in the proposed series to be of such importance that I believe that resumed U.S. atmospheric testing is justified on the basis of these tests considered alone.
2. The effects of nuclear weapons exploded at very high altitudes has been the subject of much calculation, and a few experiments, but little knowledge. An understanding of the nature and extent of these effects is equally applicable to the problems of defending against Soviet ballistic missiles and of U.S. penetration through Soviet AICBM defense. Whatever the relative difficulty of these two jobs (and I have said several times that I regard the penetration problem as the more feasible one) the information about such effects is of great importance to the design of weapons systems for either purpose.
The relevant effects at high altitudes are of two kinds. One is the effect of a nuclear explosion on an incoming ICBM. To understand this problem completely one would have to know the detailed design of the incoming re-entry vehicle, its warhead, and the yield and efficiency of the AICBM warhead. Since the construction of the Soviet warheads in re-entry vehicles will not be known to us (and the details of construction in ours may not be very well known to them) even a precise knowledge of the effects will not permit the defender to be sure of the lethal range of his AICBM warhead against an incoming warhead. Furthermore, the U.S. at least will be unlikely to be sure of the Soviet AICBM yield or warhead characteristics and so even with effects tests will not be able to design its penetration program with an exact knowledge of the distance at which a Soviet AICBM explosion can "kill" our incoming ICBMs.
However, there are defensive systems in which it makes a great deal of difference whether the kill radius is about one kilometer or about ten kilometers. For this reason it may well be necessary for us to "harden" our re-entry vehicles to insure that their high vulnerability does not make the Soviet AICBM problem much easier. Certain general characteristics of vulnerability can be explored and major causes of vulnerability eliminated understanding of the lethal radii is obtainable readily and completely only from nuclear weapons tests performed at high altitudes in the atmosphere, particularly when one considers that there may be some phenomena not predicted on a theoretical basis which could produce a very large radius of vulnerability. Some of this data could be obtained by underground tests, but there are many phenomena (such as the motion of the nuclear fireball and its interaction with the earth's magnetic field) of which account can be taken only by tests in the atmosphere.
The other important kind of effect of nuclear weapons explosions at high altitude is the "blackout" effect in which radio communications and (of more interest for the AICBM and ICBM penetration problems) radars are prevented from functioning properly. In particular it is almost certainly possible within some limits to prevent an acquisition radar from seeing an incoming re-entry vehicle for some period of time by the detonation of a nuclear weapon at an altitude of about 400 kilometers. It is also possible, within limits, to prevent the discrimination radar (which distinguishes between re-entry vehicles and decoys) from being able to locate correctly these objects by exploding a nuclear weapon at lower altitudes (50-80 kilometers). Something is already known about these phenomena, their dependence on radar frequency, altitude of burst, etc. from the tests which were carried out in 1958. However, they depend in great detail on these things and on the characteristics of the warhead. There are various causes of the ionization which produces this blackout effect, including the fireball itself, and X-rays, gamma rays and delayed fission products from the explosion. The blackout due to the fission products and the fireball itself, which may be most important from the point of view of influencing the radar for long periods of time or most completely for a short time, are matters about which we are in almost complete ignorance. We can fully understand them only with high-altitude tests. The 1.45 MT explosion at 400 kilometers and 165 KT explosion at 50 kilometers have been selected as the two which will give the most information within the limited time available for preparation, out of a longer list of such tests which are needed. The cut-off date of July 1 makes it infeasible to carry out more than two such experiments.
3. Another experiment in the effects category is a surface explosion of one KT to tell us whether the electromagnetic signal induced by the explosion can burn out command links in varied ICBM sites, and to give us an experimental point in calculating whether our hardened sites will survive nearly multi-megaton explosions. Because of the many billions of dollars we will have spent on hardened missile sites by the mid-1960's, experimental verification of their survivability (and consequent usability as a second-strike capability) becomes extremely important. This is so despite our confidence in calculations which indicate that they can survive the earth shock from a large nuclear explosion and that the control circuits can survive the electromagnetic signal from such an explosion.
The electromagnetic signal simply cannot be tested except with a surface explosion. An experiment at one or two kilotons can answer unresolved questions about the source and strength of the signal and assure that the arming circuits will not be burned out by an enemy attack. The situation with respect to earth shock is more complicated. One cannot obtain complete confidence except from a full-scale test. This is infeasible in the proposed series since it would require a multi-megaton surface explosion in a geological conformation similar to that present in the areas of location of our proposed missile bases (a coral atoll will not do for this purpose). Furthermore, one can make a very small start on the problem by carrying out experiments completely underground. However, even a small (one or two KT) surface explosion will allow a normalization of calculations. As a result we would depend on a very much smaller extrapolation than we now must in judging the effect of a surface nuclear explosion on hardened structures.
All this argues quite strongly, in my view, for the importance of the proposed Nevada surface test. Additionally, on the same test experiments could be carried out on the effects on a nearby nuclear warhead more conveniently than those particular measurements could be carried out on some of the high altitude tests.
4. The anti-submarine weapons effects test, under water, would give useful information on whether the sound detection gear would operate after use of nuclear weapons for ASW purposes. Though less important than the high altitude and surface shots, it should be included if the proposed test series is carried out.
5. The list contains a large number (up to 7) of experiments designed to produce [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Some such a number of experiments will be required because the area is one that has not been explored in previous developments and will undoubtedly prove difficult, interesting, and rewarding. One would expect as a result of these tests to be able to increase the yield available at these weights by a factor of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] or alternatively to reduce the weights presently required to give these yields by a factor of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. This would allow us to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] over the presently planned cluster of three to be carried by the Polaris A-3. Instead half the present weight of that re-entry vehicle could be allotted to penetration aids. The same arrangements could be made with each to increase the penetrability. A [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would be required for the mobile MRBM now under consideration.
One could also use these warheads (two or three times lighter than what would otherwise be available) to produce correspondingly lighter missiles for air launching--[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. This could allow such missiles to be launched from lighter aircraft. Alternatively, the lower warhead weight could reduce the weight of a [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] allowing them to be launched from aircraft or small trucks.
I believe there will also be applications in which bombers carrying rather small payloads might by use of these warheads be able to deliver twice or three times as many bombs as would otherwise be possible.
Not all of these are desirable weapons systems. They are mentioned to show what additional flexibility in systems design in the mid-1960's is allowed by warhead development in this weight class.
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] can be carried out underground, but it would cost considerably more in time (several years) and money to develop such warheads without atmospheric tests.
6. In the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] category the list contains a number of development-proof tests. This is the weight of the current Minuteman and Polaris A-1 and A-2 warheads. These tests would allow the weapons design laboratories to establish the correctness or otherwise of their current design calculations on weapons which have been certified for stockpile without exact knowledge of their yield. I believe that still further gains can be made in this weight class, but not without the normalizations to experiment which these tests would provide. I believe that these tests are justified by the future progress to which they will lead. To carry out the normalization of calculations on the burning of thermonuclear fuel, they must be done at full yield, which precludes them from being done underground in the next few years.
7. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] three experiments are proposed which would about double the available yield at these weights. Alternatively they can be viewed as about [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] presently required for those yields. They would allow us to double the present yields of our Atlas and Titan I re-entry vehicles, or to devote half of that weight to penetration aids, or to use multiple warheads (two of the present yield, or four of half the present yield). Changes of the kind indicated are unlikely to make the difference between successful and unsuccessful deterrence unless the deterrence is marginal to begin with. At the same time the factor of two in yields or weights is not negligible in military calculations, and further tests would produce larger factors.
8. A number of tests of a more experimental or exploratory nature are also included in the proposed list, to be carried out in various weight classes. For example, there is one experiment which is aimed at reducing the weight required for a [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. This would mean a reduction in weight at that yield of about [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] below what is presently planned for the stockpile. Following the inclusion of such an atmospheric test in the proposed series, it might be possible to complete the development with underground tests.
Another of the proposed ideas, which is in a considerably earlier stage of development, would involve in the actual experiment a very large and heavy box to examine the effects of a different kind of implosion. This could ultimately lead to a yield of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Here again, additional underground and possibly atmospheric tests might be required to complete the development. If such development is successful, one could replace the currently planned cluster warhead of the Polaris A-3 by two warheads of [1 line of source text not declassified]. This would be a very much more effective system, considerably surer to be able to penetrate possible defenses than one using [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] (as presently planned) for the following reasons. If the warheads of an entering ICBM are of low yield, and known beforehand to be of low yield (the difficulty of knowing this would in any event, complicate the defender's problem) intercept can be delayed until they have reached a rather low altitude. This allows considerably more sorting in the atmosphere by measurement of the different rates of slowing down, and makes the AICBM problem substantially easier. By increasing the yield of such warheads as we have in the Polaris A-3 we would have a noticeable effect in increasing the penetrability.
A third experiment of an exploratory kind is one involving the use of fissile material in the [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. There have already been a number of not very successful experiments along this line. If success could be achieved it would allow a general increase in efficiency and correspondingly of the yield per unit weight throughout the spectrum of warhead weights from a [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
Experiments of this kind, although they may not produce an immediate change in the characteristics of the nuclear stockpile, are precisely the kind of work which in the long run can lead to large factors of improvement. I believe therefore that they should be included in the proposed series; in fact I believe that they are the most important of all the weapons development experiments suggested, with the possible exception of the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
9. A number of tests have been suggested which have yields of less than [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. These are the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Though they are interesting and useful, I believe that they can be done adequately underground. I would therefore not recommend their inclusion in the basic atmospheric series, although if they could be sandwiched in after the series is laid out they would be worth doing. Since additional experiments in the series inevitably will make it more complicated and difficult to do, I advocate the exclusion of these experiments. I also advocate the exclusion of the suggested experiment [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] which would save about [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. In my view a 10 percent change in weight does not justify inclusion in the series of this kind.
10. To summarize the effect of the weapons development tests (sections 5-9) on our military posture, one can expect from this test series a decrease in weight at a given yield ranging from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the larger numbers corresponding to smaller yields. Over a longer period of time, perhaps as a result of subsequent underground tests and perhaps requiring further atmospheric tests, one could get factors of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. This would result in greater penetrability of missiles through the use of larger yields and the allocation of more weight for penetration aids, and better survivability of missiles through the greater mobility of their launching systems. It would also allow bombers of limited payload to have a greater effect. For example, if strike-reconnaissance bombers can be developed their effectiveness will depend to some degree on the number of bombs of a given yield which they can carry on a single sortie.
How important these advantages are is a matter of individual judgment. The most likely military situation, in the period at which most of the weapons resulting from these tests would become available, is that the U.S. deterrent posture will be maintained by the variety and numbers of our delivery systems. At the same time a first-strike capability which would prevent unacceptable retaliatory damage to the United States will be very difficult no matter what we are willing to spend or do (including atmospheric nuclear testing). This argues that failing to reduce warhead weights by factors of two or even five is not likely to make deterrence infeasible instead of feasible, nor will systems made available by these factors of improvement by themselves make pre-emptive attack feasible instead of infeasible.
There is, however, a broad spectrum of intermediate situations between pure minimal deterrence and a full first-strike capability, and almost inevitably that is the situation in which the U.S. will find itself. If a war ensues under these conditions, the limitation of U.S. civilian damage resulting from Soviet follow-on attacks or as a result of spill-over from Soviet counter-force attacks will depend to a considerable extent on the details of the survivability, penetrability and deliverability of our own counter-force attack. This statement is not intended to gloss over the fact that in a nuclear war civilian casualties would be enormous in any event and that the societies of the countries involved would be catastrophically and perhaps irreparably damaged. There remains the additional fact that damage will depend in detail on how much explosive power is delivered, and at what stage of the conflict, on the enemy's nuclear delivery capability. These factors depend upon the quality of the nuclear weapons as well as of the delivery systems on each side. This is turn cannot help but affect the calculations made by each side in determining its own estimate of its military strength and its resulting political behavior./3/
/3/Kaysen commented on the preceding two paragraphs in a December 27 memorandum, arguing that what the United States would give up by postponing testing in the atmosphere was "a reduction of an unknown but not very large amount in the size of the margin which our strategic striking force will offer over the minimum survivable force which provides deterrence. Since we are in some doubt as to how big this margin ought to be, the military significance of a reduction in it is small." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 12/21/61-1/8/62) In a revised version, dated January 5, 1962, Kaysen added that a second consequence of refraining from atmospheric tests would be "a slowdown in the growth of our knowledge on the problems of designing AICBM systems, which we expect can only reach a moderate degree of effectiveness in the most favorable circumstances." (Ibid.) See the Supplement.
One could probably not justify resumption of U.S. atmospheric tests on the basis of any one or two of the development experiments proposed for this series. However, the entire set of development tests, and the disadvantages which would probably result from a growing lag in U.S. nuclear weapons technology in the middle and late 60's if we do not carry out atmospheric tests, argue strongly for, and I believe justify, resumption.
11. The argument in favor of the systems tests (Polaris and Atlas) is as follows:
There is no real doubt that, if a missile is tested and works, with experiments being done on a dummy warhead in the missile (perhaps including a chemical but not a nuclear explosion), and if the warhead is separately tested and works, the system will function as a whole.
However, the confidence obtained in operational forces by virtue of having carried out tests with actual nuclear weapons in actual systems is of very great importance. It is notable that the Soviets in their recent test series have included a large number of air drops of thermonuclear weapons involving several aircraft, apparently designed to provide operational training for at least a fraction of their force, and have also carried out several explosions of large nuclear weapons in missiles fired operationally. Though by themselves such a set of tests would not justify the resumption of atmospheric nuclear testing, I would strongly urge that if the proposed test series is carried out these two tests be included. They will neither lengthen nor delay the proposed test series, since they would be carried out by quite different groups from those carrying out the other experiments.
12. I have omitted in the body of this paper discussion of political considerations for and against resumption of atmospheric nuclear testing as being outside my area of responsibility. In order to make a recommendation, however, I must include my personal and undoubtedly oversimplified estimate of these factors. The long-term political issue of greatest significance is the arms race, and the need to limit it so as to improve the security of all nations. To the extent that this aim is advanced by refraining from atmospheric tests, resumption is undesirable. To what extent is the aim of arms limitation so advanced?
Atmospheric testing is not open to "cheating." However, the Soviets have not offered to sign a treaty banning atmospheric tests, and even if they did it is not clear what would keep them from breaking it at their convenience. Thus we are faced with a unilateral and unreciprocated exclusion of the U.S. from atmospheric nuclear testing.
The unilateral limitation imposed by not resuming U.S. atmospheric tests is unlikely to prove fatal. But it will allow a clear shift in the military balance in favor of the Soviet Union, and there is in high-altitude nuclear effects a small chance of decisive military advantage. To close off or seriously hamper one line of military development unilaterally while other areas of military technology go forward seriously limits U.S. flexibility in design of our military systems. Seeing no counterbalancing political gains, and on the basis of the military-technical considerations given in earlier sections, I recommend that the series comprising items 2-3 and 5-8 above be carried out. The tests mentioned in paragraphs 4 and 11 should be included only if they do not lengthen the series.
Respectfully yours,
Harold Brown
110. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Wiesner) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, December 19, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 12/19-20/61. Secret; Restricted Data.
I have reviewed Dr. Brown's letter of 12 December/2/ to you setting forth his views on the need for atmospheric tests. Dr. Brown has prepared a thoughtful document which makes the best case for atmospheric testing that I have seen. I believe that he has focused on the most important technical and military issues involved and has correctly identified the relative priorities of the tests. Nevertheless, my assessment of the proposed tests leads me to the conclusion that, while these tests would certainly contribute to our military strength, they are not critical or even very important to our over-all military posture. I believe that our most important task is to maintain an extremely effective deterrent and that we have the capability to do so without conducting atmospheric tests. I believe, therefore, that you have the flexibility to make whatever decision on this matter best supports your broader foreign policy and national security objectives.
/2/Document 109.
I agree with Dr. Brown that the proposed effects tests are the most important part of the proposed atmospheric test series. These tests relate to significant problems on which our knowledge is far from complete. I do not believe, however, that the proposed effects tests will be nearly as significant as Dr. Brown's analysis would indicate. Specifically, while the proposed effects tests relating to warhead vulnerability would certainly increase our knowledge on this important military problem, I do not believe these tests are critical to our understanding of this problem or that they would as stated result in the elimination of major causes of vulnerability. This problem was studied last Spring in great detail by an Ad Hoc Panel of your Science Advisory Committee/3/ whose report on this subject was in a large part responsible for stimulating the present justifiable concern within the DOD about the vulnerability of our missiles. With regard to the vulnerability of our own warheads, the Panel's investigation showed that we have considerable knowledge on this subject from calculations and laboratory experiments and could obtain a great deal more knowledge both by these techniques and by highly instrumented underground tests. In fact, unless full advantage is taken of the information we already have on this subject, the proposed atmospheric tests will probably simply confirm what we already know about our weapons, namely that they are quite vulnerable to certain nuclear effects. Improvement of the "hardness" of our missiles to nuclear effects is an engineering problem which requires tests of a large variety of structures; such a program clearly has to rest primarily on laboratory experiments. With regard to any future nuclear AICBM defense that we might develop against Soviet missiles, our lack of knowledge concerning the specific design of Soviet missiles probably will introduce, as Dr. Brown points out, a much larger factor of uncertainty than our lack of knowledge concerning the effects themselves.
/3/Apparent reference to the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing (Panofsky Panel); see Document 42.
I consider that the effects tests concerned with nuclear "blackout" of certain regions of the radar and radio frequencies spectrums to be the most significant aspect of the proposed test series since additional data on these phenomena probably cannot be obtained without atmospheric tests. In view of the complex nature of this problem, I have asked an ad hoc panel of highly knowledgeable scientists to meet on 19-20 December/4/ in order to examine the actual state of our knowledge on this problem and to evaluate the proposed experiments. It must be recognized, however, that we already know the general nature of these effects on radar and communications as the result of previous high altitude nuclear tests and extensive calculations and that this factor has been taken into account in technical planning for the last year or two. For example, in view of the severe effects anticipated on high frequency radio communication, SAC has already modified their communication procedures so that they are confident that they will not be affected by any nuclear blackout phenomena associated with high altitude nuclear explosions. As another example, Nike-Zeus radars have also been modified to the extent that appears possible to minimize the effects of nuclear blackout.
/4/Not further identified.
I also consider that the proposed small surface test to determine whether the resulting electromagnetic signal in the ground will affect command links at an ICBM site to be an important experiment. However, as Dr. Brown indicates, calculations indicate that this effect will not introduce any serious problems and special equipment is being incorporated in these systems to protect them against this effect even if it were to prove considerably larger than expected. With regard to the question of ground shock on hard ICBM sites, as Dr. Brown indicates, the proposed surface tests would give only limited information on a problem on which there is already a great deal of general knowledge. In addition, a rather elaborate underground test has been included in the present underground series to provide specific data on this problem.
With regard to the proposed development shots, I would agree with Dr. Brown that the most interesting development area is that of achieving [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in weights of 50-100 lbs. This could prove of real value in permitting the use of multiple warheads or allow incorporation of additional penetration aids in some of our smaller missile systems such as Polaris and Minuteman if there should be concern at some future date that they were too vulnerable to a future Soviet AICBM system. This would also provide an option for smaller more mobile missile systems if these should be desired. It should be recognized, however, that tests in this yield range could be conducted underground. This would result in some, but certainly not prohibitive, increases in cost in the test program and a stretch out in the test program. The resulting delay in availability of weapons would not be out of phase with the long range nature of these requirements. While I have always thought that underground testing would be more difficult than many of its advocates claimed, the current problem that the AEC is having with underground testing appears to be part of the normal learning process, and I am confident that adequately instrumented testing at these higher yields could be accomplished if there were a real need to do so. At yields above a megaton, underground testing will always be extremely difficult if not impossible as a practical matter. However, I do not believe that the higher yield tests proposed are particularly important to our military posture. Increasing the yield of our larger strategic warheads for Atlas and Titan by a factor of two is of little military significance as these vehicles have adequate payload capacity to carry large yield weapons and significant quantities of penetration aids if these prove necessary because of any future Soviet AICBM systems.
If we begin atmospheric testing, I would agree that the tests of some of the higher yield weapons which are based on the extrapolation of proven designs would be justified so that the laboratories could have confidence in extrapolating further improvements in these designs. However, in themselves these tests are not necessary to establish confidence in the weapons since they have been certified by the AEC for stockpiling and there is a very high degree of confidence that they will give yields very close to those estimated.
I think that it should be recognized that, if it is considered important to test weapons of higher yield than can reasonably be tested underground (above a few hundred kilotons), the technical option exists to test such weapons in outer space. While this possibility has been largely ignored in recent discussions, it is clearly within our present technical capability. The penalty for space testing would be an initial delay of a year or so and considerably higher costs than of atmospheric testing. However, these costs would not be prohibitive if the requirements were considered important.
In these comments on Dr. Brown's paper, I have attempted to put the various proposed atmospheric tests in proper perspective as to their importance. However, I agree with Dr. Brown that the significance of atmospheric testing should be judged not by the criticality of any individual test but by the over-all significance of the proposed series. Clearly the cumulative significance of the proposed tests is greater than that of any individual test. Nevertheless, I believe that a realistic appraisal of the proposed test series even when taken as a whole, indicates that it is not only not critical to our military posture but would not, in fact, be particularly significant to it. I believe this to be a particularly valid conclusion when one considers the alternative paths of weapon development available to us in aggressive use of underground testing, imaginative laboratory work, and possibly even space testing if it should prove necessary. Therefore, I have concluded that, while the proposed atmospheric tests would be desirable as part of our over-all military development effort if there are no political objections, the military security of the U.S. would not be endangered in the event that you determine that our longer range national policy would be better served by a decision not to test in the atmosphere at this time.
J. Wiesner
111. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Bermuda, December 21, 1961, 5-6:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, UK. Top Secret. There is no drafting information on the source text, which is on White House stationery. According to the President's Appointment Book, the meeting was held at Government House. (Kennedy Library)
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION PERTAINING TO NUCLEAR MATTERS
PRESENT
United States:
The President
The Secretary of State
Dr. Seaborg
Dr. Brown (from 5:40 PM)
Mr. Bundy
United Kingdom:
The Prime Minister
Lord Home
Sir William Penny
Mr. de Zulueta
The Prime Minister asked Sir William Penny to explain the technical aspects of the problem. Sir William said that the first question was whether it was possible for the USSR to combine an effective defense against missiles and an effective capacity to devastate the United States. The balance of missile/anti-missile capabilities was the crucial one.
He believed that even after the recent Soviet tests the United States today has a slight advantage. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] One particular Russian operation caused some apprehension: the execution of a very sophisticated test series in a location closely associated with anti-missile defense.
Sir William believed that if we can stand where we are today we will be all right. But how can either side avoid the effort to set up an anti-missile defense? No one can say that this cannot be done, if enough time and money is put into it. It seemed fantastically hard, but he thought both sides would have to try. If the United States should hold its hand, and the USSR should go full steam ahead, then in two or three years the United States would be behind. Could the United States allow the Soviets that two or three year period start on anti-missile defense?
As Sir William saw it, the President could give his technical people three different orders. The first would be to go ahead, in which case they would have lots of energy and enthusiasm and would make rapid progress. The second would be to prepare for testing, without a direct go-ahead order. In this case they would do well, but not as well as in the first case. The third order would be to stop. In this case we would lose more than just the time in which such a stop-order held. If the order to resume were given after two or three years, we should be less ready to make progress than we are today, because of the decay of the research laboratories in the meantime.
Sir William made one further point: a hundred megaton weapon like that tested by the Soviet Union can do enormous damage from a distance of twenty-five miles by heat. This may make a very great difference in the effectiveness of anti-missile defenses, since interception at such a range is very much more difficult than interception at five or six miles (where the atmosphere is thicker). The President asked if we should attempt to make such a weapon ourselves, and Sir William answered obliquely that we could probably make it without tests. Mr. Seaborg indicated that without tests it would be substantially heavier than the indicated Russian weapon, but he urged that the problem was worth careful study.
The Prime Minister discussed at some length the terrifying prospects of an indefinitely conducted and enormously expensive arms race in this field. If all of these talented people go on about their business, more and more and bigger and bigger bombs would be piled up and if even one of these new bombs should go off, it would burn up all of France. On and on, the two great powers would go. The Prime Minister said of Great Britain, "We shall probably drop out." We have of course an absolute justification for going on with it, because of what the other man is doing. But as we are now, we are even. Neither side has a defense nor will have one for many years.
This pattern worried him. Should mankind in the next generation be dedicated to this kind of effort? If the weapons are not fired off, of course, it is only a waste. But if they are fired off, it will be the end. Of course, the Soviet Union must not get ahead of us to the point where they could bully us, but could they really do so? This was the picture for the next twenty-five years, and while the only ones engaged in the highly sophisticated race would be the US and the USSR, everyone else would have the simpler forms of bomb in a few years. What would have happened if the Portuguese had had only two or three little Hiroshima bombs in the Goa affair? Would they have dropped them on Indian cities? The Prime Minister found Berlin very small beer compared to the destruction of mankind. He believed we have to make another effort. Mankind could not go on this way.
Should we do it by bringing great weight on the disarmament discussions now scheduled for April?/2/ They now look as if they would make very small progress. Yet we cannot sit in an ordinary little room three days before Christmas and talk about these terrible things without doing anything. The Prime Minister turned back to look at the lesson of the test ban discussions. To these discussions both the United States and Great Britain had given great effort. David Ormsby Gore had spent three years in Geneva, the dullest city in the world. The Prime Minister thought we had been close to agreement and then somebody--he asked Dr. Seaborg to forgive the allusion--unveiled the "big hole" underground and agreement on underground controls had proved impossible. Now it appeared that underground testing was not a very serious business, and he thought the failure of the test ban effort was a great pity. We might have got it then. He thought the Russians might have agreed.
/2/The first plenary meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee was held on March 14.
So is it worth contemplating a new test series in which the British would give Christmas Island to the Americans, or the Americans would use Johnston Island? Or should we call it off if we can really get down to a new effort which will give a real impetus to serious disarmament? Perhaps he and the President and Khrushchev might really get together and give a great new push. And such a new "push" might put other things, like Berlin, in perspective. We might fail but if so we would have lost only a few months. The Prime Minister's feeling about these people, after reading their novels and all that he could about them, was that they might come around. In short, he would suggest a great new effort to break the cycle of the arms race. (At this point Dr. Harold Brown joined the meeting.)
The President remarked that what the Russians had done in the last nine months suggested that they do not really want an agreement, and asked if it were not true that they must have been preparing tests since February.
The Prime Minister then briefly reviewed the kinds of tests which are proposed, in the following four categories:
1. High altitude effects which would not require Christmas Island.
2. Existing warheads of Polaris and Minuteman.
3. Tests of advanced designs to reduce the weight-to-yield ratio, and
[1 paragraph (1-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
Such tests would take two or three months to prepare, and the Prime Minister wondered if we could not use the time for one further try. He compared the arms race to a rogue elephant against which we must all act. We had very nearly succeeded before. With no disrespect to his great friend General Eisenhower, he thought that the U-2 incident and the pressures on Khrushchev had broken up the last effort. He thought the Russians were not very happy about it and he pointed out that after all a continuation of the arms race will cost them ferociously. They had got into this business when we had a monopoly and they had to catch up. If the Prime Minister had had to face this decision, he would probably have done the same thing. But if you just bid up and up, it is a grim prospect.
The Prime Minister asked Sir William why the Russians did test in this case. Sir William replied that he was inclined to think there had been a change in the thinking of their military men, who suddenly "went nuclear." The President thought our technological lead had not been so large as to give them any great concern. Sir William was inclined to agree and pointed out that he was interested in the fact that the Soviet Union had not gone for light-weight, high-yield weapons of the sort which would be most useful in anti-missile defense.
Dr. Brown said he thought that the Soviets had initially believed that they could hide their large missiles. The effectiveness of the U-2 had been a great shock to them. They now felt that they needed more smaller, lighter ones, which they would be able to make as a result of their tests. He thought also they were on to some new principles of design in the 5-10 megaton range, and also at the level of very large yield. He pointed out, as Sir William had already done, that there were two or three high-altitude tests associated with their anti-missile efforts and that we had a particular need to know more in this field, partly for our own anti-missile program and still more for the purpose of penetrating theirs. The Soviets apparently were not interested in 600-pound or 300-pound warheads, but in every area where they had displayed real interest, they were now equal to or ahead of the United States.
The President asked Sir William whether it is possible to get a good anti-missile defense. Sir William replied that in any ordinary way he would say it was impossible. But at these stakes and with these resources committed, "I contract out."
The Prime Minister asked what a 100-megaton bomb would do. Sir William replied that it would cause great destruction and the Prime Minister asked what it would do to people. Sir William replied that it would burn up all the people in even the largest city. It was repeated that the United States could build such a weapon if it were needed.
Dr. Brown remarked that penetration was easier than defense as long as other things were equal. One purpose of the proposed new tests was to make sure that other things were indeed equal. The Prime Minister asked how many large bombs would be needed to destroy England, and Sir William remarked that eight of the existing multimegaton weapons would make a terrible mess of England.
The Prime Minister remarked that a very large part of the early wave of the Western strategic forces was based in England, and he said, "Every time you lift the phone, Mr. President, I think you are about to say that you are going to go, and I always wonder what I would answer."
The Prime Minister could see the reason for every one of the proposed tests. They were all proper enough in their own terms but he could not see any end to it.
Secretary Rusk agreed with the Prime Minister that this was an enormous problem and agreed also that the point was to get ahold of the easy end of it--not the machines, but the men who make decisions about them. Was there not some way in which we could change the minds of these men? In particular, was it not possible that the real trouble is what the Soviets and the Chinese Communists are trying to do, in their persistent effort to take the world over. If they would only shift from this policy, how much they could transform the face of the world and improve its hopes.
The President said that in a year or two this nuclear arms race would come to a stand-off. Nobody would be able to use these things. We could not use them; the Soviets could not use them, since each side would be destroyed if it did. Secretary Rusk remarked that this stand-off would work only if it really were a stand-off, and others commented that it would have to be a stand-off in which both sides believed. Dr. Brown said it must be psychologically as well as technologically stable.
The Prime Minister remarked that the stronger the great powers became, the less they could control the weaker powers. Returning to Secretary Rusk's comment he said that perhaps the position of the Russians is changing. They are half-way between Asia and Europe. They see with foreboding the rise of China and the possible spread of nuclear weapons. We think of them as enormously different from us, but their economic structure, seen from afar, is not very different. Their railroads and mines are nationalized; so are the railroads and mines of Western Europe. Children of their ruling class are put in Public Schools like ours (the British Public School, he meant), and in general there is a spread of unequal privileges throughout their society. Could we not, gradually, without giving in, allow the forces of humanity to operate? And in that context we might work for an end of the arms race. If not, every little country would want what the French call a force de frappe and then make a nuisance of itself. The Prime Minister thought we were at a turning point. Could we not pull it out of the ruck and get it back on the road?
Lord Home asked how all this would fit into the new U.S. disarmament plan./3/ This new plan was not very different from that of the Soviets. We look for general disarmament in six years against the Soviet five. Their early phases call for more nuclear disarmament than ours but basically the plans are similar except in the very important area of inspection. Here Dr. Seaborg remarked that the test ban negotiations would have to be moved toward the forum of general disarmament. A test ban treaty in itself would be harder and harder for the West to accept, because of the problem of secret Soviet preparations.
/3/Apparent reference to the U.S. plan presented to the United Nations on September 25; see footnote 5, Document 73.
Lord Home continued on disarmament, pointing out that the eighteen chaps will have to meet. Their plans are not too far apart. Moreover, the Pugwash boys go on meeting, with some quite high-level Russians in the party. So there is at least some hope. Could we not make the opening of the eighteen-nation conference a moment of major effort? We might get the President and the Prime Minister and Khrushchev to meet and really start it off.
The President replied that the experiences of earlier months were discouraging. What assurances could we have? It seemed to him we should test unless we make major progress on either Germany or disarmament. He quite agreed that the Soviet edge, if any, was not decisive now, but he also agreed with Sir William Penney that the problem was what would happen in 1964 if we did not continue and the Soviets did. We could not get taken twice. Therefore, we ought to go ahead and prepare to test, and test, if there was no great progress in other fields. The President said this was his view even though he was a "great anti-tester."
The Prime Minister asked what would happen if all the bombs in the world went off, and the replies all indicated that the disaster would be enormous. The Prime Minister said that he had talked to Khrushchev on the same subject, and Khrushchev had answered that there would be nobody left but the Chinese and the Africans. Lord Home repeated that we ought to make some great exercise. Mr. Macmillan asked if by doing so we might not help the Berlin situation. The President continued to reply that we ought to prepare to test, and test, unless we get something serious that helps our security in the world. He added that there was one and only one serious issue, the balance of missile/anti-missile capabilities.
There followed a brief discussion of bluffing in which Prime Minister Macmillan remarked that the real question was what the other man thought. Mr. Brown remarked that bluffing was easier for a man who had looked at his cards while his opponent had not. The Prime Minister replied more seriously that to a man with the responsibilities of great-power leadership it would always seem hard--if not impossible--to give the order on a mere suspicion of bluff.
The Foreign Secretary said that if there were to be a resumption of testing, there must also be a major effort to get on with disarmament. The arms race really must stop. The President replied that the timing of such a great effort of disarmament was difficult. We could not start such a great effort and then begin atmospheric testing just when there were new hopes for disarmament.
Lord Home suggested one last try in which the three great leaders would open it up and then all the heads of the eighteen nations might come to Geneva. The President asked whether the Russians would agree to anything serious and it appeared that Lord Home thought we would be testing in the meantime. (But the recorder is not sure of what Lord Home said here.)
The President summed up the discussion by saying that there seemed to be three issues:
1. Should we prepare to test and test?
2. Should we make a parallel effort in disarmament?
3. Would the British wish to join in the testing program by making Christmas Island available, or should the United States plan its program alone?
At this point Prime Minister Macmillan ended the discussion, remarking that he felt better and that he thought the discussion had been most helpful.
112. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Bermuda, December 22, 1961, 10:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, UK. Top Secret. There is no drafting information on the source text, which is on White House stationery. According to the President's Appointment Book, the meeting was held at Government House. (Kennedy Library)
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION PERTAINING TO NUCLEAR MATTERS
PRESENT
United States:
The President
The Secretary of State
Dr. Seaborg
Mr. Brown
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Bundy
United Kingdom:
The Prime Minister
The Foreign Secretary
Mr. de Zulueta
Ambassador Ormsby Gore
Sir William Penny
The Prime Minister asked whether the Christmas Island group had reported. The experts replied that the advance party had given its report. The Prime Minister asked how long a time would be needed for preparations. Mr. Brown answered that they must start in early January in order to be ready for testing between April and the first of July.
The Prime Minister asked about underground testing. Dr. Seaborg replied that underground testing could usefully be done at levels up to 100 KT and that the United States would expect to continue with underground testing even if atmospheric testing should be decided on. The Prime Minister asked whether underground testing could be detected. Dr. Seaborg replied that we could certainly expect to detect Soviet tests at the level of 20 KTs but that detection would be less certain at lower levels, down to a point which could not be definitely stated, at which detection would not be possible.
The Prime Minister said that what worried him was that the Soviets had negotiated when they were behind, although they were preparing tests. He said there was a theory that the U-2 really did give them a shock because they did not know how much we could learn from such photography. Now we are even, and the question was how to prevent them from further testing. If they did any in the atmosphere, the tests could be detected. Now we have a situation that may be decisive. (The Prime Minister remarked that the British played only a small part in this situation, through having convenient facilities.) He asked whether we could make a new try toward some agreement. Here he remarked that he must have Cabinet consent to any decision on these matters. He thought it might be possible, with no real delay, to embark upon an attempt to break through. On one side was Berlin, which could be settled if people wanted to settle it. On the other side was this problem which might involve twenty-five years of terrible effort in a travesty of the purposes of human life.
The Prime Minister then read a draft paper/2/ proposing in essence that a new effort should be made to spare future generations these costs and dangers, even though on a fair assessment it was agreed that the United States should make all necessary preparations and that Christmas Island should be used in such preparations. The paper proposed that the final decision should be postponed until this effort had been made. What the Prime Minister hoped for was that this effort might have its effect both in Berlin and on disarmament. He hoped for a new phase of understanding. He believed it might be possible to summon Khrushchev to a meeting for such purposes and that we could thus get a great moral advantage.
/2/Not found.
The President said that he could not believe that the Soviets would give us such a propaganda advantage. If we embark on such new discussions, it would delay us another year. We would not have a better case a year from now, and what could we expect the Soviets to agree to in such a period? He agreed that we should have had an agreement before, and that the problems of underground testing had been greatly exaggerated, but now the Soviets had tested and could prepare secret tests again, while we on our side could not stay in the posture of real preparedness.
There followed a discussion of the disarmament proposals of the United States and of the optimum time for the proposed new test series. Dr. Seaborg stated that if this were the last series, and if we knew it, and if we knew that it would happen, we would go somewhat later.
The President restated the position as he saw it: we must decide to test, but we could couple the decision with a restatement of our purposes of disarmament. He thought we should not announce a decision now but only that we were making preparations. The Prime Minister wanted to make it clear that we would make a new and real effort for disarmament. If real progress could be made we would not test. We should only have to defend our preparations, on the first round; the President agreed to this last point. The Prime Minister teased the scientists about their destructive powers, but in reply to their remonstrances he said that they were really only "the innocent victims of the folly of politicians."
The President asked the Prime Minister if he could agree on Christmas Island with an understanding that tests would occur if the situation did not change. The Prime Minister replied that he wished to think of the two countries as partners in this. Whether testing occurred on Christmas Island or not, we were in it together and Britain would have to back up the United States. But could we not announce our plans so that they would be less a threat than a hope. The President said we could do this as long as we did not use any words that would trap us.
The Prime Minister repeated his hope that we could "summon this fellow." After all, on paper the disarmament plans were close together, and historians looking back from the distant future may wonder why it had been so hard to reach an agreement.
The Secretary of State thought it was extremely important not to think of our testing as opening a new chapter. It was the Soviet tests which opened the new chapter.
The Prime Minister said that a great deal depended on what the Soviet Union really wanted in the nuclear field. He thought that these tests had occurred because Khrushchev was frightened.
Lord Home asked if the President really intended to link the testing decision to Berlin. The President replied in the affirmative. If a really good settlement could be achieved on Berlin, he believed--as a private matter, not for publication--that it would be easier to make a decision not to test. The Secretary of State emphasized that these two propositions would never be linked formally with the Soviets.
Lord Home asked again if we could not summon the Soviet leaders to a disarmament meeting.
The Prime Minister asked if there were really a grave problem of keeping teams together. Secretary Rusk restated the American view quite simply. The Soviet Union can agree not to test and still prepare in secret for a new series. The United States cannot; no democracy could take that course. Dr. Seaborg remarked that we had been accused of preparing even when we were not, and now any such course would be doubly difficult.
Ambassador Ormsby Gore remarked that we could say that we now have an absolute justification for testing and mean to prepare, but before we execute tests we will make a further great effort. The Prime Minister said that there must be a private agreement, subject to Cabinet understanding, and that meanwhile a simple public statement should be made. The President asked Ambassador Bruce to work with Ambassador Ormsby Gore and the technical experts in preparing such a statement. It was later decided not to reach a private agreement at this time; the Prime Minister instead gave the President a letter explaining his intentions./3/ Meanwhile the technical experts did reach a tentative agreement ad referendum, on rules for the use of Christmas Island.
/3/In his letter of December 22, Macmillan stated that the experts should agree on the terms of a formal agreement for the use of Christmas Island, that the matter would be subject to a decision of the British Cabinet, and that "it would be unreasonable for the British Government, should it approve in principle of the use of Christmas Island, to be in a position to disapprove the tests if you and I feel ourselves unable to reach agreement." He did not think the "decision should rely only upon the state of the world at the time, as if this was something that could not be changed by human effort. I should like to feel that we had done everything possible to control events and not merely to follow them." (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan-Kennedy 1960-1961)
113. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, December 29, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 12/21/61-1/8/62. No classification marking. A handwritten note reads: "President saw."
SUBJECT
Resumption of Atmospheric Testing: A Proposal
1. On November 2, you said that the atmospheric testing decision would rest on a prior technical decision as to whether "the orderly and essential scientific development of new weapons has reached a point where effective progress is not possible without such tests." Unfortunately, as we now know, technical evidence will not yield a clearcut answer to this question. Our most expert scientific judgment is that the recent test series enabled the USSR to make gains--but not breakthroughs. Mr. Wiesner, after a study of the data, has reached the conclusion that, while atmospheric tests "would certainly contribute to our military strength, they are not critical or even very important to our over-all military picture." The decision, in short, is back in the political field.
2. In the meantime, opinion around Washington is crystallizing in favor of the decision to resume atmospheric testing. Even some who see no overriding security need for resumption are fatalistic about the possibility of avoiding it. The essential arguments behind this crystallization are (a) that, if we deny ourselves the right to do what is necessary for our security, nuclear superiority may pass to the Soviet Union by default--not this time, but next time, or the time after that; and (b) that there is nothing to be gained by non-resumption except the transient, illusory and meaningless favor of "world opinion."
3. I would agree that non-resumption per se is a pallid and negative position, and that an unexplained failure to resume might even be construed as weakness. However, I wonder whether it might not be possible to put non-resumption in a positive and dramatic context--and, at the same time, protect ourselves against the threat of a new cycle of Soviet tests.
4. The underlying reason for world concern over the resumption of atmospheric testing, I believe, is not so much the fallout problem (which will become of diminishing importance as we move into a clean-bomb period) as it is a spreading fear that the arms race is getting completely out of control and the world is sliding hopelessly into chaos. The pattern over the last few years shows rather clearly that, if we start a series of atmospheric tests (especially if at the same time we continue to proclaim that we still have a commanding lead over the USSR), this will precipitate and--for some people--validate the next Soviet cycle and thereby induce further degeneration. At present we are holding the arms race in check; if we go ahead, then the sky becomes the limit. What the world yearns for is a leader who will point out the ominous significance of this process and make one mighty effort to arrest the slide into international anarchy.
5. Would it not be worthwhile for you to consider issuing a statement containing two elements:
a) the announcement that, in a last effort to halt the process of degeneration, we have decided that we will not resume atmospheric testing;
b) the statement that at the same time, we will, in the interests of our own security and that of other free nations, complete all necessary standby preparations for the immediate resumption of atmospheric testing and, if the USSR conducts one more atmospheric test, we will instantly begin a massive group of militarily significant atmospheric tests.
6. The serious arguments against this are (a) that the USSR is going to resume atmospheric testing anyway, and that a unilateral moratorium would give them time to digest the 1961 series and prepare for new strides forward in, say, late 1962; and (b) that, in the meantime, the morale of our own laboratories would so decline that we would be unable to resume our own momentum.
7. As for argument (a), if we kept our testing program in a state of continuous ground alert, ready to go at the first new Soviet test, we would lose, at the most, six months.
As for argument (b), we very much need an impartial evaluation of the extent to which we can, if we put our minds on it, maintain readiness to test. AEC and DOD scientists tend to say that it is impossible to maintain the morale of scientists and the pace of scientific advance unless the men in the laboratories know that they can test their hypotheses. However, the reasons cited for this are not very persuasive. It would seem to me (and I think that Bill Foster agrees) that this is one of those cases where what is convenient and what is necessary are confused; i.e., that it would clearly be nice if all devices could be tested in the open air; but the essential work can still probably be done without such tests. I have raised this subject with Ros Gilpatric, who has now ordered a DOD analysis of the issues involved./2/
/2/See Document 118.
I do not believe that the real problem has yet been posed: that is, how to maintain morale and advance in the laboratories without assurance of atmospheric testing. If some one were given an order to do this, I am sure it could be done. If a disgruntled set of scientists went out of the laboratories, for example, another set would respond to the very possibility of avoiding atmospheric tests. Moreover, the present proposal would not exclude testing underground or in outer space, nor would it exclude bringing testing atmospheric tests to the very brink of fulfillment. And it commits us to resumption as soon as the USSR resumes; so that those who argue that the USSR will resume in any case should not (if they believe their own argument) suffer any loss of morale at all. I see no reason why this could not be a time of vigorous technical advance in our weaponry.
8. There is also the argument that non-resumption would show us to be weak and would strengthen the Soviet claim to be the greatest power in the world. But it can be argued with equal plausibility that it is resumption which would produce this effect because it would suggest that we have to go into the atmosphere in order to make up for our deficiencies. We are, indeed, in a logical dilemma as a result of repeated statements that we are "ahead." If we are "ahead," why test in the atmosphere? If we do test in the atmosphere, does this not constitute a confession that we are "behind"?
The arguments in terms of political effect tend to cancel each other out, though I agree that any nation indisputably ahead in the nuclear field would have a major psychological advantage. But since an indisputable lead is hardly possible for any nation, it would seem better to stick to your assurance that "no nuclear test in the atmosphere will be undertaken, as the Soviet Union has done, for so-called psychological or political reasons."
9. On the other side, conditional non-resumption would not necessarily make the essential balance of military power more insecure than it would be if we resumed atmospheric tests; for the relative gains we would make by resumption would probably be cancelled out by the next Soviet cycle which our resumption would provoke and legitimatize. In other words, we would presumably prefer to have our nuclear superiority (or the nuclear standoff, whatever the situation is) at the lower rather than higher stages of the nuclear apocalypse; and presumably the cessation of atmospheric testing, as compared with what would be the case if both sides pressed on in the atmosphere, would--at least by precluding the development of a reliable AICBM system--tend to maintain more stability as well as to halt the slide into chaos.
Everyone agrees, in short, that the serious danger to the US comes, not from the past series of tests, but from the next series. Everyone seems to agree that we would be ready to settle for things as they are now, if we had absolute assurance that the USSR would not start a new sequence in the atmosphere. The problem, in other words, is to deter the USSR from atmospheric resumption--and the threat of a series of our own, ready to go, is probably the best possible deterrent.
10. More than that, with Khrushchev discredited by Hungary, testing and a thousand other things, with Nehru discredited by Goa, with the UN discredited by Goa and the Congo, the US has an unmatched opportunity to recover the moral and political leadership of the world. I know that it is currently fashionable to say that "moral leadership" could not matter less. But history refutes this contention. For years, we rested our policy in Latin America on the employment of force--and our position, by all power criteria, grew steadily worse. Then FDR renounced the use of force, established the Good Neighbor policy--and our power position in Latin America was transformed. Wilson and Roosevelt enjoyed an influence on world events out of all proportion to the military power at their disposal simply because they regarded "world opinion" as a basic constituent of power. Even Soviet policy is not based on a rejection of "world opinion"; it is based rather on the belief that world opinion can be more successfully manipulated by terror than by ideals--an option not open to us unless we change the whole character of our society.
The good opinion purchased by the refusal to resume atmospheric testing would not be in itself a great accretion to our power. But it would enable us to move swiftly ahead in a number of areas which can mean a genuine strengthening of our world position. We should not consider this as an act in isolation but as a prelude to a number of planned actions and demands which would enable us to cash in on our self-restraint.
Nor is it necessarily so that a conditional refusal to resume atmospheric testing would be unpopular in the United States. The most recent Gallup Poll shows the general public evenly divided on the question of whether, in the light of Soviet testing, the US should go into the atmosphere (yes 44%, no 45%). This showed a decided swing of opinion against atmospheric resumption; 4 months earlier 55% favored resumption and only 26% opposed.
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
114. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, December 30, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 12/21/61-1/8/62. Secret. A handwritten note reads: "President saw." In a covering note to Clifton, not found attached, Bundy stated that this memorandum and Schlesinger's memorandum (Document 113) needed to be "called to the President's attention for careful consideration." The President had "several times indicated to me his desire to have the other side of the atmospheric case sharply stated," as Schlesinger's memorandum did. "Since it will be very important, if the President should ever take this course, not to have the author of this memo blamed for it, I am emphasizing the quality of the argument and not the name of the creator." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 12/12/61-1/8/62)
SUBJECT
Atmospheric Testing
Attached is a really powerful paper/2/ arguing for a last effort to avoid atmospheric testing, by announcement that we will not test in the air unless and until the Soviets do it again. This is the best statement of the case I have seen, and it satisfies a feeling I have had for some time that you have a right to hear a better argument against testing now than you have yet heard from advisers nearly all of whom personally favor testing.
/2/Reference is to Document 113, not found attached.
I believe that if you personally care enough, and want to make the argument strongly enough, you can carry a decision against atmospheric testing with the Congress and the country. I also believe it is safe. The missile/anti-missile balance is the only serious area of possible danger, and we can be confident that Soviets are not decisively ahead here on what they have done so far. I know no one who believes they can deploy an effective AICBM system without further tests and long lead time of construction. If I myself, on balance, prefer to test, it is because I think the net military advantage is real, and the political balance a very even one. But this case for the other view deserves your close attention. Especially you should weigh the consequences of unlimited testing on both sides, through time.
An alternative to the course in the memo would be to keep our April 1 deadline and simply renew--perhaps first privately and earnestly--the Kennedy-Macmillan offer of September, with a sixty-day time limit. This would put quite a lot of heat on Khrushchev, and if he is prepared to come along at all, it would offer him the carrot of preventing some tests of ours which otherwise will surely happen.
The Soviet answer to either of these proposals will probably be, at first anyway, to demand also a moratorium on underground tests. We cannot accept such a moratorium, as I think nearly everyone agrees. We need underground tests to maintain the readiness and morale of our nuclear laboratories and to avoid falling behind decisively in the case of new Soviet secret preparations and massive tests. But I now believe that underground testing would be enough to keep our labs alive, and I think this point was seriously neglected in our Bermuda talks.
If you like either of these proposals enough to want to go further with them, I believe we should schedule a prompt small meeting for extended discussion. I would limit such a meeting to yourself, Vice President, Rusk, McNamara, McCone, Seaborg, Brown, and me. I regret to say that every one of these men, except yourself, favors atmospheric testing. But a decision to go the other way, if you take it, should be yours alone--not yours with support from politically vulnerable disbelievers like Wiesner, Sorensen, and the author of the attached memo. I believe that every one of these men, except perhaps John McCone, will do his best to support and defend whatever decision you do take--and even John would try--though he's deeply committed the other way.
McG. B.
115. Editorial Note
In his memorandum for the record of the White House daily staff meeting on January 2, 1962, Colonel Legere reported that Arthur Schlesinger complained "that the Disarmament Advisory Committee, which consists of 15 individuals, includes only one person who could be fairly described as a liberal: Ralph McGill of the Atlanta Constitution. Mr. McGill has had no exposure to disarmament matters, and, besides, Mr. Schlesinger felt that a group as big as 15 could well have included 2 or 3 persons of liberal persuasion. Mr. Bundy shut this off rather firmly when he said that the President himself had approved the list and felt that it was important to have the Administration's disarmament policy supported by the Republicans, who in general were not as likely to be quite as liberal as some might like. Anyhow, almost everyone agreed that the immediate future of disarmament activity would be largely in the nature of a propaganda exercise, although Carl Kaysen entered a moderate dissent to this view by saying that we must always stand willing to negotiate substance if the Soviets appear forthcoming." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings Jan-Apr 62)
116. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, January 4, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 12/21/61-1/8/62. Secret. A notation in Bundy's handwriting reads: "Put in folder of things to talk to Pres. about."
SUBJECT
Resumption of Atmospheric Testing
The Foster group met today./2/ Most of the talk was in terms of a Presidential announcement of the resumption of atmospheric testing early in February./3/ (At my behest, however, and in order to hold the balance even, a paper has been prepared entitled "Program to Explain U.S. Decision to Refrain from Testing in the Atmosphere"!)/4/
/2/A memorandum by Goodby of this meeting of the Subcommittee of the NSC Committee on Atmospheric Testing, chaired by Foster and established by NSAM No. 116 (Document 105), is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/1-462)
/3/On January 5, Foster submitted the Subcommittee's report to the President. It recommended that the United States, in announcing a test resumption, avoid a defensive or apologetic attitude and demonstrate forcefully that U.S. national security required atmospheric testing. The Subcommittee suggested Presidential announcement of a decision in mid-February, with atmospheric tests to begin in Nevada at the end of February and in the Pacific 2-3 weeks later. The series would conclude by the end of June. Text of Foster's letter and a summary of the report are in Seaborg, Journal, vol. 3, pp. 22-26.
/4/Not found.
1. If this is the way the decision is going to go, I would like to make the following proposal: that the President announce early in February (a) that we have no choice but to begin atmospheric testing on April 1, (b) that spectacular test preparations are under way, but (c) that we will cancel these tests on one condition--that the Soviet Union sign the test ban treaty submitted at Geneva.
2. This proposal has some obvious advantages:
a) it puts testing in the context of disarmament and makes clear which we prefer;
b) it puts the USSR in the position of triggering our test series and may therefore do something in the weeks before actual resumption to transfer popular indignation from the USA to the USSR. Pressure will be applied to the Communists to sign the treaty as well as on us to suspend the tests.
3. I see no disadvantage in our making this proposal if we still want the Geneva treaty. This suggests the need for a thorough reappraisal of the Geneva treaty in the light of recent developments.
4. The USSR could respond by accepting the Geneva treaty. Or it could respond by denouncing the whole proposal (most likely). Or it could respond by throwing the Kennedy-Macmillan offer of last September back on us--that is, by proposing a moratorium on atmospheric testing.
5. What should we do then? My view is that we should reject a moratorium on the ground that experience has defined a moratorium as a space of time in which the Soviet Union prepares for its next series of tests.
But what if the USSR proposes a treaty banning atmospheric tests? Because it would be harder for the USSR to violate a treaty than to end a moratorium, I think that a treaty might well be considered in a different category. Query: would such a treaty be disadvantageous to us? Since our underground testing capability is greater than the Soviet Union's, we would surely stand to gain by an arrangement which allowed underground testing but banned atmospheric testing.
6. Anyway what is wrong with saying that, if the USSR will sign the treaty, we will stop the tests?
A.S.jr
117. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, January 8, 1962.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings Jan-Apr 62. Secret. Drafted by Ewell. The records of White House staff meetings were routinely circulated to Taylor and members of his staff.
SUBJECT
Daily Staff Meeting, January 8, 1962
[Here follows discussion of Berlin, Latin America, public relations, security, the Military Assistance Program, and the forthcoming State of the Union speech.]
h. There was a rather fuzzy, involved discussion of atmospheric testing. Evidently Bundy and Schlesinger have written memorandums to the President/2/ which promote maintenance of a laboratory state of readiness to resume atmospheric testing by utilizing underground tests to accomplish certain fundamental testing objectives. Mr. Bundy plans to talk "quietly" to Seaborg and Wiesner about the feasibility of this approach. State has submitted a paper outlining a suitable statement in the event that we do resume atmospheric testing./3/ AEC has submitted an underground testing program which includes 23 or more shots./4/ Kaysen suggested that Wiesner convene a panel to re-study the problem. Bundy takes a dim view of these panels because they usually come out in favor of testing. Kaysen said if we decide to go to underground testing completely, perhaps we should use this decision to sandbag the British into giving us Christmas Island for atmospheric testing if necessary, and should also use the decision to entice the Russians to renounce atmospheric tests. Bundy said that he was impressed with this line of reasoning also. He felt that we also ought to keep in mind the necessity for avoiding a nuclear testing arms race. According to Bundy, most people think that we can live with the present situation, i.e., that the Russians haven't gained too much in the recent test series. As a result, the basic policy question is--can you deter the Russians from testing? Bundy quoted Kaysen as stating that the need for ballistic missile defense related to atmospheric tests was not really very great because such tests would only show how much harder it is to defend against missiles by the Zeus approach. He originally thought there is no point in making a test to increase your difficulties. The only useful type of test is one that makes things easier for you. Kaysen, to his credit, said that this wasn't entirely true, whereas such tests would tend to undermine the Zeus approach itself. It is also possible that some aspect of the test would lead us to a different approach to missile defense. My own reaction to this confused discussion is that the non-atmospheric testing boys have discovered another rationalization to postpone atmospheric tests, i.e., the "laboratory state of readiness" slogan.
/2/Documents 113 and 114.
/3/Not found.
/4/Document 102.
JJE
118. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Washington, January 12, 1962.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Atomic 400.112 12 Jan 62. Secret.
SUBJECT
Atmospheric test ban
Mr. Gilpatric asked Dr. Johnson and me to look into the question of an atmospheric-only test ban. He asked Dr. Johnson to study the question of how ready-to-test we could keep ourselves. He asked me to put that question in its broader context--i.e., with other factors which bear on a decision whether or not to resume atmospheric testing. Dr. Johnson ultimately joined forces with Dr. Seaborg, Dr. Wiesner and General Starbird to produce a report on his question for Mr. McGeorge Bundy on January 10 (you have a copy)/2/ His results are summarized in my paragraphs 3(a)(iii), 3(b) and 3(c) below. This memorandum represents my results (I have deliberately oversimplified the issues, hopefully without distorting them in any relevant way).
1. Why NOT test in the atmosphere? The primary reasons for stopping atmospheric testing are (a) to dampen the arms race (especially by preventing the development of a reliable Soviet disarming or AICBM capability) and (b) to make a net propaganda-prestige gain. (c) The avoidance of harmful fallout, except as it bears on the propaganda battle, is not as important as the other reasons (see draft report of Federal Radiation Council)./2/
/2/Not found.
2. Must the U.S. test in the atmosphere even if the Soviets do not? We probably do need to test if we wish to maintain, as long as possible, nuclear superiority. ("Superiority" will probably still have some meaning--in fighting war, and in deterring Soviet lower-level adventures by fanning fear of a possible U.S. first nuclear strike--when our 1962 test results reach stockpile.) But we probably do not need to test in the atmosphere if we intend to permit things to evolve into a nuclear standoff and to handle lower-level Soviet threats by conventional (or other non-nuclear) means.
(a) Deterrence.
(i) Against a Soviet first nuclear strike. The Soviets are, even after the 1961 series, quite unlikely to build weapons and defense systems sufficient to permit them to carry out an effective first, disarming strike on us without expecting to receive unacceptable retaliation. It is conceivable since the 1961 Soviet series may have produced "surprises," but it is unlikely. Whether they would be likely to create such capabilities after their next series of tests is another question. (For dissent, see JCSM-880-61.)/3/
/3/Not further identified.
(ii) Against lesser Soviet adventures. The Soviets are now capable of building weapons and defense systems sufficient to convince them (and us) that they can, despite our best disarming and defensive efforts, deliver on us an unacceptable retaliatory blow. A decision by the U.S. not to test in the atmosphere will, by giving up the 18 months mentioned in paragraph 3(a)(ii) below, probably accelerate the demise of the credible U.S. first-nuclear-strike threat.
(b) If deterrence fails. Since a major purpose of the atmospheric ban is to prevent development of reliable AICBM capability (i.e., to keep each side in a "hostage" condition), it follows that the ban could contribute greatly to the losses in the event of a war. This effect will be offset to the extent that the ban succeeds in dampening the arms race and therefore reducing the destructiveness of the war.
3. What PRICES do we pay for an atmospheric ban?
(a) Time lost in the technology race.
(i) The first "time price" is not properly chargeable to the decision not to resume atmospheric testing because it has already been paid and cannot be retrieved. It is the 7-months' jump the Soviets got on us when they surprised us with their 1961 series. (The time periods mentioned in this and ensuing paragraphs are meaningful, but figurative. Here, for example, it is clear that, with respect to tests of AICBM systems, the Soviets got perhaps an 18-month jump on us. We will not be ready for such tests in the 1962 series.)
(ii) The second "time price" must be paid only if there is a moratorium but whether or not the moratorium sticks. It is the equivalent of 18 months in the technology race. This is the time difference between April 1962, when we will be ready to go, and the fall of 1963, when the Soviets probably will be ready with an equally mature series.
(iii) The third "time price" will have to be paid only if the Soviets break the ban in a surprise move. This price can be said to be the equivalent of 2 or 3 months in the technology race. This figure is based on the judgment that the highest state of readiness that we can maintain over time would put our "canned" series roughly 2 or 3 months behind the Soviet surprise series.
(b) Quality. The quality of U.S. tests will be lower, if "canned," than they would be if testing were going on regularly. This is because of the effect of the ban on morale. The best people will work on what can be done rather than on what cannot be done. The quality differential will increase as time passes.
(c) Money. After the initial capital investment (which might be $15 to $28 million, depending on whether the development of Christmas Island should be included), the cost per year of remaining on quick-reaction testing alert would be between $1 and $1.5 million a year. No estimate has been made of the net dollar effect on the military budget of a decision not to test in the atmosphere (no atmospheric testing but vigorous underground testing, different weapons systems, etc.). The effect would probably be a money saving--perhaps a substantial one.
4. Will the Soviets accept a proposal to ban only atmospheric tests? Probably not--at least not in good faith. Their military interests, as contrasted with ours, probably make them more reliant than we on atmospheric testing. It is unlikely that they would agree to a deal in which we could continue underground testing.
(a) If the Soviets refuse a U.S. offer of an atmospheric ban, it would probably produce a net propaganda gain for the U.S.
(b) If the Soviets "accept" the ban for two or three years and then find a pretext to break it, we will have been "taken" for 20 months or so in the vital technology race. The risk of losing these 20 months of time and the incalculable increment of test quality is the big risk facing the President!
5. What TACTICS should the President employ if he decides he wants the atmospheric ban?
(a) WHO should propose it? The ban should be proposed by the U.S. This gives the U.S. more control over its timing and form, and it gives us the major propaganda value. However, if the Soviets proposed it, it might be more likely to "stick."
(b) What FORM should the ban take? The ban should be in the form of a treaty. This makes it somewhat harder to break (which, by the way, may work to our disadvantage if we want to break it). It may also provide a better vehicle for obtaining the participation of France, China, etc.
(c) What should be the TIMING? The President should make the offer not long before the date when the tests are scheduled to begin. Optimum timing would be a month before D-Day or, on the present schedule, by March 1. This permits preparations to go on. But it heads off the great movement of planes to the Pacific; it avoids a big item of psychological damage to our testing people; it allows time for negotiations; and it does not appear to be an ultimatum.
(d) How can we structure pressures to make the ban STICK? Here are some factors (in addition to the disopprobrium which would follow from the breaking of a treaty) which could be employed to help make the ban "stick":
(i) U.S. readiness to launch a major series in the atmosphere (although this readiness, which would surely be reciprocated, makes it physically easy to break the ban and therefore makes the ban fragile). U.S. can, for an indefinite period, maintain readiness on a 3-months' basis with the quality of the "canned" series being degraded somewhat by the passage of time.
(ii) Maintenance of U.S. military position (A) strong and invulnerable enough so that the Soviets will not believe that with testing they can achieve a first-strike capability, but (B) not so strong that they will believe that we with testing can achieve a first-strike capability. (Our present near-to-disarming capability, for example, probably put pressure on the Soviets to conduct the 1961 series; this problem cannot be avoided as long as we rely on a first-nuclear-strike threat, instead of lower level capability, to deter Soviet non-nuclear adventures.)
(iii) UN resolution supporting the ban.
(iv) Military sanctions.
(v) Economic sanctions, possibly including forfeitures.
(vi) Vigorous information program designed to emphasize factors favoring continuation of the ban.
6. Would the ban be better LATER? If the proposal to initiate an atmospheric ban does not now appear attractive, the proposal may nevertheless be attractive (a) after the U.S. has completed its mid-1962 series, or (b) after both the Soviets and the U.S. have completed their next series after that. That is, the proper thing for the U.S. to do may be to conduct its mid-1962 series and then, when that series has been completed, to offer an option to the Soviets: (a) An atmospheric ban dating from that moment, or (b) one dating from the conclusion of the follow-on series by both nations, perhaps with the dates of the follow-on series to be set by the two sides so that they coincide. This would not pick up the 7 months we lost when the Soviets jumped the gun in 1961, but it would avoid further time losses.
7. How does the atmospheric ban compare, in attractiveness, with the US-UK all-environments treaty? It is important to note that both permit us to be taken by surprise, and therefore we should object to both unless the partial "opening" of the USSR involved in the US-UK treaty is worth the risk. In more detail:
(a) The atmospheric-only ban is as good in one respect (in both cases atmospheric tests are "self inspectable").
(b) It is as bad in one respect (it allows us to be taken by surprise).
(c) It is not good in one respect (it involves no "opening" of the Soviet Union).
(d) It is not as bad in one respect (it does not allow the Soviets to perform, clandestinely, tests which we deny ourselves).
(See McNaughton-Rostow letter of 3 January 1962 on this subject.)/4/
/4/A copy is in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, Atomic Energy-Armaments 1962. For text, see the Supplement.
8. Conclusions.
(a) Advantages and disadvantages.
(i) It probably would be to our advantage (but not necessarily, though probably, to the Soviets' disadvantage) if atmospheric tests could be stopped permanently now.
(ii) It would probably be to our advantage (and probably to the Soviets' disadvantage) if we make the offer and they refused it.
(iii) It would probably be to our disadvantage (and to the Soviets' advantage) if we made the offer and they "accepted" it, but the ban lasted only (say) six months to four years--long enough to cause us to sacrifice much or all of our present readiness-to-test advantage but not long enough to be worth, in terms of dampened arms race, that sacrifice.
(b) Structuring the deal. If there is to be an atmospheric ban, it must be structured to stick. It must be created and nursed along with that thought in mind.
John T. McNaughton
119. Letter From President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan/1/
Washington, January 13, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy-Macmillan 1960-1962. Top Secret. Attached to a note from Bundy to Rusk, stating that Kennedy wanted Rusk to deliver it to Ormsby Gore. A draft by Foster, dated January 11, is ibid.
Dear Mr. Prime Minister: We are giving the most urgent consideration to your letter of January 5 /2/ and to the additional comments made on it by David Ormsby Gore. I find myself in deep agreement with nearly all of what you say about the dangers of the arms race and the boldness of action required from those of us who bear primary responsibility in these matters. We must do all that we can to turn the nuclear spiral downward, and to save mankind from the increasing threat of events of surpassing horror.
/2/In his letter, Macmillan stated that his Cabinet had agreed to make available to the United States "the facilities at Christmas Island which you require," subject to an agreement on "scientific and technical collaboration," and provided there was "full consultation before a decision to start tests from Christmas Island is actually made." The Prime Minister also stated that he would want to link an announcement on the availability of Christmas Island for U.S. testing to a major new disarmament effort to be implemented through the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. (Ibid., Macmillan-Kennedy 1962-1963) For text, see the Supplement. The letter is also printed in Harold Macmillan, At the End of the day, 1961-1963, pp. 154-163.
Whatever may be your final decision about Christmas Island, or mine about American atmospheric testing, I can assure you that we are ready to examine with you the possibilities for new efforts toward disarmament, on the most urgent basis. We are eager to work out together an initiative which might, if successful, mark a significant step forward and which would demonstrate, at a minimum, that we are continuing to press in every possible way to bring the arms race to an end. Dean Rusk is seeing David Ormsby Gore in order to determine how best to proceed. We have questions about some of the tactical aspects of your proposals. But we have no differences at all on the importance and urgency of the effort for progress.
Meanwhile, the preparations for testing must, as we agreed, go forward, and so we are forced to make a definite decision on the matter of Christmas Island. I am very glad to learn that you and your colleagues have agreed to make Christmas Island available, subject to the conclusion of agreements on scientific and technical collaboration, and on financial and administrative matters. I am glad also that, in your judgment, the program of tests proposed for Christmas Island does fall within the criteria of justifiable tests.
May I take it that our agreement on this last point is now definite?
Your letter does not make it altogether clear to me how far the Cabinet's decision to make Christmas Island available is conditional upon agreement on the shape of a new initiative toward disarmament. I would hope very much that the Cabinet would not intend a coupling of this sort. It will take us some time to work out the details of the next steps on disarmament; on Christmas Island, for the reasons we considered in Bermuda, there really must be a definite decision within the next few days. Moreover, while of course we must consult closely at every stage, I am sure from our previous talks that you understand the requirement on me, as President, to retain freedom to prepare to test, and freedom to test, on the basis of the whole situation and the best judgment available at the time. I know we are in agreement on the urgency of disarmament, and I am most eager to find ways of making effective progress, but it would be hard to accept specific conditions, in this range of effort, that might prevent me from meeting my responsibilities for military security. In particular it would seem wrong, at this stage, to make any definite link between the timing of tests and the progress of new efforts toward disarmament. As I said at Bermuda, it is important not to expose ourselves to Soviet maneuvers designed not for progress but simply to tie our hands on testing.
Thus what I hope is that we can agree now to go ahead with Christmas Island and go ahead with a real new effort toward disarmament, but avoid any tie-up between the two that might now or later lead to misunderstanding. We would rather make our preparations without Christmas than run any risk of putting that sort of strain on our old and vital friendship.
Sincerely,
John F. Kennedy/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
120. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, January 15, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 1/13-15/62. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty
This paper examines the merits of a U.S. initiative in proposing a treaty to the USSR and others banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, as the immediate step in our "supreme effort to break the log jam on disarmament and nuclear tests" promised in the State of the Union message./2/
/2/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 5-15.
1. If we propose the treaty, and the Soviets reject it, we will be in a better public position when we begin our proposed Spring test series. This alone is not a sufficient reason for proposing it; although it is much more likely than not that the Soviets will refuse our offer.
2. If the Soviets do sign such a treaty, we will have achieved a politically significant pause in the arms race. In the first instance we can expect the UK to join us, and France and Communist China not to. While nuclear tests are not the most critical element in our strategic posture, they are the most highly visible and emotionally charged aspect of the arms race. Thus, the value of any first step involving them cannot be judged merely by its technical military significance, but must take into account its symbolic value. The pause might naturally last three or four years; after which increasing attention to development of kinds of new weapons not dependent on atmospheric testing and problems posed by nations outside the treaty--France and Communist China--will erode the usefulness of the treaty as an arms control device. The prospect that it can be extended to cover these nations is poor. Nonetheless, a pause of several years' duration is of high importance: a first step is necessary, and this might be an achievable one. The period of the pause would create both the opportunity and the incentive to take a second step. For these reasons the proposed treaty should run for a definite term, say, four years, with provision for review. Review could take into account whether other countries with nuclear capability have acceded to the treaty, and the achievement of other further steps in arms control.
The present moment offers what is almost certainly the last opportunity to achieve such a pause in this Presidential term. Our Spring tests in the atmosphere will certainly provoke Soviet response. Further, they clearly will not, in themselves, provide satisfactory answers to many of the most interesting questions to which they are directed, and thus must be viewed not as a self-contained series of tests but as the first step in what will be a continuing and expanding program of testing in the atmosphere, especially taking into account Soviet responses. The next opportunity for a pause will not arise till we and the Soviets have each completed at least two test series, a period of three or four years.
3. Are there any military risks in signing such a treaty? This depends on our assumptions about Soviet behavior during and after the term of the treaty, and the goals of our own military policy. It is clear that we can continue to keep a secure deterrent, capable of surviving the largest Soviet strike that is possible in this period, and thereafter inflicting such damage on the Soviets that they would not knowingly initiate general nuclear war as a rational policy choice. It will also be possible to maintain some war-fighting capability beyond this; to what extent cannot be so simply stated and will be discussed in (6) below. In (4) the chief points bearing on the security of our deterrent are examined.
4. Our confidence in the deterrent power of our strategic striking force rests on our estimate of its capacity to achieve what we confidently consider an unacceptable level of damage to Soviet society, in the most unfavorable circumstances which we should take into account in our planning. Now, and for at least the next five years, our present and proposed deployments of aircraft and missiles promise to achieve the required capability, unless the Soviets (1) deploy a much larger missile force than our present intelligence estimates lead us to expect and (2) are capable of a coordinated attack on a large number of targets simultaneously, with no strategic warning and less than 15 minutes tactical warning, and (3) achieve and deploy an AICBM capability far superior to any we now foresee. It is only the conjunction of these three capabilities which would permit the Soviet Union to feel secure from retaliation by the alert-bomber force, which can be launched on 15 minutes warning, the Minuteman force, and submarine-launched Polaris missiles. The argument is further strengthened if account is taken of our bombers on airborne alert, naval strike forces and tactical forces in Europe.
The growth of the Soviet missile force is not directly related to the presence or absence of an atmospheric test ban; neither is its capacity to achieve a highly-compressed, zero-warning attack. (To be sure, there may be an interaction between Soviet force goals and Soviet technical plans, such that their acceptance of an atmospheric test-ban treaty might lead them to revise their missile deployment program, but this possibility does not affect the argument.) The possibility of achieving an effective and reliable AICBM capability based on present concepts is associated with testing in the atmosphere, and it is this which must be examined first. In the worst case, let us assume that the Soviets sign the treaty, and prepare for atmospheric testing, so that they can begin a large series of tests at the end of two or three years--having indeed signed the treaty with this end in view. We on our side will be in the state of maintaining such readiness for atmospheric testing as we can in circumstances in which it is not clear that we will ever conduct such tests again. In these circumstances we can maintain some reserve capacity, consisting of test facilities and support facilities on Christmas Island, and a specially outfitted group of test ships, and such scientific readiness as can result from the existence of laboratories and development teams engaged in underground and possibly space testing. The support facilities would involve costs on the order of an initial $30 million in capital investment and then $15 million per year of operating costs.
By the end of the period the attention of the best people in the laboratories would certainly have turned away from questions which can be answered only by atmospheric testing. To the extent that there were problems of this category which were not at all related to the questions involved in underground testing, some desirable people would have drifted away from the laboratories. On the other hand, the problems we are proposing to examine in the Spring series of tests can be further studied, and instrumentation for these problems can be brought to a higher state of development. All this can, so to speak, be put on the shelf as a reserve against the resumption of testing in the atmosphere. The extent to which still further theoretical work on problems and instrumentation could be maintained is not clear. Presumably the best people would find it less interesting than working on ongoing underground testing. On the other hand, the underground tests and laboratory work would continue to suggest new questions to be answered by atmospheric tests.
We would be prepared to perform atmospheric tests on some 60 to 90 days' notice. This notice might be provided by Russian testing or, in a less likely case, by some other event which we would interpret as a violation of the treaty. The first series of tests we would be prepared to perform would be directed in part toward warming up interest in the problems, and recruiting personnel, but it would also produce immediately useful knowledge. This series would probably be more fruitful than the presently proposed Spring series both because there had been more time for thought on the problems and preparation of instrumentation and because the continuing underground testing and laboratory work would provide more ideas to be tested. However, it is equally clear that these first tests would not operate at maximum efficiency and it might take as much as a year after atmospheric testing was resumed to achieve a really good posture by the process of rebuilding interest and recruiting additional personnel not then engaged in underground testing and associated weapons development.
How significant is this gap? Assuming that both sides have used the interval to do whatever can be done without nuclear testing in the atmosphere in developing guidance systems, radars, and missiles, as well as in exploring quite different concepts of AICBM systems and that neither has made any significant breakthrough in this way (which is what we expect, and the only situation relevant to our discussion) the gap is not militarily threatening. The most likely results of the atmospheric testing efforts will be to reveal further the weaknesses of AICBM systems. But if this is not the case, the time from a test revealing significant new information about AICBM to the achievement of a large-scale deployment of weapons will be of the order of five years. Many of the steps in this sequence will be such as to give us notice, from the first nuclear tests themselves to the systems-testing of weapons and the initial phases of deployment. In this period we would have sufficient time to ready our own responses to the new developments. What these responses might be would, of course, depend in part on what we learned about Soviet developments and from our own resumed tests. In the interim, however, we could continue to explore the possibilities of weapons which would not be vulnerable to AICBM's, such as low-trajectory aerodynamic re-entry vehicles for Minuteman and Polaris, and the proposed SLAM supersonic, low-level ramjet, and similar devices. Further, and with more certainly predictable success, we can now intensify our programs to modify existing missiles to make them less vulnerable to AICBM systems of the general Nike-Zeus type. This can be done on the basis of our present knowledge and of new knowledge from underground testing and laboratory experiments, and does not depend on atmospheric tests. Finally, if we become aware of what appear to be substantial deployments of Soviet AICBM's, we can build up our own missile force at a faster rate. The economic exchange ratio in such a case would favor us by a wide margin; it would be quicker and cheaper for us to add to our offensive strength than for them to add to their defensive strength. The same point can be made in relation to an increased build-up of Soviet missile forces over that which we now anticipate. In the first case it might be mainly further hardened Minutemen and advanced Titans that we would deploy; in the second, mainly further Polaris submarines. The essential point in this argument is that significant changes in Soviet weaponry and deployment take time, reveal themselves to us in the course of their occurrence, and allow us time to react: the margin of deterrence cannot disappear in six months or a year, much less overnight.
The discussion above started from the assumption that the Soviets do what is most damaging to our capacity to learn from atmospheric testing, namely, wait essentially the whole of the two or three years and then test. A shorter life for the treaty would not change the argument significantly. A much shorter life would probably result in a smaller degradation in the capacity of our weapons establishment to produce significant tests in the first new series.
5. This discussion has not attempted to explore what the next step in arms control might be. The proposed treaty would give us the space to explore this step, and it would be quite important to begin preparations for that exploration now. As a first step, an atmospheric test-ban has the advantages and disadvantages of being chiefly political. It avoids the difficult problems of inspection and control. A natural next step might be the present Geneva test-ban treaty or some revised version of it. However, it is possible that the very justification put forward for accepting the proposed ban on atmospheric testing would argue against an extension of the ban to other environments. It might be that a more acceptable next step should be a much bigger effort, going either in the direction of an attempt to limit development of new nuclear weapons altogether or tackling the problem of limiting fissionable-material production, or controlling inventories of delivery vehicles. The difficulty of predicting the next step is no reason to refuse to take the first one now, unless we never intend to take it, since we will always face this difficulty.
6. The extension of the foregoing argument to the problem of assuring that under an atmospheric test-ban treaty we can maintain that something extra, more than survivable deterrence, which our currently planned strategic force is supposed to provide presents no new issues of principle, but it does raise a difficult quantitative problem. The purpose of maintaining such a margin in the event of nuclear war is to be able to prevent Soviet follow-on attacks after a first strike, and still maintain a reserve capacity for deterring yet further attacks. The highest figure that could be set for this margin is an ability to strike all identifiable targets in the relevant category. However, neither the proportion which is ideally desirable nor a rationale that would determine it has as yet been defined.
Our previous arguments apply; the possible Soviet developments in AICBM which could diminish the capacity of our force to strike at the Soviets could be countered in the same ways. What is not clear is what would be the magnitude of fluctuations in the extra margin above deterrence which we might have to accept, since the exact times of Soviet developments and subsequent deployments, and of our reactions thereto, are unpredictable. We must recognize that the extra margin might fluctuate somewhat in the period in question under the proposed treaty. However, the same thing can be said in its absence. It is in the nature of this margin that it is never known to even a fair degree of precision at any time. One way to define it is by the proportion of the total of Soviet offensive targets--missile sites, long-range bomber fields, and the like--we can attack after absorbing a first strike and still maintain a defined reserve capacity to attack cities or other targets. Our estimate of this magnitude depends, of course, on our knowledge of the Soviet striking force. It seems that inevitably this knowledge is subject to a substantial margin of uncertainty, and further, that there are elements of the force, such as missile-firing submarines or air-alert aircraft which it is difficult for us to account for and impossible for us to target. Even the maximum possible figures could be maintained over time by a sufficient increase in our own forces, although of course the scale and expense of so doing might rapidly climb to astronomical heights. But it is clear that it cannot be asserted that this margin can be maintained at its maximum level continuously, whether or not there is a test-ban treaty. What can be asserted is that, under the adverse circumstances discussed above--namely, a treaty which expired after four years with no further arms control measures--the period of our uncertainty as to how near the maximum margin we were might be greater. Whether we should tolerate this additional uncertainty depends on the relative value we place on the political benefits of an atmospheric test-ban treaty on the one hand, including its effect on international tensions, and the unknown possible loss of counterforce capability in the light of whatever chance there may be that we in fact may be forced to general nuclear war during this period on the other.
7. A "full first strike" counterforce capacity can never be any more than our ability to hit all the offensive targets we know. In what sense this is "full" is open to debate since we never know just how ignorant we are. It is clear that the argument in paragraph (6) above applies to this case.
8. On the other hand, there are advantages to us if the Russians sign and abide by such a treaty. Indeed, it is precisely because of these advantages that the Soviets might not sign. The U.S. is far ahead of the Soviet Union in the capacity to test underground. The Russians have had little experience here, and it would be both costly and time-consuming for them to develop suitable facilities. This might well slow down their testing progress for the equivalent of a year in relation to our own efforts. This is no more or no less significant on their side than a corresponding lag would be on ours.
9. In sum, on the one side are the opportunities to move on arms control in a striking and dramatic fashion. The probability of success is not high, but the value of success would be substantial. On the other, the military effects of a signed treaty are such as appear risky only in terms of the proposition that anything short of the maximum effort of which we are capable in building up our strategic forces, is dangerous. This view makes any step toward arms control or disarmament impossible; and, logically, it would require that we do much more than we are now doing. The great difficulty that has attended past discussions of arms control measures within our own government arises from the desire to secure assurance of an exact balance between the impact of the proposed measures on ourselves and our opponents. The whole thrust of the preceding argument has been that this is an unnecessary goal. In the framework of a strategy of deterrence, quite large fluctuations in specific elements of relative strength need not alter the fundamental military equilibrium. Even in the framework of a strategy of deterrence plus controlled counterforce, moderate fluctuations in effective strength are tolerable unless we in effect assume that general nuclear war is both inevitable and imminent. If we consider general war an unlikely event and, further, think that its probability is affected by the level of international tension, on which arms control measures, among others, may have an effect, we need not seek an unattainable precision of balance in the effect of any arms control measure.
C.K.
121. Editorial Note
[Summary of the Report of the Foreign Weapons Evaluation Group (chaired by Hans Bethe), January 16, 1962 (3 paragraphs of source text), not declassified. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/AE Files: FRC 69 A 2243, 58 AWT USST Tests (1961-1965)) The Report is in the Supplement.]
122. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/
Washington, January 18, 1962, 1:27 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/1-1862. Top Secret; Niact; Verbatim Text.
1875. Eyes only Stevenson. There follows text of letter from Macmillan to the President.
January 16, 1962
"Dear Mr. President: Thank you for your message of January 14/2/ about nuclear tests. I am very glad to feel that we are in such close agreement about the need for some new initiative to break the deadlock on disarmament and to try to stop the nuclear arms race. I shall be very interested to hear what you propose about this.
/2/The President's January 13 letter (Document 119) was delivered on January 14.
"I quite understand your wish to start soon the preparations necessary at Christmas Island to enable you rapidly to carry out the programme of nuclear tests there which we discussed, should you in the event decide that these tests must go forward. I also accept that once you begin preparations at Christmas Island it would not be right for the United Kingdom to claim a veto on the actual decision to start the series of tests, although of course we should, as I said in my letter of January 5,/3/ expect full consultation with you on this point. But opinion here while it would accept our decision that tests are militarily right would not like an arrangement under which we gave you the right to decide unilaterally whether or not actually to conduct the nuclear tests from Christmas Island. It was for this reason that I suggested in my letter that it would be better to state straight away that you and I had jointly decided that further tests were indeed militarily justified, rather than saying only that we had agreed to make preparations for tests against a possible decision to hold them. That is still our position.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 119.
"As I explained in my letter, my colleagues, while recognising the military need for further tests, nevertheless wanted to find a way out of this sterile contest. They would prefer, therefore, to connect the announcement on tests with an announcement about a disarmament initiative.
"While I recognise the practical difficulties about this, I think we could overcome them. I have, therefore, prepared a formula for your consideration somewhat different to the one which I suggested on pages 8 and 9 of my letter, and I attach this as an annex to this letter. You will see that I have left a bracketed passage in section C of this annex, as this will turn on what kind of initiative you feel able to agree to. Perhaps Rusk and Ormsby Gore could discuss the wording of this. The more we can make it look like a constructive initiative, the better. If you felt able to agree to a presentation on the lines of this annex, I would propose to recommend it to my Cabinet colleagues at a meeting which I would arrange for the purpose on Thursday, January 18./4/ If, as I hope, the Cabinet accept my advice, we could then discuss the timing of the announcement, in relation to whatever disarmament initiative we mutually agree, and meanwhile our experts could be discussing the draft agreement about the scientific, technical, financial and administrative arrangements at Christmas Island.
/4/A January 19 memorandum from the British Embassy to the Department of State states that on January 18 the British Cabinet had decided it was "willing in principle to agree to" U.S. use of Christmas Island subject to a number of conditions. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 1/16-22/62) See the Supplement.
"I hope very much that this suggestion may meet both our difficulties.
"With warm regard,
"Yours sincerely, Harold Macmillan."
ANNEX
Possible joint statement by the United States and the United Kingdom
"A. It is the joint view of the United States and the United Kingdom Governments that the present state of nuclear development, in which the recent massive Soviet tests are a factor, justifies the West in making a further series of nuclear tests for purely military reasons. The United States and British Governments have therefore decided to make preparations to conduct a series of tests in various places including Christmas Island.
"B. The two Governments recognise the possibility that further tests by the West may be followed by more Soviet tests. Nevertheless, they do not accept that this situation in itself justifies them in putting at risk the military security of the free world.
"C. The two Governments are, however, deeply concerned for the future of mankind if a halt cannot be called to the nuclear arms race. The two Governments are, therefore, determined to make a new effort to move away from this sterile contest. [They propose accordingly to approach the Soviet Government at an early date with the object of finding ways and means whereby the nuclear aspects of disarmament, for which the three Powers have a special responsibility, could be discussed again at a high level, preparatory to the meeting of the 18-Power Conference on general and complete disarmament.]"/5/
/5/Brackets in the source text.
Rusk
123. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, January 17, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 1/16-22/62. Top Secret.
MR. PRESIDENT:
These two papers are really of high importance. One is by Kaysen, with help from a lot of others./2/ Kaysen says:
/2/Neither paper was attached. Kaysen's paper is Document 120.
1. You can safely offer an atmospheric test-ban, because without atmospheric tests we can be sure of a nuclear stand-off, and even with them we cannot get anything better after 1963.
2. If Russians accept, you get a real step toward arms control--though further steps would be needed.
3. If Russians reject, you shift much of the weight of our test series to them.
This paper rests on evidence provided by Defense, AEC, and Science Adviser. Defense and AEC would accept its facts but not its conclusions--but only because neither is prepared to say a stand-off is all we can expect. This is the gut issue.
Those who want atmospheric tests think there is a real prospect that one side or the other can get decisively "ahead" in strategic nuclear power. This paper says they are wrong, and the argument is one that is of great importance; you should read it and then expose it to discussion.
The other paper is a summary of a Teller-dominated report to LeMay in favor of much more massive testing than anything you now plan./3/ It gives the flavor of the sentiment on the other side. The document is probably of high political importance, because men like Bethe and Baker have also signed it,/4/ and because it is already being leaked privately to the Hill.
/3/Only an undated fragment of the summary was found. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 1/16-22/62) The report is presumably "Military Implications of 1961 Soviet Nuclear Tests: Report by the Twining Committee to The Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force," dated January 5 and known as the Twining Report after its Chairman, General Nathan F. Twining (Ret.). Bethe, Teller, and Dr. William O. Baker were among the 14 members of the committee. (Ibid., Twining Report 1/5/62)
/4/Bethe signed the Twining Report but submitted some partial dissents in a memorandum to Twining on January 26. He did, however, agree with the Twining Committee that a nuclear test ban treaty at that time would not be to the military or technological advantage of the United States, and agreed also that some atmospheric testing was necessary. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/AE Files: FRC 69 A 2243, 58 AWT USSR Tests (1961-1965))
McG. B./5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
124. Editorial Note
In his memorandum for the record of the White House daily staff meeting on January 30, 1962, Ewell included the following item on nuclear testing:
"b. Bundy said that the President feels that we must have a definitive review of the atmospheric nuclear testing problem in the next week to 10 days. This should include what sort of results we are getting and can anticipate from our underground tests, an assessment of the present DOD/AEC atmospheric testing schedule, and a review of technological progress. Komer asked whether there was any articulate policy support for testing. Bundy said yes, that every one of the President's senior advisers was for it. He didn't say whether this was articulate support, however. (I sense that the senior policy people see the answer so clearly that their staffs have not bothered to get into the staff level and wrestle out the sophisticated arguments which are being used against the testing program.) Bundy said that the reason he and the NSC staff had taken a line against the testing program was that no one else would articulate this side of the question, and that he felt that the President deserved a balance to the weight of Government opinion. He did not mention how he planned to organize the development and presentation of this problem to the President. (My guess would be that this would be presented to the President in a highly controlled way, with as small a group as possible participating. I am sure that this would not be considered a suitable topic for the NSC due to the fact that the non-testers would be completely swamped by the pro-testers.)" (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings Jan-Apr 62)
125. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, January 31, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/1-3162. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Developments in connection with Kennedy-Macmillan letter to Khrushchev on Disarmament
In your discussion with Ambassador Ormsby Gore on January 20,/2/ it was agreed that we would undertake to prepare a draft letter to Khrushchev regarding a Foreign Ministers meeting on disarmament, that we would study the problem of the desirability of sending a special emissary to deliver the letter and to make certain additional points, and that we would consider specific points which might be considered by the Foreign Ministers when they met.
/2/The memorandum of conversation by F.E. Cash of EUR is ibid., 600.0012/1-2062.
On January 22, we met with representatives of the British Embassy and gave them a draft of a possible letter to Mr. Khrushchev (see Memo of Conversation attached at Tab A)./3/
/3/No attachments were found with this memorandum. The memorandum of conversation by Spiers is ibid., 600.0012/1-2262, to which is attached the draft letter to Khrushchev. For the letter as sent on February 8, which contains only a few changes from the draft of January 22, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 25-26. Khrushchev's reply of February 10 is ibid., pp. 32-36. See also volume VI, Documents 30 and 31.
On January 24, the U.K. Embassy stated that Macmillan believed the U.S. draft formed an excellent basis for a message to Khrushchev and suggested several modifications of a minor nature. The text as agreed appears at Tab B. At the same time, the U.K. Embassy gave us for comment a copy of a draft letter to President de Gaulle, advising him of the proposed initiative. (See MemCon of January 24 at Tab C.)/4/ This letter was approved by the President without change, and was dispatched to General de Gaulle immediately. As yet, no reply has been received by the British from General de Gaulle and the draft letter to Khrushchev is being held in abeyance for possible revision after de Gaulle's comments are received.
/4/The memorandum of conversation by Spiers is in Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/1-2462. Attached to it is the draft letter, in which Macmillan invited de Gaulle to join the United States and the United Kingdom in mounting a major initiative on disarmament in connection with the forthcoming meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. Macmillan sent the letter to de Gaulle on January 28.
At the meeting on January 24, the U.K. Embassy indicated that they did not feel the idea of a special emissary should be pursued or that specific proposals for an agenda for the Foreign Ministers, who would meet together prior to the opening of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee, should be proposed. The UK hoped that the letter to Khrushchev could be delivered by January 31, so that the agreed announcement which appears as Tab D could be issued on February 1./5/ This timing is now clearly out of the question.
/5/For the announcement as it appeared on February 8, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 31-32.
The UK has also given us (Tab E MemCon of January 25)/6/ a series of questions and answers which would serve as guidelines for the UK in dealing with the press. We have several minor comments to make on the suggested questions and answers at the time it is decided to proceed with the message to Khrushchev.
/6/Not found.
On January 31, Ambassador Ormsby Gore advised us that the UK did not expect a reply from de Gaulle before the end of this week./7/ In the meantime, London wished to secure U.S. views on what specific points we could propose to Gromyko be taken up by the Foreign Ministers in their meeting prior to the 18-Nation conference. We have expressed the tentative view that it would be best not to suggest specific points of discussion, since there would not appear to be any questions which could be dealt with conclusively in a three-day meeting of this character. It might be better to justify the meeting primarily in terms of its symbolic demonstration of the importance which we attach to the 18-Nation negotiations and, at the most, as giving an opportunity to exchange views in a tentative and exploratory way on areas of inquiry in which our representatives in the 18-Nation group might concentrate. Ambassador Ormsby Gore reported that London was particularly interested in whether we could be prepared to make a "bold" and specific proposal on reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles, since this was at the heart of the disarmament problem. We advised Ambassador Ormsby Gore that our studies had not yet proceeded far enough to allow us to anticipate being in a position to make such a proposal even during the early stages of the 18-Nation negotiations, and this was a further reason why we should attempt to keep the Foreign Ministers' discussion quite general.
Adrian S. Fisher
/7/President de Gaulle, in his February 6 reply to Macmillan, stated that while France was "entirely favorable" toward any measure that might lead to disarmament, it seemed to him quite hopeless to expect "anything impartial or effective in this realm" from the Committee of Eighteen, since both it and its source, the General Assembly, had "too marked a demagogic and irresponsible character for one to be able to take towards it any other attitude than one of complete reserve." (The English text is attached to a note from Ormsby Gore to Kennedy, February 6; Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan-Kennedy Volume II) According to Spiers' memorandum of a conversation between Fisher and Lord Hood, also February 6, the French had advised the British that de Gaulle would "allow" France to attend the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee without playing an active role. (Ibid., Central Files, 600.0012/2-662)
126. Editorial Note
On February 2, 1962, President Kennedy was briefed on the recent Soviet test series. Seaborg's account of the meeting reads as follows:
"From 4:15 p.m. to 6 p.m. I attended a meeting with the President in the Cabinet Room. Others present were: Secretaries McNamara, Gilpatric, Nitze; Drs. Brown and Johnson (DOD); General Lemnitzer (Chairman, JCS); Amory and Scoville (CIA); General Taylor, Bundy, Wiesner, Keeny, Carl Kaysen (White House) and General Betts.
"Scoville, Betts and Brown made presentations regarding the Russian progress on their tests, our underground and proposed atmospheric test program and our proposed effects program respectively.
"The President expressed some doubt that the arguments for the developmental tests are sufficient to justify carrying them on, and he wondered whether it wouldn't be best to conclude the atmospheric test ban agreement, say for four years, with the USSR. I pointed out again that if the Russians broke such an agreement in about two years we would find the capabilities of our laboratories reduced even further because it is difficult to have a capability for testing in the atmosphere after such a long period of refraining from atmospheric testing. The President did, however, direct that the negotiations for Christmas Island be speeded up, and also asked that the proposed atmospheric test series be planned in such a way that weapons systems tests such as those for the Polaris and Atlas missiles could be carried out in the event they are authorized." (Seaborg, Journal, volume 3, page 159)
A lengthy summary of the briefing by Keeny, which does not include any report of remarks by the President, is in the Kennedy Library, Nuclear Weapons Testing, 497th NSC Meeting, Keeny Report. See the Supplement.
127. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations/1/
Washington, February 2, 1962, 7:48 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/2-262. Secret. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels, London, and Moscow.
Topol 1110. Re Polto 998, rptd London 195, Brussels Polto 34, Bonn Polto 187 and Moscow Polto 114./2/ Breakdown of nuclear test ban talks/3/ should not be interpreted as anything more than US unwillingness continue indefinitely with talks which Soviet rejection of concept of international control had made devoid of content. Trend of test ban talks had been pointing towards this conclusion for many months. That talks resumed at all after Soviet Fall series only reflected US desire to exhaust all efforts to reach agreement before deciding test ban treaty on acceptable terms was unlikely outcome at early date. Soviet tactic in presenting four-point Nov 28 proposal/4/ was assessed by us as attempt recoup propaganda losses and shift blame for lack of agreement to US. In this situation continuation of talks on separate test ban treaty seemed fruitless exercise. We therefore tried tactic of suggesting we willing explore relationship of test ban to other disarmament measures. When this too was rejected it was apparent that proposal for conference recess was only sensible course. This outcome, of course, means that impetus which agreement might have given to disarmament prospects and to hopes for improvement in East-West relations may never be achieved through test ban route. However, other effects on disarmament and East-West relations likely be minimal.
/2/Not found.
/3/The Geneva Test Ban Conference adjourned on January 29. For the final Soviet and U.S. statements, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 15-18 and 18-24, respectively. In March the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee established a Subcommittee made up of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States as a forum for test ban negotiations.
/4/For text, see ibid., 1961, p. 664.
Rusk
128. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, undated.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 497th NSC Meeting. Secret; Restricted Data.
SUBJECT
Resumption of Atmospheric Nuclear Testing
It is the Department of Defense position that immediate military requirements exist which provide a clear basis for resumption of atmospheric nuclear testing at this time. Of particular importance are weapon effects data which are critically needed to assure that both offensive and defensive weapon systems are and continue to be effective.
Weapon development tests in the atmosphere would provide increased diversity for existing and future weapon systems in the face of changing and sometimes unpredictable threats. The particular weapon development experiments in the proposed series are unlikely by themselves to produce radical changes in our relative strength. However, the developments resulting from several test series will certainly produce an important difference in military capability. Furthermore, prudence demands we be alert to the possibilities of major breakthroughs which can only be explored with a vigorous basic weapon development program including atmospheric testing.
Operational tests of existing systems, though less critical than effects and development tests from a purely technical viewpoint, are highly recommended if the decision is made to test in the atmosphere. Such full scale tests of systems would go a long way toward strengthening the confidence of the Congress and the public in the forces on which we place so much reliance in our defense and war plans. The reliability of our deterrent forces should be credible to ourselves as well as to our potential enemies.
(1) Weapons Effects
Preparations are being made for four specific weapons effects tests for early execution: two at high altitude, one on the surface in Nevada, and one underwater. These tests by no means satisfy the total needs, but will, even if no others are subsequently carried out, make a qualitative change in our ability to understand and predict such effects, and to make changes in our operational forces to take account of them. It should be noted that though these tests will probably raise as many questions as they answer, our military capability and flexibility will be improved greatly even by the posing of the unanswered questions. Preparations and planning are also underway for overseas tests which could build on the results of a first series and be ready about twelve months later, as well as additional small-scale tests in Nevada.
The first series of high altitude tests will provide critical data for both offensive and defensive systems. In the absence of an active enemy defense, existing systems are adequate to insure unacceptable damage to any enemy. However there is clear evidence that the U.S.S.R. is working vigorously on AICBM development. To counter this possibility we must minimize the vulnerability of our delivery systems and provide measures to penetrate their defenses. The high altitude tests will provide critical data necessary to evaluate nuclear "blackout" and associated electromagnetic effects. They will also provide some additional information on the vulnerability to enemy attack of U.S. nuclear warheads and reentry vehicles at two altitudes of interest. With these data we can provide inputs for the design of systems to aid in the penetration of potential enemy defenses.
The same kinds of information are essential to an evaluation of defensive problems. The attacker may attempt to "blackout" our AICBM systems and in any case we may have "blackout" problems from our own defensive explosions. To evaluate and optimize the kill effectiveness of our possible AICBM systems we must, for lack of precise knowledge of the enemy warhead, obtain and use basic information on the vulnerability of U.S. systems.
High altitude nuclear bursts produce widespread and long-lived disruption of certain radio communication systems. Considerations of command and control demand that we understand the magnitudes of the effects and adjust to the possible loss of communication channels on which we now place heavy reliance.
The low yield surface effects test planned for Nevada will provide important information on the vulnerability of hardened missile sites to enemy attack. This experiment will tell us whether the electromagnetic signal induced by the explosion can damage command and communication links in varied ICBM sites, and give us an experimental point in calculating whether our hardened sites will survive nearby multi-megaton explosion. This test will also provide important data on blast and shock relevant to estimating effects on hardened structures. Certain warhead vulnerability experiments, pertinent to AICBM problems but best performed on the surface, will also be incorporated in this test.
The underwater test is both an effects test and a systems proof test. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] ASROC warhead will be detonated at a depth of 750 feet. An example of the critical effects information that defies simulation or calculation is the response of the complex sonar gear to such an explosion. It is probable that in a combat situation more than one ASROC would be fired and it is important to determine how accurately if at all track can be maintained on hostile targets. In addition information will be obtained on the fleet operational problems in a nuclear environment of blast and radioactivity.
(2) Weapons Development.
The planned AEC weapon development shots fall in three general categories:
(a) Tests of devices designed during the moratorium and now entering stockpile. Each specific device of this category represents the maximum acceptable extrapolation from tested devices and because of the critical nature of the systems they are part of they should be tested. Further these tests will provide normalization of the design calculations for the more advanced devices also proposed for testing. If the advanced designs do not perform as expected this normalization data will be essential for understanding the reasons.
(b) Tests of advanced designs providing increased yield-to-weight and/or greater diversity. These designs represent in general extrapolations beyond those acceptable for certification without testing. Present devices delivered on target would be adequate. However, in the face of an active enemy defense these advanced designs will make major contributions to the penetration problem. Our possession of multiple warheads [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would make it much more difficult for the Soviets to produce systems able to intercept the variety of penetrating attacks we could then mount.
One basic point about yield and penetrability needs to be understood. If a single ballistic missile warhead has a yield of less than a megaton the enemy has a real advantage in AICBM design because to be effective the incoming device must be detonated at low altitude. This gives the enemy AICBM system maximum time and use of the slowing-down effects of the atmosphere to aid in discrimination and intercept in the face of whatever penetration tactics we use. Increasing the yield at a fixed weight will make detonation at a higher altitude possible for existing systems such as Minuteman and Titan II, thus increasing the enemy AICBM problem.
Finally, some counter-force capability seems desirable even with a second strike strategy. Large yields then become essential and must be compatible with existing weight capabilities of our systems.
(c) Developmental tests exploring major new design concepts. These tests represent first steps toward major improvements in weapon performance. Being first steps they will undoubtedly require further testing at future times to exploit the knowledge gained in this series. If we wish to maintain a vigorous weapon development program over the next decade these experiments are essential. The two groups of tests previously discussed are addressed to immediate problems, whereas this group look to the future. Weapon development, like any exploratory area, takes time and usually contains many surprises. A few of the proposed experiments are thus of an exploratory nature rather than oriented toward immediate or easily foreseen requirements.
(3) System Tests.
It appears possible and highly desirable to incorporate in the planned test program proof tests of the complete Polaris and Atlas systems. These tests will not jeopardize either the weapon effects or weapon development program since they can be carried out almost completely independently of the others. It is recommended that these system tests be included in the planned series; they have a total [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
It is a matter of judgment how much testing, and of what kinds, is necessary for confidence in system performance. Plans are underway for exhaustive user-type missile tests. Missile tests have been carried out measuring the environment to which the nuclear warhead is subjected, and verifying that the separately tested nuclear warheads will perform after missile flight. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the proposed systems tests are essential to building confidence in our major existing deterrent forces and to confirm the operability of complete weapon systems. They are submitting a paper outlining in more detail the basis of their requirements./2/ Mr. McNamara and I concur in the desirability of complete system tests of selected systems.
/2/Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President dated February 16. (Ibid.) See the Supplement. Also on February 16, Seaborg submitted to the White House an unaddressed memorandum reviewing objectives and operational plans for the proposed test series, and detailing changes in the program since his November 29 letter (Document 102). (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 497th NSC Meeting)
The Joint Chiefs of Staff at the same time support the critical need for both the weapon effects and weapon development programs as outlined above.
(4) Effect of Not Resuming Atmospheric Testing on Future Weapons Development and Weapons Effects Capability.
It is in the nature of weapon effects and weapon development research that one must rely heavily on theoretical studies. But theory without experimental confirmation and guidance soon becomes sterile. We are now at a point in important areas of such research where full scale experiments are absolutely essential to any further progress.
Even ignoring the immediate military requirements that motivate most of the proposed atmospheric tests, this serious loss of momentum and capability with time should weigh heavily in a decision to resume atmospheric testing. A vigorous and reasonably unfettered weapon program is the best insurance against unpleasant and unpredictable surprises of the future. If the decision is made not to conduct atmospheric tests during 1962, and if the Soviets carry out another extensive test series in 1963 or 1964, we would at that time be in a substantially worse position than we are now with respect to both state and momentum of development compared to the Soviets.
129. Editorial Note
On February 16, 1962, the United States and the United Kingdom effected by an exchange of letters a Memorandum of Understanding regarding U.S. use of Christmas Island for nuclear tests and related exchange of information. (Department of State, Files of the Office of the Legal Adviser) In a note to Battle dated February 26, Farley stated that the agreement was "probably more satisfactory to the U.K. than to the U.S. Moreover, it was not concluded with particular speed on the part of the British." Farley's note transmitted a letter of February 19 from Macmillan to Kennedy, in which Macmillan mentioned the exchange of letters and stated his desire that "the exchange of scientific information should be of mutual benefit and flow easily" and that pertinent agreements would be "applied and interpreted on both sides in the broad spirit of the collaboration on which we are embarked." Farley stated that no reply to the letter would be necessary. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan-Kennedy Volume II)
130. Memorandum From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, February 21, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests 2/17/62-4/4/62. Confidential.
SUBJECT
Resumption of Atmospheric Tests
Without more information than I have it is not possible to hazard an opinion as to whether atmospheric testing should be resumed. From what I have heard I assume a decision has been reached, however, to resume tests for legitimate reasons of military security, and not for political and psychological considerations.
The political price of test resumption will be paid most directly in the United Nations and in terms of public opinion around the world. The immediate problem, therefore, is to cushion the shock and moderate the adverse political effects of such testing. There are the following possibilities:
(1) Assuming that it is not realistically possible to delay the announcement on March 1 that the United States will resume atmospheric testing, every effort should be made to channel the controversy out of the United Nations and into the Geneva 18-nation Conference. We should press there for immediate consideration of a test ban treaty together with an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons as specified in the present U.S. disarmament program, but without prejudice to more general disarmament discussions.
(2) A new test ban agreement, to be most negotiable, should not involve elaborate international controls or inspection arrangements. One possibility would be a comprehensive ban on all testing, with a limited number of inspection challenges by each side to investigate whenever national detection systems indicate that there is clandestine testing. The agreement would be temporary--perhaps of two years duration--so as to allow time to work out a definitive treaty with broader controls, in the context of other disarmament measures. To deal with the problem of clandestine test preparations, we could propose continuous observation of known testing sites and maintain our own standby preparations for resumption of tests. This is not the only type of treaty we might propose, but it has the virtue of relative simplicity. The important point is to keep pressing for a test ban agreement even as we test.
(3) Other initial steps which we could suggest at the outset of the Geneva meeting to improve our posture include:
(a) a proposal to set aside specified quantities of delivery vehicles (bombers and missiles) for eventual destruction;
(b) immediate cut-off of fissionable materials production, with sequestration of specified quantities of weapons material for ultimate peaceful use;
(c) various measures to reduce the risks of war by surprise attack or miscalculation through systems of fixed or mobile observation groups, aerial observation, and reciprocal inspection in specified zones. (We should prepare the best possible mix of regional security arrangements: area to be covered; limitations to be placed on weapons, manpower and movement; facilities for observation and inspection);
(d) an agreement prohibiting the placing in orbit of weapons of mass destruction;
(e) an updating of the 1925 Convention to prohibit the use of chemical, biological and radiological warfare;/2/
/2/For text of the protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925, and entered into force on February 8, 1928 (for the United States on April 10, 1975), see 26 UST 571.
(f) a non-aggression agreement between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries, perhaps linked with limitations on certain types of forces near East-West demarcation lines;
(g) immediate drafting of the Charter of an International Disarmament Organization and of arrangements for a United Nations Peace Force.
(4) I recognize that each of the foregoing measures could involve some disadvantages for the United States, but we must realize that without any of them our disarmament posture is thin and featureless. We should be prepared to offer some specific proposals to offset the Soviet propaganda onslaught calling for immediate and radical disarmament measures without adequate controls.
(5) I assume that the rationale for the decision to resume testing will be set forth fully and persuasively in a statement by the President which will be circulated to all UN Delegations in New York.
(6) I conclude with the suggestion that if testing must be resumed and an announcement is to be made promptly, we should attempt to:
(a) channel the discussion into the 18-nation Conference in Geneva;
(b) urgently propose a new test ban treaty;
(c) propose at the outset an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons;
(d) propose two or three other initial arms control steps of the type suggested above.
Unless we are prepared to come forth with a group of such initial measures, and unless the President indicates in his announcement that he intends to make such proposals, we shall be exposed to widespread protests and growing demands for unrealistic and unacceptable disarmament measures.
Let us lead not follow. The essential point is that test resumption makes it all the more necessary to press for a test ban and other immediate disarmament measures. Let us not insist on unattainable perfection in inspection and control and thereby jeopardize the whole disarmament enterprise./3/
/3/This last paragraph is handwritten.
131. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, undated.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests 2/17/62-4/4/62. Secret. Attached to a February 21 memorandum from Battle to McGeorge Bundy stating that the memorandum had been approved at a meeting in the Secretary's office on February 20.
SUBJECT
Atmospheric Nuclear Testing
You have asked for my recommendation as to whether the United States should, in the near future, resume the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. This question is one of extreme gravity and of exceptional complexity. The views and recommendation which follow can reflect this in only a small way. I hope that the long and searching discussions we have held on this subject have done more justice to the multitude of issues involved.
In my judgment the most important argument against resuming nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere is the possibility of prejudicing formal or tactic steps toward arms control arrangements by making it more certain that the USSR would again test and thereby further escalate the nuclear arms race. Any step we can take to damp down this race is obviously in the national interest if consistent with our national security. Furthermore, to the extent that our nuclear weapons capability is superior to the Soviet capability, a freeze on nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere would be to our military advantage.
This said, I think the problem for decision can thus be formulated. If there is no reason to believe that the Soviets will agree to a test ban of a type we deem necessary to safeguard our national security over the long term, can we risk our national security by gambling that the Soviets will parallel restraints we could unilaterally impose on ourselves? I do not personally believe we can accept this risk in view of the Soviets' declared objectives and their recent resumption of testing.
There is no reason to believe that the Soviet Union now regards an agreement to ban tests under appropriate safeguards as a serious matter for negotiation. Their influence in inhibiting the Chinese Communists has diminished. We know that they are engaged in a massive drive toward an AICBM capability. Their recent test series has doubtless whetted, rather than damped, their determination to surpass us in the state of the art. I think the conclusion to be drawn is that the Soviets will again test in the atmosphere to achieve what they believe may be significant military advances, regardless of whether or not we resume atmospheric tests. Our failure to resume atmospheric tests might indeed encourage the Soviets to capitalize on their recent advances by launching another massive test series which could in fact seriously jeopardize our national security.
This situation might change in the future, and for this reason I believe we should continue to support a comprehensive test ban treaty with adequate international control.
Other reasons which are commonly advanced to support the argument that the United States should not test in the atmosphere do not seem to me very convincing when our national security is at stake. One argument is that world public reaction would be adverse and inimical to our interests.
We may certainly expect losses to our international position as a result of a decision to proceed with a test program. For example, the decision would be viewed as having a damaging effect on the forthcoming disarmament conference, even though we do not believe that the Soviets would use this as a pretext for breaking off the negotiations. However, such losses may be balanced to a certain extent by the fact that much of foreign public opinion is already conditioned to a U.S. resumption of atmospheric tests. Moreover, our international posture may be strengthened by the evidence of our will to do what is necessary to protect our national security interests, and those of that part of the free world which depend upon us for protection from Soviet aggression.
The problem of radioactive fallout is another argument against testing in the atmosphere, and I share the concern you once expressed at having even one individual affected by radioactive fallout. Nevertheless, I believe that the hazards from fallout produced by such testing as we may carry out are minimal as compared with the hazards which might be caused by misunderstandings about our nuclear strength.
In any event, our security must be the primary consideration, and I am convinced that we can do much to minimize psychological and propaganda losses by careful explanation of our policy, including taking advantage of our improved disarmament program. If, in addition, we are scrupulous in the exercise of responsibility in the conduct of our program, limiting our tests to the kind and number which are essential for military and scientific purposes and conducting them with careful regard to health and safety factors, we should be able to hold our political losses to manageable size.
I have noted the Secretary of Defense's statement that immediate military requirements now exist for resumption of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, particularly with respect to effects data to assure a continued capability for our offensive and defensive weapons systems. These requirements are particularly persuasive in the light of the major advances in weapons technology, including weapons effects information in the AICBM field, which I understand the Soviets made in their recent test series. If, as seems to be the case, atmospheric tests are necessary to maintain the effectiveness and credibility of the nuclear deterrent, then I believe we now have no satisfactory alternative but to proceed with our test series.
The atmospheric test program of about twenty-four shots proposed by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission seems generally satisfactory and appears to conform to the criteria you have established.
While I believe our best approach in general would be an obviously sober and businesslike approach which would confine the tests to the fewest possible events in the shortest possible period of time in the least inhabited area of the Pacific, I believe there are political and psychological advantages in scheduling cratering or balloon shots in Nevada prior to the commencement of the main series. Specifically, this would permit the briefest possible time lag between your announcement and the first test in the series, and, although it would lengthen the period of tests, it would serve to alleviate criticism that the United States is callous about the safety of inhabitants of the Pacific area but does not use its own territory for tests.
In sum, the reasons for resuming testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere appear to me to be more compelling than the reasons for refraining. My recommendation, therefore, is that you decide to order such atmospheric nuclear weapons tests as you may deem militarily necessary along the lines of the program proposed for the period March-July 1962.
I should like to emphasize the importance of preparing our allies and friends in other parts of the world to assist us in facing up to the criticism which a test series will produce. Diplomatic consultations, including those at the United Nations in New York, will be an essential element in this process. I recommend that we provide our ambassadors in selected countries and at the United Nations with a summary of the reasons which you will advance in your statement of a decision to test, and authorize them to communicate it to the governments to which they are accredited and to the U.N. Secretary General preferably twenty-four hours in advance of its release here. We have developed, and are coordinating with your staff, arrangements for carrying out such diplomatic consultations, including a contingency plan involving a possible initiative with respect to the Security Council. In addition, of course, we will presumably need to take in advance of this some more formal step to consult with the British.
We plan to use the United Nations to bulwark a decision, if taken, to resume atmospheric testing. We would hope for Ambassador Stevenson on the day following the announcement to circulate to the United Nations a document for the information of the entire membership explaining fully our rationale for testing in the atmosphere. At the same time Ambassador Stevenson might hold a press conference which would give him an opportunity to play a full public role in support of your decision. In Washington the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense would play similar roles.
In addition, we have developed plans to take this question to the Security Council in the event it appears likely that the USSR or a third power will seek to convene a special session of the General Assembly. If there is no such move, we would prefer to avoid formal United Nations actions since we will be confronted with difficult proposals calling for an uninspected ban on atmospheric tests. Moreover, the USSR can be expected to use the United Nations in order to build up the pressure for a summit meeting. If the indications are that a special General Assembly is likely, we believe there is relative political advantage for the United States to preempt the situation and convene the Security Council to consider this matter. The Security Council is a much more manageable organ than is the Assembly. In the Security Council our objective would be to remand this question to the Geneva conferees.
The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Director of the United States Information Agency concur in the views expressed above.
Dean Rusk/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
132. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/
Washington, February 22, 1962, 10:35 a.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Disarmament. No classification marking.
The President said the matter which he thinks some people over there should think about and give their advice is the question of testing and disarmament conference. One alternative has been strongly recommended by Gaitskell;/2/ another was the one we originally were going to follow--to have a meeting at the end of this month and announce that before the disarmament conference begins we were not going to get entwined with testing in April. Gaitskell feels that we will be charged with sabotage. He, of course, would like us to announce that we would give this one last chance on the presumption that the Soviets would not respond and we could test. The President does not particularly want to announce, but make one more effort because he thinks it places us in a weak position. He does not think there is a question as to whether we should make our announcement the end of February or the first of March and take the risk of saying we are sabotaging or whether we should just say nothing--let the ship sail--and then about April 10th announce that it seems to be inevident the Soviets are going to agree to anything. Then go ahead with speed for the choice is--do we make it the first of March or some time the end of next week, recognizing when the conference begins. Or do we wait until the last minute and then say that the conference has not produced any indication we are going to get any place and that we are going to test. We have to begin to decide which of these two.
/2/No memorandum of the President's conversation held February 19 with Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the British Labor Party, has been found, but a briefing memorandum from Bundy to Kennedy with two attachments, dated February 19, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests 2/17/62-4/4/62. See the Supplement. A February 20 letter from Gaitskell to Kennedy, urging Kennedy not to announce resumption of testing before the commencement of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan-Kennedy 1962.
Ball said Secretary Rusk had talked at some length with Gaitskell about this problem./3/ One of the possibilities that we put forward was to say that by such and such we are going to make up our minds, but we really want to see if there is any evidence of serious intention. The President said that this was the course he thought Gaitskell wanted us to do. In addition he thought it laid us open to a lot of "Oh, my God, we're not going to start that!" sort of thing. Ball agreed saying it was like giving an ultimatum. He thought that the Secretary's own inclination as well as his own was probably to feel that we ought to go ahead as the President had suggested--around the 10th of April, or something like that--after we see that there was enough evidence one way or another to indicate whether there was any serious intention here. That is, without saying anything. But not to make it, in other words, the first of March. Ball would like to have another look at it, after the Secretary calls around 11./4/ The President said this should be decided next week. Ball agreed./5/
/3/Memoranda by Alf E. Bergesen of BNA of Rusk's conversations with Gaitskell on February 19 and 24 are ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
/4/The memorandum of Ball's telephone conversation with Rusk at 11:50 a.m. reports Ball as saying that the President wanted "to get some thoughts as to three possibilities: The announcement next week, or about the 10th of April, or try to adapt." The conversation was inconclusive on this point. (Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Disarmament)
/5/In a memorandum for the record of the White House staff meeting held February 23, Legere reported Bundy as saying that Kennedy would "make his decision on the resumption of nuclear testing presumably at the NSC meeting Tuesday [February 27]" and would later that week make a speech in which he would "announce his decision." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings Jan-Apr 62)
133. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, February 22, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Official Use Only. Drafted by Guthrie and approved in U on February 23.
SUBJECT
Disarmament
PARTICIPANTS
The Acting Secretary
Mikhail Smirnovsky, Soviet Chargé d'Affaires
Oleg Sokolov, Employee, Soviet Embassy
John C. Guthrie, Director, SOV
Mr. Smirnovsky called under instructions to deliver the text of a letter from Chairman Khrushchev to the President./2/ The letter was in reply to the President's letter of February 14 on the subject of disarmament and the forthcoming meeting of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva./3/ Mr. Smirnovsky noted that Khrushchev in his letter expresses disappointment with the negative attitude of the President toward the proposal that the 18-nation meeting be opened by Heads of State./4/ The letter, Mr. Smirnovsky said, argues for the Soviet proposal and explains why the USSR cannot agree with the President's arguments in support of the U.S. proposal. The letter deals, he said, with the control problem and the nuclear test question. In conclusion the letter expresses a strong belief that the Geneva meeting should be opened by Heads of Government and expresses the hope that the President has not yet said his final word on the subject. Mr. Smirnovsky said a similar message was being sent to Prime Minister Macmillan and that the text of the letter to the President would be published.
/2/Apparent reference to a letter dated February 21; for text, see vol. VI, Document 36, or Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 49-57.
/3/In his letter, Kennedy maintained that attendance by the Heads of Government at the forthcoming Geneva Conference might be useful, but not until progress had been made on substantive disarmament issues. For text, see vol. VI, Document 32, or Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 36-38.
/4/Khrushchev made this proposal in a February 10 letter to Kennedy and Macmillan; for text, see vol. VI, Document 31, or Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 32-36.
The Acting Secretary said that the President would give full consideration to Mr. Khrushchev's letter./5/
/5/Kennedy's February 25 reply again argued against attendance by the Heads of Government at the beginning of the conference; for text, see vol. VI, Document 37, or Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 61-63. Extensive documentation on the U.S. replies to the Soviet Union in these exchanges, including consultation among the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy (the "Western Five") at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, is in Department of State, Central File 600.0012 and ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330 for January and February 1962.
134. Letter From the British Ambassador (Ormsby Gore) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, February 26, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests 2/17/62-4/4/62. Top Secret; Limit Distribution.
Dear Dean: I think it may be useful to you if I send you the exact wording of the telegram I sent to the Foreign Secretary on February 21, recording my telephone conversation with the President on the previous day.
Yours ever
David
Attachment
February 21, 1962.
The President telephoned me yesterday to say that he had planned to hold a meeting of the National Security Council at the end of this week in order to reach a final decision on atmospheric tests. An announcement would then have been made on March 1 with the idea of starting tests on April 1.
2. The President told me that on consideration he was not happy with this timetable and, after discussing various alternatives with me, he thought that it would be wiser to make no announcement at the present time other than confirmation that preparations were going ahead as rapidly as possible. In addition he thought that April 1 was too soon after the opening of the Disarmament Conference and that the West would inevitably be accused of not allowing sufficient time for the Soviet Union to show whether their participation in the Conference was genuinely in good faith.
3. He therefore thought that the target date for the first atmospheric tests should now be postponed to April 15.
4. Finally, the President told me most emphatically that the one thing he was determined to avoid was to get tied down by language which specifically linked progress in the talks with a decision on testing. This would inevitably lead to tremendous pressures on the Administration and he hoped very much that we would bear this consideration in mind in any statements we might make in Parliament or elsewhere.
135. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, February 26, 1962.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings Jan-Apr 62. Secret. Drafted by Legere. These memoranda for the record were routinely circulated to Taylor and members of his staff.
SUBJECT
Daily Staff Meeting, 26 February 1962
1. Mr. Bundy presided.
2. The principal subject discussed bracketed the NSC meeting tomorrow on atmospheric testing and any follow-up announcement by the President which may derive from that meeting. As of last week, the feeling was that the President would probably be making a speech sometime this week which would tie together the announcement of the decision on testing with some depiction of the broad US approach to disarmament in anticipation of the Geneva Conference which begins on 14 March. However, it now appears that the President, in Bundy's judgment, will likely prove cool toward a quick and definitive announcement. Instead, he will probably take the line (I gather in response to questions rather than in a speech) that the testing preparations of the United States are being completed but that we are always open to acceptance by the Soviets of a truly significant system of international inspection. Bromley Smith demurred somewhat at this rather flabby approach, but Bundy shut him off somewhat sharply with a reminder that we must never foreclose our minds to possible Soviet agreement to our position.
3. In connection with the above exercise as envisioned last week, when it was thought that the President would surely be making a speech sometime this week, Mr. Adrian Fisher of Mr. Foster's disarmament organization, has prepared a paper which apparently was designed to state the broad US approach to disarmament./2/ According to Hansen, it doesn't conclude anything, but rather sketches four or five possible alternative approaches. I gather that there was an intention to submit the Fisher paper to the JCS for comment, but that Mr. McNaughton of ISA has said that the Chiefs would probably take at least a week, and probably more, to come up with any comments. I further gather that this will shunt out the Chiefs, despite the fact that a lot of the pressure, which was created because of the President's speech intentions this week, has disappeared. I will be mentioning this right away, orally, to Colonel Ewell because I think that a discreet telephone call to the office of General Lemnitzer or Admiral Riley is indicated.
/2/Reference may be to an ACDA paper, "U.S. Position at the Forthcoming 18-Nation Disarmament Conference," dated February 24. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 3470, NATO-NSC Mtg)
[Here follows discussion of counterinsurgency programs, the Panama Canal, and the strategic stockpile.]
LJL
136. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, February 27, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests 2/17/62-4/4/62. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
The National Security Council Meeting on Testing
So far there has been no publicity about this meeting, but you will undoubtedly want to repeat your warning against any discussion of the meeting itself or its subject. Equally, you will want to reserve any final decision in the meeting itself.
There are two main items of business:
A. To test or not to test
B. The timing and tactics of an announcement and of the test series.
A. To test or not to test
The documentation which has been circulated on this point has been unusually comprehensive. It includes a memorandum from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission,/2/ and a summary of the basic briefing on the positions of the U.S./U.S.S.R. which was presented to you on February 2/3/ (this is the one which you have been using with Gaitskell and Stevenson.)/4/
/2/The memoranda from the Secretaries of State and Defense are Documents 131 and 128, respectively. The memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Seaborg's memorandum, both February 16, are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 497th NSC Meeting. The JCS memorandum (JCSM-127-62) is in the Supplement.
/3/Apparent reference to Keeny's summary mentioned in Document 126.
/4/Kennedy had lunch with Stevenson on February 22. There is no record of the conversation, but Legere reported Bundy as saying "in a rather horrified manner" at the White House daily staff meeting on February 23 that "Stevenson had proposed to the President the institution of a two year moratorium on testing." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings Jan-Apr 62)
This documentation reaches the unanimous judgment that we should test. Since it has been available to all present for several days, you will not want to ask for repetitive speeches. My suggestion is that you may want to ask for questions and comment in the following order:
1. Intelligence on the Soviet position after the tests of 1961 (John McCone will respond if there is questioning).
2. The technological meaning of our test series (Glenn Seaborg will respond).
3. The Defense recommendations (McNamara and Lemnitzer).
4. Foreign policy recommendation (Dean Rusk will respond).
At this point I suggest that you may wish to ask the Vice President to comment (or, alternatively, you may want to hold him until the end). I have asked him to be ready, and indicated to him that we are eager to have as solid an expression of opinion as possible. The men who still may have reservations in this group are Stevenson and Wiesner, though Wiesner will limit his comment, if asked, to a statement that the technological balance of judgment is very even and that political considerations should govern.
Stevenson has asked to have a memorandum written for him by Harlan Cleveland,/5/ but I do not yet know what is in it.
/5/Not further identified.
I doubt if you want to go all the way around the room, but Wiesner will not speak until spoken to, so perhaps the decisive question is how you wish to handle Adlai. Douglas Dillon will not be present, but I have a short memorandum from him expressing his firm advice that you should go ahead.
When you have heard as much as you want on the basic question, I assume that you will reserve the final judgment and turn to the question of timing and tactics in the event of a decision to go ahead.
B. The timing and tactics of an announcement and of the test series
Here there are three serious problems:
1. Should your position be stated in a speech this week?
2. Should there be any atmospheric tests before the Disarmament Committee meetings on March 14?
3. Should we hold to the date of April 1st for the main series, or should it be moved back to April 15--or conceivably further?
1. Should your position be stated in a speech this week?
The argument here is more evenly balanced than I have thought. Harold Macmillan has an ally in John McCone and, to some extent, in Douglas Dillon. The argument is that no decision should be stated until the very last moment before testing, in order to avoid very heavy propaganda pressures from good people in the English-speaking world and self-righteous neutrals everywhere.
It is also contended that an announcement this week will be just as bad for the Geneva conference as an announcement in early April.
On the other side, there is very strong feeling that we must not go to Geneva with this issue still apparently open. To complete our preparations for testing with no public explanation, and to test on one or two days' notice would, on this argument, be deeply resented and would appear to be a torpedo attack on the Geneva meeting. In this argument, it is much better to state our position straightforwardly this week and to stick to it calmly through whatever criticism we may get in the intervening period. The men who hold this view most strongly are Bill Foster, Jack McCloy, Ed Murrow, and your own staff.
2. Should there be any atmospheric tests before the Disarmament Committee Meetings on March 14?
I think you have already pretty well decided against atmospheric tests before March 14, and I have alerted the principal Departments to this probability. If we could make a lot of tests quickly, the question might be more difficult, but the fact is that the only truly atmospheric test which is possible is a low-yield balloon shot of marginal importance which could not be set off now before March 8. This timing is so obviously unfortunate that no one is much in favor of it at present.
There is a minor technological question about an underground crater shot which will give off some radioactive gas (though less than the venting shot of last December).
I think this should be approved for next week, as a respectable underground noise with no significant atmospheric effect.
3. Should we hold to the date of April 1st for the main series, or should it be moved back to April 15--or conceivably further?
The test program is now scheduled for an April 1st opening, but I am informed by Defense and AEC that there is no technological loss in a 2-week postponement, assuming that tests can continue 2 weeks longer at the other end. Indeed, Harold Brown believes that there would be a technological improvement if this additional time is allowed. Major General Starbird, the Task Force commander, has no objection.
The disadvantage of the postponement is simply that we have to wait that much longer for the other shoe to drop if you make an announcement this week. Macmillan much prefers April 15, and while the 6 weeks of open time is troublesome to USIA and some others, it is generally agreed that the United States Government can stand it, as long as the decision itself is firm and you yourself are willing to take it calmly.
My own summary judgment on these tactical points is that, once we have made a decision to test, our tactics should be as open, calm, reasonable and forthcoming as possible. I take this to mean a full explanation this week, an avoidance of tests before the Disarmament Committee meetings, and the delay of the test series itself to the middle of April. The decision to test will itself satisfy all the tough guys, and the rest of our tactics should be aimed at those who have hoped for a different decision.
137. Memorandum of the 497th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, February 27, 1962, 10 a.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings 1962. Top Secret. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy. A complete list of the 22 attendees is ibid., President's Appointment Book. Other accounts of the meeting are in Seaborg, Journal, vol. 3, pp. 225-227, and in a memorandum for the files by McCone in Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President, 12/1/61-6/30/61.
The meeting of the National Security Council was convened on Tuesday, February 27, 1962, at 10 a.m., to discuss nuclear testing. Present at the meeting were those listed in the preliminary attendance list,/2/ with the following exceptions: the Secretary of the Treasury and The Attorney General were absent, while Lt. Col. Burris, the Assistant to the Vice President, was present.
/2/Not found.
The meeting began with a brief report by the Director of Central Intelligence on recent reports of possible Soviet preparations for atmospheric testing. Mr. McCone reported that there were indications of aircraft movements parallel to some which had preceded the Soviet test series of 1961. He reported that while we might expect additional indicators before testing occurred in the northern testing grounds, we could not anticipate such additional warning in the event of renewed Soviet testing in the missile range. He reported that Khrushchev found himself in a flexible position, since his statements in recent months had carefully avoided commitments that might limit his freedom to test.
At the request of the President, the Secretary of State then summarized his recommendations on atmospheric testing. He believed that in the light of the progress which the Soviet Union had made in recent months, and in the light of the fact that the Soviet Union can test again whenever it is ready, common prudence now requires the United States to test. He recognized that atmospheric tests had some political disadvantages, especially in the short run. But he noted that the Soviet Union today did not seem to be suffering greatly from the public indignation which had greeted its tests last fall. Memory was short in these matters. The Secretary believed that we would not want a time to come when we were--or were thought to be--behind. We must not fall behind, but must rather rise to the expectations of those who wish us to succeed. The Secretary noted the spontaneous enthusiasm which had broken out in other countries after the successful space flight of Colonel Glenn.
Turning to more specific questions, the Secretary indicated that in his belief, from a political point of view, the United States would be in a strong position if it could say that it was ready, still, to sign today the treaty which had been presented last April, for the prevention of nuclear tests.
The Secretary recognized that this position might be criticized from two sides. On the one hand, there were those who believed that it was important to try to be more liberal, in the face of the fact that the Soviets have rejected the existing proposal. Could we not do better? And could we not offer an arrangement more nearly compatible with Soviet views on inspection? Mr. Rusk believed that in April we had gone as far as we could--even to the edges of security--and to a point which might make Senatorial consent to ratification uncertain.
On the other hand, there were those who argued that the April treaty offered no safeguards against preparations for atmospheric testing. Mr. Rusk was prepared to take the risk of this weakness, because if we could put inspection teams in, in accordance with the treaty of April, then we would create a great political weight against any Soviet decision to resume testing.
More broadly, the Secretary of State believed that Khrushchev might well be willing to accept some limitations upon his freedom to test in return for a limitation upon the costs and dangers of the expanding arms race. The Secretary then turned to the question of the timing of U.S. tests, in relation to the Geneva talks. He believed that it was important not to tie the tests tightly to "progress" of an indeterminate sort at Geneva. He believed that we should announce before the Geneva meeting that we do mean to conduct tests, though he also argued that we should not in fact begin the test series until after the meeting had begun in April. He recognized that others felt that we should in fact conduct a test or two before the Geneva meeting, but his own review of the tests proposed for this period convinced him that they did not amount to much and would not in fact do what their advocates desired.
Finally, the Secretary believed it extremely important that we should have strong and far-reaching proposals to put before the Disarmament Committee in Geneva. The track ahead might be hard to see, and the future murky, but we must make a major effort.
The President asked how the Secretary of State would reconcile his statement that we must not link our tests to "progress" but that we should be prepared to sign an effective test ban treaty. The Secretary of State replied that we would undertake not to test only if there were a major change--as, for example, consent to an effective test ban treaty, or a major settlement in Berlin.
The President then asked the Secretary of Defense to comment. Mr. McNamara began by stating his agreement with the Secretary of State that we must neither fall behind nor appear to fall behind. From the military point of view there were 3 questions to which tests would contribute answers.
1. Should we modify our design for the penetration of enemy defenses by our strategic vehicles?
2. Should we modify our command and control system in order to increase its survivability against enemy attack?
3. Can we redesign the Nike-Zeus system for anti-missile defense to overcome its present weaknesses? The Secretary believed that the answer to the third question was probably negative, but he considered it highly important to obtain additional information on the point.
The President asked whether the Secretary of Defense would be willing to refrain from testing if we could obtain Soviet agreement to the April treaty. Mr. McNamara replied that he would indeed sign on to such a treaty. He believed that the United States would be more secure if there could be a complete and effective end to testing. The President put the same question to Mr. Harold Brown, and Mr. Brown also indicated that in his judgment, on both technical and political grounds, it would be to the advantage of the United States to accept such a treaty.
Deputy Secretary Gilpatric indicated his agreement with the position of the Secretary of Defense, with the addition of his belief that the proposed tests would be most important in indicating, in addition, the degree to which our 1200 missile sites were appropriately protected against attack.
General Lemnitzer, for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reported that the Chiefs strongly favor the resumption of tests. He particularly emphasized the importance of proof tests of complete weapons systems. He reported the agreement of the Chiefs that the tests listed are the most important at this time.
General Lemnitzer also reported that the Joint Chiefs could not approve a treaty such as the April proposal, from the military point of view.
In their judgment we do not now know the level of Soviet progress in full detail. The Soviets may have made a major breakthrough in the last series of their tests. The U.S. needs one series at least in order to feel confident that it has not been dangerously surpassed. Gen. Lemnitzer emphasized that these considerations were advanced from the strictly military point of view and indicated his recognition that there might be other reasons which might govern the decision. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs believed that there was too much at stake not to go ahead with the tests currently proposed. Without knowing all the provisions of the April treaty, General Lemnitzer nevertheless recorded his doubt that it would offer hard assurance that there would be no resumption of Soviet testing.
The President indicated his own doubt that these tests--the Soviet tests of 1961--sophisticated as they may have been--had given the Soviets a clear breakthrough. Then after some discussion with General Lemnitzer on the point, the President indicated that in his judgment this question did not have to be decided at the moment.
Mr. William Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, indicated his general agreement with the Secretary of State. In particular, he reported that in his judgment the treaty of April was a good document. It would allow us to break through the barrier of secrecy surrounding the Soviet Union, and would have great value from this point of view alone. Mr. Foster's one disagreement with the Secretary of State was that he hoped there might be an early test, promptly after an early announcement. He was in favor of the posture which Ambassador Dean had described as "test and talk." He believed that the tests available before the opening of the Geneva meeting did have some significance, and he thought that if we had not tested before March 14, we would come under considerable pressure from neutrals and others not to test at all.
Secretary Rusk indicated his own support for the notion of "test and talk," while he could not accept the argument for an early test. In supporting the "test and talk" idea, the Secretary reminded the meeting that the United States and the Soviet Union had worked out the statement of agreed principles in the fall of 1961 while the Soviets were conducting their great series of atmospheric tests.
Chairman Seaborg reported that the Atomic Energy Commission recommended that they return to atmospheric testing. He found some trouble with the question of the starting date, but he agreed that the proposed early tests would not have great significance, since their yield was limited pretty much to what can be done underground. Still there would be some significant elements in any such tests.
The President, at this point, remarked that it would be a mistake in his view to have a first atmospheric test in the United States. Such a test would result in widespread press attention, including pictures of the mushroom cloud in the U.S. newspapers. The domestic reaction would more than offset the gains from being in a position to say that our first test was in the U.S., not abroad. The other arguments in favor of a U.S. test were not important.
The President then asked Ambassador Stevenson to comment. Mr. Stevenson remarked that while he did not like to disturb the wholesome unanimity of the meeting, he had misgivings. These were not because he doubted the gains made by the Soviet Union--which he was not competent to judge. He wondered whether the United States had weighed the political and moral elements of the problem. He saw the world scene as a contest for the non-aligned, non-Communist, non-nuclear nations, and he believed that if we could avoid testing, we might make major gains with these nations. He expressed his doubt about the concept of "nuclear superiority" which appeared frequently in the briefing papers. He believed that for the hope of eventual arms control, nuclear equality was a better concept. He hoped that the moral and political balance had been carefully weighed, and he believed that if after such consideration there was a decision to test, there were a number of things which could be done. He proposed a package of proposals for a "Peace Offensive," as follows: The President should present to Geneva a number of proposals including a modified test ban treaty, with emphasis on inspection for preparations and reduced emphasis on inspection of clandestine testing. The proposal should also include an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, an agreement on the cut-off of nuclear production, an agreement on the sequestration of materials, an agreement to set aside certain numbers of delivery vehicles, an agreement which might limit the dangers of accident, miscalculation, and surprise, an agreement to prohibit the orbit of weapons of mass destruction, and perhaps other proposals.
Asking how it was possible to get an agreement to a test ban treaty, Ambassador Stevenson asked if we could not hold our hand on testing and simply threaten to resume if nothing serious were accomplished--but in the next sentence he indicated his belief that such a threat would not have any effect on the Soviet Union.
The President asked Ambassador Stevenson in what way he would adjust the treaty of April, and Ambassador Stevenson said in reply that he believed there should be less emphasis on the detection of underground testing and more on the detection of preparations. He interjected the thought that we are on the eve of a historic event--the opening of the Soviet society--and that we should conduct our affairs accordingly. He also remarked, however, that he did not assume for a moment that the Soviets would now accept an adequate test ban treaty.
The President asked Ambassador Stevenson directly whether he was against the resumption of testing. Ambassador Stevenson avoided a direct answer and asked again whether we have adequately weighed the moral and political elements of the problem. He thought there was no question but that we should prepare for tests, and certainly we should test if the Soviet Union tested again. And it was perfectly clear, also, that the Soviet Union had made significant gains. And if it were the judgment that these gains required a resumption of testing, Ambassador Stevenson would not disagree with the judgment. The Ambassador returned to the question whether nuclear superiority was really desirable, and Secretary McNamara in reply indicated that his reasons for favoring a resumption of tests were more complex. It was not so much a belief in the necessity of American superiority as a determination to prevent Soviet superiority which seemed to him governing in this matter.
Returning to the prospects for disarmament, the Secretary of State emphasized his own belief that a chance does exist and that this chance must be worked for. Dr. Wiesner agreed, pointing out that each passing year makes disarmament more difficult.
The President then indicated his own judgment that we must be prepared to test and indeed to test, unless we can make significant progress. Turning to Mr. Foster he asked which elements of Ambassador Stevenson's peace offensive were a part of the current thinking of Mr. Foster's agency. Mr. Foster replied that many of these proposals were in the President's own speech of September 25, 1961, while most of the others were in the current plans of the Disarmament Agency.
The President then asked Ambassador Dean for his opinion. Mr. Dean replied that he would like to get something in the April treaty that would provide for an inspection of preparations. He believed that the Soviet government had never seriously negotiated after the April treaty was tabled, probably because of its own prior decision to turn toward the resumption of testing.
He believed that we would be met at Geneva by propaganda tactics, and at a very violent level, and he believed, in consequence, that we must follow our own line with calm determination. There followed a brief discussion of the tactics of debate in the United Nations between Ambassador Stevenson and Ambassador Dean, in which it was generally agreed that we might look forward to the possibility of a full propaganda exercise by the Soviet Union in June.
The President indicated that he saw some advantages in updating the April treaty, both in order to make it more responsive to the actual situation and in order to avoid any appearance of stale rigidity.
The Vice President was then asked by the President for his opinion: The Vice President's judgment was that we should proceed with tests with a minimum of delay. On the basis of the papers available to him, he concluded that there was an urgent necessity, and he shared the Secretary of State's conclusion that testing was necessary. He was in favor of an early decision and early tests. He believed we should test in Nevada and as quickly as possible. We might have superiority or we might not. But there had been a time when there had been no question on this point, and in the Vice President's judgment it was no longer right to hesitate. He would rather have nuclear superiority than a test ban treaty. He believed that American people look to America for leadership. He favored the resumption of tests as soon as possible. It was time to stand.
In response to a final question from the President, Director McCone indicated his belief that the importance of Soviet efforts in the anti-missile field had been too little recognized in the discussion thus far. He believed that these efforts were very great, and he noted that there was much opinion in the intelligence community to the effect that both Soviet capabilities and Soviet deployment were far advanced. There followed a complex discussion of the anti-missile problem among Chairman Seaborg, Dr. Wiesner, and Dr. Brown, the result of which was general agreement that the problem is a very difficult one, both to attack and to estimate.
Director Murrow, responding to a question from the President, indicated his belief that if a decision to test should be made, there should be very little delay in actual testing. He believed that delay would look like indecision, and while he believed that our resumption of tests had been considerably discounted by public opinion throughout the world, he would like as short an interval as possible for such opinion to exert itself between a decision to test and the tests themselves. On the other hand, he could see the importance of an announcement of the American position before the Geneva meeting, and he recognized the physical facts which made significant testing in the immediate future difficult.
The President noted that this was the dilemma with which the meeting was faced, and after brief and inconclusive further discussion, he adjourned the meeting by expressing his thanks for all their participation./3/
/3/NSC Action No. 2448 states in part that, at this meeting, the Council: "Noted that the President would shortly reach a decision with respect to the resumption of nuclear testing in the atmosphere." (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council, 1962)
McG.B.
138. Letter From President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan/1/
Washington, February 27, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy-Macmillan 1960-1962. Top Secret. Attached to a note from McGeorge Bundy to Rusk, stating that the original had been delivered to Ormsby Gore.
Dear Mr. Prime Minister: Since I last talked with David Ormsby Gore,/2/ I have had a most careful review of the testing problem with my senior advisers, and I should now inform you that they have unanimously recommended to me that the United States should resume tests in the atmosphere, starting about April 15. I myself believe that their advice is correct, and that once this decision is definitely taken, it should be promptly announced to the American people, and not allowed to dribble out in gossip and rumor. Our present plan is that I should announce such a decision in a television address to the American people on Thursday evening, the first of March. But before this decision becomes final, I wish to take this further opportunity of consultation with you, and I am sending you this letter in the hope that we may talk it over tomorrow, if you wish.
/2/This meeting or conversation has not been identified. Kennedy was in Florida from the evening of February 22 until the morning of February 26. On February 24, Ormsby Gore gave Rusk and Bundy text of a message from Macmillan suggesting that Kennedy resolve the question of a meeting of Heads of Government by inviting Khrushchev to come to Washington at the end of April. If no progress were made, then "our tests could still be carried out with no real disadvantage, by announcing the dates immediately after the meeting. This plan would really trump his card. It would be difficult for him to resist." (Ibid., Macmillan-Kennedy Volume II) See the Supplement. No documentation on U.S. reaction to this proposal has been found.
The military reasons which are leading me to this decision are, I think, familiar to you and to your advisers. The essence of it is that I do not believe we can accept a further moratorium on atmospheric testing while the Soviet Union remains free to move onward from what it learned last fall and test again and again. My central concern is not with the size of any particular weapon--the Western stockpile is large enough, in all conscience, from that point of view. The problem is rather one of assuring the effectiveness of our strategic deterrent against possible surprises in missile or anti-missile technology in future years. Until we can get a reasonably safeguarded agreement, of the sort which you and we have worked for in recent years, I feel that I have no alternative.
There remain a number of tactical questions on which I hope we may not be too far apart. You will see that I have somewhat changed my thinking since I talked to David Ormsby Gore a week ago. It now seems plain to me that I should not allow the Disarmament Committee to begin its work under the illusion that the United States is not yet settled in its own mind about the need for testing. I believe that a sudden announcement of a quick decision to resume, sometime in early April, would be seen as more of a blow to the work of the Disarmament Committee than a careful and moderate explanation of our position ahead of time. The honest way is to put the matter plainly now.
I would, however, intend to make it clear in any speech that the United States is still ready to sign and put into effect a properly safeguarded treaty which would protect the world from nuclear testing. I would like to be able to say that Great Britain joined in this position. I would also plan to say that if any such agreement could be signed in the next six weeks, there would be no American atmospheric testing.
The test series which we now propose is essentially the same as that which has been discussed at length between your experts and ours. I am giving David Ormsby Gore a short memorandum which contains a precise description of the current proposals./3/ The one notable addition is a pair of what are called "systems tests." These are designed to show whether all of the components of our basic Polaris and Atlas missiles work together as well as the individual parts have done in separate testing. If we had not reached a decision to test on other grounds, these two, in my judgment, could be omitted. But once the general decision is made, I believe it would be wise to accept the strong and unanimous military advice that such tests would be necessary to give our commanders proper confidence in our basic strategic deterrent systems.
/3/Not found.
I shall be at my desk all day tomorrow, Wednesday, and would hope to be able to talk with you about this whole subject at any time that you wish./4/
/4/In his February 28 reply, Macmillan thanked Kennedy for his "message about nuclear testing. It is of course very short notice and as you frankly say represents a change in plan." Macmillan indicated that the systems tests were not along previously discussed lines, "but I agree with you on this, that in for a penny in for a pound." Macmillan asked, in order to aid in explaining the decision, that Kennedy delay his speech by a day or two, that the date of testing be postponed until May 3, and that Kennedy insert in his speech language stating that the United States and the United Kingdom would present proposals for a comprehensive test ban treaty to the Geneva Conference. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan-Kennedy Volume II) See the Supplement.
With warm personal regards,
Sincerely,/5/
/5/Printed from an unsigned copy.
139. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, February 27, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Eighteen Nation 1/62-2/62. Secret.
SUBJECT
Issues on Disarmament
1. At the Geneva meeting, which begins in two weeks, we are committed to try to make progress on all three levels of disarmament: a plan for general and complete disarmament; first steps in putting this plan into effect; and concrete measures not necessarily connected with the GCD plan. You have made these commitments in your recent exchange of letters with Chairman Khrushchev.
The Conference will present a challenge to us at three levels: making some real progress in getting disarmament agreement in the not too likely event that the Soviets are interested in so doing; conducting the discussion in such a way as to educate the participants to the realities and complexities of the problems of disarmament, whether or not we achieve useful agreements at this time; and seeking a victory in what will undoubtedly be a propaganda contest with the Soviet Union.
2. There is as yet little agreement within the government on many of the problems involved either in choosing a plan for GCD to present to the Conference, or in deciding what concrete independent measures we should offer. Accordingly, there will be many issues which you must decide in the next week or ten days. They fall into two classes: those related to plans for GCD and first steps thereunder, and those related to concrete measures of disarmament not necessarily part of GCD.
3. At present we have a broad U.S. statement of principles on GCD (25 September Statement of Principles to the UNGA) and three attempts of varying degrees of completeness to embody these principles in plans. These are the ACDA Draft Plan No. 1; the White House Staff revision of ACDA Draft Plan No. 1; and the proposals of the ACDA Memorandum of February 24./2/ None of these has been finally selected by ACDA or cleared within the government. The major features of the three principal plans are sketched below:
/2/ACDA Plan No. 1 is the same as the ninth revision of the Foster Plan; see footnote 6, Document 72. The White House revision, dated January 30, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, General 7/61-6/62. Regarding the February 24 ACDA paper, see footnote 2, Document 135.
4. ACDA Plan No. 1 proposes to achieve GCD in a series of stages that deal first with the strategic delivery vehicles of the NATO-Warsaw Pact countries and would subsequently be broadened to cover all armaments in all countries. Specifically, the first stage of the plan would reduce strategic delivery vehicles of all types of the NATO and Warsaw Pact states to parity at 1,000 vehicles for each side. Within this limit, continued production would be permitted. In the second stage, Communist China and other allies of the NATO-Warsaw Pact states would be included, and all arms would be reduced to a parity at defined levels, with a parity of 500 for strategic vehicles. Subsequent stages would apply to all countries and all arms. Inspectors would be stationed at declared production facilities, and all destruction would be verified. Inspection against undeclared activities would be based on progressive opening of zones which would result in the progressive opening up of all countries as disarmament progressed. This plan envisages establishment of an international control organization and police force during the third stage.
The White House Staff revision of ACDA Plan No. 1 proposes to achieve GCD through stages that deal from the outset with all major armaments. Initially it would apply to the NATO and Warsaw Pact States, and would subsequently be broadened to include all countries. Specifically, the first stage proposes to reduce all major armaments of the NATO and Warsaw Pact States by 30% for each individual type of weapon. From the outset there would be a complete production cutoff. In the second stage, the armaments of all countries, including Communist China, would be reduced to 40% of initially declared levels. Subsequent stages would reduce armaments by stages to final agreed levels. Inspectors would be located at declared facilities and destruction would be verified. To inspect against undeclared facilities complete access would be obtained progressively to zones so that access would be obtained progressively in direct proportion to the amount of disarmament achieved. This plan envisages establishment of an international control organization and police force during the second stage.
The ACDA memorandum of February 24 does not contain a complete plan. The alternatives it examines deal only with the first stage of a GCD plan. The apparently preferred alternative calls for a 30 percent reduction of strategic delivery capabilities of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. The paper discusses, without recommendation, whether the 30 percent reduction should be measured in terms of individual types of equipment, categories of equipment, or delivery capacity measured in megatons. The paper also discusses, without recommendation, whether or not a production cutoff should be included in the first stage. Later stages are not discussed in detail in this proposal, although presumably the agreement would be broadened to cover all armaments and all countries in a second or subsequent stage. Inspection methods are not discussed, even in broad, conceptual terms.
5. In choosing among plans there are five major issues to be considered:
a. Specificity of the plan. Do we discuss only the first stage, plus a general discussion of goals? Do we discuss the first and second stages, with a more detailed discussion of goals and some discussion of transition procedures from stage to stage? How much attention is given in the plan to the development of international peace-keeping machinery and its relation to the stages? The February 24 ACDA memorandum really discusses only the first stage. The two earlier documents are complete plans which go through all stages with more or less equal detail. Perhaps a middle position would be more satisfactory; namely, a fairly detailed discussion of the first two stages, plus some indications of how the processes might run further and the character of the ultimate goals.
b. Linkage. What should the relation be between reductions in strategic striking forces and reductions in conventional forces, and, in particular, reductions in personnel strength? Neither the first ACDA plan nor the latest memorandum provides for linkage at the outset. The revised ACDA plan does. The arguments involved are complex. On the one hand the present balance of forces is in our favor in nuclear striking power; in the Soviets' favor in conventional forces. This argues for parallel reduction in both. On the other side is the argument presented in ACDA's memorandum that we should not reduce conventional strength until we get the Chinese Communists into the agreement, and that this must be left for the second or even a later stage. This argument applies with particular force to personnel strength, but it also reaches naval and tactical air strength. Linkage avoids the difficult problem of defining "strategic" and "tactical" weapons.
c. Production cutoffs. Do we forbid new production, as well as reduce existing stocks? In essence, this is a problem of whether we limit numbers but continue to have an armaments race in the various quality dimensions of armament, or try to eliminate the race altogether. A related question is whether we define reduction in terms of individual types of weapons, or broader or narrower categories such as strategic delivery vehicles, or missiles with ranges of 6,000 km or more. A combination of reductions defined in terms of types and a production cutoff result in limiting competition in all dimensions of weaponry. Reductions defined in terms of categories, delimited in various ways, without production cutoffs, represent an attempt to allow quality competition to go on within limits.
d. Inspection and its relation to staging. A major part of the negotiability of any proposal will depend on the inspection procedures contemplated. An important general question is whether or not we wish to decide on an inspection plan now or leave the whole matter open for the conference. Both of the earlier ACDA plans rest on the notion of zonal inspection in which each side selects for inspection one of a number of previously agreed zones in the territory of the others. The memorandum of February 24 proposes no specific inspection procedure. Zonal inspection appears to be the most promising attempt yet made to meet the Soviet opposition to inspection without disarmament. It is clearly easier to operate this form of inspection if all armaments are included from the first stage. Otherwise the question of what facilities within a zone should or should not be open for inspection arises, and again the question of inspection without disarmament appears.
e. Proportionality vs. parity. There is the question of whether reductions should be by equal proportions or should have a goal of parity. This issue is really one of staging. The ultimate goal might be parity or some other agreed set of force levels, but movement toward it could be by equal proportional reductions in early stages, adjusting in later stages to achieve the agreed goal.
6. The proposed concrete measures of disarmament which are effective independently of a plan for general and complete disarmament fall into three classes: those concerned with nuclear weapons, more general measures which purport to reduce the danger of surprise attack and proposals for establishing expert study groups. The important measures of the first class are a cutoff of the production of fissionable material for military use combined with a transfer from stockpiles to peaceful uses and a nuclear test ban. The combination of the first two of these measures would provide a substantial measure of arms control. The problems inherent in them are well known. In respect to the nuclear test ban, the most important question is what controls additional to those proposed in the Geneva treaty would be needed to deal with the danger of secret preparation for testing in violation of the treaty. In connection with the production cutoff and transfer from military stockpiles to peaceful uses, the problem arises as to whether the offer of 40,000 kg per year, suggested in the ACDA memorandum of February 24, is not too one-sided even as an initial position. The relative size of our stockpiles and production facilities suggest that a 2-for-1 offer on our part might be both more attractive and a better propaganda point.
The proposals for advance notification of major military movements, the establishment of observation posts at transfer station centers, and the exchange of military missions between NATO and Warsaw Pact raise little question except as to their effectiveness. The same cannot be said about a proposal to prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons to third countries. The distinctions between transfer and the present procedures under which we operate both our NATO stockpile and the bilateral arrangements with certain of our allies is so subtle that it is difficult to see how we could succeed in explaining it in the Geneva forum in the face of the obvious target it would present for Soviet polemics. It may be better to treat this as the ACDA memorandum proposes treating the problem of an experts committee on biological and chemical warfare, something we respond to but take no initiative on.
CK
140. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, March 1, 1962.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings Jan-Apr 62. Secret. Drafted by Ewell. Bundy presided at the meeting.
SUBJECT
Daily Staff Meeting, 1 March 1962
[Here follows discussion of Latin America and the timing of the President's announcement of the resumption of nuclear testing.]
c. Disarmament. There is increasing pressure to come up with something concrete on this. Kaysen allowed as how he had been working on it. Bundy told him to look at the April draft treaty/2/ (which, incidentally, is not on disarmament but is on the nuclear test ban) to see whether it is sufficiently dramatic and forthcoming to get something out of it. The British think we can do better. Kaysen, Wiesner and Harold Brown will presumably sit down over the weekend and see if they can dream up some new ideas. Bundy cautioned Kaysen that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) is responsible for coming up with the formal papers for Presidential review, and that the White House should help them rather than steal the action from them. However, he wanted it made clear that our proposals at Geneva should be more forthcoming. I inquired as to what the purpose of this afternoon's meeting of principals would be in this context./3/ Bundy said that it would cover a lot of related "junk." However, it could be used to indicate the direction of the President's thinking. (Major Smith tells me that Raskin, who has been doing Kaysen's leg work in this area, really hasn't studied the problem enough to know what he is talking about. To be more specific, neither Kaysen nor Raskin know what is in either the disarmament or the nuclear test ban proposals, and that they don't seem to realize that the Foster Plan/4/ is new to some extent. As an example of this, several of their so-called new proposals really go back in the direction of the original papers. Major Smith is going to try to diplomatically put across to Kaysen that there is some confusion as to the basic elements of all these plans which should be clarified before anyone starts trying to develop so-called new proposals.)
/2/For text of the U.S.-U.K. draft treaty, tabled at the Geneva Conference on April 18, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 82-126.
/3/See Document 141.
/4/Reference presumably is to the ninth revision of the Foster Plan; see footnote 6, Document 72. A comparison of that plan with a White House disarmament plan is in a memorandum from William Y. Smith to General Maxwell D. Taylor, February 27. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, WYS Chron (2) T-134-69) William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, created an interagency Inspection Study Group in October 1961 "to define and evaluate the inspection and control implications of ACDA Plan 1, a comprehensive arms control program which had been developed by a panel earlier in the year." (Preface to the July 1962 Report) In addition to Foster, who chaired the Inspection Study Group, other members were Bruno W. Augenstein (DOD), Lloyd K. Belt (ACDA), Eugene C. Fubini (DOD), Larry Holmes (ACDA), George M. Kavanagh (AEC), Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr. (White House), Louis Marengo (CIA), Herbert Scoville (CIA), Stanley Van Voorhis (DOD), and Captain Frederick Welden (DOD). The report of the Inspection Study Group, July 1962, is printed as Document 207.
[Here follows discussion of the remaining agenda items.]
JJE
141. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, March 1, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-162. Secret. Drafted by Spiers and approved in S on March 3. Other accounts of this meeting are in Seaborg, Journal, vol. 3, and in a memorandum for the record by Kaysen, March 1, in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Basic Memoranda 2/62-4/62.
SUBJECT
Meeting of Committee of Principals
PARTICIPANTS
See Attached List/2/
/2/The attached list of 37 participants is not printed.
The Secretary asked Mr. Foster to outline the problem before the Committee. Mr. Foster referred to his memorandum of February 28 to members of the Committee/3/ which detailed the problems for consideration and which centered on the necessity to know where we are going as we attempt to become more precise in the forthcoming negotiations regarding the September 25 Plan,/4/ particularly the first Stage. ACDA has attempted to focus on the possibilities of reducing the power to destroy while preserving the power to deter. Mr. Foster recalled that ACDA Plan #1/5/ emphasized the exploration of the possibilities of reduction on a parity basis of strategic delivery vehicles which were at the heart of the modern nuclear threat. The February 28th memorandum suggests five alternative bases for effecting reduction in strategic delivery vehicles and also other armaments. He noted that these alternatives had been discussed with the Defense Department./6/ He would now like to get the views of the Committee on which alternative it might be most useful to pursue in further detail and which might serve as the basis for meaningful bilateral agreement with the Soviets which would avoid the necessity of including China at the early stage. The second major item for consideration was what particular methods of verification and control warranted more exploration. He referred specifically to the ACDA work on zonal inspection and sampling techniques.
/3/Not found.
/4/For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 475-482.
/5/ACDA Plan No. 1 is the same as the ninth revision of the Foster Plan; see footnote 6, Document 72.
/6/The comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a February 24 ACDA draft (see footnote 2, Document 135) are contained in their memorandum to McNamara, February 28. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 3470, McNamara Records, NATO-NSC Meeting)
At Mr. Foster's request, Admiral Parker presented a series of charts/7/ illustrating in specific terms the impact on the US and USSR's strategic delivery vehicles of each of the five approaches, i.e. reduction by types, reduction by categories, reduction by total number of vehicles, reduction by total megatonnage capacity within categories and reduction by total megatonnage delivery capacity.
/7/Not found.
Secretary McNamara expressed the wish to go back to the more general considerations after viewing the charts presented.
The Secretary inquired whether we have at hand the practical inspection techniques to verify the kind of reductions proposed. Mr. Foster said that we have good capabilities, even unilaterally, to check on aircraft. If we had as well sampling and ground control posts, the capabilities would be excellent. We do not have the same feeling of confidence with regard to inspection of reductions in the missile areas. He noted that there was an inter-departmental committee studying this problem/8/ which is reaching the conclusion that, with specified improvements, a high degree of confidence might be achieved. Dr. Wiesner noted that in the first phase there was little need for any inspection beyond verification of destruction. As the disarmament process got deeper, verification of destruction alone would not suffice. The Secretary said the broad question is whether we move toward proposals involving proportionate reductions or toward parity in reductions. Secretary McNamara said an additional basic question was whether our initial proposals should apply to conventional and nuclear armaments across the board or should be limited to reduction of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles alone. The Department of Defense would not support either limitations related only to strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or reductions on a parity basis in the initial stages. If the parity concept is to be applied, Defense would like strategic nuclear reductions tied in with conventional reductions. Therefore, he would like serious attention to be given to proposing reductions, by categories, of all important weapons--both conventional and strategic nuclear. However, he would be willing to consider as a substitute for the proposed reduction of all classes, reduction of certain classes of strategic nuclear vehicles on a proportional basis. Until some of these basic considerations had been decided, he felt it would be unproductive to discuss the details of the five possible approaches outlined in the February 28th memorandum. He noted that the JCS has serious questions on a number of these points and he asked that General Lemnitzer be allowed to comment in due course.
/8/For the report of this committee, July 1962, see Document 207.
Mr. Foster said that it was easy to speak of across the board reductions but he is much concerned by the sheer magnitude of the problem. That is why ACDA recommended the exploration of the degree of risk which might be involved, in a limited first stage, in dealing with strategic nuclear vehicles alone. Such a proposal would not only be more readily operable, it would be more negotiable. This would also allow us in the meantime to build up our conventional forces, where we are inferior. He noted that there were certain categories of strategic aircraft which would be phased out in any case in the not too distant future. Although there would inevitably be some risk in a first stage such as he was proposing, this may be worth doing because of its greater simplicity with respect to inspection. The numbers presented by Admiral Parker, in his view, indicated that there were some steps we could safely take in this direction even though they would have to be followed by conventional cuts.
The Secretary said he was interested to know whether we can begin to achieve steps in disarmament which are consistent with our security and that of our allies. From this point of view, he questioned whether the problem of administrative difficulty was really relevant. The major question was whether we impaired our security. Mr. Foster indicated his complete agreement with this observation. He was looking for the best of both worlds. In the judgment of many close students the approach that he proposed was a feasible one both from the administrative and security standpoint. This approach would not only result in saving a lot of money but have a significant effect on the possible destructiveness of war should it come.
The Secretary asked whether if we made the kind of reductions in the nuclear field of which Mr. Foster spoke we would have to build up our conventional forces. General Lemnitzer said that it was impossible to identify a precise point at which this would be the case. We were in a bad way at present regarding our conventional strength in Europe in any case. Mr. Foster agreed it was impossible to be precise. A 50% reduction in the nuclear field might indeed force us to build up our conventional armaments.
Secretary McNamara said that a proportionate reduction of 30% would probably not require more of a build-up in conventional forces than will be required anyway. He noted that he was not certain the JCS would not take the same view.
Mr. Rostow inquired whether it would not be easier, if we opted for the sampling or zonal approach to inspection, to reduce on an across-the-board basis. It would be complicated and difficult to restrict the inspection to selected weapons. Mr. Foster said he was not sure this was the case since we intended to concentrate on the big items. Dr. Wiesner agreed that it would be much easier if everything were reduced, since there would be no basis then for excluding certain plants from inspection. He thought that in the first phase it would be possible in the case of all major armaments to rely on initial declarations and upon our own unilateral intelligence capabilities; inspection of declared levels would not be required. He was not sure that it was in our military interest to concentrate only on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.
General Lemnitzer said that the JCS's view was that although the approach limited to strategic nuclear delivery vehicles might be simpler from the standpoint of counting, these should not be separated from other elements of disarmament. The JCS was also worried about omitting China. The JCS view was that nuclear reductions should be linked with conventional reductions. Further they feel it is important to move cautiously and slowly and to have a sure test of the inspection system at an early stage. Anything that limits the inspection process is "phony". If inspection is limited only to certain categories of weapons it is simpler to spoof.
The Secretary asked what the effect would be on total U.S. security if we were to propose a 30% reduction in all weapon categories across the board. Secretary McNamara observed that the answer to this could not be simple since disarmament cannot be viewed as only an alternative to the status quo--since that will not continue--but to what the situation would be in the future if disarmament did not take place. Without disarmament, the Soviets will continue to close the nuclear gap. This is why he would be willing to support disarmament action which in effect limits the increase in nuclear armaments on both sides. He felt that a 30% reduction would leave us in a stronger position than we would be in if the present situation continues. Mr. Nitze stated that an across-the-board cut of 30% in all armaments would freeze the inferiority of the United States in conventional armaments. He wondered how our allies would react to such a freeze in U.S. conventional inferiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. He noted it was highly unlikely that the allies would do what they might otherwise do to improve their conventional strength position if we adopted a program such as Mr. Foster was referring to. Mr. Foster felt that the need for improving our conventional position was another sound reason for sticking to a first stage which was limited to nuclear vehicles, although the ultimate objective is to deal with all categories of weapons. The major expected Soviet increases would be in this field; the approach he was suggesting would check this increase. Dr. Wiesner raised the question of the possibility of a stand-off with the Soviet Union; namely that the U.S. would reduce proportionately more in the strategic field than the Soviet Union, and the Soviets in turn would reduce proportionately more than the U.S. in the conventional field.
The Secretary inquired how we would establish the basis from which the reductions would begin. Mr. Foster said that we were taking a January 1, 1964 target date for a basis. We would begin on the basis of declarations of strength by either side. As the inspection capabilities increased in the early periods we would improve our possibilities of spotting any cheating in declarations. He felt that not much risk was involved in such an approach. Mr. Amory noted that the quality of our information varies drastically from one category of weapons to another. We could catch any arrant cheating in the declarations in many of the categories right at the beginning (he cited heavy bombers and tanks as an example). Mr. Foster said that we had not viewed verification of the starting level as a requirement. He described the zonal approach to inspection, which he said would probably offer the best opportunity of gradually closing in on the problem while avoiding taking a politically untenable position. Dr. Wiesner said that our unilateral intelligence information was good enough to allow us to rely on initial declarations, particularly in view of the relatively modest size of the first cuts. The Secretary observed that it might be well to have some sort of challenge procedure in the event we suspected that the declarations were substantially incorrect.
With respect to the basic question, the Secretary stated that his view was that we should adopt the proportional rather than the parity concept. He felt also that any significant nuclear cuts should be linked with cuts in the conventional area. Dr. Wiesner raised the problem of production cut-off, noting that the attractive feature of such a cut-off would be the degree it would ease the inspection problem. Secretary McNamara stated that any continuation of production would be within some formula related to the reduction. The Secretary asked for views on the five alternative approaches presented in the paper. Mr. Amory noted that the fifth alternative presented most incredible difficulties from the standpoint of inspection. He favored very much the use of categories. Secretary McNamara noted that Defense would object to approach #3, although it might be the easiest to carry out. Dr. Wiesner felt that approach #1 might be preferable. Secretary McNamara suggested that a combination of #1 and #5 might be examined. Either one could be modified in the direction of the other. He did feel, however, it was unproductive to discuss these details in this meeting and proposed that a sub-committee be established.
Mr. Bundy asked what the basis was of the 30% figure. He did not feel that this was an impressive figure over a three-year period, if the basis for reductions was total megatonnage capacity. Why not, for example, a 20% cut each year? The Secretary preferred the small number in view of our special geographic disadvantage vis-à-vis the USSR. Mr. Rostow said that he was not worried about the propaganda drawbacks in the 10% a year proposal. It had a serious ring to it and would meet the world's appetite for some kind of a down-turn in the present situation. Mr. Foster said that 30% was quite substantial enough and would meet the pressures we were under for early specifics from our allies. Mr. Fisher noted that this general percentage fitted in with the 2.1 million force level in the first stage of the September 25th Plan.
Mr. Foster inquired whether it was the sense of the meeting that it would be best to work for an across-the-board cut of about 30% over a three year range. If this was the case, we could work out more of the specifics for presentation to the President on Tuesday./9/
/9/March 6.
Secretary McNamara said that he could accept this expression of consensus. While he preferred a reduction of all weapons he believed that it would be well to study as an alternative, the plan for proportionate reduction limited to strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. He proposed the establishment of a technical sub-committee to consider the five approaches and possible modifications thereof. Mr. Kaysen said that we could substantially improve our position by talking in a more forthcoming way about the follow-on second stage and making clear that we were thinking of a similar or even larger cut in this subsequent stage, assuming the first stage went well. Dr. Wiesner agreed.
Mr. Rostow asked how specific we could be with regard to inspection. Mr. Foster said that we would be in a position to discuss the zonal approach on an informal basis with the Soviets but that we would not be ready with all of the details required for a formal proposal. We could indicate our willingness to explore ways of ensuring that the "intrusion" was proportionate to the disarmament involved.
Secretary McNamara proposed that we agree to pursue three areas of study: (1) the specifics relating to a 30% proportionate reduction in all major weapons categories, conventional and nuclear; (2) a similar reduction limited to specified categories of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles; and (3) a sub-committee to study the five approaches and to develop any necessary modifications in them. He said that he considered that such reductions could be accomplished as between the U.S. and USSR, without involving China, although an escape clause of some kind would be necessary and we could not go beyond 30% without China. He said that the sub-committees studying the first and second problems should consider also the kind of formula which might govern cut-off of production in both cases. In answer to a question by Mr. McGhee, Secretary McNamara said that he would not propose exceptions be made in "defensive" weapons. If we were to reduce our ICBM's he would want to insist that Russian SAM's be reduced.
Mr. Kaysen said that we need specifics on the inspection problem as well, in view of the central place inspection has had in our disarmament position. He felt we should organize ourselves to present a decision-issue to the President on Tuesday on the zonal inspection approach. We should decide whether this approach is good enough to warrant discussion with the Soviets. Mr. Foster noted that ACDA recommended the zonal approach as a basis for further study within the United States Government. Mr. Marengo reported on the work of the interagency inspection group which would meet again next Monday. Secretary McNamara said that he was not yet in a position to decide on the specific acceptability of the zonal approach although he could accept, in principle, the concept of inspection being proportionate to the disarmament accomplished. Mr. Kaysen said he had not wanted to imply that we should be pressed to decide on details such as the number of zones, etc.
With respect to transfer of fissionable material from past production, Mr. Amory said that since US-USSR stockpile ratios were on the order of five-to-one, we should be willing to offer to transfer material on at least a two-to-one basis with the Soviets. He suggested we offer to make an initial transfer of 100,000 kilograms to 50,000 from the Soviets. Secretary McNamara noted that the JCS has not yet accepted the idea of a transfer on a one-for-one basis, although he, himself, was quite prepared to accept this. General Lemnitzer said that all of the Chiefs were not yet ready to go along with a one-for-one transfer until they had seen the results of our next series of tests.
Dr. Wiesner said that he thought it was better to make no proposal than a one-for-one proposal since this would be so clearly non-negotiable and would not be taken seriously by the Soviets./10/
/10/Seaborg's account of this March 1 meeting concluded: "There seemed to be general agreement that inspection to account for planes is quite feasible and that inspection to account for missiles is much more difficult, but probably not impossible. The consensus of the meeting seemed to be that the U.S. policy should be: (1) a proportionate reduction of all nuclear and conventional weapons and that this would include a cut-off of production of fissionable material; or alternatively (2) a proportionate reduction of any strategic nuclear capacity, including cut-off of production of fissionable material; and (3) a choice should be made between the five alternatives described in the memorandum of February 28th to effect 30% reductions, with a general feeling that a combination of alternatives (1) and (5) would be most desirable. It was decided that there would be committees to work on each of these three points and possibly a fourth committee to work on the general inspection problem and its sampling and zonal features." (Journal, vol. 3, pp. 240-241)
142. Letter From the Minister of the British Embassy (Hood) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, March 2, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, Atomic Energy-Armaments, 62. Secret. Attached to the source text is a March 2 note from Battle (S/S) to Halla (ACDA) asking Halla to take "appropriate action" on the letter.
Dear Mr. Secretary: The President and the Prime Minister have exchanged messages recently about the resumption of nuclear tests.
One of the points made in the Prime Minister's message of February 28/2/ was that it would not be easy to open the Geneva Conference by tabling again the Draft Treaty on a Nuclear Test Ban of April 1961. The Prime Minister added that we have some other ideas which we wish to put to the United States Government. In his reply of March 1,/3/ the President said that he agreed with the Prime Minister that we ought not to tie on tight to the Treaty of April 1961; he went on to say that he was instructing his experts to work at full steam with the British experts so that a really good offer on the nuclear test ban deal could be made at Geneva.
/2/See footnote 4, Document 138.
/3/President Kennedy's reply to Macmillan, dated February 28, not March 1, was transmitted in telegram 4608 to London. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/2-2862) See the Supplement.
This point was discussed, I think, subsequently by the Ambassador and Mr. McGeorge Bundy./4/ In addition, the Minister of State, who has been attending the recent disarmament talks, has talked about it to Mr. Arthur Dean, and gave him copies of a memorandum dated February 3 drawn up by Sir Michael Wright, which illustrates some of our ideas./5/ Since then the Ambassador has prepared a further memorandum on this question, and I have been instructed by the Foreign Office to put this to you as representing some first thoughts so that your experts may take it also into account in developing your own ideas. I enclose two copies.
/4/No record of this discussion has been found.
/5/This memorandum from Sir Michael Wright, British Alternate Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, has not been found.
In view of the importance which both the Prime Minister and the President attach to the presentation of a modified proposal to the Russians at Geneva, I hope it will be possible now to work something out very soon.
I am sending a copy of this letter, with the Ambassador's memorandum, to Mr. McGeorge Bundy.
Yours ever
Hood
Enclosure
Memorandum by the British Ambassador (Ormsby Gore)
Washington, March 1, 1962.
NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
The President has now indicated that he would like to present a modified test ban treaty when the Geneva conference meets on March 14. He would not want to add control provisions to guard against preparations for testing in this context.
I suggest that to meet the present requirements a modified treaty should be based on two criteria. First of all, it should look like an offer which world opinion would regard as reasonable and capable of acceptance by the Soviet Union if they had any serious intention of reaching an agreement. Secondly, it should be a treaty which, in the unlikely event of the Soviets agreeing to it, we and the United States could live with.
In the time available before March 14 I cannot see how we and the Americans could hope to work out a complete draft treaty based upon some new set of principles. In addition, it might be a bad precedent to abandon at this stage the experts' report of 1958 when we have gone on record with the view that the best method of proceeding in the disarmament field is to get the experts to solve the technical problems involved and then to translate their findings into a political agreement.
In these circumstances, what modification to the April 1961 treaty could we offer which would look like a genuine attempt to reach agreement with the Russians? One way I suggest would be to meet, so far as is possible, all the major Russian objections which they originally advanced against the United States-United Kingdom proposals of last April. The major points of difference between the two sides were really four: the length of the moratorium, the single administrator, the number of control posts and the quota of inspections. I do not think that at this stage it is worth bothering about the minor differences on criteria for inspections, on the division of contributions to the budget, etc., as these make no impact on the public and could certainly be resolved if the major differences had been removed.
I therefore take the four major points of difference in order and suggest how we might alter the draft treaty in order to meet the Russian objections to the maximum extent.
Length of Moratorium
The best solution would be to do away with the moratorium altogether and make the treaty comprehensive from the date of signature. We were already prepared to accept a 3-year moratorium on underground testing so that the additional risk we might run applies only to the subsequent years, and my impression is that scientific opinion would now support the thesis that small clandestine underground tests, if they were possible, could not significantly alter the present balance of nuclear power. If however it is thought undesirable to drop the whole idea of a moratorium on underground tests for a fixed period, then we might accept the Russian proposal for a 5-year moratorium. Here again the additional risk of clandestine tests giving the Russians a significant military advantage seems to me to be acceptable. In this case, therefore, we would either meet or better Soviet demands.
A Single Administrator
Here we can obviously not accept the Soviet demand for a troika but we might put forward a proposal which precisely followed the arrangements that the Russians agreed to in respect of the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations. These arrangements were accepted by the Russians as recently as last October and it would be distinctly awkward for them to oppose such arrangements without exposing themselves to the charge of inconsistency and even implied criticism of U Thant's impartiality which would go down very badly with all the neutral countries.
Number of Control Posts
We have proposed 19 for the U.S.S.R., and the latter have insisted on no more than 15. We were in fact prepared to go down to a figure of 17. It is of course possible, by juggling the grid proposed by the experts, to increase or decrease the number of posts within the borders of the U.S.S.R. If such juggling can really produce a figure as low as 15, I think we should accept it. The effectiveness of the control system is not going to turn on whether there are 17 posts within the Soviet Union or 15 posts within and 2 just over the border outside. Here again, if we agree to 15 control posts we shall have met the Russian demands one hundred per cent.
Quota of Inspections
Here we are wide apart. We claim 20 inspections per year, the Russians offer 3. I suggest that we accept 3 veto-free inspections a year and then add some such proviso as the following:--
"Should the quota of veto-free inspections have been exhausted and a further seismic event take place on the territories of any party that meets the criteria for an unidentified event which might be suspected of being a nuclear explosion, then any party to the treaty may request a further inspection, such a request not to be unreasonably refused. The unreasonable refusal by any party of such requests shall constitute a breach of Article 2 of this treaty."
This proposal would look to the general public very like an acceptance of the Russian offer of 3 inspections a year, since I doubt whether they would be very much concerned with the small print. On the other hand it could be shown that in practice this proposal would enable us to do all the inspections we wanted, even up to the figure of 20 per year. If the Russians refused our reasonable requests for inspections above the quota of 3, we could then withdraw from our obligations under the treaty. I think we in the U.K. have always felt that if the Russians signed such a treaty the chances are that they would probably abide by it; but if they did cheat, as I have indicated earlier, the carrying out of some small undetectable underground tests could hardly affect the nuclear balance in the world.
A variation of this proposal would be to suggest a quota of 5 veto-free inspections a year. This would still look like a very reasonable offer to the rest of the world.
To sum up, I think we should base ourselves upon the treaty into which we have put three years of work, but as regards the four most important points in our draft treaty to which the Soviet Union took exception last year, we should in two of the cases meet them one hundred per cent. In one case we would look as though we had met them one hundred per cent, and in the fourth case over the Administrator we would be making an offer which would seem reasonable to the vast majority of nations and which it would be difficult for the Russians to argue against. Such a treaty offer would have a very considerable impact on world opinion and in the unlikely event of the Russians agreeing to it, I believe it would be defensible on scientific grounds and would constitute a minimal risk to Western security.
(D. Ormsby Gore)/6/
/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
143. Editorial Note
On March 2, 1962, in preparation for his address to the nation on nuclear testing and disarmament, President Kennedy and senior administration officials briefed the bipartisan Congressional leadership. Glenn Seaborg summarized the briefing as follows:
"From 4 p.m. to 4:45 p.m. I attended a meeting the President called for the purpose of briefing the bipartisan leaders of Congress on his decision to resume atmospheric testing. Present were: the President, Senators Anderson, Mansfield, Russell, Pastore, Dirksen, Fulbright, Saltonstall and Hickenlooper; Congressmen Holifield, Price, McCormack, Van Zandt and Vinson; Secretary McNamara, John McCone, Harold Brown, Mac Bundy and I. The President described the general outline of the announcement that he intends to make on nationwide television tonight. Following this McCone gave a description, using charts, of the results of the Russian tests and their significance. Brown then made a brief statement regarding the four classes of tests in the U.S program: (1) effects, (2) advanced concepts, (3) verification, and (4) systems. I mentioned in particular the 2000 kilometer test to develop a capability for testing in outer space and also the role that Johnston Island and Christmas Island will play.
"The President said that Prime Minister Macmillan asked him to delay his announcement until today; the original plan had been to make the television announcement last night. The President said that the only dissenting message from a Head of State which should be taken seriously was from Japan. Countries like England, France, Switzerland, etc. have expressed approval. Senator Anderson said he feels the Soviet Union would accept our offer for a Treaty but in such a manner that prolonged negotiations would result; but the President assured him he meant it should be a signed Treaty before the deadline mentioned. The President said that we won't announce the number of tests, but merely give a general description of the types and total fallout. It was the unanimous reaction of the members of Congress present, voiced individually by such people as Vinson, McCormack, Mansfield, Dirksen and Hickenlooper, that the President has made the proper decision in the proper way." (Seaborg, Journal, volume 3, pages 243-244)
From his office in the White House at 7 p.m. the same day, President Kennedy delivered a major radio and television address on nuclear testing and disarmament. The President reviewed the U.S. attempts to achieve "an effective world-wide end to nuclear tests," which would check the nuclear arms race, and the Soviet Union's breaking of the moratorium in September 1961, which had prompted his decisions to renew underground tests and to begin preparations for atmospheric tests. Following the National Security Council's completion of its review of the Soviet tests, the President continued, he had authorized the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense earlier that day to conduct a series of atmospheric tests "beginning when our preparations are completed, in the latter part of April and to be concluded as quickly as possible (within two or three months)--such series, involving only those tests which cannot be held underground, to take place in the atmosphere over the Pacific Ocean."
In his address, President Kennedy provided an extensive review of the recent Soviet test series and the U.S. security needs that required additional U.S. tests, including some aboveground tests. He also emphasized the determination of the U.S. negotiators to reach a comprehensive disarmament agreement at the opening of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva on March 14. "And of greatest importance to our discussion tonight, we shall, in association with the United Kingdom, present once again our proposals for a separate comprehensive treaty--with appropriate arrangements for detection and verification--to halt permanently the testing of all nuclear weapons, in every environment: in the air, in outer space, underground or under-water. New modifications will also be offered in the light of new experience."
For full text of the President's address, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, volume I, pages 66-75.
144. Editorial Note
On March 3, 1962, Chairman Khrushchev sent President Kennedy a long message on disarmament, which in turn was a reply to Kennedy's February 25 message to him (see footnote 5, Document 133). For text of Khrushchev's March 3 message, see volume VI, Document 38, or Documents on Disarmament, 1962, volume I, pages 75-81. On March 5, the President replied as follows:
"I have received your message of March 3, and I am glad to know of your agreement that the meeting in Geneva on March 14 should be opened by Foreign Ministers. I am particularly glad that Mr. Gromyko will be able to join with Lord Home and Secretary Rusk before the meeting for preliminary discussions; our hope is that these conversations might begin on March 12. It will be the purpose of the representatives of the United States, headed by Secretary Rusk, to make every possible effort to find paths toward disarmament.
"Our object now must be to make real progress toward disarmament, and not to engage in sterile exchanges of propaganda. In that spirit, I shall not undertake at this time to comment on the many sentiments in your letter with which, as I am sure you know, the United States Government cannot agree. Let us, instead, join in giving our close personal support and direction to the work of our representatives, and let us join in working for their success."
This message, drafted by Vincent Baker (ACDA/IR) and cleared by Kohler, Foster, Spiers, Bundy, and Secretary Rusk, was transmitted to the Embassy in Moscow, with instructions to deliver this reply to Khrushchev's March 3 letter. (Telegram 2037 to Moscow, March 5; Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-562) The letter is also printed in volume VI, Document 39.
Secretary Rusk was in Geneva March 10-27 for the meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.
145. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, March 6, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/3-662. Confidential. Drafted by Goodby.
SUBJECT
Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations
PARTICIPANTS
Lord Hood, Minister, British Embassy
Mr. Wilkinson, First Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. Foster, ACDA/D
Ambassador Dean
Mr. Conger, ACDA/D
Mr. Goodby, ACDA/IR
Lord Hood came in at his request to give London's preliminary comments on possible modifications in the April 18, 1961, test ban treaty/2/ as suggested by the United States in the paper which is attached. Lord Hood said that in general London was disappointed by the US paper, particularly since the Prime Minister and the President had taken the initiative to make a success of the Geneva conference. London felt that in the nuclear test ban field the United States and United Kingdom ought to go further to meet the Soviet position than they had hitherto done. In proposing modifications to the US-UK draft treaty, proposals of real substance should be put forward so long as basic principles of control were not sacrificed. The British felt that ideas of the kind advanced by Ambassador Ormsby-Gore ought to find their place in any proposal that we make.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 140.
Turning to the US paper Lord Hood said that the British welcomed Item No. 1 (reducing the threshold). The British hoped that we would be able to go all the way to a comprehensive treaty. Mr. Foster remarked that at this point the United States had not concluded its review of this particular idea but the more it was explored the less acceptable it seemed to be.
Continuing to refer to the US paper, Lord Hood commented that Item No. 2 (speeding up the inspection process and inspecting for preparations) seemed to be aimed at meeting the ideas the President had put out in a press conference concerning preparations./3/ Mr. Foster said that this was correct; the problem of inspecting for preparations was admittedly a difficult one but the United States was working on it. Lord Hood said that items 2. A. and 2. C. (speeding up on-site inspection) seemed sensible to London although the Soviets would, of course, dislike these two proposals. London felt that neither of these proposals would be likely to get anywhere unless there were other elements which would appeal to the Soviet Union. Mr. Foster said that he was personally concerned by the thought that the United States should have to make further concessions to the Soviet position. Lord Hood replied that the passage of time might have certain consequences in the sense that there might be certain concessions we could make now which might not have been feasible earlier.
/3/Reference presumably is to the President's concerns about any delay in the implementation of the provisions of a disarmament treaty negotiated with the Soviet Union, which he expressed at his press conference on February 7. See Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, p. 31.
Turning to Item 3 (six months delay in being relieved of treaty obligations) the British felt that this proposal would not accomplish very much and they rather disliked the idea of putting it forward.
With respect to Item 4 (a nuclear "package" to include a test ban), London felt that it would be preferable to avoid linking the test ban to other disarmament measures. London preferred to keep this as a separate item. Amb. Dean stated that the United States was inclined to agree but that Tsarapkin had always talked about a test ban as involving no real disarmament. On the other hand, it would clearly take some time to negotiate a package of measures. Mr. Foster stated that in the context of the late April deadline for signing a test ban treaty there did not appear to be too much validity in presenting a package proposal for the Soviets to accept. Lord Hood agreed and pointed out that a test ban would, of course, be one element in a broader approach.
Lord Hood then inquired whether the United States had arrived at any views on ideas advanced by (see attachment B)/4/ the British. Mr. Goodby said that we had looked into the question of arrangements under which the UN Secretary General had been appointed and exercised his office and had been informed that the Soviets seemed to have more of their position already written into the test ban treaty than we could give them by offering this kind of a suggestion. In the first place, U Thant had been appointed with no prior understandings about deputies. After being appointed, he had stated that he would consult with the Soviet and US under secretaries. We had already provided in our treaty that there would be two deputy administrators appointed from each of the two nuclear sides. Amb. Dean pointed out that offering the Soviet Union the proposal mentioned by Ambassador Ormsby-Gore might be considered a retreat. As a talking point it might have some value, however. On the question of the quota and the number of control posts, Mr. Foster stated that his personal belief was that the United States should not make concessions in these areas. In particular, Mr. Foster stated, the way the British proposal on quota was drafted looked as though the Wets might get four inspections annually but not 12 to 20. Concluding the discussion Lord Hood remarked that going to the comprehensive treaty seemed to be the most constructive thing which we could do. Mr. Foster replied that perhaps the threshold could be reduced but it would be difficult to make the treaty comprehensive from the outset.
/4/Attachment B is an extract from Ormsby Gore's March 1 letter to Rusk attached to Document 142. The extract, not printed here, comprises the five paragraphs outlining the four major points of difference between the U.S.-U.K. and Soviet positions on nuclear testing.
Attachment A
Washington, March 3, 1962.
ACDA MEMORANDUM
We are now urgently studying several possible modifications in our position on the draft test ban treaty of April 18, 1961, as follows:
1. We are considering reiterating and possibly elaborating our proposals of last August 28 with respect to lowering the threshold./5/ It may be possible to make the treaty a comprehensive one, to all intents and purposes, from the very beginning.
/5/See Document 57.
2. We are considering proposals for giving greater authority to the Preparatory Commission provided for in the April 18 treaty. For example, the Preparatory Commission could:
(a) Upon receipt of data indicating a suspicious event had occurred in the territory of an original party, make arrangements for verifying the nature of the event through an on-site inspection.
(b) Arrange for observers to visit known or declared nuclear test sites used by the original parties in order to check whether preparations for testing had reached an advanced stage.
(c) Begin the construction of control posts in the territories of the original parties as soon as the treaty is signed. Arrangements worked out by the Preparatory Commission for performing the above functions could be carried over, as agreed, into the period between ratification of the treaty and the date upon which control posts begin to provide data.
3. We are considering proposing a new article to the treaty providing that no party to the treaty could be legally freed from its obligation not to test nuclear weapons in outer space, in the atmosphere, on or under the oceans, and underground if such tests produce signals of 4.75 seismic magnitude or above, until six months after such party had given notice of its intention to withdraw from the treaty. Under the present treaty it is legal to withdraw from the treaty one day and to test the next.
4. We are considering making an offer for a "nuclear disarmament" package, which would link a test ban to one or more disarmament measures, such as the cut-off of production of fissionable material for use in weapons. It would then be possible to merge the control systems required for the various measures. The control system for a nuclear test ban might then not be at all disproportionate to the measures proposed.
146. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, March 6, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, 18-Nation Committee, Geneva, 3-62. No classification marking. The source text, dated March 7, bears no drafting information.
SUBJECT
Meeting on Disarmament, Cabinet Room, March 6, 5:00-7:00 PM /2/
/2/A summary of the decisions reached at this meeting are in General Maxwell D. Taylor's memorandum for the record, March 7. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-37-71) See the Supplement.
PRESENT
The President; The Vice President, The Secretary of State and Messrs. Foster, Dean, Fisher, McGhee, Kohler and Farley of State Department; the Secretary of Defense, General Lemnitzer, and Messrs. Nitze and McNaughton of Defense Department; Mr. Amory, CIA; Chairman Seaborg, Atomic Energy Commission; Dr. Wiesner, Mr. Schlesinger, Mr. Keeny, Mr. Kaysen, White House
Secretary Rusk began the meeting by some comments on the problem of procedure at the Geneva meeting. He raised the possibility that it might be more desirable to seek a procedure which would avoid opening statements and would resolve the Conference into committees as quickly as possible. The President then indicated that he wanted first to consider the questions on the modifications that were desirable or necessary to the April test ban treaty. These changes had to be considered in the light of his speech, our relations with the UK, and the political acceptability of the treaty at home. Dr. Wiesner and Ambassador Dean indicated that there were possible desirable modifications on the time lapse before the international control system began to work and reporting began, and on the number of control posts. Dr. Wiesner raised the question of dropping the threshold and also of allocating the on-site inspection in different parts of the Soviet Union in proportion to the seismic activity. There was some discussion of both these points, and the President, in summing up at a later stage of the meeting, indicated that he thinks for the moment we should hold fast to the threshold as it now stands in the treaty, but that we should be willing, if the Soviets showed interest and serious discussion, to reconsider this point. As to the pro-rating matter, he indicated that this would be desirable as a point to examine, and if the ACDA and the technically competent people (AEC, Defense, Science Adviser) agreed on this question, this would be included. The proposal of keeping the UK in line with our position was discussed. The President indicated that he thinks it most important that we avoid a split, and if there is going to be a split, it would be better to come at the end of the period rather than now. He asked Secretary Rusk to follow his point. Secretary Rusk commented that the British agreed with us on the April treaty as of now. In the course of the discussion, he indicated his own feeling was that our past experience argued for a tougher treaty rather than an easier one. Perhaps we should keep things that way. The President indicated the problem raised by his discussion of modifications. On the matter of monitoring of the preparations, Messrs. Foster, Wiesner and Seaborg indicated that it was difficult to get anything that was effective. Nonetheless, the President said we had to say something on this. He then asked Mr. Foster to come up by Thursday for a Thursday afternoon or Friday meeting /3/ with agreed language on the treaty modifications, except that for the matter of preparations, it might be a discussion in memorandum form rather than treaty language.
/3/For minutes of the meeting on Friday, March 9, see Document 148.
In sum, it was agreed that we should get agreed language which can meet the needs on a shorter time interval between signing and effective operation of the control system and should say something about preparations and be prepared to speak on the number of control stations, the removal of the threshold and the proportionate distribution of inspections by zones of seismicity in the event that the Soviet Union showed interest in serious discussion. In his discussion of the test ban treaty, the President repeatedly indicated that he thought good preparation on this point was of the greatest importance.
The discussion then turned to the general disarmament question and the ACDA memorandum of March 3, 1962. /4/ At Mr. Foster's request, the President asked Admiral Parker and Captain Greelee to present a briefing on the impact of the various alternative plans on the reduction of strategic delivery vehicles on our and Soviet forces. After the briefing, the President remarked that he didn't see how it was possible to come to any conclusion about which of the methods presented, Option 1, pages 9-11 of the Foster memorandum was preferable from our point of view, or even which was safe. He thought it was a problem for electronic computers and that it couldn't possibly be solved in the time available. Dr. Wiesner argued the case for a 30% across-the-board cut of all armaments applied by types (Foster memorandum, Alternative 2, page 12) and a complete production cutoff. Mr. Foster indicated his objections to freezing types and cutting off production of the R&D. Secretary McNamara said he thought this a highly complicated question which obviously required more study. The President raised the question of linkage: should we confine our attention to strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or consider conventional armaments as well. Mr. Foster presented the following argument against linkage: the problem of China; the need for building up our own conventional strength; the impact of a reduction in our conventional strength on NATO; and the complications of trying to do everything at once. Secretary Rusk said that he felt that focussing on strategic delivery vehicles produced a pattern that was too complicated to make sense. The first staging of any proposal had to be thought out chiefly as a political probe and related to the cutting down of crises, such as Berlin, Viet-Nam, etc. This demanded something simple. His own judgment would be in favor of a 30% across-the-board reduction with inspection as a first stage and a production cutoff deferred until the second stage. The President raised the question of whether we were talking about categories or types. This was not immediately followed up in the discussion, but at a later point Secretary McNamara emphasized the importance of distinguishing long-range vehicles from medium and short-range vehicles in any categorization scheme for a production cutoff. The President asked Secretary McNamara and Mr. Foster to explore this and come to an agreement before the next meeting on the subject, if possible, and that he should have a memorandum on the subject in advance of the meeting. There was some further discussion in which Mr. Foster indicated his preference for the proposal which focussed on strategic delivery vehicles, while Dr. Wiesner, General Lemnitzer, Secretary McNamara expressed their preferences for the 30% across-the-board proposal. Secretary McNamara and General Lemnitzer agreed that this served our security interests better than a reduction focussed entirely on strategic vehicles. The President indicated that he favored a 30% across-the-board cut with a production cutoff deferred to the second stage.
/4/Reference is to a 23-page memorandum, with 2 appendices totaling 9 pages, on the U.S. position at the forthcoming Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, which Foster sent to the President on March 3. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/DD Files: FRC 77 A 17, Chron File, Jan-Mar 1962)
Mr. Foster raised the question of what should be said about a second stage. He indicated he thought it should provide for a continuation of the reduction in armaments at a rate like that of the first stage, plus a large buildup in international peace-keeping machinery and the adherence of other states to the treaty. The President then raised the question of inspection. Mr. Foster indicated that he thought it was well worth discussing with the Soviet Union the proposal for zonal random sampling system. In addition, we had of course to bear in mind our own unilateral capabilities. He mentioned some proposed tests of our inspection capabilities in the U.S. The President asked whether we didn't need to have an inspection proposal concretely incorporated in our presentation, and Mr. Foster responded that the zonal random sampling system was the best. The President then summarized the discussion up to this point by saying that we needed by Thursday or Friday at the latest the modifications of the April treaty discussed above in as good shape as we could get them, and agreed with the UK, and a proposal for at least the first stage of a GCD plan with the 30% across-the-board reduction of all armament but with a production cutoff deferred until the second stage. Mr. Foster raised the question of the cutoff of fissionable material production with an offer of 40,000 kg transferred to peaceful uses. There was some discussion about whether this offer was big enough, in light of our estimates of our own and Soviet production and stockpile vehicles. The President indicated that he was perfectly willing to raise the offer to 60,000 kg as against 40,000 kg for the Soviet Union. General Lemnitzer pointed out that other members of the Joint Chiefs were against any transfer, but he himself was in favor of a transfer offer if it were in equal amounts. The President decided then that we should begin with an offer of equal amounts but be willing to bargain on this point. Secretary Rusk raised the tactical issue again. In the ordinary course of events, he would expect to make a speech at Geneva next Thursday or Friday (15th or 16th), but his own preference was to avoid speech-making by heads of delegations. Therefore he was not sure he would make one.
147. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, March 8, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-862. Secret. Drafted by Spiers.
SUBJECT
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
PARTICIPANTS
USACDA/D--Mr. Foster
ACDA/ST--Dr. Long
ACDA/IR--Mr. Spiers
Ambassador Dean
UK Embassy
Ambassador Ormsby Gore
Mr. Peter Wilkinson, First Secretary
Ambassador Ormsby Gore apologized for feeding in more "bright ideas" from the UK on the nuclear test issue and handed Mr. Foster the paper attached at Tab A.
After reading the document, Mr. Foster observed that there was one major new proposal, i.e., the dropping of international control posts in Soviet territory. He observed that this suggestion would not be acceptable to Congress and the American public. Ambassador Ormsby Gore inquired whether the fundamental U.S. position was to build on the present treaty and not to consider any substantial departures from it. Mr. Foster said this was the case, although it was possible that we would choose simply to stand on the present treaty without any changes.
Ambassador Ormsby Gore said that the U.K. feels strongly that after the statement of the President regarding the modifications which would be suggested at Geneva, it will be necessary to put forward a proposal which seems reasonable both to our own and to world public opinion. We need to offer the Soviets a "new choice." The U.K. agreed that the controls incorporated in the offer must be scientifically adequate and offer a reasonable safeguard to national security. However, two elements in the over-all situation had changed since last April. First, there had been some important technical advances that suggested there would be even further improvements. Dr. Long asked what the new U.K. evidence was. Ambassador Ormsby Gore said that he could not discuss the details until tomorrow, since his "brief" had not arrived. Continuing, he said that the second element was our assessment of the advantage to be gained by one side or the other from undetected underground tests. Such advantage was apparently much smaller than we had heretofore thought and this should change our approach to the importance of controls in this area. He noted that this was an argument used by the President in justifying atmospheric testing. Mr. Foster agreed that we would not be as frightened about underground testing as before, but such testing was useful, particularly in the area of small weapons. He said that the US had spent some $50 million last year on Vela. Although areas had been uncovered which showed some promise of improvements, the actual progress was relatively small. Ambassador Ormsby Gore said that he understood that important advances had been made in depth of focus theory. He promised further details on this tomorrow. He noted, also, the success the UK had had with a 15-array seismic equipment system. He added that it would be difficult for the West to defend itself against a Soviet attack on the 19-kt threshold when it was well known that 5-kt shots had been picked up without difficulty.
Dr. Long noted that there was a wide spread of scientific opinion in the U.S. on these points. While some of these developments showed theoretical promise, it was hard for us not to rely on the assessments of the men in charge. Ambassador Ormsby Gore asked whether it was the U.S. position that it knows of no significant technical advances justifying major changes in the control system. Mr. Foster said this was correct. He said that we had been instructed by the President to come up with an internally agreed U.S. position by 5:00 today./2/ The President believes that the treaty as it exists today is essentially the proper basis on which to proceed. However, he believes we should explore possible modifications to take care of the problem of inspection for preparations and in order to speed up the on-site inspection process. The question of elimination of the threshold is still being debated. Some believe it should be unchanged and some feel that the proper course of action for the US is to drop it entirely. He did not believe there would be any major difficulty on the question of the number of control posts and it would be possible to consider a minor liberalization in the number of inspections. Inspections might be weighted in seismic areas. He said that the President was extremely anxious that we reach an early understanding with the U.K. on how we would play our hand in Geneva. Dr. Long pointed out that the U.K. proposal seemed to ignore the problem of location. With the U.K. approach, the area subject to inspection would be huge. He felt that this was a most vulnerable point in the U.K. approach.
/2/See Document 148.
Ambassador Ormsby Gore thought that the West might be in a good position if it could move to a fully comprehensive treaty and make the modification he had suggested on the question of the Administrator. This would stand well with public opinion even though the Soviets would certainly not accept the proposal. The U.K. felt that sticking with the present treaty without change would not fulfill the promises made by the President and the Prime Minister to present modifications. He recalled that the President had said to him in response to a specific inquiry that the U.S. would not suggest any increase in the burden of inspection. Mr. Foster said that the President would be quite willing to consider elimination of the threshold if the majority of his advisers thought this was reasonable. Dr. Long said that, on balance, we were coming to the conclusion that it would be best not to change the inspection posts grid through relocation.
Ambassador Ormsby Gore said that he felt the single most important thing we could do is abolish the threshold. In addition, we could speed up the control post installation process, and make some provision for inspection of known test areas. Dr. Long felt that it might make some sense to abolish the threshold, since this would give us the possibility of on-site inspection of seismic events below the 4.75 level. Since the moratorium on sub-threshold tests is presently part of our position, we would not necessarily be giving up anything by moving to a comprehensive treaty. Mr. Foster agreed, but reiterated that his personal feeling was that the U.K. suggestion in Point 3 would be unacceptable, although he would, of course, put the matter up to the President.
Tab A
Memorandum by the British Embassy
Washington, March 8, 1962.
NUCLEAR TESTS TREATY
Our latest scientific advice is that national systems do or can provide a reasonable degree of assurance of detection of all atmospheric tests of a yield that matters, and of underground shots above an insignificant level: and that the types of shots unlikely to be detected are unlikely to affect in any serious way the balance of nuclear power.
2. At the same time, it is only reasonable that there should be some form of international system of verification to give the world some positive check on the findings of national systems and to provide a negative check if one party accused another of carrying out a test and the accused party denied the charge. This minimum international system would have at the least to comprise machinery for organising sampling flights by aircraft, for studying evidence submitted by nations and for sending inspection teams. With regard to negative checks at the request of the accused party, there would be no problem over the number of inspections. For positive checking the organisation ought to be allowed at least a quota of inspections at its request, refusal of which would be presumptive evidence of a breach of the treaty.
3. The essential point of this proposal is that there would be no permanent control posts in Russian territory which is a major Russian objection. In return we could reasonably ask for a veto-free quota of inspections of at least ten or more. It would also be reasonable to demand the right to make periodical inspections of known testing sites in order to detect preparations for testing; and to require that the Preparatory Commission should have additional authority so that some verification might start immediately on signature.
4. Finally, to meet another possible Russian objection, we hope that the Administrator of the Organisation could as we have suggested be on a comparable basis to the Acting Secretary General of the United Nations.
5. In short, we hope that the U.S. Government would join us in proposing a modified treaty on the following lines:
(a) The parties agree to conduct no more nuclear tests.
(b) An International Tests Verification Organisation with the basic structure as in the Western Treaty proposals of a Conference, a Commission, a single Administrator, and inspection machinery (but not control posts) should be established to investigate any accusation by one party that another has tested by arranging air sampling flights and by studying records produced by the parties: the Organisation may, on the basis of its study, make inspections in the territory of the accused party, to a limit of say ten occasions in any one year in any one party's territory at the request of the other side; the Organisation shall inspect any site or installation at the request of the Government responsible for that site or installation: the Organisation shall publish its findings.
(c) The Organisation should also have the right to carry out periodical inspections of known testing sites.
(d) The Organisation shall be run by an Administrator who consults with deputies broadly on the U Thant basis.
(e) The parties agree not to carry out peaceful explosions except after inspection by the Organisation of the object to be exploded and of the instrumentation of the explosion and its records.
148. Minutes of Meeting/1/
Washington, March 9, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Basic Memoranda, 2/62-4/62. Secret. The source text, which is dated March 12, bears no drafting information. An attached list of participants is not printed.
Minutes of Meeting with President held on March 9, 1962 on U.S. Position for the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference
Mr. Foster summarized the attached memoranda to the President/2/ setting forth the proposed U.S. position for the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference. He stated that the ACDA understood that the U.S. position would contain the following points:
/2/No memoranda were attached to the source text.
(1) An across-the-board cut of 30 per cent in all armaments in increments of 10 per cent a year over a three-year period. Strategic armaments would not be separated out as an initial measure.
(2) The 30 per cent cut in strategic vehicles refers to both numbers and "destructive capability." Neither "destructive capability" nor the categories into which strategic weapons would be separated have yet been defined.
(3) No production cutoff in the first phase. Whether production will be unlimited or limited to some percentage of inventories has not yet been determined.
(4) The 30 percent reduction in non-strategic armaments will involve both numbers and total weight.
(5) No reduction in inventories of nuclear warheads and BW-CW in the first stage. Our position on these problems is contingent upon the outcome of experts conferences which will be proposed.
(6) Force levels should be reduced to 2.1 million.
(7) Authority to discuss with Soviet representatives the possibility of sampling or progressive zonal inspection techniques.
(8) A cutoff of production of fissionable material for weapons and an initial proposal for the U.S. and USSR to each transfer 50 thousand kilograms of U-235 for peaceful purposes.
(9) The second stage of the U.S. plan would involve further reduction of inventories of the same magnitude as the first stage and a more stringent production cutoff.
With regard to the nuclear test ban treaty, Mr. Foster stated that ACDA recommended that we present our April 18 treaty with the amendments offered last summer/3/ and indicate that we would like to discuss methods of speeding up the installation of the control system with the Soviets. In addition, we should urgently explore the possibility of eliminating the threshold from our present treaty proposal. With regard to inspection of preparation for testing, he reported that there did not appear to be any really effective inspection measures; however, the proposal could be made to call for declarations by heads of state that preparations were not in process and to periodically inspect the principal test sites.
/3/Not further identified.
The President stated that there were three new factors in the nuclear test ban issue: (1) the problem of guarding against clandestine preparations for testing is now recognized; (2) underground tests are probably easier to inspect than previously thought; and (3) underground tests of small weapons are not as important as had previously been contended. As a consequence, the President said that a smaller number of inspections would probably be acceptable and that a serious question was raised as to the real value of the threshold in our proposed treaty in view of the three-year moratorium associated with it. Mr. McCone reviewed the history of the proposed three-year moratorium, pointing out that it had been agreed by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan at Camp David as a measure to balance our introduction of the threshold in the treaty./4/ He noted without a threshold the treaty would bar us from any future testing and that there would be some level of small Soviet clandestine tests that could not be detected. Dr. Wiesner then stated that removal of the threshold would constitute a major initiative on our part and would answer one of the basic objections to our treaty by the USSR, the U.K., and other countries. He argued that a treaty without a threshold would be more to our security advantage than a treaty with a threshold. With a three-year moratorium, we would as a practical matter almost certainly be giving up the possibility of future underground testing since such testing would not be resumed if the treaty were being honored. However, under a threshold we would not have the right to inspect detected seismic events below magnitude 4.75, even though the Geneva system could detect and locate much smaller events than this. This would give us some ability to verify that the Soviets were, in fact, honoring the treaty below the threshold down to the point of detectability of seismic events. Our unilateral intelligence could assist us with selecting the most suspicious detected events for inspection. He noted that retention of the threshold would permit Nth countries to develop and test Hiroshima-size weapons under the full treaty obligation. Dr. Seaborg stated in response to a question that there were probably no experiments critical to national security that could be conducted by either the U.S. or USSR underground below the threshold of detection of the Geneva system although the initial development of a nuclear capability could be achieved by an Nth country below the threshold of 4.75./5/ He emphasized that his principal worry was that it would be very difficult to maintain the weapons laboratories in the event that either a complete test ban was signed or a treaty with a threshold and a three-year moratorium.
/4/For text of the Eisenhower-Macmillan joint declaration on nuclear testing at Camp David, Maryland, March 29, 1960, see Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 77-78.
/5/In a March 10 letter to the President, Seaborg elaborated on his remarks:
"In response to a question from Secretary Rusk at the meeting yesterday, in which we discussed the proposed test ban treaty, I replied that I thought the U.S.S.R. probably could not make a major breakthrough by means of clandestine underground testing.
"I want to be sure that it is understood that I was speaking within the context of the discussion, namely, clandestine underground testing for a limited time period prior to the imposition of adequate controls.
"I feel that if the Russians should have a long period of clandestine underground testing, they might make substantial steps toward the development of an all-fusion weapon (that is, the so-called neutron bomb), which probably should be classified as a major breakthrough." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing)
When Seaborg telephoned McCone on March 10 to tell him he was sending this letter to the President, "McCone replied that he thinks I should bring this to the attention of the President; he feels that continued clandestine testing underground at low yields could do some harm." (Seaborg, Journal, vol. 3, p. 269)
Mr. Nitze suggested a possible alternative proposal in which we would withdraw our offer of a moratorium upon treaty signature but would agree to a complete ban without a threshold as soon as elements of the control system became operational. He pointed out that this would maintain the laboratories during the period when Soviet intentions to fulfill the treaty were being tested. Ambassador Dean stated that in his opinion it was impossible for us to withdraw our offer of a moratorium upon signature of the treaty. He pointed out that, although this was not part of the treaty, this was a firm offer that had been repeated on many occasions by both the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations. The President stated that it would be logical to give up our present threshold position for a speed-up in installation of the Geneva detection system. Ambassador Dean noted that a speed-up in installation of the system could be accomplished within the existing treaty language provided this proposal was acceptable to the Soviets.
Dr. Wiesner suggested that, if we wanted to have a nuclear test ban treaty, we should offer a complete test ban without a threshold at the outset of the negotiations and not wait to see whether or not the Soviets were willing to negotiate on our present treaty. Mr. Bundy stated that this tactic would be very effective in obtaining the support of world opinion for our position. The President asked what the position of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was on the threshold problem. He was informed that Mr. Fisher, who had just left an executive session with the Committee, reported that the Committee was skeptical about removing the threshold but that they were also skeptical of the treaty in general. The President stated that, while the views of the Joint Committee were important, it was the responsibility of the Executive Branch, and not the Joint Committee, to draft the treaty.
In response to further discussion as to whether an offer to withdraw the threshold should await Soviet initiative on the test ban problem, Mr. Bundy recommended that we should obtain the full advantage of this move at the outset of the conference.
The President concluded that if the Soviets were willing to discuss nuclear testing, we should make an initiative on the threshold proposal. He stated that he desired a treaty and wanted the world to know that we were prepared to walk the last mile to obtain it. He recalled that it was Secretary McNamara's position that an effective treaty in this area would be to our national security advantage. He did not want to be put in a position where the U.K. or other countries could maintain that we did not in fact really desire to have a test ban treaty. Secretary Rusk stated that he interpreted this to mean that every effort should be made at the conference to obtain a treaty that is acceptable to us. The President asked Mr. Foster to be certain that Ambassador Ormsby-Gore was informed of these decisions./6/
/6/In a March 10 memorandum to Ormsby Gore, Bundy transmitted to the British Government the U.S. position on the test ban question in Geneva. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Secretary Rusk's Conversations with UK Officials, 1961-1962, Vol. I) See the Supplement.
149. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, in Geneva/1/
Washington, March 10, 1962, 4:24 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-1062. Secret; Niact. Drafted and approved by Andre J. Navez (S/S). Secretary Rusk was in Geneva March 10-27 to head the U.S. Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.
Tosec 2. Eyes only from President for Secretary, Foster, and Dean.
1. This message summarizes my views on the test ban issue at Geneva and records the decisions we reached yesterday/2/ as I understand them.
/2/See Document 148.
2. In renewing discussion with the Soviets on the test ban treaty at Geneva we have three objectives to pursue. If we can get the Russians to sign a treaty which is consistent with our security interest, we wish to do so. If they are unwilling to sign a treaty and we are accordingly to test, we wish to show the world that we have gone the last mile with them and that it is their intransigence which has brought about the result. Insofar as possible, we wish to maintain a unified position with the UK on these matters, and certainly to avoid a public split.
3. In pursuing these aims we have agreed that four kinds of changes in the package which we have previously offered are appropriate.
4. First, we need to shorten the time spent between signature of the treaty and the beginning of the inspection process. This is a matter, not of treaty language, but of the functioning of the preparatory commission and thus depends on Soviet willingness to accept our goal.
5. Second, we wish to add to the treaty something on preparations for testing. Our best judgment is that a declaration in behalf of the heads of state that there will be no preparations for testing plus the right to inspect a certain number of times per year an equal number of named sites on each side is the best that we can do in this matter.
6. We should propose to drop the threshold of test events that the treaty covers from its present level to zero, i.e., a complete test ban, and thus eliminate the need for a moratorium on testing below the threshold. This change provides for a more effective control system than the combination of a moratorium and inability under the treaty to inspect events of less than threshold magnitude.
7. We should re-propose whatever changes Dean has been authorized to present since April.
8. As a final ingredient, we should propose to allocate the agreed number of inspections according to zones defined in terms of natural seismic activity.
9. This combination of changes meets what I had in mind in my speech in talking about modifications of the treaty in the light of experience./3/ It seems to me essential that the first extended public presentation of our views in Geneva should make plain not only our willingness to accept the April treaty but our willingness to offer this set of modifications.
/3/See Document 143.
Ball
150. Telegram From the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, March 12, 1962, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/3-1262. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London.
Disto 11. Dean met March 11th with UK (Godber and Wright) re test ban. Dean indicated US intends make following proposals: (1) US desires some inspection for preparations--declarations of activities re test preparations and preco inspection certain test sites. (2) US hopes shorten time between treaty signature and beginning inspection. (3) US agrees to drop treaty threshold to zero. (4) US would hope propose reallocation on-site inspections by zones within USSR. In large portion of USSR which is aseismic, i.e., no earthquakes for last ten years, we would propose minimal number annual on-site inspections.
Remainder of annual inspection quota could be utilized in seismic areas. Re point 3, Dean indicated he presently uncertain whether his instructions call for increase in number control posts and on-site inspections as part of process elimination threshold. Noted we attempting clarify this point urgently with Dept and would report results UK soonest.
Godber's general reaction, not unexpectedly, was "disappointment". UK had hoped we would be more forthcoming. True, forward movement on threshold is most appreciated by UK. Nevertheless we were backtracking on two major issues--inspection for preparation and time at which control system and inspection process would begin to operate. These would make things terribly difficult publicly, would not be welcomed in London and could not be called bold initiatives. Wright backed up Godber's disappointment. Godber explained he felt proposal to inspect for preparations was retrograde because it was going back on treaty of April 18, 1961.
Dean pointed out during test ban conference we had received solemn Sov assurances they were not testing while all the time Sov secret preparations were underway. Noted also removal of threshold and limitations of inspection in aseismic areas both forward moving proposals.
Godber said UK scientists believe real progress has been made in detection and therefore bolder proposals in order. If this not the case then US and UK scientists had better quickly get together.
Dean pointed out re inspection for preparations that declaration plus inspection of certain test sites relatively modest proposal. True we couldn't inspect labs but we had to have assurances against secret preparations for weapon field tests. Godber replied if that case, in presenting proposal we were assuming large political liability for very little in return on inspection side.
Godber asked if we ruled out all use of national systems--even in case of detection atmospheric tests. Dean replied Sept. 3 atmospheric ban offer/2/ made only to prevent extensive Sov atmospheric series and that series is now over. Wright asked if we could agree to propose only changes in April 18 draft, i.e., threshold, limited inspection aseismic areas, and last year's treaty modification, while at same time make clear that we would be prepared at appropriate time to negotiate on questions inspection preparation, keeping specifics submerged for moment.
/2/Reference is to the joint statement on nuclear testing by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan on September 3, 1961; see Document 63.
Del comment: As reported Disto 4,/3/ del not clear about circumstances under which treaty threshold would be dropped as explained first para this tel. Therefore del made no suggestion US would be prepared sign April 18 draft with three amendments noted last sentence last para above.
/3/In Disto 4, March 11, the Delegation asked the Department for clarification on the relationship between abandonment of the threshold and any increase in controls, and on U.S. willingness "to sign treaty as it now stands even without supplementary inspection for preparations and speed-up provisions." (Department of State, Central Files, 396.12-GE/3-1162)
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