President Bush's Trip to Europe

Senior Administration Official
Foreign Press Center Background Briefing
Washington, DC
May 16, 2002

       SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: (Event fed slightly in progress) -- Paris, where the president and newly reelected President Chirac will meet. The following day the president goes to Normandy -- that will be Memorial Day -- and that evening goes to Rome. The next day in Rome is the NATO-Russia Summit. The president will also meet with the leadership of Italy and the Holy Father. That's the trip -- back very late Tuesday night. So it is a week-long trip.

       The trip to Russia is in the middle, and of course the NATO- Russia Summit is also about the Russia relationship. And this is a major and important opportunity to really fulfill the mandate that both presidents felt they had at Washington and Crawford to build a new relationship -- not simply a post-Cold War relationship, but a new cooperative relationship for the 21st century. They are -- and you can pick which metaphor you want, putting flesh on the bones or filling out the agenda that they had sketched out at Crawford. And the past six months have been very active and very successful.

       This will also be the president's first trip to France and Germany, his second trip to Italy. These are our major continental allies, close friends. There's an enormous agenda to cover. We have global relations, and I expect the agenda will cover all of those issues. We look forward of course to seeing newly-reelected President Chirac, as well as Chancellor Schroeder.

       Now, because time is short, I'll turn to my colleague, who can talk about the Treaty of Moscow.

       SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you. What the presidents will sign in Moscow is properly seen as bringing down a curtain on several decades -- make it three decades worth of arms control -- and that is a good thing. It is recognized to be a good thing by both sides, because it marks the end of a relationship in which arms control was needed to regulate the behavior or the composition of the nuclear forces on both sides, because those nuclear forces were designed against one another.

       What you have here is the end of an era. You have a new treaty, which is very short. It is very short because of two things. First, it is very short because the provisions that it requires for transparency and predictability will be derived from START I's verification procedures, which remain in effect. But, second, it's a new treaty because neither side, for the first time in the history of U.S.-Soviet, U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reductions -- neither side is seeking to use this treaty to shape or drive the other side's forces in a particular direction. That is an indication that we are comfortable that the Russians can choose their own way to reach a level of 1,700 to 2,200 strategic warheads. And the Russians are comfortable that we can do the same thing. This mean that we have moved from the zero-sum game relationship of the past three decades of arms control, where one side perceived itself getting an advantage only disadvantaging the other side, to a situation where both sides win. The treaty, as you know, reduces each side's deployed strategic nuclear warheads to some level between 1,700 and 2,200 by the end of the year 2012.

       Each side, as I said, will reduce according to its own plans. It will be -- the document will be in the form of a treaty to be ratified by the Senate of the United States and by the Russian Federation legislature, the Duma and the upper house as well, Federation Council.

       This treaty is good for the United States, because it provides a document which allows us to make clear to Russia that we are going to be legally bound by the reductions agreed by the two presidents. It is good for Russia, because it allows predictability, and it allows the Russian government and the Russian people to understand that the reductions agreed upon by the two presidents will in fact outlast their respective presidencies. As I say, it is good for Russia in that it allows Russia to structure its forces in ways which it chooses, which avoids economic burdens otherwise imposed by previous arms control agreements.

       And it is good for the strategic relationship because it signifies that the two presidents have put into action that which they have been saying about their relationship; that is, the Cold War is over, the adversarial arms control relationship is over. This will be the last so-called arms control summit. From now on we will be focusing on things in the relations between our two countries, which my colleague will describe in detail, which are the kinds of things that are normally found in the relations between friendly states, not in the relations of states which are in some sort of adversarial position.

       Now, why don't I stop there, and the two of us can take your questions.

       Q Andrei Sitov from Tass from Russia. Two questions. It looks like the peacekeeping was dropped from the list of areas where NATO and Russia will cooperate. Is that a true impression? And how did that at least evolve? Generally speaking, what's new in the new relations, other than the previous council? And I have a question, a technical question.

       Oh, the question for -- (briefer's name omitted) -- is today in the morning a senior administration official was quoted as saying there will be a cooperation on ABM between -- at least it will be proposed by the president. Will that include commercial cooperation, including the possibility of Russian companies taking part in work on the ABM?

       SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I'll answer the second one first. I think it's a little more straightforward. There is -- one of the other documents being prepared for the summit in addition to the strategic arms treaty, the Treaty of Moscow, is a document which is a broad political statement of shared goals and objectives. That document will contain references to U.S.-Russian cooperation on missile defense; that cooperation to include the research and development, to include field exercises, and potentially to include working with NATO and other countries to develop and field new systems. So there is a broad hope for cooperation in the area of missile defense. And I should note that one of the things that is very important about that statement in the political declaration which will come out of Moscow, and the treaty, is the fact that for years -- for decades -- the arms control community said the ABM Treaty is essential to any future strategic reductions. Drop the ABM Treaty, and you will restart the nuclear arms race. There cannot be further reductions if the ABM Treaty is no longer in place. That turns out not to be true, and this is demonstrable. W hat you have here is a situation where the United States is leaving the ABM Treaty for right and proper purposes, and the presidents are about to sign a document which will cut the existing nuclear forces, strategic nuclear forces of both sides, by about two thirds.

       SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: The new NATO-Russia Council is an element, a very important element of the new strategic relationship, both between the United States and Russia and between Russia and NATO. As we move beyond the Cold War and the immediate post-Cold War strategic relationship that my colleague described, we are moving into an area of common strategic concerns.

       The NATO-Russia Council will allow us to build on this, project by project, moving forward.

       It allows Russia and NATO to work together as partners without -- without the adversarial sense that has dogged previous efforts to do so. I believe that there's a strong possibility that this will be -- that we will look back on this as a turning point in the development of a common security understanding between Russia and the West, and part of the integration of the West and Russia together.

       We are very hopeful about this. It takes the adversarial zero- sum relationship out of Russia's strategic relations with its Western neighbors, which is in everybody's interests. There is a list of initial projects for cooperation. It's important that we make this list a success and show a track record of success, and move on from there. We are very hopeful that this can work in the way -- both sides -- in the way both sides intend.

       The -- this process will continue, and it will make issues like NATO enlargement much less painful and contentious.

       Oh, the list was developed over a period of a couple of months, and I don't remember all the back and forth, but this is -- as far as peacekeeping goes, NATO and Russia are already working together in the Balkans, and have done so successfully. So the question doesn't -- and they will continue.

       Q Simon Marks (ph) from Feature Story News. A couple of questions away from the arms control issue. Could you expand a little bit on the contacts that the president will have with civil society representatives in Moscow? Will he be taking any specific action to emphasize issues like freedom of the press and other open society reforms? And, also, can you tell us whether there will be any progress expected on some of the economic disputes between the two countries, specifically the one about chickens that I know he has expressed concerned about?

       SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I love the chicken issue too. We all do, and we have all become experts. You'd be surprised. That is a serious trade dispute, and we take it seriously. At the same time, it is interesting that a trade dispute -- trade disputes are what happen between countries that have normal relations. Countries that are the best of friends have trade disputes. That's what happens. It's not that I look forward, that we look forward to trade disputes as a mark of progress. But the fact that we -- Secretary Powell has put it this way: We used to worry about exchanging missiles; now it's worried about trade in chickens. That's progress of a sort. We obviously hope for progress.

       You asked about civil society. In fact, the president does plan to meet with a broad spectrum of representatives from civil society and religious groups while he is in Moscow. President Bush and President Putin agreed to set three so-called dialogues -- a business dialogue, a banking dialogue and a dialogue on media entrepreneurship. The concept was to bring private sector leaders of both sides, of both countries, together to work together and to formulate recommendations to governments about how commercial relations could be enhanced; and, with respect to media how conditions could be strengthened for development of a commercially-viable independent private media industry in Russia. And these dialogues will meet with both presidents during the trip.

       Q (Off mike) -- Italian News Agency, ANSA. I have two very practical questions, and then a question on the European part of the trip. The two practical questions: Who is traveling with the president? Dr. Rice is traveling with the president? Secretary Powell is traveling with the president? And, if you can be more detailed on the program in Rome, the visit with the Pope will follow the summit or will precede the NATO summit?

       And a question on European relations. Before, at the eve of the French elections, President Bush expressed concern about the anti- Semitism and xenophobia rising in Europe. After the French election and after what happened in the Netherlands, will it arise again the question with President Chirac and Chancellor Schroeder?

       SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: With respect to the trip -- well, with respect to the people accompanying the president -- Dr. Rice and Secretary Powell will of course be there, and other officials will - - a large number of other officials will be there as well. But those two certainly.

       My understanding of the schedule is that the meeting with the Holy Father will take place after the NATO-Russia summit, but I don't want to be -- schedules can change. But that's my current understanding.

       With respect to transatlantic relations and the question you raised, our relations with Europe are rooted fundamentally in shared values, and I emphasize shared values. That's one of the reasons why the U.S.-European relationship is so intense, so close, and has proven so productive over decades. We have been allies, friends, close trading partners, and this will remain so, because ultimately we are heirs to the same civilization and the same set of values. The differences -- our differences pale in comparison to what we share and our common purposes.

       We've welcomed the reelection of President Chirac, and we are delighted to be visiting him. Those -- all countries have legacies to deal with -- we have our own in the United States, Europe has its own -- and it's just a responsibility of societies to grapple as best they can with their own legacies and move forward.

       Q John Parker (ph) of the Economist. A couple more on security. Firstly, a tactical nuclear missile is going to be discussed at the summit. And, secondly, can you speak a little bit more about Russia's involvement in missiles defense? I mean, perhaps just talk about the process -- how the projects that it might be involved in going to be decided? Are they going to be decided at the summit on a bilateral basis, or are they going to be decided through the new NATO Council? How? Thank you.

       SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: As to your first question, the treaty does not cover anything except deployed strategic nuclear warheads. I am quite certain that the subject of nuclear warheads for shorter-range systems will be discussed, as it is discussed often between U.S. and Russian officials. Russia has a fairly large stockpile of those weapons. It is our judgment, which we have conveyed to the Russian side, that the size of that stockpile probably exceeds Russia's national security requirements, and also in its own way poses a risk, that the numbers of those kinds of weapons, which are generally smaller in size than strategic warheads, pose a risk of theft or diversion, and therefore that both countries would be safer -- the world would be safer if Russia destroyed more of those weapons.

       We are, however, through our Cooperative Threat Reduction, or Nunn-Lugar program, providing assistance, and have been for several years to Russia to upgrade the security of its nuclear weapons storage facilities, so as to reduce to very small levels any risk of diversion, theft or capture. But I suspect that as a matter of course these kinds of weapons will continue to be discussed as various teams from foreign ministries and defense ministries continue to meet.

       As to cooperation on anti-missile systems, whether they are against longer-range missiles or short-to-mid-range missiles, those will not be worked out in great detail at the summit. That's not the kind of place to do that kind of work. But the summit will likely set up a bilateral steering group at high levels to include officials from both the State and Defense Department and their counterparts, to continue to pursue a series of contacts which have already been made. For example, U.S. and Russian theater missile defense u nits have already been engaged in what we call table-top exercises -- not field exercises, but classroom type exercises. NATO and Russia have discussed for various means of defending small areas against short- and medium-range missile threat, and there have been discussions on the threats to both NATO countries and Russia posed by other countries' missiles. There are in addition various scientific exchanges which have taken place between the U.S. and Russia which bear on the subject of missile defense.

       What this summit will do is to try to formalize some of these arrangements and lend more official imprimatur and more vigor. as imparted by both presidents, to the relationship in the missile defense area. But it doesn't do for presidents to sit down and try to work out the very specific details of cooperation; rather to turn that over to various senior officials with competence in the area.

       Q (Off mike) -- Azerbajani News. Could you please give us any details on how will the Caspian region or Caucuses would be highlighted in the Bush-Putin meeting? The question that I am interested in particular is the resolution of the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict where the U.S. and Russia cooperate in the framework of the Minsk Group and support for Caspian energy projects.

       Will it just be the verbal reiteration of the U.S. support to those projects, or will that be actually mentioned in some official documents to be signed? Thank you.

       SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: With respect to Nagorno-Karabakh, the United States, Russia and France, as co-chairs of the Minsk Group, have been very active, and continue to be very active in the search for a settlement. In fact, this is one of the early initiatives of the Bush administration in the spring of 2001, and I think we made some good progress at the Key West talks, and we hope to be able to move ahead.

       Our two presidents have discussed issues of the South Caucasus before, and although I can't predict, I wouldn't be surprised if the South Caucasus came up again in the context of security and stability. With respect to energy cooperation, we have a very good dialogue with the Russians. Our support for the Baku-Ceyhan -- Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and other -- and multiple pipelines to transport Caspian energy to world markets is well known. It continues. And we believe that -- we believe that there ought to be a cooperative relationship between the United States and Russia in all of these areas. The CPC pipeline is -- has strong American participation, and we would welcome Russian participation in Baku-Ceyhan. This works for everyone. I can't predict how this will come out, but we are trying to see the relationship between the United States and Russia as a cooperative relationship, not a zero-sum relationship. Everyone benefits to the degree that world energy -- that energy resources reach world markets. There is certainly enough energy in the Caspian area to support multiple pipelines. We support their development on a commercial basis. Here you are.

       Q My name is -- (inaudible) -- from Der Tagespiegel in Germany, in Berlin. The chances are high in Berlin that maybe tens of thousands of demonstrators will be on the street in welcoming the president for I would think the first anti-Bush demonstration in this presidency. Are you afraid that this will I mean in a way dominate the perception of this trip, because Berlin and the demonstrations in Berlin have a history of being maybe even violent?

       SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Afraid? Certainly not. Demonstrations happen in democracies. There are demonstrations in Washington, there are demonstrations for various causes. Certainly not. We are looking forward to the trip to Germany. It's going to be -- we are looking -- the president has a strong relationship with Chancellor Schroeder. Berlin is a symbol of not just a reunited Germany but a reunited Europe. It was a symbol of freedom in the Cold War. It was a symbol of the success of that common effort for decades. We all look at this as a great opportunity. Demonstrations are what happens. Okay?

       Q Michael Bachfischer (ph) -- (inaudible) -- Germany. You said that the transatlantic relations are in pretty good shape, a few months after there were some warnings of unilateral overdrive. But still everybody is talking about the Bush-Putin -- the Bush-Putin summit, and nobody is talking about transatlantic relations. Couldn't it be that these relations have become less important in fact? And, secondly, an other question -- the problem of proliferation will be a big one in regard to the Swiss cheese approach of this new treaty, because there are many exceptions as far as the storage is concerned. It is called maximum flexibility, but that's basically what it is. Would this summit also touch these serious questions, or would it more be like a celebration of joy and mutual understanding?

       SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: The transatlantic relationship is a constant feature of journalistic essays and various comments, and it is always characterized in various ways. I can't -- every since I was a student I have been reading about the crisis in the transatlantic relationship and the crisis in NATO, and the crisis in this and that, and we are always diverging. And we have diverged -- if we had diverged -- if we have been diverging all the times it is said we are diverging, we would truly never be speaking to each other, and there wouldn't be, let us say, $2 trillion worth of trade and investment annually between the United States and Europe. So this is -- I guess it would be inaccurate of me to describe this as a parlor game between now foreign policy elites of both sides. So that's inaccurate, and I am sure I couldn't say that and mean it.

       But the -- Europeans and Americans, I will repeat, are heirs to the same civilization. We share basic values, and the differences are minor -- minor compared to what we have in common. And certainly it is important for the president to make clear the importance of the transatlantic relationship in our foreign policy priorities. So we are looking very much forward to that -- and I will let my colleagues speak about --

       SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I'm glad you mentioned that, because it's a completely false notion, which has been promulgated by some ardent arms controllers who have not even bothered to go back and look at any treaty that has ever been signed in the nuclear arms control era.

       First of all, no treaty ever signed in the nuclear area has ever destroyed a single nuclear weapons. What we used to do is destroy launchers, because those were the only things that could be verified by national technical means -- because on-site visits weren't allowed. Beginning with START I, on-site visits were allowed, and people were allowed from the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the United States now and Russia, to visit a missile base or a missile submarine base in the other's country, and say, I want to go look at that missile silo, or I want to go on that submarine, and I want to open that missile tube. And the inspected party is obliged to open a missile silo or the missile tube on the submarine, to remove the cap on the missile, so that the other side can see whether or not there are the proper number of warheads on board -- because it's a truly random process. There is a fair amount of confidence that cheating is deterred, and the cheating is not taking place.

       But the notion that storing warheads is Swiss cheese is pure bunk. It's nonsense. For example, START I gave both sides the ability to have 6,000 accountable warheads. Well, an accountable warhead meant that a missile warhead counted as one, but a warhead on a bomber counted as either 10 for a B-52, which could carry 20, or 1 for a B-1 or a B-2, which could carry 16 -- because they were trying to favor more stabilizing systems. So 6,000 weapons was 10,000 weapons. But nobody ever said anything about that.

       Okay, then there was START II. START II took the 6,000 to 10,000 range down to 3,000 to 3,500 real warheads. How would those reductions have taken place? Most of them would have taken place by removing warheads from existing missile systems and putting them in storage. And START II was hailed as a breakthrough in real arms control. This continues that tradition of removing missiles or removing warheads from operational status and placing them in storage. So, first of all, this was -- even the last administration was moving down this path, and it would have been hailed as real arms control. So what you are hearing is ideology and nonsense -- not fact.

       Second, when you are talking about warhead destruction, you should know first of all this was not a major issue between the two sides as they carried on these discussions. It was played up much more in the press than it was carried out in the negotiations. Second, what does warhead destruction mean? Warhead destruction would mean that I go into your warhead factory, and I watch you take apart a nuclear warhead, until I am convinced that that warhead is no longer serviceable. The Russian side was not prepared to provide anything close to that level of transparency at this point in the relationship. So the notion that you could have had a warhead destruction regime, which could have been verified, was simply not on. And, as you know, we are not going to engage in treaties that are not verifiable.

       The third thing that you need to know in this whole area is that the United States stopped building nuclear warheads during the president's father's term. That is not the case with Russia. Russia has three factories today that continue to build nuclear warheads. That is largely because Russian warheads have a shorter shelf life than American warheads; that is, they have to be remanufactured, which is to say basically taken down and rebuilt, or new ones have to be built in their place.

       If you were going to have a warhead reduction regime that involved the destruction of warheads, you would have to call on the Russian Federation, to stop -- to close all three of those factories -- because it is absurd to have a regime in which warheads are verifiably destroyed on the front end and new warheads are made on the back end. So, I mean, this is -- I am glad you raised the point so I could knock it down -- this is just nonsense. This treaty does what other treaties have done. It takes warheads off of real missiles and puts them away. For the United States, because we do not build any new warheads -- if there is a failure -- if there is a technical problem with one of our warheads, the only way we can replace that warhead is to take something out of storage and put it on the missile after removing the broken warhead. For the United States, some of the warheads which are removed will be destroyed.

       Some of the warheads which will be removed will be placed in long- term storage, and others will be available to replace broken warheads over the course of time. But this notion that this is Swiss cheese is pure poppycock. (Laughter.)

       Q (Off mike)?

       SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: The problem of proliferation I did raise. I raised that earlier. Proliferation occurs when warheads can be seized, stolen or sold. We are working with the Russian Federation, as we have been for at least five years, to enhance the Russian Federation's ability to store its nuclear warheads safely. That involves providing them computers to track where the warheads are at all times; it involves providing them advanced sensor systems so that they can put sensors around their nuclear warhead facilities. It involved providing fencing and other equipment to better secure the warheads. It involves assisting them in developing a training program for the guards around their nuclear warhead storage facilities guards, to ensure that none of the people use drugs or that they are -- that they have good backgrounds. We take this very, very seriously, and we have spent a lot of money on it.

       Over time -- over time we may get to the point where there is transparency in warhead production facilities. Over time the Russian Federation may get to the point where it stops building new warheads. But that's not a central issue. What's a central issue is whereas today there are five to six thousand warheads for each country on missile or at bomber bases, ten years from now there will be 1,700 to 2,200 such weapons -- a reduction of two thirds. And that is huge progress. It's dramatic progress.

       Q (Off mike). Will there be a meeting of the quartet in Moscow during the summit? There was one during the EU-U.S. summit in Washington. And will the Middle East and Iraq be on the agenda of the talks between President Bush and President Putin?

       SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No quartet meeting. And it's always hard to predict what will come up, but I would expect -- the Middle East and Iraq have come up in the past, and they may well this time. But I'm not making a prediction.

       Q (Off mike) -- German Radio Deutsche Welle. Will the war on terrorism figure on the agenda? And will President Bush formulate any new expectations as to future cooperation in the war against terrorism?

       SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I anticipate the war on terrorism will come up. Again, you can't predict, but I anticipate it will. We have cooperated with Russia, and it has been -- this cooperation has certainly benefited both countries. It has benefited the world. And I fully expect that this will come up. That's a large issue, so the different facets come up, whether it's cooperation in Afghanistan, Central Asia, Iraq. There are different facets of it, but I am reasonably confident it will be discussed, yes.

       Q (Off mike) -- daily newspaper -- Belgrade. Another question on the agenda. Do you think that the question of the Balkans will come up, and in which stance -- militarily, politically, economically -- if any?

       SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, the United States and Russia are working together with NATO allies and partners in the Balkans, and this has been rather successful. I don't -- again, I don't know whether it will come up, but this certainly -- the Balkans, which were an awful, painful, both a bilateral topic and an objective situation several years ago are now an area where we are working together in common purpose, and with considerable success. So it is in that context -- if it comes up, it will be in that context.

       MODERATOR: Thank you, gentlemen, for a really excellent, thorough briefing. I have one announcement for those that came in late -- this briefing was on background, attributable to "a senior administration official," with audiotapes for your own use. Also, I'd like to alert you to the fact that Dr. Rice will be giving an on-the- record briefing some time later this afternoon, and we will be piping it in here. Thank you very much.