



UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE INCIDENT INVOLVING NORTHERN EDGE SINKING (5 DEAD)

ON 12/20/2004



MISLE ACTIVITY NUMBER: 2264168
ORIGINATING UNIT: MSO PROVIDENCE
MISLE ACTIVITY OWNER: COMMANDANT (G-MRI)
MISLE ACTIVITY CONTROLLER: COMMANDANT (G-MRI)
MISLE CASE NUMBER: 213971

I. INCIDENT BRIEF

At approximately 1644 on December 20, 2004 the F/V NORTHERN EDGE a 75ft scalloper with a crew of six persons was fishing (towing two dredges) 45 NM SE of Nantucket, MA when, according to an eye witnesses account, the vessel suddenly listed to the starboard side. At the time of the incident five of the six crewmen were on deck and the captain was in the wheelhouse. As the vessel listed the crew ran to the stern.

Two crewmen cut the liferaft loose and it fell in the water. Another crewmen jumped in the water to retrieve the raft. Grabbing the liferaft painter lanyard (line) the crewman swam back to the vessel attempting to hand the lanyard to another crewman on the stern so they could attempt to open it. The vessel then rolled further knocking him underwater before completing the lanyard exchange.

Once the crewmen resurfaced, he swam back to the liferaft, popped it open and climbed in. While in the raft the crewman saw three of his shipmates on the stern and the fourth crewman in the water attempting to swim towards the liferaft. The crewman attempting to swim to the liferaft disappeared in the waves. The vessel then suddenly capsized and the three remaining crewmen on the stern went in the water.

The crewman in the liferaft attempted to call for his shipmates but heard or saw no one. The captain was never seen on deck. The crewman in the liferaft found the survival kit and used the flares to hail other vessels working in the area. The crewman was picked up by the F/V DIANE MARIE approximately 40 minutes after the sinking. None of the other 5 missing crewmen were found and are presumed dead.

Drug and alcohol testing was not conducted due to the lapse in time between the incident and the survivor returning to port. The survivor did not return to port until 36 hours after the accident.

Possible illegal emigration issues have been forwarded to INS.

See IO narrative in correspondences for more details on the casualty investigation.

II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Incident Summary

At approximately 1644 on December 20, 2004 the F/V NORTHERN EDGE a 75ft scalloper with a crew of six persons was fishing (towing two dredges) 45 NM SE of Nantucket, MA when, according to an eye witnesses account, the vessel suddenly listed to the starboard side. At the time of the incident five of the six crewmen were on deck and the captain was in the wheelhouse. As the vessel listed the crew ran to the stern.

Two crewmen cut the liferaft loose and it fell in the water. Another crewmen jumped in the water to retrieve the raft. Grabbing the liferaft painter lanyard (line) the crewman swam back to the vessel attempting to hand the lanyard to another crewman on the stern so they could attempt to open it. The vessel then rolled further knocking him underwater before completing the lanyard exchange.

Once the crewmen resurfaced, he swam back to the liferaft, popped it open and climbed in. While in the raft the crewman saw three of his shipmates on the stern and the fourth crewman in the water attempting to swim towards the liferaft. The crewman attempting to swim to the liferaft disappeared in the waves. The vessel then suddenly capsized and the three remaining crewmen on the stern went in the water.

The crewman in the liferaft attempted to call for his shipmates but heard or saw no one. The captain was never seen on deck. The crewman in the liferaft found the survival kit and used the flares to hail other vessels working in the area. The crewman was picked up by the F/V DIANE MARIE approximately 40 minutes after the sinking. None of the other 5 missing crewmen were found and are presumed dead.

Drug and alcohol testing was not conducted due to the lapse in time between the incident and the survivor returning to port. The survivor did not return to port until 36 hours after the accident.

Possible illegal emigration issues have been forwarded to INS.

See IO narrative in correspondences for more details on the casualty investigation.

Incident Involved: Marine Casualty, Reportable

Level of Investigation: Informal

IMO Classification: Routine

USCG Classification: Major Marine Casualty

Was this a Serious Marine Incident? Yes

Was a Marine Board Convened by Commandant? No

Personnel Casualty Summary

Total Missing = 0

Total Dead = 5

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Total Injured = 1
Total at Risk, Not Injured = 0
Total People at Risk = 6
Other Personnel (Not at Risk) = 0

Vessel(s) Status Summary

Actual Total Loss(es) = 0
Total Constructive Loss, Salvaged = 0
Total Constructive Loss, Unsalvaged = 1
Damaged = 0
Undamaged = 1

Property Damage Summary/Total Damage

Vessel(s) = \$6000000*
Cargo = \$
Facility(s) = \$
Other = \$

* Includes estimates

Waterway Mobility Summary

Vessel Delays (including speed restrictions): None

III. ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO THIS REPORT

Actions on Recommendations

Safety Recommendation #6009: 1. Review 1999 Fishing Vessel Task Force Report

For Coast Guard Headquarters (G-MOA). Recommendations submitted in the 1999 Fishing Vessel Task Force Report entitled "Living to Fish, Dying to Fish" should be reviewed and implemented to the greatest extent possible. Implementing these recommendations would drastically improve the safety of all commercial fishing vessels by providing much needed safety requirements currently not required at this time.

Date Created: 03/30/2005
Current Owner Unit: COMMANDANT (G-MOA)
Date Last Modified: 07/21/2005 3:34:45 PM
Priority: Normal

Endorsement(s):

>USER: [REDACTED]/MSO Providence
>TIME: 03/30/2005 15:21
>STATUS: --->Forward
>NEW OWNER: D01 M
For review and endorsement

>USER: [REDACTED]/D01 M
>TIME: 05/05/2005 11:46
>STATUS: Forward--->Return for Revision
>NEW OWNER: MSO Providence
Returned for revision.

>USER: [REDACTED]/MSO Providence
>TIME: 05/06/2005 10:55
>STATUS: Return for Revision--->Forward
>NEW OWNER: D01 M
Forward recommending approval.

>USER: [REDACTED]/D01 M
>TIME: 06/27/2005 15:20
>STATUS: Forward--->Forward
>NEW OWNER: COMDT MOA

Report of Investigation

(m) Concur with recommendation of IO. Numerous safety recommendations made by Coast Guard Investigating Officers over the years regarding fishing vessel casualties have addressed the important factors of vessel seaworthiness and crew competency. These recommendations have been consistently basic and straightforward: Regulatory oversight, licensing and/or competency standards for navigation and seamanship, seaworthy boats, adequate survival equipment, and safety conscious resource and industry management regimes. There continues to be resistance in the commercial fishing community to the implementation of standards that ultimately could save the lives of scores of fishermen. Many nations with significant fishing fleets impose higher standards than the United States imposes on its fishing vessels. There needs to be a change to the culture that accepts the high risks of fishing as part of the job and a move toward national standards consistent with international fishing vessel standards. The "Living to Fish, Dying to Fish" report provides a road map to effect change.

>USER: ██████████ W./COMDT MOA
>TIME: 07/21/2005 15:33
>STATUS: Forward--->Final Agency Action
>NEW OWNER: COMDT MOA

The Final Agency Action has been determined and approved by W. D. Rabe by direction of the Commandant.

Final Agency Action:

Concur- Acceptable Action
> ██████████ /COMDT MOA
>07/21/2005 15:34:

We concur with this recommendation. We are currently conducting a review that is evaluating all facets of the Commercial Fishing Vessel Safety Program in conjunction with a regulatory development project and strategy development process. All recommendations from past studies, including the 1999 Fishing Vessel Safety Task Force report, as well as recommendations from marine casualty investigation reports are being considered in the review. Upon completion of the review, we will endeavor to implement those recommendations identified as most likely to be effective and feasible in an effort to improve commercial fishing vessel safety.

W. D. Rabe
By direction

Required Actions:

Proposed Start Date: 03/30/2005
Proposed Completion Date: 03/30/2005

Actual Start Date: 03/30/2005
Actual Completion Date: 03/30/2005

Report of Investigation

Estimated Effort to Complete: 0 Staff Days

Action Status:

Action Commentary:

Safety Recommendation #6010: 2. Establish Formal Training Standards for Operators and Crew

For Coast Guard Headquarters (G-MOA). This investigation revealed a lack of licensing and crew competency credentials or certificates by all individuals onboard. With the exception of the survivor, none of the fishermen had formal training of any type related to vessel safety or emergency response. Witness accounts revealed at least two of the deckhands simply did not react to the vessel sinking in a manner consistent with someone who received basic survival training. Core competencies in vessel handling and basic survival training to include use of equipment already mandated on fishing vessels would ensure that the masters and crews have the minimum training to help them know how to increase their survivability.

2.a. Operator License. Obtain legislative authority and require that operators of certain commercial fishing vessels hold a vessel operator's license. Practical considerations will call for various grandfather clauses, phase-in schedules, and exemption provisions; however, the extent of such exemptions should be minimized. (From 1999 Fishing Vessel Task Force Report, Table 5-2, Recommendation 2.2)

2.b. Operator's License Prerequisite for Federal fishery Permits. Obtain legislative authority and require that operators of commercial fishing vessels holding a federal fishery permit have a vessel operator's license. The absence of a licensed mariner on fishing vessels leads to lack of accountability. A licensed mariner would be accountable for ensuring proper safety equipment is maintained, ensuring safety orientations and drills are conducted, and that the vessel is operated in a safe and prudent manner. (From 1999 Fishing Vessel Task Force Report, Table 5-2, Recommendation 2.3)

2.c. Crew Competency Certificate. Obtain legislative authority and require that certain crewmembers working aboard commercial fishing vessels hold a crew competency certificate similar to a merchant mariners' document. This initiative should follow the implementation of a licensing program for commercial fishing vessel operators. (From 1999 Fishing Vessel Task Force Report, Table 5-2, Recommendation 2.5)

Implementing these requirements would substantially improve the overall the safety of all commercial fishing vessels by ensuring masters and crewmen are qualified for their respected positions and trained in basic life saving skills.

Date Created: 03/30/2005

Current Owner Unit: COMMANDANT (G-MOA)

Date Last Modified: 07/21/2005 3:36:53 PM

Priority: Normal

Endorsement(s):

Report of Investigation

>USER: ██████████./MSO Providence
>TIME: 03/30/2005 15:23
>STATUS: --->Forward
>NEW OWNER: D01 M
For review and endorsement.

>USER: ██████████./D01 M
>TIME: 04/15/2005 07:52
>STATUS: Forward--->Return for Revision
>NEW OWNER: MSO Providence
Returned for revision.

>USER: ██████████./MSO Providence
>TIME: 04/15/2005 10:35
>STATUS: Return for Revision--->Forward
>NEW OWNER: D01 M
revised 4/15/05

>USER: ██████████./D01 M
>TIME: 05/05/2005 11:48
>STATUS: Forward--->Return for Revision
>NEW OWNER: MSO Providence
Returned for revision.

>USER: ██████████./MSO Providence
>TIME: 05/06/2005 11:11
>STATUS: Return for Revision--->Forward
>NEW OWNER: D01 M
Forward recommending approval.

>USER: ██████████ K./D01 M
>TIME: 06/27/2005 15:21
>STATUS: Forward--->Forward
>NEW OWNER: COMDT MOA

(m) Concur with recommendation of IO. The issue of licensing or some proof of competency for commercial fishing vessel operators and crew has been the subject of numerous safety recommendations by Coast Guard investigators following fishing vessel casualties. Until Congress enacts such changes, the unfortunate and probably avoidable circumstances that led to the untimely death of five individuals aboard the F/V NORTHERN EDGE will likely be repeated.

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>USER: [REDACTED]/COMDT MOA
>TIME: 07/21/2005 15:36
>STATUS: Forward--->Final Agency Action
>NEW OWNER: COMDT MOA

The Final Agency Action has been determined and approved by W. D. Rabe by direction of the Commandant.

Final Agency Action:

Concur- Alternate Acceptable Action
> [REDACTED]/COMDT MOA
>07/21/2005 15:36:

We concur with the intent of this recommendation. We support efforts to improve crew competency at all levels of operation of commercial fishing industry vessels. One possible means to achieve such an improvement would be to implement requirements for licensing and certification of crewmembers; however, numerous requests for the necessary legal authority to implement such requirements have been unsuccessful in the past and there is no indication that a new request would be successful. Therefore we are seeking alternative methods to improve crew competency. One possibility under consideration is to require that emergency drills, which are already required to be conducted on commercial fishing vessels, be witnessed by the Coast Guard to ensure their effectiveness and successful completion.

W. D. Rabe
By direction

Required Actions:

Proposed Start Date: 03/30/2005	Actual Start Date: 03/30/2005
Proposed Completion Date: 03/30/2005	Actual Completion Date: 03/30/2005

Estimated Effort to Complete: 0 Staff Days
Action Status:
Action Commentary:

Safety Recommendation #6011: 3. Establish Informal Training Standards for Operators and Crew

For Coast Guard Headquarters (G-MOA). This investigation revealed that no informal training or drills were conducted with the crew before departing the port or during the fishing trip. Core competences in vessel handling and basic survival training to include use of equipment already mandated for the vessel would ensure that the master and crew had the minimum training necessary to possibly survive an incident such as this. The investigation revealed that some of the crewmembers did not know how to react to the

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emergent situation and subsequently perished. Informal training and drills conducted with this crew could have increased the crew's awareness and may have helped them effectively react to the emergency. Below are specific recommendations for informal training standards:

a. Drill Conductor Training. Re-evaluate required training for drill conductors considering course content and duration, refresher training, and market-driven availability of third party organizations able and willing to train conductors. (From 1999 Fishing Vessel Task Force Report, Table 5-2, Recommendation 2.1)

b. Safety Awareness Drills. Amend 46 CFR 28.270 to require: (1) safety awareness instruction for each crewmember, (2) moving equipment hazards instruction for each crewmember, and (3) vessel operator logging of drill dates/times, participants, and drill conductor. (From 1999 Fishing Vessel Task Force Report, Table 5-4, Recommendation 4.2)

c. Safety Briefings. Establish regulations requiring initial and periodic crew safety briefings pertaining to vessel specific machinery and deck hazards. (From 1999 Fishing Vessel Task Force Report, Table 5-4, Recommendation 4.6)

Implementing these requirements would substantially improve the overall the safety of all commercial fishing vessels by ensuring masters and crewmen are properly trained and are continuously training in the event of fire/flooding or abandonment at sea.

Date Created: 03/30/2005
Current Owner Unit: COMMANDANT (G-MOA)
Date Last Modified: 07/21/2005 3:38:18 PM
Priority: Normal

Endorsement(s):

>USER: [REDACTED]/MSO Providence
>TIME: 03/30/2005 15:24
>STATUS: --->Forward
>NEW OWNER: D01
For review and endorsement.

>USER: [REDACTED]/D01
>TIME: 04/15/2005 14:21
>STATUS: Forward--->Return for Revision
>NEW OWNER: MSO Providence
Return to LCDR J. Williams per her request.

>USER: Williams, Jennifer F./MSO Providence

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>TIME: 04/15/2005 14:23
>STATUS: Return for Revision--->Forward
>NEW OWNER: D01 M
for review and endorsement

>USER: [REDACTED]/D01 M
>TIME: 05/05/2005 11:48
>STATUS: Forward--->Return for Revision
>NEW OWNER: MSO Providence
Returned for revision.

>USER: [REDACTED]/MSO Providence
>TIME: 05/06/2005 11:12
>STATUS: Return for Revision--->Forward
>NEW OWNER: D01 M
Forward recommending approval.

>USER: [REDACTED]/D01 M
>TIME: 06/27/2005 15:23
>STATUS: Forward--->Forward
>NEW OWNER: COMDT MOA
(m) Concur with recommendation of IO. There continues to be resistance from the commercial fishing community to the implementation of mandatory standards that ultimately could save the lives of scores of fishermen. There needs to be a change to the culture that accepts the high risks of fishing as part of the job and a move toward nationwide safety standards. Bringing fishing vessels under the umbrella of federal inspection regulations would allow the Coast Guard to enforce compliance. The voluntary fishing vessel inspection program has gained ground and made some impact on safety in the industry, but until enforceable regulations are implemented, the percentage of voluntary compliance will likely remain relatively stagnant.

>USER: [REDACTED]/COMDT MOA
>TIME: 07/21/2005 15:37
>STATUS: Forward--->Final Agency Action
>NEW OWNER: COMDT MOA
The Final Agency Action has been determined and approved by W. D. Rabe by direction of the Commandant.

Final Agency Action:

Concur- Alternate Acceptable Action
> [REDACTED]/COMDT MOA

>07/21/2005 15:38:

We concur with the intent of this recommendation. This recommendation and the issues it addresses are being included in the comprehensive review of the Fishing Vessel Safety program currently underway and, where appropriate, will be included in the current regulatory development project.

W. D. Rabe
By direction

Required Actions:

Proposed Start Date: 03/30/2005

Actual Start Date: 03/30/2005

Proposed Completion Date: 03/30/2005

Actual Completion Date: 03/30/2005

Estimated Effort to Complete: 0 Staff Days

Action Status:

Action Commentary:

Safety Recommendation #6012: 4. Establish Safety Standards for Survival Equipment

For Coast Guard Headquarters (G-MOA). This investigation revealed that none of the crewmembers wore a pfd or immersion suit while working on deck. Furthermore, the pfd/immersion suits were not readily accessible to the deck area where the crewmembers commonly work. If the crew on deck were wearing PFDs at the time of the incident, it may have increased their chance for survival by allowing them much needed floatation to swim to the liferaft. If the crewmembers were able to retrieve and don their immersion suits, they would have further been protected from the cold water thus significantly increasing their ability to reach the liferaft or survive for a longer period of time in cold water.

4.a. Wear PFDs on Deck. Establish regulations requiring the wearing of personal flotation devices (PFDs) in designated areas on deck. Encourage innovation for designs (e.g., inflatable) that do not interfere with work. (From 1999 Fishing Vessel Task Force Report, Table 5-4, Recommendation 4.10)

4.b. Location of stowage for survival suits when working on vessels during in cold-water months: Regulations already require the stowage of immersion suits to be readily accessible to the individual for whom it intended, from both the individual's work station and berthing area. The Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Advisory Committee and CFVS Program Manager should charter a focus group to study this issue and develop guidance for fishing vessel operators and Coast Guard CFVS Examiners to help them determine what locations are considered "readily accessible" for different size and type of fishing vessels.

Implementing this recommendation would save countless fishermen's lives by giving them the ability to stay afloat during a fast sinking or man overboard situation, thus

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allowing time for their shipmates, other vessels or Coast Guard SAR assets to find and rescue them.

Date Created: 03/30/2005
Current Owner Unit: COMMANDANT (G-MOA)
Date Last Modified: 07/21/2005 3:39:43 PM
Priority: Normal

Endorsement(s):

>USER: Williams, Jennifer F./MSO Providence
>TIME: 03/30/2005 15:25
>STATUS: --->Forward
>NEW OWNER: D01 M
For review and endorsement.

>USER: [REDACTED]/D01 M
>TIME: 04/15/2005 07:54
>STATUS: Forward--->Return for Revision
>NEW OWNER: MSO Providence
Returned for revision.

>USER: Williams, Jennifer F./MSO Providence
>TIME: 04/15/2005 10:36
>STATUS: Return for Revision--->Forward
>NEW OWNER: D01 M
revised 4/15/05

>USER: [REDACTED]/D01 M
>TIME: 05/05/2005 11:49
>STATUS: Forward--->Return for Revision
>NEW OWNER: MSO Providence
Returned for revision.

>USER: [REDACTED]/MSO Providence
>TIME: 05/06/2005 11:14
>STATUS: Return for Revision--->Forward
>NEW OWNER: D01 M
Forward recommending approval.

>USER: [REDACTED] D01 M

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>TIME: 06/27/2005 15:24
>STATUS: Forward--->Forward
>NEW OWNER: COMDT MOA

(m) Concur with recommendation of IO. Bringing fishing vessels under the umbrella of federal inspection regulations would allow the Coast Guard to enforce compliance. The voluntary fishing vessel inspection program has gained ground and made some impact on safety in the industry, but until enforceable regulations are implemented, the percentage of voluntary compliance will likely remain relatively stagnant. With federal regulations in place, the focus of the CFVS program can shift to enforcement rather than education.

>USER: ██████████ COMDT MOA
>TIME: 07/21/2005 15:38
>STATUS: Forward--->Final Agency Action
>NEW OWNER: COMDT MOA

The Final Agency Action has been determined and approved by W. D. Rabe by direction of the Commandant.

Final Agency Action:

Concur- Alternate Acceptable Action
> ██████████ /COMDT MOA
>07/21/2005 15:39:

We partially concur with this recommendation. The Coast Guard raised the possibility of requiring the wearing of personal flotation devices (PFDs) with the Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Safety Advisory Committee (CFIVSAC) during the development of the original safety regulations. At that time, the CFIVSAC recognized the benefits of wearing some form of buoyancy aid while working on deck, but also noted many PFDs work to the detriment of safety by limiting the mobility of the wearer and being susceptible to being snagged on deck fittings and fishing gear. As a result, the CFIVSAC recommended that PFDs not be required to be worn. Now however, there are PFD designs that do not restrict the wearers' mobility and fit under traditional fishing outerwear so that they no longer present snag hazards. Type V commercial hybrid inflatable devices are allowed for use on vessels of 40 feet or more in length under 46 CFR 28.110, but there are none currently produced. Type V fully inflatable devices have been approved by the Coast Guard and have become widely available. As a result, we will consider asking the CFIVSAC to revisit this issue. We will include the issue of stowage and accessibility of survival gear in the current regulatory development project, as well as consider submitting it to the CFIVSAC.

W. D. Rabe
By direction

Required Actions:

Report of Investigation

Proposed Start Date: 03/30/2005

Actual Start Date: 03/30/2005

Proposed Completion Date: 03/30/2005

Actual Completion Date: 03/30/2005

Estimated Effort to Complete: 0 Staff Days

Action Status:

Action Commentary:

Safety Recommendation #6013: 5. Conduct Research and Development

For Coast Guard Headquarters (G-MOA). This investigation revealed that none of the crewmembers were wearing immersion suits, pfd's, or worksuits. These items of personal survival gear are bulky and cumbersome to move around in. If personal survival gear was more conducive to fishing, it is probable that fewer fishermen would be opposed to wearing them on deck or designated areas and more fishermen would survive immersion into the water.

This investigation also revealed a common practice among scallop vessels to keep their scupper gates closed to prevent their catch from washing overboard. If the scupper gates were open on this vessel at the time of the casualty, it would have had a positive affect on the vessel's stability by allowing trapped water and scallops off the vessel.

Below are specific recommendations for research and development:

- a. Immersion Suits. Develop an immersion suit that allows greater freedom of movement and is easier to don. (From 1999 Fishing Vessel Task Force Report, Table 5-6, Recommendation 6.3)
- b. Work Suits. Develop a full-body protective suit that can allows freedom of movement, can be comfortably worn in moderate temperatures, and provides reasonable protection against hypothermia. (From 1999 Fishing Vessel Task Force Report, Table 5-6, Recommendation 6.4)
- c. Scupper Gates. Develop scupper gates with the capability for remote operation in case of emergencies or design scupper gates with expanded metal that allows for drainage of the deck while keeping the catch on deck.
- d. Winch equipment settings. Develop guidance for fishermen to properly set winch drum motor brakes pressures enabling them to slip when the dredge encounters resistance above a certain threshold. Presently, most of the winch equipment in service have the ability to have the brake pressures adjusted.

The development and regulatory requirement of this type of personnel safety gear and vessel equipment would lead to substantially improving the overall the safety of all commercial fishing vessels. Implementing these recommendations would provide the crew with valuable time that could enable them an opportunity to survive a casualty or prevent one from happening.

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Date Created: 03/30/2005
Current Owner Unit: COMMANDANT (G-MOA)
Date Last Modified: 07/21/2005 3:40:59 PM
Priority: Normal

Endorsement(s):

>USER: [REDACTED]/MSO Providence
>TIME: 03/30/2005 15:26
>STATUS: --->Forward
>NEW OWNER: D01 M
For review and endorsement

>USER: [REDACTED]/D01 M
>TIME: 05/05/2005 11:46
>STATUS: Forward--->Return for Revision
>NEW OWNER: MSO Providence
Returned for revision.

>USER: [REDACTED]/MSO Providence
>TIME: 05/06/2005 11:15
>STATUS: Return for Revision--->Forward
>NEW OWNER: D01 M
Forward recommending approval.

>USER: [REDACTED]/D01 M
>TIME: 06/27/2005 15:27
>STATUS: Forward--->Forward
>NEW OWNER: COMDT MOA
(m) Concur with recommendation of IO. However, this recommendation should be addressed to and by the fishing vessel industry and its equipment manufacturers.

>USER: [REDACTED]/COMDT MOA
>TIME: 07/21/2005 15:40
>STATUS: Forward--->Final Agency Action
>NEW OWNER: COMDT MOA
The Final Agency Action has been determined and approved by W. D. Rabe by direction of the Commandant.

Final Agency Action:

Report of Investigation

Concur- Alternate Acceptable Action

> [REDACTED]/COMDT MOA

>07/21/2005 15:40:

We partially concur with this recommendation. We will include the topic of scupper gates and freeing ports in our comprehensive review of the Commercial Fishing Vessel Safety Program and the current regulatory project. As for the other specific recommendations regarding immersion suits, work suits, and winch equipment settings, we do not believe further action is necessary for the following reasons:

(1) The performance of approved immersion suits is based on longstanding international regulations and standards. The ability to don the suits is evaluated in both ambient and very cold conditions, and there is no indication historically, or in the context of this casualty, that the ability to don the immersion suits was insufficient if they are properly maintained.

(2) Approved Type III and Type V deck/work suits and “float coats” that allow freedom of movement, can be comfortably worn in moderate temperatures, and that provide reasonable protection against hypothermia are already widely available.

(3) Development of guidance for setting winch drum motor brake pressures would be complex and of questionable value. There are numerous variables that can affect proper brake pressure, including weight and drag of fishing gear, condition of the brake, speed of the vessel, length of the towed gear, and tidal currents. Winch drum motor brake pressure must be carefully monitored to account for the existing fishing conditions, and voluntary guidance could not cover every possible variable.

W. D. Rabe
By direction

Required Actions:

Proposed Start Date: 03/30/2005

Actual Start Date: 03/30/2005

Proposed Completion Date: 03/30/2005

Actual Completion Date: 03/30/2005

Estimated Effort to Complete: 0 Staff Days

Action Status:

Action Commentary:

Safety Recommendation #6014: 6. Ensure vessels comply with regulatory standards

For Coast Guard Headquarters (G-MOA). All dockside examinations are voluntary and the discovery of any discrepancies during a voluntary dockside examination is not considered to be a violation. If fishing vessel regulations allowed for periodic inspections or mandatory examinations with the authority to enforce all safety regulations at the dock, the required vessel standards, drills and training deficiencies could have been effectively enforced. Below is a specific recommendation for compliance with regulatory standards:

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a. Safety Inspections. Obtain legislative authority to require commercial fishing vessels to undergo periodic vessel safety inspections with the authority to enforce such standards at the dock. This effort would require the development of expanded standards in addition to the limited standards currently contained in 46 CFR 28. (From 1999 Fishing Vessel Task Force Report, Table 5-3, Recommendation 3.8)

Implementing this recommendation would ensure commercial fishing vessels are meeting federally required safety regulations. Presently commercial fishing vessels are not subject to Coast Guard inspection. The dockside voluntary fishing vessel examiner program only addresses life saving equipment requirements and the program is "voluntary". It does not take into account the condition of the structural, engineering and navigation systems, which are vital in determining how safe a vessel is.

Date Created: 03/30/2005

Current Owner Unit: COMMANDANT (G-MOA)

Date Last Modified: 07/21/2005 3:42:14 PM

Priority: Normal

Endorsement(s):

>USER: Williams, Jennifer F./MSO Providence

>TIME: 03/30/2005 15:28

>STATUS: --->Forward

>NEW OWNER: D01 M

For review and endorsement.

>USER: [REDACTED]/D01 M

>TIME: 05/05/2005 11:47

>STATUS: Forward--->Return for Revision

>NEW OWNER: MSO Providence

Returned for revision.

>USER: [REDACTED]/MSO Providence

>TIME: 05/06/2005 11:16

>STATUS: Return for Revision--->Forward

>NEW OWNER: D01 M

Forward recommending approval.

>USER: [REDACTED]/D01 M

>TIME: 06/27/2005 15:27

>STATUS: Forward--->Forward

>NEW OWNER: COMDT MOA

Report of Investigation

(m) Concur with recommendation of IO. The voluntary fishing vessel inspection program has gained ground and made some impact on safety in the industry, but until enforceable regulations are implemented, the percentage of voluntary compliance will likely remain relatively stagnant.

>USER: [REDACTED]/COMDT MOA
>TIME: 07/21/2005 15:41
>STATUS: Forward--->Final Agency Action
>NEW OWNER: COMDT MOA

The Final Agency Action has been determined and approved by W. D. Rabe by direction of the Commandant.

Final Agency Action:

Concur- Alternate Acceptable Action
> [REDACTED]/COMDT MOA
>07/21/2005 15:42:

We concur with the intent of this recommendation. We agree that there is a need to improve the compliance of commercial fishing industry vessels with requirements designed to improve their safety; however, numerous requests by the Coast Guard in the past for the legislative authority to require mandatory, periodic safety inspections for commercial fishing industry vessels have been turned down. In light of this, we are evaluating the extent of all current authorities the Coast Guard has to enforce safety standards on commercial fishing industry vessels as part of a comprehensive review of the Commercial Fishing Vessel Safety Program.

W. D. Rabe
By direction

Required Actions:

Proposed Start Date: 03/30/2005 Actual Start Date: 03/30/2005
Proposed Completion Date: 03/30/2005 Actual Completion Date: 03/30/2005

Estimated Effort to Complete: 0 Staff Days
Action Status:
Action Commentary:

Safety Recommendation #6015: 7. Expand Safety and Stability Standards

For Coast Guard Headquarters (G-MOA). Fishing industry vessels are subject to greater dynamics in stability and watertight integrity due to the fact that their cargo operations are conducted at sea when subjected to weather and sea conditions. Having loading and operating parameters established and available prior to operating is extremely important

Report of Investigation

to ensuring the safety of all vessels and crew. If this vessel had a stability test to determine its capabilities when operating (i.e. dragging/loading), in particular sea conditions and in a loaded and unloaded configuration (i.e. fuel and water tank levels, deck and hold cargo) the captain would have been better informed of the stability status of his vessel on that evening. This investigation revealed that the vessel's tow cable hung up, causing a sudden list that compromised its stability. If the tow cable could have been effectively slacked or disconnected, the vessel might have recovered. Below are specific recommendations for safety and stability:

- a. Stability Regulation Project. Complete project requiring stability letters for all commercial fishing vessels greater than, or equal to, 50 feet in length. Also establish watertight integrity and subdivision requirements for commercial fishing vessels less than 50 feet in length. Evaluate impact and feasibility of eliminating "grandfather" provisions. (From 1999 Fishing Vessel Task Force Report, Table 5-4, Recommendation 4.1)
- b. Fishing vessel equipment: Prescribe standards for winch motor brake systems being used in conjunction with towing cables to be set to a particular limit allowing it to slip if the tow cable reaches a certain tension.
- c. Good Marine Practices. Develop good marine standards and practices for application to equipment, materials, designs, and operations on commercial fishing vessels. (From 1999 Fishing Vessel Task Force Report, Table 5-4, Recommendation 4.14)

Implementing these recommendations would substantially improve the overall safety of all commercial fishing vessels by determining first and foremost whether the vessel is a stable platform and what sea state and cargo capacity limits the vessel can safely operate under.

Date Created: 03/30/2005
Current Owner Unit: COMMANDANT (G-MOA)
Date Last Modified: 07/21/2005 3:43:37 PM
Priority: Normal

Endorsement(s):

>USER: Williams, Jennifer F./MSO Providence
>TIME: 03/30/2005 15:34
>STATUS: --->Forward
>NEW OWNER: D01 M
For review and endorsement.

>USER: ██████████/D01 M
>TIME: 05/05/2005 11:47
>STATUS: Forward--->Return for Revision
>NEW OWNER: MSO Providence

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Returned for revision.

>USER: [REDACTED]/MSO Providence
>TIME: 05/06/2005 11:18
>STATUS: Return for Revision--->Forward
>NEW OWNER: D01 M
Forward recommending approval.

>USER: [REDACTED]/D01 M
>TIME: 06/27/2005 15:28
>STATUS: Forward--->Forward
>NEW OWNER: COMDT MOA
(m) Concur with recommendation of IO. Deaths within the fishing industry persist due to a culture that eschews safety in favor of the bottom line. Despite the significant advances in safety for vessels operating at sea, and general adherence by most operators to those standards and requirements, the problem remains that there is still a small percentage of operators willing to cut safety corners and push stability limits, even if it means putting a crew at risk. The regulatory tools at the Coast Guard's disposal, as legislated by Congress, are limited and need to be expanded.

>USER: [REDACTED]/COMDT MOA
>TIME: 07/21/2005 15:42
>STATUS: Forward--->Final Agency Action
>NEW OWNER: COMDT MOA
The Final Agency Action has been determined and approved by W. D. Rabe by direction of the Commandant.

Final Agency Action:

Concur- Alternate Acceptable Action
> [REDACTED]/COMDT MOA
>07/21/2005 15:43:

We partially concur with this recommendation. We are actively working on a regulatory project that includes proposed stability regulations for vessels of less than 79 feet in length. However, the proposed requirements would only apply to vessels that are newly constructed or substantially altered after the regulations enter into force. This is due to the Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Safety Act's (P.L. 100-424) explicit prohibition against requiring the alteration of a vessel or associated equipment that was constructed or manufactured before the effective date of the regulation. Requirements for safety of deck equipment will also be considered as part of the same regulatory project; however, the Coast Guard does not have authority to mandate design features of this equipment. Nonetheless, the Coast Guard does have authority to tailor regulations that consider the shortcomings of existing equipment in vessel operations and will seek to do so.

W. D. Rabe
By direction

Required Actions:

Proposed Start Date: 03/30/2005
Proposed Completion Date: 03/30/2005

Actual Start Date: 03/30/2005
Actual Completion Date: 03/30/2005

Estimated Effort to Complete: 0 Staff Days
Action Status:
Action Commentary:

Safety Alerts

IV. FINDINGS OF FACT

Subjects of the Investigation

Vessels. The following vessels were subjects of this investigation. Particulars for each vessel follow.

Vessel Name:	DIANE MARIE
Flag:	United States of America
Vessel Identification Number:	1041740
Call Sign:	
Status:	Undamaged
Role:	Transiting Vicinity of Primary Subject
Vessel Class, Type, Sub-Type:	Fishing Vessel, Fish Catching Vessel, General
Gross Tonnage(GRT):	
Net Tonnage(NRT):	
Deadweight Tons:	
Length:	91.9
Home/Hailing Port:	
Keel Laid Date:	
Delivery Date:	
Place of Construction:	NEW ORLEANS, LA, UNITED STATES
Builder Name:	TRI MINH DO
Propulsion:	
Horsepower:	
Master:	
Classification Society:	
Owner:	SEA ROVER FISHING INC 1860 TANGLEWOOD DRIVE NE ST PETERSBURG, FL, 33702 US
Operator:	FIVE STARS SEAFOOD INC 19597 CHEF MENTEUR HWY NEW ORLEANS, LA, 70129
Inspection Subchapter:	
Most Recent Vessel Inspection Activity:	
Vessel Name:	NORTHERN EDGE
Flag:	UNITED STATES
Vessel Identification Number:	607574
Call Sign:	WQZ3265

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Status:	Total Constructive Loss: Unsalvaged
Role:	Involved in a Marine Casualty
Vessel Class, Type, Sub-Type:	Fishing Vessel, Fish Catching Vessel, General
Gross Tonnage(GRT):	
Net Tonnage(NRT):	
Deadweight Tons:	
Length:	75.7
Home/Hailing Port:	
Keel Laid Date:	
Delivery Date:	
Place of Construction:	PORT CANAVERAL, FL, UNITED STATES
Builder Name:	CANAVERAL SHIPBUILDING CORPORATION
Propulsion:	
Horsepower:	
Master:	
Classification Society:	
Owner:	K & R FISHING ENTERPRISES, INC 84 FRONT STREET NEW BEDFORD, MA, 02740 K & R FISHING ENTERPRISES, INC 84 FRONT STREET
Operator:	NEW BEDFORD, MA, 02740 LAPOINTE, ROGER 62 THOMAS ST New Bedford, MA, 02740 US
Inspection Subchapter:	
Most Recent Vessel Inspection Activity:	

Facilities. The following facilities were subjects of this investigation. Particulars for each facility follow.

Parties and Organizations. The following people and organizations were subjects of this investigation.

████████████████████	Status:	Not at Risk
	Role:	Witness
	Gender:	M
	Age:	█

Report of Investigation

SSN:
Birth Date:
Email Address:
Phone Number():
Address(Home/Primary Residence):

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Comments:

CROWLEY, GLEN E

Status: Dead
Role: Subject of Investigation
Gender: M
Age: 45

SSN: 020-52-2583
Birth Date: 05/04/1959
Email Address:
Phone Number():
Address(Friend/Relative):

[REDACTED]

Comments:

[REDACTED]

Status: Not at Risk
Role: Other
Gender: M
Age:
SSN:

Birth Date:
Email Address:
Phone Number(Work): (508) 971-3316
Address(Primary Place of Business): Marine Safety Consultants, Inc.
26 Water Street
Fairhaven, MA 02719
USA US

Comments:

FLORES, JUAN M

Status: Dead
Role: Subject of Investigation
Gender: M
Age:
SSN: 455-11-3291
Birth Date:

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Email Address:
Phone Number():
Address(Primary):

[REDACTED]

Comments:

[REDACTED]

Status:
Role:
Gender:
Age:
SSN:
Birth Date:
Email Address:
Phone Number():
Address(Home/Primary Residence):

Injured
Subject of Investigation
M

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Comments:

[REDACTED]

Status:
Role:
Gender:
Age:
SSN:
Birth Date:
Email Address:
Phone Number(Phone Number):
Address(Home/Primary Residence):

Not at Risk
Subject of Investigation
M

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Comments:

[REDACTED]

Status:
Role:
Gender:
Age:
SSN:
Birth Date:
Email Address:
Phone Number():
Address(Home/Primary Residence):

Not at Risk
Other
M

[REDACTED]

Comments:

Prior crewmember - not on board at

time of incident.

LOPES, CARLOS A

Status: Dead
Role: Subject of Investigation
Gender: M
Age: 48
SSN: 047-50-1904
Birth Date: 07/12/1956
Email Address:
Phone Number(Phone Number):
Address(Home/Primary Residence):



Comments:

MORENO, ERIK I

Status: Dead
Role: Subject of Investigation
Gender: M
Age:
SSN: 528-50-0127
Birth Date:
Email Address:
Phone Number():
Address(Home/Primary Residence):



Comments:

Richards, Raymond

Status: Dead
Role: Subject of Investigation
Gender: M
Age:
SSN: 007-80-2467
Birth Date:
Email Address:
Phone Number():
Address(Home/Primary Residence):



Comments:

K & R FISHING ENTERPRISES, INC

Status: Not at Risk
Role: Subject of Investigation
Email Address:

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Phone Number():
Address(Primary Place of Business): 84 FRONT STREET

NEW BEDFORD, MA 02740

Comments:

NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE

Status: Not at Risk
Role: Other
Email Address:
Phone Number(Phone Number): 508-281-9222
Address(Primary Place of Business): ONE BLACKBURN DRIVE

GLOUCESTER, MA 01930

Comments:

POC [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Status: Not at Risk
Role: Other
Email Address:
Phone Number(Work): 508 994-7300
Address(Work): 18 North Water Street
New Bedford, MA 02740
US

Comments:

Drug and Alcohol Testing. The following people have been determined by the Coast Guard, Law Enforcement Personnel, and/or the Marine Employer to have been directly involved in a Serious Marine Incident as defined in 46 CFR 4.03-2:

LOPES, CARLOS A; Subject of Investigation
[REDACTED]; Subject of Investigation
MORENO, ERIK I; Subject of Investigation
FLORES, JUAN M; Subject of Investigation
CROWLEY, GLEN E; Subject of Investigation
Richards, Raymond; Subject of Investigation

Response Resources. The following incident response resources were subjects of this investigation.

Resource Name: ESCANABA
Resource ID:
Kind: Vessels
Sub-Kind: Other

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Type:

Resource Name: ESCANABA
Resource ID:
Kind: Vessels
Sub-Kind: Other
Type:

Resource Name: HH60J - 6001
Resource ID: 6001
Kind: Aircraft (Helicopter)
Sub-Kind:
Type:

Resource Name: HH60J - 6001
Resource ID: 6001
Kind: Aircraft (Helicopter)
Sub-Kind:
Type:

Resource Name: HH60J - 6032
Resource ID: 6032
Kind: Aircraft (Helicopter)
Sub-Kind:
Type:

Resource Name: HH60J - 6032
Resource ID: 6032
Kind: Aircraft (Helicopter)
Sub-Kind:
Type:

Resource Name: HH60J - 6032
Resource ID: 6032
Kind: Aircraft (Helicopter)
Sub-Kind:
Type:

Resource Name: HU25C - 2140
Resource ID: 2140
Kind: Aircraft (Fixed Wing)
Sub-Kind:
Type:

Resource Name: HU25C - 2140
Resource ID: 2140
Kind: Aircraft (Fixed Wing)
Sub-Kind:

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Type:

Resource Name: HU25C - 2140
Resource ID: 2140
Kind: Aircraft (Fixed Wing)
Sub-Kind:
Type:

Resource Name: HU25C+ - 2133
Resource ID: 2133
Kind: Aircraft (Fixed Wing)
Sub-Kind:
Type:

Resource Name: WMEC - 907
Resource ID: 907
Kind: Vessels
Sub-Kind: Other
Type:

Resource Name: WPB - 1330
Resource ID: 1330
Kind: Vessels
Sub-Kind: Other
Type:

Other Subjects. The following were subjects of this investigation.

Waterway Segment(s). The following waterway segment(s) were subjects of this investigation.

ATLANTIC DEEP WATER ACCESS

Role: Location

Local Name: Segment #21

Description: Atlantic Ocean. ATLANTIC DEEP WATER SPINE ACCESS

Incident Information

Location(s).

<u>Description</u>	<u>Latitude</u>	<u>Longitude</u>
ATLANTIC DEEP WATER ACCESS	42 16.8936 N	070 42.7452 W
ATLANTIC DEEP WATER ACCESS	42 16.8936 N	070 42.7452 W
ATLANTIC DEEP WATER ACCESS	42 16.8936 N	070 42.7452 W
ATLANTIC DEEP WATER ACCESS	42 16.8936 N	070 42.7452 W

Sequence of Events.

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12/20/2004 12:00:00 to 12/20/2004 12:00:00 (Estimated):

Action Type: Safety and Emergency Operations - Abandon Vessel Operations
Action Class: Don survival suits and personal flotation devices
Location: Known; US Waters
Description: ATLANTIC DEEP WATER ACCESS
Latitude: 42 16.8936 N Longitude: 070 42.7452 W

Subject(s) and Details:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
LOPES, CARLOS A	Party	Dead	Subject of Investigation

Details Filed: Detail Description

Crew had not drilled for abandon ship as required by regulation. Life jackets were not required on the vessel and the required survival suits were not accessible at the time of the sinking because they were stored in the berthing area inside the main house.

[REDACTED]	Party	Injured	Subject of Investigation
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Details Filed: Detail Description

Crew had not drilled for abandon ship as required by regulation. Life jackets were not required on the vessel and the required survival suits were not accessible at the time of the sinking because they were stored in the berthing area inside the main house.

MORENO, ERIK I	Party	Dead	Subject of Investigation
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Details Filed: Detail Description

Crew had not drilled for abandon ship as required by regulation. Life jackets were not required on the vessel and the required survival suits were not accessible at the time of the sinking because they were stored in the berthing area inside the main house.

FLORES, JUAN M	Party	Dead	Subject of Investigation
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Details Filed: Detail Description

Crew had not drilled for abandon ship as required by regulation. Life jackets were not required on the vessel and the required survival suits were not accessible at the time of the sinking because they were stored in the berthing area inside the main house.

CROWLEY, GLEN E	Party	Dead	Subject of Investigation
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Details Filed: Detail Description

Crew had not drilled for abandon ship as required by regulation. Life jackets were not required on the vessel and the required survival suits were not accessible at the time of the sinking because they were stored in the berthing area inside the main house.

Richards, Raymond	Party	Dead	Subject of Investigation
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Details Filed: Detail Description

Crew had not drilled for abandon ship as required by regulation. Life jackets were not required on the vessel and the required survival suits were not accessible at the time of the sinking because they were stored in the berthing area inside the main house.

12/20/2004 12:00:00 to 12/20/2004 12:00:00 (Estimated):

Condition Class: Person

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Condition Type: Personnel Condition
Subject Type: Person
Location: Known; US Waters
Description: ATLANTIC DEEP WATER ACCESS
Latitude: 42 16.8936 N Longitude: 070 42.7452 W

Subject(s) and Details:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
LOPES, CARLOS A	Party	Dead	Subject of Investigation

Details Filed: Personnel Condition

Human Factors:

Human Factor:	Type of training
Factor Type:	Psychological Factors
Factor Sub-Type:	Training
Description:	According to interviews with the survival and a past crewman Captain Lopes did not conduct the required training.
Latent Unsafe Condition:	Yes

Merchant Mariner:

	Party	No Injured	Subject of Investigation
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Details Filed: Personnel Condition

Human Factors:

Human Factor:	Type of training
Factor Type:	Psychological Factors
Factor Sub-Type:	Training
Description:	Crewman received no training or orientation after reporting on this vessel.
Latent Unsafe Condition:	Yes

Merchant Mariner:

MORENO, ERIK I	Party	No Dead	Subject of Investigation
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Details Filed: Personnel Condition

Human Factors:

Human Factor:	Type of training
Factor Type:	Psychological Factors
Factor Sub-Type:	Training
Description:	No record of crewman receiving any training on this vessel.
Latent Unsafe Condition:	No

Merchant Mariner:

FLORES, JUAN M	Party	No Dead	Subject of Investigation
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Details Filed: Personnel Condition

Human Factors:

Human Factor:	Weaknesses observed in training
Factor Type:	Psychological Factors
Factor Sub-Type:	Training
Description:	No record of crewman receiving any training on this vessel.
Latent Unsafe Condition:	No

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Merchant Mariner: No
CROWLEY, GLEN E Party Dead Subject of Investigation

Details Filed: Personnel Condition

Human Factors:

Human Factor: Type of training
Factor Type: Psychological Factors
Factor Sub-Type: Training
Description: No record of crewman receiving any training on this vessel.
Latent Unsafe Condition: No

Merchant Mariner: No
Richards, Raymond Party Dead Subject of Investigation

Details Filed: Personnel Condition

Human Factors:

Human Factor: Type of training
Factor Type: Psychological Factors
Factor Sub-Type: Training
Description: No record of crewman receiving any training on this vessel.
Latent Unsafe Condition: No

Merchant Mariner: No

12/20/2004 12:00:00 to 12/20/2004 12:00:00 (Estimated):

Condition Class: Vessel, Facility, Equipment, Gear, or Cargo
Condition Type: Vessel Material/Equipment Condition
Subject Type: Lifesaving
Location: Known; US Waters
Description: ATLANTIC DEEP WATER ACCESS
Latitude: 42 16.8936 N Longitude: 070 42.7452 W

Subject(s) and Details:

Name Type Status Role
NORTHERN EDGE Vessel Total Constructive Involved in a Marine
Loss: Unsalvaged Casualty

Details Filed: Material/Equipment Condition

System: Lifesaving
Sub-System: Immersion Suits
Component: Readily Accessible
Details: The storage of the survival suits in the crew berthing area did not allow for the suits to be readily accessible during this casualty.
Cite:

12/20/2004 12:00:00 to 12/20/2004 12:00:00 (Known):

Condition Class: Vessel, Facility, Equipment, Gear, or Cargo
Condition Type: Stability Condition

Report of Investigation

Subject Type:

Location: Known; US Waters

Description: ATLANTIC DEEP WATER ACCESS

Latitude: 42 16.8936 N Longitude: 070 42.7452 W

Subject(s) and Details:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
NORTHERN EDGE	Vessel	Total Constructive Loss: Unsalvaged	Involved in a Marine Casualty

Details Filed: Detail Description

The NORTHERN EDGE was not required to comply with the stability regulations (46 CFR Part 28.500) because it was less than 79ft in length.

The owner never had any stability testing done on the vessel so there is no information available to determine how stable or unstable the vessel could have been from the point of construction in 1979 until the time of the accident. The owner reported that there were only two noteworthy modifications to the vessel throughout its years of service. In 1987 the owner removed the net wheels from the gantry "A" frame, welded the stern ramps closed and installed the aft shucking house. In 2003, the "A" frame was relocated from the stern of the vessel to an area amidship around and over the wheelhouse, relocated the boom pedestals to behind the wheelhouse and installed port and starboard outriggers. The relocation of the "A" frame, which is estimated to weigh approximately 3,000 lbs in 2003 would have been a modification reviewed by a "qualified individual" had the vessel, been over 79ft length. Based on interviews with past captains there is no evidence to suggest that these modifications had a negative effect on the vessel's stability, or that the vessel was unstable or needed special care other than normal stability factors all vessels need such as balancing liquid tank levels, hold and deck cargoes. Additionally, the amount of cargo onboard at the time of the casualty is not indicative of an overloading situation. (There was an estimated 9,000 to 11,000 lbs of scallop meat in the hold and 10 bushels/ approximately 500 lbs of scallop on the deck. During the previous twelve months, the vessel landed on average 16,000 lbs of scallop and as much as 28,000 lbs).

1. Deck scuppers (Freeing ports)

Deck scuppers are designed to allow seawater to quickly clear the maindeck and reduce the free surface affect of water getting trapped or moving around on deck possibly affecting the vessel's ability to maintain stability. The NORTHERN EDGE had five scupper openings on each side with the four most aft ones having gates installed so they can be closed when the crew had scallops on deck. At the time of the accident all the scupper gates were in the closed position allowing sea water to become trapped on deck and not allowing the vessel to right itself as the slack was taken out of the tow cable. If the vessel had a scupper gate control system that could remotely open all the scupper gates in case of emergencies or had scupper gates designed to allow the water to drain and keep scallops on deck, such as expanded metal, there is a good possibility that the vessel could have recovered when the tow cable was slacked.

2. Watertight doors/Hatches/Engineroom vents

Mr. [REDACTED] stated the watertight door (WTD) leading to the engineroom and main house (galley) was open at the time of the accident. The open engineroom door allowed seawater to ingress into the engineroom resulting in uncontrolled down flooding. The open galley door allowed water to enter the main house thus adding more weight to the starboard side further disabling the vessel from righting itself. Based on interviews with the previous two captains the engineroom and main house WTD's are left open for the convenience of the crew. The engineroom door was left open for three general reasons:

- a. Allows captain and crew to monitor the space for problems while working on deck
- b. The crew uses the space for heat when shucking when working on deck.
- c. Ensures enough air is getting to the main engine to prevent performance problems.

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The galley door is left open basically because they had an interior door to keep the weather out so there was no need to open and close the WTD unless in coming water was a problem. Both captains made it clear that if there were any weather concerns they would close the doors and secure the crew from working on deck. The general rule they used is that when the crew is on deck or the weather is not to rough the doors are open.

Fishing vessel equipment (adjustment/modifications)

Mr. [REDACTED] stated that the vessel was either in the process of making a starboard turn or the starboard dredge got hung up causing the vessel to list. Either scenario points to a potential problem with the dredges. During interviews with the past two captains and a crewman all stated that there is a way to adjust the drag on the winch drum air brakes to allow the drum to slip in case of a hang up. There is no guidance available to captains that would provide them information on recommended setting for their winch brakes. Settings made available to captains based on the size and weight of loaded dredges along with other factors such as the speed of the vessel and depth of water could enable captains to use a piece of equipment that already exists. While this may not prevent future dredge hang up casualties it could prevent the heavy initial lists such as the one that took place during this accident thus allowing the captain time to take the necessary actions to right the vessel.

12/20/2004 12:00:00 to 12/20/2004 12:00:00 (Estimated):

Condition Class: Policy, Procedures, or Regulations
Condition Type: Policy, Regs, and Procedures Condition
Subject Type: Regulations
Location: Known; US Waters
Description: ATLANTIC DEEP WATER ACCESS
Latitude: 42 16.8936 N Longitude: 070 42.7452 W

Subject(s) and Details:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
NORTHERN EDGE	Vessel	Total Constructive Loss: Unsalvaged	Involved in a Marine Casualty

Details Filed: Detail Description

Fishing vessel regulations do not require the carrying of lifejackets if vessels have survival suits. Neither life jackets nor survival suits are required to be worn by crewmen at any time; they are just required to be accessible to the crew. At the time of the incident, the captain was on the bridge and all five crewmen were on deck working. Wearing life jackets by the crew would have given them a greater chance of survival. The life jacket's ability to keep them floating would buy them additional time to possibly reach the raft or get picked up by another vessel before the cold water temperature affected their ability to stay afloat.

12/20/2004 16:30:00 to 12/20/2004 16:30:00 (Estimated):

Action Type: Deck Operations - Fishing Operations
Action Class: Bring aboard and load catch
Location: Known; US Waters
Description: ATLANTIC DEEP WATER ACCESS
Latitude: 42 16.8936 N Longitude: 070 42.7452 W

Subject(s) and Details:

Report of Investigation

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
LOPES, CARLOS A	Party	Dead	Subject of Investigation

Details Filed: Detail Description

While mastering the vessel the Captain was towing with a port and starboard dredge. During the tow the starboard dredge got hung up causing the vessel to list to the starboard side and take water on the maindeck and trapping it behind closed deck scupper gates.

12/20/2004 16:44:00 to 12/20/2004 16:44:00 (Known):

Event Type: Fouling
 Event Class: In Fishing Gear
 Event Subclass:
 Location: Known; US Waters
 Description: ATLANTIC DEEP WATER ACCESS
 Latitude: 42 16.8936 N Longitude: 070 42.7452 W

Subject(s) and Details:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
NORTHERN EDGE	Vessel	Total Constructive Loss: Unsalvaged	Involved in a Marine Casualty

Details Filed: Detail Description

While conducting a tow with the port and starboard scallop dredges dragging one or both of the dredges got hung up on the bottom and tripped the vessel to the starboard side.

12/20/2004 16:45:00 to 12/20/2004 16:45:00 (Known):

Event Type: Flooding
 Event Class: Progressive - out of control
 Event Subclass:
 Location: Known; US Waters
 Description: ATLANTIC DEEP WATER ACCESS
 Latitude: 42 16.8936 N Longitude: 070 42.7452 W

Subject(s) and Details:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
NORTHERN EDGE	Vessel	Total Constructive Loss: Unsalvaged	Involved in a Marine Casualty

Details Filed: Flooding Details

Initial Source:	Downflooding
Area Submerged:	STBD side maindeck
Route of Water into Vessel: doors.	Through open engine room and galley watertight
Subdivision Standard:	Two Compartment
Watertight Subdivisions Intact:	Intact
Watertight Doors Fitted:	Yes
Door Type:	Watertight, manual hinged
Door Status at Time of Event:	open-operative-local
Reason Door was Open:	To keep an eye on engine room

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Door Type: Watertight, manual hinged
Door Status at Time of Event: open-operative-local
Reason Door was Open: Access to galley

Were High Level Alarms Fitted: Yes
Last Functional Test Date: Date Unknown

Status During Incident:
Audible Alarm: Unknown
Visual Alarm: Unknown
Were Alarms Understood: Yes

12/20/2004 16:46:00 to 12/20/2004 16:46:00 (Estimated):

Event Type: Capsize
Event Class: Tripped
Event Subclass:
Location: Known; US Waters
Description: ATLANTIC DEEP WATER ACCESS
Latitude: 42 16.8936 N Longitude: 070 42.7452 W

Subject(s) and Details:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
NORTHERN EDGE	Vessel	Total Constructive Loss: Unsalvaged	Involved in a Marine Casualty

Details Filed: Detail Description

After the starboard or both dredges fouled the vessel was listing to starboard. According to the survivor at the time of the incident the scuppers gates which are used to keep the scallops from falling over the side through the scuppers/freeing ports on the maindeck were closed trapping water behind them. Attempts were made by the crew to open the gates but they were unsuccessful. The captain did release the brake on the winch drum allowing the dredge tow cable to slack but the vessel remained on a starboard list. The survivor indicated that the seas were striking the vessel from the portside. He also reported that the engine room and main house WTD's located on the STBD side were also open at the time.

12/20/2004 16:47:00 to 12/20/2004 16:47:00 (Estimated):

Event Type: Sinking
Event Class: Damage Control Efforts Not Possible
Event Subclass:
Location: Known; US Waters
Description: ATLANTIC DEEP WATER ACCESS
Latitude: 42 16.8936 N Longitude: 070 42.7452 W

Subject(s) and Details:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
NORTHERN EDGE	Vessel	Total Constructive Loss: Unsalvaged	Involved in a Marine Casualty

Details Filed: Detail Description

After capsizing to the starboard side the vessel sank.

Report of Investigation

12/20/2004 16:55:00 to 12/20/2004 16:55:00 (Estimated):

Event Type: Personnel Casualties
 Event Class:
 Event Subclass:
 Location: Known; US Waters
 Description: ATLANTIC DEEP WATER ACCESS
 Latitude: 42 16.8936 N Longitude: 070 42.7452 W

Subject(s) and Details:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
FLORES, JUAN M	Party	Dead	Subject of Investigation

Details Filed: Injury Details

Did death occur:	Yes
Was Death Immediate	No
Cause of Death:	Drowning
Nature of Event Causing Death:	Noncontact Injury- Exposure
Date of Death Known:	Yes
Date:	12/20/2004
Date of Declared Death:	
Declared By:	Captain [REDACTED]
Organization:	USCG OCMI Providence
Was Diving Involved:	No
Did injury occur:	No
Is the Person Missing:	No
Subject to Chemical Exposure:	No
Exposed to Biological Hazards	No
Exposed to a Confined Space/Respiration Hazard:	No
Exposed to Other Hazards:	No
Narrative Summary:	Mr. Flores was not recovered, letter of presumed death issued.

LOPES, CARLOS A	Party	Dead	Subject of Investigation
-----------------	-------	------	--------------------------

Details Filed: Injury Details

Did death occur:	Yes
Was Death Immediate	No
Cause of Death:	Drowning
Nature of Event Causing Death:	Noncontact Injury- Exposure
Date of Death Known:	Yes
Date:	12/20/2004
Date of Declared Death:	
Declared By:	Captain [REDACTED] (presumed dead)
Organization:	USCG OCMI Providence
Was Diving Involved:	No
Did injury occur:	No
Is the Person Missing:	No
Subject to Chemical Exposure:	No
Exposed to Biological Hazards	No
Exposed to a Confined Space/Respiration Hazard:	No
Exposed to Other Hazards:	No

Report of Investigation

Narrative Summary: Mr. Lopes was not recovered, letter of presumed death issued.

[REDACTED] Party Injured Subject of Investigation

Details Filed: Injury Details

Did death occur: No
Did injury occur: Yes
Nature of Event Causing Injuries: Contact Injury- Fall into water
Severity:
Injury Description:
Type: Hyperthermia
Body Region: Ankle/Foot
Aspect: Left
System/Organ:

Was Diving Involved: No
Is the Person Missing: No
Subject to Chemical Exposure: No

Exposed to Biological Hazards No
Exposed to a Confined Space/Respiration Hazard: No
Exposed to Other Hazards: No

Narrative Summary: Mr. [REDACTED] was recovered in a liferaft approximately 40 minutes after the sinking wearing just his jeans.

MORENO, ERIK I Party Dead Subject of Investigation

Details Filed: Injury Details

Did death occur: Yes
Was Death Immediate No
Cause of Death: Drowning
Nature of Event Causing Death: Noncontact Injury- Exposure
Date of Death Known: Yes
Date: 12/20/2004
Date of Declared Death:
Declared By: Captain [REDACTED]
Organization: USCG OCMCI Providence

Was Diving Involved: No
Did injury occur: No
Is the Person Missing: No
Subject to Chemical Exposure: No

Exposed to Biological Hazards No
Exposed to a Confined Space/Respiration Hazard: No
Exposed to Other Hazards: No

Narrative Summary: Mr. Moreno was not recovered, letter of presumed death issued.

CROWLEY, GLEN E Party Dead Subject of Investigation

Details Filed: Injury Details

Did death occur: Yes
Was Death Immediate No
Cause of Death: Drowning
Nature of Event Causing Death: Noncontact Injury- Exposure
Date of Death Known: Yes
Date: 12/20/2004

Report of Investigation

Date of Declared Death:
Declared By: Captain
Organization: USCG OCMI Providence
Was Diving Involved: No
Did injury occur: No
Is the Person Missing: No
Subject to Chemical Exposure: No
Exposed to Biological Hazards: No
Exposed to a Confined Space/Respiration Hazard: No
Exposed to Other Hazards: No
Narrative Summary: Mr. Crowley was not recovered, letter of presumed death issued.

Richards, Raymond Party Dead Subject of Investigation

Details Filed: Injury Details

Did death occur: Yes
Was Death Immediate: No
Cause of Death: Drowning
Nature of Event Causing Death: Noncontact Injury- Exposure
Date of Death Known: Yes
Date: 12/20/2004
Date of Declared Death:
Declared By: Captain
Organization: USCG OCMI Providence
Was Diving Involved: No
Did injury occur: No
Is the Person Missing: No
Subject to Chemical Exposure: No
Exposed to Biological Hazards: No
Exposed to a Confined Space/Respiration Hazard: No
Exposed to Other Hazards: No
Narrative Summary: Mr. Richards was not recovered, letter of presumed death issued.

12/22/2004 11:43:00 to 12/22/2004 11:43:00 (Known):

Action Type: Other Actions - Drug and Alcohol Use and Testing
Action Class: Take Drug Test - Post-casualty
Location: Unknown

Subject(s) and Details:

Name Type Status Role
LOPES, CARLOS A Party Dead Subject of Investigation

Details Filed: Drug and Alcohol Test Details

Sample Collection
Reason for Sample: Post Accident
Directed to get DOT Test: No
Chemical Test Sample Provided: No
Reason: Not Available
Field Sobriety Test
Field Sobriety Test Performed: No
Drug Analysis

Report of Investigation

Analyzing Laboratory:
DOT Protocols Used: Yes
Test Results:
Medical Review Officer/Coroner:
MRO/Coroner Conclusions:
Sample Transferred and Chain
of Custody Complete: Yes

Drug Re-Analysis

[REDACTED] Party Injured Subject of Investigation

Details Filed: Drug and Alcohol Test Details

Sample Collection

Reason for Sample: Post Accident
Directed to get DOT Test: No
Chemical Test Sample Provided: No
Reason: Not Available

Field Sobriety Test

Field Sobriety Test Performed: No

Drug Analysis

Analyzing Laboratory:
DOT Protocols Used: Yes
Test Results:
Medical Review Officer/Coroner:
MRO/Coroner Conclusions:
Sample Transferred and Chain
of Custody Complete: Yes

Drug Re-Analysis

MORENO, ERIK I Party Dead Subject of Investigation

Details Filed: Drug and Alcohol Test Details

Sample Collection

Reason for Sample: Post Accident
Directed to get DOT Test: No
Chemical Test Sample Provided: No
Reason: Not Available

Field Sobriety Test

Field Sobriety Test Performed: No

Drug Analysis

Analyzing Laboratory:
DOT Protocols Used: Yes
Test Results:
Medical Review Officer/Coroner:
MRO/Coroner Conclusions:
Sample Transferred and Chain
of Custody Complete: Yes

Drug Re-Analysis

FLORES, JUAN M Party Dead Subject of Investigation

Details Filed: Drug and Alcohol Test Details

Sample Collection

Reason for Sample: Post Accident
Directed to get DOT Test: Yes
Chemical Test Sample Provided: No
Reason: Not Available

Field Sobriety Test

Field Sobriety Test Performed: No

Report of Investigation

Drug Analysis

Analyzing Laboratory:
DOT Protocols Used: Yes
Test Results:
Medical Review Officer/Coroner:
MRO/Coroner Conclusions:
Sample Transferred and Chain
of Custody Complete: Yes

Drug Re-Analysis

CROWLEY, GLEN E Party Dead

Subject of
Investigation

Details Filed: Drug and Alcohol Test Details

Sample Collection

Reason for Sample: Post Accident
Directed to get DOT Test: No
Chemical Test Sample Provided: No
Reason: Not Available

Field Sobriety Test

Field Sobriety Test Performed: No

Drug Analysis

Analyzing Laboratory:
DOT Protocols Used: Yes
Test Results:
Medical Review Officer/Coroner:
MRO/Coroner Conclusions:
Sample Transferred and Chain
of Custody Complete: Yes

Drug Re-Analysis

Richards, Raymond Party Dead

Subject of
Investigation

Details Filed: Drug and Alcohol Test Details

Sample Collection

Reason for Sample: Post Accident
Directed to get DOT Test: No
Chemical Test Sample Provided: No
Reason: Not Available

Field Sobriety Test

Field Sobriety Test Performed: No

Drug Analysis

Analyzing Laboratory:
DOT Protocols Used: Yes
Test Results:
Medical Review Officer/Coroner:
MRO/Coroner Conclusions:
Sample Transferred and Chain
of Custody Complete: Yes

Drug Re-Analysis

V. CAUSAL ANALYSIS

The Initiating Event of the Incident

Initiating Event:

Fouling (12/20/2004 4:44:00 PM)

Production Factors

Active Human Failures - Execution Errors - Attention Failures - Inattention errors

Other Inattention Error;

Fouling: 12/20/2004 4:44:00 PM, ATLANTIC DEEP WATER ACCESS,
NORTHERN EDGE

Preconditions

LUCs in People - Limitations of the person - Psychological conditions

No documented crew training in preparing for abandoning ship or combating flooding.

Person: 12/20/2004 12:00:00 PM, ATLANTIC DEEP WATER ACCESS,
LOPES, CARLOS A

Workplace Factors

LUCs in Supervision - Rules/Regulations not enforced

Required training was not conducted or enforced by owner.

Vessel, Facility, Equipment, Gear, or Cargo: 12/20/2004 12:00:00 PM,
ATLANTIC DEEP WATER ACCESS, NORTHERN EDGE

Organization Factors

LUCs in Human Resources - Inadequate Training (of Line Managers)

Captain provided no crew training as required by regulation.

Person: 12/20/2004 12:00:00 PM, ATLANTIC DEEP WATER ACCESS,
LOPES, CARLOS A

Defense Factors

Defenses that were in place but failed due to inadequacy - Improper use of defensive equipment

Watertight doors were left open.

Flooding: 12/20/2004 4:45:00 PM, ATLANTIC DEEP WATER
ACCESS, NORTHERN EDGE

Defenses that could reasonably have been expected but were never put in place - Absence of training

Crewmen were not trained by vessel's captain as required by regulations.

Failures of Defense Against Subsequent Events in the Incident

Subsequent Event #1:

Flooding (12/20/2004 4:45:00 PM)

Defense Factors

Defenses that were in place but were disabled - Engineered defenses deactivated to meet conflicting goals

Crew had both watertight doors. The engineroom door was left open to allow the heat from engineroom to warm crew working on deck. The main house door was open for crew convenient.

Flooding: 12/20/2004 4:45:00 PM, ATLANTIC DEEP WATER
ACCESS, NORTHERN EDGE

Subsequent Event #2:

Capsize (12/20/2004 4:46:00 PM)

Defense Factors

Defenses that were in place but were disabled - Engineered defenses deactivated to meet conflicting goals

Maindeck watertight doors were left open leading to the engineroom and main house allowing water to access those spaces, which led to the vessel capsizing. The engineroom door was left open for heat for the crew working on deck and air intake for the main engine. The house door was left open for convenient.

Flooding: 12/20/2004 4:45:00 PM, ATLANTIC DEEP WATER
ACCESS, NORTHERN EDGE

Subsequent Event #3:

Sinking (12/20/2004 4:47:00 PM)

Defense Factors

Defenses that could reasonably have been expected but were never put in place - Missing engineered defenses

Maindeck watertight doors should have been closed.

Flooding: 12/20/2004 4:45:00 PM, ATLANTIC DEEP WATER
ACCESS, NORTHERN EDGE

Defenses that could reasonably have been expected but were never put in place - Absence of training

Report of Investigation

Train crewmen on what to do in the event of maindeck flooding (open scupper gates, close watertight doors).

Person: 12/20/2004 12:00:00 PM, ATLANTIC DEEP WATER ACCESS, LOPES, CARLOS A

Subsequent Event #4:

Personnel Casualties (12/20/2004 4:55:00 PM)

Defense Factors

Defenses that were in place but failed due to inadequacy - Improper or inadequate personal protective equipment

Survival suits were on board but stored in the berthing area and inaccessible to the crew during the sinking.

Person: 12/20/2004 12:00:00 PM, ATLANTIC DEEP WATER ACCESS, LOPES, CARLOS A

Defenses that could reasonably have been expected but were never put in place - Missing engineered defenses

Watertight doors leading to engine room and main house were open allowing water to access the vessel.

Flooding: 12/20/2004 4:45:00 PM, ATLANTIC DEEP WATER ACCESS, NORTHERN EDGE

Defenses that could reasonably have been expected but were never put in place - Absence of briefings

No crew orientation training was conducted.

Person: 12/20/2004 12:00:00 PM, ATLANTIC DEEP WATER ACCESS, LOPES, CARLOS A

Defenses that could reasonably have been expected but were never put in place - Absence of training

No monthly required crew training was conducted by captain.

Person: 12/20/2004 12:00:00 PM, ATLANTIC DEEP WATER ACCESS, LOPES, CARLOS A

VI. REFERRAL FOR ENFORCEMENT ACTION

The following referrals for enforcement action have been made as a result of this investigation and represent those instances where the Coast Guard has gathered evidence that indicates one or more alleged violations or offenses may have occurred. Any determinations as to whether or not one or more actual violations or offenses have occurred are documented in the appropriate Coast Guard enforcement activities.

n/a

APPENDIX 1 - EVIDENCE

2264168 #1 [REDACTED]: Document/CG-2692 Report of Marine Accident, Injury or Death

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/05/2005 5:10:00 PM
Location: MSO Providence
Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED], MSO Providence
Witnessed By: 3rd Party Witness; ,

Tracking:

Attachments:

- image.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED]; 01/05/2005;

2264168 #10 [REDACTED]: Document/Other Document

Invoice from drydock work done in 07/31/03.

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/06/2005 4:00:00 PM
Location: MSO Providence
Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED], MSO Providence
Witnessed By: USCG Witness; ,

Tracking:

Attachments:

- image1.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED] 01/06/2005;

2264168 #11 [REDACTED]: Document/Other Document

Invoice from purchase of hydrostatic release for liferaft.

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/06/2005 4:05:00 PM
Location: MSO Providence
Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED] MSO Providence
Witnessed By: USCG Witness; ,

Tracking:

Attachments:

- image1.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED] 01/06/2005;

2264168 #12 [REDACTED]: Document/Written Statement

Initial interview with Mr. [REDACTED], written statements.

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/10/2005 9:06:00 AM
Location: MSO Providence
Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED], MSO Providence
Witnessed By: USCG Witness; ,

Tracking:

Attachments:

- image.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED]; 01/10/2005;

2264168 #13 [REDACTED]: Document/Written Statement

Report of Investigation

interview at Marine Safety Consultants on Dec 23, hard copy and wave file.

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/10/2005 12:19:00 PM
Location: MSO Providence
Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED] MSO Providence
Witnessed By: USCG Witness; ,

Tracking:

Attachments:

- image.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED] 01/10/2005;
- FURTADO Pedro stm 04-1488.doc; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED].; 01/10/2005;
- 06-01-NORTHERN EDGE INTERVIEW.wav; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED].; 01/19/2005;
- 05-01-NORTHERN EDGE INTERVIEW.wav; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED].; 01/19/2005;
- 04-01-NORTHERN EDGE INTERVIEW.wav; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED].; 01/19/2005;
- 03-01-NORTHERN EDGE INTERVIEW.wav; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED].; 01/19/2005;
- 02-01-NORTHERN EDGE INTERVIEW.wav; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED].; 01/19/2005;
- 01-01-NORTHERN EDGE INTERVIEW.wav; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED].; 01/19/2005;
- Part2-NORTHERN EDGE INTERVIEW CONT.wav; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED].; 01/19/2005;

2264168 #14 [REDACTED]: Document/Written Statement

NOAA Fisheries information about November compensation trip

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/11/2005 12:48:00 PM
Location: MSO Providence
Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED], MSO Providence
Witnessed By: USCG Witness; ,

Tracking:

Attachments:

- image.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED].; 01/11/2005;

2264168 #15 [REDACTED]: Electronic/Digital Audio Recording

Mayday relay from F/V OCEAN REIGN to Group- SWH.

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/14/2005 2:33:00 PM
Location: MSO Providence
Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED] MSO Providence
Witnessed By: USCG Witness; ,

Tracking:

Attachments:

- NorthernEdge.wav; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED] 01/14/2005;

Report of Investigation

2264168 #16 [REDACTED]: Document/Written Statement

Master OCEAN REIGN statement.

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/14/2005 3:17:00 PM

Location: MSO Providence

Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED], MSO Providence

Witnessed By: USCG Witness; ,

Tracking:

Attachments:

- image.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED].; 01/14/2005;

2264168 #17 [REDACTED] Document/Other Document

E-mails to and from Northern Edge during the November 11, 2004 trip

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/14/2005 3:12:00 PM

Location: MSO Providence

Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED], MSO Providence

Witnessed By: USCG Witness; ,

Tracking:

Attachments:

- image.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED].; 01/14/2005;

2264168 #18 [REDACTED]: Document/Other Document

December 16, 2004 trip e-mails.

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/14/2005 3:46:00 PM

Location: MSO Providence

Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED] MSO Providence

Witnessed By: USCG Witness; ,

Tracking:

Attachments:

- image.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED].; 01/14/2005;

2264168 #19 [REDACTED]: Document/Written Statement

[REDACTED] final interview

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/18/2005 11:56:00 AM

Location: MSO Providence

Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED], MSO Providence

Witnessed By: USCG Witness; ,

Tracking:

Attachments:

- image.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED] 01/18/2005;

2264168 #2 [REDACTED]: Document/Drawing or Diagram

Picture with sketches showing modifications made to the Northern Edge in February of 2003.

Collection Information:

Report of Investigation

Date/Time: 01/05/2005 5:19:00 PM
Location: MSO Providence
Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED], MSO Providence
Witnessed By: USCG Witness; ,

Tracking:

Attachments:

- image.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED].; 01/06/2005;

2264168 #20 [REDACTED]: Document/Written Statement
Interview with Captain from the F/V DIANE MARIE

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/18/2005 12:05:00 PM
Location: MSO Providence
Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED], MSO Providence
Witnessed By: USCG Witness; ,

Tracking:

Attachments:

- image.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED].; 01/18/2005;

2264168 #21 [REDACTED]: Document/Written Statement

Interview with [REDACTED].

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/18/2005 12:06:00 PM
Location: MSO Providence
Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED] MSO Providence
Witnessed By: USCG Witness; ,

Tracking:

Attachments:

- image.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED].; 01/18/2005;

2264168 #22 [REDACTED]: Document/Written Statement
[REDACTED] Captain of the Chris and Amy.

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/19/2005 10:36:00 AM
Location: MSO Providence
Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED], MSO Providence
Witnessed By: USCG Witness; ,

Tracking:

Attachments:

- image.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED].; 01/19/2005;

2264168 #23 [REDACTED]: Document/Written Statement
[REDACTED] was a pass captian on the NORTHERN EDGE.

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/19/2005 10:39:00 AM
Location: MSO Providence
Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED] MSO Providence
Witnessed By: USCG Witness; ,

Report of Investigation

Tracking:

Attachments:

- image.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED]; 01/19/2005;

2264168 #24 [REDACTED]: Document/Written Statement

PO [REDACTED] statement about the November 11, 2004 boarding.

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/19/2005 10:42:00 AM

Location: MSO Providence

Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED] MSO Providence

Witnessed By: USCG Witness; ,

Tracking:

Attachments:

- image.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED]; 01/19/2005;

2264168 #25 [REDACTED]: Document/Other Document

Information from NMFS on NORTHERN EDGE on December 20, 2004.

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/19/2005 10:56:00 AM

Location: MSO Providence

Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED] MSO Providence

Witnessed By: USCG Witness; ,

Tracking:

Attachments:

- image.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED]; 01/19/2005;

2264168 #26 [REDACTED] Document/Written Statement

[REDACTED], crewman

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 02/09/2005 11:10:00 AM

Location: MSO Providence

Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED] MSO Providence

Witnessed By: USCG Witness; ,

Tracking:

Attachments:

- image.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED]; 02/09/2005;

2264168 #27 [REDACTED] Document/Written Statement

Captain [REDACTED]

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 02/09/2005 12:10:00 PM

Location: MSO Providence

Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED] MSO Providence

Witnessed By: USCG Witness; ,

Tracking:

Attachments:

- image.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED]; 02/09/2005;

Report of Investigation

2264168 #28 [REDACTED] Document/Other Document

Vessel permits and broken trip regulation information

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 02/09/2005 12:19:00 PM

Location: MSO Providence

Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED], MSO Providence

Witnessed By: USCG Witness; ,

Tracking:

Attachments:

- image.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED].; 02/09/2005;

2264168 #29 [REDACTED]: Document/Written Statement

Owner [REDACTED]

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 02/14/2005 11:38:00 AM

Location: MSO Providence

Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED], MSO Providence

Witnessed By: USCG Witness; ,

Tracking:

Attachments:

- image.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED] 02/14/2005;

2264168 #3 [REDACTED]: Physical/Conventional Photo

Still photos of Northern Edge

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/05/2005 5:46:00 PM

Location: MSO Providence

Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED] MSO Providence

Witnessed By: USCG Witness; ,

Tracking:

Attachments:

- image1.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED].; 01/06/2005;
- image1.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED].; 01/06/2005;
- image1.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED].; 01/06/2005;
- image1.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED].; 01/06/2005;
- image1.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED].; 01/06/2005;
- image1.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED].; 01/06/2005;
- image1.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED].; 01/06/2005;
- image1.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED].; 01/06/2005;

2264168 #4 [REDACTED]: Document/Other Document

Survey report

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/06/2005 1:55:00 PM

Location: MSO Providence

Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED], MSO Providence

Witnessed By: USCG Witness; ,

Tracking:

Report of Investigation

Attachments:

- image1.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED]; 01/06/2005;

2264168 #5 [REDACTED]: Document/Other Document

Landings between 01/20/04 & 12/11/04

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/06/2005 1:56:00 PM

Location: MSO Providence

Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED] MSO Providence

Witnessed By: USCG Witness; ,

Tracking:

Attachments:

- image1.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED]; 01/06/2005;

2264168 # [REDACTED]: Document/Other Document

Fishing vessel examiner report 9/4/03.

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/06/2005 1:59:00 PM

Location: MSO Providence

Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED], MSO Providence

Witnessed By: USCG Witness; ,

Tracking:

Attachments:

- image1.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED]; 01/06/2005;

2264168 #7 [REDACTED]: Document/Other Document

Invoice for purchase of Hydrostatic release for EPRIB.

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/06/2005 3:24:00 PM

Location: MSO Providence

Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED] MSO Providence

Witnessed By: USCG Witness; ,

Tracking:

Attachments:

- image1.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED]; 01/06/2005;

2264168 #8 [REDACTED]: Document/Other Document

Liferaft servicing report from 11/24/04.

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/06/2005 3:30:00 PM

Location: MSO Providence

Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED] MSO Providence

Witnessed By: USCG Witness; ,

Tracking:

Attachments:

- image1.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED]; 01/06/2005;

2264168 #9 [REDACTED] Document/Other Document

Report of Investigation

Invoice for welding and moving the vessel's gantry crane in February 20, 2003.

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/06/2005 3:44:00 PM

Location: MSO Providence

Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED], MSO Providence

Witnessed By: USCG Witness; ,

Tracking:

Attachments:

- image1.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED].; 01/06/2005;

APPENDIX 2 - CORRESPONDENCE

29766 - Subpoena for Boatracs

Source: USCG
Type: Incoming
Received: At MSO Providence on 01/10/2005 3:44:00 PM
Attachments:
- image.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED]; 01/11/2005;

29767 - Subpoena K&G Fishing

Source: USCG
Type: Incoming
Received: At MSO Providence on 01/10/2005 3:45:00 PM
Attachments:
- image.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED]; 01/11/2005;

29768 - Subpoena Novoa

Source: USCG
Type: Incoming
Received: At MSO Providence on 01/10/2005 3:45:00 PM
Attachments:
- Nesubpoena.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED]; 01/10/2005;

29801 - Representation ltr for Mr. Flores and [REDACTED]

Source: USCG
Type: Incoming
Received: At MSO Providence on 01/11/2005 8:57:00 AM
Attachments:
- image.pdf; COMMANDANT (G-MOA); Post, Kelly M.; 02/17/2005;

31402 - 1999 Report on Fishing vessel casualty task force

Source: USCG
Type: Incoming
Received: At MSO Providence on 02/14/2005 11:57:00 AM
Attachments:
- fvctf.pdf; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED]; 02/14/2005;

31549 - IO Narrative

Source: USCG
Type: Incoming
Received: At MSO Providence on 02/16/2005 3:19:00 PM
Attachments:
- IO narrative.doc; MSO PROVIDENCE; [REDACTED]; 05/06/2005;