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No. 00-62
In the Supreme Court of the United States
CSU, L.L.C., PETITIONER
v.
XEROX CORPORATION
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
AS AMICUS CURIAE
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
A. DOUGLAS MELAMED
Acting Assistant Attorney General
LAWRENCE G. WALLACE
Deputy Solicitor General
JEFFREY H. BLATTNER
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
PAUL R.Q. WOLFSON
Assistant to the Solicitor General
CATHERINE G. O'SULLIVAN
SUSAN M. DAVIES
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether a unilateral refusal to license or sell intellectual property protected
by patent or copyright is absolutely immune from a claim of monopolization
and attempted monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act,
15 U.S.C. 2.
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 00-62
CSU, L.L.C., PETITIONER
v.
XEROX CORPORATION
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
AS AMICUS CURIAE
This brief is submitted in response to the Court's order inviting the Solicitor
General to express the views of the United States.
STATEMENT
1. Respondent Xerox manufactures, sells, and services photocopiers and printers.
Pet. App. 3a. Petitioner CSU is an independent service organization (ISO)
that specializes in servicing machines manufactured by respondent. Petitioner
competes with Xerox in servicing Xerox products. Id. at 3a-4a. Before 1984,
Xerox sold to ISOs parts necessary for repairing its products. Id. at 3a,
22a-23a. In 1984, Xerox established a policy of refusing to sell parts for
its machines directly to ISOs. Xerox continued, however, to make parts for
its machines available to authorized resellers and service providers and
to end-users of Xerox equipment. Id. at 3a, 22a-24a. In 1989, Xerox tightened
enforcement of its policy to ensure that parts ordered by ISOs or their
customers were actually intended for their own end-use, and not for use
by ISOs in servicing others' Xerox machines. Id. at 3a. In addition, before
1991, Xerox machines came with diagnostic software installed, but subsequently
Xerox unbundled the software and used its copyright to restrict ISO access
to the software. Id. at 80a.
2. In 1994, CSU filed suit against Xerox,1 alleging that Xerox violated
Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 2, by monopolizing and
attempting to monopolize the markets for service of Xerox high speed copiers
and printers. Xerox counterclaimed for patent and copyright infringement.
Pet. App. 4a.
Xerox moved for summary judgment on CSU's antitrust claims and its own counterclaims,
contending that its unilateral refusal to sell or license patented parts
and copyrighted software could neither violate Section 2 nor provide a basis
for a patent or copyright misuse defense to its infringement claims. Pet.
App. 4a. The district court initially denied those motions for summary judgment.
Id. at 97a-124a, 78a-96a On Xerox's motion to reconsider, however, the district
court granted summary judgment in favor of Xerox on CSU's antitrust claim
with respect to Xerox's refusal to license patented parts and partial summary
judgment on Xerox's patent-infringement counterclaims Id. at 17a-18a, 56a-77a.
The district court held that "Xerox's unilateral refusal to sell or
license its patented parts cannot constitute * * * unlawful exclusionary
conduct under the antitrust laws." Id. at 69a; see also id. at 74a.
In denying CSU's motion for reconsideration, the court further held that
"Xerox's refusal to license is expressly authorized by patent law and
therefore immune from antitrust scrutiny." Id. at 40a. The district
court subsequently extended those rulings to grant summary judgment to Xerox
on CSU's antitrust claims based on Xerox's refusal to license its copyrighted
materials as well as Xerox's counterclaim for copyright infringement. Id.
at 16a, 21a-45a. After a trial to determine Xerox's damages on its copyright
counterclaims, the district court entered an appealable judgment in favor
of Xerox, and CSU appealed. Id. at 16a.2
3. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.
Pet. App. 1a-14a. The court initially determined that the antitrust claims
involving copyrighted materials were governed by Tenth Circuit law, but
that Federal Circuit law governed the claims relating to patented parts.
Id. at 5a-6a.
a. On CSU's claims relating to patented parts, the court first acknowledged
that "[i]ntellectual property rights do not confer a privilege to violate
the antitrust laws." Pet. App. 6a. The court nonetheless read its prior
case law and Section 271(d) of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. 271(d),3 to establish
that a patent holder generally has no obligation to license or sell its
intellectual property, and that privilege is not negated by the antitrust
laws. Pet. App. 6a-7a.
The court did note at least three established exceptions to the principle
that a patent holder may enforce the right to exclude conferred by the patent
without antitrust liability. First, a suit to enforce the statutory right
to exclude is not exempt from the antitrust laws if the infringement defendant
shows that the patent was obtained through fraud on the Patent and Trademark
Office. Pet. App. 7a. Second, an infringement defendant may avoid liability
by demonstrating that the infringement suit is a sham to cover an attempt
to interfere with the business relations of a competitor. Id. at 7a-8a.
Third, the court of appeals noted (id. at 8a) that, in Eastman Kodak Co.
v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 457, 479-480 n.29 (1992) (Kodak),
this Court stated that "power gained through some natural and legal
advantage such as a patent, . . . can give rise to liability if a seller
exploits his dominant position in one market to expand his empire into the
next."
The court found none of those three exceptions applicable to this case,
however. CSU had not alleged that Xerox obtained its patents through fraud
or that Xerox's patent-infringement counterclaims were shams. Pet. App.
8a. As for the exception recognized in Kodak, the court stressed that Kodak
"was a tying case," whereas "there are no claims in this
case of illegally tying the sale of Xerox's patented parts to unpatented
products." Ibid. Thus, the court stated, Kodak merely "restat[ed]
the undisputed premise that the patent holder cannot use his statutory right
to refuse to sell patented parts to gain a monopoly in a market beyond the
scope of the patent," and did not "limit the right of the patentee
to refuse to sell or license in markets within the scope of the statutory
patent grant." Id. at 9a. And, the court noted, it had already held
that, "absent exceptional circumstances, a patent may confer the right
to exclude competition altogether in more than one antitrust market."
Ibid.
The court declined to align itself with the Ninth Circuit's subsequent decision
after the remand in the Kodak case, Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (1997) (ITS), in which that court held that (1)
a unilateral refusal to license under a patent or sell patented goods may
constitute exclusionary conduct in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman
Act; (2) there is a rebuttable presumption that the exercise of the right
to exclude constitutes a legitimate business justification; and (3) such
a proffered business justification for the right to exclude is subject to
a demonstration that it is pretextual. See Pet. App. 9a-10a. The Federal
Circuit disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's approach on the ground that it
"requires an evaluation of the patentee's subjective motivation for
refusing to sell or license its patented products." Id. at 10a. Rather,
the court stated, it would not inquire into the patent holder's subjective
motivation for exerting his statutory rights, "even though his refusal
to sell or license his patented invention may have an anticompetitive effect,
so long as that anticompetitive effect is not illegally extended beyond
the statutory patent grant." Ibid. Concluding that Xerox's refusal
to sell its patented parts did not exceed the scope of the patent grant,
the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of CSU's antitrust claim
based on Xerox's refusal to sell or license those patented parts. Id. at
10a-11a.
b. The court reached a similar disposition of CSU's antitrust claims with
respect to Xerox's refusal to sell or license its copyrighted materials.
Pet. App. 11a-14a. The court noted that "the property right granted
by copyright law cannot be used with impunity to extend power in the marketplace
beyond what Congress intended." Id. at 11a. Thus, it cited United States
v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962), for the proposition that block-booking
of copyrighted motion pictures is illegal tying in violation of the Sherman
Act. See Pet. App. 11a. But, the court noted, this Court has not "directly
addressed the antitrust implications of a unilateral refusal to sell or
license copyrighted expression." Ibid.
The court found persuasive the approach of the First Circuit in Data General
Corp. v. Grumman System Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1994), in which
that court held that, "while exclusionary conduct can include a monopolist's
unilateral refusal to license a copyright, an author's desire to exclude
others from use of its copyrighted work is a presumptively valid business
justification for any immediate harm to consumers." Pet. App. 12a.
Although the Ninth Circuit, in ITS, had adopted a modified version of the
First Circuit's Data General standard, which (as modified) permits a showing
that "the defense and exploitation of the copyright grant was merely
a pretextual business justification to mask anticompetitive conduct,"
id. at 13a, the court of appeals in this case found the First Circuit's
original approach "more consistent with both the antitrust and the
copyright laws," and concluded that it would most likely be followed
by the Tenth Circuit in considering "the effect of Xerox's unilateral
right to refuse to license or sell copyrighted manuals and diagnostic software
on liability under the antitrust laws." Ibid. In the absence of evidence
"that the copyrights were obtained by unlawful means or were used to
gain monopoly power beyond the statutory copyright granted by Congress,"
the court concluded that "Xerox's refusal to sell or license its copyrighted
works was squarely within the rights granted by Congress to the copyright
holder and did not constitute a violation of the antitrust laws." Id.
at 14a.
DISCUSSION
Whether the unilateral refusal to sell or license intellectual property
protected by a patent or copyright may constitute a violation of Section
2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 2, is an important issue that
may well warrant this Court's resolution in an appropriate case. But precisely
because that issue has such broad potential implications, it is particularly
important that this Court choose the appropriate vehicle for resolution
of the difficult questions implicated by the intersection of antitrust law
and intellectual property law. In our view, this case does not present that
vehicle.
First, there are significant ambiguities in the decision below about the
applicability of antitrust law to intellectual property. Unlike petitioners,
we do not believe the Federal Circuit's decision must be read as holding
that no Section 2 claim may ever be based on the unilateral refusal to sell
or license such intellectual property (even setting aside the three circumstances
expressly recognized by the court of appeals in its decision in which an
antitrust claim could be based on such a unilateral refusal to deal). While
it is conceivable that the court of appeals intended to go that far, its
opinion does not compel that conclusion, and that uncertainty makes this
case an undesirable one for resolving the important issues presented.
Second, the actual extent of the disagreement between the Federal Circuit's
decision in this case and the Ninth Circuit's decision in ITS, supra, is
not clear. Indeed, it is not clear how this case would have been decided
in the Ninth Circuit. We therefore suggest that the Court would benefit
from further percolation of these difficult issues in the courts of appeals.4
1. Both the Federal Circuit in this case and the Ninth Circuit in ITS recognized
that (a) the holders of patents and copyrights have broad rights to refuse
to sell or license their works, and that (b) intellectual property rights
do not confer a privilege to violate the antitrust laws. See Pet. App. 6a
("Intellectual property rights do not confer a privilege to violate
the antitrust laws. But it is also correct that the antitrust laws do not
negate the patentee's right to exclude others from patent property.")
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); ITS, 125 F.3d at 1215 ("Two
principles have emerged regarding the interplay between these laws: (1)
neither patent nor copyright holders are immune from antitrust liability,
and (2) patent and copyright holders may refuse to sell or license protected
work."). But with respect to antitrust claims based on the unilateral
refusal to sell or license property, the central issue in this case, the
Federal Circuit's opinion is susceptible of varying interpretations. The
Federal Circuit did state that, "[i]n the absence of any indication
of illegal tying, fraud in the Patent and Trademark Office, or sham litigation,
the patent holder may enforce the statutory right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the claimed invention free from liability under
the antitrust laws." Pet. App. 10a. Almost immediately thereafter,
however, the court stated that evaluation of a patentee's motivations in
refusing to deal would not be appropriate "so long as [the] anticompetitive
effect [of refusing to sell or license a patented invention] is not illegally
extended beyond the statutory patent grant." Ibid.
If the Federal Circuit had clearly held that a refusal to sell or license
property protected by a valid patent may never be the basis of an antitrust
violation except in the circumstances of an illegal tying arrangement (as
discussed in this Court's opinion in Kodak, 504 U.S. at 479-480 n.29), we
would have serious concerns about such a holding and would not be prepared
to endorse it. Exemptions from the antitrust laws are "strongly disfavored."
Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 421
(1986); see National Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Ctr. v. Blue Cross,
452 U.S. 378, 388 (1981). That well-established principle reflects the fundamental
importance of the antitrust laws as an element of national economic policy.
It also reflects the cardinal rule of statutory construction that "when
two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts,
absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard
each as effective." Morton v. Moncari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).
Moreover, the antitrust laws, properly construed, afford ample scope for
the exercise of lawfully obtained intellectual property rights. A patentee's
basic right is defined by statute as "the right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United States."
35 U.S.C. 154(a)(1). That right to exclude is the essence of a patent grant.5
But the right to exclude others is no less "one of the most essential
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property,"
even when the property in question is tangible property. Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); see Consolidated Fruit Jar Co.
v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1896) ("A patent for an invention is as
much property as a patent for land. The right rests on the same foundation
and is surrounded and protected by the same sanctions.").
The antitrust laws generally permit those whose efforts have advanced the
common well-being to benefit fully from their contributions. Thus, a lawful
monopolist is perfectly free under the antitrust laws to charge monopoly
prices, without regard to whether the monopoly derives in part from intellectual
property. Like the intellectual property laws, the antitrust laws applaud
"skill, foresight and industry," United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.), and do not penalize
lawful monopoly by preventing its exploitation. And under the antitrust
laws, a firm ordinarily may choose with whom it will do business, without
regard to whether the doing of business is the licensing or sale of intellectual
property. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984);
United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) ("In the absence
of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman] act does
not restrict the long recognized right of a trader or manufacturer * * *
freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom
he will deal.").
In addition, a lawful monopolist could properly be held liable under Section
2 for a refusal to deal only if it had monopoly power and if its refusal
to deal sacrificed profit available from exercising that monopoly power
in order to exclude competition and thereby to create additional market
power-only if, in other words, it sought to enlarge its monopoly by "attempting
to exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency." Aspen Skiing
Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Conduct generally does not violate Section 2 if
it does not involve a sacrifice of profits in order to exclude competition
and thereby create market power. See Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox
144 (2d ed. 1993) (defining predation as conduct "that would not be
considered profit maximizing except for the expectation" of a resulting
reduction in competition). Accordingly, the antitrust laws usually permit
monopolists, if lawful, broad license in refusing to deal with others.
Given that there are only limited circumstances in which any lawful monopolist's
refusal to deal may constitute a violation of the antitrust laws, we do
not believe that it is necessary to construe either the Patent Act or the
Sherman Act as making patent holders immune from liability under Section
2.6 Yet we also do not believe that the court of appeals' decision must
be read as adopting such a holding. The court of appeals' decision expressly
recognized, for example, that a patent holder that attempts to expand the
scope of its monopoly by tying its patented product to some other product
or service, over which it did not have a lawful monopoly, may be found to
have engaged in a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15
U.S.C. 1 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). See Pet. App. 8a-9a. The court of appeals
thus recognized the fundamental principle, reiterated by this Court in Kodak
(504 U.S. at 480 n.29), that "power gained through some natural and
legal advantage such as a patent, * * * can give rise to liability if a
seller exploits his dominant position in one market to expand his empire
into the next." Pet. App. 8a (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).7 See also Phillip Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law
¶ 704.1, at 229 (Supp. 2000) (discussing potential antitrust liability
from refusals to license intellectual property in conditions such as price
fixing, reciprocity, and exclusive dealing).
Much the same might well be true, for example, in a Section 2 case where
the patent holder, although not engaging in an express tying arrangement
like that alleged in Kodak, had nonetheless sought to accomplish a similar
result by restricting the sale or license of its patented product to those
customers who had also demonstrated their willingness to purchase from it
another product or service over which it did not have a lawful monopoly.
See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 108 (1948) ("Though he
makes no threat to withhold the business of his closed or monopoly towns
unless the distributors give him the exclusive film rights in the towns
where he has competitors, the effect is likely to be the same where the
two are joined."); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458, 463
(1938) ("[E]very use of a patent as a means of obtaining a limited
monopoly of unpatented material is prohibited. * * * [The prohibition] applies
whatever the nature of the device by which the owner of the patent seeks
to effect such unauthorized extension of the monopoly."); see also
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 136 (1969)
(patentee may not "extend the monopoly of his patent to derive a benefit
not attributable to use of the patent's teachings"). We do not read
the court of appeals' opinion as holding that no claim of monopolization
or attempted monopolization under Section 2 could be made out in such a
case, and this case does not in any event present such facts.
2. The court of appeals in this case rejected the Ninth Circuit's decision
in ITS, which upheld a jury verdict in favor of an antitrust plaintiff in
a similar Section 2 monopolization case, on the ground that the Ninth Circuit,
by making the assertion of the intellectual-property right to exclude only
a presumptively valid business justification subject to rebuttal by an antitrust
plaintiff, improperly permitted "an evaluation of the patentee's subjective
motivation for refusing to sell or license its patented products for pretext."
Pet. App. 10a. In ITS, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the district court should
have instructed the jury that Kodak's protection of its patent rights was
a "presumptively valid business justification" for its refusal
to sell those parts to ISOs competing with Kodak in the service market.
125 F.3d at 1218. The Ninth Circuit also held, however, that the failure
to give such an instruction was harmless error on the facts of that case,
because the record clearly demonstrated that Kodak's policy of refusal to
sell parts to ISOs extended well beyond patented parts. The Ninth Circuit
distinguished other appellate decisions that had found patent holders immune
from antitrust liability for the refusal to license a patent because, unlike
those cases, ITS concerned "a blanket refusal that included protected
and unprotected products." Id. at 1219. The Ninth Circuit therefore
concluded that the jury would have had to reject Kodak's proffered defense
of patent protection even under proper instructions, because the exercise
of the right to exclude granted by the patent was not the actual basis for
Kodak's actions in the marketplace.8
In light of the Ninth Circuit's reliance in ITS on the fact that Kodak's
policy of refusal to deal extended to unpatented parts, it is not clear
how this case would have been decided by that court. The district court
in this case specifically noted, when it entered summary judgment in favor
of Xerox on CSU's antitrust claims, that "CSU concedes that it cannot
prove antitrust injury premised on Xerox's refusal to sell unpatented parts
because its damages are based on an alleged unavailability of critical parts,
including patented parts, copyrighted manuals, and patented and copyrighted
diagnostic software." Pet. App. 16a. But the Ninth Circuit in ITS ruled
that Kodak's refusal to sell unpatented parts established that that case
had been decided properly by the jury. The Ninth Circuit did not indicate
whether the jury might properly have found in ITS that Kodak's refusal to
sell patented parts alone to the ISOs would have constituted a Section 2
violation. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit in ITS distinguished one of its own
prior cases, United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 647
(1981), in which it found no antitrust violation where the patent holder
decided merely "to license some of its patents and refuse to license
others" (see ITS, 125 F.3d at 1216). In light of CSU's concession that
Xerox's refusal to sell unpatented parts had no anti-competitive significance,
it is thus possible that the Ninth Circuit might have affirmed the district
court's decision in this case to enter summary judgment for Xerox.
In light of the considerable uncertainty about the scope of both the decision
below and the Ninth Circuit's decision in ITS, we suggest that the Court
allow these difficult issues to percolate further in the courts of appeals.
The courts of appeals may harmonize their approaches upon further reflection,
and in light of additional factual variations, or they may make their differences
more clear, in which case this Court's review may eventually be warranted.
At this stage, however, we submit that the issues presented by this case
are not ripe for the Court's review.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
A. DOUGLAS MELAMED
Acting Assistant Attorney General
LAWRENCE G. WALLACE
Deputy Solicitor General
JEFFREY H. BLATTNER
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
PAUL R.Q. WOLFSON
Assistant to the Solicitor General
CATHERINE G. O'SULLIVAN
SUSAN M. DAVIES
Attorneys
JANUARY 2001
1 In 1994, Xerox settled an antitrust suit brought against it by a class
of ISOs. Under the settlement, Xerox suspended its parts policy for 6 1/2
years and agreed to license its diagnostic software to ISOs for 4 1/2 years.
CSU opted out of that settlement. Pet. App. 4a, 23a.
2 Although CSU alleged that the prices at which Xerox sold patented parts
to ISOs after the 1994 settlement (see note 1, supra) were intended to forestall
competition from ISOs (Pet. App. 4a, 23a), the district court deemed that
issue to have been resolved by its conclusion that Xerox's exercise of its
unilateral right to refuse to sell or license patented products cannot constitute
a violation of the antitrust laws. Id. at 74a-75a.
3 Section 271(d) provides, in pertinent part: "No patent owner otherwise
entitled to relief * * * shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse
or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having * * * (4)
refused to license or use any rights to the patent."
4 The Question Presented by the petition (Pet. i) raises not only the issue
of antitrust liability, but also the doctrines of patent misuse and copyright
misuse. The body of the petition, however, does not address in detail the
doctrines of patent and copyright misuse, nor does it identify any conflict
among the circuits regarding any misuse issue. The court of appeals rejected
petitioner's allegations of patent misuse in a footnote, stating only that,
"[h]aving concluded that Xerox's actions fell within the statutory
patent grant, we need not separately consider CSU's allegations of patent
misuse and they are rejected." Pet. App. 10a n.2; see id. at 7a (discussing
Section 271(d) of the Patent Act). The court of appeals did not address
copyright misuse at all. We therefore limit our discussion in this brief
to antitrust liability.
In addition, our focus in this brief is on antitrust claims based on the
refusal to sell or license matters protected by a patent, although our observations
also apply to the refusal to sell or license copyrighted materials. The
antitrust immunity recognized by the court of appeals for the refusal to
sell or license patented materials is at least as broad as that for the
refusal to sell or license copyrighted materials. Moreover, the statutory
rights afforded a copyright holder are generally less expansive than those
enjoyed by a patent holder. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984) (noting that Congress "has never accorded
the copyright owner complete control over all possible uses of his work").
But in general, the "governing antitrust principles are the same"
for patents and copyrights. U.S. Dep't of Justice & FTC, Antitrust Guidelines
for the Licensing of Intellectual Property § 2.1 (1995). Moreover,
this Court has recognized the "historic kinship between patent law
and copyright law," Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 439. Accordingly, for antitrust
purposes, we perceive no basis for distinguishing between a patent holder's
and a copyright holder's unilateral refusal to deal.
5 See, e.g., Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215
(1980); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135
(1969); Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405,
429 (1908); Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1852); cf.
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyle, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (noting copyright owner's
"right to exclude others from using his property").
6 The court of appeals relied on Section 271(d) of the Patent Act, which
provides that "[n]o patent owner * * * shall be denied relief or deemed
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his
having * * * (4) refused to license or use any rights to the patent."
35 U.S.C. 271(d). On its face, however, that provision does not address
antitrust liability for monopolization or attempted monopolization by refusal
to deal. See ITS, 125 F.3d at 1214 n.7 (noting that the language of Section
271(d) does not compel a reading precluding antitrust liability, although
it does "indicate congressional intent to protect the core patent right
of exclusion").
7 The court of appeals also read its prior case law as holding that a patent
may confer the right to exclude competition in more than one antitrust market
"absent exceptional circumstances" (Pet. App. 9a)-a potentially
significant exception that might well include the circumstances discussed
in the text following this footnote.
8 In ITS, the Ninth Circuit also held that, although Kodak's refusal to
sell parts to ISOs was a violation of Section 2, Kodak was entitled to condition
such sale on "any nondiscriminatory price that the market will bear."
125 F.3d at 1226. The Ninth Circuit therefore reversed the district court's
injunction insofar as it required Kodak to make its patented parts available
for sale at reasonable prices. In the decision below, however, the Federal
Circuit did not address the validity of any condition that might be placed
on the sale or license of patented parts or copyrighted materials. This
case, therefore, does not present the Court with an appropriate vehicle
to determine whether or to what extent Section 2 restricts the conditions
under which a monopolist patent or copyright holder may sell or license
its protected materials.