United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (credibility
quantification testimony implicates the very concerns underlying the
prohibition against human lie detector testimony; it invades the
province of the court members to determine the credibility of the
victim and violates the limitations of MRE 608 on admissible testimony
relating to truthfulness).
United States v. Dobson, 63 M.J. 1 (the military judge
erred when he prevented appellant from introducing corroborating
evidence when her credibility was attacked; such evidence is admissible
to rebut a claim of recent fabrication under MRE 801(d)(1)(B)).
United
States v. Saferite, 59 MJ 270 (during sentencing, as
at every
other moment of trial testimony, the credibility of a witness is an
omnipresent
issue; each witness’s credibility determines the authority of the
testimony;
Section VI of the Military Rules of Evidence is entitled “Witnesses,”
but
easily could be viewed as “Credibility of Witnesses” as the whole
section
focuses on technical evidentiary rules to bolster or to attack the
credibility
of testimony).
(MRE
608 is a
key evidentiary rule that covers several methods to bolster or attack
the
credibility of a witness; these methods include opinion and reputation
evidence
as to the character of a witness for truthfulness and questions
regarding
specific instances of conduct that may be relevant to credibility).
2001
United
States v. Goldwire, 55 MJ 139 (it is not
reasonable to
conclude that attacks on the credibility of a speaker’s statement are
excluded
merely because the statement is admitted as made by a party-opponent;
when the
defense affirmatively introduces the accused’s statement in response to
the
prosecution’s direct examination initially admitting some portion of
the
statement, the prosecution is not prohibited from impeaching the
declarant
under Mil. R. Evid. 806).
United
States v. Hart, 55 MJ 395 (Mil. R. Evid. 806
permits
attacks upon the credibility of a hearsay declarant as well as attacks
upon the
declarant of a statement which is not hearsay under Mil. R. Evid.
801(d)(2)(C),
(D), or (E)).
(where pretrial statements made by appellant are elicited during
cross-examination as “state of mind” evidence, appellant is then
treated as a
declarant/testifying witness and the government may properly introduce
reputation and opinion evidence to impeach appellant’s truthfulness
pursuant to
Mil. R. Evid. 806).
(once defense counsel’s cross-examination introduced appellant’s
exculpatory
pretrial statements, it was appropriate to introduce character evidence
as to
appellant’s untruthfulness).
United
States v. Whitney, 55 MJ 413 (human lie detector
testimony
is inadmissible).
2000
United
States v. Jenkins, 54 MJ 12 (MRE 608(a) permits
the
credibility of a witness to be supported or attacked by opinion
evidence, but
that opinion evidence may refer only to the witness’ character for
truthfulness
or untruthfulness; a witness may not, however, opine that another
witness is
lying or telling the truth).
(it is improper for a trial counsel to compel a defendant to state
that the
witnesses testifying against him are lying).
(while
it is improper
for a
trial counsel to compel a defendant to state that the witnesses
testifying
against him are lying, each such case will be reviewed on a
case-by-case basis
to determine if the improper cross-examination was prejudicial).
(trial counsel’s improper questioning, which was designed to compel
the
accused to state that the witnesses testifying against him were lying,
was not
plain error where: (1) defense counsel’s theme of the case was
that the
accused had been framed by his co-actors; (2) accused declined to
respond to
trial counsel’s questions about whether certain witnesses were lying;
and (3)
even though the accused did testify that a law enforcement officer was
testifying falsely, that error was harmless where trial counsel’s
questions
merely reinforced the defense theory of the case).