"The
promotion of democracy is something that the
United States has to stay true to, because ultimately,
our values and our interests are inextricably
linked. ...On any given day, on any day in policy,
one has to balance the fact that, yes, sometimes
you have to deal with authoritarian regimes.
Sometimes you have to deal with friendly regimes
that have not made as much progress as you want
them to. But unless the United States keeps
the lodestar out there of the end of tyranny
and that every man, woman, and child deserves
to live in a democratic society, it will fall
off the international agenda." |
|
Secretary Condoleezza Rice
Washington, DC
December 18, 2008
QUESTION: Okay. So, Secretary Rice, the town is pretty
much abuzz over inauguration planning, and I’d like
to go back to the last inauguration, where the President
issued a pretty bold statement and a bold program about
democracy promotion, especially in the Middle East. And
you were very much involved in that early on.
Nowadays, we hear less of it, although I know you’ve
written about it, and – but you’ve also made
some statements like, you know, the U.S. is not an NGO --
SECRETARY RICE: Right, right.
QUESTION: -- and we have to balance our relations with authoritarian
countries. Is that a – sort of a concession to perhaps
that there’s a realpolitik side of this that we should
consider as well to the democracy promotion agenda?
SECRETARY RICE: No. The promotion of democracy is something
that the United States has to stay true of, because ultimate
– true to, because ultimately, our values and our
interests are inextricably linked. And we’ve learned
that whether in fact – the collapse of the Soviet
Union, which was good for our values and it was terrific
for our interests. And so I’m a firm believer that
those are linked.
On any given day, on any day in policy, one has to balance
the fact that, yes, sometimes you have to deal with authoritarian
regimes. Sometimes you have to deal with friendly regimes
that have not made as much progress as you want them to.
But unless the United States keeps the lodestar out there
of the end of tyranny and that every man, woman, and child
deserves to live in a democratic society, it will fall off
the international agenda. And that’s what the President’s
speech did. And the conversation in the Middle East is fundamentally
different today than it was a few years ago as a result,
I believe, of American promotion of democratic values.
QUESTION: There – just to take one example, say Egypt,
which was a very prominent one – there’s concern,
though, that were maybe mixed signals that the U.S. was
going to be maybe more supportive of really pressuring Egypt
on democratic reforms. But when it came down to it, Egypt
was more important on the sort of security front and being
useful on the Hamas situation and so forth. How do you respond
to those concerns that are out there?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, you have to be able to do both. On
the one hand, the United States – I personally have
advocated strongly for democratic reform in Egypt. Egypt
is going to be better off and, in fact, more stable ultimately
when Egypt trusts its people more. And I do believe that
the presidential election was a different kind of election
than Egypt had ever had. There was criticism of the president’s
policies right on the front page of Egyptian newspapers.
The café talk in Egypt was extraordinary. And then
the parliamentary elections were, frankly, a step back.
But I don’t think you will ever have another presidential
election in Egypt like the old-style presidential election.
These things go in almost stepwise function. You make a
lot of progress for a while and then it tends to level out
and you make another jump. But what the United States has
done is to support reformers, to support democracy building
programs through the Middle East partnership program. I
have had here reformers and women who are running for office
and democratic forces. And that’s what we do. We both
advocate with the governments for everything from individual
people to changes in law. You support reformers. But change
isn’t going to come all in one day.
QUESTION: What about seeing in the region a country like
Iran where there’s not a relationship with the government,
but there’s very much interest in sort of cultivating
the grassroots democratic forces there. There was –
seemed to be an unfortunate response that they had to U.S.
democracy promotion funding, in particular, Akbar Ganji
and Shirin Ebadi and others were – who were saying
– you know, was sort of tainted by the image of regime
change. How do you reconcile that? How do you deal with
that sort of troubling association of democracy promotion
versus, you know, a threat of regime change in a country
like Iran?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, I am a firm believer that for the
most part, regime change is going to come from within, ultimately.
And helping to strengthen civil society, strengthen democracy
forces, hold governments accountable publicly when they
take harsh measures against those forces is what the United
States can do. But the United States is not going to be
able to change every regime in the world.
Now when there’s a circumstance like Iraq where Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq was a threat to the region and a threat
to our interests where he dragged us into war twice and
used weapons of mass destruction, and when you deal with
the security threat there, I do think then you have an obligation,
having engaged in regime change for security reasons, to
insist that what follows is democratic.
And so the United States didn’t take the easy way
out in Iraq, which was to remove Saddam Hussein and just
install another – another strongman. We took the harder
role – road of helping the Iraqis to develop democratic
institutions and they’re now starting to take root.
QUESTION: Now when you mention Iraq and Iran, it’s
an interesting parallel that seems to be developing, in
that the latest round of sanctions is – covers dual
use goods, there’s increasing move to isolate Iran.
You know, are we looking at going down this road of maybe
some UN-monitored sanctions regime that’s going to
try to put Iran in a box like Iraq was?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, I think the sanctions with Iran are
a bit different. Yes, there are UN Security Council sanctions,
but they’re generally against Iranian entities that
are practicing proliferation or are engaged with terrorism,
like the Qods Force and the IRGC funding. They go after
individual assets of people who are engaged in the policies.
We’ve tried to tailor them not to have a general effect
on the Iranian people.
But what they are is they’re having an effect on the
Iranian economy, because Iran is not able to get the kind
of investment and – investment or investment support,
for instance, from countries in Europe. Western oil companies
have all left. I think Total was the last one to leave.
So, reputational risk and investment risk is what’s
driving people out of Iran. It’s somewhat different
than the comprehensive sanctions that were put on Iraq.
QUESTION: In terms of trying to engage Iran, you have been
in favor of – there was a movement towards opening
up an Iran – a U.S. interests section in Iran. That
sort of got derailed by various events in the summer. What
was the Iranian – what kind of feedback did you get
from Iranian official points from that type of move?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, we never proposed it officially. The
President made an in-principle decision. We did the work.
And then as you said, the Russian invasion of Georgia and
then later, Iranian opposition to our SOFA sort of derailed
it. But we never really asked the Iranians, so we don’t
know what they would have said. Sometimes we heard even
in public pronouncements that they would be prepared to
look at it. But this was always aimed at the Iranian people.
It was always aimed at our efforts to reach out to them,
to make it easier for them to get visas to the United States,
to have a point of contact with the United States of America,
much as our Interests Section in Havana has done.
And in the context of a pretty firm policy against the regime,
I think an interests section that can be a platform for
contact with the Iranian people makes sense. Now whether
the Iranians ultimately would have agreed, I don’t
know, but I would have hoped that they would have. And had
they not, it would have said something about their policy.
QUESTION: The – just keeping on the nonproliferation
front and the North Korea file, you’ve been dealing
with this most recently – can you state what has been
the value of the U.S. engagement policy that’s been
unfolding the last couple of years? How do you tell someone
that despite this latest backsliding, this has been a worthwhile
move? What are the tangible benefits?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, you start with the fact that they
haven’t made plutonium since the Six-Party agreement
of September 2005. And that’s an important point.
They have shut down the reactor. They’ve disabled
certain elements of it, blown up the cooling tower. It’s
not the permanent disablement that we look for, but it’s
a series of important steps. We have negotiated a verification
protocol to which they’ve agreed. Unfortunately, some
of the clarifications that they made to us privately that
needed to be made so that there were no loopholes in that
verification protocol, they refused to write down. And that’s
where things broke down.
But it also has been a value because the North Koreans are
in a situation in which they are confronting Russia, China,
the United States, South Korea, and Japan so that they can’t
just make this a bilateral problem with the United States.
And the fuel oil shipments that they need, they need not
just from the United States but also from South Korea, since
South Korea has made clear that their relationship with
North Korea depends in part on how denuclearization goes.
The North can’t enjoy certain benefits while continuing
to stall on the nuclear file.
But I think much has already been achieved here. I think
that within the context of the Six-Party Talks, you ultimately
will get a verification protocol that allows us to deal
with a lot of very troubling activities, many of which we
have learned more about as the process of diplomacy has
gone on.
QUESTION: Let me jump to the issue of what you call transformational
diplomacy, and one big aspect of that is foreign aid. There’s
obviously been some innovations under the MCC and just the
sheer numbers of relief that have gone to places like Africa,
in particular. But there are a number of experts who also
say to really do this right, you have to get rid of the
overlapping mandates and maybe even make a cabinet level
position that’s overseeing all development aid. Is
that something feasible in the U.S.?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, it’s not something that I favor
because development assistance has to be a part of your
broad foreign policy, which links development, democracy,
and security for people. If you want to see the development
of well-governed, democratic states, they have to have the
kind of foreign assistance help from the United States that
will allow them to deliver good help and good education
for their people. And it has to be integrated with policies
that give support to good governance. It also has to be
in a secure environment.
So in a place like Colombia, you’re talking about
trade policy, you’re talking about economic growth,
you’re talking about governance, and you’re
talking about foreign assistance and security assistance.
That’s a package. And only the State Department and
the Secretary of State can bring all of those together for
the United States of America. And I really would not want
to be the Secretary of State who does not have foreign assistance
as a tool in helping to bring about the promotion of democracy
or security or nation building after conflict. I think it
would be very difficult without the tools of foreign policy
– of foreign assistance.
QUESTION: So we’re on the subject of what’s
being discussed quite a bit today, soft power, and that
there’s going to be seemingly a new introduction of
soft power in the next administration. One aspect of that
that doesn't get mentioned that much is something that I
know a little bit about, is U.S.-funded broadcasting, international
broadcasting. But there’s a debate that’s looming,
especially in Congress, over whether U.S.-funded broadcasting,
TV and so forth, should be a -- something that evangelizes
democracy or something that is purely journalism and then
provides a forum with which these local – you know,
with which countries can hear in their own language about
things like democracy, but doesn't necessarily have the
mission of democratization. How do you see that, the role
of foreign broadcasting?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, I think that foreign broadcasting,
by its very nature, it is telling the truth and it’s
showing the examples of democracy and giving people access
to information where they wouldn't otherwise get it, then
you are, in fact, part of the democratization process in
these countries. Radio Free Europe and Voice of America,
which – Radio Liberty, which I know well as a former
specialist on Soviet Union, were admired because they told
the truth. They were admired because they were contrary
to the propaganda that people had ceased to believe. And
in places like the Middle East, where we’re fighting
a massive propaganda machine about what America is, what
American policies are, it’s extremely important to
be able to have this broadcasting. And the President has
increased the money for broadcasting dramatically in his
Administration.
But I just want to say one word about soft power. I don’t
like the term, frankly. I think what you’re talking
about is helping people improve their lives, how much can
be done to help people to have decent lives with decent
governments. And this President, having tripled foreign
assistance worldwide when it had been flat for decades,
quadrupled it in Africa, doubled it in Latin America; this
President, who launched the largest health program in all
of history, the President’s Emergency Program for
AIDS Relief; this President, who took on malaria and has
made it a priority; this President, who has advocated for
girls’ education and for a decent life for indigenous
people; this President, who has advocated for trade, free
trade so that Colombian paramilitaries can be demobilized
and get a decent job, a decent-paying job, where Colombian
products can get into the American market; or this President,
who advocated for 1,100 new Foreign Service officers and
300 new USAID officers in his 2009 budget; that’s
a policy that has used what some will call soft power. I’ll
simply say that it is using America’s generosity and
America’s understanding that it is more secure when
people are free from poverty and free of tyranny. This President
has done an awful lot in that regard.
QUESTION: Let me stay roughly on the subject, which is about
systemic changes. There have been a lot of discussion in
both parties, and experts in the military as well, about
perhaps some sort of a Goldwater-Nichols approach to civilian
military cooperation, in particular, nation building in
Iraq and Afghanistan being the biggest, you know, case studies
that we have right now. How do you see the working of those
two? Is there a need for this really formal process in which
you improve the coordination between the two?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, I think we’ve had very good
coordination. We’ve learned to do this the hard way,
through experience. That’s why the Civilian Response
Corps, the need for civilians who can be mobilized to help
countries build their tax systems or their budget systems
or to work with justice reform or police training, that’s
why that institution that now resides within the State Department
is going to be probably one of the most important innovations.
Because, frankly, we tried it in the Balkans through UN
processes; didn’t work that well. We tried it in Afghanistan
through what I’ll call the adopt-a-ministry, country-by-country;
we’re living with some of the incoherence of that
now. Even though it’s wonderful to have all of these
countries involved, it’s not really a coherent effort.
And then in Iraq, the Defense Department had responsibility
for it, and it really wasn’t right to the task.
But giving the State Department oversight of the U.S. Government
effort in this regard, but also being able to really mobilize
civilians who have the specialized expertise that is needed,
I think that is going to work. We’ve also pioneered
Provincial Reconstruction Teams, where military and civilian
aid workers and governance experts are all together in an
area like Anbar in Iraq or in parts of Afghanistan, Kandahar
in Afghanistan. That’s really the way these institutions
get built. You know, there’s a kind of false understanding,
I think, of what happened in 1947 with the National Security
Act which created all of the institutions that we know.
They weren’t created out of somebody’s imagination.
The CIA was the OSS, which had grown up during World War
II. The National Security Council was Roosevelt’s
war council, because he wanted to have better coordination.
The Defense Department came out of the frustrations of the
Navy and the War Department not operating very well together,
and the creation of the Defense Department.
And so while I understand the desire to make all of this
work better, I think that we have a lot of innovations now
that need to be worked on and need to be furthered. We’re
learning. We’ve learned the hard way that counterinsurgency,
which is mostly what we’re doing around the world,
is not war and then peace; it’s a continuum. And yes,
civilians and military have to cooperate better together.
But you do have two very distinct departments with two very
distinct missions and two very distinct sets of authorities.
And what we’ve been able to do is to blend those through
various mechanisms without really eroding the State Department’s
capabilities and the State Department’s mission, or
eroding the mission of our military. I prefer the blended
strategy that we have.
QUESTION: I had a question – I wanted to do a Russia
question.
SECRETARY RICE: Yeah.
QUESTION: Which has been a bit of a puzzle, or people use
the word “enigma” for Russia a lot. This particular
year, there were cases that the U.S. had ongoing dialogues
– Kosovo, Georgia, Abkhazia, the missile defense systems
– and they all seemed to boil over this year. And
some of the response has been that – you know, that
the Russia file was neglected, that Russian interests were
being – were not being truly taken into account, and
this was allowed to get out of hand. What, in your view,
is what happened and what led to these unfortunate developments?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, first of all, Kosovo came out just
fine. The Russians didn’t agree, but the independent
state of Kosovo was born.
QUESTION: It’s still a divided state, though, with
sort of an unclear --
SECRETARY RICE: Well, but the fact is the international
community as a whole, I think, knew that Kosovo wasn’t
sustainable the way that it was. And perhaps you’re
not going to always have agreement on something like that.
But let me go back to the Russia issue. You know, we’ve
had very good cooperation with Russia on global issues,
whether it’s terrorism or nuclear nonproliferation
or, really, Iran or North Korea. We just sponsored with
the Russians a Middle East resolution at the UN a couple
of days ago on piracy. You name it; on the global front,
we’ve had very good cooperation. Where we’ve
had trouble is where it’s come to Russia’s periphery
or the states of the former Soviet Union. Because Russia
has a view that it ought to have a special role on its periphery
and that that special role ought to dictate the policies
of those states that are now independent. And our view is
that those states have a right to an independent policy,
both internally and in terms of their foreign policy. We’ve
never believed that because the United States would have
good relations with Georgia or Ukraine or Central Asia,
that that somehow was a threat to Russian interests. And
that’s where there’s been a problem.
And so when you look at Georgia, what Russia did with the
Georgians was really uncalled for. But I have to tell you
that the unity of the United States and Europe led to a
circumstance in which Russia was denied its strategic objectives.
It didn’t achieve a single one. Instead, the Georgian
democracy survived. The Georgian Government survived. The
Georgian economy didn’t collapse. Russia is stuck
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia with the resounding support
of Nicaragua and Hamas. Their recognition policy was a failure.
And all that this did was to cause people to question what
kind of partner Russia could be.
And so sometimes it’s not neglect of the file; it’s
that the Russians see things differently. And when they
do things like Georgia, I think the fact that we’ve
been able in a unified way to frustrate those strategic
objectives speaks very well for the policy.
QUESTION: Final question?
SECRETARY RICE: I’ve got to go, yeah.
QUESTION: Yeah, okay. Well, I appreciate it. Thank you very
much.
SECRETARY RICE: Thank you. Thanks very much.