



Woodside Travel Trust

July 10, 1998

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The Honorable Barbara B. Kennelly
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 205 15-0701

JUL 17 1998
forward letter
to DOT
under the
comment
period in
Federal Register

Dear Representative Kennelly:

Woodside Travel Trust, the largest global partnership of 130 independently owned travel agencies (including Professional Travel Corporation, **headquartered** in Windsor, **Connecticut**) and Travel Strategies Inc., headquartered in Stamford, **Connecticut**, operating in 74 countries with a combined 1997 sales of \$19.3 billion, asks you to support the United States Department of Transportation (DOT) rulemaking process and its **efforts** to promote a level and open playing field in the airline industry.

On April 6, 1998, DOT issued a draft "Airline Competition Policy Statement" for public comment. In issuing the draft statement, Secretary Rodney Slater stated:

Consumers **deserve** a pro-competitive standard that helps ensure affordable airfares and accessible service. To provide a level playing field, we must preserve vigorous competition and prohibit unfair exclusionary practices meant solely to eliminate that competition.

These practices have been **identified** in a number of reports issued by GAO, DOT and others. Those who have been hit the hardest live in small and medium-sized communities throughout the country.

In February, 1998, **state**, local and federal officials met at the National Air Service Roundtable, held in Jackson, Mississippi, to discuss the need to **finish** "the unfinished business of **the** Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 by bringing a competitive mix of **service to all** communities," particularly those that lack adequate airline competition or **service** quality. The report issued at the end of the 1997 conference stated:

While **conferrees** identified marketing steps that can be taken by communities and **carriers**, participants agreed that, "if local efforts to enhance competition are to **succeed**," the federal government must address "anti-competitive practices of larger airlines."

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The proposed **policy** statement was issued to address instances in which a large carrier dominating a **concentrated** hub' takes a number of steps to drive a new entrant out of a market so **that** it will "raise its own **fares**" and "cut back its level of service."

As to the need for the pro-competition guidelines, Patrick Murphy, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs at the US. Department of Transportation, stated at a hearing before the Senate Transportation Appropriations Subcommittee on March 5, 1998:

...**we conducted** an investigation based on the complaints of two small carriers. We went out and received boxes of material **from** the large airlines. When the large airlines gave us that material, they took the view that it would be unfair for us to **come** down on top of them after we read **this** material, because we had never set any **standards**. They had been competing in a certain way for decades; and if we want to come down on them, we ought to set some guidelines. We **looked** at that material. We were somewhat surprised by what we saw. The intensity of what was going on was of concern. We decided to develop these guidelines.

Our role here, if any, is to protect competition, not to protect large companies. [Emphasis added.]

In commenting on **the** guidelines, **Alfred E. Kahn** stated:

...**what** seems to have occurred time and again in recent years has been: unrestricted fares are jacked up and up; that induces entry of low-cost [**carriers**]...**who** can profitably serve those customers at much lower fares; the incumbents then cut their fares deeply and sharply increase the **number** of **low-fare** seats they offer on the routes – and only on the routes – on which they have been challenged; the new entrant departs; and fares immediately go right back up, with no **further** challenge.

The most **grievous** governmental failure in recent years has in my opinion been **the** failure to prosecute a single case against what appear to have been just such cases of **flagrantly** predatory competition by incumbent major airlines against new competitors.

¹The need to address these issues comes at a time when a Salomon Smith **Barney** study ("Airline Competition at the 50 Largest **U.S.** Airports -- Update," March 12, 1998) states: "Measures of concentration at the 50 largest **airports** show an unprecedented degree of **concentration in** the airline industry."

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The history of the airline industry over the last 20 years clearly **demonstrates** the great importance of entry by low-cost, uniformly (or **much** more uniformly than in the case of the major carriers) low-fare **carriers** in keeping the industry competitive – so long as they survive.

[Hearing of the Subcommittee on Transportation
of the Senate Appropriations Committee, May 5, 1998]

The end result of **these anti-competitive** practices is that **fares** are escalating and competition is decreasing, except in markets with affordable-tie carriers. DOT's "Domestic Airline Fares Consumer Report – Fourth Report, Second **Quarter** 1997 Passenger and Fare Information/January, 1998" best demonstrates the impact on consumers when **affordable-fare** carriers are **driven out** of markets. Table 3 in that report lists **the** city-pair markets' with the largest percentage fare increases – second quarter 1997 versus 1996. Of the four city-pairs with the largest percentage increases, three were **markets** in which an affordable-fare carrier was driven out of **the** market?

<u>City-Pair</u>	<u>Carrier Driven Out</u>	<u>% Increase in Fares</u>	<u>Loss of # Passengers</u>
Boston-Detroit	Spirit	128%	38,311
Chicago-Des Moines	Vanguard	127%	30,121
Dallas/Fort Worth- Wichita	Vanguard	84%	5,187

The loss of competitive **affordable-fare** services and resultant increase in fares have a significant impact on each of these communities. As DOT states in the report, "large changes in average fares **are** directly attributable to entry or exit by a low-cost carrier."

To no one's surprise, the large carriers are asking that DOT be prevented from enforcing statutory provisions (49 U.S.C. 41712)³ which **require** the **Secretary** to address "**unfair** or deceptive practice or an unfair method of competition" and to take appropriate action to end any abuse. **These** same large **carriers** are asking that all responsibility on these **issues** be given to the Department of Justice; which is already overwhelmed with cases. Moreover, **they** know **that** such an approach can take years to conclude and involves **significant** costs. If that occurs, additional communities will lose service and **fares** will continue to **escalate**.⁴

² Table 4 of **the** DOT report lists **city-pair markets with the largest percentage** decreases. Most of the markets listed on **this chart benefited from** entry by **affordable** fare **carriers**: Baltimore-Providence (**Southwest**); Kansas City-Minneapolis (Vanguard); and Akron/Canton-Atlanta (**AirTran**).

Similar to FTC's authority to **address** unfair **practices**.

⁴ "According to **the** Bureau of **Labor** Statistics, ticket prices soared at a 37% annual rate **in the first** quarter of 1998." "**The** Power to **Raise**," **Business** Week, **38-40**, (May 4, 1998).


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The Air Transport **Association** – which represents carriers with 96% of the domestic market **share**⁵ – **has** asked for an **extension** of time on the **draft** guidelines, **which** was granted by DOT. True competition and affordable fares will result from a level playing field, not **from an** industry dominated by a few carriers.

Having acknowledged **in** its draft guidelines not only its “mandate” to prohibit **unfair competition**⁶ but, perhaps more significantly, its “obligation” to do so, the Department of Transportation would now be hard pressed to fail to fully examine the implications of **all anti-competitive** actions by the major airlines. To fail to do so would clearly **amount** to a breach of that “obligation.” The Department of Transportation must be encouraged to prevent practices taken to drive competitors out of markets.

Sincerely,



Ivan Michael Schaeffer
President and Chief **Executive** Officer

cc: Michael **Gillis**
President
Professional Travel Corporation
Windsor, CT

Patricia **Charla**
COO & Vice **President**
Travel Strategies **Inc.**
Stamford, CT

⁵ **New** entrants hold about 2% of the market share.

⁶ Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 41712.