[DNFSB
LETTERHEAD]
September 29, 2004
Mr. Paul M. Golan
Acting Assistant Secretary for
Environmental Management
U.S. Department of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20585-0113
Dear Mr. Golan:
Enclosed is a report detailing
observations made by members of the staff of the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board (Board) concerning process chemistry and facility design for the Hanford
Waste Treatment Plant. These
observations were developed through document reviews and discussions with representatives
of the Office of River Protection (ORP) and Bechtel National Incorporated (BNI).
In general, ORP and BNI
personnel recognize the need for follow-up actions that would address the
issues noted by the Board's staff. A
detailed discussion of these issues is provided in the enclosed report, which
is forwarded for your information and use, as appropriate.
Sincerely,
John T. Conway
Chairman
c: Mr. Roy J. Schepens
Mr.
Mark B. Whitaker, Jr.
Enclosure
DEFENSE
NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
Staff
Issue Report
September
10, 2004
MEMORANDUM FOR: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
COPIES: Board Members
FROM: J. Plaue and S. Stokes
SUBJECT: Waste Treatment Plant Process
Engineering
This report documents the
results of a review of various matters related to process engineering for the
Waste Treatment Plant (WTP). This review
was conducted August 3-5, 2004, by members of the staff of the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board (Board) S. Stokes,
J. Plaue, M. Duncan, and M. Sautman. Also
included in this report are the results of a September 2, 2004, follow-up video
teleconference on cesium ion exchange hydrogen mitigation.
Cesium
Ion Exchange. Bechtel National Incorporated
(BNI) completed a revised hydrogen mitigation design for the cesium ion
exchange column using a nitrogen inerting system. Overall, the BNI design represents a
significant improvement over previous designs. However, the new approach is based on
controlling to a limiting oxidizer concentration (LOC) rather than to the
hydrogen lower flammability limit (hydrogen may be present in potentially explosive
concentrations). An initial review by
the Board’s staff indicated that BNI’s choice of LOC and subsequent calculation
of inerting volume may not have been consistent with
Chapter 5 of
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 69, Explosion Prevention Systems,
and could have
resulted in a potentially unsafe condition.
During a follow-up
teleconference, the Board’s staff was encouraged by BNI’s modified calculation,
which reflected a more conservative LOC and safety margin for the inerting volume. In
addition, the staff awaits the outcome of assessments by both Department of
Energy’s Office of River Protection (DOE-ORP) and a BNI Integrated Safety
Management panel on the applicability of NFPA 69 requirements to the ion
exchange system, as well as other flammable gas vessels. In particular, the staff is interested in
DOE-ORP’s approach to oxidant concentration monitoring, as required by the
standard. Technical issues of particular
concern regard confirmation of the gas generation rate and oxidizer composition
established on the basis of limited research. For example, gas generation information is
based on testing of a single simulant of Envelope A waste, which may not adequately
bound some waste constituents, such as transition and noble metals. In general, these metals are known to have
catalytic effects on oxidation reactions, but without a mechanistic
understanding of gas generation, it is difficult to gauge the margin in the
limited testing.
Erosion in Melter Feed
Preparation Vessel and Melter Feed Vessel Agitators. The
staff reviewed the higher-than-anticipated erosion in the Melter Feed
Preparation Vessel (MFPV) and Melter Feed Vessel (MFV) agitators. BNI has determined that the greater erosion rate
is restricted to the agitator assembly—not the vessel walls and bottoms (fortunately, the MFPV and
MFV are designed to be replaceable). This conclusion is supported by BNI’s existing
calculations; however, BNI is also performing additional computational fluid
dynamic modeling to verify its position. BNI has added sparge tubes for
important-to-safety mixing in these tank designs. Since the sparge tubes are located very close
to the impeller blades, their wear would reasonably be expected to be greater
than that of the vessel itself. BNI’s
existing calculation does not address wear for these components. The staff pointed this out and suggested that
scaled testing would be needed to fully understand sparger wear. BNI staff acknowledged that their calculation
does not adequately address vessel internals and requires revision. They also stated that prototypical testing
would be considered. The Board’s staff
also pointed out that BNI had not yet fully evaluated the impact of
transferring glass former containing waste to the radioactive waste system. Staff of DOE-ORP indicated that they would
perform this evaluation.
Waste Blending. DOE-ORP
and BNI have recently discussed blending of difficult-to-treat wastes. For example, non-Newtonian wastes possessing
characteristics beyond the current design limit will require blending before
treatment, as will certain high-sulfate wastes. The Board’s staff reviewed the capability of
CH2MHill Hanford Group (CHG) to blend wastes in the tank farms, as well as
within the pretreatment facility.
DOE-ORP is currently urging CHG
to empty single-shell tanks and maximize the contents of double-shell tanks
(DSTs), which could severely limit any opportunity to blend wastes in the tank
farms. A review of the proposed DST tank
inventory clearly shows that little if any blending capability will exist in
the tank farms by 2007. The staff
pointed out that CHG currently screens waste transfers using a compatibility
data quality objective (DQO) based only upon safe storage requirements. Expanding this DQO to deal with treatment
issues could effectively address waste blending concerns, thereby avoiding
potential safety issues during WTP processing. DOE-ORP staff indicated they have the lead for
waste blending and subsequently committed to working with BNI and CHG to
develop a revised compatibility DQO. In
addition, DOE-ORP staff appeared to understand the value of performing an
analysis of the current DST inventory to determine whether wastes exist, or
could be created by transfers, that could not be treated at WTP or via other
proposed closure paths (i.e., orphan wastes), as well as to identify the
infrastructure requirements (e.g., tank space, mixer pumps) for addressing the blending
issue.
Process Chemistry Modeling. Process
chemistry for WTP is modeled in several different ways. The process engineering model, which is used
for all design and safety basis purposes, is derived from contractual
specifications for feeds and throughput requirements. The spreadsheet-based calculations then use
simple partition coefficients to determine the fate of individual elements
through each unit operation. Partition
coefficients have been chosen on the basis of literature values, operating
experience (i.e., tank farm evaporators), or specific analytical data in
support of WTP design development. Because this model is not thermodynamically based,
the validity of this approach relies heavily on the choice of appropriate
coefficients, as well as the intended purpose of the model run. For example, the model should utilize bounding
coefficients for radionuclide, nitrate/nitrite, and organic concentrations for
the purpose of determining bounding hydrogen generation rates. The staff plans to carefully review the appropriateness
of values used for those modeling runs with impacts on safety.
The process operations model
uses species-specific thermodynamic data in a variety of more sophisticated
programming environments. This model is
a contract deliverable intended as a tool for use by DOE-ORP to determine WTP
capabilities for wastes beyond the commissioning feeds. It is also currently being used by BNI to
determine management risk and to reconcile BNI’s Research and Technology
(R&T) data. The Board’s staff
believes the rigor and dynamic nature of this model allow for potentially more
accurate results for safety cases and off-normal conditions, and therefore
encourages comparisons with output from the process engineering model. However, the staff noted that verification of
the model for more realistic, scaled operations was constrained to the limited
scope of the Semi-Integrated Pilot Plant and selected R&T data. This raises some question about the ability of
the model to evaluate future needs.
Disposition of Test
Exceptions. BNI has developed a process for
modifying existing R&T test plans and specifications to accommodate needed
changes that arise. The staff reviewed
and discussed with BNI staff a survey of approximately 10 percent of the 195
test exceptions issued to date. In
general, it appears that the system has been implemented as intended, using
input from the appropriate data design and safety groups. Within the reviewed sample, however, the staff
observed several instances in which the documentation appeared to contain
insufficient technical justification.
In one example, a procedure was
modified to allow for the removal of cesium from a supernate sample to meet
dose limits for a rheological measurement performed in a glovebox. The test exception approved the use of a
crystalline silicotitanate ion exchange column; however, no justification was
provided regarding the obvious potential for removal of solids in the column and
the subsequent effect on the measurement. DOE-ORP staff stated they would perform a surveillance
on the test exception process to identify any exceptions with inadequate
technical justification and determine the impacts on safety and design.
Ultrafiltration Cleaning. The
staff has continued to express concern regarding the adequacy of the baseline
technology for cleaning ultrafilters using nitric acid. Several recent presentations by BNI to the
staff have indicated that this baseline technology is adequate for the commissioning
feeds. In contrast, R&T reports have
noted problems with nitric acid for some feeds. For example, test report INEEL-03-00886, Development of an
Ultrafiltration Chemical Cleaning Sequence for Hanford Simulated Tank Waste,
Env. A (AN-105), Env. C (AN-102), and Env. D (AZ-101),
specifically cites
problems with nitric acid cleaning of Envelope D wastes, and the authors
recommend pursuing further testing of organic acids (e.g., glycolic or citric
acids). It appears that DOE-ORP needs to
address this potential problem now, since the capability to use alternate
reagents is not currently reflected in the design, and could be difficult or
impractical to implement after construction. Limits on waste throughput or restrictions on
the ability of WTP to process certain wastes could result, particularly if
process systems within black cells are impacted.