Resolving
Conflicts In The Causasus And Moldova: Perspectives
On Next Steps
Conference Report
6-7 May 2002
The
National Intelligence Council (NIC) routinely sponsors
unclassified conferences with outside experts to
gain knowledge and insight to sharpen the level
of debate on critical issues. The views expressed
in this conference summary are those of individuals
and do not represent official US Government positions
or views or those of the participants’ organizations.
CR
2002-03
September 2002
|
|
Introduction |
On
6-7 May 2002, the National Intelligence Council
and the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence
and Research sponsored a conference that examined
the prospects for resolving regional conflicts involving
four states of the former Soviet Union: Georgia,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. The conference
brought together outside scholars, regional experts
and officials to discuss the conflicts in Abkhazia,
South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria.
The purpose was not to arrive at a consensus but
to deepen understanding of the complex geopolitical
dynamics at work in the region. |
|
This
conference report is intended to capture the salient
points and original arguments of the proceedings.
It consists of two major addresses, a précis of
each speaker’s on-the-record presentation, and a
summary of the ensuing not-for-attribution discussions.
During the panel discussions no attempt was made
to ascertain the general view of the panel or audience.
Many of the points highlighted in these summaries
of the panel discussions were noted because they
were thought-provoking or outside the conventional
wisdom. They illustrate the richness of the discussion,
but they do not necessarily reflect accepted or
prevailing views at the conference. |
Executive
Summary |
Keynote
speaker Ambassador Rudolf Perina reviewed similarities
and differences among the conflicts, factors that
might motivate change—such as new peace proposals
or new leadership—and the role of mediators in encouraging
compromise and providing interim conflict management.
Luncheon speaker Ambassador Joseph Presel focused
on lessons of the United States as mediator, the
need to work with Russia, and the challenges of
working with local leaders who have not prepared
their populations for peace.
Institutionalization
of the Conflicts
The major issues that
led to the outbreak of violence during the collapse
of the Soviet Union have largely faded into memory.
New interests and identities have emerged that pose
obstacles to resolving underlying social, economic,
and political problems. As a result, successful
settlement of the “frozen” conflicts in Abkhazia,
South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria
will require a shift in the current equilibrium.
Each of these conflicts
has produced isolated societies that engage in mutual
recrimination and hold distorted views of developments
across the conflict divide. Peace processes have
been largely the domain of elites, who often seem
to be out of touch with their societies and sometimes
act as if they are more intent on consolidating
their own positions than resolving the conflict
and transforming their societies. Having contributed
to the mobilization of their populations against
one another, leaders on both sides have become trapped
in an adversarial culture that reduces their receptivity
to compromise. A variety of mediation strategies,
both formal and informal, are required to overcome
these obstacles.
Abkhazia
is the most intractable conflict and the most subject
to renewed violence. It differs from the other conflicts
in that the ethnic Abkhaz minority expelled the
Georgian majority—with Russian and Chechen assistance.
The Abhkaz fear retribution if displaced Georgians
return. Russian policies characterized by inconsistencies
and disincentives for peace further complicate the
conflict.
The fate of Abkhazia
may be tied indirectly to that of South Ossetia
in the sense that a successful resolution in one
case is likely to affect the other. In both cases,
economic issues are crucial. Illegal trade across
cease-fire lines is considerable, creating incentives
for the preservation of the status quo.
Opportunities for enduring solutions will increase
with economic development.
Armenia and Azerbaijan
are close to a settlement of their dispute over
Nagorno-Karabakh. The near-term may offer
the best opportunities for a balanced settlement
because a prolongation of the dispute favors hard-liners
on both sides. Over the longer-term disparate economic
and demographic trends that favor Azerbaijan over
Armenia also may preclude a settlement. Each year
the Azerbaijani economy expands while Armenia’s
economy stagnates and its population dwindles. Perceptions
that the Armenian negotiating position is deteriorating
may encourage an uncompromising and tough posture
in Baku that is likely to generate an equally uncompromising
response in Yerevan. Economic emigration from Armenia
increases the influence of the relatively more hard-line
Armenian diaspora and further diminishes opportunities
for a compromise settlement.
Displaced populations
from the conflicts in Azerbaijan and South Ossetia
do not present serious pressures for settlements.
In Azerbaijan, only ten percent of the internally
displaced persons (IDPs) live in camps. Others live
primarily in urban and suburban areas, where many
show signs of economic adaptation. This integration
is due, in part, to programs sponsored by the Azerbaijani
government and international organizations that
target local economic development and job placement.
The Azerbaijani government does not acknowledge
its policy of integrating IDPs into mainstream Azerbaijani
society, however, since this might be interpreted
as acquiescence to the occupation of Azerbaijani
territory. In the case of South Ossetia, many of
the refugees—under 50,000—have settled into new
roles in North Ossetia.
The conflict in Transnistria
is close to resolution and probably will not pose
long-term problems. The original reasons for the
conflict have grown less salient, and the dispute
now is framed largely in terms of the private interests
of elites. The conflict may prove tractable to settlement
by traditional bargaining methods. External parties
can play a helpful role by providing incentives
to both sides; multiple mediators, however, have
complicated the process in the past, and better
coordination will be required. The recent election
of a Russophone head of state in Moldova offers
new opportunities for progress.
The Role of Outside
Players
Iran
is focusing internally on its national security,
economic, and geopolitical interests. The Caucasus
is looming larger on the Iranian horizon, however,
because of the region’s energy reserves. Iran seeks
to resist its marginalization in the region, which
Tehran perceives as an US objective. Some in Iran
argue that the US anti-terrorist campaign is a ruse
and that increasing US interest in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Iraq, and Azerbaijan is an effort to encircle
Iran as a prelude to hostilities. Nonetheless, Iran’s
present economic difficulties are an impetus for
greater cooperation with the United States. Iran
is likely to pursue greater cooperation with Russia,
including greater coordination of policies in the
Caucasus.
Turkey seeks
to contain Russian influence in the region, manage
difficult relations with Armenia and Iran, and maintain
good relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia, especially
to ensure the success of current pipeline projects.
Turkey’s pursuit of closer ties to Georgia and Azerbaijan
links its policies to the positions of these governments
on the Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhaz, and Ossetian conflicts,
fostering a greater sense of isolation and insecurity
in Armenia. Turkey’s position prompts Yerevan to
seek closer relations with Moscow and Teheran and
encourages further cooperation in the Caucasus between
Russia and Iran—at once an economic partner and
the Islamic antithesis of Turkish secularism.
Although Russia
will have a key role in resolving each conflict,
it is neither completely capable nor willing to
play the part. Russia has considerable regional
leverage that it has not used effectively, in part
because it lacks confidence. As a result, the Russian
approach toward these conflicts has been both ambivalent
and inconsistent and is likely to remain so, barring
incentives for change. From a security standpoint,
the Caucasus is among Moscow’s top priorities, but
under the current administration the economic dimension
is becoming more salient and distinct from regional
political goals. An increasingly pragmatic and flexible
Russian posture may lead to more opportunities for
cooperation and constructive engagement in regional
peace processes.
The current geopolitical
climate presents an opportunity for constructive
engagement with Russia. Russians are concerned about
US activities in the region, and many expect the
United States to act unilaterally. There would be
psychological leverage in public statements from
US officials declaring commitment to a multilateral
approach to regional development in which Russia
has a key role. If offered a choice between constructive
engagement and exclusion, Moscow would be likely
to choose the former. Because the Caucasus, in particular,
is crucial to Russia’s security and economic interests,
the fear of marginalization and the opportunity
to preserve or expand Moscow’s influence there might
help overcome domestic political resistance.
The current geopolitical
situation is opportune since most countries of the
region want to work on the US side. They might be
prepared to cooperate with one another for the sake
of cooperation with the United States in its struggle
against terrorism. In the present geopolitical climate,
the metaphor of a “Great Game” is anachronistic.
Compatibility and cooperation among US, Russian,
British and French interests offer significant opportunities.
Cooperation, particularly between Russia and Western
governments, may provide a new basis for encouraging
cooperation within the South Caucasus region.
Prospects for Peace
The South Caucasus
retains infrastructure that once made it a crossroads
for trade. The potential exists to look beyond past
disputes and current dilemmas toward a regional
strategy of shared advantage. History can be used
in the interest of peace because it shows how much
these populations hold in common and teaches that
no political entity can achieve security and prosperity
in isolation from its neighbors. These societies
should be encouraged to shift the discussion from
a rehearsal of hatred, grievance, and fear toward
a recognition of shared futures, joint security,
and mutual prosperity in a climate of democracy
and economic development. |
|
|
Contents
|
Page |
Introduction |
1 |
Executive
Summary |
3 |
Keynote
Address
Ambassador
Rudolf Perina, Special Negotiator for Nagorno-Karabakh
and Eurasian Conflicts, Department of State |
9
9 |
Panel
I: Abkhazia
Paula
Garb, University of California at Irvine
Jonathan
Cohen, Conciliation Resources
Highlights
of the Discussion |
12
12
13
14 |
Panel
II: South Ossetia
Arthur
Martirosyan, Conflict Management Group
Highlights
of the Discussion |
15
15
15 |
Luncheon
Address
Ambassador
Joe Presel
Highlights
of the Discussion |
18
18
19 |
Panel
III: Nagorno-Karabakh
Marc
Spurling, UNHCR
Highlights
of the Discussion |
21
21
22 |
Panel
IV: Transnistria
Ambassador
William Hill, Woodrow Wilson International
Center, Smithsonian Institution
P.
Terrence Hopman, Brown University
Highlights
of the Discussion |
24
24
25
26 |
Panel
V: Roundtable on the Role of Outside Players:
Iran, Turkey, and Russia
Iran:
Tom King, Department of State
Turkey:
Bulent Aliriza, Center for Strategic and International
Studies
Russia:
Anne Herr, Department of State
Highlights
of the Discussion |
28
28
29
31
32 |
Panel
VI: Wrap-Up Session
Highlights
of the Discussion |
34
34 |
Annexes
A.
Conference Agenda |
36 |
B.
Participants |
38 |
|
Resolving
Conflicts In The Caucasus And Moldova:
Perspectives
On Next Steps
Conference
Report
Keynote
Address |
Ambassador
Rudolf Perina
Special Negotiator
for Nagorno-Karabakh and Eurasian Conflicts,
Department of State |
This
conference focuses upon the next steps in
the resolution of conflicts in the South Caucasus
and Moldova. At first glance these conflicts
share a number of similarities, but as they
have developed over several years they also
have diverged from one another. While we will
consider them together, we may ultimately
conclude that the differences among these
conflicts are greater than their similarities
and that a comparative approach is consequently
limited.
Among
their similarities are their occurrence in
the territories of the former Soviet Union,
following upon the Cold War, and feeding upon
complex histories that go back decades or
even centuries. In each of these conflicts,
Russia has played a role that is complex and
sometimes contradictory, due to the many strong
voices that influence her policy. Yet if Russian
policy is sometimes difficult to understand
it is certain to remain important in all of
these cases. And if each of these conflicts
is currently frozen, they each have potential
for stabilization and for escalation, and
they all involve publics that are unprepared
for the compromises that are necessary if
their escalation is to be averted.
While
there are similarities in their origins, these
conflicts have been sustained by factors that
differ significantly from one another. In
Transnistria, corruption plays a major role.
In Abkhazia, the perpetuation of the conflict
ensures the self-preservation of political
elites and of those who were originally responsible
for the conflict. In Nagorno-Karabakh, there
are more traditional causes, including nationalism
and the role of the diaspora.
There
are also substantial differences in degrees
of progress that have been made toward the
resolution of these conflicts. Abkhazia is
one of the most difficult situations and perhaps
the one that is furthest from constructive
dialogue. Transnistria is somewhere in the
middle. It has seen some interesting new developments
in the last few years, including the Istanbul
commitments, which have had a major impact
on the conflict and the election of a new
president.
Nagorno-Karabakh
is the major one, the one that gets the most
international attention and the one that has
come closest to resolution at various times
through the years. Many proposals have been
put forward, but in the end one side or the
other always seems to pull back. The United
States certainly has not given up. After the
Key West meeting there was disappointment
with the follow-up, and some have concluded
that these negotiations are dead. Yet the
two sides are incredibly close. The issues
of principle have been decided, and what is
left are technical differences. Both countries
will hold elections in 2003, and this opens
a window of opportunity. There has been some
success in setting up a third tier of negotiations
in Prague to look at confidence-building measures.
That has been a step forward, but clearly
there has not been a resolution of this conflict,
nor for any of the others.
When
a conflict remains unresolved after ten years
of negotiation one must ask what is needed
to move forward. The most obvious answer is
political will. Yet while the political will
of key parties plays a critical role in each
of these conflicts, it is also more complicated
than that.
We
must not overlook the possibility of new factors
that might play a pivotal role. Cyprus, for
example, had long been a frozen conflict until
new movement occurred in recent months in
response to an opportunity to join the European
Union. There are a number of factors that
can change the dynamics of a conflict, and,
as in this case, they are often external.
New
ideas and new proposals may be among these
motivational factors. Yet in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh
the anticipation of new approaches has also
led to disappointment and frustration. During
ten years of negotiation, most ideas have
already been placed on the table. People are
looking for a magical solution that will spare
them the burdens of compromise. Of course
no one can offer that. One can juggle and
readjust the old proposals, but the basic
concepts for resolution are already out there.
A
second possible factor is new leadership.
Leaders individually can have an enormous
impact upon the fate of nations, especially
in terms of conflicts, where the attitudes
of leaders are vitally important. Consider
the case of South Africa, where no one envisioned
the emergence of F. W. deKlerk and Nelson
Mandela as peacemakers. The Balkans saw the
opposite result when leaders undermined the
peace.
Emerging
outside influences are another factor. Some
people thought progress would result from
the development of the pipeline and exploitation
of the region’s energy reserves. Perhaps one
day they will. It is also possible that progress
will result from the geopolitical shift that
occurred after 11 September and especially
from changing relations between the United
States and Russia.
External
influences are often associated with unrealistic
expectations for outside intervention. We
hear people asking when the world will step
in and write the terms of peace to resolve
these conflicts. Most sides say such things
with the silent hope that outside mediators
will shove their proposals down the throats
of the other side. The disputants may call
for a Dayton-style conference, but it was
a long and dusty road that led to Dayton.
The situation in the former Yugoslavia differed
from this part of the world in terms of a
heated conflict that included military action,
massive troop deployments, and bombing.
More
realistically, outside intervention means
convincing both sides in a conflict that they
will ultimately not get their way and that
they will have to compromise. We have not
achieved that recognition in the present cases.
In all of these conflicts, there are players
who think they can achieve their ideal solutions.
When we try to persuade secessionist leaders
that the world will never recognize them as
an independent sovereignty, they remain unconvinced
that the historical window has closed. They
draw encouragement from events in Kosovo and
cling to the belief that there is still an
opportunity for the break-up of states.
These
conflicts will be solved, but their costs
will increase as long as their solutions are
delayed. Azerbaijan alone has a promising
economic future and might weather the impact
of these conflicts. For the other countries
involved, these disputes have devastating
consequences that should be of great concern
to us. If any of these countries fail, the
consequences would be extremely serious.
The
negotiator’s task can be frustrating, but
it also brings achievements. Proactive mediation
in Nagorno-Karabakh has probably prevented
another war. Ultimately, we have to be realistic
about the nature of a settlement and the interim
management of these conflicts. |
|
|
Panel
I: Abkhazia
This
panel examined the current state of play in Georgia’s
breakaway Abkhazia region, including prospects for
bringing an end to the conflict there.
Paula
Garb
Associate
Director, Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies,
University
of California at Irvine
Professor
Garb presented her paper, “The Impact of Abkhaz-Georgian
Citizen Peacebuilding Initiatives.” She made the
following major points.
•
Conventional peace processes are sometimes
hindered by popular perceptions of deep social wounds.
Grassroots peace initiatives are needed before people
can accept agreements made at official levels.
•
The University of California at Irvine project
on peacebuilding provides a forum for constructive
analysis of and presents valuable insights into
the perspectives of both Georgian and Abkhazian
sides. At first, the discussion topics were not
political. As trust grew, it became increasingly
easier to discuss the history and roots of the conflict
and solutions for the future.
•
A key achievement has been that the participants
own the process; they set the agenda and move at
their own speed and in ways that are familiar to
them. After the first dialogues, the participants
took over the tasks of facilitation, alternating
between Georgian and Abkhaz facilitators in consecutive
sessions during each conference.
•
Reflecting upon some of the breakthroughs
that we have achieved, we believe it was crucial
that the Georgian side responded with understanding
to demands that were made by the Abkhazian side.
When the Abkhazians found that they were met with
understanding, compromise was possible.
•
After last October’s military crisis in the
Kodori Gorge, it has been more difficult for the
Abhkaz to participate in this process. They expose
themselves to local criticism and risk their reputations
but because they have built up trusting relationships
with the Georgians, they continue to meet, albeit
cautiously. If there is a resumption of military
action, the Abkhaz may feel the need to withdraw,
at least temporarily.
•
Discussions of policy options have been successful
in generating various alternatives where once there
was little flexibility. The Georgian participants
recognize the de facto independence of Abkhazia,
and the Abkhaz side was prepared to consider confederal
relations with Georgia before the October 2001 attacks
in Abkhazia.
•
Participants share several key concerns:
the desire to protect human rights, promote democratic
processes and institutions, and ensure regional
stability and security. These concerns suggest that
both communities face similar challenges and are
searching for ways to promote national identity
and protect the security of minorities within their
territories. Increased numbers recognize that they
will be more successful if both sides achieve their
goals and discuss options for addressing the concerns
of both sides.
Jonathan
Cohen
Caucasus
Program Manager,
Conciliation
Resources
Mr.
Cohen delivered his paper, “Some Thoughts on NGO
Peace Building in the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict.”
He made the following major points.
•
At a fundamental level, conflict-related
work in the Caucasus is about politics and social
change. It is helpful to think of these conflicts
in terms of transformation processes that look beyond
the termination of violence and encompass key issues
such as economic development, democratization, and
social justice.
•
A broad-based approach is especially important
in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. Obstacles to
social transformation often include people in positions
of power on both sides, but in this case patterns
of endemic polarization have appeared at all levels
of society. A polarized mindset is deeply ingrained
not only in formal relations between Georgia and
Abkhazia but also within the political cultures
of the respective societies.
•
In many ways, the conflict has become institutionalized.
The peace process has been the exclusive domain
of elites who often seem to be out of touch with
their societies and sometimes act as if they are
more intent on consolidating their own positions
than in either resolving the conflict or developing
greater social well-being.
•
Over the past decade, the parties
have grown comfortable in postures of incompatibility,
using familiar levers to pressure the other side
toward a favorable outcome. For instance, the Georgian
strategy of perpetuating low-level military activity
as a source of leverage undermines the good faith
of the negotiation process, while the Abkhaz strategy
avoids engaging with Georgian internally displaced
persons (IDPs), hoping that they will abandon their
aspirations to return, and utilizes Russia as an
essential prop. Such strategies perpetuate intransigence
and preclude a genuine commitment to the negotiation
process.
•
Conciliation Resources (CR) recognizes that
a broad range of approaches is required to transform
relationships not only between the leaders of the
two societies but also among a broad range of social
and political structures within each society. CR
takes a people-centered, “bottom up” approach, supporting
the development of community groups, NGOs, and other
civic actors to enable them to address the challenges
of their societies, whether developmental, governmental,
or conflict-related.
•
CR also takes a “middle out” approach, working
with influential social and political groups and
individuals to enhance their capacity for broader
interactions with community groups, especially with
marginalized or vulnerable populations and with
decisionmakers.
•
It also is critical to work with decision-makers
to facilitate dialogue within and between the disputant
societies.
•
Although a peace process that relies exclusively
upon negotiations between leaders might result in
an agreement that satisfies their core interests,
it is questionable whether it would address underlying
issues of concern to the public. This failure might
exacerbate public mistrust, undermine the legitimacy
of any agreement, and complicate implementation.
These concerns militate against genuine reconciliation
and demand greater public participation in the peace
process.
•
Greater access to information diminishes
isolation and breaks down the narratives of hate
and fear within these societies. Information can
help to undermine mutually antagonistic depictions
and myths that often appear to preserve the separation
of the two sides and to constrain the space for
genuine negotiation.
•
A number of lessons have emerged from CR’s
dialogue process. First, it is a long-term process
that has required an integrated and flexible approach—working
on wider issues of social change. Second, the relationship
to the parties and questions of ownership are crucial.
Third, participant selection is important. Moderates
may help to initiate dialogue, mainstream participants
lend substance to the process, but progress is unlikely
without hardliners. Fourth, there are also implications
for the wider political scene, notably that Russia
has vital interests in the region but can also act
as a spoiler; ultimately it will be necessary to
craft a joint engagement that moves toward collective
strategy.
Highlights
of the Discussion
Abkhazia
has differed from other conflicts in which a majority
population “cleansed” a territory of an ethnic minority
and subsequent discussions aimed at a peaceful return
of the minority. In Abkhazia, a minority removed
a majority with Russian and Chechen assist-ance.
The Abhkaz know there is a risk of retribution if
the Georgian IDPs return; yet the IDP issue may
not prove an absolute impediment to any resolution.
Despite
this unusual feature, the fate of Abkhazia may be
tied indirectly to that of South Ossetia in the
sense that a successful resolution in one case is
likely to affect the other. In both cases, economic
issues are crucial: trade across cease-fire lines
is considerable, creating incentives for the preservation
of the status quo. Many people have
a stake in the trade, including officials on both
sides, and much conflict has resulted from the division
of territory for purposes of drug-running and other
criminal activities. Opportunities for enduring
solutions increase with economic development.
At
some point, Georgians will have to determine the
future shape of the country. While Georgia is presently
a centralized state, a federal or confederal system
will be required to resolve problems in Abkhazia,
South Ossetia, and in other parts of the country
where problems are developing. Such an approach
will require that Georgians reconsider their relations
with minority groups and help to establish terms
of equality, reciprocity, and mutual respect. A
short-term moratorium on questions of ultimate status
could encourage the transformation of unofficial
relationships among groups.
Russia
has sought to perpetuate the Georgian-Abkhazian
conflict in order to divide and control. A working
partnership with Russia will be key to any solution.
This
panel examined the still-unresolved differences
between South Ossetia and the Georgian central government
and prospects for future resolution.
Arthur
Martirosyan
Program
Manager,
Conflict
Management Group
Mr.
Martirosyan made the following points.
•
Unlike other conflicts in the Caucasus, there
is no clear border between Georgia and South Ossetia,
and there are relatively few cultural barriers.
Indeed, it can be difficult to distinguish between
Ossetians and other Georgians due to high levels
of inter-marriage and assimilation. Ossetians have
been more a part of the Georgian state than other
minorities.
•
Georgians and Ossetians have been divided
by their differing orientations toward Russia. For
example, South Ossetians insisted that Russians
take part in the mediation process sponsored by
the Conflict Management Group (CMG) while the Georgians
were adamant about excluding the Russians. The Russian
government conceded that the CMG mediation process
would not impinge upon Russia’s role in formal negotiations
and agreed to be informed about the process without
directly participating.
•
At an early stage in the process, Georgian
participants regarded the South Ossetian position
as little more than an extension of the Russian
viewpoint and were surprised as differences began
to emerge. In 1998, for example, when the Russians
pushed for more checkpoints in the formal negotiations,
the South Ossetians agreed with the Georgians, who
wanted fewer checkpoints.
•
The two sides also found common ground on
economic issues, law enforcement, and refugees.
Initially, cooperation between criminal organizations
in Georgia and South Ossetia was greater than that
between respective law enforcement agencies, but
the situation has improved.
•
Coordination between formal and informal
mediation processes is essential. The situation
has its own dynamic and is sensitive to changes,
as illustrated by the efforts of Georgian officials
to reestablish earlier levels of confidence with
a new South Ossetian regime following the 2001 “presidential”
elections in South Ossetia.
•
The CMG mediation process has sought to build
personal relationships and to accommodate sensitivities
in a variety of ways. For example, when CMG mediators
initially arrived in the region, they first visited
officials in Tskhinvali (de facto capital
of South Ossetia) in an effort to assuage South
Ossetian fears that the mediators would tilt toward
Tbilisi.
•
The CMG approach focused upon the mediation
process and permitted substantive positions to develop
gradually through the interactions of participants.
Highlights
of the Discussion
Personal
relationships established by participants in the
CMG process have been markedly congenial. In one
case, joint efforts by delegates to recover a participant’s
stolen car foreshadowed subsequent coordination
of law enforcement. Children’s programs have been
a successful part of this process as well.
Generally,
the conflict in South Ossetia has been lower in
its intensity and has involved less antagonism than
the conflict in Abkhazia. The social wounds do not
run as deep. Still, a sense of betrayal exists among
the South Ossetian population. They were once the
most loyal of Georgia’s minorities, and many did
not foresee the conflict.
There
were under 50,000 Ossetian refugees from the conflict,
most of whom have fled to the Russian Republic of
North Ossetia. Many are not anxious to return because
of greater economic opportunities in North Ossetia,
and some have found new roles in Russia’s shadow
economy. Refugee return will be complicated by the
relocation of Georgians into some of the areas that
refugees previously inhabited. It is possible that
Georgian refugees from Abkhazia will settle on property
belonging to South Ossetians who have fled to North
Ossetia. Georgian law, however, entitles owners
to their property regardless of whether they return.
Due
to these factors, the South Ossetian diaspora has
played a lesser role than have diasporas from other
Caucasian conflicts, which have tended to acquire
a symbolic significance and have often become more
militant than their brethren in the homeland.
Yet
if deep antagonisms and militant diasporas play
a lesser role in the South Ossetian conflict, economics
plays a greater role. As is the case with other
regional conflicts, new economic opportunities,
often in the shadow economy, have opened on both
sides. In the case of Ossetia, they also have opened
up on both sides of the Russian border. Smuggling
operations run in all directions, and Russia’s interest
in a settlement is, in part, connected to contraband
entering Russia from South Ossetia. Corruption is
a serious impediment on all sides of the conflict.
Many in Russia, Georgia, and South Ossetia have
an economic interest in the preservation of the
status quo.
Also,
as in other regional conflicts, South Ossetia faces
a procedural conundrum. Resolving the conflict without
prior agreement on final status and related political
issues is difficult, but the parties cannot agree
on these issues until the conflict is resolved.
Varieties of federal and confederal arrangements
have been proposed, but further work is needed in
this area. In particular, the Georgian side needs
to consider concrete arrangements involving such
technical issues as security services and customs
as well as broader matters of principle such as
the limits of autonomy. These issues may require
a wider public discussion, especially in Georgia.
The South Ossetian side must consider concrete provisions
for the guarantees it seeks.
The
South Ossetians are watching the situation in Abkhazia,
and any solution for the latter probably would serve
as a catalyst for a solution in South Ossetia. The
situation in Abkhazia is especially challenging,
however, and the relationship between the two conflicts
is a conundrum unto itself. Though the two conflicts
are substantially different and must be addressed
separately, they merit some joint consideration
as a consequence of their mutual influence as well
as their other commonalties.
Some
observers believe that US aid to Georgia has tended
to support a corrupt old guard entrenched and opposed
to the democratic reforms necessary for any solution
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. US aid has aimed
to promote Georgia’s democratic transition, and
there will be further opportunities to support grassroots
programs. Inevitably, a complex process of social
and economic transition will surpass the tenure
and the talents of any given set of local leaders.
Like
the policies of any government, the US approach
to Georgia often has been reactive, attempting to
address immediate problems. For the most part, a
comprehensive, long-term strategy toward the development
of the region as a whole has been lacking. This
is among the challenges that we face.
|
Peacemaking
in the NIS and Lessons Learned
Luncheon
Address |
Ambassador
Joe Presel |
The
case of Tajikistan demonstrates that it is
possible to resolve conflicts in the former
Soviet Union. The United States has a genuine
role as peacemaker in the region, and we are
probably better than most. We are strong,
resourceful, and fairly well informed. We
are confident and accustomed to getting things
done. Our domestic politicians take an interest
in our activities in this part of the world.
|
|
Yet
as peacemakers we sometimes carry a double-edged
sword. Our confidence can spill over into
arrogance and impatience. It is difficult
to resist us when we want to get something
done, and overconfidence can ensnare us in
some fairly serious difficulties. Some in
the region are uneasy with our presence. Because
we are the United States, the opportunities
for success increase with our involvement,
but any failure diminishes our stature. So
we must tend to our reputation and choose
our tasks with care.
In
the Newly Independent States, most of our
peacemaking has been done in concert with
others, though our partnerships have often
been cultivated in pragmatic response to the
dictates of diplomacy. We worked with the
OSCE in Nagorno-Karabakh and with the UN in
Abkhazia, but our involvement can be overwhelming
to those with whom we work. We don’t necessarily
know better than anyone else, but we tend
to work harder as a country and as a government.
We try to do it ourselves when we think we
have a chance at success.
We
cannot succeed at peacemaking in the NIS without
the Russians. This seems self-evident. Yet
at first we thought we could do it without
them, since we saw them as part of the problem.
Since their involvement is a prerequisite
for effective peacemaking, we have to put
in time with the Russians from the very start,
get to know them, and understand what they
are doing. When we do this we learn three
lessons.
First,
we tend to think that there is a Russian policy
because there was once a Soviet policy. But
there is not a Russian policy any more than
there is a US policy. The Russian policy towards
Nagorno-Karabakh depends on what part of the
bureaucracy you are talking to, and perhaps
it depends what day of the week you talk to
them.
A
second lesson is that the Russians were the
region’s most recent colonialists, and this
inevitably places constraints upon their peacemaking
capacities.
The
third lesson is that the Russians do not really
trust us. They tend to operate on the assumption
that we will attempt to take advantage of
them. We know why we are there and that we
are trying to do the best for everybody, but
they do not trust us.
Domestic
politics matter to us in a ways they don’t
matter, for example, in the EU countries.
At times we find that our efforts in the region
are forced by events.
There
are also difficulties with local leaders,
particularly when they fail to prepare their
populations for the eventuality of a major
agreement. Everyone knows how to solve these
conflicts. All of the local leaders know what
a settlement is going to look like, but they
cannot bring themselves to accept it. So agreements
break down over details.
The
problem is that we are not very good at history.
We think the Soviet Union ended along with
Communism, but for the local populations it
was the end of colonialism far more than the
end of Communism. The Russians ended their
last colonial empire, and the way that the
people who inhabited that empire view the
Russians and their problems differs from the
way that we view the Russians and their problems.
Of course, the history of the region goes
back much further.
I
have learned that whatever countries say about
their goals, the real motto of all these groups
is: “What use is it to me?” The only weapon
that some of them have is stubbornness. We
must learn stubbornness.
There
are two final lessons. First, you probably
won’t succeed; and lastly, we Americans say
that time is money, but money is money, and
time is time. We Americans don’t think enough
about the importance of time when we try to
make these settlements happen.
|
Highlights
of
the Discussion |
On
Chechnya. Our fundamental
views on Chechnya have not changed since 11
September, but there are some additional nuances.
Clearly, Chechnya matters and will continue
to matter desperately because of its immediate
impact on all the other conflicts. We will
find it harder to get cooperation from the
Russians if we don’t cooperate with them on
the Chechnya settlement.
|
|
On
the role of NGOs. Inevitably
there are limitations to official US assistance,
and the NGOs can address those limitations.
Sometimes they may point out our shortcomings.
Theoretical discussions are not of immediate
use to us, but we are open to creative approaches,
and we will look at anything that can be shown
to bring concrete results. NGOs can be useful.
We probably don’t use them enough.
On
US-Russian cooperation in these three conflicts.
Most factors that can contribute
to US-Russian cooperation are external to
the conflicts themselves. If the Russian economy
does well and Russia moves closer to NATO,
and its policies on nuclear weapons are compatible
with ours, then Russia will look with favor
on cooperating with us on these issues. Putin
is a superb realist, and Russians understand
that the world has changed. If our overall
relationship with them goes well, so will
our cooperation on these conflicts. It will
go best in Transnistria, but they will have
a harder time accepting our long-term involvement
in the Caucasus. We tend to look at Central
Asia as Russia’s equivalent of our own Far
West, but Russia’s Far West is essentially
the Caucasus. Central Asia is almost accidental
to Russia; it doesn’t matter to them in the
same way that the Caucasus matters. The Caucasus
has a significance in Russian history, culture,
and literature similar to that of our own
westward expansion. |
Panel
III: Nagorno-Karabakh
This
panel investigated the still-simmering Azerbaijani-Armenian
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and a possible framework
for an enduring peace.
Marc
Spurling
Associate
Field Officer,
United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Azerbaijan
Mr.
Spurling presented his paper, “The Conflict Over
Nagorno Karabakh: Perspectives
on Next Steps.” He made the following major points.
•
Resolution of the longstanding dispute in
Nagorno-Karabakh eventually may be influenced by
economic and demographic trends in Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Examination of these trends suggests that the near-term
may offer some of the best opportunities for a balanced
settlement.
•
Many observers have concluded that the Azerbaijani
Government does not support the integration of IDPs
into mainstream Azeri society because it uses the
camps as a reminder that the conflict is unresolved
and that Azeri territory remains occupied. They
have suggested that benefits extended to the IDPs
by the Azeri government are simply the means by
which the government resists their integration and
maintains them in their present status.
•
These perceptions result, in part, from the
fact that the Azerbaijani Government does not acknowledge
the policy of integration that it has been quietly
promoting—to the point that only 10 percent of the
IDP population currently lives in the camps. The
others live primarily in urban and suburban areas.
•
Many of the latter population are showing
signs of economic adaptation as a result of government
programs that provide job placement and other programs
such as the World Bank social investment fund. These
policies and trends argue against the view that
poor living conditions provide a strong impetus
for Azeribaijani officials to seek a resolution
that would enable IDP resettlement.
•
There are more than 1,400 foreign business
in Azerbaijan and over 900 joint ventures. No corresponding
figures are available for Armenia, but certainly
Western oil companies are absent, as are many of
the other indicators of Western economic development.
Annual foreign investment in Azerbaijan is three
to five times greater than in Armenia.
•
Overseas development aid during the last
decade has totaled $2-3 billion for Armenia and
less than $1 billion for Azerbaijan. Moreover, Armenia’s
lack of economic opportunities contributes to an
outward migration that has emptied some villages.
•
Perceptions that the Armenian negotiating
position is deteriorating may discourage compromise
in Baku and embolden a tougher posture, as reflected
in recent hard-line rhetoric.
•
The dynamics of the situation favor hard-liners
on both sides, but economic and demographic trends
favor Azerbaijan. There may be no better time than
the present for the two sides to reach a balanced
settlement.
Highlights
of the Discussion
Some
observers see substantial strengths in the Armenian
position, since the Armenians occupy the territory
and over time their possession may be consolidated
in de facto terms. Although Azerbaijan has
the economic advantage, economic indicators may
not be a deciding factor for at least three reasons:
•
First, Azerbaijan’s relative economic strength
is also its vulnerability since the Armenians understand
that another war will interfere with petroleum transport,
undermine regional investment, and compromise Azerbaijan’s
economic momentum.
•
Second, many Armenians have concluded on
the basis of their troubled history that they cannot
safely reside in territory controlled by Azerbaijan,
and they are consequently resolute.
•
Third, Armenians are prepared to sustain
high levels of suffering. The rhetoric of Azeri
hard-liners may therefore accomplish little beyond
reducing Armenia’s capacity for compromise. One
of the difficulties in the conflict is that both
parties regard time as being on their side. In each
case, this is a fallacy. Yet it is difficult for
either party to see around a long history of mutual
grievance and mistrust.
When
a conflict has endured for more than a decade and
traditional strategies of mediation have produced
limited results, certain risks may be required,
and a creative approach may find its place.
It
may be helpful to consider opportunities for a shift
in the conceptual framework that governs the approach
of the respective populations as well as the elites
on both sides. Both sides might come to reconsider
the manner in which they define themselves and their
place in the region. Mediators might offer incentives
by emphasizing and perhaps augmenting the mutual
benefits of a compromise settlement. This approach
also would offer substantial benefits to neighboring
states, including Iran, Turkey, Russia, and those
of Central Asia.
Existing
infrastructure once made the South Caucasus a crossroads
for regional trade, and a potential dynamic might
look beyond past disputes and current dilemmas toward
a regional strategy of shared advantage. History
can be turned toward the interest of peace, for
it shows how much these populations hold in common
from their past, their present, and possibly their
future, and teaches that no political entity can
achieve security and prosperity in isolation from
its neighbors.
These
are grounds to shift the discussion from a rehearsal
of hatred, grievance, and fear toward a recognition
of shared futures, joint security, and mutual prosperity
in a climate of democracy, economic development,
business investment, and increasing employment.
Personal
relationships can play an important role in a conceptual
shift of this sort; Armenians and Azeris often do
well together on a personal level. NGOs might play
a larger role in building those relationships and
in offering incentives for broader forms of engagement
from both sides.
Business
communities throughout the region are vastly more
receptive than political elites. Key business interests
could play a larger role in the peace process and
could help to shift the discussion from demands
for the division of the pie to proposals for its
expansion.
Many
local institutions are vastly underutilized. Regional
journalism groups get together regularly and are
changing the terms of the debate. Various non-elites,
who currently have no voice, might play a greater
role in the process. Diaspora organizations all
over the world might be brought into the peace process,
talking to one another on a business level. Embassies
and regional representatives might validate and
encourage activities such as these.
The
current geopolitical situation is opportune since
all the countries of the region want to work on
the US side. They might be prepared to cooperate
with one another for the sake of cooperation with
the United States in its struggle against terrorism.
In the present geopolitical climate, the metaphor
of a “Great Game” is an anachronism. In fact, there
is significant compatibility and cooperation among
US, Russian, British and French interests. Current
geopolitical cooperation, particularly between Russia
and Western governments, may provide a new basis
for encouraging cooperation within the South Caucasus
region.
This
panel examined the current state of play between
Chisinau and the breakaway region of Transnistria.
Ambassador
William Hill
Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian
Institution, Washington, D.C.
Ambassador
Hill presented his paper, “Frozen Peace Along the
Dniestr: Internal and External Dynamics of the Transnistrian
Conflict.” He made the following major points.
•
The identification of incentives for reconciliation
has contributed to the peace process and will have
a further role to play. Yet because economic and
political elites on both sides of the dispute have
grown comfortable with the status quo, how
this conflict can be shifted from its present equilibrium
is not immediately clear.
•
Initially, the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission to Moldova
had two mandates: first, to help create conditions
for achieving a political settlement of the conflict,
and, second, to assist in the withdrawal of Russian
troops. Because it was clear that neither of these
objectives could be achieved without Russian cooperation,
Russian and US negotiators sought to forge a common
position that would prevent the local disputants
from playing them off against each other. The US
side also sought to engage larger and mid-sized
European states to provide political and logistical
support for peace initiatives.
•
That the basic options for a solution had
already been determined was clear to all. These
involved variations of autonomy, devolution, or
federalism in order to give Transnistria educational
or economic authority free from the central Moldovan
government. Local leaders who had grown comfortable
with the status quo, however, avoided commitments
to proposed solutions.
•
The circumstances required a pragmatic regime
of “sticks and carrots,” providing incentives for
movement on each of the two sides. For example,
the Russians might turn off the gas in Transnistria
or deny Transnistrian students entrance to Russian
military academies. The process also required positive
incentives for Transnistrian officials despite concerns
about local corruption.
•
The Istanbul OSCE summit also provided the
process with powerful incentives. It established
a deadline for the removal of Russian troops and
tied the Russian fulfillment of withdrawal requirements
to improving relations with the United States and
others in the West. Russian officials were thereby
encouraged to help with the destruction of weapons,
with the removal of troops, with the abolition of
a separate Transnistrian customs authority, and
with iniatives to improve the effectiveness of the
joint peacekeeping forces.
•
Both Russia and Ukraine have played ambivalent
and sometimes counterproductive roles, serving to
mediate the dispute while also competing with one
another as interested parties. The Ukrainians, for
example, undermined efforts to create a united customs
service through their assistance to the Transnistrians.
•
The original reasons for the conflict have
largely been overtaken by events. History is helpful
in understanding the origins of the dispute but
does not account for its continuation. Progress
may depend upon the development of further incentives
for the disputants to move away from the status
quo, much as incentives were previously offered
for Russian cooperation.
•
Many political and business elites on both
sides are relatively comfortable with present arrangements,
so real motivation for change and reunification
may come only if the situation destabilizes itself
through an economic or political crisis or if an
external actor, whether Russia, Ukraine, or the
international community, renders the status quo
untenable.
•
Although a formal political settlement is
the paramount objective, NGOs can play an important
role. The “track two” diplomacy of these organizations
can help to prevent the parties from moving further
apart, while shedding new light upon the current
nature of the conflict and the views of the participants.
P.
Terrence Hopman
Director
of the Program on Global Security,
Thomas
J. Watson, Jr. Institute for International Studies,
Brown University
Professor
Hopman presented his paper, “Prospects for Resolving
the Transnistrian Conflict: Some Preliminary Suggestions.”
He made the following major points.
•
The major issues that led to the outbreak
of violence during the collapse of the Soviet Union
have largely faded into memory, and other interests
and identities have been created that pose new obstacles
to a settlement of underlying issues. This has given
rise to “frozen conflicts” in regions such as Abkhazia,
Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria. As a result,
initiating a genuine process of resolution for the
underlying conflicts becomes more difficult. The
initiation of that process requires a shift in the
current equilibrium.
•
Long-lasting conflicts are particularly “ripe
for resolution” when they reach a “hurting stalemate,”
which affords the parties “mutually enticing opportunities”
that impart “a sense of the way out” of the deadlock.
Transnistria reached a stalemate long ago, but a
sense of “hurt” sufficient to move it toward a resolution
has been lacking. Considerable economic pain is
felt by many residents along the Dniestr River,
but it is doubtful that many people on either side
attribute this primarily to the to the present-day
division of Moldova. Stalemates usually offer mutual
opportunities, but in this case they are difficult
to find.
•
Multiple mediators can cause additional problems.
In the Transnistrian conflict, the OSCE is the central
mediator. Yet Russia and Ukraine have also provided
mediation at the same time that they have acted
as interested parties to the conflict. This presents
the disputants with opportunities to play the mediators
against one another.
•
How might Russia and Ukraine be persuaded
to work through the OSCE instead of working alongside
it? This realignment may require a major effort
by the United States and other Western countries
to strengthen the overall role of the OSCE. A perception
exists, particularly on the part of Russian officials,
that the role of the OSCE has been devalued in the
West and that Western states regard NATO as the
paramount security organization.
•
As NATO expands, there is a danger that Russia
and Ukraine will become increasingly isolated from
European security structures. The OSCE, not NATO,
is responsible for conflict mediation and prevention,
however. The OSCE provides a unique venue for these
activities because its membership includes all of
the interested parties, most significantly, Ukraine
and Russia.
•
The Transnistrian dispute has come to be
framed in terms of the material interests of elites.
For this reason, it may prove tractable to settlement
by traditional bargaining methods, including offers
of rewards, mutual enticements, and warnings about
future suffering in the absence of a settlement.
External parties may play a role in providing these
incentives to both sides of the dispute. Similar
incentives might encourage Romania, Ukraine, and
Russia to play more concerted and constructive roles.
•
It may be counterproductive to focus on proposals
for final status—autonomous, federal, or confederal
arrangements—since some party will resist any concrete
proposal. In such cases, it is often preferable
to build an agreement from the bottom up, one step
at a time, focusing upon mutually advantageous tradeoffs
and working with specific issues rather than with
an overall framework for agreement.
•
A relevant model for such a negotiation may
be found in the efforts by the central government
of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tartarstan
to define their mutual relationship in a long series
of negotiations between 1992 and 1994. In that case,
competencies were divided largely according to technical
criteria depending upon which level of government
could perform a given function most effectively.
In Transnistria, as in Tartarstan, the final arrangements
may vary from those that anyone has foreseen.
Highlights
of the Discussion
The
conflict between Moldova and Transnistria is close
to a solution. The final steps will be difficult,
but recent movement has been positive. Under the
leadership of Russophone President Vladimir Voronin,
Moldova has accepted Russian as a second official
language. Voronin is from Transnistria, where previously
he was head of a municipal administration and where
some of his family members still reside. He is a
Communist, and if his party obtains enough votes
it might grant Transnistrians the autonomy that
they have been seeking.
President
Voronin has applied economic leverage toward a resolution,
but the private interests of his Transnistrian counterpart,
Igor Smirnov, do not provide incentives for an agreement.
Indeed, Smirnov currently has everything to gain
from maintaining the status quo. Predictably,
he has been resisting Russia’s withdrawal of munitions
stored in Transnistria.
Voronin
may be open to some variant of a Tartarstan model,
and others on the Moldovan side also might be agreeable
as long as the result were a single state. There
may be advantages, however, in avoiding discussions
of final status. Much may depend upon whether Transnistrians
are able to trust President Voronin, and that trust
may develop over time.
Mediator
shopping on the part of the disputants has complicated
the peace process in Transnistria. Following Russia’s
commitments at Istanbul in 1999 to withdraw or destroy
Russian armaments located in Transnistria, the Transnistrians
felt betrayed and have been shifting their strategic
alliance from Russia to Ukraine. None of the conflicts
in the region can be resolved without Russia, but
conflict in Transnistria also requires coordination
with Ukraine.
If
Russia and Ukraine were to join in a concerted approach
to the problem, the status quo might prove
less alluring to Transnistrian officials. For example,
if Russia continues to require Transnistria to pay
for its energy supply, as it did in the winter of
2002 and as it does in the case of Moldova, then
Transnistrians might be moved toward an agreement.
Without the cover provided by competition between
Russia and Ukraine, corrupt local officials could
be brought to justice, or forced, at the very least,
to make tougher choices. Russia and Ukraine are
seeking certain benefits from the West; Transnistria
is seeking certain benefits from Russia and Ukraine.
Leverage is available for the conclusion of the
process.
Some
Transnistrians would be happy to achieve a status
similar to that of Taiwan, but such an arrangement
would not be a genuine solution since it would leave
an open door for corruption and criminal activity
and would legitimize the further disintegration
of former Soviet republics into unmanageable ethnic
microstates. Moreover, Moldova needs Transnistria’s
economic resources, including tax revenues. It cannot
afford to have “Europe’s largest duty-free shop”
on its territory.
Panel
V: Roundtable on the Role of Outside Players:
Iran, Turkey, and Russia
Iran
Tom King
Bureau
of Intelligence and Research,
Department
of State
Mr.
King made the following major points.
•
The Caucasus is not among Iran’s primary
concerns at the present time. Iranians are focused
upon national security, the economy, and geopolitics.
They view their country as an up-and-coming regional
superpower, a self-conception that draws upon the
heritage of their twenty-year Islamic revolution
and their desire to share its legacy with the Muslim
world.
•
Iranians have an older legacy of hegemony
in the Caucasus and a sense that Iran sits at the
crossroads of a number of different regions. They
see themselves as a bridge between the Middle East
and South Asia and between Central Asia and the
Persian Gulf. They are well positioned for various
intermediary roles among the diverse interests of
these regions. They draw upon this point in their
efforts to improve their foreign relations and especially
in their efforts to engage with Europe and China.
•
They also draw upon their Indo-European roots
and their cultural uniqueness to set themselves
apart from surrounding states. Within the Muslim
world, they are distinguished by their practice
of Shiite Islam. For all of these reasons, they
say they are not beholden to anyone and can make
alliances based on national interest alone. They
have been fairly successful at selling that notion
to the region. In general, President Khatami has
met with some success in his efforts to restore
Iran’s international image.
•
National security is the number one priority
for the regime, especially for the conservatives
who control the national security apparatus, but
much of this focus translates into an insular mentality.
They see themselves as the odd man out, surrounded
by potential enemies and the victim of countless
invasions. They became pawns in the “Great Game”
between Britain and Russia and later in the Cold
War struggle between the United States and the Soviet
Union. Part of the impetus for their revolution
was their weariness with foreign domination.
•
Oil and gas are the foundation of Iranian
income, accounting for 80 percent of its export
economy. Trade is the other major source of foreign
currency, though it is limited to exports such as
textiles and carpets, iron, steel, and agricultural
products. Iran’s major economic goal is self-sufficiency,
and it is far from achieving it.
•
With regard to its neighbors, Iran’s immediate
concern is the security of its borders. Because
it does not perceive a threat from its immediate
north, there is little discussion of Caucasus issues,
and that may be advantageous from a US standpoint.
Iran sees the Caucasus as a buffer between Russia
and Turkey, which it does not trust. In particular,
Iran is uneasy about Turkey’s growing alliance with
the United States and its relative ease with Israel.
These relations tend to place Iran on Armenia’s
side in its conflict with Azerbaijan, even though
Iran has strong religious ties to the latter.
•
Azeri nationalism and its potential for irredentist
claims are not regarded as a significant threat.
In particular, the Azeri population in northwestern
Iran is unlikely to seek to join Azerbaijan. Despite
growing prosperity in Azerbaijan, it will remain
with Iran due, in part, to Iran’s significance as
a major regional actor.
•
The Caucasus is starting to loom larger on
the Iranian horizon from an economic standpoint
as a consequence of the region’s energy reserves,
however. Iran will resist its marginalization in
the region, which it sees as an US objective.
•
During the last few years the United States
also has loomed larger on the Iranian horizon. Iranians
see the situation in Afghanistan as a double-edged
sword. They are glad to be rid of the Taliban but
are disturbed by the growing US presence in the
region.
•
Iranians have played both positive and negative
roles in the US war on terrorism. Notably, they
have helped some of America’s adversaries to evade
apprehension, as part of their standard tactic to
maintain pressure upon the United States. Some in
Iran argue that the US anti-terrorist campaign is
a ruse and that increasing US interest in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Iraq, and Azerbaijan is an effort to encircle
Iran as a prelude to US action against it. Iranians
also see the US as attempting to hem them in with
sanctions.
Turkey
Bulent Aliriza
Senior
Associate and Director of the Turkish Program, Center
for Strategic and International Studies
Mr.
Aliriza made the following major points.
•
Turkey’s current priorities are not in foreign
policy and have not been for most of the past decade.
This situation is a product of internal preoccupations,
including its long struggle with Kurdish separatists
and a floundering economy. Its international influence
has been diminishing steadily, even as its overall
geostrategic importance has been enhanced by international
developments.
•
Hobbled by foreign and domestic debts that
have reduced living standards and increased unemployment,
Turkey once again may face a confrontation between
a popular Islamist party and the vigorously secular
military. The Islamists are taking advantage of
the economic problems, mismanagement, and corruption
to open a substantial lead in recent opinion polls.
•
The main priorities in Turkish foreign policy
are the future of its European Union application—due
for a decision this year; the long-running Cyprus
problem, which has serious implications for relations
with Greece and the rest of the EU; the possible
extension of the war against terrorism to neighboring
Iraq; and the worsening situation in the Middle
East. In addition, Turkey is engaged in an ongoing
redefinition of relations with the United States
and the Western Alliance after the Cold War.
•
Following the collapse of the USSR, the emergence
of the Caucasus sub-system on Turkey’s borders required
the formulation of a new regional policy, or, more
correctly, a series of policies towards the three
new countries with a regional veneer.
•
Though still a work in progress, Turkey’s
role in the Caucasus is assured by the physical
proximity and weakness of the Caucasian states,
the need of Azeri and Georgian leaders for Turkish
support to shore up their positions against internal
foes and external pressures, and support from the
United States—particularly regarding the transportation
of Caspian oil through the projected Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline.
•
Turkey’s goals in the Caucasus include maintaining
good relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia; managing
difficult relationships with Armenia and Iran—the
latter at once an economic partner and the Islamic
antithesis of Turkish secularism—ensuring the success
of current pipeline projects, and containing Russian
influence in the region.
•
Since 1991 Turkey has participated in multilateral
diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Although tilting toward Azerbaijan, Turkey initially
sought pragmatic accommodation with Armenia and
supported efforts to achieve a settlement of the
crisis. Relations soured with Armenia following
its alliance with Russia in 1992, however, and Ankara’s
influence in Baku declined after Heydar Aliyev came
to power there in 1993. Relations with Armenia further
declined due to increasing salience of the Armenian
genocide issue and a regime change in Yerevan. Gradually
Baku began to gain influence in Ankara due to Turkey’s
eagerness to transport Azeri oil through its territory.
•
Turkey is pursuing closer relations with
Baku and Tbilisi. Despite the activities of the
Abkhaz diaspora, Turkey has consistently backed
Tbilisi. This stance puts Turkey at odds with Russia,
but Ankara has been careful to avoid any possible
spillover into its bilateral relationship with Moscow.
Paradoxically, its reluctance to support Abkhaz
insurgents, who have been backed by Moscow, is rationalized
in terms of its general policy of avoiding support
for separatists in the Caucasus, which, to Russia’s
satisfaction, includes the Chechens.
•
Involvement in the Ossetian issue, which
has little resonance in Turkey, has been even less
notable, although Turkey has participated in OSCE
missions in a low-key manner. Turkish involvement
in Moldova has been negligible.
•
In the near term, Turkish efforts are not
likely to help resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute
or the conflicts in Georgia. Theoretically, the
growing Turkish interaction with the governments
in Tbilisi and Baku, especially in energy and military
matters, could give it some positive leverage in
peace negotiations. In practice, however, the reverse
seems to be happening, as the leaders in the two
countries have become convinced that they can count
on virtually unquestioned Turkish support for their
positions.
•
Ankara surely recognizes that closer relations
with Baku and Tbilisi will foster an even greater
sense of isolation and insecurity in Armenia. A
growing sense of isolation will prompt Yerevan to
seek closer relations with Moscow and Teheran and
will encourage further cooperation in the Caucasus
between Russia and Iran, both of which will perceive
a greater threat to their interests.
•
Despite the very real changes brought about
in the region by the post-
11 September situation, including the recent deployment
of US military advisers in Georgia, the Turkish
foreign policy elite and, more importantly, the
military establishment will continue to be averse
to risky diplomatic or military moves in the Caucasus.
Russia
Anne
Herr
Bureau
of Intelligence and Research,
Department
of State
Ms.
Herr made the following major points.
•
Russia’s weakness poses a dilemma for peacemaking
in the Caucasus and Moldova. Although Moscow will
have a key role in any resolution of these conflicts,
it is neither entirely able nor entirely willing
to play the part.
•
Russia is key to the resolution of these
conflicts in the sense that it is difficult to imagine
any solutions that do not require Russian cooperation.
Russians have relationships on all sides of these
conflicts from the top levels down to the grassroots.
They have played an historical role in each of these
conflicts, since the Soviet period at least, and
their proximity means not only that Russia will
remain important to all of the disputants but that
these disputes will remain important to Russia.
•
Russia’s considerable leverage in this region
has not been effectively exerted, however. This
is, in part, because Russia recognizes the delicacy
of its situation and lacks confidence both in its
ability and in the reliability of international
support should the situation in the region deteriorate.
Each of these conflicts involves issues—trade, energy,
and troop withdrawals, inter alia—that might
be played to Russia’s advantage, but specific actions
on any of these issues run the risk of an undesirable
outcome that would undermine Russia’s prestige and
detract from its influence.
•
Moreover, the various parties to these regional
disputes have their own agendas, and many of them
would be willing to call Moscow’s bluff. Abkhazia,
for example, is already isolated and would have
little to lose by ignoring Russia.
•
Given Russia’s current weakness, the intransigence
of these conflicts, and the opportunities for failure,
serious involvement is risky and unattractive from
a Russian perspective. Because Moscow is currently
seeking to avoid risk, it is prepared to accept
the status quo and might conclude that it
has more to gain from the advertisement of its political
leverage than from its concrete application. As
a result, the Russian approach toward these conflicts
has been both ambivalent and inconsistent and is
likely to remain so unless there are strong incentives
for a different approach.
•
Generally, Russia’s interest in the CIS countries
is closely connected with the preservation of stability
and Russian influence. These factors have led Moscow
to accept broader responsibilities for regional
stability and peacekeeping. The two strategies are
not always compatible, and Russia’s present weak
position sometimes forces it to choose. When stability
is a concern it opts for one set of policies, but
when security is assured Moscow begins to maneuver
for greater influence. Currently, stability is a
key issue because Russia is overextended in Chechnya
and does not wish to become involved in other conflicts.
•
From a security standpoint, the Caucasus
is among Russia’s top foreign policy priorities,
possibly more important to Moscow than any other
region. Yet there also is an economic dimension
to Russia’s involvement in the Caucasus, and under
the current Moscow administration this dimension
is becoming gradually more distinct from Russia’s
political goals in the region. The result may be
an increasingly pragmatic and flexible posture with
more opportunities for cooperation and constructive
engagement in regional peace processes.
Highlights
of the Discussion
President
Putin’s policy toward separatists remains ambiguous.
Although he has not supported separatism, he has
been inconsistent in his discussion of separatism
elsewhere in the CIS, creating a potential for misunderstanding.
In this regard, the situation in Abkhazia could
be dangerous because of a lag between perceptions
of Abkhaz leaders and political developments in
Russia. Putin is cracking down on political “freelancers”
in Russia, but Abkhaz leaders may not get that message
until they are in the midst of a crisis. Abkhaz
misconceptions also may result from inflammatory
statements of members of the Russian Duma. The potential
exists for some Russian factions to drag Russia
into Abkhazia regardless of official policies.
The
Russian response to the Abkhazian military crisis
of October 2001 should not be interpreted as an
indication that the Russians will help the Abkhaz.
Rather, it shows that Russia will fight Chechens
wherever they may appear. Indisputably, the Caucasus
is important for Russia. Russia tends to look at
Iran and Turkey from the perspective of its interests
in Central Asia and the Caucasus.
The
Iranian revolution has failed economically. The
growing unemployment problem is seriously exacerbated
by an explosion in the population of young people.
This situation is a highly volatile and will pose
a more strenuous test for the current Iranian regime
than will any aspects of US policy. This problem
is an incentive toward rapprochement with the United
States. The Iranians are pragmatists, as illustrated
by their silence on the war in Chechnya, and they
have shown potential for cooperation with the United
States. Yet despite their antipathy toward Baghdad,
they prefer to avoid military conflict in any of
their neighboring states and remain concerned about
US policy toward Iraq.
The
Turks perceive the region’s energy pipelines from
a strategic standpoint and have become involved
in Georgia’s internal politics in an effort to protect
the transit corridor. Otherwise, they have yet to
establish coherent policies toward the Caucasus.
Apart from trading their own silence on the Chechens
for Russia’s silence on the Kurds, they also have
yet to establish a policy towards Russia’s presence
in the region. They seek an opportunity to play
a constructive role in Nagorno-Karabakh and, to
a lesser extent, in Abkhazia, but they are uncertain
as to how to proceed in either case. The Turkish
military is a conservative institution and is not
likely to get involved in the Caucasus. Turkey recognizes
a responsibility for concerted action as a member
of NATO, however, and is looking toward the United
States for strategic guidance.
Iran,
Turkey, and Russia are alike in several ways. First,
they have interests in the Caucasus. Second, they
recognize their current weakness. Third, they are
seeking some basis for a coherent and productive
approach to the region. To what extent might it
be possible to cultivate a regional approach by
moving away from a traditional zero-sum framework
and focusing instead upon shared interests in stability
and economic development? The cultivation of such
a regional approach on the part of the larger regional
players might contribute to a similar approach on
the part of the disputants in each of these conflicts.
Panel
VI: Wrap-Up Session
Highlights of the Discussion
There
was a consensus among the conference participants
that Transnistria was most likely to be resolved
in the next five years and that its duration would
pose the least danger to regional and international
communities. Participants generally saw little possibility
that the Abkhazian conflict would be resolved in
the near term. Most agreed that further fighting
in Abkhazia could contribute to the collapse of
Georgia. Although there was less consensus on the
prospects for Nagorno-Karabakh, most participants
thought that it posed intermediate-level opportunities
for resolution and dangers of intensification.
Some
participants thought that a genuinely regional approach
in the South Caucasus might help to transcend the
conflicts in much the same way that membership in
the European Union might eventually make British
devolution irrelevant. As state sovereignty is gradually
superseded by regional institutions, ethno-separatism
may seem an anachronism. For this and many other
reasons, a long-term regional approach is important
in the South Caucasus, particularly in terms of
shifting the discussion away from the present zero-sum
mindset toward a recognition of shared interests
and mutual benefits.
Other
participants thought that a regional approach might
not be as suited to the South Caucasus as in Europe
because of the vast differences between the two
regions. The South Caucasus lacks the same economic
incentives for cooperation as well as the political
will. Too many local actors have capitalized on
their own intractability, turning political stalemates
into opportunism, corruption, and criminality.
Given
the movement toward regional organizations in other
parts of the world, support for micro-political
fragmentation is waning. Instead there is general
anticipation that these statelets eventually will
recognize the inevitability of returning to the
fold of their parent states. Yet the expectation
that a separatist society should quietly lose the
peace after paying dearly to win the war is a recipe
for future conflicts, since their members surely
will be dissatisfied with the result.
Generally,
it is important for mediators to listen to the disputants
and to avoid an imposition of externally formulated
arrangements. Unofficial mediation processes can
be particularly helpful in developing creative new
approaches based on a diversity of viewpoints. Yet
outside leadership is sometimes crucial and can
ensure that international standards and principles
are upheld. All these conflicts occur within an
international context that sometimes precludes the
equal status of the parties. Georgia, for example,
is an internationally recognized state while Abkhazia
is a secessionist entity.
Following
the breakup of Yugoslavia, the international community
has shown greater caution about the disintegration
of states and a resolve that the fragmentation of
sovereignty should not continue beyond the level
of the Soviet Union republics and the Yugoslav republics.
The breakup of the Soviet Union did not go the way
of Yugoslavia. From this perspective, Russian leadership
played an historic role in preventing far greater
problems than those we are currently facing, but
how can Russia be engaged toward a solution for
these regional conflicts?
Moscow,
with its many contacts on all sides of these disputes,
can do a great deal to help. Russia has already
wielded leverage through a variety of strategies,
such as the manipulation of energy supplies and
visa regimes, yet Russian domestic politics places
constraints upon its international policies. For
example, some Russian officials have responded to
the strong Transnistrian lobby in Moscow. For the
most part, Russia’s internal political dynamics
remain somewhat obscure, though they are often important
from the standpoint of US negotiations in the field.
At times it appears that some Russian officials
are working toward a solution while others are working
against it. Some in Moscow are convinced that the
United States wants Russia to use its influence
today so that it will lose that influence in the
future.
It
also is in Russia’s interest to resolve these conflicts
because they represent pockets of potential instability
and lawlessness on its doorstep. The current geopolitical
climate presents an unanticipated opportunity for
constructive engagement with Russia. Because Russians
are extremely concerned about recent US activities
in the region and many Russians expect the United
States to act in a unilateral manner, there would
be psychological leverage in public statements from
US officials declaring commitment to a multilateral
approach in which Russia has a key role to play.
Current Russian anxiety about US involvement in
the region would provide its own inducements for
constructive multilateral engagement if a framework
for that engagement were available. If offered a
choice between constructive engagement or exclusion,
Moscow would be likely to choose the former. Because
the region is crucial to Russia’s security and economic
interests, the fear of marginalization and the opportunity
to preserve or expand its influence in the region
might be sufficient incentives to overcome domestic
political resistance.
|
Appendix
A
|
|
Conference
Agenda |
|
Resolving
Conflicts in the Caucasus and Moldova:
Perspectives
on Next Steps
Meridian
International Center
6-7
May 2002
|
6
May 2002 |
Day
One
|
8:30
AM – 9:00 AM |
Chairman:
John Parker, Office of Analysis for Russia
and Eurasia,
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department
of State
Coffee
and Registration
|
9:00
AM – 9:15 AM |
Opening
Remarks
Christopher
Kojm, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, Department of State
George
Kolt, National Intelligence Officer for Russia
and Eurasia,
National Intelligence Council |
9:15
AM – 9:35 AM |
Keynote
Address
Ambassador
Rudolf Perina, Special Negotiator for Nagorno-
Karabakh and Eurasian Conflicts, Department
of State |
9:35
– 10:45 AM |
Panel
I: Abkhazia
Paula
Garb, University
of California at Irvine
Jonathan
Cohen, Conciliation
Resources
Discussant:
Susan Allen Nan, Alliance for Conflict
Transformation |
10:45
AM – 11:00 AM |
Break
|
11:00
AM – 12:15 PM |
Panel
II: South Ossetia
Arthur
Martirosyan, Conflict
Management Group
Discussant:
Susan Allen Nan, Alliance
for Conflict Transformation |
12:15
PM - 1:30 PM |
Luncheon
Ambassador
Joe Presel
“Peacemaking
in the NIS and Lessons Learned” |
1:30 PM - 2:24 PM |
Panel
III: Nagorno-Karabakh
Marc
Spurling, UNHCR,
Azerbaijan
Discussant:
Theresa Grencik, Advisor, Office
of the Special
Negotiator for Nagorno-Karabakh and Eurasian
Conflicts,
Department of State |
2:45 PM - 3:00 PM |
Break |
3:00 PM - 4:00 PM |
Panel
IV: Transnistria
Ambassador
William Hill, Woodrow
Wilson International Center for
Scholars;
P.
Terrence Hopmann,
Brown University
Discussant:
Julianne Paunescu, Office
of Analysis for Russia and
Eurasia, Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State |
4:00 PM |
Adjournment
|
7
May 2002 |
Day
Two |
8:30 AM – 9:00 AM |
Chairman:
George Kolt, National Intelligence Officer
for Russia and
Eurasia
Coffee
and Registration |
9:00
AM – 10:30 AM |
Panel
V: Roundtable on the Role of Outside Players
(Iran, Turkey,
and Russia)
Anne
Herr, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Thomas
King, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, Department of
State
Bulent
Aliriza, Center
for Strategic and International Studies |
10:30
AM – 10:45 AM |
Break |
10:45
– 12:00 PM |
Wrap-Up
Session |
12:
00 PM |
Adjournment |
|
Annex
B
|
|
Participants |
|
John
Parker is Chief
of the Regional Analysis and Eastern Republics
Division at the Department of State’s Bureau
of Intelligence and Research (INR). He has
been an analyst of Soviet and post-Soviet
politics and national security issues for
the State Department since 1974, including
several tours in the US Embassy in Moscow.
He is the author of the two-volume work Kremlin
in Transition.
Christopher
Kojm is Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Intelligence Policy
and Coordination. He previously served in
Congress on the staff of the House International
Relations Committee, under Ranking Member
Lee Hamilton as Deputy Director of the Democratic
Staff (1997-98) and Coordinator of Regional
Security Issues (1995-96); under Chairman
Hamilton as Director of Regional Affairs (1993-94);
and under Subcommittee Chairman Hamilton on
the staff of the Europe and Middle East Subcommittee
(1984-92).
Ambassador
Rudolf Perina is the Special Negotiator
for Nagorno-Karabakh and Eurasian Conflicts.
Before assuming this position in October 2001,
he served as the US Ambassador to the Republic
of Moldova from 1998-2001. Ambassador Perina
is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service
and has specialized in Russian, East European,
German and NATO affairs. He has served in
Ottawa, on the NATO desk of the State Department,
in Moscow, the US Mission in Berlin, the US
Mission to NATO in Brussels, and in Belgrade
as Chief of Mission. He also served as Director
for European and Soviet Affairs on the National
Security Council, as Deputy Chairman of the
US Delegation to the Vienna Negotiations on
Confidence and Security-Building Measures
in Europe, and as Senior Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for European and Canadian
Affairs.
Paula
Garb is Associate
Director of the Center for Global Peace and
Conflict Studies and Associate Adjunct Professor
of Anthropology at the University of California,
Irvine. Since 1979 she has conducted extensive
anthropological fieldwork in the former Soviet
republics, most frequently in the Caucasus.
For the past six years she has facilitated
dialogue projects between Abkhaz and Georgian
academics, journalists, government representatives,
and non-governmental organizations.
Jonathan
Cohen is Caucasus
Program Manager for the London-based non-governmental
organization Conciliation Resources. His work
focuses on peace-building and dialogue initiatives
in regard to the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict.
He joined Conciliation Resources in 1997,
having served as Deputy Director of the Foundation
on Inter-Ethnic Relations in The Hague, working
with the OSCE High Commissioner on National
Minorities. Previously he worked as Former
Soviet Union Program Officer at International
Alert in London.
Susan
Allen Nan is Director
of the Alliance for Conflict Transformation
based in Fairfax, Virginia. Previously she
was the Senior Program Associate for Conflict
Resolution at the Carter Center in Atlanta.
Since 1991, Dr. Nan has regularly mediated,
facilitated, and evaluated conflict resolution
efforts in interpersonal, inter-group, and
international conflicts both within the US
and abroad. She specializes in multiple conflict
management roles in inter-group conflicts.
Arthur
Martirosyan is a
Program Manager for the Conflict Management
Group (CMG) and Director of the Momentum Program:
Leadership and Negotiation Culture Change
in the Former Soviet Union. At CMG, Mr. Martirosyan
has been involved in the design of assistance
programs in Chechnya, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia.
Before joining CMG, he was a program associate
with the Civic Education Project.
Ambassador
Joe Presel joined
the Foreign Service in 1963. He has served
in various capacities in Ankara, Paris, Moscow,
and the US Missions in Geneva, Vienna, Belgrade,
and Uzbekistan. His final post was as Ambassador
to Uzbekistan from October 1997 to October
2000. From 1994 to 1997, he was coordinator
for regional issues in the former Soviet Union.
This position involved formulating and implementing
US policy with respect to the conflicts in
Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan.
Now retired, Ambassador Presel is a private
consultant.
Marc
Spurling is Associate
Field Officer for the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Azerbaijan.
As such he is responsible for monitoring and
evaluating all projects implemented by partner
NGOs in the field of income generation, vocational
training, and agricultural inputs. Before
joining UNHCR, Mr. Spurling worked as a Senior
Field Representative, Regional Sector Advisor,
and Project Manager for the CARE International
Azerbaijan country program.
Theresa
Grencik,
a Department of State Foreign Service Officer,
is currently serving as an Advisor in the
Department’s Office of the Special Negotiator
for Eurasian Conflicts. Previously she served
as the political/economic officer in the US
Office in Pristina, Kosovo, as Special Assistant
to the Ambassador at the US Embassy in New
Delhi, and as Vice Consul in the US Embassy
in Sofia.
Ambassador
William Hill is
a Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars. A career
foreign service officer, he has served in
Moscow, Leningrad, Belgrade, the US CSCE delegation
in Vienna, and Dhaka. From 1999 to 2001, Ambassador
Hill was Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova,
where he was responsible for conducting negotiations
on the Transnistrian conflict and facilitating
the withdrawal of Russian forces, arms, and
ammunition from Moldova.
P.
Terrence Hopmann
is Professor of Political Science and Director
of the Program on Global Security of the Thomas
J. Watson, Jr. Institute for International
Studies at Brown University. Dr. Hopmann’s
research focuses on the processes of negotiation
and conflict resolution on security issues
within states, regionally within Eurasia,
and globally. Recent publications include
Building Security in Post-Cold War Eurasia:
The OSCE and U.S. Foreign Policy. His
most recent work has focused on the role of
the OSCE in conflict prevention and resolution
in the post-communist regions of Europe and
Eurasia.
Julianne
Paunescu, a Department
of State Foreign Service Officer, is currently
serving in the Office of Analysis for Russia
and Eurasia of the Department of State’s Bureau
of Intelligence and Research as the analyst
for Moldova and Belarus. Previously, she served
in Romania, Algeria, the Philippines, Panama
and, most recently, as the Public Affairs
Officer in Chisinau.
George
Kolt has served
since 1992 as National Intelligence Officer
for Russia and Eurasia in the National Intelligence
Council. Early in his career, he specialized
in Soviet and European Affairs while serving
in politico-military, intelligence and academic
assignments in the Air Force. He was detailed
to the National Intelligence Council in 1981,
first as the Assistant National Intelligence
Officer for the USSR and then, from 1984 to
1986, as the National Intelligence Officer
for Europe. After retiring from the Air Force,
he headed the Directorate of Intelligence’s
Office of Soviet and then Slavic and Eurasian
Analysis from 1986 to 1989.
Anne
Herr is the Russia and Caucasus analyst
in the Office of Analysis for Russia and Eurasia
in the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence
and Research. She has covered Russian and
Soviet foreign policy issues in that office
since 1989 and has focused on Russia’s relations
with the other Newly Independent States since
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
Thomas
King is the Iran analyst for the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research. Previously he
has served as a political analyst for Afghanistan,
staff aide to the Assistant Secretary, and
as a Watch Officer. Before joining INR, Mr.
King served overseas in Mexico and Peru as
a US Foreign Service officer.
Bulent
Aliriza is Senior Associate and Director
of the Turkish Program at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington,
D.C. He also is co-director of the CSIS Caspian
Sea Oil Study Group, looking at the problems
in the extraction and transportation of oil
and gas from the ex-Soviet Turkic Republics
to the world market. Dr. Aliriza is an expert
in Turkish politics and foreign policy, relations
between Turkey and the wider Turkic world,
and the politics and transportation of ex-Soviet
oil. He previously served for a number of
years as a diplomat with posts at the United
Nations and in Washington. |
|
|
|
|
The
National Intelligence Council
The
National Intelligence Council (NIC) manages
the Intelligence community’s estimative process,
incorporating the best available expertise
inside and outside the government. It reports
to the Director of Central Intelligence in
his capacity as head of the US Intelligence
Community and speaks authoritatively on substantive
issues for the Community as a whole. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Acting
Chairman |
Stuart
A. Cohen |
|
|
|
Vice
Chairman for Evaluation |
Mark
Lowenthal |
|
|
|
Acting
Director, Senior Review, Production,
and Analysis |
William
R. Heaton |
|
|
|
|
|
National
Intelligence Officers |
|
|
|
Africa |
Robert
Houdek |
|
|
|
At-Large |
Stuart
A. Cohen |
|
|
|
Conventional
Military Issues |
John
Landry |
|
|
|
East
Asia |
Arthur
Brown |
|
|
|
Economics
& Global Issues |
Karen
Monaghan Acting |
|
|
|
Europe |
Barry
F. Lowenkron |
|
|
|
Latin
America |
Fulton
T. Armstrong |
|
|
|
Near
East and South Asia |
Paul
Pillar |
|
|
|
Russia
and Eurasia |
George
Kolt |
|
|
|
Science
& Technology |
Lawrence
Gershwin |
|
|
|
Strategic
& Nuclear Programs |
Robert
D Walpole |
|
|
|
Warning |
Robert
Vickers |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|