IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRlCT OF COLUMBLA 7"s L -'-'A Qi'T L -2 pH 2: 07 
ELOUISE PEPION COBELL, gt A, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
) 
) Case No. 1 :96CVO 1285 
(Judge Lamberth) 
GALE A. NORTON, Secretary of the hterior, 
gt al., 
) 
1 
Defendan Is. 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR 
MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' "COMMENTS," FILED AUGUST 27,2003 
AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST FOR THE COURT TO 
CONSIDER SANCTIONS SUA SPONTE FOR FILING A FRIVOLOUS MOTION 
Defendants file this Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Strike 
Plaintiffs' "Comments," Filed August 27, 2003 and Plaintiffs' Request for the Court to Consider 
Sanctions Sun S)onte for Filing a Frivolous Motion ("Opposition"), filed Septeniber 23, 2003. In 
their Opposition, Plaintiffs' continued use of intemperate language only proves the points made 
in Defendants' September 16, 2003 Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' "Comments," Filed August 27, 
2003 ("Motion to Strike"). Moreover, Plaintiffs' defense of their misleading statements 
contained in Plaintiffs' Comments on interior Secretary Gale Norton's and Acting Assistant 
Secretary Aureen [sic] Martin's Willful Violations of Preliminary Injunction ("Comments"), filed 
August 27, 2003, only confirms how misleading those statements were. Finally, Plaintiffs' 
request for the Court to sua sponte consider sanctions is an improper attempt to circumvent the 
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure I 1 (c)(l)(A). 
- 1 - 1 
' - Id. at 5 n.8. 
- Id. at 6. 
Plaintiffs' Intemperate Language Proves the Points 
Made in Defendants' Motion to Strike 
In their Motion to Strike, Defendants argued that Plaintiffs' Comments demonstrated "an 
utter lack of decency and civility . . . .Ir Motion to Strike at 12. Unfortunately, Plaintiffs' 
Opposition serves only to confirm the accuracy of this statement. 
In their Introduction, Plaintiffs claim that their Comments contained an "accurate 
description of additional material misrepresentations of Norton, Martin, and their managers and 
counsel." Opposition at 2 (footnote omitted). Plaintiffs fail to explain, however, how their use 
of the word "fool" four times' is somehow an "accurate description" of Defendants' previous 
filings and appropriate for inclusion in their Opposition. Plaintiffs also claim that their language 
is acceptable because "'the challenged allegations describe acts or events that are relevant to the 
action."' Id. (quoting Order, March 3, 2003 (denying Defendants' Motion to Strike) (internal 
citation omitted)). Plaintiffs cannot justify, however, how inflamniatory phrases such as 
"Norton is a liar, a fool, or both . . . ." "'demonstrable' mendacity and admitted 
"sucker bet,"' and "Onsiellian newspeak"' are somehow suitable commentary on acts or events 
relevant to this litigation.' 
& Opposition at 7 ("Norton is a liar, a fool or both . . . ."); Comments at 2 ("Norton is 
a liar, a fool or both. . . ."); &. at 14 n.27 ("Cason is lying or he is a fool . . . ."); & at 21 11.41 
("[Tlliis claim is . . . the utterance of a fool."). 
2 Opposition at 4. 
These brief examples of Plaintiffs' scandalous language in no way constitute an 
(continued.. .) 
- L - Rather than attempting to rationalize such statements, however, Plaintiffs shamelessly 
and boldly assert them once again: "Plaintiffs state in their comments that Interior Secretary Gale 
Norton is a liar, a fool or both. For her and her counsel to perpetuate this nonsense proves 
conclusively the accuracy and propriety of plaintiffs' comments." Id. at 7. Such repeated conduct 
has no place in any litigation and can only further demean the litigants, the Bar, and the Court 
itself. The Court should curtail Plaintiffs' continued incivility. 
6 
Plaintiffs' Explanations of the Misstatements in their Opposition 
Only Confirm How Misleading Those Statements Were 
Plaintiffs devote much of their Opposition to defending several statements that they made 
in their Comments. See generally id. at 5-13.6 Much of this discourse demonstrates long- 
standing disagreements that Plaintiffs have with Defendants' positions. Unfortunately, as they 
have so often done, Plaintiffs equate such disagreement with deceit by Defendants. Plaintiffs 
then couch their misstatements in the same old, worn-out rhetoric,' peppering their Opposition 
with irrelevant references.' Such repetition of previous rhetoric and citation to irrelevant issues 
5 (...continued) 
exhaustive list of Plaintiffs' intemperate remarks. Defendants will not repeat all such invective as 
doing so would merely serve to repeat the libels. 
Such a necessary and extensive defense of these statements proves to a degree how 
misleading those statements were. 
' - See Opposition at 2-3 ("Plaintiffs' description of Norton's continuing misconduct 
should be embarrassing . . . ."); id. at 4 ("Norton, Martin, and their counsel continue to lie and 
conceal information . . . .'I). 
* __- See id. at 4 n.8 (discussion of alleged "forc[ing] out of office Messrs. IIoman and 
Slonaker" and alleged "retaliation taken and threatened . . . against career Interior Department 
employees. . . .*I). 
- 3 - can only be an attempt to distract from the misleading nature of the underlying Statements 
themselves. 
Not satisfied with attempting to hide the misleading nature of the Statements in their 
Comments, Plaintiffs add more misleading statements to their Opposition. Plaintiffs persist in 
claiming that Interior Defendants submitted "no competent evidence" in response to the Court's 
July 28, 2003 Preliminary Injunction ("Preliminary Injunction"). Opposition at 4-5; see also id. 
at 4 ("refusal to provide competent evidentiaty support"); id. at 5 ("devoid of competent 
evidence"); Id. at 1 3 ('ho competent evidence"). Here again, Plaintiffs confuse disagreement 
with deception. As Plaintiffs are well aware, Interior Defendants submitted approximately 922 
pages of material in Lnterior Defendants' Submissions in Compliance with Preliminary Injunction 
(August 1 I , 2003) ("Interior's Submissions") in response to the Court's Preliminary Injunction. 
Though Plaintiffs may disagree with statements contained in Interior's Submissions, it is 
misleading to suggest that nothing in those 922 pages passes for "competent evidence." 
Plaintiffs mislead the Court in other ways as well. Plaintiffs remonstrate that "[tlhis 
Court has addressed motions to strike allegedly scandalous niaterial in other cases and 
consistently has denied such motions." Opposition at 2 n.3 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs fail to 
note, however, cases cited by Defendants in their Motion to Strike where this Court has granted 
such motions.' Plaintiffs also contend that Defendants refer to "off-the-record discussions 
between counsel," id. at 7 n. 14, when Defendants in fact cite an on-the-record pleading filed by 
- See Motion to Strike at 2 (citing Johnson v. McDow, 236 B.R. 510, 523 (D.D.C. 1999) 
(striking "scandalous and highly insulting allegations . . . ."); Alexander v. FBI, 186 F.R.D. 21, 
53 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding 'ho evidence to support the claim made byplaintiffs" and therefore 
striking it from the record ); PiFford v. Veneman, 215 F.R.D. 2, 4-5 (D.D.C. 2003) (striking 
unsubstantiated allegations against government counsel)). 
- 4 - Plaintiffs, Motion to Strike at 6-7. Plaintiffs further claim that Dcfcndants "cite to no authority to 
overcome the disfavored nature of the Rule [regarding motions to strike] in circumstanccs like 
these where there is no jury . . . ." Opposition at 4 n.5. But Plaintiffs cannot explain why a non- 
jury setting could make a difference in an instance like this where a jury would not typically see 
Plaintiffs' Comments anyway, or why the requirement of civility should be ignored because this 
is a non-jury case. Finally, Plaintiffs contend that Lnterior Defendants did not comply with the 
Court's Preliminary Injunction because Interior's information technology systems do not fall 
under the two exceptions to the Preliminary Injunction. Id. at 8. However, Plaintiffs do not 
mention the Preliminary Injunction's discussion, within one of the two exceptions, of certification 
that some Interior systems already securely house trust data: "(b) Immediate disconnection shall 
- not be required for each . . . Reconnected System that the Interior Defendants certify. . . (2) is 
secure from Internet access by unauthorized" users . . . ." Preliminary Injunction at 3-4." 
Plaintiffs thus attempt to mislead the Court into thinking that Interior Defendants have not 
complied with the Preliminary Injunction by refusing to cite one of the Preliminary Injunction's 
key provisions. 
Plaintiff's Request for Sanctions is Incongruous and 
Violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 l(c)(l)(A) 
Plaintiffs ask "that this Court szta sponte consider the appropriateness of sanctions for 
Norton, Martin, and their managers and counsel in accordance with FED. R. C~V. P. 1 l(c)( I)@) 
lo - See Errata, July 30, 2003 (substituting "unauthorized" for "authorized"). 
I I The Preliminary Injunction requires Intcrior Defendants to provide "a specific 
justification in support" of such certification, "stating in specific terms the security measures that 
are presently in place to protect unauthorized Tnternet access to the Individual Indian Trust Data 
that thc Information Technology System houses or provides access to." Preliminary Injunction at 
4. Interior Defendants provided such justifications throughout Ltiterior's Snbmissions. 
- 5 - [sic]." Id. at 3. Plaintiffs' request is incongruous because it presents an oxymoron: if the Court 
grants Plaintiffs' request, then it is not acting sua sponte. Moreover, Plaintiffs' request is an 
unauthorized attempt to circumvent the extensive requirements of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 1 l(c)(l)(A). Rather than bypassing those requirements, if Plaintiffs wish the Court to 
consider sanctions, then they must adhere to the procedures set out in that rule.'* 
Dated: October 2,2003 
Conclusion 
Like their Comments, Plaintiffs' Opposition continues to demonstrate an utter lack of 
civility and a cavalier disregard for factual accuracy. The Court should not entertain such 
conduct and should, therefore, strike Plaintiffs' Comments in their entirety. 
Respectfdly submitted, 
ROBERT D. McCALLUM, JR. 
Associate Attorney General 
PETER D. KEISLER 
Assistant Attorney Gcncral 
STUART E. SCHIFFER 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
J. CHRISTOPHER KOHN 
D.C. Bar No. 261495 
Deputy Director 
JOHN T. STEMPLEWlCZ 
Senior Trial Attorney 
JOHN J. SIEMIETKOWSKI 
l 2 Even if Plaintiffs were to adhere to the rule's requirements, sanctions are not 
warranted. 
- 6 - GLENN D. GILLETT 
Trial Attorneys 
Commercial Litigation Branch 
Civil Division 
P.O. Box 875 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, D.C. 20044-0875 
(202) 5 14-3368 
(202) 5 14-9 163 (fax) 
- 7 - CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I declare under penalty of perjury that, on October 2,2003 I served the foregoing 
Defendants' Reply in Support of Their Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' "Comments," Filed August 27, 
2003 and in Opposition to Plaint@s Request for the Court to Consider Sanctions Sua Snonte for 
Filing a Frivolous Motion by facsimile in accordance with their written request of October 3 1, 
2001 upon: 
Keith Harper, Esq. 
Native American Rights Fund 
1712 N Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20036-2976 
(202) 822-0068 
Per the Court's Order of April 17,2003, 
by facsimile and by U.S. Mail upon: 
Earl Old Person (Pro se) 
Black feet Tribe 
P.O. Box 850 
Browning, MT 594 17 
(406) 338-7530 
Dennis M Gingold, Esq. 
Mark Kester Brown, Esq. 
607 - 14th Street, NW, Box 6 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
(202) 3 18-2372 
By U.S. Mail upon: 
Elliott Levitas, Esq 
1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800 
Atlanta, GA 30309-4530