165. Letter from Foreign Minister Nogueira to the Ambassador to Portugal (Anderson)/1/
Lisbon, September 1965.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 10 PORT. Confidential; Personal. Transmitted to the Department of State as enclosure 2 to airgram A-131 from Lisbon, October 6.
My dear George:
It will be recalled that during our conversation on September 2,/2/ the Ambassador outlined to me the terms of a proposal related to the Portuguese Overseas in which, among other aspects, the possibility of a plebiscite was mentioned. It will also be remembered that for my part, when I commented then on the idea, I said that from the Afro-Asian point of view a plebiscite would only be valid and acceptable if Portugal were to satisfy the following conditions: withdrawal of all the armed and police forces whose presence in the territories would certainly be taken as an obstacle to the freedom of the voter; authorization for the entry into the territories of those whom the UN and the Africans might consider to be the "chiefs" who represent the populations, and therefore a prior amnesty would be required; and lastly, since the UN requires a "democratic process", political debate would have to be permitted and even stimulated, and in this matter there would be imposed a complete freedom of political parties, headed by the "chiefs" referred to above, and inspired by any and all foreign governments.
/2/See Document 163.
I recall the preceding because the Senegalese delegation at the last conference of Plenipotentiaries of the International Telecommunications Union, which took place in Montreaux,/3/ presented a resolution on the 15th of this month in which it practically repeated what I had said in our conversation on the 2nd. I enclose a copy of the pertinent passages containing the "conditions" which Senegal wishes Portugal to obey.
/3/September 14-November 12, 1965.
The coincidence is revealing and very significant, and full of implications.
With hearty best wishes and most affectionate compliments.
(A. Franco Nogueira)/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Enclosure
a) Immediate recognition of the right of the peoples of the territories under its domination to self-determination and independence;
b) Immediate cessation of all acts of repression and withdrawal of all the military and other forces at present employed for the purpose;
c) Promulgation of an unconditional political amnesty and establishment of conditions which will permit the free functioning of political parties;
d) Negotiations on the basis of recognition of the right to self-determination through the authentic representatives of the nationalist fighting forces of the territories, in order to transfer power to freely elected political institutions representative of the people of the territories.
166. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
SecDel MC-30
New York, October 9, 1965, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2548. Secret. Drafted by Barry on October 11 and approved in S on October 19. The memorandum is Part I of VIII. The other memoranda of this conversation are ibid. The meeting was held at USUN.
SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTIETH SESSION OF
THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September-October 1965
SUBJECT
Portuguese Acquisition of U.S. B-26's
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
Secretary Rusk
Robert L. Barry
Portugal
Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira
Foreign Minister Nogueira said that he wished to bring up the problem of the B-26's which Portugal had acquired. This matter had recently been under discussion in Lisbon and Washington./2/ He asked if the Secretary knew of these discussions, and the Secretary acknowledged that he did. Nogueira remarked that it appeared that there was a violation of U.S. laws in connection with the seven B-26's which finally landed in Portugal not long ago. The Secretary was kind enough to send a message via Ambassador Anderson on the subject. An investigation was at once carried out, Nogueira said, as the Secretary may be aware.
/2/No record of the discussion was found.
Nogueira pointed out that he would like to repeat what he said to Ambassador Anderson in Lisbon./3/ Portugal made the agreement to purchase the B-26's from a European firm which the GOP had every reason to believe was bona fide. The firm had headquarters in Switzerland, owned its own airport and dispatched a representative with proper credentials. The purchase contract was negotiated without any knowledge of the involvement of any other firms. Nogueira said that he himself had seen the contract and given a copy to Ambassador Anderson. As a result of the Portuguese investigation it has been discovered that the Swiss firm seems to have cooperated with a Canadian firm which in turn had dealt with an American firm (Hamilton Aircraft).
/3/Not further identified.
Portugal has a clear conscience in this matter, Nogueira said. The contract was negotiated in the same way that such contracts are always negotiated and the GOP was unaware that any U.S. laws were being violated. Portugal paid hard cash for the aircraft and did not know the planes were supposed to fly from the U.S. The investigation has not revealed whether the planes were the property of the U.S. Government or whether they were surplus.
The Secretary interjected that this made no difference, as in any event there had been a violation of the Munitions Export Control Act. The Secretary said he was no lawyer and would have to get further details on the legal questions involved. However, one of the firms involved is in serious violation of U.S. law and Portugal is in a position of a country which had received stolen property, whether or not they knew they were doing so.
Nogueira said this was not quite the case, since Portugal had paid for the aircraft and paid a man who was not a thief. Hamilton Aircraft, he went on, had made it clear in a letter to the Portuguese Government that there are political reasons behind the U.S. objections. If the planes had been sold to any other country except Portugal there would have been no problem, thus a political factor has been injected.
The Secretary said the problem centered on the fact that the planes had been exported without an export license.
This is none of Portugal's business, Nogueira said. The GOP is aware that the U.S. Government is not responsible for a letter which might be written by a private American firm. But Hamilton has made it clear that if the GOP will make a declaration as to where these planes are to be used, the U.S. Government will withdraw its objections to the sale. Portugal is very honest on this subject, Nogueira said, and will not make any declaration unless it can be implemented, which it cannot and will not. Portugal wishes to preserve its integrity of its position and will not mislead other governments by making meaningless declarations for the purpose of avoiding controversy. Further, he said, Portugal will not return these planes to anyone. They were paid for in cash and purchased in very good faith. The GOP does not feel guilty politically, morally or legally.
The Secretary said that he would have to explore the question further upon his return to Washington.
The Portuguese Embassy has been told that the matter might be brought up in a U.S. court, Nogueira said, and the U.S. Government has released information to the effect that bilateral conversations will be held with Portugal on the subject. "I must frankly state" Nogueira said, "that I have instructed Garin (the Portuguese Ambassador in Washington) to make a statement that the conversations have taken place, that the planes were bought in good faith, and that Portugal is not responsible for any violation of U.S. law which might have occurred. I wanted to let you know this," he went on, "and I feel the Portuguese position is irreproachable." Only the U.S. and Canadian firms can be blamed for any illegality.
Nogueira said that the fact that these aircraft left the U.S. unarmed should also have a bearing on the case.
The Secretary said illegal traffic in arms is a very serious matter for the U.S. Nogueira responded that this was an American law but when foreign governments are called in, the matter takes on a political coloration. Secretary Rusk said that foreign governments are normally called in on cases where mutual enforcement of laws is required. He cited the examples of Interpol, agreements to halt the white slave traffic, and others.
Nogueira said that he could agree with this but that when American private organizations sent arms or war materials to groups of Angolan refugees or armed bands in Angola, the U.S. Government never made a fuss. The U.S. does all it can to enforce its laws on arms traffic, the Secretary answered. Portugal does not dispute this, said Nogueira, but these are your laws and it is your business. If the U.S. courts are to deal with the problem, it is one thing, but Portugal has been asked to do certain things at the governmental level. The GOP has a very clear conscience, he reiterated, and has violated no U.S. laws.
The Secretary asked if the contract specified delivery of B-26's and Nogueira said that it called for 20 of them. Asked whether the GOP had expected these B-26's to come from Switzerland, Nogueira said he did not; but they might have come from Germany, France, Italy or any place in the world. Portugal has ascertained that France is now selling B-26's and the GOP did not "have to know that these aircraft had to be U.S. property at the moment" they were sold.
167. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State/1/
Lisbon, October 23, 1965.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 10 PORT. Secret; Limdis. There is no time of transmission on the telegram, which was received at 10:05 a.m.
214. Ref: Deptels 169 and 171./2/ Met yesterday for nearly two hours with Prime Minister Salazar. He appeared good physical condition for man his age and mentally alert as ever.
/2/In telegram 169 to Lisbon, October 19, the Department of State provided guidance for discussions with Salazar on African issues. (Ibid.) In telegram 171, October 19, the Department elaborated its views regarding self-determination for Portuguese Africa. (Ibid.)
Principal topic conversation was USG proposal looking toward peaceful orderly settlement of problem Portuguese African territories. Emphasizing that much thought, serious effort and goodwill toward Portugal were embodied therein, I outlined in detail for Salazar proposal contained CA-2167./3/ I urged that if Prime Minister and his advisers saw any possibility hostilities, suffering and destruction increasing in Portuguese Africa they should give most serious consideration this proposal which did not seek elimination Portuguese presence Africa but rather a constructive approach to resolving confrontation between that presence and expanding force of African nationalism.
/3/See footnotes 2 and 4, Document 163.
Salazar listened attentively and evidenced awareness my previous discussion this subject with FonMin September 2 as well as Dept presentation thereof to Garin./4/ He brought up FonMin's September 1965 letter/5/ and problems cited therein, observed that USG appears accept as basic assumption invincibility of African nationalism, and said Portuguese experience indicates civilization and preparation for self government of native peoples take much longer than USG appears believe. To each of these observations I made appropriate reply and Salazar showed self ready discuss in serious friendly fashion.
/4/See Documents 163 and 164.
/5/Document 165.
As conversation drew to close Salazar assured me GOP has given, is giving, and will continue give serious consideration our proposal. Urged me continue discuss with FonMin and suggested latter might treat subject during forthcoming visit United States. I in turn expressed hope GOP would as occasion permits pursue useful dialogue with appropriate African leaders.
In résumé, Salazar appeared convinced as ever GOP course of action in Africa is correct. He does appear view future with some apprehension but sees this as fault of great powers for having prematurely relinquished control. Very clear to me Salazar personally calling shots GOP foreign policy but I am mildly hopeful our conversation may have stirred some new thinking./6/
/6/In airgram A-276, February 7, 1966, Anderson reported that on January 28, 1966, Nogueira responded: "Were Portugal to follow these suggestions . . . within six months the territories would be in chaos." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 10 PORT)
Memcon follows./7/
/7/Transmitted in airgram A-162 from Lisbon, November 3. (Ibid.)
Anderson
168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal/1/
Washington, June 16, 1967, 6:52 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, NATO 3 LUX. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Funseth, cleared by EUR, and approved by Springsteen. Pouched to Paris.
211930. NATUS. Following is based on uncleared memcon,/2/ subject to change and is FYI Noforn only.
/2/Not found.
1. Portuguese FonMin Franco Nogueira met with Secretary, June 14 in Luxembourg. He recalled pre-ministerial meeting exchanges between GOP and USG re possibility his making full presentation Portugal's African policy. FonMin said he had finally decided not make such presentation upon learning Secretary's response would be reiteration long-standing US views on self-determination.
2. Referring to critical comments he had just made in NATO ministerial debate on Under Secretary Katzenbach's statement to House Foreign Affairs Committee, June 6,/3/ Franco Nogueira said he strongly objected to what he took to be Under Secretary's reference to racial problems in Angola and Mozambique. FonMin particularly regretted implication that Portuguese Africa was "infectious threat" to other African countries. He said statement also implied, incorrectly in his view, that except for southern Africa, political situation in continent was good. Portugal was seriously concerned, he said, at what it had to consider as official statement by responsible senior member State Department.
/3/Apparently a reference to Katzenbach's testimony in support of the State Department budget. While the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held hearings on June 6, Katzenbach did not testify.
3. Secretary replied he would discuss matter with Under Secretary but wished to emphasize importance of some authentic expression of opinion by people of Angola and Mozambique on their future. He asked whether Portugal could anticipate likely results of plebiscite.
4. FonMin responded free plebiscite would undoubtedly result in large majority for status quo. Difficulty was, he said, that a vote under conditions acceptable to UN majority would seriously distort results. He said, UN would, for example, require prior withdrawal all Portuguese forces and return of exiled revolutionaries. Franco Nogueira said fact was that conditions for plebiscite could be drawn so as give any result desired. Portugal, he said, could not afford to start down such an uncertain road.
5. Secretary asked whether plebiscite would not be useful even if more extreme conditions desired by some UN members were not met. Important thing, in Secretary's view, was that results be credible for world opinion.
6. FonMin recalled exchange between GOP and Ball in 1963/4/ when GOP had asked whether US would be prepared give an advance undertaking support results of constitutional plebiscite whatever they might be. He said US response had been negative.
/4/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XIII, Document 357.
7. Secretary said might be useful on US side review 1963 exchange. He stated that large part of problem in southern Africa, notably in South Africa and Rhodesia, is maintenance of white rule by force. He was personally convinced this could not work in long run.
8. FonMin disagreed and expressed view most Africans in Rhodesia and South Africa support present regimes. While not questioning US right disagree with GOP's African policy, he believed US policy based on refusal recognize reality. He said present situation in Angola and Mozambique is not only stable but has belied predictions made by US officials in early 1960's. He said African inhabitants have full constitutional right at local and territorial levels as well as parliamentary representation in Lisbon. He said this circumstance has made no impression on those governments that long ago decided try and oust Portugal from Africa.
9. Referring to Mid-East, FonMin said GOP had refused subscribe to proposed Maritime Declaration/5/ for several reasons: Israeli policy on Portuguese Africa had been unfriendly; application of principles re freedom of seas not universally applied.
/5/Apparent reference to NATO's decision to establish a Standing Naval Force, effective January 1, 1968.
10. Re Rhodesia, FonMin said 169 tankers carrying petroleum had called at Portuguese African ports in past year--58 were British-owned or registered, 27 French and balance miscellaneous. He said not one of ships in question was Portuguese but Portugal was being made scapegoat. In his view it was up to governments involved control ships owned by their nationals or registered in their countries.
11. Secretary said that, if facts were as described, he thought Portugal had a point. In any case, he said, US has not been pressing Portugal on this matter.
12. FonMin said Portugal will not alter its course in Africa. He hoped find some way convince US of this. He suggested desirability further discussion between himself and Secretary.
13. Secretary said he would be in London in July for CENTO meeting/6/ and would consider whether it might perhaps be possible for him to visit Lisbon briefly at that time. In parting, Secretary said he hoped FonMin would consider whether some means could not be found for populations of Angola and Mozambique to give an authentic expression of their views on their future. He said this was very important for Portugal's friends.
/6/The meeting was cancelled.
Rusk
169. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State/1/
Lisbon, August 18, 1967, 1135Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 PORT. Secret; Limdis.
180. Ref: A. State 22031; B. State 13009./2/ Subj: Smuggled B-26 Aircraft in Portugal.
/2/Telegram 22031, August 16, instructed the Embassy that in view of the lack of response to previous démarches it should again raise the issue of Portuguese use of "smuggled B-26 aircraft" with the Salazar government. Telegram 13009, July 25, reported that the Department of State had requested assurances from Ambassador Garin that the aircraft would not be used outside the NATO defense area. (Both ibid.)
1. When Director General Political Affairs (Themido) called Counselor to Foreign Ministry August 17 (to deliver approved text for exchange of notes on Azores shipping problem), latter took advantage of occasion to raise subject as instructed Ref. A. USG position stated as in Ref. B and all points made that message were reaffirmed.
2. Themido said Ambassador Garin has reported July 25 conversation with Acting Asst Sec Stoessel to FonMinistry and had also mentioned it to him. Themido said he had taken note of USG views and proposals and would personally bring them to attention of FonMinister.
3. Counselor urged upon Themido that GOP remove this source of friction between two govts by providing assurances planes would not be used outside NATO defense area (which assurances would have been required before any export license could have been issued) if GOP could not bring itself to return planes to US custody as USG requested. He emphasized that use of planes in Africa outside NATO area could have adverse effects on US-Portugal relations far exceeding significance or value of planes themselves. He stated GOP position that it was bona fide purchaser for value not acceptable to US and pointed out evidence of US origin in terms of contract and in delivery arrangements. Themido especially interested in fact pilot returned to US directly from Lisbon after each plane delivery and asked this statement be repeated.
4. Counselor also referred to Buffalo trial, pointing out (A) that jury had acquitted defendants apparently because principal conspirator not apprehended and not before court, and (B) trial judge had ruled that defense allegation of complicity USG agency in conspiracy was not proved. Object was to anticipate any Portuguese contention trial outcome weakened US position.
5. Themido confirmed seven planes still in continental Portugal. He also confirmed GOP adheres to position it was bona fide purchaser for value. He implied US was exaggerating importance and significance of implications of sale and use of few military aircraft. Finally he took direct issue with US arms export policy, saying GOP did not understand why US imposed such restrictions on arms exports to an ally (in conformance with resolutions of UN which had been considered irresponsible organization at restricted meeting during recent NATO Ministerial) when it made available arms without similar restrictions to African states (he mentioned Congo), some of which eventually used against Portugal. Embassy officer denied US arms export policy for African states was unrestricted or had effects stated. He added that though Portuguese disagreed with US arms export policy, these planes were US origin and legally subject to US export control. Themido did not comment further but repeated he would convey US position to FonMinister./3/
/3/In telegram 24437 to Lisbon, August 21, the Department of State reported that Portuguese Embassy officials reaffirmed their position that the transaction was legal and that they would not provide any assurances that the aircraft would be used only in the NATO defense area. (Ibid.)
Bennett
170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal/1/
Washington, November 18, 1967, 0205Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 PORT. Secret; Noforn; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Funseth, cleared by EUR, and approved by Stoessel.
71457. Subject: Meeting of Secretary with Portuguese Foreign Minister, November 17. Following is based on uncleared memcon,/2/ subject to revision, and sent FYI only Noforn. Principal topics discussed at two and one-half hour meeting between Secretary and Portuguese Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira, November 17, were as follows:
/2/Not found.
1. NATO and Harmel Study/3/--FonMin said GOP believes NATO should survive but does not believe it can survive unless it is reshaped, in at least two ways: first, increased political consultation in NATO of non-NATO problems such as Mid East, Cuba, South Viet Nam and Portuguese Africa; second, while NATO allies should not expect 100 percent support for respective non-NATO policies, no NATO ally should adopt position of hostility to an ally's policy on any specific, non-NATO problem. In response Secretary's question, he said GOP had no information on what France intended to do in NATO but shared Secretary's impression that it was not present French intention to withdraw.
/3/For text of the Harmel Study, "Future Tasks of the Alliance," see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 321-323.
2. U.S. Vote in U.N. Fourth Committee/4/--FonMin expressed GOP's great appreciation that U.S. voted against resolution in UNGA 4th Committee on Portuguese territories.
/4/Reference is to the U.S. decision not to support the report on Portuguese colonies.
3. Congo--At same time, Fon Min doubted USG fully realized Portugal's surprise and hurt over USG siding with Congo on Congolese complaint about mercenaries entering Congo from Angola. Depth of Portuguese feeling explained by fact USG had never in past seven years, believed it necessary make public announcement of disfavor against Congolese Government about incursions by armed bands from Congo into Angola who had murdered between six and eight thousand Angolans of all races, sexes and ages. In Security Council, he charged that with exception of Mali and Nigeria, all Council members, including even Nigeria, favored changing language of consensus resolution from "condemning" attitude of Portugal to "deploring" Portugal's attitude except US delegation which wanted "condemn" left in resolution and it was./5/ FonMin said it was not important to GOP whether it was deplored or condemned by SC but US attitude was of great importance.
/5/Security Council Resolution 241 (1967), adopted November 15, 1967. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 252-253.
Secretary said USG had considerable interest in helping preserve unity of Congo and preventing it from fragmenting. He said US invested about half billion dollars in this policy. Soviets interested in Congo because it is big prize but so far had not succeeded in subverting Congo. He said we have been on thin ice in Congo with Schramme mercenary action threatening to set off massacre of whites. He emphasized US attaches no particular importance to any one leader in Congo--we have successively supported Adoula, Tshombe and now Mobutu--but we have supported whichever government was in power.
4. Nigeria--FonMin said as in Congo, so also in Biafra, Portugal is being made scapegoat. He said everybody is helping Biafra--Rothschild Bank, Czechs, Spain, France, Germany, Ireland, British--but Portugal is singled out for censure because it permits foreign flag aircraft, flown by foreign crews all who possess proper documentation to transmit Lisbon airport with cargoes acquired outside Portugal./6/
/6/Reference is to the May 20 secession of Eastern Nigeria. Fighting between government and insurgent forces began in July.
5. Rhodesia--FonMin stated Rhodesia is importing everything it requires including oil and is maintaining reasonable level of exports. Portuguese trade with Rhodesia, he said, is more or less at same level with some increase attributed to economic development in both places. He said everybody is trading with Rhodesia--Germany, Japan, France, Britain and even U.S. to name but a few--and these goods are passing through Mozambique. On oil, he said, GOP has documentation on all vessels arriving at Lourenco Marques and reported that Mozambique refinery continues sell its products to traditional South African customers who, he believes, instead of selling the products in South Africa are now selling to Rhodesia. But instead of applying pressure on South Africa or criticizing or condemning parties actually trading with Rhodesia, he said, Portugal is singled out for condemnation and is once more made scapegoat.
Secretary said he accepted FonMin's point that Portugal should not be held responsible as "entrepot" for Rhodesia if others are trading with Rhodesia as FonMin said they were.
FonMin said strange as it may seem to US, GOP has no information on outcome of Thomson-Smith talks and asked Secretary what he knew. Secretary said quite frankly we know relatively little about results except impression not much accomplished. In response FonMin's further question, Secretary said US did not know what British have in mind re Rhodesia.
6. Mid East--FonMin said GOP believed new presence Soviets in Mediterranean had made bigger impact in that area than West seemed to realize.
7. China--In response Secretary's question, FonMin said he believed internal situation in China was more stable and that internal dispute had polarized between two factions: one led by Mao and other led by President Liu Shao-ch'i.
8. Invitation to Secretary--FonMin renewed invitation Secretary visit Lisbon, recalling Secretary forced cancel projected June visit when CENTO postponed. Secretary said he still hoped visit Lisbon and would check his schedule to see when such visit might be arranged.
FonMin informed Secretary that he would be departing New York for Lisbon, November 22.
Rusk
171. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State/1/
Lisbon, July 24, 1968, 1125Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 PORT. Secret; Limdis; Noforn. Repeated to London, Madrid, Paris, and Rio de Janiero.
1716. Subj: The Twilight of the Salazar Era.
1. Prime Minister Salazar's most recent press interview, given in late April to an obscure Argentine publication and published with maximum play in Lisbon press and in Portuguese Africa during first week of July (Embtel 1642),/2/ was his most extreme to date. It has set tongues wagging here, and even Portuguese who are stout defenders of the Estado Novo and great admirers of Salazar personally have volunteered their concern over its general tone.
/2/Dated July 2. (Ibid.)
2. It was not so much Dr. Salazar's references, contemptuous as they were, in referring to the United States as a country with "insoluble racial problems" which takes it on itself to preach to Portugal on Africa. Nor was it his taunting of the United States on Cuba. He has said similar things in the past. Some of the present language seems to have been lifted directly from earlier interviews such as that of March 1966 with The New York Times (Embassy's A-371 of 11 April 1966),/3/ although he has never before been quite so bluntly ill-mannered. De Gaulle has also said scathing things about the U.S., but with more style.
/3/Not printed. (Ibid., SOC 12-2 PORT)
3. Rather more indicative of change in Salazar's latest interview was his extreme defensiveness about his own record and about Portuguese policies and postures in general. His statements and strictures in this area were both petulant and unyielding--rigid to the point of rigor mortis.
Is Salazar Senile?
4. Some of my European colleagues, astonished and appalled at the language used by the Prime Minister, have begun to whisper of senility. While Salazar has during the past year been noticeably showing the weight of his 79 years, and his eye trouble is rather well confirmed, it would still seem premature on the basis of what we know to judge him senile. As of now I would be more inclined to conclude that here is a very old man who is steeped in his self-righteousness and bulwarked in his convictions through his success in manipulating the local power levels firmly for 40 years--an ancient who is increasingly disgruntled and querulous as he sees time running out and himself unable to bring the world (or even substantial and growing numbers of Portuguese dissenters) around to his views as to how the world and Portugal should be ordered--in short, a man who has stayed on too long.
5. It was precisely this latter mood which members of the Brazilian Foreign Minister's delegation reported after their week-long, intimate visit here early this month. During a schedule which was crowded but carried off in cozy and confiding atmosphere befitting a mother-daughter reunion, the Brazilians found Salazar active and exercising his old charm and good humor but showing definite slow-down signs as regards physical vigor. They described even official and inner establishment Portuguese as bored with their heavily encrusted government atmosphere and as actively looking forward to end of era. These Brazilian observations parallel Embassy impressions and are in line with views expressed by members of Lisbon's foreign business community on the basis of their local contacts.
Salazar Mystique Is Still There
6. This is not to say that Dr. Salazar has lost his hold on affairs or that his mystique has evaporated. In Portuguese spectrum he has been right too many times and been wiser than his critics on too many issues. Indeed his legendary acumen was at work again during recent days in handling of "folded arms" non-strike on Lisbon's public transportation system, when service was not interfered with while conductors simply refused to accept fares. After allowing this essentially jolly situation to go on for several days, government by fiat decided it was time for company (fact that company was predominantly English-owned made action easier) to accept bulk of wage demands. After this action the workers promptly appeared wearing Salazar buttons, and there has since been a carefully staged and widely publicized rally lauding Salazar as friend of working man and dispenser of all good things.
7. For the moment, Salazar gets credit for having done workers, whom he does not allow to strike, a good turn. If, however, this precedent should come home to roost in terms of increased wage demands now being rumored with respect to locally owned industries, atmosphere could quickly turn un-jolly. Wage pressures seem sure to build up over the months ahead.
A Change of Atmosphere
8. Without wishing to overstate issue or to get ahead of developments pace of which cannot now be judged, one might say that difference in atmosphere between a year or even a few months ago and now is that Portuguese are coming to admission, which for years they have suppressed, that Salazar is mortal after all. He has been around for so long and handled matters so generally well from narrow, traditional Portuguese point of view that serious people were still saying seriously a few months ago they hoped Salazar would just go on and on and continue to take care of things. One seldom hears this expression of faith nowadays.
9. The eventual removal--and it must be emphasized that precise rhythm of process cannot be predicted--of what seems to the overwhelming majority of Portuguese their rock of ages inevitably is engendering a certain air of nervousness in the local scene.
10. It is interesting that this gestating nervousness does not have as a primary ingredient concern over Portugal's African posture and problems. Even those of the new generation who are increasingly frustrated over home policies, and who have been critical of U.S. involvement in Viet-Nam, strongly support the idea of Portugal in Africa. Although there is inevitable griping over the demands of military service, the cost of the wars in Africa (with the possible exception of Guinea) continues tolerable to the Portuguese in both human and fiscal terms. The national will seems set on staying in Africa, even though more and more people may be coming to accept the inevitability of future political adjustments there. The atmosphere of uncertainty developing locally derives primarily from worries over the future of European Portugal, and does not have at its base concern over Africa.
The Influence of France
11. This country was badly shaken by the events in France in May./4/ It was suddenly and starkly clear at various levels of Portuguese society how easily a strong-man system could be brought to the brink of revolution. Portugal is of course not France. It is presumably easier to hold down the lid in a country like this one, with a largely illiterate and unorganized people under a determined regime served by a pervasive police apparatus and a strictly controlled press.
/4/Reference is to mass demonstrations that nearly toppled President de Gaulle's government.
12. There have been audible sighs of relief here, both oral and written, over de Gaulle's rebound, together with much public and private admiration over the way he brought off his recent elections. Informed quarters, however, recognize that there are accounts to pay in France. The Portuguese will be watching French labor adjustments apprehensively with an eye to their influence on the increasingly pressed local wage structure. They will have concern over the significance of educational reforms in France with respect to Portuguese students who have been up to now surprisingly quiescent but who have begun to show restiveness in recent months. There is considerable expectation here of student troubles in the autumn. Disorders in France could trigger something here.
The Succession to Salazar
13. Despite the general recognition they found among their Portuguese contacts that Salazar can no longer be expected to go on forever, the Brazilians during their recent visit got no more discerning guidelines for the future than the rest of us. Their soundings received the usual stock answer which seems to satisfy Portuguese, i.e., when Salazar goes, the President will appoint another Prime Minister. It seems incredible that men of high professional stature and of important affairs, those who have more at stake than other social classes as regards the future, should not concern themselves more about the shape of things to come. Yet that is overwhelmingly the case.
14. In the muted speculation which goes on about the succession there is little change in the usual collection of names which continue to be bandied about. There is no indication that Dr. Salazar has given the nod to anyone, and his remark to the Argentine interviewer that his successor would be an "unknown" was not reprinted here. If he has imparted any views on this subject to his faithful chief of state, it is a deeply held secret.
The President of the Republic
15. Meanwhile, President Thomaz, 73 years old himself, continues to go doggedly about the country doing his patriotic duty as the loyal old sailor that he is--and quite often in his sailor's uniform. He is a man who always looks like his feet hurt him, but there is no local festival, commercial inauguration or educational happening too minor to merit his presence. At the major Evora Festival recently he drove through the streets of that medieval town, standing in an open car and waving to the crowd for all the world like a candidate for office. The President always gets respectful applause--the Portuguese are a courteous and respectful people--but there was in this basically unstaged reception at Evora some warmth which went well beyond the requirements of protocol. The President of the Republic is a taciturn man who rarely expresses any opinion publicly or in conversations with diplomats other than patriotic sentiments. Although a rather amiable father-type figure who often appears at public functions accompanied by his grandchildren, he gives every appearance on policy matters of being a hardliner. He has close military connections, and certainly his cronies belong to that group. In event of a sudden vacuum his views as to Salazar's successor could assume key importance.
The Estado Novo Tightens Up
16. The enigma of the future continues in Portugal, as inscrutable as in Spain. Here at least there is an operating framework which includes both chief of state and chief of government. Whether Salazar will go on for some years yet or whether we are on the threshold of an accelerating deterioration of age which will bring earlier changes, only time will tell. As the regime shows increasing signs of entering its final stage the inner power structure, smugly satisfied with things as they are, has begun in authoritarian style to tighten up, to turn further to the right. Recent public statements by the Saurian Minister of Interior (Embtel 1674)/5/ have constituted grim warnings to all and sundry to stay in line. I am told that contingency plans of the security forces have been recently revised and toughened in anticipation of student problems in the autumn. The church has also been put on notice.
/5/Dated July 11. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 PORT)
17. The initial succession to Salazar, when it comes will require the support of the armed forces and should be largely in his image. However it goes, the immediate successor will lack the immense authority which the present Prime Minister derives from his 40 year rule. The successor may also be of baser metal and lack the personal rectitude which has been one of Salazar's principal strengths. The successor could be a real dark horse, and there might be several changes in tandem before power finally lodges. In the latter event, strains on military unity might well develop. Assuming an orderly first act after Salazar, the plot could then become more intricate and involved.
Bennett
172. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State/1/
Lisbon, October 8, 1968, 1800Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL PORT-US. Confidential; Limdis.
2076. 1. Foreign Minister asked me to come to see him late afternoon October 7 for our first meeting since change of government and naming of Marcello Caetano as Prime Minister./2/ He wasted no time on preliminaries, emphasizing he was speaking "on direction and with authority of" new Prime Minister to present for attention of USG in formal and solemn manner a statement of GOP policy which latter considered of highest importance. Franco Nogueira said he was making same statement to Ambassadors of Brazil, Spain, France, Germany, UK and South Africa, as representatives of governments which GOP considered to have particular interest in matter. Statement concerned Portuguese policy in overseas territories.
/2/Following an accident, Salazar underwent emergency brain surgery on September 6. On September 16 he lapsed into a coma. President Thomaz announced on September 26 that Salazar's doctors had determined the Prime Minister would not recover, and he appointed Caetano as Salazar's successor.
2. Franco Nogueira began by commenting that there had been widespread view among foreign governments, press and other sectors of public opinion abroad that Portugal's African policies had represented personal position of Dr. Salazar. Latter was regarded internationally as a strong-minded individual who had seen his country in a certain framework and had forged its policies in a manner to suit his own vision of Portugal at home and overseas. Various governments had come to conclusion that no changes were to be expected as long as Salazar remained at helm of Portuguese affairs. However, there had been considerable conjecture that, once Salazar left power, alterations would then begin to be made in GOP overseas policy.
3. Stressing again that he spoke on specific direction of new Prime Minister, Franco Nogueira said GOP considered it matter of highest importance to make its position unequivocally clear. Portuguese policy with respect overseas territories "would not be changed in the slightest degree." Policies followed under Salazar were not personal ones but represented a considered national view of Portugal's interests. These national interests continued to be valid and the new government was united in its determination to continue as before. There would be no changes in overseas policy, he repeated. Foreign Minister requested that I transmit this statement of GOP policy to USG.
4. I inquired whether statement, since it being made to several governments, would remain as oral one or whether we would be furnished with aide-mémoire. FonMin did not seem to have thought much about this; he replied no aide-mémoire would be furnished but then added that Garin would later follow up with presentation of GOP views in call at Department./3/ At another point in conversation Franco Nogueira said consideration had been given by new government to public announcement making clear its unswerving adherence to existing overseas policy. This idea had, however, been rejected as possibly raising rather than allaying doubts and speculation, and it had been decided instead to make direct approach to selected governments.
/3/No record of such a meeting was found.
5. Franco Nogueira then said he would go farther and make an additional comment specifically for background information of USG. In surprisingly direct reference to political maneuvering that went on in inner government circles during week preceding Thomaz selection of Caetano as new Prime Minister, Franco Nogueira asserted he personally had tried to stay aloof from situation but that his "political friends" had been active. Discussions during that period had made it absolutely clear that no Portuguese Government could change the overseas policy and remain in power. Attachment to present policies was strongly and firmly held. This was honest Portuguese view, which had long considered its African posture a contribution to Western cause. With recent changes in Czechoslovakia, threats to Berlin and Rumania and renewed belligerent attitude on part of Soviets, FonMin considered recent Gromyko speech at UNGA as ominous, particularly with respect to its comments on Middle East and Mediterranean area--Portugal was more convinced than ever that she serving Western welfare by her posture in Southern Africa.
6. Comment: Presumably there will be opportunity in due course for a general talk with Prime Minister Caetano (we are now preparing some thoughts on this for consideration by Department)./4/ Once he gets settled in, ranking member of new Cabinet, Minister of State Vaz Pinto, has invited me to accompany him to Funchal for October 12 unveiling of Columbus statue and this will provide occasion for relaxed discussion re Caetano government's plans and intentions. Meanwhile, I have no reason believe Franco Nogueira doing other than faithfully executing government policy in transmitting statement on overseas policy. His tone in our October 7 meeting was sober and serious and belligerency which he sometimes shows when discussing overseas matters was entirely lacking. Whatever understanding may have been reached behind scenes with respect to agreement on Caetano as Prime Minister, military and other hard-line elements (including Franco Nogueira on overseas matters) would have insisted on maintenance of existing line on Africa. We start from where we are, and time will tell how much Caetano will want to change overseas policies and how he will go about his delicate operation.
/4/Transmitted in airgram A-540, October 18. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 PORT)
Bennett
173. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State/1/
Lisbon, November 5, 1968, 1725Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 PORT. Confidential; Limdis.
2188. Subj: First Conversation with New Prime Minister.
1. I made my initial call on new Prime Minister late afternoon, November 4, having held off asking for appointment during his first month in office to give him time to settle in. Brazilian Ambassador also saw Prime Minister yesterday.
2. Caetano received me in his office alone, rising from meticulously clean desk as I entered and greeting me with warm courtesy. He has reputation from his days at university of enjoying conversation and exchange of ideas, and gave every impression of welcoming opportunity for exchange of views. (Interestingly enough, Franco Nogueira had sought to dissuade me from requesting appointment, asserting that new Prime Minister did not wish to receive foreign Ambassadors.) I believe we can look forward to reasonable discussion and rational argumentation with Caetano, even though we may not always find agreement.
3. Caetano emphasized he was greatly looking forward to Secretary's visit. He spoke of his interest in a "renewal of dialogue" with USG after some years of what he described as "misunderstandings" between our two governments. He went on to suggest, in more generous approach than we are accustomed to hear from Portuguese officialdom, that both sides had suffered from misunderstandings. I assured him of USG and my personal interest in exploring differences between us and in trying to ameliorate them.
4. For my part I stressed mutual interests and common tasks which USG and Portugal share, mentioning that I had come to his office direct from ceremony of delivery to Portuguese Navy of third destroyer-escort built under shared-costs arrangement to meet NATO commitment. Prime Minister proved already well informed on that program. We reviewed recent Lisbon meeting of Atlantic Treaty Association as example of common interest. I brought up also our interest in program for exchanges of students and professors and expressed satisfaction over recent decision by GOP to make financial contribution to program. I said we thought it useful to have American students and professors coming to Portugal; before I could finish sentence Prime Minister broke in to comment that it was very valuable for Portuguese students and professors to have opportunity of spending some time in US.
5. Neither Prime Minister nor I brought Azores base or African problems into conversation. It would have been counterproductive in this initial talk, particularly in view of his lack of maneuverability at present on latter issue.
6. I took occasion to compliment Prime Minister on dignity and self-discipline shown by Portuguese during difficult period of past two months in Portuguese life. He expressed appreciation and said he took pride in the calm way in which the country had managed the change-over from Salazar regime and was now adjusting to new ways of doing things.
7. He commented with satisfaction that there was now a new spirit in the country. I agreed and remarked that one was particularly conscious of it in the daily press, going on to add that evidences of more freedom of expression had made a very favorable impression in US, with our devotion to freedom of the press. Caetano took up this theme, stating that censorship had been relaxed a great deal already. He put emphasis on fact that his is a new administration which feels itself free of the past, but balanced that by saying that this is a difficult and delicate time and that transition would have to be carried out in a "suave" manner. After all, he said, laying his palms out expressively and smiling, Portugal is changing from a regime which went on for forty years.
Bennett
174. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Lisbon, November 19, 1968, 9:30 a.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 7 S. Secret. Drafted by Asencio and approved in S on December 3. The memorandum is Part I of VIII; Part VIII is Document 175. The other memoranda of the conversation are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 7 S. The meeting was held in the Foreign Ministry.
THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO MADRID AND LISBON
November 16-19, 1968
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Bennett
Assistant Secretary John M. Leddy
George W. Landau, Country Director, Spain/Portugal
Diego C. Asencio, Political Officer
Portugal
Foreign Minister Nogueira
Dr. Jose Luis Archer, Secretary General of Foreign Office
Dr. Goncalo Caldeira Coelho, Director General of Political Affairs
SUBJECT
Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands
Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira stated that in April or May of the last year the Portuguese had received a detailed report from New York on a conversation between a prominent American friendly to Portugal and a highly placed Soviet UN delegate. The Soviet delegate had stated that while the Soviet Union was hostile to the Portuguese regime for various reasons, it would not like to see a Portuguese collapse in Angola and Mozambique in the foreseeable future because they were not yet prepared to exploit the resulting situation. Instead they were interested in Portuguese Guinea because it dominated the Cape Verde Islands where the Soviets would hope to establish a base giving them a strategic position in the south Atlantic. The Foreign Minister stated that the strength of insurgent activity in Guinea had increased considerably in recent months. The insurgents appeared to have Soviet and Czech armament in unlimited quantities. The training of guerrillas in the Republic of Guinea with Soviet supervision and support appeared to be increasing with 6,000-8,000 being the current intelligence estimate. The insurgents had introduced an entirely new type of land mine apparently of Chinese manufacture which was very difficult to detect and was causing the Portuguese great difficulties. There were reported to be large stocks of these mines in the Republic of Guinea ready to be shipped. The Portuguese forces in Portuguese Guinea amounted to 20,000 troops and to demonstrate proportions the much larger area of Angola had a Portuguese force of only 50,000.
According to the Foreign Minister the Governor of Guinea, General Spinola, had made a three hour presentation to the Portuguese National Security Council (Note: on October 29, 1968) in which he requested reinforcements of troops and material and stated that unless these were forthcoming, he "would not be in a position to discharge my responsibility for the security of the territory" and an eventual collapse would occur. The Foreign Minister stated that the GOP would try to provide as much as they could and while he and the Defense Ministry felt that Spinola was painting too dark a picture, he wanted the US to know that the situation was really serious and that the Portuguese were worried. He added that he was putting this observation forward with no ulterior motives. While of course there were purely Portuguese motives for staying in Guinea, the loss of Guinea and by extension the loss of the Cape Verde Islands would also be a Western problem of very great importance.
In answer to Mr. Leddy's question, the Foreign Minister stated that the loss of Guinea would have a tremendous impact on the Cape Verde Islands because the Islands and Guinea were completely inter-related economically, socially, politically and ethnically. In answer to the Secretary's question, Nogueira stated that he was quite certain the support for the insurgent activity emanating from the Republic of Guinea was Russian in origin rather than Chinese and he was quite prepared to allow US experts to examine captured armaments to prove the point. The Secretary replied that the US now had better leverage with the Republic of Guinea than 2-3 years ago and perhaps something could be done.
In answer to the Secretary's question as to whether Soviet ships had been spotted off the Portuguese-African territories since the closing of the Suez Canal, Foreign Minister Nogueira replied affirmatively and added that Chinese "spy ships" had also been spotted at several points.
175. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Lisbon, November 19, 1968, 9:30 a.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 7 S. Secret. Drafted by Asencio and approved in S on December 3. The memorandum is Part VII of VIII; Part I is Document 174. The other memoranda of the conversation are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 7 S. The meeting was held in the Foreign Ministry.
THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO MADRID AND LISBON
November 16-19, 1968
PARTICIPANTS
[Here follows the same list as Document 174.]
SUBJECT
Azores Base
The Foreign Minister stated that at the insistence of Prime Minister Caetano the Ministry of Defense was undertaking a study of the US use of the Azores Base at Lajes. This would be followed by a Foreign Ministry study. At sometime in the future, possibly before the end of the year, the GOP would make proposals either in Washington or in Lisbon on the base. It was not the intention of the GOP to be difficult or "fussy" about the base nor to cause the US any special problems. He saw the problem in the light of world conditions and in the mutual need for cooperation. With the continuing threat of the Soviet Union and of other world problems the need for cooperation between the US and European countries was important. On the other hand Portuguese African policy which had been under attack for ten years was now being seen by other countries in a different light. The Azores was one area where US-Portuguese cooperation was possible. Such cooperation was also possible in Africa and in Europe.
The Secretary pointed out that the US Government was now in the process of transition although it would be useful for him to inform his successor. The Foreign Minister immediately replied that the date of the Portuguese presentation had no significance.
In reply to the Secretary's question the Foreign Minister stated that the GOP would deal only on a bilateral basis and was not interested in Lajes as a NATO base. The same policy applied to the Beja air base where the Germans, under the terms of a bilateral agreement, had certain rights and facilities. Some countries such as the Netherlands, Turkey and Greece had indicated interest in the use of the Beja base and had been turned down. The Foreign Minister also reiterated that local relations with regard to the Azores base were excellent. There were no outstanding problems except for a small administrative one of smuggling from the PX at Lajes which would have to be faced sometime in the future. He added that the Azores shipping agreement had worked out nicely. Portugal had not been entirely satisfied with the agreement, he said with a smile; therefore, it must be a good one.
176. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Lisbon, November 19, 1968, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 7 S. Secret. Drafted by Asencio and approved in S on December 3. The memorandum is Part I of III. The other memoranda of the conversation are ibid. The meeting was held in the Palacio Sao Bento.
THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO MADRID AND LISBON
November 16-19, 1968
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Bennett
Diego C. Asencio, Political Officer
Portugal
Prime Minister Caetano
Dr. Goncalo Caldeira Coelho, Director General of Political Affairs, Foreign Ministry
SUBJECT
US-Portuguese Relations and Africa
The Secretary expressed greetings from President Johnson noting that both the President and Prime Minister Caetano had assumed office in a moment of sadness. The Prime Minister stated that he had been very happy to receive a message from President Johnson on his accession to office in which a reference had been made to the maintenance of cordial relations between the US and Portugal. The Prime Minister reiterated that feeling and added that "we are friends and must be friends".
According to the Prime Minister the first Portuguese concern in US-Portuguese relations is the hope for better US understanding of the Portuguese position both domestically and in Africa. On the internal situation it was his impression that US public opinion failed to understand that special circumstances operating in Portugal would not permit the type of government which would be the most acceptable to the US. However, it happened to be the government most suitable for the Portuguese. The government of Portugal was in the process of evolution. Naturally after forty years there had to be things which required moderating. This had to be done carefully and slowly in order to avoid a collapse which would be dangerous for the Atlantic Alliance. Impatience from friends or outside pressure could be fatal to Portugal and dangerous to the Atlantic Community.
In response to the Prime Minister's request for his views on Africa the Secretary stated that the US was not leading a crusade on the African question and had no interest in the disappearance of the Portuguese presence from Africa. It was not the US that raised questions in the agenda of the UN. When they came up, of course, we had to express our views, which were not always the views of our Portuguese friends. Out of our own national experience we had developed a point of view that a great deal depended on the expression of the authentic views of peoples in areas like Angola and Mozambique. The Secretary cited the case of Puerto Rico, although stating it was not analogous to the situation in the Portuguese African territories, to demonstrate how the US had met criticism in the UN on the status of the island by the simple response of "ask the Puerto Ricans."/2/ He had the impression that there was a stronger feeling among the people of Angola and Mozambique for Portugal than somehow the Portuguese had been able to make public and known.
/2/Reference is to the 1967 plebiscite which defused Cuban efforts to have Puerto Rico considered as a separate item by the UN General Assembly.
In response the Prime Minister cited the tribal state of native populations both in the Portuguese territories and in the other African lands, which he asserted made elections a farce. What was undeniable was control of a region like Mozambique with less than a division of troops, a valid demonstration that it was an integral part of the Portuguese nation. Another undeniable fact was the foreign base of the subversion being launched against the Portuguese territories. In addition in the Prime Minister's view when public opinion manifested itself through modern processes it never expressed the deep feelings of the people but rather the thinking of certain leaders. The elite of the native populations in the Portuguese territories were sufficiently evolved to produce such an opinion but because of their European education and their very association with the Portuguese governmental structure they had become detribalized. Therefore, the Portuguese Government considered the friendliness and readiness to accept the present situation on the part of the natives of Angola and Mozambique as an expression of opinion by them.
The Secretary stated that it was his impression that in the last two or three years the attitude of the African States toward the Portuguese territories had moderated to some extent partly because they had understood that the issue in the Portuguese territories was not strictly speaking a racial one. The Prime Minister replied that Portugal's social objective in Africa was what Portugal had accomplished in making Brazil a multi-racial society and was an eminently human work which could not be precipitated. He was certain that Africa and particularly southern Africa needed the white man not only as a technician but also as a settler. Collaboration between whites and natives was essential to the progress of that region.
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