Statement of Michael Shifter
Vice President for Policy, Inter-American
Dialogue
Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere
“Crisis in the Andes: The Border Dispute Between Colombia
and Ecuador,
and Implications for the Region”
April 10, 2008
Last month’s ominous episode
involving three Andean countries offers a much-needed opportunity to examine
what is happening more widely in the region and to assess its implications for U.S.
policy. The Colombian government’s military incursion against a Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) camp in northern Ecuador and the international
reaction reveal a great deal about the changing realities in the hemisphere and
the capacity for effective diplomatic responses. Tensions have mercifully
subsided, but the underlying problems that provoked the flare-up have not
disappeared, leaving the region uneasy and combustible. It is essential not to
ignore what has been learned from the recent crisis, but instead to address the
challenges, acutely mindful of the consequences for regional peace and
stability.
What accounts for
actions and reactions by Colombia,
Ecuador, and Venezuela?
Colombia is going through a
collective catharsis. The closest analogy to what is happening may not be elsewhere
in Latin America, but rather South
Africa. The country has endured a dreadful
drug-fueled armed conflict and a severe humanitarian crisis for decades and is
now palpably struggling to confront and overcome the trauma. After experiencing
such an ordeal, any serious attempt at cleansing and reconciliation will take
place at best by fits and starts, running into enormous resistance by those
wedded to the status quo. But the catharsis is underway, and that is salutary.
Perhaps the most dramatic sign of
such a catharsis is the unprecedented series of recent street marches. Last
Sunday thousands mobilized demanding that the FARC release the hundreds of
hostages it holds – some for over a decade – including former presidential
candidate Ingrid Betancourt and three Americans kidnapped in Colombia over five
years ago. The March 6th protest against violence in Colombia,
particularly paramilitary brutality, was also significant. Most impressive were
the massive marches on February 4th in Colombia
and many other cities throughout the world (including Washington, DC),
expressing outrage at atrocities committed by the FARC.
Most Colombians believe that in the
past several years the country has made notable progress towards greater
security and peace. That widespread confidence largely accounts for the
overwhelming public support – 84% in the most recent poll – enjoyed by
President Alvaro Uribe. His “democratic security” strategy has helped the
government assert its authority and expand state presence throughout the
national territory. The demobilization of paramilitary forces, initiated in
late 2003, has been accompanied by significant and sustained military pressure
against the FARC. Last August, President Uribe undertook an initiative to free
hostages held by the FARC, enlisting the support of Venezuelan president Hugo
Chavez. That effort ended just three months later, but Chavez has since
facilitated the unilateral release of six FARC hostages.
Against that backdrop, it is hardly
surprising that the March 1 raid on the FARC camp was applauded by a large
majority of Colombians. The killing of Raul Reyes, regarded as the second most
important FARC official, was seen as a significant blow against a hugely
unpopular insurgency that has wreaked much havoc for decades. Any diplomatic costs
incurred were outweighed by the belief that the strike moved the country a step
closer to ending the conflict. Armed with sound intelligence on Reyes’s
whereabouts, the Colombians acted quickly and decisively. From their
perspective, they had previously solicited the Ecuadoran government’s
cooperation, but to no avail.
The Ecuadoran government deems Colombia’s
targeted attack unacceptable, arguing that it has in fact pursued the FARC and
destroyed camps in its territory. Ecuador’s strong reaction to the
military strike on its territory and to the subsequent discovery that one of
its citizens was among those killed was predictable. Most Ecuadorans do not
want to get caught up in the Colombian conflict. They believe the Colombian
government should do a better job confining the conflict to its country and
containing any spill-over effects. Ecuador has managed to prevent coca
production in its territory and does not want to jeopardize that achievement. Among
the least politically stable countries in Latin America, Ecuador has
profound governance and poverty challenges that would only be exacerbated by
involvement in the conflict.
Of course, the outrage expressed by
Ecuadorans also stemmed from the fact that Colombia violated its sovereignty
and territorial integrity. These are sacred, inviolable principles in a region
that has suffered from foreign intervention in the past. The anger was
compounded since it is well known that Colombia
has received ample security aid from the United States over the last decade.
Further, in stark contrast to Colombian public opinion, most Ecuadorans side
with the government in its skepticism of the authenticity of files in Reyes’s laptop
computers found after the raid. President Rafael Correa, in office since
January 2006, has expressed the popular outrage in Ecuador and benefited politically. He
is in the midst of leading an effort to rewrite his country’s constitution, and
Colombia’s
incursion helped him consolidate political support and reverse a slide in
popularity.
The crisis clearly reveals the vast
differences in national priorities as well as the high levels of mistrust on
this sensitive matter. Unfortunately, the Ecuador-Colombia diplomatic relationship
has been ruptured as a result. Commerce between the two countries has been
largely unaffected, but cooperation along the border in attacking the drug
problem has suffered. This marks a serious setback. Prior to the March 1 attack,
both governments were working together more productively on the drug issue. The
Correa administration has filed a suit against Colombia at the International Court
of Justice to stop aerial coca fumigation along the border, citing the negative
human and environmental impacts. The move makes prospects for a rapprochement
in the near term remote.
It is striking that, given that
Venezuelan territory was untouched, President Chavez initially reacted to Colombia’s raid
even more angrily and vigorously than President Correa did. Chavez saw Colombia’s military action as a unilateral
intervention instigated by the United
States. His decision to move tanks to the
border and his defiant posture were aimed chiefly to Washington,
as a warning against future US
military involvement.
The response was also partly
designed to shore up domestic political support. According to several reliable
polls, Chavez’s popularity has been dropping steadily since December 2, when he
was narrowly defeated in a national referendum on constitutional reforms. Nonetheless,
unlike Uribe and Correa, who have benefited politically from their handling of
the Andean situation, Chavez has alienated voters with his bellicosity and
nationalism. Most Venezuelans wonder why their president was compelled to
assume center stage in response to an episode unrelated to their country. For many this seemed like yet another example
of misplaced priorities – regional adventurism while Venezuelans face growing
problems at home.
Like Correa, Chavez has
categorically rejected the claim that the computer files found in the FARC camp
are authentic. Still, it is worth pointing out that Chavez has recently been
uncharacteristically restrained regarding Reyes’s laptop information. The
information in those files, if verified, would raise serious questions about
the relationship the FARC had with Chavez and, to a lesser extent, Correa.
Why did things calm
down? What is the significance of the flare up?
The potentially explosive
situation in the Andes last month was defused
chiefly because Uribe and Chavez checkmated one another. Whereas Uribe was
concerned about international criticism of the violation of sovereignty, Chavez
was perceptibly uncomfortable with the information found in the computer files.
It was in neither president’s interest to press on with a confrontational
strategy that would keep delicate issues in the limelight. In the end, they
both decided to back down, embracing at the Rio Group meeting in the Dominican Republic,
which was fortuitously timed on March 9. That Chavez quickly resumed diplomatic
relations and trade with Colombia
reflects his desire to move on and the importance of bilateral commerce. Last
year, trade between the two countries was up sharply, totaling $5.5 billion.
Indeed, one of the principal lessons from the
border incident and its aftermath is that these Andean nations – particularly Colombia and Venezuela – have profound
connections with one another that serve as shock absorbers and help prevent
volatile situations from spiraling out of control. The links are not only
economic, but also involve energy cooperation, cultural ties and fluid
migratory patterns. They simply have too much at stake to proceed down such a
perilous course.
Another key lesson is that despite the
indisputable mistrust and bitterness between Colombia and these two neighbors,
there is a fortunate propensity to turn to regional bodies to help resolve
disputes. From the outset, the three relevant governments were eager to engage
the international community. No one in Latin America – especially the larger
nations like Brazil and Mexico – wanted
to see a crisis develop.
As an instrument for nations to
work together, the Organization of American States proved to be the logical
place to deal with the dispute and help facilitate dialogue and ventilate
differences. Under the leadership of Secretary General Jose Miguel Insulza, the meeting of the OAS Permanent Council on March 4
and the convening of the hemisphere’s foreign ministers on March 17 were
helpful in alleviating the tension.
The OAS mission to both countries
also served a useful purpose in strengthening the organization’s credibility. Perhaps
the most important task facing the OAS in this crisis will take place in the
coming period, as it sets up a binational commission
to monitor the Colombia-Ecuador border and prevent another flare up. This case will
test the OAS’s capacity to establish an institutional mechanism and deal with
comparable situations effectively.
The governments of Latin
America, both through the OAS and separately, reaffirmed the
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention on the one hand and legitimate
self-defense on the other. They were rightly concerned with the competing
priorities, and dangers, the situation exposed. Happily, there was no move to
break up into competing camps or allow ideological differences balloon into
geopolitical crises. On balance, the region exhibited remarkable pragmatism.
Looking ahead: Some
scenarios
The fundamental dilemma is
how to alleviate tensions while examining credible information on the alleged
connections between governments in the region and the FARC. The guerrillas are
working to overthrow a democratically elected government of Colombia, which
makes it critical that this question be treated with utmost care and
responsibility. The possibilities raised by the files are serious, but need to
be pursued in a professional fashion, with due consideration to possible
consequences for peaceful, democratic order. Although the region’s increasingly
polarized geopolitical configuration could result in heightened criminality and
chaos, it also offers an opportunity to achieve more stable governance and
social cohesion.
Whether Colombia is on the verge of ending
its armed conflict is unclear, but the signs that the FARC are weakening are unmistakable.
This progress is to be celebrated, but some caution is warranted. Just as the
Medellin and Cali drug cartels fragmented into smaller cartels in the 1990s and
the paramilitaries have morphed into drug gangs more recently, so too might the
FARC become fractured, breaking down from a single army into independent units.
Though preferable to the current situation, violence would certainly continue
in that scenario, especially since the drug problem remains formidable in Colombia
and throughout the region.
A second concern would be the weakening of Colombia’s
strong, democratic institutions. Though Uribe deserves credit for the
impressive strides in security, the economy and other areas, there is a real
risk in continued reliance on a single leader to tackle all problems. Another
reelection would likely tarnish Uribe’s legacy, weaken democratic governance, and
damage Colombia’s
international image.
Ecuador has embarked on a path of
seeking to overhaul its political order. The outcome of the constituent
assembly process is uncertain. Given the country’s high level of political volatility
– there have been nine presidents in the past dozen years – it is important
that Correa successfully translate his substantial legitimacy and support into
forging more effective governance structures. Any confirmation of an association
between the government and the FARC would not contribute to the viability of
Correa’s stated project or to restoring political stability in Ecuador.
In Venezuela, despite record oil prices,
Chavez is facing his most significant vulnerabilities in nearly a decade of
rule. The country’s politics remain polarized and a more coherent opposition has
yet to emerge. Inflation, crime,
corruption and scarcity of basic foods are mounting and are proving difficult
to remedy. The governance model Chavez has forged simply is not working. In
advance of presidential elections in December 2012, local elections in November
of this year will give other political forces a chance to present alternative policy
prescriptions for the country’s future.
Though it manifests itself in different ways,
the drug problem is serious in all three countries – as it is in the United States
and much of the hemisphere. As the recent crisis illustrates, the drug issue intersects
with ideological divisions in the Andean region. Chavez in particular is pursuing
an agenda that explicitly defies U.S.
interests in Latin America and elsewhere. The
drug trade alone has a decidedly corrupting impact on any political system. But
for the United States,
and the region’s governments and societies, the challenge becomes especially
daunting when ideology and the illicit drug problem converge.
What is the challenge
for U.S.
policy?
The U.S. has a considerable
interest in fostering a peaceful, democratic, and prosperous Andean region. The
key question is how the U.S.
can orient its decisions and actions with that goal in mind. The U.S. cannot and
should not succumb to either of two common temptations: intervening with a
heavy hand to dictate a preordained solution or remaining disengaged from the
central questions that most concern our neighbors.
For the most part, and largely to its credit,
the Bush administration played a marginal role at best in the Andean crisis. In
the end, a formula to calm things down was worked out by the relevant parties
and other regional governments determined to avoid any escalation. Washington rightly
yielded to the Latin American desire for mutual settlement. Latin America is often
said to be the “backyard” of the U.S.,
but Washington
certainly did not behave that way in this case. It is still unclear, however,
whether the U.S.
consciously decided to play the role it did, whether it simply did not know how
to react or, worse, did not care.
President Bush’s expression of support for the
Uribe government on March 12 was ill-advised. The President took advantage of
the situation to promote the free trade agreement with Colombia, citing the security risks
in the region. Yet, while defending a close ally like Colombia in
such circumstances was understandable, it would have also been appropriate, as
a demonstration of evenhandedness, to express concern about the violation of Ecuadoran
sovereignty. Siding so strongly with Colombia
undermined any chance the U.S.
could be an honest broker in a regional dispute. It also further isolated Colombia, whose
peace and security ultimately depends on trust and cooperation with its
neighbors.
Moving forward, the United States would be wise to
maintain a low profile and avoid the kind of protagonism
that would only be counterproductive in light of the anti-Americanism prevalent
in the region. At the same time, it would be a mistake for the U.S. to
retreat from the region at this critical moment. Some guidelines for possible U.S. actions:
1) Pursue
a discreet and measured approach when managing the information that emerges from
the computer files. It would be a mistake to sound the alarms, but equally
unwise to turn a blind eye. At the right opportunity, the U.S. might consult with close friends in the
region like Mexico, Chile and Brazil to ask how they view any
credible information produced and what they consider to be appropriate
responses.
2) Support
Colombia,
which has been a close friend and ally. Assistance should be provided not in a
way that sets Colombia
apart from its neighbors, but rather in a way that encourages it to diversify
political and economic ties, both within the region and globally. Apart from
its economic merits, the Congress should approve the free trade agreement with Colombia for sound
foreign policy reasons. Rejecting the deal would send a signal to the rest of
the region that the U.S. is
not a reliable ally and that domestic political considerations continue to
drive U.S. policy toward Latin America. Continued support for programs that
strengthen security, the rule of law and democracy are also vital.
3) Enhance
partnerships with friendly governments in the region. On Venezuela, the
Bush administration deserves credit for recently carrying out a wiser and more
moderate approach. The main focus should continue to be collaboration with
Latin American allies. While it is understandable that the U.S. will want to
review any information regarding the FARC’s connections to other governments,
it is critical to keep in mind the possible consequences – for US interests and
the region’s general well-being – of putting Venezuela on the list of states
that support terrorism. Political prudence would recommend a diligent
examination of the information, but restraint in making decisions that may be
self-defeating for the United
States.
4) Encourage
and support reasonable efforts to secure the release of the FARC hostages.
Humanitarian concerns are paramount and do not necessarily conflict with
policies aimed at ending the armed conflict. Pragmatic approaches should be
pursued, including the possible role of Chavez, who has already shown that he
can deliver results. The release of further hostages would be in the interest
of all parties, including the Colombian government. Such an approach would not
reverse the recent troubles of the FARC or Chavez.
5) Stay engaged with the Correa government and explore ways of
cooperating more productively. Trade preferences and counter-narcotics assistance
ought to be extended and continued. The U.S. should not let decisions by
the Correa government – such as not renewing the lease of the forward operating
location in Manta – affect the overall bilateral relationship. Disagreements on
some issues should be expected, and the U.S. can and should explore other
options to replace the Manta facility.
6) Back
the OAS and other multilateral fora committed to peace and democratic progress.
Although the region is politically fragmented – hemispheric relations are
marked by considerable mistrust – it is crucial to find ways to reenergize
cooperative efforts, including on the drug question, among the region’s
governments and civil societies. Such an approach does not necessarily require
additional financial resources, but rather a change in style and mindset. The U.S. must
recognize that respect in the region must be earned through a genuine give and
take. Early in 2009, the next U.S.
president will be meeting with other hemispheric heads of state at the Summit of the Americas
meeting in Trinidad and
Tobago. That is an excellent opportunity to
recover some of the ground that has been lost over the last decade in
hemispheric cooperation.