Docs 15-38
15. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos/1/
Washington, February 10, 1961, 9:22 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/2-1061. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Steeves; cleared by SEA, FE, L, IO, and by Nitze of Defense; and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Bangkok as telegram 1182.
841. Deptel 1181 to Bangkok 840 to Vientiane./2/
/2/In this telegram, February 10, the Department of State instructed Brown to proceed to Vientiane from Bangkok as soon as possible and seek an appointment with Phoumi and Boun Oum and "make a preliminary and rather general exposition" of the neutralization concept in order to sound out their reactions. (Ibid.)
This message prepared as circular but for present being sent only Vientiane and Bangkok/3/ describes plans intended bring critical situation Laos nearer solution. It supplies background and rationale for use as appropriate with government to which accredited in order provide it better understanding our concept of problem and intended courses of action. Special instructions to certain posts will follow.
/3/It was sent as circular telegram 1190 on February 11. (Ibid., 751J.00/2-1161)
(Begin FYI)
1. US wishes leave no stone unturned find peaceful solution and has therefore joined in attempt find conditions under which ICC might function. However rate progress current negotiations re ICC tends strengthen our fear that inherent limitations in ICC likely lead to abandonment this approach. To permit ICC operate effectively RLG would either have to make concessions unacceptable to it or impose restrictions which ICC would not accept. Negotiations may be spun out and valuable time lost. We therefore taking steps explore feasibility of a "neutral nations commission" centering around Cambodia and Burma with suitable flexibility for additions. This move based on assumption that while neutral and sometimes troublesome, Cambodia and Burma are anti-Communist domestically, are alive to Communist threat, desire a non-Communist Laos in their own self-interest and have themselves taken initiatives consistent with approach we have in mind. Moreover Soviet Bloc actively wooing them and would find it difficult completely rebuff their efforts on behalf of peace.
2. By taking initiative in proposing neutral nations commission of this character and by strengthening our bargaining position by actions set forth below we are acting in conformance with the guidance in the President's inaugural address/4/ that while we do not fear to negotiate for genuine peace and understanding, we will not abandon our friends. While we would hope that Soviets will see in neutral nations suggestion and its most probable actions an indication of this willingness and determination and thus acquiesce we may at the proper stage have to set forth our objectives in clear terms by note or demarche so that Soviets may know what the alternative would be if they rebuff our obvious "olive branch" approach. Having taken positive step toward peaceful solution onus passes to the USSR for recalcitrance.
/4/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 1-3.
3. Because Soviets may feel time favors Pathet Lao, they will probably be reluctant acquiesce unless pressure brought to bear. We feel such pressure must be not only political in terms proposed commission, but also military, the latter in terms further advances of RLG, with recapture of Plaines des Jarres obviously important. In order to reassure our Asian Allies that SEATO has a capability to act we must respond without further delay to the RLG request that has been before the Council representatives for some time. We are therefore instructing Ambassador Johnson to vote in favor of the Australian proposal for a fact-finding commission composed of SEATO nations representatives resident in Vientiane./5/ (We understand that U.K. may propose that the Committee of Security Experts function in this capacity which would in our opinion be better.) It is not considered that such action will affect the NNC proposal which could not be implemented fully for some time. The factfinding mission would become an NNC task when the latter group becomes operational. No further SEATO action is contemplated unless it is later determined that the NNC concept has proven ineffective. Should the above mentioned political (NNC) and military (RLG offensive) pressures fail to materialize, additional political and military pressures could be brought to bear by further SEATO action, the nature of which would depend upon developments, with SEATO expected to meet its responsibilities in full. END FYI
/5/Text of the Australian draft proposal is in telegram 1350 from Bangkok, February 1. (Department of State, Central Files, 379/2-161)
Presentation along following lines should be made to host government but only on receipt specific instructions which may include variations for individual cases. Circular telegram on Neutral Nations Commission will be helpful in supplying points for your demarche./6/
/6/Circular telegram 1191, February 11, outlined in detail the concept for a Neutral Nations Commission. (Ibid., 751J.00/2-1161)
A. The Legitimacy of RLG and its International Relations
Drawing on previous instructions including cirtels 878 and 1004/7/ you should urge affirmative action in support RLG and at minimum an overt willingness work with it.
/7/In circular telegram 878, December 19, 1960, the Department provided guidance regarding U.S. attitudes to the Provisional Government of Laos of Prince Boum Oum and Phoumi Nosavan. In circular telegram 1004, January 12, the Department stated that the Boun Oum provisional government was fully legalized in accordance with the Lao Constitution and any claim by Souvanna Phouma that he headed a legal government was without foundation. (Ibid., 751J.02/12-1960 and 751J.02/1-1961)
United States supports Royal Lao Government, of which Prince Boun Oum is Prime Minister. This is in keeping with policy we have consistently followed with each succeeding government in Laos formed pursuant to its constitutional processes and sanctioned by the King. There is no other government in Laos and to assume otherwise is a fiction, acceptance of which would make it impossible conduct business with this constitutional monarchy. If collectively or singly we are to use our influence and support to work toward a satisfactory solution of the current and historic ills of Laos, we can do so only in cooperation with duly constituted government. We share view of many of our friends re general desirability of having in Laos a government formed on as broad a base as possible, but some patience and time may be needed to persuade incompatible personalities to lay aside their differences in interests of independent Laos. There would be little profit in bringing about under pressure inclusion of incompatible elements in RLG if this would again lead to instability. Nevertheless despite obstacles we would be prepared to join effort to obtain more broadly based government committed to obtain genuine independence.
We conceive of Laos as a neutral state, unaligned in her international relations but determined to preserve her national integrity. In order to exist in this special status, enjoy independence and retain territorial integrity, some temporary international machinery to guard this neutrality will have to be devised. Neutralized status would envisage, except as provided by previous agreements, no foreign military bases, no foreign troops and no military alliances. (See Section E below) Status of Austria may serve as precedent. An underlying assumption is that it is in best interest of US and USSR avoid widespread hostilities in Laos.
Accordingly, the United States has suggested to RLG that neutrality of Laos be proclaimed and defined by a declaration which all interested governments would be invited to respect.
B. A Neutral Nations Commission
To assure establishment of such neutrality, it has been suggested that King and RLG invite certain neutral nations to form a commission formation of which would be reported to UN Security Council in some appropriate way. It was suggested that two of members of commission be Laos' neighbors, Burma and Cambodia.
We consider first responsibility of commission would be to arrange for cessation of not only Soviet airlift, but all foreign military intervention in form of personnel, arms and equipment introduced in contravention of international agreements and inconsistent with status of Laos as neutral. Until such time as Commission has established a mechanism capable of effective supervision and surveillance of entire national area, we would urge RLG to take great care not to deny itself right to continued assistance from US and France.
As next task of Commission RLG might request its help to effect cessation of hostilities in all areas where armed conflict in progress.
Commission would be expected establish machinery for supervision under its auspices over military material and equipment required for defense and maintenance law and order. Such machinery would remain in place until RLG is satisfied it has worked out a peaceful solution of internal differences and established an integrated state with capability of maintaining internal security. FYI Terms of reference would be spelled out in RLG's invitation. Text to be suggested to RLG will follow. End FYI.
C. SEATO
Appropriate exposition should be made that SEATO and its individual members obviously prefer settle Lao crisis by peaceful means, and all feasible steps to reach this goal should be taken. SEATO has responsibility support integrity of Laos and security of Southeast Asia which outcome struggle in Laos will vitally affect. In view of SEATO undertakings, and more particularly US pledges under SEATO, violation of integrity of Laos cannot be allowed to take place with impunity. However US envisages that primary emphasis should be on peaceful solution as outlined above.
D. Economic Aid
United States will continue to extend economic aid to Laos under existing agreements with RLG. US would hope that other states interested in future welfare of Laos would also contribute according their individual capacities. US prepared examine with others the channeling of economic and technical aid through an international mechanism.
E. Military Training and Aid
We would expect RLG to insist that there be real evidence of effectiveness of control and supervision which would deny clandestine support before assistance from ourselves, French, and other anti-Communist sources would be subject to restriction.
Under neutral concept, US would be prepared to have military assistance screened by Commission. US would also be prepared to withdraw its training mission at such time as a competent neutral training mission, invited by the RLG and approved by Commission, was in place and able effectively to assume the mission of training RLG security forces.
Rusk
16. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, February 14, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos General, 2/8/61-2/15/61. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Laos Task Force Meeting, Tuesday, February 14, 1961
1. As Parsons has informed you, our neutralization proposal is now being communicated to governments in all directions./2/
/2/In a memorandum to Parsons, February 14, Anderson summarized international reactions to the U.S. proposal for a neutralized Laos. Pakistan, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Thailand all favored the idea. France welcomed it, but feared it was too late to be effective. King Savang and Phoumi also favored the concept. Only the Philippines was noncommittal. (Ibid.)
2. The question of the timing and character of the communication to the USSR is still not decided; but it will be discussed this week by Parsons, Thompson and Bohlen.
3. General Phoumi's offensive is going very slowly. It is meeting severe resistance. The level of support through the Soviet airlift has been expanded. They evidently understand, at least as well as we do, the role of controlling the Plaine des Jarres in the inevitable negotiations about the political constitution of the Laos government. There is some anxiety that General Phoumi understand clearly that the launching of our diplomatic initiative should not be an occasion to slacken his efforts. A cable on the relation between the diplomacy and military action in Laos will be dispatched./3/
/3/Telegram 865 to Vientiane, February 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/2-1461)
4. There is no shortage of supplies; and no need to consider an alteration in your decision on the airfield.
5. Parsons would like you to be alerted to the possibility that your assistance might conceivably be invoked in either of the two following circumstances: either to help push the King of Laos into accepting our proposal; or your personally welcoming this proposal when he puts it forward.
17. Memorandum of Conversation
Washington, February 20, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/2-2061. Confidential. Drafted by Chapman and approved in S on March 3. The conversation took place at the Department of State.
SUBJECT
Laos
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
J. Graham Parsons, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Christian G. Chapman, Officer in Charge of Laos Affairs
His Excellency Mikhail A. Menshikov, Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Nikifor Levchenko, Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy
The Secretary requested the Soviet Ambassador to come to the Department to discuss Laos. The Secretary introduced the topic by stating that Laos was one of the situations to which the new Administration had to turn its attention immediately after taking office. While obviously concerned that the fighting might spread and the activities of the various powers might lead to dangers which all wished to diminish, the Administration still thought that there were elements for a reasonable solution as we understood the long-range objectives of both sides. The Secretary made clear the desire of the new Administration to see Laos "independent, a genuine neutral unaligned in its international relations but free to exercise its sovereign right to manage its own affairs and provide for its national integrity." The Secretary explained that he had called the Ambassador in because he wanted to let the Soviets know right away our reaction to two developments which had occurred over the weekend:
1. The King of Laos had issued a declaration/2/ insisting on the neutrality of his country and offering guarantees of this neutrality by inviting Southeast Asian countries to form a Commission to bear witness to the neutrality of Laos.
/2/Text of the statement, which was carefully coordinated with the U.S. Embassy, is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 991-992.
2. The Soviet Government had replied to the British by proposing that the Chairman of the ICC be approached to reactivate the ICC and a conference be called to work out a settlement./3/
/3/The Soviet reply was an oral statement made by Georgi M. Pushkin, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, to British Ambassador in Moscow, Sir Frank Roberts, on February 18. Puskin also reacted negatively when Roberts raised the idea of a neutral nations commission. (Memorandum from Parsons to Rusk, February 20; Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/2-2061)
The United States, the Secretary said, very much hoped that the Soviet Government would permit the Southeast Asian countries and the Royal Lao Government to work out together a solution thus minimizing controversy and permitting prompt implementation of a settlement. For its part, the United States is prepared to cooperate fully to help carry out the King's proposal but does not believe that it would be helpful at the present stage of our relations to call an international conference. Such a conference would be public and would stimulate public debate and would not be as conducive to a settlement as a quieter approach. Therefore, we wanted the Soviets to know that we considered the King's proposal a very useful basis for a genuinely neutral Laos which might take the country out of the area of sharp controversy from which a more dangerous situation could evolve. We considered the King's proposal offered every guarantee of the neutrality of his country and the steps he proposed seemed constructive. We hoped therefore that the Soviets would also cooperate and let the three Southeast Asian countries, Burma, Malaya, and Cambodia, which have been named by the King, function and provide machinery satisfactory to both the Soviets and ourselves.
The Ambassador asked whether the Secretary would give him anything in writing. The Secretary answered that he would not but only wanted to give our reaction to the Soviets immediately, particularly as we were expecting a communication from them on the subject of the ICC. The Secretary repeated that it was President Kennedy's desire to see Laos independent, neutral, and a threat to no one and that we were prepared to cooperate to this end.
The Ambassador remarked that this objective is what the Soviets had been seeking all the time; that they had considered a neutral Laos as the best solution ever since the 1954 conference. The Government of Souvanna Phouma, he continued, had tried to do something in this direction when General Phoumi, Prince Boun Oum, and their group threw him out. Somebody, he said, wanted to establish a pro-Western government, which was unfortunate. He was not instructed, but speaking personally, he still hoped that a conference would be held. Such a conference, he said, was a better approach, more objective and provided a solid foundation to a settlement. If one had been called two months ago, all would have been settled by now. Regarding the King's declaration, he remarked that the King was "more or less captive of these rebels."
The Secretary pointed out that what the King was seeking was not only the neutralization of his country but also a government of national union. The Secretary considered this move constructive. He recognized that we took different points of view regarding the legality of the Lao Government. We do not know, the Secretary said, what the possibilities are of broadening the Government but we understand that discussions are going on in Vientiane. It would be well, he said, to let this effort proceed. We think it has a fair chance of being successful. Furthermore, there is a keen interest among Southeast Asian countries to avoid creating a situation whereby peace would be disturbed. We were concerned over the possibilities that an international conference with maximum public attention and argumentation reaching back over many years would have an unsettling effect. Finally, the Secretary remarked that there was no guarantee a conference would produce a better settlement and possibly it might be worse than the one proposed by the King.
The Ambassador expressed the view publicity was not necessary and that the press could be kept out by the participants in a conference.
Again speaking personally, the Ambassador said that the establishment of an international body as proposed by the King was "one-sided." He thought that many of the problems of today could be solved comparatively easily if they were not approached on a one-sided basis. The Congo and Laos were examples. Instead, an international conference comprising all interested countries could establish international machinery on a sound basis.
The Secretary answered that the problem is whether we cannot let these questions be taken over by peoples not directly involved in a world-wide relationship such as the Soviets and ourselves. The Secretary further specified that Laos is the country of the Lao. They want to be neutrals. They ask other countries whose neutrality is recognized to assist them in certifying their neutrality. If the Soviets and ourselves are in Laos, difficulties may arise.
Menshikov noted that China was there and that, unless all interested countries participated, Laos could only be considered half-neutral.
18. Memorandum From the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff (Breitweiser) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
J2DM-63-61
Washington, February 23, 1961.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Laos '61, 121. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
SNIE 58-61, "Probable Communist Reactions to Certain US Courses of Action with Respect to Laos"/2/
/2/Dated February 21, not printed. (Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 99)
ENCLOSURE
Brief of SNIE 58-61
On 21 February 1961, the United States Intelligence Board approved an Estimate on "Probable Communist Reactions to Certain US Courses of Action with Respect to Laos" (SNIE 58-61). A Brief of this Estimate is attached for your information in advance of the regular distribution which will be forthcoming.
RABreitweiser
Major General, USAF
[Attachment]
BRIEF
SNIE 58-61: Probable Communist Reactions to
Certain U.S. Courses of Action with Respect to Laos
This Special National Intelligence Estimate was approved by the United States Intelligence Board on 21 February 1961. It was prepared in response to a requirement of OASD, ISA for an estimate of Communist reactions to selected hypothetical US sponsored courses of action, and is not intended to cover the full range of possibilities of U.S. initiative in Laos. Significant judgments of the Estimate are:
Except possibly in the case of the more extreme U.S. military measures, we believe that Soviet leaders would not match U.S.-sponsored military actions in Laos with corresponding, step-by-step, Bloc military measures. Except in the case of the most modest U.S. military measures Bloc leaders would almost certainly expect that most of world opinion would be sharply critical of the U.S., and that this fact would deter the U.S. from pressing too far.* [* Joint Staff footnote to SNIE 58-61. It is the opinion of the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, that reactions of the Bloc and the non-Communist world to U.S. sponsored measures would depend significantly on the vigor, forthrightness and success of these measures. Accordingly the Bloc leaders would not necessarily expect "most of world opinion" to be "sharply critical of the U.S." Forthright U.S. action in the Taiwan Straits and in Korea attest to the fact that a significant segment of world opinion could be expected to applaud heartily U.S. sponsored military action taken against a Communist threat against all of Southeast Asia and its attendant challenge to the Free World. The considerations of timing, vigor and success of possible U.S. sponsored measures are not weighed in the assessments that follow. The Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, believes that without careful weighing of these factors the judgments as to probable Bloc and non-Communist reactions must be viewed with reserve.]/3/ Responses to lesser U.S. measures would be designed far more for their political than their military effects. The Soviets do not want to prejudice their chances of negotiating with the U.S. on issues more important to them than Laos. This may restrain them from stepping up military pressures in Laos on their own initiative; it will be less likely to restrain them from military responses to U.S. military initiatives in Laos.
/3/Asterisks and brackets in the source text.
The direct delivery of military supplies to Vientiane by U.S. aircraft, sustained U.S. reconnaissance flights over Laos, the use of unmarked Thai or other aircraft to augment present airlift in Laos, or the assignment of volunteer Thai specialists to FAL units would draw a vigorous diplomatic and propaganda reaction. None of these measures would be likely to cause the Communists to cease their military efforts in Laos, to feel the need to make any concessions, or themselves to step up the tempo in Laos.
If the U.S. were to commit "Volunteer" combat aircraft to ground support operations in Laos, the Bloc would probably seek to increase PL AAA capabilities, possibly covertly introducing DRV AAA units, and Soviet threats would be made against bases supporting the air operations. The chances are about even that "volunteer" Communist ground attack aircraft would be committed in Laos.
If Chinese Nationalist irregulars were committed to combat action in Laos, as long as these forces did not significantly affect the course of fighting in Laos and did not make raids into China, Soviet and Chinese Communist reactions would probably be confined to vigorous propaganda-political exploitation.
If a token force of U.S. and allied ground forces were overtly assembled in northeast Thailand, DRV troops would probably be deployed along the Laos border, and threats of DRV intervention might be made. None of the foregoing measures would cause the Communists to cease their military support of the PL.
If the U.S. were to commit a volunteer, composite-nationality ground force in Laos, and the security of the PL forces were threatened, additional numbers of (DRV) "Lao" or "border" forces would probably be committed to stabilize the situation. It is unlikely that Chinese Communist "volunteers" would be committed, although we cannot rule out this possibility.
The overt commitment of U.S. and allied nation combat aircraft in Laos would probably be regarded by the Bloc as indicating a major commitment by the U.S. to the support of non-Communist forces in Laos, and that this challenge obliged it to make a strong political and military response. They would probably move to negotiate, calculating that they could both get a settlement that would protect Communist assets in Laos and at the same time reap considerable political benefit. It is possible that they might commit Bloc air or ground forces, but would in any event build up their readiness posture in the general area and issue strong threats against the U.S. and participating allies to cease their air operations.
If overt U.S. and allied ground forces were committed to garrison or combat duty in Laos, Bloc reactions would probably be similar to, but more intense than, those described for air action above. In particular, the chances are about even that the USSR would at the same time sponsor DRV intervention in Laos, and it might even acquiesce in Chinese Communist intervention.
If the U.S. issued a solemn, private warning to the Bloc powers to cease their military support efforts in Laos or face possible U.S. air and amphibious action against the DRV, the Soviets would certainly regard defense of North Vietnam against such an attack as imperative. They would probably feel that their total interests could best be served by making public the U.S. warning and castigating it as a threat to world peace. Simultaneously, Moscow would probably announce its determination to defend the DRV against attack and stress that any such U.S. action would carry the risk of general war, calculating that worldwide pressures on the U.S. would dissuade it from its threat and force it into negotiations on terms acceptable to the Communist side.
19. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, February 28, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 2/20/61-2/28/61. Secret.
SUBJECT
Laos Task Force Meeting, Monday, February 27, 1961/2/
/2/An account by Chapman of this meeting, classified Top Secret, provides some additional detail. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-161)
1. Phoumi is stuck. In the twenty-one days estimated by our people as required to take the Plaine des Jarres, he has made four to seven kilometers. He has been stopped by a better organized and better equipped opposition than anyone had calculated; employing artillery on high ground to command Route 7, mines, etc.
2. In addition, the good General has been politicking rather than using his forces to increase our bargaining position in the negotiations ahead.
3. It turns out that the airfield at Udorn is not of much use. The question of our flying into Vientiane will probably be raised with you again. The rationale is that the CAT airlift from Bangkok is running down; and there may be some supply shortage up front. In addition, it is believed that the time may not be inappropriate for us to make a show of strength and determination, since the Soviet air supply continues unabated. Further, it turns out that CAT is a very expensive operation, running to $450 million [sic] a month.
4. There is a serious gap in intelligence about the Communist build-up in the Plaine des Jarres. There is a possibility that they may plan an offensive before the rainy season sets in, in about a month. On the whole, the view is that Phoumi's forces can hold even if they are unlikely to advance very far. The Pentagon is undertaking to get better intelligence and also to see whether the dumps the Communists are creating might not be targetable and, conceivably, attacked [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] volunteer pilots. This is staff work exploration, of course; and no decisions have been made.
5. In general, the view is that the Royal Laotian army has improved; the lack of officers and non-coms is being remedied; in time it may become a competent force; but it is still a relatively weak reed for an offensive against determined and well armed opposition.
6. The one bright spot in our operation is the performance of the Miaos [Meos/H'mong] whom we have specially trained and who are doing a good job in a limited area against Pathet Lao. There is thought of arming them with mortars, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
7. The extreme difficulty with the French in Laos was discussed at some length. It was agreed that it would be unfruitful to discuss the problem of training with them in the field; but we can engage in diplomatic conversations on the question of widening of the Lao government and on the question of whether Souvanna has gone completely over to the Communists or whether he can be saved.
8. The Department of State is proceeding to urge the widening of the government with the King as the central figure; and the approach through some version of the neutral commission should not be regarded as having yet failed. Both the Cambodians and the Burmese have kept the door open a little; and perhaps the widening of the government may move them.
9. The problem of the KMT irregulars appears to be tolerably in hand at the diplomatic level; but it will take some time to extract those prepared to go back to Formosa./3/
/3/On February 20, Rusk sent the President a paper on the Chinese irregular problem in the Burma-Laos area. (Ibid., 751J.00/2-2061)
10. We are still trying to get a letter from the King in reserve to regularize our position (on analogy with our intervention in the Lebanon-Jordan crisis) should the French cover for our role in Laos blow.
20. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, February 28, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/2-2861. Confidential. Drafted by Chapman and approved in S on March 13. The conversation took place at the Department of State.
SUBJECT
Laos
PARTICIPANTS
H.E. Mikhail A. Menshikov, Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Mr. Igor Bubnov, Third Secretary, Embassy of the USSR
The Secretary
Mr. J. Graham Parsons, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. C. Chapman, Officer-in-charge, Laos Affairs
At his request Ambassador Menshikov called on the Secretary on February 28 and read a prepared text setting forth the Soviet answer to the Secretary's presentation of the United States position on Laos. The Soviet Government, the Ambassador began, notes with satisfaction that the United States Government desires an independent and neutral Laos and a cessation of hostilities there. This position coincides with that of the Soviet Government. However, the Soviet Government also maintains that provisions of the Geneva Agreement remain in force, a position it has made known in a number of previous exchanges. While the Soviet Government does not want to stir up the past, nevertheless, it considers that the existing situation has been caused by US military support to the Boun Oum-Nosavan rebels against the legitimate Government of Souvanna Phouma. If both the United States and Soviet Governments agree that Laos should be independent and neutral, their joint efforts should be aimed at supporting the Souvanna Government. To take another road would be fraught with dangers to peace. While it will be a difficult job to avoid conflict, there is a common basis if we proceed from the Geneva Agreement. The Soviet Government believes that the international conference proposed by Prince Sihanouk to settle the Lao problem is of paramount importance. This conference will consider measures for the normalization of the situation and will issue directives on new terms of reference for the ICC. This Commission could and should make a valuable contribution to the solution of the problem. The Commission can only proceed if it rests on a firm foundation of international law. The terms set forth by the Geneva Agreement on Laos are no longer adequate. If in the past the Commission worked under conditions of peace, the Commission will now have to restore peace. In order to enable the Commission to restore peace, it must obtain additional powers from an international conference. The Soviet Government has already proposed to the United Kingdom and to the Government of India to take steps to convene the ICC in New Delhi and the Government of India has spoken in favor of the reactivation of the ICC. The key now to the solution of the Lao problem is to call an international conference and reactivate the ICC. Of the invited 14 countries, most have accepted the invitation or shown a "positive attitude"; only the United States and the South Vietnamese have not expressed themselves in favor of the conference. Therefore only United States assent is needed to make the conference possible.
The Soviet Government notes the United States Government's support of the King's proposal. The United States Government is actually proposing to abandon the Geneva Agreements and replace the ICC with a new commission for which there is no legal ground. Obviously the Soviet Union as one of the co-chairmen cannot take such a road which would lead to the aggravation of the situation in Laos. The proposal is aimed at strengthening the Boun Oum-Nosavan regime and leading it out of its political isolation. Moreover, the question arises whether the proposal for a new commission, which sidesteps and violates the Geneva Agreement, does not aim at removing socialist Poland from the Commission. The cooperation of all countries is required and not the imposition of another group.
Attaching great importance to the taking of immediate measures for settling the Lao problem, the Soviet Government hopes the United States Government will join the common effort and is firmly convinced that the two Governments can find a common approach which will considerably strengthen the faith of the people in the possibility of peaceful solutions of problems.
The Secretary answered that he welcomed the thoughtful and moderate tone of the communication and the indication that the Soviet Government agrees that a neutral and independent Laos is a common objective. The Secretary said we will want to think about the Soviet presentation and that we will present our detailed views at a later date. However, he made a number of observations: 1) The United States Government believes that the Royal Lao Government is the only legitimate government of Laos, though we would be glad to have it include other elements who had experience, and that it should proceed to get on with the central task of reconstruction of the country which has been torn by strife for too many years. The King is the focal point of constitutional authority. He is free to act as he chooses and the Parliament is free to act as it chooses. The present Government of Prime Minister Boun Oum is, under the Lao constitution, the proper constitutional authority of that country. 2) The United States Government thinks that the King's proposal has real merit because we feel that Laos and other disinterested neighbors might search among themselves to find means of solving the problem to the satisfaction of both of our Governments in a way to reduce future tensions. 3) The Secretary noted the Ambassador's remark regarding the elimination of the Polish representative and pointed out that the proposal would also eliminate the Canadian as well as Indian representatives. The proposal seemed to offer one way of bringing some distance between the Soviets and ourselves, thereby avoiding a direct confrontation. Thus, the three proposed members of the Commission over whom neither of our two countries had any control would permit neither threat nor anxiety. 4) The United States Government has hoped that we could find in the course of our discussion that our objectives were indeed the same. We believe it is important to work toward common objectives by methods which are conducive to the reduction of tensions and which are likely to produce agreement. 5) The Secretary gathered from the Ambassador's remarks that the Soviet Government had in mind amendments to the instructions for the ICC. The Secretary observed that if we are to go into an international conference with important issues unresolved, the conference itself could be a source of increased tensions and impede satisfactory settlement.
The Ambassador professed not to understand the Secretary's last remarks. There are only two approaches to the problem: one, he said, is based on the decisions taken by the Geneva Conference and the other on a one-sided approach. The Ambassador thought that the best and proper thing was for all countries to get together to settle this question. There are two positions, he continued, that of the United States and that of the USSR plus a majority of the other countries. Already in 1954 a solution had been found in the same area. It had taken a long time and attracted attention, but the main thing was for the interested countries to get together.
The Soviets know, the Ambassador said, that the King is a captive of the Boun Oum-Nosavan regime. He declares one thing one day and another thing at a different time. Again in regard to the ICC the Ambassador asked why change its composition only to satisfy one side.
The Secretary again emphasized that we consider the King to be free. The Secretary added that since the new administration took office the United States and Soviet Governments have treated each other civilly and thereby opened the possibility of improving relations. We would be disturbed by any kind of meeting which would lead to a public debate of differences, particularly if there are people around the table interested in stirring up and adding to existing differences. The Soviets and ourselves have important problems, e.g., nuclear tests which we are approaching in a serious way which we hope the Soviets share. Prospects for agreement will turn in part on the success of maintaining a certain correctness and calm toward each other.
The Ambassador answered that since the United States and the USSR would be present at the international conference we could jointly see that such a conference took a proper course and reached decisions agreeable to everybody. All countries, the Ambassador repeated, are interested in reaching a solution.
21. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, March 1, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-161. Secret. Drafted by Erickson on February 27 and cleared with SEA, EUR/SOV, and by Steeves and Parsons.
SUBJECT
Laos
The King of Laos on February 19 issued a declaration of neutrality and appealed to the neighboring neutral nations of Cambodia, Malaya and Burma to form a commission to arrange for the cessation of all foreign military intervention inconsistent with the country's neutral status./2/ The same day, following the King's declaration, the Department's spokesman issued an informal statement to the effect that the declaration seemed constructive and promising.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 17.
Free World reaction to the King's proposal has been generally favorable. The Communists, however, denounced the plan, reiterating their insistence on an international conference and on the reactivation of the ICC. I called in Soviet Ambassador Menshikov on February 20 and expressed our hope that the Soviet Government would cooperate and let the three nations named by the Lao King provide the machinery for the neutralization of Laos satisfactory to both of us./3/ Ambassador Menshikov, speaking personally, stated the King's proposal was one-sided and insisted an international conference was the better approach since it would give an eventual settlement a more solid foundation. Gromyko reiterated essentially this position to British Ambassador Roberts.
/3/ See Document 17.
Of the nations invited to form the commission, only Malaya has reacted favorably. Burma is reported to have declined the King's invitation and Cambodia has termed the commission unacceptable stating it is a unilateral proposal and that no such commission can be formed until an international conference has been held to examine the problem and decide what should be done. Your letter to Prince Sihanouk of February 20 together with his rejoinder of February 24 were both published in the Cambodian official press on February 25.
Before concluding the neutral nations plan unworkable and considering steps to place the onus for failure on the Communists, we believe it best to continue for the time being our efforts to overcome major obstacles to its acceptance. The key obstacle is the narrow composition of the present Lao Government which makes it suspect in the eyes of many nations and permits the Communists to continue their support of Souvanna as the legal Prime Minister.
The USSR's reply to Britain's proposal of January 21 for reactivating the International Control Commission in Laos, delivered the day before King Savang issued his declaration of neutrality, underscores Moscow's determination to keep any East-West negotiations for a Lao settlement within the framework of the Geneva Agreement of 1954./4/
/4/See footnote 3, Document 17.
Former Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma left Phnom Penh on February 21 in a Russian plane, accompanied by Pathet Lao Leaders, for Xieng Khouang, Laos, now under the control of the Pathet Lao. His visit will probably bolster the claim of the Communist-supported shadow government there to be the "legal government of Laos".
Little change in the military situation has been reported during the past two weeks. Neither side appears to be pressing the other very hard.
Dean Rusk/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
22. Memorandum From the Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (McGhee) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, March 3, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 3/2/61-3/12/61. Secret. According to the President's appointment book, the President met with Vice President Johnson, Rusk, McGhee, McNamara, Lemnitzer, Dulles, McGeorge Bundy, Rostow, and others at this meeting which lasted from 3:15 to 5:15 p.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book)
SUBJECT
Laos--Meeting with the President
The following action decisions were taken in the meeting with the President today with respect to Laos:
(1) Plans are to be formulated under the leadership of Defense for the taking of the Plaines [sic] des Jarres by RLG forces within the present level of military escalation in Laos.
(2) There will be a meeting within three or four days between State, Defense, and CIA to approve these plans.
(3) Ambassador Johnson is, before his return to Washington, to see Souvanna Phouma in order to sound him out as to his general views and to whether and under what conditions he would be willing to come into a new government in Laos./2/
/2/Omit Item 3: No firm decision taken on this matter (per Mr. McGhee). [Footnote in the source text.]
(4) U.S. efforts to achieve a broadening of the base of the Laotian government are to be continued./3/
/3/Part of this effort was to encourage discussions between Phoumi and Souvanna in Phnom Penh. Accounts of Phoumi's discussions with Souvanna there on March 9 and 10 are in telegram 1671 from Vientiane, March 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-1161) The CIA prepared a background memorandum on these meetings for Clifton at his request. (Memorandum from Dulles to Clifton, March 16; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 3/16/61-3/19/61)
(5) As soon as the situation permits, a high level U.S. representative, presumably Ambassador Gavin, would see General DeGaulle in an attempt to get the French to cooperate better with us in achieving our objectives in Laos.
(6) Admiral Felt and a U.S. officer currently serving in the front lines in Laos are to be asked to come back to Washington immediately for consultation.
(7) The possibility was discussed of Admiral Felt returning via Laos as a means of showing evidence of U.S. support. It is not believed, however, that any final decision was made in this matter.
(8) It was agreed that the Department would give maximum publicity to the recent Russian build-up of arms in Laos, along the lines of the New York Times article of March 1.
I am sending a copy of this to FE who I assume will take necessary action for the Department.
23. Memorandum of Meeting/1/
Washington, March 7, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-961. Top Secret. Drafted on March 8. A note on the transmittal memorandum, drafted by Chapman, indicates that Rusk read the memorandum.
SUBJECT
Meeting of Task Force on Laos
Review of Decisions Reached at White House Meeting
Mr. Parsons reviewed the decisions which had been reached at the White House meeting of March 3.
[Here follows a summation of Document 22.]
British Demarche
The British demarche requesting our agreement to the Soviet proposal for recalling the ICC in New Delhi was reviewed./2/ It was noted that the matter had already been leaked to the press in England and that the British had recently used this tactic on a number of occasions--a tactic which makes it very difficult to hold private discussions with them. It was decided to wait for the outcome of a number of actions which are in train before giving our answer (i.e., comments from the field on this demarche; discussions with Admiral Felt; discussions among the Lao in Phnom Penh).
/2/As outlined in a memorandum of conversation between Ledward and Usher, March 4. (Ibid., 751J.00/3-461)
Recommended Courses of Action
In introducing the paper on recommended courses of action,/3/ Mr. Parsons noted that it had always been recognized that for the Neutral Nations Commission proposal to have any chance of success, there had to be an element of strength to persuade the other side to dampen down its activities. Since we did not move in SEATO and the offensive against the Plaine des Jarres has not succeeded, this element is lacking and explains the fact that we have had no more success.
/3/The paper, also March 7, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 3/2/61-3/12/61)
It was noted that the Communist bloc considered the conquest of Southeast Asia as a whole and that a further paper would attempt to address itself to that question.
After considerable discussion, it was agreed that Defense should make recommendations as to what could be done on the ground to help our diplomatic action [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].
Consideration will be given to the substantive position we should take at the SEATO Ministerial Meeting.
Consideration will be given to what we would do to support and train the FAL if the situation continues as at present.
[heading and paragraph (3-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
Lao Police
The problem of police force was brought up. It was pointed out that the authorized complement which we had agreed to finance was 3,200 men. Phoumi had raised this force to 12,000 without prior consultation with us and ICA insisted that it would only pay and train the original 3,200. Thus there was a floating group about which a decision had to be taken. The question was: What was to be the role of the police? The mission of the original 3,200 force was to maintain law and order and included a special branch. Phoumi now wanted to build up a para-military force along the lines of the Malay police.
It was decided that: (a) we should seek an opinion from the Country Team; (b) if the increased force level is approved, request Department of Defense's views as to their military value; (c) this matter would also be discussed with Admiral Felt as Ambassador Brown had recommended.
SNIE
Finally, it was agreed that an interdepartment group should meet as soon as possible to consider a SNIE setting forth the basis for possible courses of action.
24. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, March 7, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 3/2/61-3/12/61. Secret. A note on the source text indicates that this memorandum was delivered verbally at 9:30 a.m.
SUBJECT
Situation in Laos as of Task Force Meeting, Tuesday, March 7, 1961
1. As we have feared, the Communists launched a probing offensive against Phoumi's men. Without much fight, our boys fell back, apparently beyond the crucial crossroads. It is not yet clear whether Phoumi's forces have the capacity to rally; nor is it yet clear how vigorously the Communists will exploit the initial breakthrough.
2. The Laos Task Force meeting,/2/ in addition to considering certain measures to harden our defensive position in Viet-Nam, Thailand, and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, considered a variety of measures which might be taken urgently to maintain morale and to maintain a minimum military position capable of giving us a basis for negotiation of neutralization. None of these seemed promising; but the Pentagon will go to work and we will evidently consider the matter with Admiral Felt.
/2/See Document 23.
25. Memorandum of Conference With President Kennedy/1/
Washington, March 9, 1961, 3:30-4:44 p.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 3/25/61-3/31/61. Top Secret. Drafted by Clifton on March 29.
OTHERS PRESENT
Vice President Johnson
Secretary McNamara
General Lemnitzer
Asst. Secretary of Defense Nitze
Admiral Harry Felt (CINCPAC)
Brig. General Boyle
Colonel Wood
Asst. Secretary of State McGhee
Mr. Steeves
Mr. Gleeck
Mr. Dulles
Mr. Bissell
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Rostow
General Clifton
Secretary McNamara opened the meeting with an outline presentation. For discussion, they presented a concept and plan for the military actions concerning the Plaine des Jarres (PDJ)./2/ Copies of the plan were distributed. The four White House copies were returned to General Lemnitzer.
/2/The JCS produced a plan--technically "a concept"--in response to a request from the President on March 3. The plan was designed to seize the Plaine des Jarres and deny it to the enemy. The concept envisioned preliminary interdiction operations by aircraft and Meo guerrillas, followed by a two-pronged FAL attack from the east and south, and culminating in an airborne assault designed to link up with the two ground forces. The problem was that the FAL lacked the means to execute this operation. The JCS recommended military and covert assistance to the FAL (see Document 26) and measures to improve FAL leadership. ("Concept for the Recapture of the Plaine des Jarres," March 10; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Files: CCS 091 Laos (20, 1 Mar. 61))
General Lemnitzer read the first part of the plan and then Admiral Felt was asked to comment.
Admiral Felt said that their plan had three objectives: (1) to fragment and split the guerrillas; (2) to fragment and split the Pathet Lao from support which is coming from North Vietnam, and (3) to destroy the Pathet Lao forces.
Admiral Felt stated that there were three or four significant dates he would like to point out.
In September, 1958, Ambassador Smith in Laos reported that it was a bad situation. Smith felt that we had a poor type of personnel in the area, and our program needed the Army's best man. Up to that time they had been largely retired officers who were not knowledgeable or aggressive.
A second significant date was when the Army produced the man, Brigadier General Heintges. In November 1958, they evolved the Heintges plan, which fundamentally was to teach the Laotians to shoot and salute.
Then in February 1959, after the preliminary planning, General Heintges was placed in command of our effort, as Chief of the PEO.
In August 1959, the Communists intervened in North and Northeast Laos. (Admiral Felt presented a map of the Communist intervention in the fall of 1959.)
The President asked what political event accompanied the Communist intervention. What really was the key to that intervention?
Admiral Felt: I believe it was the success of the Heintges plan. The Communists saw the Royal Laotian Government getting control of its people.
President: What was the objective of the Heintges plan--political or military?
Admiral Felt: The objective was fundamentally to train a Laotian Army. France--which is really charged with the training of the Laotians--had not actually trained them well. Our efforts were circumscribed and limited to giving the Laotians the equipment in good shape and giving them some technical training on the use of the equipment.
President: What had been the progress up to that time?
Admiral Felt: We have to go back a little way, but since 1954 the U.S. had furnished economic and military aid under a pentalateral agreement (and we are still operating under that agreement)./3/
/3/The Agreement for Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina, signed by the United States, France, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, on December 23, 1950, and entered into force that same date; 3 UST 2756.
Admiral Felt pointed out that the PEO was really not a MAAG. It was only to receive equipment and to give it to the Laotians. The efforts were limited by the French, and in some instances, by the Ambassador.
The President asked when the Heintges plan went into effect and if it is still in effect. Admiral Felt said that the plan has been working ever since its initiation, and since its inception, the Communists have never stopped trying to infiltrate Laos. In the Phoui government there were no Communists, and this has continually frustrated the Communists.
Admiral Felt said the next significant date was August 1960, the time of the Kong Le coup. Phoumi wanted a counter-coup, but got no support for this effort.
On December 3, 1960, the Soviet airlift began, with eight Soviet pilots and eight Soviet navigators on the planes bringing in oil, howitzers, guns, and much other equipment. It was quite apparent that Phoumi now needed heavier equipment than we had been supplying.
In response to the President's question, they estimated that the Soviets have flown 2000 sorties into the area and have brought in 2400 tons by air and about 1000 tons by truck.
The President's questions developed the point that the U.S. has sent in much more tonnage since December 3 than the Soviets have.
Admiral Felt then presented a new map of the current situation and brought out the following points. The PDJ controls the communications network, the main roads. The Laotian roads are really not much. Highways 7 and 13 are the main thoroughfares across and in the interior of the country. The Sam Neua road, another important one, is being repaired and built up to being a major supply line. Admiral Felt pointed out that we have pinpointed their supply dumps, we have good knowledge of the airfield at PDJ, and we know where Kong Le's command post is. The blue dots on the map showed where the Meo tribesmen are all spread out. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
The President asked Admiral Felt how long it had been since he had been to Laos. The Admiral replied that he had visited Laos two years ago and that he had repeatedly requested permission to go back, but the Ambassador had asked him not to come. Admiral Felt pointed out that his Chief of Staff has been there and several other officers have visited, but the Ambassador did not want such senior representation in the area.
In response to further questioning, Admiral Felt said that the U.S. has unilateral plans for intervention if we are called upon and that he has a task force organized and a commander designated (this is Lieut. General Paul D. Harkins who is on Admiral Felt's staff and who, at the present time, is visiting Laos).
General Lemnitzer then introduced Brigadier General Boyle, who is stationed in Vientiane as Chief of the PEO, in civilian guise, and Colonel Wood, who is stationed at Souvannakhet. Both are advisers to Phoumi. The President asked how many French military are in the country now. Colonel Wood replied that there are 1000 French at Seno, but that they are just garrison troops, and that he estimates the French Army has about 150 "trainers" scattered all over the area. General Boyle said that the French have not been closely associated with the fighting elements of the Laotian Army since the Kong Le coup in August 1960.
In further response to Presidential questions, General Boyle said that the French have really not talked to the U.S. representatives since August 1960. He said that the Thais accuse the French of wanting to see the pro-Western mission fail so that they can move in and pick up the pieces with an "I-told-you-so" attitude.
The President then asked about the French attitude, and General Boyle reiterated that the French are standing off but that Phoumi has been to France.
Mr. Steeves of State Department said that ten days ago, in a talk with the French urging them to be friendly and to let bygones be bygones and to tolerate the present government, the French attitude was that "we won't have a thing to do with them."/4/ The French want to let this government fall (the Boun Oum/Phoumi government). The French are extremely jealous and they have no real relations with the present government, according to Mr. Steeves.
/4/Steeves is apparently referring to his conversation with French Minister Counselor Claude Lebel, who according to the record of the conversation stated that "the French were asking themselves whether anything short of a complete turnover [of the Lao Government] would induce Moscow to accept the proposal [for a neutral nations commission]." (Memorandum of conversation, February 28; Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/2-2851)
The President then directed that the group send someone to Boston to brief General Gavin on our views of this situation before he goes to France. Admiral Felt feels that De Gaulle is hoping that with our failure the French can reestablish themselves in Southeast Asia through this Laotian operation. He pointed out that General Heintges got along very well with the French.
General Lemnitzer said that General Heintges is due in the Pentagon in the next two weeks. He is being assigned to the Army Staff.
The point was brought up that Ambassador Alphand says that we are wasting our time and that we can never recover the ground we have lost. It was brought out that the French and the British have practically the same view in these matters. Mr. Dulles made the point that France really wants us to fail.
At this point, they reverted to a further reading of the plan. When it was completed, the following questions went around the table:
The President asked what political actions we are now taking. The State Department representatives made the point that our political activities are not yet a failure; they would like to postpone any further steps until they see the results of Ambassador Thompson's talks with Khrushchev/5/ and the results of Phoumi's talk with Souvanna Phouma./6/ In an ensuing discussion, the State Department people pointed out that Alexis Johnson was not being sent to talk to Souvanna because he was "too powerful" in view of the fact that he was going to soon be assigned here in the Department. They mentioned that Trimble had already talked to Souvanna,/7/ that Ambassador Brown and Souvanna have a good relationship, but Brown did not want to go down and talk to Souvanna after Trimble talked to him (it was Brown's decision) because at present he is accredited to the Royal Laotian Government and really can't talk to a "rebel" without degradation of his present position with the Royal Laotian Government. He made the point that the King of Laos would welcome Souvanna to confer with him, but Souvanna has lately been disparaging the King, his government and his attitude.
/5/See Document 27.
/6/A report of the Souvanna-Phoumi discussions in Phnom Penh is in telegram 1671 from Vientiane, March 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-1161)
/7/Trimble's report on his discussion with Souvanna, March 6, is in telegram 1141 from Phnom Penh, March 7. (Ibid., 751J.00/3-761)
The President asked what offers Phoumi might make to Souvanna. Would he visit Souvanna to make his own propositions; would he be assured of safe passage and security? State indicated that Phoumi would offer Souvanna the Vice Premiership in a broadened government.
The President asked three questions: Would the Prime Minister accept this arrangement; do we like the arrangement; and should we let the Communists into the government?
There was a discussion that Souvanna is a little naive and not very well informed, and that after the Kong Le coup, he had willingly let the Russians come in. Trimble had reported that Souvanna felt that the West can't win by arms and that the neutrality of Laos is essential.
The President asked what the hope is of success by a tripartite commission. State said there was some hope in this, but that the Prince is afraid of opposition in a small commission.
The President asked what the U.S. attitude is toward an ICC, and if it would work. State answered that the ICC package could be acceptable and then could be followed by calling together a 14-nation conference. If it included the Indians and the Canadians, it would be pretty good, but we would have to worry about the Poles being added.
The President then asked who the 14 nations are. State answered that they are Laos, Russia, UK, France, Communist China, North Vietnam, Cambodia, South Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, India, Canada, Poland and the U.S.
The President remarked that it looked like all were in favor of Souvanna except us, and perhaps Thailand and South Vietnam, and that this did not look like a very good lineup. He also said that perhaps the first item on the agenda with this lineup would be to cuss out the U.S.
The President asked for a discussion of Souvanna's trip to Western Europe and what his political plans were.
In the ensuing discussion, the following points developed. First, State said we must have a point at which we will not back off and the President must fix such a point. Second, the President said it was a basic problem to us that all the countries who are supposedly our allies favor the same person (Souvanna), as the Communists do. The third point State made was that the Laotians prefer peace and even a communized Laos to continuing the fight right now.
The President asked what our political plan is if the military action that we are discussing is successful. State responded that if the PDJ plan is successful, and if it were to trigger a peace-seeking by the Communist side, we would then hope to continue about where we were in the Geneva Accord. This did not seem to be a very satisfactory reply because, as the President pointed out, as a political objective, it was limited and did leave us open to continued torture in this situation.
The President indicated several points. We could run supplies in [1 line of source text not declassified] from Bangkok if we got the permission; and that certain planes in the plan would have to be run by civilianized USAF personnel.
In regard to page 1 of the plan, the President asked what the Sino-Soviet arguments were concerning our proposal, what are their ideas on Laos, and why had the Russians leapfrogged the Chinese Communists in this area?
The President asked General Lemnitzer how we can carry this plan out without an escalation on the Soviet part. General Lemnitzer responded that their long line of communications would make it harder for them to escalate in the near future than it would for us if we took this step.
The President then said that he recalled a report the Joint Chiefs had given him which pointed up that if we went at this on a full scale, they could still put five troops to one of ours into the battle,/8/ that the defensive would be much easier than the offensive, and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should keep this early report of theirs in mind.
/8/Kennedy was apparently referring to CM-85-61, a memorandum from Lemnitzer to him, February 16, in which Lemnitzer estimated that the North Vietnamese could introduce into Laos 15 divisions (average strength 7,000 men) and the Chinese 8 divisions (average strength 6,000 men) and 3 parachute battalions (nominal strength 1,000 each) within 30 days. In addition, the Chinese had 340 jets and 125 light jet bombers based in China within range for operations over Laos. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 2/16/61-2/19/61)
The President then asked a series of questions on the lack of morale and the lack of leadership, to which General Boyle and Admiral Felt responded. Admiral Felt pointed out that there were fifteen American teams now in Laos; that they were working down to battalion level; and that it was a little hard to work any lower down because they have to save face for the Asians and make it look like they were able to run their own army.
The President then asked General Boyle to give his impression of these troops. General Boyle responded that some battalions fight well, and he knows of one particular battalion, where they have a good commander and some good company commanders, which is as good as any battalion he has ever seen. The President asked again where we can get the officers these people need. General Boyle responded that Phoumi had a winning team, but he took his best commanders out and put them in regional commands, probably to support him politically and to keep an eye on the forces at his back. One reason given for their change of leaders was that when the families live in the south, the Laotian commanders don't like to fight up north, and so they put in for a southern regional command. General Boyle expressed the fact that most of all, the troops need motivation, so that they could know what they were fighting for.
The President said we had an earlier plan to seize the crossroads and to go on to the PDJ. He asked why they think it would be better now.
The response was that this was a different situation, and that the Laotians probably could not bring the earlier attack off by themselves, but they could bring this plan off if we all supported it.
Secretary McNamara said that we really did not support the earlier plan like we should have. The Ambassador out there fought the plan, and that plan itself was not as strong as the one they were presenting here. Secretary McNamara added it was essential that Admiral Felt, State Department, Defense Department and the Ambassador all work on the same set of instructions. The President again asked what plans we have after winning. The points were made that the neutral Laos that we were seeking was different than the one we are working for now. The Laos we are fighting for now should be anti-Communist, but neutral--in other words, keep the Laotian government from strong Communist influence. Before, we sought a pro-Western "neutral" Laos.
The President than said, "Well, look at Vietnam. What kind of a government are we going to get? Couldn't we settle now for a non-Communist Laos?" He also asked if we agree to this plan today, when is the "point of no return"--when we start all this in motion, how long do we have before we have to go through with it, or call it off? Mr. McNamara and General Lemnitzer responded April 1st, if we started right now, would be the point of no return. Mr. McNamara also said that if we get the equipment and personnel, alert the forces properly, and have a determination of what we are going to do, D-Day could be April 1st. The President then asked for the last time if there is any disagreement around the table, and no one evidenced any.
The senior State Department man then asked what would happen if the attack failed and what we would do then.
General Boyle then asked that even if we lose the PDJ attack plan and do not accomplish our mission, can Phoumi still hold the rest of the country? Would he be sufficiently supported? Or will we have expended all our effort on this attack? Will we back Phoumi up so we can keep the rest of the country under control? Admiral Felt commented that this would be pretty tough because the Pathet Lao are all over the country.
The President then asked the group if there was any partition of Laos that the people around the conference table felt we could agree upon.
State Department said that if we win this attack situation, we will be back to the 1954 situation and we can work from there. Admiral Felt commented that we were trying to return Laos to the situation that existed when Heintges came in. Mr. Bissell said that if we succeeded we would be back to the Geneva Accord and we would have the Pathet Lao in command in the north and the others in the south.
There followed a lengthy discussion on the use of our maximum bargaining capacity with Phoumi; [1-1/2 line of source text not declassified] that Laos is a political liability as long as we had no French, no British, no New Zealand and no Australian support.
There was a short discussion of our viewpoint for the March 20-30 SEATO conference.
The President said "What if we discuss this problem only with the Thais?" The State Department said that this would be the breakup of SEATO.
The President directed that we have another opportunity to talk this over before launching--that we would carry on our political efforts--and for the moment, say that we are gravely concerned. He wanted to make sure that if there is a military offensive in this area, we have some capability of holding things together in Laos.
The President then left the conference, with instructions that they needed to get together and set up a plan of action and get things in orderly priority of activity. This was done at a subsequent conference, and Secretary McNamara pulled together the seventeen courses of action and the assigned responsibility for them.
C.V. Clifton/9/
/9/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
26. Memorandum of Meeting
Washington, March 9, 1961.
[Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 3/2/61-3/12/61. Top Secret. 1-1/2 pages of source text not declassified.]
27. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, March 10, 1961, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-1061. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 8:21 a.m.
2138. Laos. After commenting on President's letter,/2/ Khrushchev invited me discuss specific issues. I set forth our views on Laos (Deptel 1439/3/) with exception para 3 which I worked in later in discussion. I ended presentation with statement I could personally assure Khrushchev US position not manoeuvre but sincere and genuine effort arrive at secure and neutral Laos.
/2/Apparent reference to a letter from Kennedy to Khrushchev, February 22 (?), in which the President suggested the "use of diplomatic channels for quiet informal discussion" of outstanding issues and proposed a face-to-face meeting. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 206, Kennedy/Johnson Correspondence with Khrushchev)
/3/In this telegram, March 6, the Department of State instructed Thompson to express U.S. disappointment over the Soviet answer to the U.S. proposal for a neutral nations commission; to express U.S. misgivings about the Soviet proposal for a reconvocation of the 1954 Geneva Conference; to reject the Soviet contention that U.S. military support of the Phoumi-Boun Oum government caused the crisis in Laos; and to reiterate Washington's desire for neutralization of Laos accomplished by a commission of neutral neighbors. (Ibid., Central Files, 751J.00/3-661)
Khrushchev replied US Declaration on Neutral Laos appears new and differs agreeably from position US adhered to before in its attitude toward neutralist policies of individual states. As for concrete questions, he said King's proposal, supported by US, does not seem realistic since other govts do not accept this position. He then described Boun Oum as not serious man but drunkard and libertine and added US intelligence must have already told us this.
He then described Souvanna as serious man, type like Sihanouk, and not Communist. He said they believe Souvanna govt real govt since it had been approved by Parliament and overthrown only by force from direction Thailand. He added Boun Oum govt has no legal basis since military forced King and Parliament approve it.
Khrushchev said they sympathize and support Sihanouk proposal for 14-power conference. He said that to end fighting there must be agreement between us to exercise influence on others and said mechanism could be devised along lines of "Polish-Canadian-Indian Commission." In a word, he said, we share same desire as you, namely to end fighting which only sheds blood, gives neither you nor us anything, and hurts relations between us. We welcome, he continued, a Laos that pursues neutral policy on model of Austria. He said to achieve agreement on Austria not difficult and in case of Laos situation can be brought to beneficial end.
If another approach of aggravating military conflict was chosen, he did not know what would be end but was certain it would lead to defeat of Boun Oum. Souvanna controls two-thirds of Laos now, but not capital because it lies across river from Thailand where artillery can support Boun Oum. Souvanna has people with him because of his neutralist position and his interest in welfare of peoples. Khrushchev ended with statement Laos should pursue neutralist policy like Cambodia and Burma. He said USSR does not have nor seek any interests--territorial or economic--in Laos and US has no real interest there other than prestige.
I replied we have differences over what happened in past concerning govt and pointed out sequence events contained para 3 reftel but did not use last two sentences that para. I said we had in mind Laotian Govt should be broadened and this would be one of main tasks of NNC to bring about.
I raised possibility King might establish govt of former ministers or one of technicians. I emphasized that so long as US and USSR each support different group in Laos, it difficult for Laotians themselves broaden their govt. I said I had no brief for Boun Oum but pointed out there are other people in his govt. I said it would be clearly impossible for us to acknowledge Souvanna as head legal govt but said we had no objection to Souvanna in broadened govt or even as head govt if others in Laos agreed. I said we should let Laotians work out their own govt and we and USSR should attempt reach agreement to support neutrality of Laos just as we did in Austria. I concluded we did not see how conference of 14 countries with different positions can arrive at settlement we both desire. This bound result in polemical discussion which would make situation more difficult.
Khrushchev agreed this question for people Laos. He said he did not know what kind govt could be established since neither Boun Oum nor Souvanna recognize each other. He said USSR, like US, exercises influence and renders assistance in Laos and it necessary try find decision.
Khrushchev said if we honestly agree on neutrality for Laos, this already step forward and perhaps conversations should be continued. He pointed out Gromyko now New York and suggested he and Secretary Rusk might continue discussion. He said he had desire achieve peace in Laos but did not see concrete way.
Khrushchev then said US would not lose if Souvanna heads govt, because he not Communist nor candidate of Communists but rather man like Sihanouk or Nehru and would not, in Khrushchev's opinion, follow pro-Soviet policy. He added parenthetically no Communists in Laos, but perhaps sympathizers.
Referring to possibilities for creating new govt in Laos, I said Phoumi was important factor. I reiterated idea of King heading govt, of King appointing govt of technicians, or of agreement on govt headed by someone acceptable to both sides. I said we thought NNC would be helpful in forming govt and that once Laotian knew US and USSR agree, once US and USSR out of picture, they will be able work more easily together. Khrushchev said he agreed and then referred to Phoumi's plans to see Souvanna but said he did not know on what they would agree.
Khrushchev said if we both honestly want create conditions to end fighting and have neutralist Laos, let us not reject efforts find common ground. Noting Souvanna plans trip, said maybe we should wait little while, but before I could make point he went on to say question should not be put off for long time because it would become more complicated and fighting could flare up. I replied that precisely what we concerned about. I said it would be good for Secretary and Gromyko to discuss how to solve problem. I said it would be pity if we could not arrive at solution on problem where we had same objectives.
Khrushchev said he agreed, and then, as final remark, jovially said let us accept Souvanna. I replied let us both accept Boun Oum. Khrushchev answered that we cannot agree on which is legal govt, and then asked what other subjects we might discuss.
Comment follows./4/
/4/In telegram 2139, March 10, Thompson reported that Khrushchev seemed convinced that the United States was "genuinely seeking" neutrality for Laos and that he was "intrigued by the possibility" of settling the problem. Thompson suggested there was a real possibility that Rusk could convince Gromyko to urge Souvanna to accept either a government of technicians headed by King Savang, a government of former prime ministers and vice prime ministers, or a government headed by a third party. (Ibid., 751J.00/3-1061) Also published in Declassified Documents, 1977, 636.
Thompson
28. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, March 10, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 3/2/61-3/12/61. Confidential.
1. I believe you should reflect on the deeper lesson of our experience in Laos thus far. That lesson is that the Department of State has an understandable instinct to conduct pure diplomacy with minimum involvement with the CIA and the military until and acute crisis occurs. The tendency is then to turn the problem over almost wholly to those who control force, and to get the hell out. Concretely, first we listened to Brown; then we listened to Felt. We never faced them--and what they represent--together. This is the pattern which produces the uneasy relations between State and the Pentagon which surfaced yesterday./2/
/2/Apparently in the meeting, as described in Document 26.
2. This is the exact opposite of Communist policy which is to orchestrate force and diplomacy intimately at every stage.
3. The instinctive American position, in the face of Communist tactics, is dangerous on several grounds. When we are being nice diplomats we tend to lose ground. We lose opportunities along the way to strengthen our diplomatic position. When we turn to force, after diplomatic setbacks, we have to use more force than would otherwise be necessary, and we bring closer the moment when our position must be defended by direct U.S. military intervention.
4. There is another weakness. When the diplomats withdraw and we begin to think, as we did yesterday, in terms of military hardware, we tend to forget that, in the end, most of the situations we confront are, in their essence, political and can only be settled by diplomatic and political formulae. You yourself noted the vagueness of the Department's conception as to what kind of a political settlement in Laos is possible that we could live with.
5. I think we must put our minds steadily to work--in general and on each particular problem--on how to orchestrate diplomacy and force better all the way along the line. In the case of Laos. we must have a much sharper notion as to what our political objective is; and the Department of State should be instructed to go to work on this and report.
29. Memorandum From the President's Military Aide (Clifton) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, March 10, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 3/2/61-3/13/61. Secret. Clifton noted on this memorandum that the President saw it. McGeorge Bundy wrote on it "very interesting."
ATTENTION: Mr. Bundy
I had an opportunity to talk to General Boyle and Colonel Wood after the meeting yesterday./2/ The following points were developed:
/2/See Documents 25 and 26.
a. The PDJ plan is essentially Phoumi's plan, with very slight modifications by CINCPAC and the JCS. Phoumi and Boyle and Wood are all firmly convinced that this will succeed.
b. All the items they have requested for implementation are essential to a continuing program of military capabilities. They were especially grateful that you had called this meeting because they have had some trouble in getting these very few items that they need.
c. Boyle and Wood point out that we do not have to wait until all of this is ready and then make a large decision to launch. They gave me as their honest estimates that when the eight large aircraft are ready--and if they are given permission to use them--they will accomplish this mission with the facilities now at hand.
They estimate that the Pathet Lao will "bug out" at the first sign of heavy attack. Their battalions will disintegrate and they will fade into the woods. They point out that the only reason Royal troops folded at the crossroad was on account of some unobserved artillery fire which fell in the area and scared them to death.
d. They gave as their honest opinion that there would be no intensification of the fight by Souvanna or the Soviets because of the use of the air bombardment. They point out that the Air Attach[ from Saigon is running daily aerial reconnaissance over the PDJ from altitudes as low as 200 and 300 feet (that is where those air photos came from) and no one has made a pass at them. They believe that the Soviet interest in building up these supplies is "to keep the pot boiling" and to keep the Chinese Communists out of the fracas so that they won't have so much influence in the future.
e. Obviously, Boyle and Wood are not diplomatic experts, but they feel strongly that Souvanna would be welcomed back by the Royal Lao Government troops and also by a great many members of the present Royal Government who feel that Laos should be unified politically.
f. Boyle and Wood say that the Phoumi army has good morale--as good as the Pathet Lao, but they have pointed out in cables over and over again the bare fact that everytime a battalion commander becomes aggressive, Phoumi relieves him of his command. He doesn't want any one personality to develop as a military leader. The other reason is that he doesn't want to be guilty of killing a lot of other Laotians.
This is the most significant part of the action on the military level: No Laotians want to shoot each other. They cannot look down a rifle barrel and shoot another Laotian. They can stand off with artillery pieces and blast hell out of each other because they don't see the results. Furthermore, their artillery fire is largely ineffective because both groups are dug in and neither group is skilled enough to use high-angle fire to get into the bunkers.
g. Boyle and Wood have the strong feeling that before you have given a decision to go all the way, you could take the intermediate step--which they are convinced would also test Communist intentions--of letting them use the eight big aircraft.
C.V. Clifton
30. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos/1/
Washington, March 11, 1961, 6:28 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-1161. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Chapman and Usher, cleared by Steeves and in substance with Anderson and Parsons, and approved by Rusk.
951. For Ambassador from Secretary. I believe it is important you tell Phoumi at this critical juncture that while we still believe worthwhile for RLG continue explore possibility achieve political settlement, US reaffirms its determination support independence and integrity of Laos. RLG need not therefore contemplate making any concessions to Communists that might endanger freedom of country.
While talks going on in search satisfactory political settlement it is of utmost importance for RLG pursue military effort vigorously because military position will condition any political settlement. It is vital not permit any weakening RLG military position. US determined continue support RLG in its military efforts. (FYI. Relevant important message this subject being sent to you today in another channel./2/ End FYI.)
/2/Not further identified.
Rusk
31. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, March 12, 1961.
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-1261. Top Secret. Drafted by Anderson and approved in S on March 29.
SUBJECT
Situation in Laos
PARTICIPANTS
(See page 4)
The following are highlights of a two-hour meeting which began at 2 p.m. under the chairmanship of the Secretary:
1. The Secretary opened the meeting by saying that recent news stories about the situation in Laos were not at all encouraging and, in fact, the situation appeared serious. There was a need to strengthen the position of the government's troops on the ground in order to make political efforts successful. However, it appeared that, as a cover for military action, the Soviets were engaged in delaying tactics as shown by the time involved in discussing the ICC proposal and the relaxed fashion of Mr. Khrushchev's talk with Ambassador Thompson./2/ The situation was such that we must prepare for the contingency of a major Communist drive in Laos.
/2/March 10; see Document 27.
2. The Secretary said we needed better and faster intelligence since the information we were getting was twelve to twenty-four hours old. The Secretary felt intelligence from Laos should be received at intervals of no less than eight hours and that every third report should be analytical; we would leave to the experts how this was to be done. [6 lines of source text not declassified]. Mr. McNamara emphasized that it was most important to have frequent appraisals of the situation.
3. The Secretary said that if our intelligence information should indicate a strong Communist effort in Laos, we had a number of actions in mind:
a. Early publication of a statement of warning.
b. Consider referring the matter to the UN.
c. Consult with the British and French as quickly as possible and with other SEATO members.
d. If we decided to step up military action, we would do so unilaterally or through SEATO.
e. USIA might consider a program on Communist intervention, including the preparation of a White Paper emphasizing the Soviet airlift and North Vietnamese participation.
f. On the military side, we would review the decisions reached at the White House on March 9, each one of which was already being acted on.
[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]
5. In discussing the employment of the T-6 aircraft already provided the RLG, Mr. McNamara reiterated the Defense position that these aircraft should be free to bomb military targets. Mr. Parsons explained the position taken by the Ambassador and most of the members of the Country Team against the use of bombs, which was largely based on a fear of retaliation against key airports, especially Vientiane. General Lemnitzer thought that these T-6 aircraft should not be committed for bombing missions [less then 1 line of source text not declassified].
6. The Secretary outlined his concept of three phases of action which we might have to take:
Phase 1 would involve the maximum acceleration of the steps authorized by the President on March 9 and the review by the military [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of these steps. The military plan prepared by CINCPAC would have to be modified to meet new circumstances.
Phase 2 would involve the overt commitment of outside forces, especially Asian ground forces, with U.S. logistic and air support. The Secretary raised the question of whether at this phase to move a Marine combat group into the area as a demonstration of our seriousness of purpose.
Phase 3 would go into operation if there were sufficiently serious escalation in Laos or in Viet-Nam as to require us to consider military action against the whole complex. How could we intervene most effectively? How would our air arm be most effectively used? The Secretary felt that there was a possible overestimation on our side since (1) we could not guarantee the steadfastness of any Lao, even Phoumi, and some of his troops were discouraged and weary; and (2) we should not count too heavily on the effectiveness of air action in this terrain. (General Lemnitzer said that air action in itself would not be sufficient and that there must be adequate forces on the ground.)
7. In a discussion of intelligence reports, General Lemnitzer said there was nothing to indicate the imminence of the fall of Luang Prabang. The Pathet Lao who had taken the road junction were fanning out north and south but could not move any faster than the road would permit.
8. In discussing Admiral Felt's plan to attack the Plaine des Jarres, it was agreed that the plan would have to be changed in view of the capture of the crossroads. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
9. There was a brief discussion of the possibility of eliminating Souvanna as the "legal Prime Minister", possibly by inducing him to become a Deputy Prime Minister under the King or a relative, with Boun Oum as the other Deputy Prime Minister.
10. It was agreed that the President's [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] authorizing the T-6's to use bombs would be taken up with him tomorrow.
PARTICIPANTS
White House
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Department of State
The Secretary
Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant
Mr. J. Graham Parsons, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs
Mr. Theodore C. Achilles
Mr. Roger Hilsman, The Director--Intelligence & Research
Mr. John M. Steeves, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Daniel V. Anderson, Director, Office of Southeast Asian Affairs
Department of Defense
Mr. Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense
Mr. Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense
General L.L. Lemnitzer
General Paul J. Fontana
Central Intelligency Agency
General C.P. Cabell
Mr. Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
[1 line of source text not declassified]
United States Information Agency
Mr. Edward R. Murrow, Director
32. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cambodia/1/
Washington, March, 12, 1961, 9:04 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-1261. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Rusk and cleared by Parsons, Anderson, and Chapman. Repeated priority to Vientiane.
805. For Moore from Secretary. Please arrange see Souvanna Phouma alone and give him following message orally from me:
"As Secretary of State of new Administration I have been much preoccupied with unhappy situation in which Lao people now find themselves. Since I know you must be similarly concerned, I am asking our representative to give you my views. President Kennedy has unequivocally declared his policy in support of genuinely neutral and independent Laos. Basis his declaration is complete absence of any selfish United States interest or ambition in that country and our deep feeling that Lao people should be allowed by others to live in peace. This has been the purpose of efforts we have made to obtain acceptance by other powers, including Soviet Union, of neutral and independent country, as well as to bring about reconciliation all patriotic elements without which Laos cannot survive.
Unfortunately, there is strong reason to believe that Communists either do not comprehend or are unwilling to accept genuine neutrality as that term has long been understood among nations. The introduction into Laos of large reinforcements of personnel from DRV and heavy Soviet arms supply are to establish such a Communist position in Laos as to enable them to subject it forcibly to their control at will. We know Your Highness as dedicated, patriotic man. We know that Your Highness has also sought to preserve independence of your country. Yet we greatly fear, quite frankly, that Communists are using your name as a facade behind which to accomplish purposes you yourself do not endorse. I have been told of the many times you have told our Ambassador that as a Royal Prince of Laos you could not possibly become a Communist or support their cause.
It has not been my privilege, since I have only recently assumed my present office, to have worked with you on these difficult problems. But I should like to give you categorical assurances that the Government of the United States has no other purpose than to allow the Lao people to work out their own destiny without being caught up in the turbulent struggles which are in course in other parts of the world. It is with this in view that I should like to make certain personal remarks which I would hope you would consider to be in the best interests of your country.
My first hope would be that you could find it possible to cooperate with others who are trying to build an independent Laos and to be a part of a government serving the King and the nation under acknowledged constitutional processes. I have been told of certain suggestions that have been made to reorganize the government which offer fruitful means for accomplishing this cooperation and which I would hope Your Highness would entertain seriously.
Alternatively, if, as reported in press from Phnom Penh, you plan to undertake a world trip and not return to Laos, I sincerely believe that you could best serve your country and establish your place in its history if you declined to accept formal responsibility for what is being attempted in your name by declaring that you do not consider that those who are bringing in heavy arms by plane and road to attack Vientiane and Luang Prabang have any right to act in the name of the Royal Lao Government. In this contingency, I can assure you that United States influence and assistance will be used in the direction of a broadly based government motivated by a sincere concern for the Lao people and for the neutrality and independence to which they are entitled.
I have taken the somewhat unusual step of this personal communication because I see other alternatives looming on the near horizon which could lead only to severe suffering and tragic violence among the people of Laos. The peoples of Southeast Asia no more than the people of Laos want a Communist-controlled Laos imposed by an armed minority with massive external support. Other nations, and also the United States, which has for years been trying to assure that the various peoples of the world be left free to work out their own destinies, do not wish to see and will not in my opinion readily permit another chapter in the long history of Communist aggression.
I do hope that you will reflect upon what I have said and do your utmost to assist in bringing this dangerous and distressing situation to an early, peaceful and satisfactory conclusion."/2/
/2/In telegram 1186 from Phnom Penh, March 14, Charge Moore reported that he had met with Souvanna Phouma and read him a French translation of Rusk's message. Souvanna stated that he would not return to Vientiane as a member of the Boun Oum government and he suggested that the establishment of the Neutral Nations Commission and convocation of a 14- or 13-nation Conference on Laos should be concomitant. (Ibid., 751J.00/3-1461)
Rusk
33. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, March 16, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.11/3-1261. Secret. Drafted by Usher and cleared by Anderson, Chapman, and Steeves.
SUBJECT
Possible Visit to the United States by Souvanna Phouma
Background:
Souvanna has indicated to the press that he would be glad to visit the US during his trip if there were any indication forthcoming from the United States that he would be welcome here. Embassy Vientiane has reported (Vientiane's 1679 of March 12)/2/ that Souvanna told Ngon Sannikone that he would like very much to stop off in Washington and see the Secretary and, if possible, the President. Souvanna indicated belief that he might be able to persuade them that the Soviets would stop their airlift if the US ceased its supply of war materiel to the Phoumi forces, but he spoke bitterly of US policy in the past. Ngon said he hoped the US would invite Souvanna to visit Washington so as to soften Souvanna's bitterness. Phoumi told the Embassy that he preferred that Souvanna stay in Phnom Penh, but that if he did start a tour then it would be a good idea for Souvanna to visit the US to make him more amenable to Western influence.
/2/Not printed.
Reports from our Embassies in Phnom Penh and Vientiane, as well as Souvanna's own statements in reply to your message,/3/ indicate that the negotiations in Phnom Penh between Souvanna and Phoumi foundered on the issue of the nature and timing of an international conference on Laos. Although Souvanna's initial position was that a conference should be convened prior to the formation of the NNC, he apparently retreated to the concept that the NNC could be formed simultaneously with the convening of the conference. Souvanna also seems to be pressing for fairly early elections.
/3/Document 32.
Phoumi has, of course, agreed in a discussion with Souvanna, and with Cambodian Government officials, that there should be an international conference. However, at Ambassador Brown's suggestion, Phoumi has held out for the concept that any conference should follow the work of a NNC. Ambassador Brown also told Phoumi that we would be prepared to consider a conference called for the purpose of ratifying and implementing the actions of the NNC, although we were not enthusiastic about this. (Vientiane's 1693)/4/
/4/Dated March 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-1461)
While we have not put forward any proposal with respect to the question of elections, it is our view, and one which the RLG would undoubtedly accept, that elections should be postponed for at least a year and a half. The British have volunteered a similar view on the matter to our Embassy in London.
Discussion:
It is generally known throughout the world and, of course, in Laos that the US has considered that Souvanna is a man who is too willing to make dangerous compromises with the Communists. Moreover, the press has reported that Souvanna left Phnom Penh before concluding negotiations with the RLG representatives there; that the main issue has been disagreement on the timing of an international conference; and that Souvanna has embarked on a world tour to gain support for his position. Communist broadcasts from Peking and Hanoi in the last few days have been emphasizing that to restore peace in Laos and provide a guarantee of its neutrality an international conference should be called which "should assign concrete tasks to an international commission". These broadcasts have also insisted that "the US imperialists and their lackeys must, first of all, withdraw their aggressive troops from Laos and must stop their military assistance to the Phoumi-Boun Oum traitor clique". These broadcasts have also specifically stated that the NLHX "is willing to support at all times all efforts made by Souvanna in carrying out the above mentioned policy--the only correct policy".
It is pretty clear then that, as of the moment, Souvanna is unwilling to go any further in accommodating his position to that proposed by Phoumi than is permitted by the limitations placed upon him by the publicly announced Communist policy.
If under these circumstances we were to receive Souvanna in the United States for talks with the Secretary and the President, our action would be interpreted by the Lao, as well as by other members of the international community, as indicating a serious weakness in our intentions to oppose Communist designs in Laos. This would have a further deteriorating impact on the already waning morale of the Lao Army.
On the other hand, if during Souvanna's visits to New Delhi, Paris and London, the Indians, French and British would press upon Souvanna the importance of handling the conference question in the manner proposed by Phoumi and putting off the elections for at least a year and a half, it is possible that Souvanna might indicate a willingness to try to move beyond the limitations placed on him by the Communists toward an accommodation with Phoumi's position. If there were good evidence that this in fact was being accomplished during Souvanna's visits to these countries, we might then find it useful to receive Souvanna here in order to confirm our willingness to seek a solution on the basis of Phoumi's proposals and our firm intention not to go beyond those proposals toward the Communist position in seeking a peaceful solution. Under such circumstances we could make it clear to the Lao and others that we are standing behind the RLG's efforts to oppose Communist ascendancy and that we are only receiving Souvanna because he has manifested a willingness to move constructively toward the Phoumi position.
Recommendations:
1. That we seek British, French and Indian agreement that every effort must be made to bring Souvanna around to acceptance of the Phoumi position on the question of the conference and the timing of elections.
2. That if as a result of British, French and Indian discussions with him, it appears that there would be any possibility of our moving Souvanna in that direction, we would indicate a willingness to receive him here on an unofficial basis.
34. Notes by Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, March 18, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-1861. Top Secret. Delivered to Kohler at 10:30 a.m. on March 19. These notes are an addendum to the memorandum of a meeting, which lasted from 2:45 to 6 p.m., between Rusk and Gromyko. (Ibid.) Gromyko was in New York for a resumed session of the U.N. General Assembly and traveled to Washington for discussion on March 18. After seeing Gromyko, Rusk told the British and French Ambassadors that the length of the meeting was misleading, it could have been accomplished in less than an hour. Rusk said he tried to find out what the Soviets really expected to happen in Laos--the government they foresaw, their attitude towards continued fighting, their general estimate of the situation. Rusk stated that Gromyko was "completely elusive," refused to give substantive answers, and repeatedly returned to the Soviet proposal that discussions on Laos must begin with an international conference. (Memorandum of conversation, March 18; ibid.)
The following notes were drafted by the Secretary, who asked that they be passed to Mr. Kohler for inclusion in his notes of the Gromyko meeting:
"After the group discussion, I called Gromyko aside briefly and gave him the line agreed in Mr. Bohlen's 'stick' memorandum./2/ I said that I was speaking privately with him on the basis of a talk I had with the President. Mr. Gromyko picked up my word 'underestimate' in the last point and said, 'But don't underestimate us either.' He asked me to tell the President that the Soviet Union 'wants nothing' in Laos. He added that if we had any proposals about Laos they would be at our disposal.
/2/Parsons prepared a briefing memorandum, March 17, for Rusk's talks with Gromyko, which he described as the "carrot". Bohlen prepared a memorandum, also March 17, which Parsons called "the stick", but it has not been found. (Both ibid., 751J.00/3-1761)
Since we had discussed a variety of possibilities with him in the group discussion and had no indication of interest in a settlement in Laos, I concluded that the Soviets are content to let matters develop on the ground and were not interested in serious discussions at this stage.
D.R."/3/
/3/ Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
35. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, March 21, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Libary, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 3/20/61-3/22/61. Secret.
SUBJECT
Laos
One fundamental fact failed to emerge from yesterday's discussion of Laos,/2/ which you may wish to have elaborated this afternoon./3/
/2/On March 20, Kennedy met with McNamara, Admiral Arleigh Burke, Nitze, Bowles, Parsons, Bohlen, Dulles, Richard Bissell, Desmond FitzGerald, McGeorge Bundy, Rostow, and Theodore Sorensen to discuss the Laos situation. The meeting, which was described as "off the record," began at 5:30 and ended at 7:20 p.m. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book)
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., describes this meeting in A Thousand Days, pp. 332-333, incorrectly as an NSC meeting. Schlesinger writes that the participants discussed the possibility of moving a small number of U.S. troops into the Mekong Valley to deter the Pathet Lao and act as a bargaining chip at an international conference on Laos. According to Schlesinger, the JCS objected and warned that North Vietnam would send thousands of troops into Laos in response and war with China could be a possibility. The JCS recommended either a large-scale intervention of 60,000 troops with air cover, and even the use of nuclear weapons, or else no intervention. Roger Hilsman also discussed the JCS objections in To Move a Nation, pp. 127-132.
/3/See Documents 36 and 38.
The fact is this: the basic military plan, which we are modifying for Laos, calls for the placing of our forces, in the first instance, in Thailand rather than Laos. The plan could, of course, be modified to place them directly into Vientiane; and some of them could be parachuted into the Vientiane area or anywhere else.
But the meaning of this plan is that we can move as many troops as we wish, if we have Sarit's agreement, into Thailand; and we can move them as soon as we wish. We would then be in a position to feed them into Laos at the times and places the situation demands.
36. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, March 21, 1961.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, 092 Laos 1961, Jan.-March. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Discussion of Laos at White House Meeting, March 21 (from notes by Mr. Nitze)/2/
/2/The meeting took place from 2:40 to 3:30 p.m. and was attended by the President, Vice President Johnson, McNamara, Burke, Nitze, Bowles, Parsons, Bohlen, Dulles, Bissell, Clifton, FitzGerald, McGeorge Bundy, Rostow, and Sorensen. It was characterized as "off the record." (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book, Book I)
1. Mr. Rusk explained that, even if we move in, the object is not to fight a big war but to lay a foundation for negotiation. He said that the approach was "two-stringed,"--negotiation and action.
2. The diplomatic moves are:
a. Tell the British to modify their present position.
b. Tell the Russians the seriousness of the US view, but that if the Russians were prepared to get the Pathet Lao to stop moving forward, thus creating a de facto cease-fire, then the British would be willing to meet in New Delhi with the Soviets as co-chairmen of the old Geneva Conference. This meeting in turn would lead to a 14-nation conference in which the US would participate. Concurrently, there should be negotiation for a settlement among the Lao political leaders.
3. On the action side, the following steps were to be taken:
a. British to agree to a SEATO force stationed in Thailand but not entering Laos for the time being.
b. British to support an effort at the SEATO Conference to induce all other members to join.
c. Sarit to be assured of our support.
d. The US to move forward with all the 17 actions agreed at the White House recently,/3/ up to, but short of, the actual commitment of the B-26s and other forces.
/3/See Document 26.
e. Congressional leaders to be told tomorrow the general plan.
f. President to hold a press conference Thursday.
4. Actions today:
a. Rusk to talk to British and French here.
b. Cables to New Delhi, Harriman, Nehru, etc.
c. Cables to other SEATO members.
d. Cable to Brown to inform Phoumi, and keep the King in Vientiane (i.e., not going back to Luang Prabang).
e. Pentagon to take all preparatory steps indicated in the paper tabled at the meeting./4/
/4/Not found.
5. Remaining questions:
a. What happens if the Russians don't agree to a de facto cease-fire? It was suggested that in this event, we should persuade the British to support the SEATO action in any event and should prepare to execute the Millpond operation and go on from there.
William P. Bundy/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
37. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/
Washington, March 21, 1961, 10:59 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-2161. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Chapman, cleared with SEA and in draft by Parsons, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Paris, Rangoon, Phnom Penh, and Vientiane.
2579. New Delhi for Ambassador Harriman. Deptel 2566./2/
/2/In telegram 2566, March 20, the Department told Harriman the President wanted him to make contact with Souvanna Phouma through Nehru and that guidelines for the talk would follow. (Ibid., 751J.00/3-2061)
If still feasible you should request Nehru to arrange meeting with Prince Souvanna Phouma not as Prime Minister but as former Prime Minister and prominent Lao. If meeting arranged you should talk to Souvanna/3/ along following lines:
/3/Harriman saw Souvanna Phouma in New Delhi and had a conversation with him, but because of a delay in communications, Harriman did not receive telegram 2566 until after Souvanna left for Paris. Therefore, the Department cabled identical instructions to Ambassador James Gavin in Paris to present to Souvanna on his arrival. (Telegram 1063 to Manila, Bowles to Rusk, March 24; ibid., 751J.00/3-2461) Harriman's discussion with Souvanna in New Delhi is in a memorandum of conversation, March 22. (Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, Subject File, SEA)
Situation in Laos was one of most pressing international problems confronting new administration when it took office. After reviewing situation, administration determined that it remained policy of US to support independence and integrity of Laos. It is view of US that Laos should be at peace and recognized as neutralized state unaligned in its international relations, and free to exercise its sovereign right to manage its own affairs and to provide for its national integrity.
It also remains policy of US to try to find peaceful settlement which would ensure these objectives. For this reason US has continued to consider with great interest various proposals that have been made for such settlement. One of these was proposal to call international conference made by Sihanouk and supported by Souvanna.
After careful study of all these proposals, it appeared to US that declaration issued by King of Laos on February 19 offered sound basis for peaceful settlement. It incorporated ideas suggested by Sihanouk and by Government of Burma. It proposed to bring into Laos representatives of nations which have clear interest in preservation of independence of countries of area and yet which are unaligned. It offered guarantees to all neighbors of Laos that it would not be used as base of aggression. To Lao themselves it offered assurances that they could work out their internal differences free from international pressures and intervention. US is prepared to support such settlement which it considers equitable and in consonance with best interests of Laos. For its part and as token of its willingness to work toward truly neutral Laos, US would be prepared to have its military assistance screened by proposed Neutral Nations Commission (NNC) and to examine with other donor states channeling of economic and technical aid through international mechanism.
US has never been opposed to international conference in principle but has had misgivings because there is yet no known mutually acceptable basis for settlement. US has feared that conference held under these circumstances might permit continuation of Communist intervention aimed at capture of country, lead to public exchange of recriminations, which far from bringing about tranquilization of situation might result in heightening international tensions, and possibly fail. Such failure would make likelihood enlargement of conflict greater. Furthermore even if it could come to grips with problem, US seriously wonders whether international conference would produce better settlement than one proposed by King. Indeed it might be worse.
US also shares Souvanna's desire to end fratricidal struggle in Laos. For this reason we are seeking to have Soviets call a cessation of hostilities. If a de facto cease-fire can be achieved within few days, we prepared agree to meeting of International Control Commission (ICC) and holding 14-nation conference. If however Communists do not halt their offensive, we shall consider other measures. In US eyes however essential step is reconciliation non-Communist elements to bring forth widely representative RLG. It has been a constant of US policy as Souvanna knows to encourage unity of patriotic elements in Laos for US believes only on basis such unity can Laos confront united party supported by bloc. Thus US considered Phnom Penh talks between Souvanna and General Phoumi as constructive step and regrets that Souvanna's departure has prevented their being pursued further. US hopes that Souvanna would return to Phnom Penh and talks resumed ASAP. US also hopes that Soviet airlift can stop or that at very least Souvanna will dissociate himself from Communist build-up which threatening very life of country.
In endeavor to save Laos, US is convinced that Souvanna deeply imbued with patriotic desire of freedom of his country from foreign domination from either side which is all US itself desires and that he will recognize real dangers to his country. US is convinced that Souvanna has essential role to play in helping save his country.
Rusk
38. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos/1/
Washington, March 21, 1961, 11:01 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-2161. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Parsons, cleared by Usher, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD and priority to Bangkok.
992. 1. At White House meeting/2/ following was decided:
/2/See Document 36.
a. Objective remains to reach political settlement.
b. We shall pursue courses of action both political and military.
c. Political--We shall seek British cooperation to tell Soviets that if PL offensive stopped and de facto cessation of hostilities can be achieved, we willing to agree to meeting of ICC and holding 14-nation conference.
d. Military--We should pursue courses of action already in train to meet all eventualities.
e. We should prepare RLG and King appeal to SEATO and in event PL offensive did not stop, we persuade RLG to make an appeal. We would expect SEATO to respond by bringing forth a SEATO force into Thailand for possible move to Laos if it became necessary. Preliminary phase to Thailand following political action outlined above should facilitate SEATO unity (hitherto lacking).
2. You should immediately consult King and Phoumi to describe to them above proposed line of action. You should make clear to them that while we moving on political front to seek peaceful settlement, we remain firmly determined to do what is necessary to preserve independence of Laos and there should be no let-down in military effort. It particularly important at present time when this major test of PL and Soviet intentions is being made that King and Phoumi rally morale FAL and Government to be prepared for next phase, political or military, either of which will require maximum effectiveness Lao effort. FYI. RLG should not of course launch SEATO appeal until agreed time. End FYI.
3. You should urge on King to remain in Vientiane as we would hope to consult closely with him on development of events. FYI In view uncertainty military situation we would prefer he remain there than Luang Prabang. As added argument you might tell him that in our view he symbol of country's unity and independence. Therefore considering difficult times country is experiencing it seems to us that his continuing presence in Vientiane should have beneficial effect of upholding morale and prestige of population and RLG. End FYI.
Rusk
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