UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATOR
IN THE MATTER OF
SENECA ASBESTOS REMOVAL
& CONTROL, INC., and CAA-010A-1993
SCHOOLCRAFT CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Respondents
INITIAL DECISION
DATED: January 2, 1997
CAA: This proceeding was brought under Section 113(d)(1) of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §
7413(d)(1), which authorizes the assessment of civil penalties for violations of Section 112 of the CAA,
42 U.S.C. § 7412, and the Regulations promulgated thereunder. In pertinent part, Counts I through V of
the Complaint alleged violations by the Respondent SchoolCraft Construction , Inc. (SchoolCraft) of
Subpart M of Part 61 of the EPA Regulations on asbestos , 40 C.F.R. Part 61, Subpart M. However,
Complainant failed to establish a prima facie case against SchoolCraft on the five Counts in the
Complaint since it did not establish that SchoolCraft was an operator of the asbestos removal project
involved, a necessary prerequisite to find SchoolCraft liable for the violations. Accordingly, pursuant to
Section 22.20(a) of the EPA Rules of Practice (Rules), 40 C.F.R. § 22.20(a), the proceeding against
SchoolCraft is dismissed with prejudice. Since this dismissal disposes of all remaining outstanding issues
in this case, it constitutes an Initial Decision under Section 22.20(b) of the Rules.
APPEARANCES:
For Complainant:
Timothy J. Chapman, Esq.
for U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Region 5
For Respondent:
Martin Lewis, Esq.
for SchoolCraft Construction,
Inc.
I. Procedural History
This proceeding arises under Section 113(d)(1) of the Clean Air Act (CAA or the Act), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413(d)(1). This Section authorizes the assessment of civil penalties for, among other things, a
violation of any requirement in Section 112 of the CAA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. In
a Complaint filed on June 15, 1993, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region 5
(Complainant), alleges in nine Counts that Seneca Asbestos Removal & Control, Inc. (Seneca) had failed
to comply with the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants ("NESHAP') for asbestos,
which are contained in Part 61, Subpart M of the EPA Regulations, 40 C.F.R. Part 61, Subpart M, and
which are promulgated under Section 112 of the CAA. The nine Counts involved four projects, including
the 1992 renovation at W.O. Cline Elementary School (Cline or Cline Elementary) in Centerville, Ohio.
In addition, the first five Counts of the Complaint allege that SchoolCraft Construction, Inc.(Respondent
or SchoolCraft) failed to comply with the asbestos NESHAP standards during the 1992 renovation at
Cline.
The first five Counts of the Complaint specifically allege that Seneca and SchoolCraft, during the
Cline Elementary project, violated various provisions of the asbestos NESHAP standards for demolition
and renovation operations, which are set forth in Section 61.145 of the EPA Regulations, 40 C.F.R. §
61.145.1 The five Counts at issue herein charge as follows: Counts I and II, failure to notify the Regional
Air Pollution Control Authority (RAPCA), by telephone and in writing, of a new starting date for the
asbestos removal project, as required by Section 61.145(b)(3)(iv)(A)(1) and (2) of the EPA Regulations;
Counts III and IV, failure to wet adequately all regulated asbestos containing material (RACM) being
stripped during renovation, and to ensure that the RACM remains wet until collected and contained or
treated in preparation for disposal, as required by Section 61.145(c)(3) and (c)(6)(i) of the EPA
Regulations; and Count V, failure to post evidence of an on-site representative's training in asbestos
NESHAP requirements, as required by Section 61.145(c)(8) of the EPA Regulations. For these alleged
violations, Complainant proposed that a $62,000 civil penalty be assessed, of which $42,000 would be
entered against Seneca and $20,000 against SchoolCraft.
In their Answers, Respondent and Seneca denied all charges alleged in the Complaint, asserted
certain defenses, and contested the reasonableness of the proposed penalty.
Before this case went to hearing, Complainant settled the matter with Seneca. A Consent
Agreement and Consent Order between Complainant and Seneca, which resolved, inter alia, the charges
and proposed civil penalties against Seneca in connection with the Cline asbestos removal project, was
executed on September 1, 1994. After the Seneca settlement, this action proceeded solely against
SchoolCraft.
The parties filed joint stipulations of fact and exhibits on October 31, 1995, which were
supplemented on September 9, 1996. This proceeding went to an evidentiary hearing on September 24-25, 1996, in Dayton, Ohio, during which the following decisional record was established. All joint
stipulations of fact and exhibits were admitted into the record (Tr. 32). The joint stipulations of fact
consisted of 36 stipulations2 , and the joint exhibits were numbered 1 through 25. Complainant presented
six witnesses and introduced twelve exhibits, numbered 23 through 29, and 67 through 71. All the
Complainant's exhibits were admitted into evidence, except for Complainant's exhibit 25, which was
excluded. Also, Complainant's exhibits 23, 24, 26, 27, 28 and 29 were admitted for the limited purpose
of putting into context part of the methodology that was used to calculate the proposed penalty (Tr. 206-219). Respondent presented one exhibit, which was admitted into evidence for the limited purpose of
putting testimony in context as to how the economic impact factor was assessed in the overall proposed
penalty (Tr. 253). Initial briefs and reply briefs were submitted according to the schedules established.3
This initial decision will consist of a brief review of the factual background of this case, a
delineation of one dispositive issue, a discussion as necessary of the positions of the parties with regard to
the dispositive issue, an analysis and resolution of the dispositive issue, and an order resolving this
proceeding. Any argument in the parties' briefs not addressed specifically herein is rejected as either
unsupported by the evidence or as not sufficiently persuasive to warrant comment. Any proposed finding
or conclusion accompanying the briefs not incorporated directly or inferentially into the decision, is
rejected as unsupported in law or in fact, or as unnecessary for rendering this decision.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
To place this proceeding in context, it is helpful to review briefly the events that led to this case.
Centerville City Schools (Centerville) has jurisdiction over all schools within the boundaries of
the City of Centerville located in Montgomery County, Ohio (Stip. No. 2). Cline Elementary is a public
school building within the jurisdiction of Centerville (Stip. Nos. 3 & 4).
In 1989, Centerville hired SchoolCraft to develop an asbestos management plan for Cline
Elementary (Stip. No. 6). As part of the process for developing the plan, suspect asbestos containing
materials (ACM) were tested under EPA approved methods to determine if in fact the materials contained
asbestos (Stip. No. 7). The testing of the suspect materials revealed that Cline Elementary contained at
least the following ACM: (1) roughly 17,500 square feet of friable spray on acoustical plaster located
throughout many parts of the school, (2) about 4,730 linear feet of heat and water pipe insulation located
in the Boiler Room and Boiler Room Tunnels, (3) approximately 1,200 square feet of block insulation in
the Boiler Room, and (4) roughly 23,760 square feet of ceiling tile located throughout many parts of the
school (Stip. No. 8).
After preparation of the asbestos management plan, Centerville decided to abate the asbestos
conditions by removing the ACM described above (Stip. No. 9). Under contract from Centerville,
SchoolCraft prepared the project specifications for the asbestos abatement project at Cline Elementary
(Stip. No. 10). Based upon the specifications, Centerville solicited bids for the Cline Elementary
asbestos abatement project from various asbestos abatement contractors (Stip. No. 11). Centerville
awarded the contract for the Cline Elementary asbestos abatement project to Seneca on June 5, 1992
(Stip. No. 12).
On Page 7 of the project specifications, SchoolCraft is defined as a "Consultant" for purposes of
the project specifications (Stip. No. 13), and SchoolCraft assisted Centerville in choosing Seneca to be
the asbestos abatement contractor (Tr. 41-42). The Cline Elementary asbestos abatement project
occurred between June 1992 and August 1992 (Stip. No. 14). During the time of the asbestos removal in
the Summer of 1992, Cline Elementary was undergoing a more extensive renovation with numerous
contractors at the site doing such tasks as painting, installing a drop ceiling and installing lighting, tile and
carpet (Tr. 81, 82). SchoolCraft's's job was to coordinate all the different contractors according to the
timelines Centerville had, to make sure the work was done in time for the students to return to school in
the Fall (Tr. 80-83).
The Cline asbestos abatement project was subject to the notification and wcrk practice
requirements set out in Section 61.145 of the EPA Regulations (Stip. No. 16). On June 2, 1992, Seneca
submitted a notification to the RAPCA4 specifying June 15, 1992, as the starting date for asbestos
removal (Stip. Nos. 20 and 22; Ex. J-7). The Cline Elementary asbestos renovation did not begin until
June 17, 1992 (Stip. No. 24). Also, on June 17, Seneca sent a revised notification to RAPCA, specifying
June 17, 1992, as the new starting date (Stip. Nos. 25 and 26; Ex. J-9).
On June 30, 1992, the RAPCA, through Mr. Jeffrey Adams, inspected the Cline Elementary
renovation and filed an inspection report (Stip. No. 27; Ex. J-12). The renovation involved the
stripping and removal of RACM5 in a combined amount in excess of 260 linear feet on pipes and 160
square feet on other facility components (Complaint ¶12; Answer ¶12). This amount of RACM subjected
the Cline Elementary project to the requirements of the asbestos NESHAP standards in Part 61, Subpart
M of the EPA Regulations (Stip. No. 15).
III. THE DISPOSITIVE ISSUE
As a matter of primary importance, an issue that can be dispositive of all Counts in the
Complainant must be addressed. That issue is whether SchoolCraft can be held liable for any NESHAP
asbestos violations as an owner or operator of the renovation activities involving asbestos removal at
Cline Elementary. If it is determined herein that the Respondent was not an owner or operator of the
asbestos renovation at Cline Elementary, then SchoolCraft cannot be held liable for the violations charged
in the Complaint. This dispositive issue will be covered next by considering the statutory and regulatory
framework in this case, by reviewing as necessary the positions of the parties on this issue, and by an
analysis and resolution of this issue.
A. The Statutory and Regulatory Framework
Section 112 of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412, authorizes the Administrator to publish a list of
hazardous air pollutants and to prescribe emission standards known as NESHAP for those pollutants.
Asbestos has been listed as a hazardous air pollutant under Section 112, and a NESHAP for asbestos has
been promulgated in Subpart M of Part 61 of the EPA Regulations. Section 112(i)(3)(A) of the CAA, 42
U.S.C. § 7412(i)(3)(A), prohibits any person from operating any stationary source in violation of an
emission standard promulgated under this Section. Therefore, any violation of the asbestos NESHAP, in
Subpart M of Part 61 of the EPA Regulations, can be subject to civil penalties under Section 113(d)(1) of
the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(1).
Under Section 61.145 of the EPA Regulations, the asbestos NESHAP establish specific notice and
work practice requirements to be followed during an asbestos renovation operation. Section 61.145(a)(4)
of the EPA Regulations provides that these standards apply to owners and operators of a demolition
operation where the amount of friable asbestos material in the facility being renovated is at least 260
linear feet on pipes or at least 160 square feet on other facility components. In order to establish a prima
facie case of liability, Complainant must establish that the following elements have been met: (1)
SchoolCraft is an owner or operator of a demolition or renovation activity, (2) the amount of friable
asbestos containing material exceeded the regulatory threshold under the renovation standard, and (3) the
specific requirements of the renovation standard in the asbestos NESHAP have been violated, U.S. v.
Tzavah Urban Renewal Corp., 696 F. Supp. 1013, 1021 (D.N.J. 1988), citing U.S. v. Ben's Truck and
Equipment, Inc., 25 ERC 1295, 1298 (E.D. Cal. 1986). It is the first essential element that is contested
in the instant case: whether SchoolCraft was an owner or operator of the asbestos removal renovation at
Cline Elementary.
B. The Positions of the Parties
1. Complainant's Position
Complainant contends that Respondent falls within the definition of an operator under the
asbestos NESHAP regulations because it supervised the renovation at Cline Elementary (Comp. Init.
Br., p. 12). Complainant asserts that SchoolCraft's supervisory role and thus, operator liability for the
Cline Elementary asbestos removal project, is evident from several joint exhibits. Primary among them is
the Cline asbestos project specifications, drafted by SchoolCraft (Ex. J-2, pp. 694-824). Complainant
claims that these specifications are replete with examples of SchcolCraft's supervisory authority, and
listed some 29 alleged examples of the Respondent's supervisory control (Comp. Init. Br., pp. 13-16),
Complainant contends that SchoolCraft gave itself, inter alia, the power to: (1) direct Seneca's work
shifts; (2) fire and discharge Seneca's employees from the renovation site; (3)deny or authorize payment
to Seneca; (4) direct the removal of asbestos contaminated soil; (5) allow Seneca to initiate abatement; (6)
determine which individuals were to be allowed inside the containment; (7) approve finished work areas;
(8) issue stop work and corrective action orders; and (9) direct re-insulation following asbestos abatement
(id. at 23).
Complainant also argues that SchoolCraft's supervisory role is evident in Centerville's purchase order
which stated that SchoolCraft's services included supervision of the work (Ex. J-4; Comp. Init. Br., pp.
17-19). Complainant also submits that Centerville considered SchoolCraft as having supervisory
authority over the Cline Elementary asbestos removal renovation based on an informal job description
that sets out that a consultant should supervise abatement work as agent for Centerville (Ex. J-4, pp.
835, 837, 838).
Complainant further contends that the relevant case law interpreting the term operator supports its
broad scope and application to many different persons (Comp. Init. Br, pp. 21-23). In this regard,
Complainant argues that the definition of owner or operator is intended to be read broadly for the purpose
of the asbestos Regulations, U.S. v. Tzavah , supra, 696 F. Supp. at 1021, citing U.S. v. Geppert Bros.,
Inc., 638 F. Supp. 996, 999 (E.D. Pa. 1986). Complainant asserts that many different persons have been
held to be operators within the meaning of the asbestos NESHAP, including asbestos abatement
contractors, facility owners and any third party whose involvement demonstrates that it had control or
supervision over the renovation. In support of this proposition Complainant cites U.S. v. Walsh, 783 F.
Supp. 546 (W.D. Wash. 1991), aff'd 8 F. 3d 659 (9th Cir. 1993) (on-site supervisor); U.S. v. B&W
Investment Properties, Inc., Dkt. No. 91 C 5886, Memorandum Opinion (N.D. Ill. 1992), aff'd 38 F.3d
362 (7th Cir. 1994) (facility manager); U.S. v. Sealtite Corp., 739 F. Supp 464 (E.D. Ark. 1990)
(asbestos abatement contractor); U.S. v. Hugo Key and Son, Inc. 731 F. Supp. 1135 (D. R.I. 1989)
(demolition contractor); U.S. v. Tzavah., supra (facility owners and managers); and U.S. v. Geppert,
supra (facility owner).
Complainant contends that it is justified to hold a consultant like SchoolCraft liable as an operator
since the Respondent was in the best position to police Seneca's actions and assure the asbestos was
handled in accordance with the asbestos NESHAP standards. Complainant asserts that, if SchoolCraft is
not held liable, oversight consultants like the Respondent would have no incentive to take the steps
necessary to insure that asbestos abatement contractors comply with the asbestos NESHAP standards.
(Ccmp. Init. Br, p. 26.)
Based on these arguments, Complainant argues that it has established the first essential element of
its case: that SchoolCraft was an operator of the Cline Elementary asbestos removal project.
2. The Respondent's Position
Respondent argues that, as a consultant, it is not an owner or operator of an asbestos renovation
activity as defined in Section 61.141 of the EPA Regulations. SchoolCraft contends that the record
herein and the applicable case law show that the definition of owner or operator in Section 61.141 does
not apply to it. (Resp. Init. Br., pp. 11, 12.)
Discussing the case law, Respondent would distinguish the cases relied upon by Complainant
since none of them address the status of a consultant. Indeed, SchoolCraft asserts that the cases support its
position. Respondent avers that U.S. v. Geppert, supra, 638 F. Supp. at 999, involved owner liability;
that U.S. v. B&W Investment Properties, Inc., supra, Memorandum Opinion at 10, involved both owner
and operator liability where B&W leased the property at issue and hired the asbestos company to clean it
up; that U.S. v. Tzavah, supra, 659 F. Supp. at 1021 involved parties who hired and fired contractors
and actively engaged in supervision of the asbestos removal project; and that U.S. v. Walsh, supra, 783
F. Supp. at 549 involved an employee of the asbestos removal contractor. (Resp. Init. Br., pp.12-14.)
Regarding the factual record, Respondent claims that its activities do not fall within definition of
operator of the asbestos removal activity at Cline Elementary. According to SchoolCraft, the facts
establish that Centerville was the owner of Cline Elementary and Seneca was the operator of the asbestos
removal project at Cline. Respondent attacks Complainant's position that it supervised the asbestos
removal because it ignores the definition of demolition or renovation activity contained in Section 61.141
of the EPA Regulations. Section 6l.141 sets out that renovation is altering a facility by the stripping or
removal of RACM from a facility component, and demolition is described as wrecking or taking out any
load supporting structural member of a facility. SchoolCraft argues that Seneca, not it, performed these
functions at Cline Elementary and that, therefore, Seneca was the supervisor of the renovation and
demolition activity at Cline. (Resp. Init. Br., pp. 14-16.)
SchoolCraft also points out that Mr. Bowman, its representative, visited only very infrequently
the enclosure area where the asbestos abatement was taking place, and was not in the abatement area on any
consistent basis, which would have been necessary to supervise the removal activity (id. at 15). In this
regard, Respondent notes that Mr. Bowman was only in the abatement enclosure area on seven of the
thirty-three days when the abatement work was in progress, and avers that Mr. Bowman was never listed
as a supervisor or consultant on the daily logs for the enclosure area, but was signed in as a visitor on the
seven occasions he was in the enclosure area (Resp. Reply Br., pp. 3-5). Respondent also asserts that
Centerville did not look to SchoolCraft to have a presence in the asbestos abatement area but looked to
Seneca to control that area (Resp. Init. Br., p 15; Tr. 89, 90). In addition, SchcolCraft argues that its
function was to coordinate and schedule the various contractors working at Cline Elementary, not to baby-sit Seneca
which was being paid over $338,000 to remove the asbestos from Cline properly (Resp. Reply Br., pp. 3,
4).
Respondent further contests the Complainant's strong reliance on the project specifications and
purchase order for SchoolCraft's services, which Respondent claims do not demonstrate that it was an
operator. According to SchoolCraft, the project specifications and the purchase order, reflecting duties
and compensation, do not show actual supervision of the Cline asbestos abatement. Respondent submits
that this responsibility fell to Seneca, as exemplified by its payment of over $338,000 for the asbestos
removal work. (Resp. Br., pp 15-16.)
B. Analysis and Resolution of the Dispositive Issue
At the outset, it is warranted to look at definition of the term owner or operator of a demolition or
renovation activity found in Section 61.141 of the EPA Regulations, which sets out that:
Owner or operator of a demolition or renovation activity means any person
who owns, leases, operates, controls, or supervises the facility being demolished
or renovated or any person who owns, leases, operates, controls or supervises the
demolition or renovation operation, or both.
It is clear that SchoolCraft is not an owner of the facility, Cline Elementary, so for liability to attach to
the Respondent, it must be found to be an operator of the asbestos removal project at Cline.
Complainant contends that SchoolCraft should be considered an operator because it allegedly
supervised the Cline Elementary asbestos removal work. Complainant SchoolCraft asserts that
SchoolCraft's supervisory role is evident from the record and under the relevant case law examining the
scope of operator liability.
In order to bring SchoolCraft within the operator regulatory universe, Complainant cites several
cases noted above in the section describing Complainant's position, for the general proposition that this
term is interpreted broadly and encompasses many different persons. While this point by the Complainant
is well taken, it is also compatible with the language in the regulatory definition requiring that, for
liability to attach, the person involved must either own, lease, operate, control or supervise the facility or
own, lease, operate, control or supervise the asbestos removal activity. The key question in the case at
bar is, therefore, whether SchoolCraft exercised control or supervision over the asbestos removal activity
at Cline Elementary.
To demonstrate SchoolCraft's alleged supervisory authority over the Cline Elementary
renovation, Complainant relies strongly on the asbestos project specifications drafted by SchoolCraft (Ex.
J-2, pp. 694-824), as well as on the Centerville purchase order to SchoolCraft and the informal job
description, both of which set out that the Respondent should supervise the asbestos abatement work as
agent for Centerville (Ex. J-4, pp. 835-37). It is correct that the various provisions in the project
specification relied upon by Complainant did technically provide SchoolCraft with supervisory power,
and that the purchase order and job description did specify that SchcolCraft should supervise the asbestos
abatement work at Cline Elementary. However, the question is whether the Respondent exercised that
authority to a sufficient extent to establish its liability as an operator.
The issue of whether a consultant, who is neither the owner nor the asbestos removal contractor,
can be held liable as an operator of the asbestos removal work since that consultant ostensibly had
authority to supervise the asbestos removal, is a matter of first impression. None of the cases cited by the
parties and discussed above is directly in point on this issue.
However, one court case, U.S. v. Walsh (Walsh), 783 F. Supp. 546 (W.D. Wash. 1991), aff'd 8
F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 1993), is sufficiently close that the rationale used therein can be applied to the instant
cause to resolve the operator issue. In Walsh, 783 at 548, the District Court set out the test for holding a
person liable as an operator of an asbestos abatement removal project if that person is not the owner:
. . . because the statute and the regulations in question impose strict liability,
the Court would be reluctant to impose liability unless it is clear that Mr. Walsh
was substantially in control or substantially supervised the various projects in
question. I recognize the government contends that there is nothing that has to be substantial
about the supervision, but I believe that what was intended here was a person having
significant or substantial or real control and supervision over a project before he or she
could be found liable under these regulations if they were not an owner. And it is my
intention to apply that test in determining the liability of this defendant.
[Emphasis added.]
Moreover, the substantial control test adopted by the District Court was upheld on appeal as
correct as a matter of law by the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, U.S. v. Walsh, 8 F.3d 659, 663
(9th Cir. 1993).
It is also instructive to review the four abatement projects in Walsh, 783 F. Supp. at 549-51, to
assess what type of substantial control is needed to hold someone liable as an operator of an asbestos
removal activity. During the projects, Mr. Walsh had served in various capacities with the abatement
contracting company, including estimator, vice-president and president of the company, id.
On one project, where he was only the estimator, he was held liable as the employee responsible for
the overall supervision and control of the project since he estimated the job, wrote the job proposal,
directed the project foreman, directed certain of the asbestos removal and met with local regulator
officials, id. On another project, when Mr. Walsh was vice-president, he was held liable as a
superintendent with an on-site supervisory role where he was responsible for all contractual aspects of the
project, signed the notice of intent to remove, directed the foremen, dealt with problems of the workers or
other inspectors and dealt with a local official about scheduling, delays and increased costs of the project,
id.
On the other hand, Mr. Walsh was not held liable when, as vice-president, he had signed the
asbestos removal contract, a Notice of Appeal and a Notice of Violation, but where he was not the
estimator, was not responsible for solving problems during the course of the work, was not present at the
site and lacked hands-on supervision and control of the project, id. Similarly, on the fourth project, when
Mr. Walsh was president of the company and had signed the Notice of Removal, he was not held liable
because he did not estimate the job, was not on the job site when the work was being done and had no
personal involvement in the project, id. The District Court pointed out that the fact that Mr. Walsh was
president in name does not make him liable where his personal involvement is not sufficient to find
liability, id. at 551.
Given the substantial control rationale and the examples from Walsh, attention can now be turned
to whether the facts of record in the present case warrant the conclusion that SchoolCraft can be held
liable as an operator of the Cline Elementary asbestos removal project.
As noted above in the section discussing the Complainant's position, Complainant summarizes
SchoolCraft's supervisorary control as the power to: (1) direct Seneca's work shifts; (2) fire and
discharge Seneca's employees from the renovation site; (3) deny or authorize payment to Seneca; (4)
direct the removal of asbestos contaminated soil; (5) allow Seneca to initiate abatement; (6) determine
which individuals were to be allowed inside the containment; (7) approve finished work areas; (8) issue
stop work and corrective action orders; and (9) direct reinsulation following asbestos abatement (Comp.
Init. Br., p. 23). However, there is no evidence of record that SchoolCraft ever during the course of the
asbestos removal at Cline Elementary: directed any Seneca work shift; fired any Seneca employee; denied
or authorized payment to Seneca6; directed the removal of asbestos contaminated soil; allowed Seneca to
initiate abatement; approved finished work areas; issued stop work or corrective action orders; or directed
re-insulation following asbestos abatement.
The fact that SchoolCraft had the supervisory authority over the asbestos removal at Cline is not
the issue in the substantial control test. The real question is whether the Respondent exercised that
power. In line with the rulings in Walsh, 783 F. Supp. 546, 548, there must be "real control" and "hands-on" supervision. In the instant case, real control and hands-on supervision by SchoolCraft of the Cline
asbestos abatement has not been established.
In this case, the record indicates that SchoolCraft did not exercise any real control over the actual
asbestos removal activity at Cline Elementary. The asbestos project specifications plainly laid out
Seneca's responsibilities to control and perform the asbestos removal at Cline, setting out that Seneca
was to, inter alia: be responsible for obtaining all necessary permits and arrange for all necessary
inspections; be responsible for all notifications to governing bodies; perform all work in compliance with
EPA and OSHA guidelines and with the project specifications; employ a competent superintendent who is
certified as an asbestos hazard abatement specialist and is certified by EPA as a contractor/supervisor,
and who shall remain at the job site during the progress of the work (Ex. J-2, p.698). Moreover, Mr. Aris
Jende, the Centerville representative with responsibility for the Cline renovation, confirmed that the
supervisor authority set out above for the asbestos removal project was the responsibility of Seneca, not
SchoolCraft (Tr. 37, 85-88). Mr. Jende specifically stated that the responsibility to give notice of the
start of the project to RAPCA, to post the superintendent's training certificate at the job site and to wet
the asbestos material adequately, was Seneca's responsibility, not SchoolCraft's (Tr. 87-88).
In the abatement projects in Walsh, 783 F. Supp. at 550-51, where Mr. Walsh was not held
liable,an important consideration was his lack of presence at the work area. In the instant case, SchoolCraft
was seldom present in the abatement area where the removal work was being performed. The daily logs
for the abatement enclosure area show that Mr. Bowman, SchoolCraft's representative, was only present
on 7 of the 33 days involved, and was always only present as a visitor, not as a supervisor or consultant
(Ex. J-2, pp. 192-210). These logs also show that the last date Mr. Bowman was present was July 2,
1992, even though the logs cover a period running through July 31, 1992 (id. at 195, 210).
While it is true that Mr. Bowman was at the general Cline Elementary renovation site on an
almost daily basis (Tr.44), he was only present in the asbestos abatement enclosure area on the 7
occasions described above. Mr. Bowman's almost daily on-site presence was for the purpose of
coordinating the work of the various contractors on the general renovation, who were performing such
tasks as painting and installing tile, ceilings and lighting, in addition to the asbestos removal activity.
SchoolCraft's job was to coordinate all the different contractors according to the timelines Centerville
had, to make sure the work on the entire renovation was done in time for the students to return to school
in the Fall. (Tr. 80-83.) It is warranted to conclude, therefore, that SchoolCraft's presence at Cline was
not to supervise the asbestos removal but to coordinate and act as a liaison between Centerville and the
various contractors. Further, it should be pointed out that Centerville, not SchoolCraft, hired and paid
these various contractors (Tr. 83, 84). Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that the
Respondent was a coordinator of the various construction activities at Cline Elementary, and did not
exercise substantial control of the asbestos abatement activities at Cline.
Moreover, the two projects where the District Court in Walsh, 783 F. Supp. at 550-51, found
Mr. Walsh was individually liable as an operator stand in contrast to the instant situation involving
SchoolCraft. First, the Walsh court's finding of liability is tied to the fact that Mr. Walsh was an
employee of the asbestos removal company (id.). It is significant that SchoolCraft, by contrast, did not
have such a role. Other crucial facts supporting operator liability in Walsh, id., were that Mr. Walsh:
issued directions to the foreman at the job site, directed the actual asbestos removal, and met with state
inspectors to discuss and resolve asbestos problems. However, it is clear that Seneca, not SchoolCraft,
was the party which performed these activities in connection with the Cline Elementary asbestos removal project (Tr. 86-87).
Although SchoolCraft did meet with the state RAPCA inspector, Mr. Jeffrey Adams, this meeting was at
the follow-up inspection, after Mr. Adams had already met with Seneca and Seneca had addressed the
asbestos infractions (Tr. 132). Further, at that meeting Mr. Adams indicated that Mr. Bowman of
SchoolCraft had asked Seneca to re-wet the asbestos and was glad the inspector was there to require
Seneca to re-wet (Tr. 132-33). This suggests that SchoolCraft was there in a coordinating rather than a
supervisor position, or Mr. Bowman would have directed, not asked, Seneca to re-wet the asbestos
material.
A final consideration in the control analysis is to evaluate the fact that SchoolCraft prepared the
asbestos removal specifications and assisted in the selection of Seneca as the asbestos removal contractor.
However, it is uncontested that Centerville, not SchoolCraft, entered into the asbestos removal contract
with Seneca (Tr. 83). And, there has been no suggestion that the contract specifications were in any way
defective so as to lead to the violations charged in this proceeding. Therefore, analogous to the situation
in Walsh, 783 F. Supp. at 550-51, where Mr. Walsh signed the removal contract and various official
notices relating to the projects but was held not liable, it is warranted to determine that SchoolCraft's
preparation of the project specifications and assistance in selection of Seneca as the asbestos removal
contractor does not constitute sufficient control or supervision of the Cline Elementary asbestos removal
project to make the Respondent liable as an operator of the Cline asbestos removal project.
When the overall circumstances are taken into account regarding the relationships of the parties
and their activities in connection with the asbestos removal project at Cline Elementary, it is warranted to
find that SchoolCraft did not have such substantial control over the asbestos removal to make the
Respondent an operator of the asbestos removal activities at Cline, within the meaning of Section 61.141
of the EPA Regulations. Accordingly, no liability can attach to SchoolCraft for the violations alleged in
Counts I to V of the Complaint. Therefore, it must be concluded that the Complainant has failed to
establish a prima facie case against the Respondent in connection with Counts I to V of the Complaint.
As a result, under Section 22.20(a) of the EPA Rules of Practice (Rules), 40 C.F.R. § 22.20(a), and all
charges against the Respondent in connection with those Counts must be dismissed with prejudice.
IV. PENALTY CONSIDERATIONS
Even if an opposite result were to be reached in the previous section herein on the dispositive
issue of SchoolCraft as an operator of the Cline Elementary asbestos removal project, certain comments
are warranted on the appropriateness of any penalty sought in this cause against the Respondent. Section
113 (e)(1) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1), requires that in assessing a civil penalty for violations of
the CAA, there shall be taken into account, inter alia, such other factors as justice may require.
Moreover, under Section 22.27(b) of the EPA Rules of Practice, 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(b), the applicable
penalty guidelines7 issued under the Act must be taken into account, but these guidelines are not binding
on the Presiding Judge as long as reasons are given for deviating from them, Great Lakes Div. of Nat'l
Steel Corp., EPCRA Appeal No. 93-3, pp. 23, 24 (EAB, June 29, 1994).
In the present proceeding, the statutory consideration of other factors as justice may require,
provides the necessary justification for not following the penalty guidelines. The Complainant's own
penalty witness indicated that, taking into account such other factors as justice may require, he did not
consider it to be an equitable result to assess a $20,000 penalty against SchoolCraft, who had collected
about $22,000 under its contract, when Centerville, the owner, paid no penalty and Seneca had settled for
a $55,000 penalty (the major part of which related to the Cline job) but had collected over $300,000 for
its asbestos removal work at Cline (Tr. 279-282). Under these circumstance there is more than ample
reason for not following the penalty guidelines.
Basically, in this proceeding, the following situation is presented. Seneca was responsible on a
substantive basis for the violations charged against SchoolCraft. Regarding Counts I and II, it was
Seneca's responsibility to notify the state agency of the start of the abatement work at Cline (Tr. 87; Ex.
J-2, p.698). Similarly, for Counts III and IV, it was Seneca's responsibility to wet adequately the asbestos
material since the project specifications explicitly required Seneca to complete the asbestos removal in
compliance with the EPA Regulations (Tr. 87, 88; Ex. J-2, p. 698). And, as to Count V, the failure to
post the superintendent's certificate on-site, this clearly is Seneca's responsibility since the superintendent
involved was Seneca's employee. Again, under the project specifications, Seneca was required to comply
with EPA Regulations, including the posting of the superintendent's certificate (Ex. J-2, p.698).
Moreover, Seneca's greater role and responsibility for these violations is further reflected in its
compensation of $338,510 (Ex. J-2, p. 608), in comparison to the $21,040 received by SchoolCraft for
its work in connection with the Cline Elementary renovation. This large payment was in consideration of
the fact that Seneca was the party that had the actual workmen conducting the asbestos renovation
activities. On this basis, the record amply illustrates that Seneca was the party mainly responsible the
infractions committed. Furthermore, it was Seneca that remedied the specific notice, work practice and
certification violations.
Overall, based on such other factors as justice may require, it is reasonable to conclude that, even
if SchoolCraft could technically be considered an operator of the asbestos removal activities at Cline and
therefore liable for the violations committed by Seneca in connection with the Cline asbestos removal, no
penalty would be warranted against SchoolCraft.
ORDER
Base on the findings, conclusions and ruling contained in this Initial Decision, the charges against
the Respondent contained in Counts I to V of the Complaint are hereby ordered dismissed with prejudice,
pursuant to Section 22.20(a) of the EPA Rules of Practice (Rules), 40 C.F.R. § 22.20(a), and this
proceeding is terminated. Under Section 22.20(b) of the Rules, this dismissal constitutes an Initial
Decision8 since it disposes of all remaining outstanding issues in this proceeding.
So ordered.
Daniel M. Head
Administrative Law Judge
Dated: January 2, 1996
Washington, D. C.
1 For brevity, hereinafter, the reference to the volume of the Code of Federal Regulations, 40 C.F.R., will
be omitted when citing the pertinent sections of the EPA Regulations.
2 Complainant pointed out that joint stipulation of fact number 36 was erroneously listed as number 40.
3 Citations to the record and the parties' briefs will be as follows: (1) Complainant's exhibits will be cited
with the letter "C", the corresponding number and applicable page, Respondent's and Joint exhibits will
adhere to the same format with the letter "R" and "J" (e.g. , Ex. C-1, p. 2; Ex. R-1. p. 2; and Ex. J-1, p.
2); (2) the transcript will be cited as "Tr." with the page number (e.g., Tr. 12); (3) the stipulations will be
cited by the number (e.g., Stip. No. 1): and (4) the briefs will be cited by the abbreviated party and the
page number (e.g., Comp. Init. Br., p. 10).
4 U.S. EPA has delegated authority to the State of Ohio to implement and enforce the asbestos NESHAP
(Stip. No. 17). For activities subject to the asbestos NESHAP in Montgomery County, Ohio, regulatory
authority has been delegated to RAPCA pursuant to Section 61.04(b)(KK)(vi) of the EPA Regulations
(Stip. No. 18).
5 The renovation standard defines regulated asbestos-containing material (RACM) as friable asbestos
material in Section 61.141 of the EPA Regulations. And, the renovation standard defines friable asbestos
material, in pertinent part, as any material containing more than 1 percent asbestos, under EPA standard
testing methods, that when dry, can be crumbled, pulverized or reduced to powder by hand pressure, id.
6 Seneca's application for payment does show an area for SchoolCraft as architect to certify the payment
to Seneca but in no instance on the payment application has SchoolCraft signed the payment certificate
(Ex. J-2, pp. 598-607).
7 The penalty guidelines applicable herein are the CAA Stationary Source Civil Penalty Policy (October
25, 1991), including Appendix III, Asbestos Demolition and Renovation Civil Penalty Policy (May 5,
1992).
8 Under Section 22.30 of the Rules, the parties may file with the Environment Appeals Board (EAB) a
notice of appeal of this Initial Decision and an appellate brief within 20 days of service of this Initial
Decision. This Initial Decision shall become the final order of the EAB within 45 days after its service,
unless an appeal is taken or the EAB elects, sua sponte, to review this Initial Decision under Section
22.30(b) of the Rules. If there is any appeal or sua sponte review by the EAB, the decision of the EAB
disposing of this proceeding shall be the final order in this case.