

# **Lessons Learned & Ideal Architecture**

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# Requirements for a Successful Exploration Program

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# What Parts of an Avionics System Can Be Open?

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- **System Databus & Backplane**
- **Processor**
- **I/O types**
- **Software environment (OS, tools)**
- **Mechanical**

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- **Avoid constraint of having to go to one supplier**
- **Risk avoidance of a single source**
- **Reduced development costs**
  - **OTS**
  - **Common use**
  - **Multiple suppliers – competition lowers price**
- **Reduced maintenance costs**
  - **Tools & licenses; knowledge base; training**
- **Reduced upgrade costs**
  - **Obsolete parts**
  - **Change of mission**
  - **Technology migration**
  - **Integration costs**


- **Openness has been defined in a variety of ways:**
  - **Standards**
    - Documented standard
    - Widely used standards or interfaces
    - Plug-and-play (standard HW /SW interfaces)
    - Non-proprietary interfaces
  - **Commercially Available (multiple sources)**
    - Commercially available end items
    - Commercially available software development tools
  - **Long life availability**
  - **Open source code**
  - **Third-party compatibility**

- **Definition**
  - System architecture consists of readily-available similar parts, accessories, or enhancements provided by industry standard distributors
- **Trade-off**
  - Does maximum use of COTS components, lower the life cycle costs?
    - ↑↑ Minimizes the NRE
    - ↑↑ Avoids a custom design/solution
    - ↑↑ Faster development cycles
    - ⇔ Reduced support costs
    - ↑↑ Standardization across large programs.
    - ↓↓ Parts obsolescence is an industry concern

# Shuttle Lessons Learned

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- **Need for assured data consistency throughout the redundancy management system.**
  - **Shuttle uses a very complex method**
    - Four lock step synchronized computers
    - Redundant & monitored Terminal Units data flow
    - If any data does not match, the majority of the computers votes a “fault”
    - No autonomous deactivation of the computer
- **This scheme very complex compared to later architectures such as PAVE PACE used on ISS**
  - Expensive to build, code, and architect
  - Requires excess computational power
  - Additional redundant data communication to solve the Byzantine problem
  - High cost of ownership



**A much simpler and strait-forward redundancy management system for future architectures is necessary to be cost effective**

- **Shuttle avionics**
  - **300 major electronic components throughout the vehicle**
  - **Connected by more than 300 miles of electrical wiring.**
  - **Many different architectures, techniques, and electronics concepts.**
  - **Only two standard interfaces:**
    - Multiplex Interface Adapter (MIA)
    - Pyrotechnic Initiator Controller (PIC)
- **Undocumented/lost/forgotten requirements**
  - **Cannot be gained by review of existing documents.**
    - Honeywell in a unique position - primary supplier for Space Shuttle and ISS
    - Prime contractors retain a similar level of historical knowledge.
  - **Foremost undocumented requirement**
    - Predictable response to failures within the system.
    - Historic processor based systems have contained unpredictable failure modes
    - Today's processor "features" are legacy fixes for unpredictable behavior.
    - Watch dog timers, memory error correction, and Triple Modular Redundant (TMR) processors



# Architectural Framework Requirements


## OPERATIONAL VIEW

- What the system needs to do
- Concept of Operations




## SYSTEM VIEW

- How the system does the job
- Flow Diagrams
- Behavior Models
- Operational Interface



## ARCHITECTURAL VIEW

- The physical implementation
- Block Diagrams
- ICDs
- Test Requirements




- User Objectives Pull System Design
- Project Focus On Primary SE Products
- Readily Understood Requirements
- Stabilized Process For Future Improvement
- Requirements Organized For Rapid Change

# Requirements: The Start of a System

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- One unit to host autonomous activity, health management, and housekeeping functions
- Commercial interfaces to reduce life cycle costs
- Hardware completely de-coupled from the hosted software reduces Cost
- Expandable and/or re-configurable in the future

- Uses open architecture concepts to allow flexibility within the implementation
- Allows third party participation either in the development of the avionics hardware or at a future time
- Low cost system throughout the lifecycle
  - Low development cost
  - Low integration cost
  - Low future cost of ownership




**The simplest architecture is a “flat” system**

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# A Backbone Designed for both Flexibility and Availability


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
# Distributed System Decomposition

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**Additional system engineering and software effort is required to move data throughout the infrastructure.**

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


**Data is moved through the system without additional software. Data is available throughout the system.**

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# “System of Systems” Fusion

- Integrated Systems architecture supports reconfiguration
  - Individual systems are coupled through fusion of their individual Virtual Backplane™ elements
  - Several free-flying elements fuse into a new combined configuration



**An updated system is achieved through predetermined, yet dynamic, re-configuration of individual element configuration tables**


## Centralized Computing System –

Original digital avionics controls were centralized with few fault containment zones



## Federated Computing System –


Federated systems provided fault containment zones but increased interface complexity



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## Integrated Modular Computing System –


IMA provides the best of centralized and federated systems



# Integrated Modular Avionics History


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## 2<sup>nd</sup> Generation DAIS




- Federated, LRU based systems

## 3<sup>rd</sup> Generation PAVE PILLAR



- Open architecture, common modules for RF
- Technology drives core processing performance

## 4<sup>th</sup> Generation PAVE PACE / ISS




- Integrated, LRM based system
- Open architecture, common modules for core processing

## 5<sup>th</sup> Generation Low Cost Integrated Avionics



- Technology drives system performance
- Architecture drives schedule / risk / affordability

From a presentation by Ron Szkody on 29 May 1996 to the Integrated Sensor System (ISS) Open System Architecture (OSA) Joint Task Force (sponsored by United States Air Force Wright Laboratory /AAS-30)




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# Minimizing Application Dependencies

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# Integrated Modular Architecture

**HW & SW Modularity,  
Commonality & Scalability**

**Fail Passive Fault  
Response**

**Full Time & Space  
Partitioning**


**Table-Driven Operations &  
Memory-Mapped Interfaces**

# Modularity, Commonality, & Layers of Abstraction


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## Integrated Modularity Avionics benefits


- Reduced size, weight, power
- Reduced NRE cost and schedule
- Reduced parts, part types, and spares
- Reduced training and maintenance costs
- Reduced software development, certification, and modification costs



### Hardware Resources



### Software Resources




## Layered approach benefits

- Layered approach protects applications from physical implementation
- System upgrades, modifications, and changes require minimal or no impact to applications
  - Operating system version or vendor
  - Processor, I/O types, data buses
  - Redundancy Levels

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
The system behaves as if all units are peers...

## Conceptual Architecture



...regardless of the physical implementation

## Physical Architecture



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# Integrated Modular Architecture

**HW & SW Modularity,  
Commonality & Scalability**


**Fail Passive Fault Response**

**Full Time & Space  
Partitioning**

**Table-Driven Operations &  
Memory-Mapped Interfaces**

# One Approach - Lock-Step Processor

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**Error Immunity**  
 100% detection & correction of single-bit errors  
 100% detection of double-bit errors

**Space Partitioning (MMU)**  
 Write protection over IMM, SRAM, H/W Resources

**Fault Containment (Dual Cross-Compare Monitors)**  
 - Lockstep comparison  
 - MMU integrity validation

**Data Integrity Mgt**  
 - Freshness Monitoring for Partition Usage

**Bus Error Containment**  
 - Dual Lockstep transactions  
 - Total fault containment  
 - 100% detection of single-bit transmission errors  
 - Dual redundant transmission  
 - De-centralized control

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- **Lack of cross channel trust typically handled by shuttle-like voting schemes**
  - Extraneous cross-channel data link required
  - Complex voting algorithms
- **Alternative is fail passive architecture**
  - Faulty modules remove themselves from operation until corrected
  - Does not require a cross-channel voting mechanism
- **Several approaches to fail passive**
  - Lock-step processor (also provides 100% fault coverage)
  - Command-monitor processor pairs
  - Polynomial encoding

Required Fault Tolerance	Self Test Coverage	Cross Channel Trust	Number of Redundant Channels
0 Faults	N/A	N/A	$\geq 1$
1 Fault	100%	Truthful	$\geq 2$
	<100%	Truthful	$\geq 3$
	<100%	Lies*	$\geq 4$
2 Sequential Faults***	100%	Truthful	$\geq 3$
	<100%	Truthful	$\geq 4$
	<100%	Lies*	$\geq 5$
2 Simultaneous Faults***	100%	Truthful	$\geq 3$
	<100%	Truthful	$\geq 5$
	<100%	Lies*	$\geq 7$

\* Classic Byzantine Fault: number of required channels is established by a formal proof

\*\* 1st failure removed before second failure occurs

\*\*\* 1st failure not removed before second failure occurs

**Fail silent architecture enables minimal number of required channels to compensate for fault conditions**



# Integrated Modular Architecture

**HW & SW Modularity,  
Commonality & Scalability**


**Fail Passive Fault  
Response**

**Full Time & Space  
Partitioning**

**Table-Driven Operations &  
Memory-Mapped Interfaces**




# Time and Space Partitioning – a Hardware View



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# Time and Space Partitioning – a Software View

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# Integrated Modular Architecture

**HW & SW Modularity,  
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
**Fail Passive Fault  
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# Offline Table Generation Simplifies System Modifications

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



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


# Designing for Modifiability – Computing Platforms

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Run-Time



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