Documens 246-272
United States-Iran Relations
PARTICIPANTS
The President
The Shah of Iran
Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense
Abbas Aram, Foreign Minister of Iran
Hosein Ghods-Nakhai, Iranian Ambassador to the United States
Julius C. Holmes, United States Ambassador to Iran
Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State, NEA
William S. Gaud, Assistant Administrator, AID/NESA
The President and the Shah examined the draft Joint Communiqué
/2/ and agreed that it should be released later in the day. /2/For text of the final Joint Communiqué, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 778-779, or Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, p. 327. The Joint Communiqué was discussed during a meeting between Talbot and Foreign Minister Abbas Aram on April 12 at 5 p.m. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 611.88/4-1262; for text, see Supplement, the compilation of Iran) The Secretary of Defense handed the Shah a list of military assistance items reflecting the United States offer to the Shah/3/ which had been conveyed orally by the Secretary of Defense to the Shah on the preceding afternoon. He explained that there had been certain changes, and that some C 47 aircraft and some additional ammunition had been added. /3/See Annex A to Document 248. The Shah examined the list and observed that it should include some SS 11 anti-tank missiles. The President instructed the Secretary of Defense to look into the matter in order that the President could discuss it with the Shah the next day at Camp LeJeune./4/ /4/According to the President's Appointment Book, on April 14, the President met with the Shah and Vice President Johnson at 2:24 p.m. during his tour of the U.S. Marine Corps base at Camp LeJeune, North Carolina. (Kennedy Library) No record of the conversation has been found. The Secretary explained that ammunition reserves had been calculated on the standard 30-day NATO reserve level. The Shah indicated doubt as to whether a 30-day level was adequate for Iran, which is far away from sources of supply. The Secretary said that he had checked the question with General Norstad, who felt the 30-day level was adequate: Iran would be built up to a 30-day level before the NATO countries reached that goal.The President referred to a conversation the previous evening with the Shah,
/5/and stated that he was interested in the police situation, which was a difficult problem in many countries. The United States would make an analysis of conditions in European countries and elsewhere and would take the matter up with the Shah again. The President might take this function of building police capabilities out of AID and make it a responsibility of the Defense Department. The President and the Shah agreed that it is an important problem. /5/During the evening of April 12, the Shah and Empress Farah hosted a State banquet for President and Mrs. Kennedy at the Iranian Embassy in Washington. No record of conversations held during the banquet have been found. Speaking of the economic development program in Iran, the President said that, like the Shah, we are pinning great hopes on the program, and that we desire to help. In order that we can contribute and in order that we can assist in getting together a consortium of other contributing nations, it is important that the details of the Plan be put into the best possible shape. The formation of a Consortium is not easy; the effort failed once in the case of Pakistan, and another attempt was necessary. Great care is therefore necessary.The President said that nothing contributed so much to the Shah's prestige as Iran's economic development program. The President congratulated the Shah for having found such an excellent Prime Minister and for supporting him in his efforts. We are very interested in cooperating with Iran in the field of economic developments as far as our resources would permit; it is very important to get the other Western nations to help Iran.
The President noted that he, the President, could leave his present job and the United States would go on, but Iran would collapse if the Shah were to leave his post. The President assured the Shah that he had the support of the United States.
The Shah acknowledged the importance of this point, and noted that he had been working for twenty years at the task of building a strong anti-Communist society through social reform and economic development. But even if the USSR did not exist, he would still have a duty to work for the progress of the Iranian people. The Shah remarked that he felt responsible to the majority of his people and he cannot belong to the few. The President interjected that the few can take care of themselves. The Shah replied that this was true, although things were being made a little harder for them now.
The President told how Franklin Roosevelt was still regarded almost as a god in places like West Virginia, because Roosevelt, though a rich man, had worked for the interests of the common people. Referring to the current trouble with the steel companies, he said it was necessary to identify ourselves with the small people, and he was aware that the Shah had done precisely this. This particular thunder must be taken away from the Communists. He wanted the Shah to realize the depth of his feelings on this subject. Life is a burden, but unless the Shah survives, Iran and then the whole Middle East would crumble.
The Shah stated that this concept was the goal of his life, and that he had devoted his life to this end. He gathers strength from seeing that Iran is moving forward. To succeed on the economic side Iran needs time and security. These last elements will be provided by the bilateral agreement with the United States and by the existence of revamped armed forces which will give Iran the prestige it has needed. The Iranian people expect strength from their government. Iran needs an honest, first-class army with a decent standard of living. With such an army Iran can resist Communist pressures and build the country into a showcase so that other peoples can see that it is possible to work with the West and get more effective support than countries such as Egypt receive.
The President told the Shah that he wanted the content of their exchanges to be perfectly clear, in order that there should be no feeling later that their meaning had been misunderstood. Therefore he wished to remark that he did not believe it was possible to make Iran a showcase immediately. Even here in the United States, we still have many problems, such as unemployment. We have fiscal limitations, and we cannot give as much as the Shah would wish. But we will do the best we can and will press other countries to help. He emphasized that the United States is far from being a showcase--we still have unemployment, educational problems, and many other problems yet to be dealt with.
The Shah said that by the term "showcase" he had meant only a comparative improvement. He wondered why Iran's efforts looked better now than they had in the past.
The President surmised that this interest and support for Iran was due partially to the fact that Iran has picked its enemies and partially to the fact that it has picked good people to work on the main problems. The situation in Iran is obviously improving.
The Shah agreed and remarked that he is not by nature a dictator. But if Iran is to succeed its government would have to act firmly for a time, and he knew that the United States would not insist that Iran do everything in an absolutely legal way.
The President agreed that there are always special factors that have to be taken into account in different countries. We are aware that the Shah is the keystone to the arch in Iran. Iran's progress will depend on continuing recent efforts--it will be necessary to keep the heat on those who do not accept the national interest and take their money out of the country.
The Shah said that some people had become unjustifiably frightened of the stabilization program and had taken their money out of Iran.
The Shah asked if it would not be possible for Iran to take more advantage of PL 480 assistance, and noted that Iran needs substantial supplies of wheat now. Mr. Gaud said that Iran's request for 100,000 tons of Title I wheat represented no problem, and that a further request, which he understood was coming along, for 100,000 tons under Title II would be given prompt consideration.
The Shah pointed out that PL 480 wheat was also important in that it generated local currency which could be used, among other purposes, to provide low cost housing for civilian and military employees of the government. The President suggested that we might consider devoting all the local currency generated by the forthcoming wheat shipment to such housing rather than spending it on a variety of scattered projects. He said AID should check on the possibilities. He also asked AID to assist the Iranian government in obtaining information on recently-devised methods of producing inexpensive housing, such as had been used in Brazil and Venezuela.
The Shah spoke of his interest in utilizing special Army battalions to further civil economic development programs. Ambassador Holmes mentioned that we had a Corps of Engineers headquarters in Iran, and that there are plans to expand civic action programs there.
The President asked if the Shah had any advice as to how the United States should cope with its problems and responsibilities. The Shah replied that he felt the United States was doing very well indeed, and that the Communists will be defeated in this way.
The President said that as a politician he would like to emphasize that national leaders must identify themselves with the common people. The President said that he knew this was the Shah's course, and that politically it is the most successful course.
The Shah replied that he had been working at this very problem for many years, and that it is his life. For example, he had been jailing people for corruption for two years, but that it was only being noticed now.
At this point Mrs. Kennedy and Caroline entered the office for a brief visit with the Shah before he had to leave for his Press Club speech.
PARTICIPANTS
H.I.M. the Shahanshah of Iran The Secretary In opening the conversation and inviting the Shah to comment on any issues which he wished to pursue further following his conversations in Washington, the Secretary remarked on the favorable public response which both the Shah's visit and Iran's progress in the economic and social fields had made in this country. He believed that in a very real sense the U.S. and Iran were partners, and wished to know if the Shah agreed, what the Shah's plans were, and how the Shah felt as a result of his visit.
In response, the Shah stated that he had tried to be as clear as possible in all his conversations in Washington. Obviously speaking extemporaneously, he continued that his primary problem was how to promote social justice in Iran, and also how to utilize the untapped as well as the existing wealth of the country, agricultural and/or industrial. The aims are to raise per capita income, and to secure for the country a posture of both plenty and social justice. On one side, there was the question of state development to provide an incentive to his own people for investment. This they were doing: for example, there was a five-year tax exemption. There was also legislation providing a favorable climate for foreign investment. On the side of social justice, there were problems as regards land and labor. In the latter sphere, he was thinking of some formula to make labor shareholders in factories, or perhaps to give them a share in profits. As regards government employees it was not just a question of pay raises: housing was essential. He was also thinking of cooperatives or something in the nature of a civilian PX. The essential thing was not to force the civil servants to be dishonest. If their living conditions were improved, then he could be hard on them in the case of dishonesty.
The Shah continued that this was all part of what he described as "positive nationalism." This was true of Iran's foreign relations as well. This policy was based not on hatred but rather on friendship. He then turned to Iranian-United States relations and said "that is the basis of our relations with you, we are not your stooges." What the Shah was trying to put across, he said, was that it is possible to cooperate with the West. As he had mentioned the day before to Congress, the Shah's policy is based on friendship with the Western powers. He then said he hoped that this policy would also be instructive as regards the African countries. They should not, as some were obviously doing, base their policies on hatred. Returning to his own internal problems, he said that what was necessary was to speed up development and raise the standard of living rapidly. He referred to the Soviets' 20-year program enunciated at the 22nd Party Congress. We have great chances, he continued. Essentially Iran is stable; we have had no serious upheavals. We have a tradition of stability. For example, my trips throughout the country are eloquent witness of the response of the people. There is no possibility, so far as I am concerned ("perhaps your information services have information to the contrary") that in the absence of outside intervention there will be any upset. It has not happened in Iran as it has happened elsewhere. This raises the question why? So far as the Shah could see, it was the brave start his father had made. For his own part, he thinks it is because as both King and Commander-in-Chief of the army he has kept the army and politics separate. Internally, this involved several interwoven problems. On the one hand Iran had a good plan, and is working toward social development. They had good administration--although admittedly it needed revision. On the other hand, there was the need for security. This was as much psychological as anything else. Iran's borders must be secure. This was accomplished both through the bilateral with the U.S., and through the Iranians' own will to resist. It was necessary, however, to give a firm impression to the people. They don't need to know the details, but must know that the borders will be defended. Therefore the Shah could not allow himself to withdraw completely his military elements from the northern borders lest, among other things, the fear of occupation induce the people to establish contact with the Russians even before they come.
Turning to his neighbors, the Shah remarked that Turkey, Pakistan and other countries depend on their armed forces. "We, however, have the institution of the Crown. We also have strength--I don't want something fantastic, but something worthwhile." This helps boost morale. Internally reforms must be made. Sometimes measures are unpopular, for example constitutional reform. As he had told the President, personally his character had nothing of a dictator in it: in the long run dictators cannot last. But he must give his people the base on which to build. The Shah then alluded to the Belgian constitution, and said that if it was merely a question of a piece of paper, this could be adopted overnight. But it must be built, beginning in the village councils and on up, through the parliament. As regards parliaments, Iran had had one for many years. The Shah had never personally suffered from it; in fact he regarded it as the foundation of the state. This is not enough, however. In his view he could not permit the constitution to impair Iranian unity. "If it does so, let's forget about it." The Shah hasn't forgotten it: "perhaps in just a few months time I may be forced to have a parliament." But this should not come first. "I must put first the high interests of society and my people." He thought he was making progress. He also thought he was having a desirable influence on his neighbors.
This line of thought led the Shah to dwell on the Afghan situation, which concerned him "seriously." More and more the Afghan economy was falling into the Russian orbit. The Iranians were trying to help; they were offering the Afghans trade routes for many reasons, including their own benefit. This was one of the reasons the Shah was particularly interested in Bandar Abbas. A cardinal interest in Bandar Abbas was military as it would permit help to reach him more rapidly in the case of necessity. It would also have the additional advantage of offering the Afghans facilities. As for Iraq, unfortunately he just did not understand. For the last two years both the UK and the U.S. had told him the uncertainty would be "finished," but so far as he could see the situation just continued to deteriorate. Just before he left Iran he was told that 12,000 Kurds were united in opposition to Baghdad. So far the Soviets had not gotten in, but if the situation gets out of hand, "if next summer the Kurds pass to the offensive," then possibly the Soviets might be tempted. "We must therefore be on our watch, especially since we have Kurds, as do the Turks--incidentally the Kurds are the purest Persians, pure Aryans, from their tradition, their language and their history." In Iran the Kurds have had no local success, as they have had in Iraq. The Shah is endeavoring to help them by building roads, schools, hospitals, electrifying their villages, paving their streets, building silos.
As regards Turkey, "our strong ally, and for which we have only real fraternal affection, I hope we need not worry," the Shah continued. But, because the country is now divided and there is strong political hatred, because the army is now in politics, it is worrying. The army should be a national army, drawing strength from all sections of the country and all walks of life. But the Shah hoped that Turkey could pull through.
As regards the Arab world, "perhaps it is pure prejudice, but I just don't like them." Therefore we have some apprehensions, particularly when we see them talk about the "Arab gulf." The Shah was referring to all the Arab countries except Jordan, Lebanon, which is not a military power, and Saudi Arabia. All the rest have switched to Russian arms. They have either sent their people to the Soviet Union, or have accepted missions of experts in the hundreds. Thousands of Egyptians have gone to Russia or Czechoslovakia, officers of the air force, navy, etc. Iraq also has the same policy--"It is true they are divided, and there is not much chance they can get together." The Shah was sorry to say it, but his feeling was that if the President of Egypt "gets what he wants, he might be a source of danger." He has started Arab socialism, "which cannot succeed;" it is not compatible with Arab nationalism. But what happens when it fails? The Shah had the feeling that "we, who are the open and declared allies of the West--we should succeed. I am sure that you want also to see your friends succeed." He concluded his remarks by stating that he had not mentioned Pakistan because the Iranians really had no problems with the Pakistanis.
The Secretary thanked the Shah for his comments, which contained many elements of solid interest, and were very important to us. He wished to speak first of what the Shah referred to as his policy of "positive nationalism," which he interpreted as meaning independence of national policy in friendship with the West. We were "entirely comfortable" with such a policy. That is just the way we think the international community should be organized. Our view of the world community was well stated in the opening passages of the UN Charter. We were not seeking satellites as allies. As regards the neutrals, their very independence could be a source of concern to us. In a certain sense the U.S. was never less sovereign than it was today. Its responsibility has limited its freedom of action. He was reminded of a remark a friend had made to him that in an international negotiation, two countries could never reach accommodation unless each fully understood its own interests.
247. Memorandum of Conversation
Last Formal Conversation Between Secretary and Shah: State Visit to Washington, April, 1962
Abbas Aram, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Hosein Qods-Nakhai, Iranian Ambassador to the U.S.
Safi Asfia, Managing Director of the Plan Organization
The Under Secretary
Fowler Hamilton, Administrator of AID
George C. McGhee, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Julius C. Holmes, American Ambassador to Iran
Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary, NEA
William S. Gaud, Assistant Administrator, Bureau of Near East and South Asia, AID
Oliver M. Marcy, Deputy Director, GTI
Referring to the Shah's allusion to Khrushchev's 20-year plan, he quoted Adenauer as being amused at "the luxury of being able to announce a program concerning which you would not have to answer any questions for 20 years."
Regarding the Shah's remarks on the Arab world, we looked at the possibility of an Algerian resolution as perhaps presenting new opportunities both for France and for the Western powers. Algeria has been the worst problem. Of course, on the other side there was also Palestine which, together with Algeria, is the only unifying element in the Arab world. The Secretary continued that we are not completely discouraged with the direction of the Arab-Moscow relations; sometimes the temperature goes up, sometimes it goes down. Arab temperament and Arab nationalism are such that we thought they would cause the Soviets as much trouble as they have us and would in fact be a bar to the Soviet ambitions.
The Secretary then commented that the most important element was the sense of security. This was where Berlin was vital. Perhaps the Shah would like him to expand on the Berlin problem--unless the President had done so that morning. The Shah acknowledged that they had touched on Berlin, but not at length, whereupon the Secretary continued that Berlin was the principal issue over which a major clash could occur. The Soviets had been making insistent demands, which "cut right across the vital interests of the West." Since June, in fact since the President and Khrushchev had met in Vienna last summer, it had seemed that the harsh Soviet line was designed to intimidate the West. This had led to the President's July 25th demand to the Congress to increase our defenses. Since mid-September, it had seemed that the Soviets had been more moderate. In fact there was some evidence that Khrushchev had perhaps been a little surprised at the degree of the President's reaction. As regards his own talk with Gromyko, on substance, that is on the merits, there had been no significant headway. There had been, perhaps, a change in the atmosphere and mood. The Secretary could be wrong, and it could change tomorrow, but he felt that the Russians were not driving toward a crisis or a diplomatic impasse.
The Berlin situation could affect Iran in two major respects, first if there were a major clash--and the Secretary here emphasized that "We will not be driven out, for the consequence of that would be just as disastrous as a major engagement," and we have been trying to make this known to Khrushchev. Secondly, it would weaken the Shah's position if we were weak in Berlin. If we are able to interject a note of caution in Soviet thinking in this respect, it could be reflected in their conduct in Southeast Asia and regarding Iran.
Turning to the economic, social development side, the Secretary continued that the U.S. is very much interested in Iranian progress. The Secretary understood that the Shah's plan would be ready in June. There would then be a consultative group under the Bank, "with the maximum U.S. interest in enlisting the efforts of a number of countries, in September." There was also the question of how to maintain the momentum before other countries undertook commitments. In this respect, there were a number of things that could be done: for example, Bandar Abbas, where we hoped to be able to respond favorably to a loan application somewhere in the order of $20 million for foreign exchange costs. There were a number of other things that could be done. The Secretary had only two remarks to make. First, we are trying, and he asked the Shah "not to be understandably cynical too soon"--we are trying to establish a mechanism to make decisions more rapidly. This was basically a question of good administrative practice: the Secretary found it amusing that we were encouraging the Iranians to improve their administration at a time when we were also working in the same direction. The Secretary was trying to concentrate decisions in two places; with Ambassador Holmes, who would on the basis of his expert knowledge of the local scene, and in consultation with the Iranians, make recommendations, etc. The second focus was with Messrs. Gaud and Hamilton here in Washington: these two elements working together should be able to make decisions promptly.
The second remark the Secretary wished to make was that we recognize that international consultation may be cumbersome. But in the next decade we foresaw that the West would be developing common policies with regard to aid to less developed countries. For example, OECD was a symbol of this cooperation. There are nations who are already devoting to international development portions of their gross national product comparable to that devoted by the U.S., and in total somewhat more: this to development, not to military assistance. What we must do is to mobilize the resources of the free world for the long term: this was where the Iranian program was important. We propose to work with you and the International Bank. First there will be consultation no later than September. In the meantime, we must manage to maintain momentum. For this purpose we are prepared to entertain applications for development loans during the period before the plan is finally prepared. The Secretary wished to know whether this approach fit the Shah's thinking and approach to the problem. There was a very considerable number of things in which we are interested, but the Secretary did not believe it necessary to go into detail. It was basically a question of how best to use our own interest in Iran for its maximum leverage on others.
In thanking the Secretary for his remarks, the Shah stated that U.S. policy was a great comfort to him, to his people and to the region. He continued that he knew and accepted U.S. policy. Even when the U.S. was not directly concerned, it was interested in justice, international standards, etc. Therefore he looked to the U.S. For a long time Iran had been suspicious of the Western powers, particularly Britain and Russia. Therefore, in the First World War Iran had been pro-German. But now Iranian policy had switched to a pro-West policy, and had every prospect of remaining so. Iran endorses U.S. policies. The Shah therefore understands the sense in which we agree with his "positive nationalism."
As regards the Arabs and the Secretary's remarks concerning a possible happy outcome to the Arabian problem, the Shah commented that he had friendly personal feelings towards DeGaulle and believed these were reciprocated. He had first warned DeGaulle about Algeria in 1959, pointing out that he was the only one who could resolve the issue. (The Secretary commented that this was "extraordinary counsel.") The Shah was happy that the situation was improving, and envisaged that this would bring the Moslems together, particularly the Algerians and the Tunisians. He agreed that thereafter Arab nationalism would focus on Israel, but pointed out that Egypt did not "want" a solution. As he was coming to the U.S. this time, at the Beirut airport, the Lebanese Prime Minister had commented that it was now necessary to resolve the refugee problem, along the lines of the UN resolution. The Shah had not given him a direct answer, but Lebanese informants had told him that it was essential that the U.S. induce Chehab and Chamoun to get together. To an interjected question by Mr. Talbot as to whether this had been recently, the Shah replied that it was perhaps indiscreet to say so, but in fact this had been said by the Lebanese Ambassador in Tehran on March 21.
Turning to the EEC, Japan and economic growth in the West, the Shah continued that he had long told many of his European friends that they "could no longer get rich on the U.S." As regards Iran, foreign powers could not just sell to Iran: they must invest in order to secure foreign markets. "Otherwise we will attract capital and you will suffer. We will offer favorable markets to those who invest capital in Iran." The Shah was of the opinion that the European nations were inclined to help--perhaps not to the extent that the U.S. and he wished, but in any event to help. He then commented that, broadly speaking, the price of industrial imports tended to increase each year, whereas the prices of agricultural exports were declining. This was very difficult for a country like Iran, with an increasing population. With respect to aid, the Shah had talked to the President, who seemed to have liked the idea that Iran should take more and more P.L. 480. The possibility should be explored to the maximum. This would help him combat the rise in prices of agricultural commodities. Iran's problem was complicated, of course, by a bad harvest. To this, Mr. Gaud commented that we are in agreement to the extent that there is a need.
The Shah then commented, in reference to AID, that the Iranians had decided to have an over-all budget. He continued that Mr. Asfia was having talks with various competent people in Washington. He was not aware of the details, but he assumed they were helpful. Mr. Hamilton agreed that there had been very helpful talks. In the course of this exchange, the Shah made a remark to the effect that the talks had been useful "to the extent that you are willing to give us the same kind of help you are extending to India and Pakistan." He continued that "surely we will tax, we wish to tax," but this is not a good year to start. Furthermore, the stabilization program made it difficult. Following a comment by the Secretary that he believed that the IMF was coming to Iran in May in connection with stabilization, the Shah continued that it was also necessary in the long term to make the oil companies grasp the situation in order to have stability. Iran should "remain the bastion guarding the gateway to the Middle East." Therefore, it was "in the oil companies' interests that we should stand firm. They should see to it that our production is boosted; particularly when there is a choice of where to increase, they should naturally favor us." This is especially so when others have so much income they don't know what to do with it, for example Kuwait. Mr. McGhee interjected that it was difficult, because they were not the same companies, for example, in the gulf. To Mr. Ball's statement that we understood that the Shah was going to talk with the members of the consortium, he said that he talked with them regularly. Just a month ago he had received five or six of them. They have promised to increase revenues 7 to 10 percent this calendar year. This, Mr. McGhee commented, would compound rapidly, and the Shah remarked that if they continued to increase up to perhaps 12 percent, it would naturally be of great importance.
To Mr. Ball's comment that as the President had said, we intended to talk to the oil companies--what success we would have is questionable, however--the Shah remarked that he thought they would be favorably disposed since the Iranians were not causing them troubles, as was for example Iraq. Mr. McGhee suggested that perhaps the Shah could speak to them more forcibly, directly, than could we, and the Shah acknowledged that that might be true.
Mr. Ball then addressed himself to the Shah's comments regarding the adverse developments in terms of trade. We were thinking now not only in terms of the EEC but also the over-all general development in this respect. In many items Iran was simply not competitive. After some discussion on Iran's competitive position, particularly with Greece and Turkey, Mr. Ball continued his explanation of the broad lines of U.S. policy. We were seeking free trade without preferential agreements. We were talking with the UK, France, and others seeking to eliminate preferential treatment and substitute commodity arrangements on a global basis. These were clumsy and difficult when perishable items were concerned. The U.S. is attacking the problem directly on an item basis, for example, coffee, cocoa, and minerals, seeking both stabilization in price, and income stability. From the point of view of terms of trade as such, the Shah was right. We are aware of the problem of the rise in industrial prices and can understand the Iranian anxiety regarding the Common Market. As regards our own trade policy, we had two points: (1) the most favored nation approach and (2) our new trade legislation. The latter would provide free access for certain tropical products and perhaps would be available for some Iranian products. In any event, we were very actively working on these problems. Mr. Ball agreed that over a period of time it could be serious if aid were vitiated by price fluctuations. He could give no assurances; it was a very complex problem but we were working on it.
The Secretary then turned to military questions, referring to the Shah's conversations with the President and Mr. McNamara. He handed the Shah an aide-mémoire and annex, The Shah continued that he would naturally be very glad to receive the planning team to consider the reorganization of his forces. Although he personally agreed in the light of the fantastic retaliatory power that he had seen during his visit, and since also the Soviets know that any attack would mean war (but also that Iran could not defend effectively), nevertheless this did represent a completely new approach. It was different from CENTO, and that was a problem for him: how to explain to CENTO, and what would be its effect on the military committee? The Shah could not comment on that. Ambassador Holmes interjected that this reflected precisely what the Shah had been seeking: more mobile forces, and greater striking power. Military plans were never static, and there should be no difficulty in explaining it. The Shah continued that stationing of these new units would be a problem which must be studied. He must also study the "static forces which we have to keep in the north in order not to give the impression that we are abandoning our territory. Well, this is a new approach, in any event." As he understood it, the material reflected in the annex "is for the rest of our conventional forces." To Ambassador Holmes' comment that there would be less concentration and more emphasis on transport and mobility, the Shah replied that these questions must be studied. He did not mind cutting his forces but there was a question of mobility and of the mechanization of these units, for example, personnel carriers and tanks. He did not know whether these questions had been taken care of. In any event, the team could discuss these matters. The Ambassador continued to point out that with smaller forces there would be more concentration of equipment--a greater density, and the Secretary noted that substantial training was also involved. This the Shah had not thought of, but continued that the important question is that "This is not the result of discussion--this is your approach. We cannot, of course, force you, but we can tell you if we agree. I recognize I cannot force you, but I do know that you are fair enough to let us tell you if we do not think this is sound." Ambassador Holmes noted that the Secretary of Defense was prepared to send a team immediately and thus get things moving, which the Shah acknowledged. Regarding the Air Force, the Shah noted "You naturally tell us what you are willing to give, but let us see and study. There are questions of targets and ground support. We must see if it is adequate, then we would have the sentiment of having studied and told you our point of view." Nonetheless, the Shah had the feeling that, short of atomic weapons of course, "you want us to have a hard-hitting mobile and modern force." The Secretary and Ambassador Holmes acknowledged that this was our joint objective, and the Secretary directly asked the Shah if he did not wish modernization. The Shah said he did, and raised the question of timing, to which the Ambassador responded that we would act immediately if we can.
There was then some talk about the question of training, it being pointed out that it took three years to make a pilot. The Shah noted that while he had men to fly the planes today, there was the problem of ground personnel. And maintenance, Ambassador Holmes interjected, continuing that as he understood it, Mr. McNamara would send for General Hayden immediately. The General would go into the problem of organizing a JCS group which would then go out to Iran to study these matters. The Shah said that he would receive them himself. He noted that he, of course, would have to make the decision and that it would not be a popular one--general staffs always exaggerate their needs. The Secretary noted that in this regard general staffs always wanted bigger and better forces, it was something like Parkinson's Law. Ambassador Holmes summed up by saying that if the Shah were agreeable we could proceed on this basis, and the Secretary acknowledged that the Shah must know before he could prepare his budget. The Shah then raised the question of radar, noting that while the British were supplying some equipment, the Iranians themselves were doing all the construction, which seemed to him onerous. Ambassador Holmes noted his understanding that the UK had undertaken its radar construction in the north. As he understood it, Mr. McNamara was thinking of early warning in other directions, and the question of numbers of stations was also involved. To this the Shah acquiesced, noting that he had been amazed at the detailed knowledge that Mr. McNamara possessed. Ambassador Holmes noted that it was important that we not compete with the UK since after all we were all allies.
The Secretary then raised CENTO, noting that there was the question of international military headquarters. It seemed to us increasingly that there was a question as to whether there should be theoretical or real planning. This we had noted in many alliance organizations, including NATO, SEATO and CENTO. We were trying to direct matters towards real planning. We must also direct our thinking towards what would be real contingencies, not just theoretical possibilities. He felt that CENTO must review its planning with this thesis in mind. In this general line of thinking the Secretary hoped to have very frank and intimate talks with his Foreign Minister colleagues at the CENTO meeting. He therefore felt it very important that the Pakistani Foreign Minister attend. Acknowledging the significance of such attendance, the Shah said he would try to help, and turning to the Foreign Minister, asked him to draft an appropriate message. Turning back to the Secretary, the Shah commented that he had already informed him of a message he had received from Ayub. The Shah said that he had spoken to Ayub regarding a U.S. Commander-in-Chief, telling him that while he recognized his reasons for wishing an American, this was no reason to refuse a British commander. Why hurt the UK for nothing? "I will now tell him that if he wants more military assistance, from my talks here I do not think it will help" to have an American. To this the Secretary commented that the nationality of the Commander-in-Chief would have no bearing whatever on U.S. MAP policies, and the Shah repeated that he would send Ayub a message. He continued "I have already tried, but . . . maybe." The Secretary, stating that he was speaking privately, not for the Pakistanis but for the Shah's information, remarked that the psychology of our own people made it desirable not to have an American commander. We had already Commanders-in-Chief in NATO, Atlantic Command, Sixth Fleet; we had substantial forces in Turkey; substantial forces in other regions. We had the Seventh Fleet in the Far East. We had several thousand military men in Vietnam, and in that area we were now having casualties every day. It was important for the U.S. people to see that the U.S. was not the gendarme for the world. A UK general for CENTO would help in this respect. We wished our allies to help more everywhere. We would like the Australians to help in Vietnam. We are prepared to meet our fundamental commitments everywhere and anywhere there is a major confrontation. "We are entirely serious in this." But the U.S. is unique in having so many forces elsewhere in the world. What we need is more of a mixture of our allies.
The Shah said he understood, and also that he recognized that it would have no effect on MAP. "But in the same trend of thinking," he continued, "if the U.S. is sure of some countries and certain of their will and capability to resist, surely the U.S. would wish them to take some part of its responsibilities. There would thus be less and less need for the U.S. to undertake such responsibilities short, of course, of total war." The Secretary acknowledged that this was our hope. There followed an exchange on the relative cost of maintaining a division, the Shah noting that it cost the U.S. some $250 million a year, whereas an Iranian division cost much less. Ambassador Holmes commented that this was a figure for a combat division during the Korean war, including ammunition and equipment. The Secretary continued that for the time being of course there was a need for our physical presence in many places, to register our commitment. He then told a story of Vishinsky and a U.S. businessman. In response to the businessman's comment that Vishinsky must recognize that the U.S. people would never permit an attack on the Soviet Union, Vishinsky had averred that he could not rely on this. Look at Korea, he said "didn't you tell us--didn't you do everything you could to tell us--that you were not interested, and then look what happened!" To this the Shah commented that his concern was not to give the Russians a situation, be it economic or military, of weakness which might lead them to temptation. He might add, in connection with the UK assuming a little more responsibility, that it was his impression that the British were revamping their military planning, and gravitating south of Suez. They were building up Aden and some place in Africa. He speculated that perhaps they wished to assume more responsibility in that area, noting that it was "OK with us." The Foreign Minister interjected that they might be contemplating the necessity of leaving Cyprus, and Ambassador Holmes noted their interest in Kenya. To the Secretary's acknowledgment that they had major interests in the general area of the Indian Ocean, the Shah concluded that what they required was some sort of a base between Malta and Singapore.
The Shah then asked the Secretary's opinion regarding the prospects for disarmament. The Secretary began his reply by expressing the hope that his colleagues would not hear of his response, but frankly while there would be lots of discussion, there was one utterly fundamental point on which no agreement could be reached: inspection. Secrecy and disarmament were utterly incompatible. The Secretary continued at some length to discuss the history of the testing discussions, and the breakdown over inspection. Gromyko had noted to him that one man on an inspection team could conduct espionage of vital significance to the Soviet Union. Noting that the inspection we had proposed in connection with testing did not provide "a farthing's worth", the Secretary indicated that no progress could be made, although he foresaw that we would go ahead talking, perhaps in moderate terms. Noting that the point we had now reached was that we could inspect what had come to be known as the "bonfire," but nothing else, he opined that the Soviet position defies logic. To the Shah's speculation as to Soviet motivation and his suggestion that they might be afraid to expose their weakness, the Secretary said that one or two of the satellites with whom we were talking had in fact suggested the Soviets were concerned about a disclosure of weakness. This of course might change, but we felt that the Soviets had reached a basic decision last summer to make a major new effort in the missile and nuclear field. They had resumed testing for a sound military reason. We therefore must conclude that for the present at least they have no intention of making progress. The Secretary then asked the Shah if he might have a few words with him in private and the meeting broke up, with Mr. McGhee taking the Foreign Minister to his office as arranged for a separate chat. The United States Government believes that the basic force level of the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces should be 150,000 men. The United States Government recognizes that a static force above this level may be required in minimum strength to preserve a visible defensive posture in the northern border areas of Iran and is prepared to undertake a joint study to determine the size and equipment of such a force.
The United States Government is prepared to send a military planning team from the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff to Iran, to consider these questions and to consult generally with Iranian Armed Forces concerning their plans and military deployments.
In conjunction with the proposed force level stated above, the United States Government is prepared to make a firm undertaking to deliver military equipment to Iran over the period July 1, 1962 through June 30, 1967, in accordance with the attached Annex A to this aide-mémoire. This firm undertaking would, of course, be subject to the approval of the United States Congress for annual appropriation requests of the necessary funds. The United States Government believes that, in the light of the present and future strength of its own strategic retaliatory and non-nuclear forces, together with the measures being taken to improve their mobility, the above force level and proposed equipment supplies for the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces would make these forces substantially more effective than at present for the purpose of carrying out their missions. The United States Government notes that the proposed equipment deliveries would constitute a major increase in the delivery levels of the past two years, and would provide for the first time a clear understanding of military assistance plans over a five-year period.
248. Aide-Mémoire Presented by Secretary of State Rusk to the Shah of Iran/1/
Washington, April 13, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2082. Secret. Secretary Rusk handed the aide-mémoire to the Shah during a conversation that began at 2:30 p.m. on April 13; see Document 247. The aide-mémoire and its annex are also attached to a memorandum from Battle to Bundy, April 20, that transmitted to the White House the summary record of the Shah's conversations that the Iranian Government had requested. (Ibid., Central Files, 611.88/4-2062) The White House copy is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, Iran, 3/27/62-5/21/62.
His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah of Iran and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara held a discussion on April 12, 1962, concerning the defense problems of Iran. Secretary McNamara, on behalf of the United States Government, expressed the following views:
Annex A
MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO IRAN/3/
/3/Subject to approval by U.S. Congress of annual appropriation requests. [Footnote in the source text.]
1. Additional Firepower:
a. Stocks of M-1 rifles; BAR automatic rifles; 3.5" rocket launchers; and 57 mm and 106 mm recoilless rifles will be brought to authorized levels for the suggested force levels.
b. Ammunition will be supplied for light and heavy weapons in quantities sufficient for reasonable training requirements and to bring stocks to the planned 30-day level.
c. Approximately 200 60 mm mortars.
2. Additional Communications Equipment
3. Approximately 100 M-113 Armored Personnel Carriers
4. Additional Vehicles:
a. 5,000 Jeeps
b. 1,500 3/4 to 1-ton trucks
c. 3,500 2-1/2-ton trucks
d. 250 5-ton trucks
Total: 10,250
5. Combat Support Equipment: Cranes, water trucks, graders, tractors, Bailey bridges, etc.
6. 2 Minesweepers (inshore)
7. 20 Helicopters (H-43B)
8. Civic Action Program Support
9. Ground Force Construction Project: Guchon Barracks and Facilities
10. Liaison Aircraft:
a. 30 L-19's
b. 15 Cessna 180's
11. Transport Aircraft:
a. 1 Squadron C-130's (4 aircraft)
b. 12 additional C-47 aircraft
12. Additional Combat Air Capability:
a. 2 Squadrons Jet Fighter-Bombers (13 aircraft per squadron)
b. 2 Additional Squadrons (13 aircraft per squadron)
/4/ /4/Subject to improvement of the operational and maintenance efficiency of the Iranian Air Force. [Footnote in the source text.] c. Complete the operational airfield and facilities at Hamadand. Provide a dispersed staging base in Northeast Iran
e. Consult with the British as to steps which can be taken to assist in providing the required early warning radar system.
249. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) to President Kennedy
SUBJECT
Size of PL 480 Programs in United Arab Republic--Egypt
This is the report you requested on the size of the current PL 480 programs in the UAR.
Food-for-Peace programs in the UAR have been large because of Egypt's increasing dependence upon food imports to meet its growing needs. Egypt was traditionally a food exporting country, but the rapid growth of population, combined with a restricted supply of arable land, had forced her to import large amounts of food in recent years to supplement local production. This increased need from abroad put an increasing burden on the nation's foreign exchange reserves which were badly needed for economic development purposes. The PL 480 program, especially through Title I, has contributed much to satisfying these needs and has made a major contribution to the economic development program in the UAR. By saving scarce foreign exchange reserves, which would ordinarily be used to purchase the required food, the UAR was able to purchase capital goods from hard currency areas, including the U.S., and thus become less dependent upon assistance from the Soviet Bloc to meet its capital needs.
While the program was expanded considerably in FY 1962, this was due largely to severe crop failures which sharply increased the country's needs from abroad. The program, which began in FY 1955 under Title III (donations to voluntary non-profit agencies), was interrupted in 1957 and 1958 following the Suez Crisis and revived in later years under Titles I (sales for foreign currencies) and III. In 1961, severe insect infestation and abnormal flooding of the Nile reduced output sharply in the agricultural sector. The production of corn, which provides a part of the farm population with the main ingredient for its bread, was down 20%. Wheat production remained about the same but in recent years the UAR has been able to produce only about half of its requirements. Cotton production declined about a third and supplies of edible cottonseed oil fell far short of requirements. Exports of cotton normally account for about 70% of the country's foreign exchange earnings. The decline in the cotton crop alone represents a potential loss of $100 million and has compounded the chronic problems of foreign exchange shortages. To help alleviate these conditions, the PL 480 program was expanded. As a result, the FY 1962 program rose almost $80 million to about $180 million. While the FY 1963 program is expected to decline with improved crop conditions, Egypt's needs are still expected to total about $140 million.
The following table shows the dollar value of the PL 480 program in the UAR over the last three years, broken down by Title and by commodity:
(millions of dollars)
| FY 1960 | FY 1961 | FY 1962 | |
| Title I/2/ |
73.2 |
80.3 |
123.7 |
| Title II (Emergency relief due to floods and insect infestation) |
-- |
-- |
29.1 |
| Title III |
8.2 |
22.5 |
27.5 |
| Total |
81.4 |
102.8 |
180.3 |
/2/A supplementary Title I agreement of $14 million for wheat has been approved but not yet signed. [Footnote in the source text.]
(millions of dollars)
| FY 1960 | FY 1961 | FY 1962 | |
| Wheat/3/ |
57.5 |
75.4 |
76.6 |
| Corn |
5.4 |
5.4 |
43.3 |
| Edible Oils |
4.0 |
6.6 |
31.2 |
| Other--including ocean transept. |
14.5 |
15.4 |
29.2 |
| Total |
81.4 |
102.8 |
180.3 |
/3/A supplementary Title I agreement of $14 million for wheat has been approved but not yet signed. [Footnote in the source text.]
Fowler Hamilton
Secretary invited Harman's forecast area developments as influenced, among other things, by Algerian settlement. Harman expressed pessimism stating even before end of Algerian situation Israel had observed hardening attitudes among Arabs and sensed comparative calm recent years might soon end. He referred to Ben Bella's declarations that Israel is Arabs' next target and he would contribute 100,000 men to cause. In rising current of hostility, according to Harman, it important not to encourage Arabs even by such unconscious acts as equating Syrian and Israeli declarations. Syrian threat to exterminate Israel is in simple justice not to be equated with Israel assertion of determination to defend itself against aggression. Secretary observed that in such era as Harman envisaged Israel might be well advised cooperate to fullest extent with UN as source great political strength.
Harman declared this is exactly what Israelis are doing, and had done in recent Tiberias troubles. He criticized UNTSO's performance and definition its responsibilities. Citing Von Horn's suggestion Israel had not given him adequate access, he declared UNTSO has much greater freedom of movement on Israel's side than Syria's, where observers are not permitted to move fifty yards beyond their stations. He expressed resentment with Von Horn's alleged practice of describing facility as absolutely imperative and then making public issue of this requirement. When Secretary asked him elucidate, he referred to UNTSO boat on Tiberias. According to Harman there no need for boat because tiny Lake Tiberias can be adequately "covered" from shore stations. Violence is not from vessel to vessel but from shore to ship or ship to shore. In second place Syrians are making determined effort obtain rights to Tiberias and introduction UNTSO boat would be regarded by them as great advance. Secretary asked if Harman thought in fact that boat would impair Israel's claims, Harman replying probably not except for Syrian aspirations. He complained also about UNTSO's recent use of stickers on their vehicle windshields describing themselves as road patrol regulating traffic of their vehicles on Israel roads.
Secretary said he would like to ask informally if Israel in its relations with UN would not be wiser in long run regard it as an ally and try to grant its requests unless such concession materially affected Israel. Secretary said suggestion made in all friendliness on basis his own personal experiences. In relations with other governments he supposed at least once weekly US Secretary of State could take umbrage at attitudes or requests other governments. US had learned to try not let problems develop in this atmosphere and instead do what needs to be done. He observed psychology of Israel's relations with UN is most important both to Israel and its friends if Middle East is in fact moving into new era increased tensions. Impression US public opinion has of Israel's relations with UN is important to Israel's security.
Harman described Israel as wedded to principles of UN and cooperating with it but on basis of UNTSO having understanding of its role. He was particularly critical of ISMAC, asserting it should not be umpire keeping record of balls and strikes; its job is keeping borders quiet, which is easier of accomplishment by diplomacy. (He broadly hinted UNTSO might function better if headed by civilian with military advisor.) Israel prepared rejoin ISMAC at any time Syria will drop demand for consideration D/Z status as agenda's first item. According to Harman, this is not unreasonable requirement inasmuch as General Riley, former UNTSO Chief of Staff, ruled in 1951 that disputes about D/Z were to be referred to him rather than ISMAC. He made usual reference to Lebanon-Israel MAC as model which should provide pattern for all others. It meets, he said, to correct difficulties not to engage in futile exercises as to where responsibility lies.
Secretary remarked Harman may have misunderstood him. He had not meant to suggest specific relations with Von Horn or UNTSO but UN and all its agencies as complex with which it Israel's advantage to cooperate. It difficult to escape conclusion there is element of pugnacity in Israel's attitude.
Rusk
SUBJECT Mr. Feldman requested Assistant Secretary Cleveland to provide the White House with a recapitulation of the recent Security Council consideration of the Israeli-Syrian controversy, with appropriate material which could be drawn upon in response to complaints and inquiries.
Nature of the Complaints
The Syrian complaint centered on an Israeli raid in force, launched from within the Demilitarized Zone on the night of March 16/17. Israel counter-claimed a) that Israeli fishermen and police patrol boats on Lake Tiberias had been fired upon by the Syrians and b) that Israel's political independence had been threatened in statements by high officials of the Syrian Government.
Background
The Lake Tiberias region is a particularly sensitive one because: a) Syria has traditionally been particularly and vigorously anti-Israeli and is determined to resist Israeli encroachments in the Demilitarized Zone and b) the Arabs are agitated about Israel's plan to withdraw Jordan Basin waters from Lake Tiberias in late 1963. Israel alleges absolute sovereignty over the entire lake. In response to Mr. Feldman's request, the Legal Advisor is preparing and will shortly transmit a thorough legal exposition of the position of the U.S. Government on this question of sovereignty. The Formulation of the U.S. Position
Our major aim during this exercise was to strengthen the U.N. peacekeeping machinery in the field and to encourage the parties to cooperate more fully with it so as to render the recurrence of such hostilities unlikely. In order to prevent the Soviets and/or the UAR from pre-empting the situation and to give us the maximum degree of control over the outcome, we and the British decided to sponsor a reasonable, balanced, and constructive resolution.
The Secretary sent to the President on March 28 a memorandum outlining the projected U.S. position (Tab C). A proposed resolution was enclosed. On the basis of the von Horn report (Tab D), reports from our posts in the area, and consultations with the Israelis, friendly Council members and Dr. Bunche, USUN drafted the preliminary U.S. statement, which was cleared in the Department and delivered by Ambassador Stevenson on March 28 (Tab E). Mr. Cleveland was informed by you that we should proceed along the lines of the memorandum, and USUN was authorized to proceed accordingly (Tab F).
In keeping with the Council's previous stand on retaliatory raids, in our original draft resolution the Israeli attack of March 16/17 was explicitly condemned. However, adequate balance was provided by a paragraph which would have held "that the hostile actions from Syrian territory of March 8" were clearly violations of the cease-fire. Although the presumption is that Syrian provocation took place, UNTSO was unable conclusively to determine where the responsibility lay for initiating the several fire exchanges which occurred prior to the Israeli raid. In response to questions put by members of the Council General von Horn made further observations on April 4 (Tab G). A major reason for the fragmentary nature of UNTSO's information was the denial by both parties of sufficient observational facilities and freedom of movement to the UN observers.
The Israelis made energetic representations at all levels, including a call by their Ambassador on the Secretary on April 2 to persuade us to desist from supporting a condemnatory resolution (Tab H). Consultations with the Israelis in New York, Tel Aviv and Washington were frequent and frank throughout.
Despite the fact that we had urged the Israelis not to bring into the Council debate the contentious question of sovereignty over Lake Tiberias their representative explicitly reaffirmed their assertion of sovereignty in two statements before the Council. It was determined by USUN that it would be tactically undesirable for us publicly to take issue with Israel on this aspect of the problem in the Security Council debate.
In light of the consultations conducted with regard to the resolution, the Department reconsidered its original draft. Ambassador Stevenson was given discretion to negotiate within a range between a strong version and a milder one (Tab I). He decided to use the milder version as the basis for further negotiations and so informed you and Mr. Schlesinger.
The Israelis, who were obviously acquainted with our first draft, should have been pleased that we decided to pursue a milder resolution. Meanwhile, however, more background information became available, publicly and privately, from General von Horn, who had come to New York at our suggestion, and from sources in the field. Inter alia, this information strengthened doubts about who had really provoked whom in the fire exchanges prior to the Israeli raid. USUN came to the conclusion, with which the Department concurred, that a factual justification for charges that the Syrians bore exclusive responsibility for initiating the hostile exchanges simply could not be made. Consequently the resolution took on a less "balanced" if more objective cast, in order to reflect more accurately the ascertainable facts and accordingly to make it more viable in the Council. Naturally, the Israelis were disappointed about these last changes. You will note that in our major statement (Tab J) we took the Syrians seriously to task for raising the level of fire in the March 8 exchange.
Moreover, we were as responsive to Israeli suggestions about the resolution as the facts of the situation warranted. For example: (a) the resolution does not newly and directly condemn Israel, but rather reaffirms the Council's position on retaliatory raids; (b) in response to Israel's second complaint, an operative paragraph calling upon both Governments to refrain from the threat as well as the use of force was added to our original draft and later the phraseology of this paragraph was changed to make it even more satisfactory to the Israelis; (c) we eliminated a direct call upon the Governments to exclude their armed forces from the Demilitarized Zone and reduce their forces in the Defensive Area; and (d) we changed another paragraph so that the emphasis would not be solely on the reactivation of the Mixed Armistice Commission, but also on the Armistice machinery. Points (a) and (d) were major changes. At the last minute, we also made a "technical" change at Israeli request by deleting reference to the Demilitarized Zone as the "Syrian-Israeli" DZ. In retrospect it seems fair to say that despite its allegations of great unhappiness about the outcome, Israel got more of the changes it wanted in the resolution than it had good reason to expect. (Tab J(1))
The Council Action
The US-UK resolution as approved by a vote of 10 to 0 with France abstaining constitutes, in our view, an evenhanded approach to the March incident and a constructive directive for future action by UNTSO and the two parties. The vote was a convincing demonstration of the value of our taking the initiative in such cases. The completely one-sided Syrian draft resolution (Tab K) was not even pressed to a vote.
We regarded it as very important that the Council adopt a reasonable resolution. If the Council had failed to pass a resolution, which was the outcome the Israelis indicated they would have welcomed, the Council would have: 1) failed to exercise any restraining influence; 2) in effect condoned Israel's deliberate policy of retaliatory raids; and 3) failed to support and strengthen the United Nations machinery on the ground. The net result would have been to increase the risk of renewed hostilities.
Boilerplate
Attached as Tab L is material which you may wish to draw upon in replying to inquiries about the United States position in the Lake Tiberias dispute.
A.E. Breisky Following is a summary of the status of important substantive actions initiated in the course of the Shah's visit to Washington.
Military Assistance
The Shah received a copy of the Aide-Mémoire The Shah understands and agrees with the wisdom of our plans to enlist maximum support from other Western nations for multi-lateral assistance under the aegis of the IBRD by September of this year, and to maintain momentum in the planning process in the meantime. We will continue our efforts to bring about agreement between the IBRD and Iran on the Third Economic Plan. We will act to complete arrangements for a project loan on the Bandar Abbas project. We will also study the possibility of using PL 480 funds for government employees' housing projects in Iran. We will continue to urge Iran to develop specific development projects for multi-national financial consideration and to provide Iran with assistance in carrying out surveys on which intelligent investment plans can be formulated.
CENTO
It was agreed that the two governments would make a final effort to persuade the Pakistan Government to send its Foreign Minister to the upcoming CENTO Ministerial Meeting, Iraq and Afghanistan
It was agreed that in view of the Communist subversive threat in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States should attempt to maintain a vigorous presence and maximum influence in these two countries. It was agreed that strong efforts be made, including favorable transit arrangements, to prevent the spread of Soviet influence in Afghanistan. No follow-up U.S. actions or policy changes are necessary.
The Possible Increase in Iranian Oil Revenues
We have informed the Shah that we would consider the possibility of approaching the major American oil companies with a view to maximizing Iranian oil revenues through production allocations in the Middle East. A staff study is underway in the Department. The Shah may meet with representatives of the major companies while he is in the United States, and a final decision as to what if any action should be taken by the United States should await the results of this meeting, if it is held.
Increased Assistance to the Iranian Gendarmerie and National Police
We understand that the President and the Shah conferred privately on the subject of possible assistance to the Iranian Police and kindred organizations in order to improve counter-insurgency capability. Liaison with the Paris Garde Mobile was mentioned. We understand that General Taylor is acting on this subject through the Inter-Agency Counter-Subversion Committee.
E.S. Little "For Talbot and Cleveland.
Johnson saw Meir two hours Sunday, three hours Tuesday morning and at his request 45 minutes Tuesday afternoon. Moe, Rafael, Arad present all three sessions, Yahil and Rosenne at first two.
Johnson presented 'some ideas' based essentially upon his Working Paper Five. At the third meeting Johnson (1) expressed disappointment, (2) regretted essentially negative character of response, and (3) declined to assent to Meir request expressed in second session not to mention 'poll' of refugees on other side. FonMin did not again allude to last point. She said she failed to understand Johnson's disappointment. She and colleagues were manifestly determined, despite Johnson's reiterated denials, to interpret his approach as threat to Israel's security, and complained of unequal pressures on peace-seeking Israel. Also characterized his suggestions as 'mechanical' solution ignoring political fundamentals.
Given character Israel reaction Johnson did not develop brief allusion to compensation made in the first talk.
At conclusion he asked serious consideration his 'suggestions' before he returned, probably 5-6 or 10-11 May (he plans not to be in Israel on Independence Day 9 May despite cordial invitation). He did not seek interview this visit with PriMin who is on vacation but was assured without asking that Ben-Gurion wanted to see him next month.
Despite evident absence of meeting of minds conversations were generally cordial in tone.
Johnson left Jerusalem by car Wednesday planning spend evening in a kibbutz, night at Tiberias, and arrive Beirut 19 April at noon."
Scott
PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Kamel reviewed the improvement of U.S.-U.A.R. relations since 1958 and the importance of a free and stable Egypt which he described as unaligned in the domain of the Free World. He stressed the value of avoiding issues on the question of Israel and maintaining tranquility in the area. He noted the quiet which had prevailed for more than three years except for the recent incidents, because of which, he said, both sides must be strongly counseled to avoid recurrence. He defined the essential goals of Dr. Kaissouni's mission as follows: (a) agreement with the IMF for a stabilization program during the present visit; (b) agreement on a multi-year PL 480 sales program; (c) U.S. support for and help in organizing a consortium to meet the current foreign exchange problem; and (d) U.S. help for a consortium support of the U.A.R.'s longer term economic development.
In welcoming Dr. Kaissouni, the Secretary confirmed the serious interest of the U.S. in relations with the U.A.R. The nonalignment of Egypt causes the U.S. no concern. The U.S. interest is in the security of a society of independent states. He observed that the Ambassador had put the points in an appropriate order of priority. If a stabilization arrangement can succeed, it will open the way for other things.
Dr. Kaissouni noted that discussions with the Fund had been prolonged and the problem of the U.A.R. is immediate. He believed the two or three points of difference with the Fund were negotiable. He stressed the value of assistance given at the right time and hoped for good offices of the U.S. with the Fund. The current payments gap, including the cost of trade liberalization under a stabilization program, would be about $120-$130 million of which up to $60 million might come from IMF arrangements, leaving the balance for a consortium.
A consortium for the current foreign exchange problem was essential but so too was assistance for the economic development program. Social and humanitarian problems of Egypt would not permit postponement. The planned eight per cent annual growth rate might be debatable but however much progress was to be made, the U.A.R. would need foreign loans and other assistance. There were available credits and offers from a number of countries, but organization and rationalization of the approach was needed as well as verification of the availability of additional funds. The development program problem was not so much one of an immediate requirement for expenditure as of assuming the basis for going ahead.
In response to the Secretary's question, Dr. Kaissouni gave first priority in the development program to industry, including communications, electric power and the like, noting that these involve greater foreign exchange costs than does agricultural investment. Agriculture, however, could not be expanded as rapidly. Although land reclamation was in progress, gains in this area were dependent on availability of increased water from the High Dam about 1967.
The Secretary said the U.S. was prepared to help on the IMF stabilization program. Following some discussion of priorities and level of needs, the Secretary stressed that the U.S. has been pressing its friends abroad very hard to increase their aid and that the U.A.R. should understand that development of consortium support would mean effort on its part. He asked whether there had been discussions with other capitals.
The Ambassador and Dr. Kaissouni noted recent efforts to improve relations with various European countries, including release of the French Mission members and negotiations for settlement of claims with Switzerland and Italy. Dr. Kaissouni also acknowledged the validity of Mr. Gaud's comment that development consortia should be headed by an international agency and that the recipient country had to be prepared for considerable probing into the soundness of its economic plans. Dr. Kaissouni recalled that he had participated in detailed negotiations relative to the proposed High Dam consortium and knew the potential of the IBRD and the implications of this type of approach. The Ambassador stated that, while the U.A.R. would do its part, a gesture from the U.S. side was of critical importance.
Discussion of a multi-year PL 480 sales arrangement brought out that there was no objection in principle by either side although details might take a little time. Mr. Cottam noted that an interim arrangement to ensure continuation of wheat supplies might be desirable and that consideration of this possibility has already been initiated.
In conclusion, the Secretary said he wished to talk with Dr. Kaissouni again before his departure. The U.S. side would do all it could for positive steps during Dr. Kaissouni's visit and hoped he would leave encouraged by the results. II. This constructive cooperation--in its different aspects--will undoubtedly lead to fruitful results in the relations between the two countries as well as the stability and prosperity of the Middle East.
III. The visit of His Excellency, Dr. A. El Kaissouni, Minister of Economy of the United Arab Republic, and the members of his delegation is another important step in the process of exploring new possibilities for solid and extensive economic cooperation between this great country and the United Arab Republic.
IV. The visit of the Minister of the United Arab Republic has a two-fold objective:
A. The conclusion of a stabilization program with the International Monetary Fund, a matter which the United Arab Republic Government finds it urgently necessary to be finalized during the visit of Dr. El Kaissouni to Washington.
B. The settlement with the competent authorities of the United States of important and urgent matters relating to the following:
(1) To begin talks in order to form a consortium to enable the United Arab Republic to implement its Economic Development Plan.
(2) An agreement with the "Agency of International Development" concerning a loan program similar to that recently approved by the above-mentioned Agency for other countries. The objective of this loan is to overcome the existing temporary difficulties in the United Arab Republic Balance of Payments, resulting from the natural disaster which affected seriously our crops this year. The loan is to be used for payment of current imports.
(3) An agreement for a multi-year program to provide the United Arab Republic with wheat and other surplus commodities under P.L. 480.
(4) An agreement for the financing of some projects of the Five Year Plan, which are considered of high priority in the Economic Development Plan of the United Arab Republic.
(5) To study ways and means for the utilization of the accumulated amounts of the Cooley Fund.
(6) To explore the possibilities of expanding the areas of cooperation in the field of technical assistance.
(7) To explore the possibility of the United Arab Republic benefiting from the excess surplus property program.
(8) To exchange views concerning the possibilities of reaching an agreement on a grant to the United Arab Republic equivalent to 25% of the value of agricultural commodities shipped to the United Arab Republic under P.L. 480.
(9) To consider forming a mixed committee to work on the above-mentioned items of this Aide-Mémoire.
V. The Embassy is confident that the United Arab Republic Delegation, headed by the Minister of Economy, will receive from the United States authorities that kind of interest, constructive understanding and fruitful cooperation which the Government of the United States has always demonstrated in the past in the administration of its relations with the United Arab Republic.
VI. The Embassy is also confident that the success of the talks between the American authorities and the United Arab Republic Delegation will certainly promote the good relations already existing between the two countries.
PARTICIPANTS
For the United Arab Republic For the United States The Secretary commented that Dr. Kaissouni's mission had had a most satisfactory outcome for which he was pleased.
Dr. Kaissouni expressed deep gratitude for the courtesy and kindness with which his mission had been received. This would be reported fully to his Government. He confirmed that agreement with the IMF management had now been reached and he had earlier that afternoon given a letter of intent to Mr. Jacobsson regarding financial measures to be taken by the UAR. Dr. Kaissouni had talked with IBRD President Black, whom he described as an old friend of Egypt, regarding an economic development consortium. Mr. Black's response had been encouraging and he had promised to send experts to report on the UAR plans and prospects as soon as Bank staff availability would permit. Dr. Kaissouni said he had pressed for a complete report in time for discussions with other countries' finance ministers during the annual Bank and Fund meeting in September; but Mr. Black regarded this as too tight a schedule. Dr. Kaissouni hoped the Bank might consider recruitment of a team outside Bank staff, recalling the mission of General Wheeler at the time of the Suez crisis. Dr. Kaissouni replied that they were contacting Germany, UK, Italy and Japan. In the case of France, the UAR did not yet have diplomatic relations. However, the Ambassador suggested sounding out the French in view of the more favorable prospects in Franco-UAR relations.
In concluding the discussion of Dr. Kaissouni's mission, the Secretary re-emphasized the importance of IBRD leadership in the long-term development area. Dr. Kaissouni's report reinforced the Secretary's impression of Mr. Black's deep interest in Egypt's future. If the Bank was able to move forward, this was a good sign. Although the Secretary's intended conversation with various NATO ministers regarding short-term payments assistance would naturally be in the framework of its long-term problem, he did not want to step out ahead of the Bank at this time in any specifics of a possible long-term consortium.
The Secretary concluded that he was especially pleased that there had been achieved on both sides a high degree of clarity on what lies ahead.
Ambassador Kamel expressed his happiness that Dr. Kaissouni's mission had been a success and now foresaw the way to resolution of many difficult issues. The Secretary responded that he hoped the Ambassador would take quiet satisfaction in this outcome. PARTICIPANTS
For the United Arab Republic For the United States Dr. Kaissouni said he believed the UAR side had now come to agreement with the management of the Fund and he expected to sign a letter to Managing Director Jacobsson today confirming proposals for a financial program. He hoped for early approval of the arrangements, including a standby agreement by the IMF Board, perhaps as early as April 30. There were some remaining problems. While approval of a quota increase is expected, Mr. Jacobsson was most reluctant to present a proposal to the Board which prejudged the quota increase. As things were now, therefore, standby would provide for drawings of $42.5 million over a nine-months period. There was also the problem of whether the $30 million gold collateral drawing due next January would be converted to the longer term. Dr. Kaissouni had talked with various Fund directors, including the U.S. representative, Mr. Southard. He commented that Mr. Southard had been very helpful.
Mr. Gaud said the U.S. side certainly hoped that the remaining difficulties would be resolved satisfactorily, inasmuch as the U.S. program which he would describe was based on the assumption of an appropriate program with the Fund and availability of those resources.
Since the meeting on Monday, the problem presented by the UAR side had been reviewed very carefully in terms of what the U.S. could do and a program had been discussed with and approved by Secretary Rusk. Since the UAR side had discussed project requirements as well as the current payments problem, the U.S. program proposals were addressed to both. On the basis of projects discussed and understandings as to priorities in point of time, the U.S. would be prepared to finance projects totaling $51.3 million in the coming approximately one year--or through USFY 1963. This total was composed of the Cairo West Power Plant-$31 million; the cardboard plant-$5 million; the Bagasse plant expansion-$5.3 million; and another possible $10 million for diesel locomotives. With respect to the latter, it was noted that the UAR had mentioned up to $25 million of diesel locomotives but that $10 million would meet the requirement during the next year. The $10 million specified would be either AID or Export-Import Bank, dependent on further consideration. The AID loans (excluding the possible financing of diesels by ExImBank) would, according to present loan policy, be for 40 years with a 3/4 per cent service charge and no interest and would carry a 10 year grace period. The U.S. willingness to finance these projects was necessarily subject to appropriation of the funds by Congress since most of these would probably not be ready for final approval before USFY 1963. The loans would of course be subject to normal AID criteria as to engineering, feasibility, etc.
It was also proposed to utilize $5 million of the outstanding loan to the Industrial Bank toward the foregoing projects since these funds had been lying idle for some time and the prospects for the Bank's utilizing them appeared very limited. Dr. Kaissouni thought he might like to retain some of the funds for the Industrial Bank. Mr. Gaud indicated he was entirely agreeable to deferring decision on this point. It was agreed that the UAR would respond within a month.
Mr. Gaud then turned to the question of funds for the stabilization program. He recalled that it was difficult to fit emergency requirements of this nature into the pattern for which U.S. assistance funds were available. Also this had come at the end of the fiscal year when funds were limited. After careful review, however, the U.S. was prepared to loan immediately upon conclusion of arrangements with the Fund, $20 million to be used for specified types of commodities to be purchased in the United States. It was understood that the UAR would do its best to obtain further funds from other Western countries and the U.S. would do what it could to support these efforts. In addition, if contributions of other Western nations to the stabilization fund exceed $20 million, AID will in FY 1963 match the excess dollar for dollar up to $10 million, subject to availability of funds. The terms of this possible additional loan would be identical with our first $20 million loan. Mr. Gaud emphasized that for the U.S. to make all or part of the matching $10 million loan, the financial contributions of other countries would have to be new money. Diversion of existing credit commitments by other countries, such as Germany, would not be counted. It was also desirable to set a time limit on getting commitment of contributions from others. Mr. Gaud asked for Dr. Kaissouni's views. After some discussion it was agreed that the U.S. offer of an additional loan up to $10 million would be open for four months after the agreement with the Fund had been concluded. The terms of the commodity loan would be ten years at 2-1/2 per cent with three years' grace. This was clarified as three years' grace plus seven years' repayment, to total ten years. In connection with the terms, Mr. Gaud noted that emergency balance of payments assistance and support of stabilization measures could not be considered within the same criteria for terms as development type loans. He mentioned that the last loan of this type for a stabilization program in the area had been for five years at 5-3/4 per cent but in recognition of the economic problems of the UAR, the U.S. had endeavored to be as liberal as possible in setting the terms for this loan.
Dr. Kaissouni asked if it might not be possible to make the initial loan for $30 million with the understanding that the UAR would make maximum effort to obtain contributions from other countries. Mr. Gaud stressed that an integral part of the U.S. program was the inducement to other countries to contribute. He noted that the U.S. was greatly interested in promoting the consortium of Western nations to provide assistance.
There was some discussion of the status of the various projects. Mr. Williams noted that Westinghouse engineers left for Cairo two days earlier to prepare feasibility studies needed by AID. Their task would be expedited by maximum cooperation of the qualified authorities in Cairo. Feasibility study on the cardboard plant had been received and was now being reviewed. The U.S. had financed the first part of the Bagasse plant and familiarity with the project would facilitate feasibility study. With respect to the diesel locomotives, the application had not yet been received.
In response to Dr. Kaissouni's question, Mr. Gaud said that while a formal letter on the U.S. intentions could be undertaken, this would be quite time-consuming, involving a formal commitment of future fiscal year funds. He believed the present expressions were sufficient. The program outlined by Mr. Gaud had been endorsed by the Secretary and by Mr. Lingle in the absence of the Administrator. Mr. Gaud proposed that work on the details of the Supporting Assistance loan be undertaken as soon as possible in order to have it ready after the Fund arrangements would be made.
Mr. Gaud also confirmed to Dr. Kaissouni the U.S. intention to proceed with development of the multi-year PL 480 arrangement and to provide an additional 400,000 tons of wheat, subject to necessary consultations, to assure continuity of UAR wheat supplies pending consideration of a multi-year arrangement. It was noted that this would make available from this time approximately 600,000 tons of wheat which should provide ample time for consideration of the longer term program.
Dr. Kaissouni reported that he had talked with Mr. Black concerning a development consortium and had received a most sympathetic and courteous response. Mr. Black had agreed to send a committee of experts, as soon as they were free of certain other duties, to study UAR development plans and consider what projects might be financed by the IBRD or IDA. Dr. Kaissouni had hoped the results of an IBRD study could be available in time for the annual Bank and Fund meeting in September to facilitate discussions he would undertake with Ministers of Finance of possible members of a consortium. Mr. Gaud confirmed U.S. interest in the progress of these efforts.
Addendum:
In a subsequent conversation with Dr. Kaissouni and his colleagues, Mr. Gaud stated that the U.S. might have to credit all or part of the project loan financing discussed to any commitment undertaken by us in connection with the first year or two of the consortium plan--this to depend upon when the consortium takes place.
Johnson unable to get across to his full satisfaction outline of ideas embodied in his Working Paper Five though he did seem to convey notion of beginning with small number (about 20,000). Perhaps most encouraging note was that Takla remarked at one point that if 5,000 of such an initial 20,000 wished to return they must be entitled to do so.
Both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister rejected any idea of refugee commitment to "live in peace with their neighbors" prior to return, saying refugee conduct would depend after return on Israel treatment of Arabs in country.
Takla stressed Lebanon's peaceful intent and did not appear to assume Israel must be destroyed but Prime Minister used arguments which would appear logically to lead to such a result, such as "95% of the land belongs to the Arabs".
Moe in private talk with Ammoun was able to communicate considerably more effectively, and this should prove helpful preparation for further talk with Takla agreed for return visit after Amman before returning to Israel.
Knight
Gazit called me for lunch upon his return from Israel, apparently to talk about a number of problems concerning his government. He clearly felt unhappy about recent developments on Lake Tiberias and about the signs of a shift in US policy toward Nasser, especially as revealed during the Kaissouni visit (he was of course quite well-informed).
Gazit's main purpose seemed to be to float the idea that the Israelis could live with US economic support of Syria and even the UAR so long as they were adequately reassured with respect to US guarantees to them. In his opinion, the Israelis were tired of being told repeatedly by the US that Israel "was here to stay"; they needed some more tangible reassurance. For example, the President might write a secret letter to Ben Gurion along the following lines: (1) the US recognized Israel's security preoccupations; (2) Israel should be reassured that in event of clear-cut Arab aggression the US would take whatever steps were necessary to make sure that the attack could not succeed; (3) along with such reassurances the US could also ask that Israel pursue a policy of greater restraint with respect to incidents on its frontiers and cooperate more effectively with UNTSO, etc. so that ambiguous incidents would not arise. Gazit's point was that if Israel had more in the way of a security commitment from the US, it would not have to pursue such an activist policy. He further indicated that while such an idea was a personal one of his and indeed "contrary to his brief", he thought his government would be rather forthcoming in such circumstances.
Gazit implied that the Israelis had some indication that reassurances in some form for Israel were in the wind. But one big difficulty was that the US tended to issue such reassurances without any prior consultation with the Israelis. He felt that such consultations could take place in full secrecy, and that it would be much more profitable if they had a chance to discuss the matter with us. He complained bitterly about the way in which the US patronizingly makes such moves without any form of prior consultation.
Without discussing the merits of the issue, I pointed out that in any case involving two adverse parties, to have a prior consultation with one party made us their hostages if they should choose to use these to their own political advantage. He argued that there had been several communications between the US and Israel at Presidential level which had never been revealed by the Israelis; we could rely upon their keeping confidence.
Gazit indicated considerable knowledge of what was discussed with Kaissouni (I neither confirmed nor denied) and presumed that the next step after PL-480 and the stabilization program (he believed the UAR would accept IMF terms) would be a consortium. He questioned whether substantial development aid to the UAR would buy us much with Nasser; he felt that Nasser's political behavior remained as basically hostile as ever. He regarded the recent dispute in the Lake Tiberias area as having been provoked by Cairo Radio's constant pressure on Syria for not defending Arab interests against the Israelis, saying that Syria and Jordan were merely looking for a compromise under the infamous Johnston Plan for water take-off.
We briefly discussed the Shah's visit. He had heard from a middle level source in the Iranian Embassy that the Shah thought the visit had gone rather well, and had been pleased with the military hardware offered.
Gazit and I had spent the first half of luncheon discussing the events in Algeria and Morocco, including Ben Bella's remarks and their later retraction by the PAG. He seemed to endorse our policy on arms for Morocco and perhaps Algeria in competition with the Soviets; we agreed that the French should shoulder the main burden here, and might be more forthcoming in the light of the Algerian settlement. However, Gazit then posed the question of whether we would give arms to Syria on a similar basis of attempting to preclude Soviet aid or whether we would prefer to have our European allies do so. I told him that I knew of no plans for US arms sales to the Syrians and that these seemed to be in quite a different category from those to Morocco or potentially Algeria. I opined that if the French continued on the line of developing cordial relationships with the new Algerian regime, its ties with Moscow and Cairo might not develop too far.
R.W. Komer "He and Moe met once with Foreign Minister on 25 April; present also Oustouani, Secretary General Foreign Office, Ambassador Daoudi and Hamwi, relatively junior Foreign Ministry official newly assigned to Palestine Affairs probably being trained to take charge at staff level. Daoudi due to leave soon for India as Ambassador but had participated in drafting in Cairo of Arab League Resolution on Johnson's Mission later adopted in Riyadh. Daoudi evidently still regarded as expert on refugee question but extent of his involvement in policy consideration of Johnson's suggestions somewhat doubtful. That evening Johnson and Moe had long informal talk with Daoudi at hotel at latter's suggestion. Johnson and Moe paid courtesy call on Prime Minister 24th and then met about one and half hours with Oustouani, Foreign Minister having clearly indicated previous day he did not wish participation in further session.
There appeared, somewhat surprisingly, to be better communication with Syrians than with Lebanese, although meeting with Foreign Minister conducted through English-Arabic interpreter. Syrians had evidently made decision to receive Johnson with full courtesy and state their position frankly, but they apparently did not wish to be drawn into detailed discussion, presumably because they are a new government and feeling their way in both internal and external policy.
Johnson had fairly good opportunity to outline to Foreign Minister his ideas along lines of his WP5 SUBJECT The present conjunction of several considerations, both foreign and domestic, suggest the desirability of assuring Israel that the U.S. concedes Israel's jurisdiction over Lake Tiberias and concurs in its right to take an equitable portion of the Jordan River Valley waters, using the lake as the point of diversion. United States assurances would be given in exchange for certain Israel commitments which are necessary to protect possible future water development programs of the Arabs. Shortly before his departure for Europe, the Secretary had an opportunity to explain the problem to the President.
250. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel
251. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
Security Council Consideration of the Lake Tiberias Incidents
252. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, April 18, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.11/4-1862. Secret. Drafted by Bowling on April 16 and cleared by Gaud in draft, William Bundy in draft, and Cottam.
SUBJECT
Iran: Followup on Visit of Shah of Iran
253. Telegram From the Consulate General in Jerusalem to the Department of State/1/
Jerusalem, April 18, 1962, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/4-1862. Confidential; Priority. Received at 11:05 a.m. on April 19 and repeated to USUN, Tel Aviv, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, and London.
210. Following message relayed at request Dr. Johnson:
254. Memorandum of Conversation
Economic Aid for the U.A.R.
Dr. Abdel Moneim Kaissouni, Minister of Economy, United Arab Republic
H.E. Dr. Mostafa Kamel, Ambassador, United Arab Republic
The Secretary
AA/NESA--Mr. William S. Gaud
NEA--Mr. Howard R. Cottam
NE/E--Enoch S. Duncan
255. Aide-Mémoire From the Embassy of the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/
Washington, April 23, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.86B11/4-2362. No classification marking. A handwritten note on the source text indicates that the aide-mémoire was handed to Walt Rostow on April 23. No record of a conversation between Rostow and either Kaissouni or other UAR officials on that day has been found.
I. The Embassy of the United Arab Republic has the honor to express its appreciation to the Government of the United States of America for its valuable and growing cooperation with the United Arab Republic Government.
256. Memorandum of Conversation
Outcome of Dr. Kaissouni's Mission
H.E. Dr. Abdel Moneim Kaissouni, Minister of Economy
H.E. Dr. Mostafa Kamel, Ambassador
Dr. Hamid El Sayyeh, Under Secretary, Ministry of Economy
Mr. Hassan El Abd, Commercial Counselor
The Secretary
Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary, NEA
William S. Gaud, Assistant Administrator, AID
Enoch S. Duncan, OIC, Economic Affairs, NE
257. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, April 26, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.0086B/4-2662. Official Use Only. Drafted by Duncan.
SUBJECT
United States Economic Assistance to the United Arab Republic
H.E. Dr. Abdel Moneim Kaissouni, Minister of Economy
H.E. Dr. Mostafa Kamel, Ambassador
Dr. Hamid El Sayyeh, Under Secretary, Ministry of Economy
Mr. Hassan El Abd, Commercial Counselor
Mr. Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary, NEA
Mr. William S. Gaud, Assistant Administrator, AID
Mr. Howard R. Cottam, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
Mr. Randall S. Williams, Director, Near Eastern Affairs, AID
Mr. Enoch S. Duncan, OIC, Economic Affairs, NE
Mr. Edward Anderson, OIC, UAR/AID
258. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State
259. Memorandum for the Record
260. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/
Cairo, April 30, 1962, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/4-3062. Confidential. Repeated to Damascus, Beirut, USUN, Amman, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem.
1577. For Cleveland and Talbot from Johnson. There follows summary report by Johnson on his Syrian visit.
261. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Grant) to Acting Secretary of State Ball
Assurances to Israel on its Jordan Valley Water Development Program
/2/No record of the conversation has been found.
/3/A memorandum by Special Assistant to the President Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., contained the following account of Stevenson's discussion with President Kennedy on May 2 on Lake Tiberias: "The Ambassador said that he thought it would be a great mistake to send the proposed Lake Tiberias note to the Israeli Government. While he felt that we would come out on the Israeli side on the question, he argued that the present draft would throw away valuable bargaining power, and that we should stipulate certain conditions before we accept the Israeli position. Action: the President asked that the Ambassador get together with Mike Feldman and see whether they could agree on anything. Stevenson and Feldman subsequently agreed that it would be a mistake to send any note at this time. When the Israeli representative to the UN returns to New York in about two weeks, Feldman will go to New York and he and Stevenson will explore the matter together." (Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Staff Memoranda, Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., 1/62-5/62)
Considerations which have influenced the development of the proposed course of action include the following:
1. We believe Israel to be entitled to a fair share of the waters of the Jordan Valley and would not wish to permit obstruction of her plan to use the water.
2. We consider that the hostilities on and around Lake Tiberias in March between Israel and Syria were directly related to Israel's plan to divert large quantities of water from the lake commencing in 1963. Israel is determined to carry through its plan, and the Arabs desire to prevent its implementation because of the increased capability Israel will achieve to settle immigrants in the Negev. It is likely that the Syrians in particular will continue to challenge by various means Israel's diversion plan. Having once used the retaliatory raid (March 16-17) to deter Syria from hostile actions in any form, Israel is likely to do so again if Syria perpetrates new hostile acts. The fact that Syria defeated the Israel retaliatory raid is likely to lead Israel to use force on a much larger scale the next time, unless in the meantime Israel has received assurances that we will defend her right to divert the waters.
3. The principal purpose of the US-UK resolution of April 9, censuring Israel, 5. We had hoped that Jordan would be able to make more progress than it has toward construction of a dam on the Yarmuk River under IBRD aegis. It now appears that our efforts in this direction will be insufficient to dampen Arab hostility to the Israel diversion plan. Hence, we believe we should waste no time in supporting Israel in marshaling international agreement to Israel's right to the water since the case eventually must be expected to come to the Security Council. If the weight of the world commonly appears to be on the side of Israel, the Arabs will find more difficulty in creating serious trouble over the issue.
The Department proposes to deliver a note to the Israelis containing two assurances: (a) that we support their intention to divert a portion of the Jordan Valley water and are prepared to make our support clear to other governments, including the concerned Arab states; and (b) that Israel has jurisdiction over Lake Tiberias. The note in return would ask the Israelis to announce an intention to divert no more of the water than allocated to them by the Unified (Johnston) Plan, which was accepted at the technical level by the several riparians but failed of political agreement, and to agree to establishment of effective, impartial supervision of the use of the water, which also is an element of the Unified Plan.
The Department would anticipate a number of benefits to flow from this exchange of reciprocal assurances:
We would expect no difficulty in obtaining the support of major Western governments for such a position.
Conveyed, on the one hand, to the Israelis, that Government should be encouraged to act with both confidence and restraint as the critical date approaches. On the other hand, the Arabs would be left in no doubt as to the absence of Western support for any further recalcitrance on their part, but at the same time would have assurances that ultimate development of their share of the water was protected.
The Israelis would no longer have legitimate reasons, based in security requirements, for denying to the U.N. instrumentalities the additional facilities and prerogatives they require to improve their ability to arrest the threat of violence in incipient stages.
The Administration's position vis-à-vis United States friends of Israel would be greatly improved. Not only could the Administration demonstrate a positive posture on the water controversy but could argue persuasively that Israel's friends would have every reason to support the Administration's efforts in the interests of both governments and to foster peace and stability in the Near East.
It was deemed necessary to obtain the concurrence of the White House to the foregoing. A note was drafted which it was proposed the Secretary would hand to Ambassador Harman before the latter's current trip. However, protracted negotiations with the White House ensued and remain uncompleted, although differences have narrowed to the question of a U.S. definition of its official position towards Israel's claim to Lake Tiberias. Three alternatives to our original proposal have been prepared for further discussion: B. Official Version 2 represents the results of negotiations with Mr. Feldman, who could not accept our language on sovereignty.
C. Official Version 3 was approved by the Secretary, but Mr. Feldman continues to refuse to accept the language on sovereignty.
D. Official Version 4 omits any reference to sovereignty, which would be dealt with in a separate Aide-Mémoire. Mr. Feldman is reported to find this procedure unacceptable.
E. The fifth version is Mr. Feldman's. It is unacceptable to the Department.
As you are aware, the Secretary wishes to examine the text of an agreed note before it is transmitted.
Background:
Opposition to Prime Minister Abd al-Karim Qasim of Iraq has had as its consistent objective his violent overthrow but has been frustrated by fear of his wide powers over all aspects of government, by his ubiquitous and overlapping intelligence networks and by his control of the Army. Nevertheless, as a leader Qasim is now disliked, hated and privately ridiculed by almost all sections of the Iraqi public, including apparently, growing segments of the Army.
Qasim is currently engaged in a military action, using troops, artillery and planes against Kurdish tribal insurgents (supported by the leftist Democratic Party of Kurdistan and by city Kurds) in the north and northeast of Iraq along the Turkish and Iranian borders. A successor regime to Qasim would probably fall somewhere in the Arab nationalist, neutralist, political spectrum. A successor government would probably be somewhat less anti-Western in its complexion and policy. However, it has been firm U.S. policy to avoid involvement in any way with opposition to Qasim, even with Iraqis who profess basic friendliness to the U.S.
Possible Courses of U.S. Action Following Qasim's Overthrow:
1. If the group assuming power is judged as representing Iraqis generally described as nationalist and appears to be in firm control, the U.S. should consider prompt recognition and should be prepared to respond promptly and favorably to overtures for assistance. We should discourage interference by any of Iraq's neighbors if such interference is contemplated.
2. Should the group assuming power after an overthrow of Qasim be recognized as representing the Ba'ath Party (the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party, an organization often rent by serious factional disputes), the U.S. would wish to delay recognition long enough to be satisfied there is no (or little) question that the group is actually in full control. In this situation also we should discourage interference by Iraq's neighbors.
3. Should the Kurds in a period of prolonged confusion following Qasim's disappearance from the scene withhold their support from a new government and make demands for autonomy within specified areas of Iraq, the U.S. should recognize the new government on the basis of the same criteria it would use were there no Kurdish complications involved, thus avoiding any appearance of support for Kurdish claims.
4. In the event of a protracted period of conflict involving struggle between Communist and non-Communist elements, we should consider in consultation with Iraq's neighbors and with the U.K., how non-Communist elements could be assisted to prevail without open intervention by the U.S. or by any other Western power including Turkey and Iran. It would be desirable for a struggle to remain Arabized insofar as possible. Accordingly, it might be necessary to give covert support for anti-Communist elements in Iraq. It would be preferable that the U.A.R. know of and acquiesce in any such action.
5. Similarly, in the less-likely case of a successful sudden seizure of power by Communist elements in Iraq, we should consider how best to channel or encourage what would in all probability be a reaction of deep alarm by Iraq's neighbors. We should be prepared to bring the issue before the United Nations Security Council as required, with a view to deterring active Soviet, and possibly other, intervention in whatever internal conflict might ensue in reaction to the Communist takeover.
In all three conversations Johnson (1) stressed importance making start on refugee question, (2) expressed conviction that 1962 may be kind of "watershed year", in that there evidence many governments, notably US, wish to see progress on refugee question but there are signs of growing impatience with Arab-Israel disputes and with prospect of supporting refugees indefinitely in absence of any evidence of Arab or Israeli willingness to change status quo; (3) set forth his ideas along the line of his Working Paper Five; and (4) emphasized his willingness to consider any suggestions UAR might give him for moving forward, and his hope that he might receive such suggestions, expressing his willingness to return to area later for this purpose if UAR Government wished.
He received clear indications that first reaction to the idea of beginning with 20,000 was negative and strong impression that his idea would on consideration continue to be unacceptable, though it was not flatly rejected. He also doubts that his request for the UAR's own suggestions will be responded to although he believes from Nasser's attitude that this possibility cannot be completely dismissed.
Specific points of significance were:
1. Nasser believes that major source of tension in area remains Israel Government's emphasis on "a Jewish State", and continued apparent belief of B.G. 3. Several assertions that war with Israel would be folly and that it is "not on the agenda".
4. Evident appreciation of changed attitude of USA toward the Middle East and especially UAR.
5. Nasser reiterated emphasis on the return of most of the refugees (with a wry recognition that B.G. could not accept this), coupled with his mention (not fully spelled out) of a Palestine in which Jews and Arabs would have equal rights; all three men referred more than once to "second-class citizenship" of Arabs in Israel.
6. Fawzi's insistence that choice given the refugees should be so formulated as not to deliberately discourage their election of return.
7. The discussion, almost inadvertently begun, by Helmi of current activities of certain refugee spokesmen, in particular recent talks in Amman. Helmi made it clear that some of these individuals had told him beforehand of their ideas, saying they did not wish to go behind the UAR's back but adding that they wished to create a means for speaking for themselves and thus to attempt to remove themselves from the "cold war" (Helmi's words) among the Arab states. Helmi said he had told them he was not prepared to express UAR views, pending clarification of their program and intentions.
Helmi, who throughout emphasized that he was speaking personally and not officially, appeared to believe this might constitute a factor of new significance although he clearly had reservations about effectiveness of individuals involved. Johnson took opportunity not only to say that this movement might have an adverse impact on his activities but to argue that suggested parallel with Algeria was false and dangerous for Palestinians themselves.
Anschuetz
In this regard, I think you may be interested in the enclosed speech which I gave recently to the American Jewish Congress. At dinner I met with various members of the board of directors of the American Jewish Congress and opened up this question with great frankness. The views which I expressed seemed to be very much accepted.
I hope you will agree that this is reassuring evidence that while there may be criticism from some individuals that with careful handling and frank explanation our domestic political problem should not present any unmanageable difficulties.
In this regard, I believe it would be most helpful if we could extend an invitation to Nasser in the next few weeks to visit the United States sometime after the election in November.
Although the situation will always be unpredictable, I think this kind of approach will go a long way to focus his interest on his own internal development questions, with less time left for the Voice of the Arabs radio.
With my warmest regards,
Sincerely,
Chet
Through the Defense Department's Memorandum of Conversation covering the talk between the Shah of Iran and the Secretary of Defense on April 12,
262. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Grant) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (McGhee)
Contingencies in Iraq
263. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State
264. Letter From the President's Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs (Bowles) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
265. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
Iran--New Plan for U.S. Military Assistance to Iran
/3/Document 248.
In receiving the Aide-Mémoire, the Shah did not state specifically that he approved of the entire U.S. approach, and there were later indications that the Shah was slightly piqued because he had not participated in the formulation of the U.S. concept.
Ambassador Holmes, however, had several long conversations with the Shah in New York, and is convinced that the Shah is in essential agreement with the Plan, and will accept it. Ambassador Holmes feels that the Shah will delay in conveying a full acceptance until he utilizes the presence of a JCS planning team in Iran to make a final effort to persuade U.S. military authorities of the usefulness of certain additional items of equipment. State and Defense have agreed that for all practical purposes the Shah is reconciled to the general provisions of the U.S. Plan; he is welcoming the JCS team to Iran, and the presence of the team is an essential element of the Plan. We also appreciate that the Iranian military will continue to press for additional items not included in the Aide-Mémoire and will argue in favor of retaining substantial forces above the 150,000, as a static force for the northern borders. The success of the planning team and follow-up action on the part of the Shah is, therefore, an important consideration to reviewing the U.S. Plan after the planning team submits its report.
The JCS planning team, to be headed by a general officer, is to coordinate closely with CINCEUR, with Armish/MAAG in Tehran, and with the U.S. Permanent Military Deputy to CENTO. It is to report its findings by July 1, 1962. Its primary mission is fourfold:
1. Develop a detailed early warning plan for Iran, including cost estimates, consulting with the British military authorities as to steps which the U.S. can take to assist in providing the required equipment.
2. A study of airfield requirements in Iran, particularly the staging base in eastern Iran, with detailed costing of any additional construction required.
3. A plan for the reorganization of the Iranian armed forces at a reduced manpower level.
4. The resolution of the discrepancy between Iranian force goals established by CENTO and those established bilaterally between Iran and the U.S.
Under these circumstances, and pending the report of the JCS planning team, State and Defense intend to proceed on the basis that the U.S. Plan is firm.
Walter Collopy You should stress to Nasser we gratified with way our relations progressing and look forward continued improvement, barring unforeseen incidents. US press, including some newspapers formerly hostile to UAR, have received news of proposed US aid program generally with favor and Cairo press reacting in similar fashion. We hope relatively favorable public relations climate can be maintained and if possible improved upon. Much depends upon care and patience in dealing with irritants which inevitably will arise.
You might additionally express pleasure at more full and frank expressions of views which are taking place between US and UAR officials at all levels, noting present understandings are proof that by such dialogue mutual problems generally become more tractable.
In conclusion you may wish stress need to guard against over-optimism as regards rapidity with which progress can be achieved. Many of problems we face in both political and economic fields are highly complex and unwieldy of solution.
Re US attitude toward current developments in Syria see no reason you raise matter. However, should it come up in course discussion you might say we have, of course, scrupulously avoided any efforts influence recent internal developments in Syria and rumors re our activities there totally baseless. Re Arab unity we prepared, as Nasser knows, accept whatever Arab peoples and governments of own free will decide so long as consistent with peace and welfare of region as whole. (2) If, as Johnson's suggestions appeared to indicate, only a relatively small proportion of refugees would be repatriated, with rest accepting compensation, that would take [in] effect lead to liquidation of Palestine question as a whole, to Arab disadvantage.
(3) If suggestion meant however that most refugees would return, this would change the nature of Israel and be step in right direction.
(4) Since latter is evidently unlikely if refugee question dealt with separately, only possible answer is to grapple with Palestine problem as a whole, and Johnson's approach is therefore unrealistic.
When Johnson expressed his surprise in view of the Arabs initiative on paragraph 11 and their reiterated insistence that he limit himself to it, both Ministers were frankly critical of Arab for proposing this approach and openly puzzled as to reasons for it. (Same attitude was expressed by many at the dinner.) Johnson pointed out possible effect of inconsistency in world opinion and UN General Assembly action. The point got across.
It is clear that both men feel that any stirrings in the Arab world are signs that 1962 may well be a "turning point" year that calls for a serious new look at Palestine question by Arabs. They urged that UN, the great powers, etc., also take new look. They do not however have yet in mind any concrete proposals or plan. They are searching for ways to overcome present weakness vis-à-vis Israel and in words of King "correct the imbalance". All are aware of difficulties, particularly in light of frankly acknowledged conflict among Arab states. Only thing specific is that they reject Palestine entity concept or a liberation government on Algerian model.
When Johnson asked Nuseibeh what he felt refugees would choose if given the chance, Foreign Minister expressed conviction that most would elect to return. The Prime Minister however, when asked same question in Nuseibeh's presence, was doubtful that many would so choose.
Scott
266. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/
Washington, May 5, 1962, 4:17 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 886B.10/5-562. Confidential. Drafted by Barrow and Thacher, cleared by Strong in substance and by Williams (AID) in draft, and approved by Cottam. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Rome, Tokyo, and Brussels.
1258. Dept understands Kaissouni has returned Cairo (without stopping Bonn or Rome) and will presumably be reporting to Nasser on results US visit. Shortly after he makes such report suggest you, at your discretion, seek interview with Nasser for general resume of understandings reached (Depcirtel 1848)/2/and for purpose of insuring against any possible ambiguity in problems remaining to be resolved.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 256.
You might wish first emphasize that although we have agreed make favorable recommendations friendly third countries regarding possible participation in IMF stabilization program, principal burden this respect will, of course, be borne by UARG itself. Thus it will wish re-inforce to maximum extent possible foreign governments' feelings confidence particularly with regard UARG's determination treat equitably those seeking settlement outstanding compensation claims.
267. Telegram From the Consulate General in Jerusalem to the Department of State/1/
Jerusalem, May 8, 1962, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/5-862. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Tel Aviv, and USUN.
232. Following text received subsequent to despatch Contel 231./2/For Talbot and Cleveland. Johnson and Moe saw Jordan ForMin Nuseibeh 3 May immediately after arrival Amman from Cairo, and again on Saturday 5 May and then had long session with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. Johnson also had audience with King Saturday, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister being present. Johnson and Moe met Foreign Minister and subsequently Prime Minister with Foreign Minister again Sunday. That evening Foreign Minister gave large buffet dinner for Johnson; the Prime Minster, several other cabinet members, a number of high government officials, and leading public figures including prominent refugees were present, also several Arab Ambassadors.
/2/Dated May 8. (Ibid., 325.84/5-862)
After Johnson made his usual opening statement Nuseibeh began by formally reading text of Riyadh Resolution/3/ in fulfillment of what he described as his duty. Subsequent discussions variously described as "private", "off the record", "unofficial", etc. were very frank and free-flowing ranging over the whole Palestine question, although both Ministers acknowledged that Johnson's mission limited to paragraph 11 of General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) and that Arabs had repeatedly insisted this point. At one point Nuseibeh justified this departure from the Arab position for the record by referring to the last paragraph of the Riyadh Resolution which in substance states that question of refugees cannot be disassociated from Palestine question as whole and from relevant UN resolutions. Principal points of Jordan position were:
/3/See footnote 3, Document 258.
(1) Complexities of Palestine question so inter-related that no part can be separated from rest.
268. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State
/2/Johnson's report on these talks was conveyed in telegram 234 from Jerusalem, May 10. (Ibid., 325.84/5-1062)
Following lunch with me, Johnson returned to Jerusalem for day of rest prior to his next encounter with Israelis.
In general Johnson described his talks throughout Arab world as "gloomy" but no doors had been closed. In addition to inter-Arab feuding, his efforts complicated by extremist moves by Shuqairi and others for some sort of Palestine organization. Consoling feature was that while Palestine-minded Arabs are "stirring" there complete lack of unanimity among extremists re what should be done.
Johnson expects rough going in Israel. He said he would after European interlude return to US and hoped have thorough talks with Department officials with view to mobilizing USG from top-level down for whatever course he would carefully lay out.
For my part, I expressed to Johnson following personal observations: a) While I had had doubts re wisdom his making trip, it clear that this round has been extremely useful in exposing to parties concerned current trend of his thinking; B) No Arab leader can be expected to say yes to anything that any rival might publicly denounce as softness toward Israel; C) Johnson's excellent rapport with Arab leaders obviously continues and is a great asset; D) No doors were closed; E) Implication is that Arab leaders will not be surprised and might even welcome Johnson's tabling his proposals but without their having to register public approval; F) Only few years ago visit to Arab capitals by any representative in search of refugee solution would have produced great uproar, street demonstrations, et cetera, but Johnson quite reasonably received and in Arab world where matters must be gauged in degrees of negative this is real progress; G) While any initiative with respect to Palestine has gloomy prospect, approach re refugees which Johnson has in mind is clearly most practical one; H) Time seems fast approaching when (if metaphors may be mixed) Johnson might wish take bit by teeth, work out best possible detailed formula, take plunge with U Thant's backing and let chips fall where they may; I) At worst what would probably ensue is resistance on part of both sides with his being able report to UN failure of his mission and plague on both their houses thus putting both sides in bad light in future UN debates; J) Off-chance exists that in effort to avert onus for failure both sides will be willing to "back into" acquiescence to his formula with at least some movement on this problem as result.
Johnson agreed his visit useful particularly along lines compelling Arabs to do some realistic thinking.
Meyer
2. As I see it, there are two separate aspects to problem--domestic and foreign. At home we can and should let Jewish community know through selective briefings that US supports Israel's use of waters and will at appropriate point make known our support publicly. Foreign policy aspects more complex. Fortunately, we have enough time, since Israelis will not withdraw water for at least 18 months. However, we have much to do to prepare Arab govts and peoples accept eventual US support. This must be presented as part of constructive plan for Middle East as a whole and not merely as US response to Israeli pressure. Meanwhile we must avoid premature moves.
3. Consider proposal to send written reassurances to GOI now (b) Almost certain knifing of Johnson refugee mission. Arabs will view Jordan waters assurances as part of coordinated scheme to liquidate Palestine problem. We have put too much of our good faith into Johnson initiative to take unnecessary risks at this stage.
(c) Free ride to Soviets in Arab countries, with possible new dangers of war through escalation of arms race. We see new and substantial Syrian requests for Soviet arms as one major result.
(d) Adverse reaction from our allies. Public backing for Israeli waters plan is major initiative of kind on which we committed (at least to UK) to prior consultations. We need them with us and their vital interests are also affected.
(e) Loss of important votes of Arabs and their close friends at the 17th GA, both in terms of positive support and abstentions.
Yet none of this necessarily need happen if we properly prepare way with Arabs and with others.
4. I accordingly propose that (a) we give no written assurances on Jordan waters until much later stage, at least not until conclusion of 17th GA, (b) that, if for good domestic or foreign policy reasons we need to reassure Israel before then, Secretary or other top level official do so orally; (c) that we give no written assurances until formally requested do so by top level of GOI; (d) that assurances take form of exchange of notes negotiated out between Israelis and ourselves; (e) that exchange of notes attempt to meet requirements and fears of Arabs and be, if possible, paralleled by similar exchange with Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.
5. In period before exchange of notes we have, as I indicated, much to do. We must:
(a) Put plan into perspective with Arab riparian govts. This will require frank but patient and well-timed diplomacy here and in capitals with purpose of assuring them we undertaking no initiative affecting their vital interests until they consulted and until full chances given for them to avail themselves of US help for exploiting their own water resources under politically realistic conditions.
(b) Consult as to substance and timing with UK and perhaps also with France. In more general way, we should also discuss problem and seek support of principal NATO powers with interests in area (Turkey, Greece, Italy, etc.) and perhaps also lay groundwork for support by India and other leading African and Asian members of UN. It not unlikely Arabs will bring up Jordan waters problem in some form in 17th GA debate on Palestine and this may give us peg for approaches to other govts well before negots on assurances.
6. I have not dealt with question of extracting quid pro quos from Israel on strengthening of UNTSO or other matters in course these negots, as I believe this somewhat extraneous issue and also tactic which is likely to fail in view of basic objections Comay explained to me. I have also not discussed interconnection of US attitude on Israeli sovereignty over Lake Tiberias as it need not be dealt with now; our quietly held views not subject of controversy with Arabs and, as Comay admits not legally germane to withdrawal of Jordan waters.
Stevenson
Have talked with Mike Feldman about Nasser visit. Instead we ought to test Nasser's responsiveness by a series of discreet probes over next few months before proceeding to what most of us would regard as the culmination of a major political initiative. Moreover, to keep Nasser dangling a bit about a visit is an added inducement to good behavior on his part. Finally, I gather that only open place on calendar would be December, so why invite him now for December or later when so many things could happen in the meantime to make an invitation inadvisable.
I'm still strongly in favor of an invite at right moment. And we should invite Nasser before Tito. Not to do so would be highly offensive to a jealous Arab who, whatever he may be, is not a Communist. To invite Tito before Nasser would, I think, be deeply resented.
Bob K.
We've already given Nasser enough bait, as a result of the Kaissouni visit, to hold him for awhile. Immediately after having promised him more PL-480, some $20-30 million in stabilization credits, and a favorable reception to about $51 million of development loans, should we rush in with yet another plum? Nasser himself probably doesn't expect any more of us at this moment, so I question whether we should throw away so quickly one of our hole cards which may come in quite handy later.
Instead it seems to me that now is the time to sit back and wait for some responsive behavior on Nasser's part over the next few months, before proceeding to what most of us would regard as the culmination of a major political initiative. To keep Nasser dangling a bit longer about a visit might be an added inducement to good behavior on his part. Moreover, with Israeli feelings, and those of the American Jewish community, rather bruised at this moment over the Tiberias affair, a Nasser invitation now might create quite a political backlash.
However, I have a completely open mind about an invitation at the right moment, and I believe this is also the President's view. All in all, I think that our policy toward Nasser is evolving at a pretty fast clip, but it has been mostly a US effort so far. The President would probably want to see a little more of the color of Nasser's money before he sat down to play face-to-face poker with him.
Sincerely,
McGeorge Bundy
(A)He had in each meeting with the Arabs explained that his mission was not only limited to paragraph 11, but circumscribed by the fact that as a UN official he could not recommend anything that would threaten the independence of Israel, a full-fledged UN member. No Arab statesman took exception to this as a proper definition by Johnson of his mission.
(B)All the Arabs had told him in various ways that war on Israel by the Arabs would be folly and he believed they were sincere. On the other hand they had serious fears of Israeli expansion or aggression.
(C)None of them showed any disposition to respond favorably to the Israeli "feeler" that Johnson had transmitted concerning some form of mutual declarations of non-aggression.
(D)All had insisted in conformity with the Riyadh resolution that Israel must accept paragraph 11 in principle and none had expressed a willingness to accept Johnson's ideas even as a basis for discussion before such acceptance. Johnson told Mrs. Meir he believed that this was largely because for internal and inter-Arab political reasons they could not afford to appear to "sell out" and that the failure to accept could not yet be definitely characterized as rejection.
(E)They acknowledged when reminded that the phrase "live at peace with their neighbors" had significance but they felt that it did not imply a prior undertaking by refugees rather that the attitude of returnees would depend on their treatment by Israel.
(F)Despite the generally negative tone he had the feeling that there was or would be if the repatriation point could be met in some reasonable fashion a greater willingness in the Arab countries to consider his suggestions for implementing paragraph 11 than in Israel. (This impression was based largely on Johnson's strong, though unexpressed, conclusion that the whole tenor in Israel's stand from last September to that point had been to parade every possible argument for doing nothing.)
At the first meeting with the Foreign Minister, Johnson made the first five points above and only touched on (F). He received essentially another long speech from the Foreign Minister on Israel's security problems. At the second meeting largely in order to crystallize the issues he emphasized (F). This gave the Israelis a jolt and they made some effort to contend that there had been a change in Johnson's attitude or position between the two meetings. The Foreign Minister specifically expressed disappointment although the meeting ended on a friendly basis personally. Arad later told Moe in some heat that Johnson's comparisons disadvantageous to Israel might lead to a stormy session with Ben Gurion. It is clear, however, that while they resent the idea of comparisons, responsible Israelis want to avoid appearing publicly to be an obstacle to progress, and cooler heads prevailed.
Ben Gurion, well briefed by Raphael, received Johnson very warmly. He opened the meeting with a summary of what he understood were Johnson's main points from the previous two meetings with the Foreign Minister. He asked if his summary was accurate. Johnson said it was in substance though a little sharper and less shaded than what he had actually said. Ben Gurion then said that despite the fact that Israel had no moral obligation to help solve the refugee problem Israel wanted to help as this could be a step to peace and accordingly he asked Johnson what specifically he wanted from Israel now.
Johnson replied that at this point he was only asking Israel to agree to think through seriously in cooperation with him to see if it would not be possible to develop a workable scheme along the lines he had suggested. He described in some detail his ideas as in his Working Paper 5, introducing for the first time the idea that Israel agree to examine repatriation applications "in good faith". He emphasized his view that the scheme would have to be in harmony with paragraph 11, make clear present realities to the refugees and safeguard Israel. Referring as in the two meetings with the Foreign Minister to the difficulties that open and formal undertakings would present to the Arabs (and might present to Israel) on certain issues he stressed the possible value of the concepts of acquiescence and tacit acceptance.
Ben Gurion said he still did not understand what Johnson wanted and launched into a fervent exposition of Israel's danger repeating much that had been heard in all sessions in 1961 and this year with the Foreign Minister and from himself last year, and emphasizing that Israel must be the sole judge in these matters. Johnson acknowledged the last, while reserving his right to try to persuade Israel on specific points in connection with the development in detail of any scheme. He tried again to explain what he wanted and this time Ben Gurion seemed to understand better. He confirmed Meir's earlier statement that "Israel had never said not a single refugee could return", but said there were two limitations: (A) There could be no "free choice"; and (B) There could be no repatriation without resettlement.
Johnson explained the difference between "free choice" and "preferences", and acknowledged (B) saying (without contradiction) that this statement--repeated soon afterward--gave him hope as he assumed this was a two-way idea, namely that if the Arabs agreed to do something on resettlement, Israel would on repatriation. He concluded with an appeal that the same imagination and creativity that Israel had shown on other problems be applied to this refugee problem, not to solve it, but to dissolve it.
The meeting concluded on this note having been on a friendly plane throughout with occasional moments of humor. Raphael confirmed to Moe later that Ben Gurion retained his high opinion of Johnson and that the formulation "dissolve" had intrigued him. The parting note with Raphael was the importance of continuing to work at the problem and assurances that Israel would give serious thought to this.
Reinhardt
269. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State
270. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
271. Letter From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President's Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs (Bowles)
272. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State
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