Docs 310-329
310. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand/1/
Washington, March 20, 1962, 8:38 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-2062. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson; cleared in substance with McGeorge Bundy; cleared by Rice, Koren, and Cross; and approved by Johnson. Repeated niact to Vientiane.
1424. Eyes Only for Harriman and Ambassadors. Hong Kong's 1010, March 20,/2/ and Bangkok's 1441, March 20./3/
/2/Not found.
/3/In telegram 1441, Young reported that he had taken up the question of Phoumi's visit with Sarit, Thanat, and Wallop during an appointment which was already scheduled for March 20. All three Thais had negative reactions to Phoumi's refusal to come to Bangkok. Sarit directed Wallop to go to Phoumi in Savannakhet to "press" him to meet with Harriman and Sarit in Thailand. Sarit promised Young that they would do all in their power to bring about a meeting. When Young told Sarit that there was still suspicion in Washington that he was secretly encouraging Phoumi, Sarit "bellowed a vehement denial." Young considered that Sarit was sincere in his professions that Thailand was not secretly supporting Phoumi. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-2062)
The President is very reluctant to authorize a decision at this time to invoke military sanctions against Phoumi as he is concerned that such action could be used by Phoumi to give the impression that Phoumi was undercut by the US at a time when he could have held his own. While it is recognized it will be difficult to find proper moment to begin on course of military sanctions against Phoumi, the President does not desire to start this course until further efforts have been made to obtain cooperation by Phoumi. However, the President will be glad to receive Harriman's further recommendations in this regard after Harriman has seen Sarit and it is seen whether Sarit's efforts to obtain presence of Phoumi in Bangkok are successful.
However, the President desires that Harriman make it absolutely clear to both Sarit and Phoumi that under present circumstances, no matter which side in fact may break the cease-fire, the image here will be that this has been brought about by Phoumi's intransigeance and that the President will not be able in present set of international circumstances intervene in support of Phoumi.
The President feels very important that, if at all possible, Harriman personally talk with Phoumi even if this requires some postponement of Harriman's departure from Bangkok.
Ball
311. Memorandum for the Record/1/
I-25327/62
Honolulu, March 21, 1962.
/1/Source: Washington Federal Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Laos 1962, 000.1. Top Secret. Prepared by William Bundy on March 22.
SUBJECT
Discussion of Laos at CINCPAC Headquarters, Wednesday, 21 March/2/
/2/Secretary McNamara and General Lemnitzer, accompanied by other Pentagon officials, visited Honolulu for the fourth Secretary of Defense's Conference, March 21-22. For discussion at the Conference on Vietnam, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. II, Documents 124 and 125.
PRESENT
Secretary McNamara
General Lemnitzer
General Decker
Admiral Felt
General Collins
Admiral Sides
General O'Donnell
General Harkins
Mr. Sylvester
Mr. Bundy
Plus a small number of members of the CINCPAC staff
1. The meeting opened with an intelligence briefing by Colonel Patterson (J-2, CINCPAC). He stated that:
a. There was no change in the balance of military forces as compared with the period prior to the cease-fire last May. In discussion, it was made clear that this related to the balance between the FAR and the Pathet Lao augmented by Viet Minh cadres and battalions. The FAR could still cope successfully with the Pathet Lao without the Viet Minh.
b. Specifically, the Pathet Lao/Viet Minh were now capable of taking over major cities and defense points in the north and central areas. These included Nam Tha, Luang Prabang, Vientiane, Pak Sane, and Thakhek. The period required to take Nam Tha and Thakhek was estimated at 14-30 days and to take Vientiane the period was estimated at 30 days. In response to Admiral Felt's inquiries whether all these could be taken simultaneously, the answer was that there would probably be a delay in a few sectors depending upon the emphasis, but that the above time tables would not require major shifts to achieve. Admiral Felt queried whether harassing by the Meo had been taken into account and Colonel Patterson replied that it had.
c. With respect to equipment, the Communists have brought in 40 PT-76 amphibious light tanks, a full-track vehicle carrying a 76 mm. gun but thought to be quite thin-skinned. This vehicle would be very useful in the Plaine des Jarres and other areas of open country, but would be an easy target if used in the narrow defiles, for example, of Route 13. . . ./3/ In addition, the Communists had just brought in a few pieces of 152 mm. artillery, as against the 105 mm. howitzer, the largest piece in the hands of the FAR.
/3/All ellipses are in the source text.
d. The present FAR deployment was spread out, with at least five battalions up at Nam Tha. However, by means of airlift across Thailand, Phoumi could, if he desired, deploy his forces fairly rapidly to the south, using the Savannakhet and Pakse airfields.
2. Colonel Haffner (CINCPAC J-3 staff) commented on the basis of personal knowledge that the Route 7 supply line had to go over a very, very steep pass just at the Laos/North Viet Nam border, and was highly vulnerable to interdiction by air on the Laotian side.
3. Admiral Felt then made three points:
a. The rainy season (beginning roughly in mid-May) would favor defense.
b. The Meo (now estimated at 10,000) had been operating under wraps to date and might be capable of much greater action than they had undertaken.
c. Air operations could be extremely effective. Phoumi's present force of T-6's could not do much alone, but the introduction of US aircraft (presumably T-28's and AD-6's as in South Viet Nam) would be a major addition to FAR capabilities.
The discussion then moved to the question of policy alternatives. Secretary McNamara stated that there appeared to be three alternatives: (1) to go on supporting Phoumi as we were now doing, not putting pressure on him, and awaiting developments; (2) to put strong pressure on Phoumi through the use of military sanctions, including in the extreme the withdrawal of US military advisors; (3) to introduce US or SEATO forces under Plan 5 or some variant.
4. Admiral Felt expressed the view that in the event of a breakdown of negotiations (for example, if Souvanna went to Paris), the US should sit tight and maintain support as its first move. If the Communists renew the fighting then we should support the Phoumi government. Specifically, we should move a force commander and headquarters and communications, together with air strength, at least to Udorn in Thailand. (The force commander would be Major General Richardson, USA, if the action were under SEATO auspices, or would be Major General Cushman, USMC, if unilateral.) He believes that these elements should be moved rapidly, and that air strength was the crucial factor, to support the FAR and hit targets confined, at least initially, to Laos. As the action developed, the US should consider moving ground forces in to hold the river towns (i.e., under the Plan 5 concept) with the US retaining flexibility to select the appropriate river towns, and also to move forces into the Plateau de Bolovens in the south as action progressed. . . . As to the Communist reaction, he thought that the Viet Minh would not fight Americans. General O'Donnell, however, expressed the view that the Communists would react by moving light bombers down from China, and could "take out" Vientiane and also clobber the main points in the panhandle area; his conclusion was that we should go all out from the first, and not go in in bits. Admiral Felt said that a carrier task force should certainly be put in position and that we "must" react if aircraft were brought to bear from Chinese bases. He noted that the SEATO military advisors had agreed to bombing North Viet Nam if the Viet Minh came in openly, but conceded that this view might not be shared by their political leaders. Admiral Felt expressed the hope that SEATO nations would join in the action, particularly the Commonwealth Brigade, but made no prediction that this would in fact take place.
5. In explaining his view, Admiral Felt said that the alternative to such full support was to see the Communists take over north and central Laos rapidly, and that Phoumi could not hold even southern Laos without substantial help from us.
6. General Lemnitzer likewise thought that so long as the cease-fire continues we should sit tight and go on supporting the FAR. He was strongly opposed to pulling out the MAAG and US military advisors. We should seek to make the Communists initiate hostilities; if they did so, however, the best we could hope for was to hold a line running from the 17th parallel on the east diagonally northwest, holding Thakhek if at all possible. In the ensuing discussion, Colonel Haffner brought out that the Communists were threatening Thakhek very closely at present, and that the terrain lent itself to rapid military reaction by them designed to preclude any occupation by other forces. It was generally agreed that Thakhek was a critical point of concern.
7. In response to Mr. Bundy's question concerning the military effect of a cessation of MAP deliveries (without withdrawing advisors or the MAAG), both General Lemnitzer and Admiral Felt thought this would have a very serious psychological effect; in concrete terms, the FAR probably had adequate supplies for a 30-60 day period, but beyond that the direct effects would likewise be very serious.
8. In discussion on the role of the Meo, it was brought out that they could help a great deal holding the Vientiane front, but that they would not extend into the areas that would be involved in a quick campaign against Thakhek.
9. Referring to the Kha situation, Colonel Haffner said that was going forward well, and that they now had 4 companies recruited who were exercising a major degree of control in the Bolovens area. The present strength of 700 could be built up to 1200 rapidly, and gradually expanded to a total strength of 9 companies and would be able to move into the area northeast of the Plateau de Bolovens toward the South Viet Nam border.
10. Secretary McNamara asked whether there was any possibility that the Thais would agree to send ground forces into southern Laos, provided that the US guaranteed Thailand and introduced its own forces into Thailand to reinforce the guarantee. Admiral Felt expressed the firm view that Sarit would not put any Thai ground forces in unless the US were "with them shoulder to shoulder". General O'Donnell queried whether the Thais might not go in provided the US furnished air support, but the universal consensus of others present was that they would not do so even under this condition.
At this point, Secretary McNamara said that he had a clear picture and would now leave the room to call the President./4/ As he was leaving (and I think while he was still in the room) both Admiral Felt and General Lemnitzer again reiterated their strong opposition to the withdrawal of MAAG advisors as a form of sanctions against Phoumi. On the political side, there were several comments during the course of the discussion to the effect that the prospects for a neutral coalition government were virtually non-existent.
/4/No record of this telephone conversation has been found.
WP Bundy
312. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand/1/
Washington, March 21, 1962, 4:08 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-2162. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Drafted by Cross; cleared by Koren, Johnson, and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by Rice. Also sent niact to Vientiane and repeated eyes only to Geneva for the Secretary.
1428. Bangkok Eyes Only for Harriman and Brown. In view apparent impossibility getting Phoumi to Bangkok wish emphasize President does not preclude Harriman going to Vientiane if necessary to see Phoumi and in fact hopes this might be arranged in a dignified manner satisfactory to Harriman. Even if Phoumi finally went to Bangkok as result of strong pressures from Thais and ourselves he would probably take position unable to commit himself without going back to his colleagues. We also see advantages in Harriman meeting other members RLG face to face which would conceivably give Phoumi face-saving way out, and enable us to convince all RLG of our determination to carry through on Souvanna solution. Therefore if Harriman concurs suggest that both Vientiane and Bangkok try to arrange for formal RLG invitation to Harriman to visit Vientiane.
Harriman's reiterated recommendation contained final paragraph Bangkok's 1450 notal/2/ is being brought again to attention of the President and we will comment further later.
/2/Document 313.
Ball
313. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State/1/
Bangkok, March 21, 1962, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-2162. Secret; Niact.
1450. Eyes Only for the President and Acting Secretary from Harriman.
On arrival here I find that despite flat assurances Phoumi previously gave Forrestal and Sullivan re his willingness meet with Sarit and me in Bangkok, he now definitely refuses come here. In reflecting on Phoumi's motivations I am impressed by having read in a memorandum of the conversation between Phoumi and Forrestal/Sullivan/2/ that Phoumi frankly admitted his policy was designed to discourage Souvanna and cause him to leave Laos and return to Paris.
/2/Not further identified.
Thus little value my repeating to Sarit and Phoumi what has already been told them by Admiral Felt, namely that US will not give Phoumi military support should cease-fire break down. Purpose my talks with Sarit and Phoumi is persuade latter begin negotiations with Souvanna in good faith. Therefore if I do talk to Phoumi I must be in position to twist his arm to point recommended by Ambassador Brown of withholding military supplies as discussed in reftel 1449./3/
/3/In telegram 1449, March 21, the Embassy in Vientiane suggested that Phoumi's refusal to go to Bangkok was an indication that the current economic sanctions against the RLG were not working and the United States must consider suspending military aid. After review with the MAAG, the Embassy recommended total suspension of deliveries of U.S. military supplies and equipment for FAR, including vehicles, POL supplies, weapons, ammunition, communications equipment, and spare parts. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-2162) Dated
Will see Sarit tomorrow morning in attempt enlist his active support. I don't wish become involved any program seeing Phoumi jointly with Sarit unless I have prior satisfactory understanding with Sarit. We might be able work out some compromise which would involve my going Vientiane for purpose seeing King, thus saving Phoumi's face but still retaining essential elements of dignity for US Govt.
Vital element in this picture is to keep Souvanna from throwing in his hand. Unanimous opinion here is that, unless Phoumi appears to begin negotiations some positive action must be taken give Souvanna sufficient evidence of our seriousness and good faith.
Feel Dept quite right in Deptel 1409/4/ that Phoumi has thrown down the gauntlet in refusing see me and in King's speech, press interviews, etc. Under circumstances I believe I must be in position to back up what I tell Phoumi with action. Therefore I request authority referred to above soonest. You may be sure I will use it only to such extent and at such time as I believe absolutely necessary.
/4/March 19. (Ibid., 751J.00/3-1962)
Harriman
314. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State/1/
Bangkok, March 22, 1962, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-2262. Secret; Priority.
1460. Eyes Only President and Acting Secretary.
Harriman, accompanied by Ambassador Young and Sullivan, called on Prime Minister and Foreign Minister this morning to discuss means designed induce Phoumi cooperate with U.S. and Thailand in serious negotiations for formation coalition government in Laos. In this conversation Sarit showed complete acceptance of U.S. objectives. General Wallop leaving this afternoon for Vientiane. He will propose that Phoumi come Nong Khai Saturday morning, meet with Sarit and Harriman, then take Harriman back Vientiane for audience with King and subsequently for discussions with Phoumi and his entire Cabinet.
As fall back Wallop is authorized propose that Harriman go initially Vientiane for audience with King, pick up Phoumi for return trip across river to Nong Kha and tripartite meeting there with Sarit. Following this session Harriman would again return Vientiane for discussions with Phoumi and Cabinet. In any event it has been stressed to Sarit that U.S. feels it most important Sarit and Harriman meet jointly with Phoumi in order avoid "double-faced" tactics which Phoumi has pursued in past.
Sarit exhibited full measure cooperation throughout interview and heartily endorsed procedures described above. He expressed concern that Phoumi felt acceptance of subordinate position in a coalition government would be capitulation.
Sarit said he himself did not understand the complications of Phoumi's flat refusal accept invitation to come Bangkok extended him by Wallop in Savannakhet Tuesday. He is doubtful that Phoumi will agree to meet with Harriman and himself together. However, he agreed fully on tactics and objectives if meeting can be arranged.
Wallop will report results his mission tomorrow morning./2/
/2/In telegram 1462 from Bangkok, March 23, Harriman informed the President and Ball that Wallop had a brief, friendly talk with Phoumi who agreed to meet Harriman and Sarit at Nong Khai, Thailand, on the morning of March 24. Phoumi would then take Harriman to Vientiane to meet the King and the RLG Cabinet. After the meeting, Phoumi talked to Hasey and informed him that Harriman must understand in advance that he was unwilling to give up Defense or Interior. Harriman observed that the prospects for the meeting were not bright and asked to be allowed to bring specific pressure on Phoumi and to begin to develop alternatives to him. (Ibid., 751J.00/3-2362)
Young
315. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand/1/
Washington, March 22, 1962, 9:09 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-2262. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Rice, cleared by Koren, and approved by Johnson.
1447. For Harriman.
In view of fact you will go Vientiane without authorization actually institute military sanctions, Dept. suggests you might seek among others limited objective of getting Three Princes' negotiations going. If Phoumi is to put on other side onus of refusal negotiate,/2/ or being unyielding in negotiations, he must invite talks and carry them far enough discover what sort cabinet distribution and arrangements for military establishment he in fact could get, hopefully, such negotiations might inch two sides closer to agreement, or at least by keeping talking going help hold present situation.
/2/In telegram 1463 from Bangkok, March 23, Harriman characterized this telegram as "unrealistic" and stated that, "Whole world knows Phoumi has not at any time negotiated in good faith. No way onus can be placed on other side." (Ibid., 751J.00/3-2362)
Ball
316. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand/1/
Washington, March 23, 1962, 10 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-2362. Secret; Niact. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson; cleared with Rice, Koren, Ball, and in substance with the President; and approved by Johnson. Repeated to Geneva eyes only for Secretary.
1451. Eyes Only for Harriman. Re last para Deptel 1428./2/
/2/Document 312.
1. The President feels that it would be unwise now to cut off military supplies to Phoumi as it would give Phoumi and others opportunity to exploit false charges against Administration that it had destroyed the freedom of Laos at a time when, they claimed, Phoumi was still able to hold on.
2. If Harriman feels it wise during the course of his visit and talks with Phoumi if such take place, President has no objection to Harriman informing Phoumi that Harriman is going to recommend to the President that military aid to RLG should be cut off. However, President feels Harriman should do this only after most careful consideration of all aspects of problem.
3. The President suggests possibility that the numerous high-level approaches being made to Phoumi are feeding his ego in such a way as to be counterproductive to the objectives we are seeking and, if Harriman concurs, suggests perhaps the adoption now of an appearance of detachment with respect to him might be more productive. What the President has in mind is that Harriman could again make clear to Phoumi that he can have no basis for any belief that US would militarily intervene on his behalf, pointing out that during the past two weeks consultation with Congressional leadership has demonstrated that the Congress is strongly against any intervention in Laos, and that members of the JCS have recommended against such intervention. Therefore, Phoumi should be under no illusion whatever that any maneuvering on his part can draw US into conflict. If Phoumi, being clear on this point, chooses to pursue a course which can only bring ruin to his country, he must bear full responsibility and we are no longer going to cajole or run after him./3/
/3/In telegram 1456 to Bangkok, March 23, also sent as telegram 829 to Vientiane, Ball informed Harriman that Harriman's request in telegram 1462 from Bangkok, March 23 (see footnote 2, Document 314), had been brought to the President's attention before his departure to the West Coast. The President still felt that he could not modify his decision as contained in telegram 1447, Document 315. However, the President said he was anxious to help Harriman in his difficult mission in any way he could "below the level of military sanctions." Ball admitted that the Department had searched in vain for possible leverage on Phoumi, but authorized Harriman at his discretion to commit U.S. funds to other members of the RLG along the lines of those contemplated for Phoumi, if it would be helpful. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-2362)
Ball
317. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/
Vientiane, March 25, 1962, 2 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-2562. Secret; Niact. Repeated niact to Bangkok, London, and Paris, priority to Geneva for Fecon, CINCPAC for POLAD, and Moscow, and to Saigon and Phnom Penh.
1325. From Harriman.
Traveled to Nong Khai with Sarit and Thanat to meet Phoumi. Young, Forrestal and Sullivan, also Generals Wallop and Bounleut present. (Brown still in hospital.) Discussion lasted nearly three hours, followed by lunch at Thai Governor's house. Sarit put situation so squarely to Phoumi that I was able to support his position. Phoumi had choice of being responsible for military takeover of his country by Pathet Lao or working with support of United States, Thais and other friendly countries to make Souvanna-led government remain independent. Thanat joined in argument effectively and suggested a troika solution either vertical or horizontal for Defense and Interior, namely, either three top positions in each ministry divided among three groups or troika committee in charge. Discussion finally centered on urging Phoumi have RLG invite Souvanna in Vientiane, but I underlined that this meeting would be useless unless Phoumi were prepared to negotiate in good faith re these two ministries.
Phoumi stubbornly resisted all arguments, claiming Souvanna had failed in his mission to form government. Finally, however, he agreed to put question up to his associates and he would not object to invitation of Souvanna. He took me to Vientiane in his plane but insisted that I tell no one, not even King or Boun Oum, of Nong Khai talks. Of course a leak has occurred through Agence France Presse reporter said to have been in Nong Khai. Embassy and I have remained silent.
Futile talk with King and inconclusive dinner discussion with Boun Oum, Phoumi and seven of his principal colleagues, plus our country team, reported subsequent tels./2/
/2/Harriman stated that his "two-hour futile talk with the King hardly worth reporting." The King stated that the Pathet Lao were a front for the North Vietnamese who for centuries had tried to conquer Laos. The King, according to Harriman, believed that a Souvanna-led coalition would let them attain that objective. (Telegram 1477 from Bangkok, March 26; ibid., 751J.00/3-2662) The Embassy in Vientiane reported on the Harriman-Savang meeting in telegram 1336 from Vientiane, March 26. (Ibid.)
During dinner Boun Oum in proposing toast to President read prepared statement explaining why his government resisted Souvanna solution.
Only progress so far has been Sarit's action in supporting our position.
Further discussion with Phoumi group set for 1000 hours Sunday morning.
Creel
318. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State/1/
Bangkok, March 26, 1962, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-2662. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Geneva for the Secretary, London, Paris, Vientiane, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
1478. From Harriman. Following were present at three-hour discussion Ministry National Security Sunday morning:/2/ Boun Oum, Phoumi, Khampan Panya, Sisouk, Nhouy, Leuam, Ngon Sananikone, Harriman, Creel, Sullivan, Forrestal, Gen Boyle, Chadbourn, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Col. Smart [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], General Phoumi, Sisouk and Ngon Sananikone spoke for RLG.
/2/Sunday, March 25, in Vientiane.
Phoumi opened meeting by RLG presentation saying we in accord on 1) need for peaceful solution, 2) need for coalition govt. However we clearly at odds re desirability Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister. After ten months discussions with Souvanna, RLG considers him not up to task forming such govt. In explanation RLG attitude, Sisouk gave historical review Laos political developments since 1954, claiming CDNI group had developed current policy on advice and guidance from US Govt. Said political upset Souvanna in 1957-8 had been at suggestion three major Western powers. Could not now understand change in US policy. Was it because Soviets had given US some assurances of which RLG not aware? Ngon Sananikone then followed with brief elaboration RLG distrust of Soviets and lack of confidence in Souvanna.
As patiently and carefully as possible, I answered all questions raised and touched on all points made by RLG. I said US could not accept responsibility for position in which RLG found itself today. All RLG friends, including Marshal Sarit, urging them negotiate sincerely for coalition govt under Souvanna as only alternative to disaster. No other alternative possible. King had flatly refused take any role other than that of constitutional monarch. Only salvation was Souvanna, alternative was disaster.
Affirmatively and in atmosphere President letter to King,/3/ I stated US attitude on Souvanna coalition, explaining such flexibility as still remained in negotiations over Defense and Interior. I outlined in detail steps which would follow organization of govt; i.e., exit foreign mil personnel, integration armed forces, eventual elections. I pointed out we could judge good faith Communist side in each step and that we would support RLG officers commanding FAR forces until integration of opposing forces takes place presumably on some proportional basis. Said that we prepared continue economic and political assistance to non-Communist elements in Laos, but that we could provide this only within framework coalition govt, in which we consider Phoumi collaboration important. Phoumi said RLG could not agree. Souvanna had failed in his task. King might ask him come Vientiane give account of his efforts form govt, but serious negotiation for Souvanna-led govt now out of question. If US decided abandon Laos at this time, this would be most regrettable.
/3/The Department of State prepared a Presidential letter to King Savang "to be held in reserve" for use in negotiations for a coalition government. It reminded the King that after 9 months the Geneva Conference was very close to a settlement that would allow for a united, neutral, and independent Laos. The formulation of a Lao Government of National Union and a single Lao delegation at Geneva representing it was now urgently required. The President stated it would be tragic to allow the achievements at Geneva to fail over disagreement over composition of the Lao Government with the probable result of resumption of hostilities. (Telegram 682 to Vientiane, January 31; Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1-3162)
Since it was clear RLG reps had nothing further say, I told them that in my opinion and in opinion all their friends, they, individually and collectively, were taking on responsibility of driving their country to destruction. I would advise them earnestly on what this meant and, as a friend, would sincerely hope that they reconsider their policy. The meeting ended on this note./4/ I am still hopeful of Sarit's influence having effect.
/4/On March 28, Harriman and William Bundy discussed Laos on the telephone. Harriman told Bundy that Sarit's message to President Kennedy was that he had agreed to help with Phoumi and "that he'd stick to it." Harriman remarked, "On Phoumi, he is much worse than I thought he was--(and you know how I've felt about him in the past)--I've never seen any thing like it." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Chronology, Telephone Conversations, December 1961-April 1962)
Harriman sent Brown in Bangkok the following instruction on March 28:
"Considering Phoumi's continued arrogance, find all hands here agree with my hunch that it would be good thing to pull [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] out. It seems to me now is the time to do it while Sarit is bringing pressure on Phoumi. In addition, this conforms highest level suggestion to give Phoumi cold shoulder. Suggest you consider urgently." (Telegram 1487 to Bangkok, March 28; Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-2862)
Young
319. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos/1/
Washington, March 28, 1962, 5:06 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-2862. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Cross; cleared by Johnson, Harriman in draft, McGeorge Bundy in substance, and Bromley Smith; and approved by Koren. Repeated to Geneva for Fecon, to New Delhi, London, Paris, Bangkok, and CINCPAC.
845. Vientiane for Sullivan from Harriman. Embtel 1340./2/ Following are supplemental instructions concerning your Khang Khay trip:
/2/In telegram 1340, March 27, Sullivan stated that in accordance with his instructions from Harriman, the main purposes of his trip to Khang Khay on March 30 would be to "dissuade Souvanna from throwing in his hand" and to do whatever he could to expedite the release of U.S. POW's captured by the Pathet Lao. Sullivan recommended inviting Souvanna to Washington en route to his scheduled trip to Paris in early April and asked for authority to extend an invitation. (Ibid., 751J.00/3-2762)
1. Primary objective is to encourage Souvanna to keep trying.
2. Leave to yours and colleagues judgment in light Addis trip/3/ and latest developments whether it desirable urge meeting between three factions or between Souvanna and Phoumi/Boun Oum. There are, of course, dangers in any meeting since Phoumi's attitude as reported Embtel 1353/4/ and others could doom it to failure.
/3/British Ambassador Addis was leaving for Khang Khay at 10 a.m. on March 28. Before his departure, he told Sullivan and Charg[ Creel that he intended to try to keep Souvanna actively committed to forming a coalition and planned to suggest a three Princes' meeting in Luang Prabang in the near future. (Ibid., 751J.00/3-2862)
/4/In telegram 1353, March 28, Sullivan reported that Phoumi refused to give him permission for a direct flight from Vientiane to the Plaine des Jarres and expressed resentment against Harriman's firm stand in their recent meetings. Phoumi reiterated his adamant opposition to a Souvanna coalition and asked the United States to reconsider its position. When Phoumi realized that Sullivan was under orders to go to Khang Khay, he stated he would not object to it, but would not approve it officially. (Ibid.) Sullivan went via Phnom Penh.
3. If Souvanna continues in his plan go to Paris you should renew invitation for him visit US enroute. Invitation should be issued in name USG and at direction Gov. Harriman. Details would be worked out if Souvanna accepts and when his plans are definite. We contemplate paying air fare from some point SEA to Paris via US for Souvanna and small entourage. We would also take care of his US expenses. Awaiting your specific recommendations after your visit. In view Souvanna sensitivities you may assure him that President as well as Sec State would be glad to see him.
4. Re prisoners: If appropriate during course your discussions you should point out to Souvanna and Souphanouvong that release of prisoners at this juncture would have favorable effect in US. This particularly so now when Administration under attack by some US elements for strong stand we have taken with Phoumi. Our latest information is that Shore, McMorrow, Ballenger and Wolfkill are held in PDJ; you might ask opportunity see them if time permits. In addition you should press for more frequent exchange of letters. (Thus far only one set received from PDJ prisoners and none from Bailey in spite of assurance given Harriman at Rangoon.) If possible you should take any undelivered letters with you and ask other side for any letters that have not been sent out. Plight of Bailey most disturbing since no one has seen him. You should ask for assurances that: (a) Bailey still alive, (b) PL will allow ICRC representative to interview him, (c) at least other side will facilitate exchange of mail, especially with Bailey.
Rusk
320. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/
Vientiane, March 31, 1962, 10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-3162. Secret; Niact. Repeated priority to Bangkok, London, Paris, Geneva for Fecon, CINCPAC for POLAD, and to New Delhi and Moscow.
1372. From Sullivan. Following is first in series telegrams reporting different aspects my discussions Plaine des Jarres:
Only encouraging result two days I spent there was considerable consensus which I found for troika in Defense and Interior. Souvanna at first insisted troika could only be created at SecState level, with both portfolios necessarily in HLC [XK?] hands. He subsequently relented, however, to agree that, during period when plans for integration armed forces and local administration being developed, troika council composed Phoumi, Souphanouvong and himself could handle Defense and Interior matters in lieu single minister assisted by three SecStates. He expected such period of planning last only "two, three months," after which execution of plans would be ministerial responsibility. He could then assume both Defense and Interior portfolios. Sisoumang and Pheng Phongsavan actively agree with foregoing. General Sinkapo also found it "realistic." So did Abramov. However Souphanouvong refused commit self, saying such questions were matters of detail to be thrashed out in three Prince meeting, which should be held Plaine des Jarres. He and Phoumi, he stated on several arrogant occasions, could work these things out together. At lunch just prior my departure, Souvanna told me his group and Souphanouvong's group would have meeting 10:00 am Monday decide course action.
If Souvanna and Pheng Phongsavan (who will head "government" during Souvanna's absence) have their way, they may propose tripartite meetings, either Hin Heup or Ban Namone at deputy level in order discuss "modalities" which would govern interim direction Defense and Interior affairs pending development integration program. If such talks eventuate, purpose would be prepare way for three Prince talks where Phoumi would concede on Defense and Interior in favor of interim troika councils to govern both areas. Souvanna and Pheng accept need provide Phoumi with face-saving exit from current impasse. So does Sinkapo.
Souphanouvong, however, says that only thing needed is American pressure (see septel/2/). Indications are that he will hold out against any initiatives which would have purpose saving Phoumi face.
/2/Document 321.
Creel
321. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/
Vientiane, March 31, 1962, 11 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-3162. Secret; Niact. Repeated priority to Bangkok, London, Paris, Geneva for Fecon, CINCPAC for POLAD, and to New Delhi and Moscow.
1373. From Sullivan. General attitude all hands Plaine des Jarres that US must take action in military support sector in order force Phoumi negotiate seriously. Souphanouvong, who most violent exponent this thesis, insists all US military support should be cut immediately. Abramov says "details up to US." Souvanna suggests withdrawal MAAG teams with combat units, insisting he does not wish starve Phoumi troops or create wholesale mutinies.
When asked for assurances that their forces would not exploit resultant situation if we imposed sanctions in military sector, Souvanna was categoric that no attacks would take place from his side. Abramov said he thought "situation would stay quiet for two or three months."
Souphanouvong however insisted that Phoumi had augmented his forces "behind PL lines" and that PL would have to "nettoyer ses zones" in order remove menace posed by this augmentation. He mentioned two or three places (such as Muong Houn and Ban Hat) which he definitely intended recapture from Phoumi on grounds they were held by PL on May 3. He and I had two long and rather explosive arguments on these matters, one March 30 and other March 31. During latter, Souvanna attempted intercede with explanation Souphanouvong really meant attack these places only if Phoumi used them offensively. When Souphanouvong contradicted him on this point, Souvanna stalked from the room.
Central substance our arguments was Souphanouvong insistence he had right attack any Phoumi position behind "line" which he has arbitrarily drawn to connect most forward positions which his units held on May 3. When I told him such line was "fictitious" and gross distortion military realities in Laos, we had real donnybrook. Issue was never satisfactorily settled between us, and I cannot give confident assessment his intentions.
Souvanna privately told me Souphanouvong was "defiant," who became excited about military matters and who did not understand political affairs. In my own judgment, Souphanouvong understands political affairs very well, but is a cocky little scrapper who smells victory. Interesting to note, however, that after our two tangles, he was picture of solicitude and charm at our last lunch together, promised effusively look after American POW's, and bade me very warm farewell.
Creel
322. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/
Vientiane, April 1, 1962, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-1662. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Paris, Geneva for Fecon, CINCPAC for POLAD, New Delhi, and Moscow.
1379. From Sullivan. Embtels 1372, 1373,/2/ 1374, 1375./3/
/2/Documents 320 and 321.
/3/Telegrams 1374 and 1375 from Vientiane, March 31, relate to Sullivan's efforts in Khang Khay toward release of U.S. POWs held by the Pathet Lao. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.537-Bailey, Lawrence R.)
Following, which is last in series cables reporting my recent trip, contains certain general impressions and observations:/4/
/4/Sullivan's trip is reported in more detail in despatch 186 from Vientiane, April 6. (Ibid., 611.51J/4-2662)
Entire area has Hemingway flavor of guerrilla camp, peopled by hard eyed little soldiers wearing odd mixture, US, French, Soviet, and Chinese type uniforms, with variety businesslike weapons casually slung, but always at hand. Troops generally in small groups hardly ever exceeding half dozen men, vehicles moving singly rather than in convoy. Russian-built vehicles everywhere. Roads miserable, quarters crude, airstrips primitive. Kong Le forces predominate, but Pathet Lao evident in good numbers. Few Russians visible, none in anything resembling uniform. Handful of Chinese seen at Chinese "mission" in Phongsavan. Many North Vietnamese laborers working on road, dam, and building construction projects (Souvanna said approximately 700 DRV technicians there).
Souvanna and Souphanouvong living in austere conditions. However, both seem robust. Souvanna once or twice lapsed into some depression, but generally indicated determination persevere. Souphanouvong generally truculent and aggressive. Only at end our conversations did he relax and become most jovial.
Quinim somewhat reserved, rather subservient. Pheng Phong-savan most sympathetic of group. Singkapo and Kong Le both very friendly and frank. Nouhak and Phoumi Vongvichit sent their apologies "indisposed". Russian Ambassador pleasant, made all correct sounds. Polish deputy commissioner gloomy, expects holocaust.
Souvanna, in rejecting invitation visit Washington, showed how carefully he is walking on eggs to avoid giving Communists impression he playing separate game with US. This in turn demonstrates that his long isolation in Khang Khay has given Communists chance sow seeds suspicion re US "two-faced" policy. On balance, therefore, I think it worthwhile he extricate himself from Khang Khay atmosphere and remain awhile in Paris. It not excluded that he will accept Washington invitation on return trip from Paris.
Although some rumors in Xieng Khouang that Kamsouk Keola would be in charge during Souvanna's absence and although Addis gained impression Quinim might be senior man present Khang Khay, Souvanna told me that Pheng Phongsavan would be in charge. He would not be sent Geneva because there is nothing to do there.
Souvanna not convinced Thai acting in good faith. Says Thailand has always sought prevent Laos from actually becoming country for fear it would offer too great attraction to Lao residents northeast Thailand.
Difficult evaluate Communist intentions immediate future. Most optimistic estimate (expressed by French and Indians) that Commies are willing step aside, let US pressure Phoumi into negotiations while military situation remains quiet. Most pessimistic is that Souvanna and Abramov, being encouraged leave country in order remove them from responsibility for PL and Viet Minh freedom to launch "punitive" drive against Phoumi before rainy season begins. Souphanouvong said rainy season acted to his disadvantage because rains handicap his logistics.
Creel
323. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/
Vientiane, April 2, 1962, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51J/4-262. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bangkok.
1382. Harriman from Sullivan. Reference: Deptel 851, 852./2/
/2/In these telegrams, March 30 and 31, Harriman asked Sullivan, Young, and Brown for their advice on how best to give Phoumi "the cold shoulder treatment." Specifically should [text not declassified] be recalled, General Boyle relieved, or Brown recalled for consultations? (Ibid., 751J.00/3-3062)
Difficult make intelligent judgment three suggestions contained reftel without knowing full context in which they proposed. For example, are they to preface massive military sanctions or are they to constitute symbolic sanctions themselves? Are we proceeding in confidence we will have protracted period calm in which to operate or do we believe Souphanouvong's blusters constitute threat to cease-fire? In order give reaction you have requested, I am making two assumptions, (a) these actions are intended as sanctions in themselves and (b) Souphanouvong will not attempt military solution. From these assumptions, I reached following conclusions:/3/
/3/In telegram 1544 from Bangkok, April 4, Brown, who was in Thailand, stated that he did not think any of the steps contemplated would have an appreciable effect on Phoumi, his colleagues, or the King, and, in fact, would have disadvantages. Without [text not declassified] there would be no way to communicate with Phoumi; Boyle was due to leave in May and replacing him now or withholding his replacement would have little effect on Phoumi; and recalling Brown would probably be interpreted by Phoumi as a positive step rather than a rebuke. (Ibid., 751J.00/4-462)
1) [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Current and future foreseeable US relationship with Phoumi will be cold and hard. This should be uniform across board. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] personal contact with Phoumi, while providing certain useful information, constitutes break in uniform US front which Phoumi will be tempted exploit. Our purpose should be force Phoumi recognize need deal directly with our Ambassador. Most intelligence we would lose by cutting [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] channel should be available from other contacts. I therefore concluded [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] should quietly disappear from Vientiane. His withdrawal should in no way be construed as any reflection on him personally. He has carried out his unique and difficult assignment as good soldier. His counsel should continue to be tapped in Washington.
2) Boyle. If we are planning any application military sanctions in near future, I consider it important Boyle be here at least for their initiation. He has not only the special judgment which he has developed from knowledge of local scene, but also an extraordinarily detached professional attitude towards the entire equivocal operation over which he presides. All MAAG units seem to have absolute confidence in Boyle's command. I believe they would carry out whatever orders he gave them willingly, no matter what their personal feelings. If no military sanctions are planned for immediate future, I do not believe Boyle's withdrawal within few weeks normal termination his tour of duty will have significant effect. Therefore, on balance, I believe Boyle should be held here until completion his tour which scheduled end May 1. Consideration could be given at that time to possibility holding up arrival his replacement for indefinite period.
3) Brown. Without having had benefit knowing Brown's own views this subject, I think it would be mistake call Brown home for consultation unless result such consultation will be manifested in new sanctions. For Phoumi, Brown has since August 1960 been symbol of a policy of peaceful reconciliation in Laos, with special position for Souvanna. Although there have been wide divergencies and contradictions within US policy in the intervening period, Brown's policies of August 1960 now represent unequivocal US position. Brown is therefore Phoumi's albatross. We shouldn't take him off Phoumi's neck. Moreover, one of basic reasons for withdrawal Hasey would be force Phoumi do business with Brown and with policy which Brown symbolizes in Phoumi's mind. Finally, believe it would be wise keep his hand on tiller during critical period here. Therefore, on balance, I would recommend against recalling Brown.
Creel
324. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative's Naval Aide (Bagley) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/
Washington, April, 3, 1962.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Laos 7, T-028-69. Secret.
SUBJECT
Laos Situation
The essential facts of the Laos situation, as they have developed over the past two weeks, are described in the paragraphs which follow.
Facts/2/
/2/On April 2, at the White House daily staff meeting, Forrestal gave a report on Laos as follows:
"Mr. Forrestal gave a very brief run-down on the Laos situation. He reported that all our heavy artillery appeared to have failed in moving Phoumi. However, some of the messages over the week end indicated some perceptible signs of effect. Mr. Harriman feels that Phoumi will begin to move somewhat in our direction in the next 10 to 15 days. (Forrestal very carefully failed to associate himself with this estimate.) Souvanna will be in Paris until June, it is thought. He further mentioned that Gromyko had told Rusk something that indicated that the Reds may not press in Laos for an indefinite period. Governor Harriman sees the need for preparing the Congress and the public for heavier pressures, such as withdrawal of some military supply support and some of the White Star training teams. Schlesinger commented on the lack of criticism of our policy in Laos as contrasted to the right wing support of the Katanga position in the Congo. Forrestal said that the Laotians are evidently trying to find some Senator who will take up cudgels in their behalf. Forrestal was careful to emphasize that this whole operation was sort of Alice-in-Wonderlandish, and that nothing was actually the way it appeared to be." (Memorandum for the Record by Ewell, April 2; ibid., White House Daily Staff Meetings, Jan.-April, 1962, T-124-69)
Governor Harriman talked with the King, Phoumi, Boun Oum, and Sarit, during the period 22-25 March. Mr. Sullivan followed up, on Harriman's departure, and has discussed the situation in detail with Phoumi, Souvanna, and Souphanouvong.
Phoumi refuses to cede Defense and Interior to Souvanna; he continues doubtful that Souvanna is independent enough of the PL to administer a neutral government. Phoumi's position has hardened since Governor Harriman told him in clear terms the U.S. view that he must give up Defense and Interior and negotiate the other positions since there was no alternative solution. Phoumi feels now there is an element of "face" which prevents his compromising. The RLG Information Chief (Sisouk) suggested the U.S. invite Phoumi to Washington; he was told in Vientiane this was impossible unless as a means to facilitate Phoumi's giving in gracefully. Sisouk also emphasized Phoumi's view that there must be no "winner" if a coalition government was entered into; the PL/KL forces act as if they were victorious already. Phoumi appears convinced that U.S. withholding of aid is temporary and that it will flow again as soon as the U.S. realizes he alone is on their side.
Souvanna will leave Laos on 3 April for Paris, returning to Khang Khay "at the proper time." This means when Phoumi agrees to Souvanna taking Defense and Interior and is ready to negotiate on a coalition government. Souvanna has declined an invitation to visit Washington en route to France. It is thought Souvanna will remain in France for his daughter's wedding, returning in June. He has emphasized that he is retaining his mandate to form a government and wants Phoumi in it. He seems willing to consider ways to make Phoumi's decision more palatable. There continue to be signs that he does not control Souphanouvong nor agree with him on some basic questions. Mr. Sullivan feels it may be beneficial that Souvanna is leaving PL pressures in Khang Khay which seem to be taking some effect on him. Souvanna has urged the U.S. to apply military sanctions against Phoumi as the only way to sway him. He has assured the U.S. that the PL/KL will not attack a weakened FAR.
Souphanouvong tries to let Souvanna speak for the Khang Khay group, but on some issues has been unable to avoid expressing his contrary views. He stresses the need for negotiations to hammer out the details of a new government if Phoumi will accede to the Defense/Interior proposal. He agrees that military sanctions must be applied to convince Phoumi, but is less convincing on the PL/KL willingness not to attack the FAR after sanctions are levied (says areas on his side of the cease-fire line will be cleared).
The King is maintaining his sympathy for Phoumi, but has confirmed that the mandate to Souvanna remains in force. He continues imprecise on any question of his taking part in a government.
The Soviets, and ICC Poles, suggest a 2-3 month period of military calm and political maneuver is commencing. In Laos and Geneva, the USSR representatives seem relaxed; the Ambassador in Laos is departing at the end of April to return in August. Sarit has become convinced of the U.S. resolve and appears sincerely to be seeking to encourage Phoumi to trust our lead. Other Asians, particularly the ChiNats, SVN, Burma, Korea and Japan, believe U.S. confidence in Souvanna is misplaced, but are maintaining a diplomatic silence. There is a widespread conviction that the U.S. and USSR have made a "deal" on Laos. The evolving ChiCom-USSR relations may reach a crisis point as a result of the current Party meetings in China, but what that will mean in Laos is not clear.
The British and French continue to support the U.S. lead. The U.K. is concerned Souvanna's departure for France will create a vacuum in Laos and delay or obstruct a solution. Governor Harriman shares this concern. Neither the British nor French see any solution except in the direction our policies are now projected, but are disappointed that the U.S. is not applying greater pressures on Phoumi.
Prospects
The principals in the Laos situation--USSR, Britain and France, plus the PL/KL--are urging the U.S. to apply military sanctions. The U.S. is considering further steps to isolate Phoumi, short of sanctions:
a. [1 line of source text not declassified]
b. Withdraw Brig. General Boyle from Laos, keeping him nearby in case of need, and accepting a hiatus until his relief arrives. (Major General Tucker not now to relieve Brig. General Boyle; plan is to find a 1-star officer. State has insisted that this is no time to increase the rank of the CHMAAG billet.)
c. Recall Ambassador Brown for consultation.
Governor Harriman believes time is working against the U.S. in Laos. Beyond isolating Phoumi, the possibilities, singly or in combination, are:
a. Establish a "Troika" for Defense and Interior ministries during the period plans for integration of the armed forces and local administration are being developed. A council of Souvanna, Phoumi, and Souphanouvong would handle Defense and Interior matters assisted by three Secretaries of State. Voting on action would be on a unanimous basis. After this period (about 2 or 3 months), Souvanna would take over both ministries. This concept is agreed in principle by all concerned except Souphanouvong, who says it should be discussed at a 3 Princes meeting, and Phoumi who has not yet commented (though some of his colleagues have indicated interest).
b. Convene a tripartite meeting, at the Deputy level, to talk over the "Troika" idea and other matters and, when necessary ground work is laid, the 3 Princes would meet.
c. Apply military sanctions. This could involve pay, supplies, aircraft, and U.S. advisors. Ambassador Brown has suggested a limited approach which would have an impact, but be reversible--the total suspension of military equipment/supplies deliveries into Laos. Because of stockpiles, the FAR would not be affected for 2-3 weeks at current rates of operations. The withholding of Feb-Apr funds has left the RLG with little money to fill the gap from other sources. Holding supplies in Thailand would make it easy for the U.S. to introduce them if desired. At the same time, if Phoumi remained adamant (or continued to think the U.S. would change its mind), the measures would eventually decrease FAR readiness drastically. Any PL/KL demonstration of strength would make the U.S. position more difficult. If the sanction continued indefinitely, the safety of U.S. personnel in the field would be a consideration. On balance, the Ambassador sees risk, but no sanction will have clear-cut advantages.
d. Maintain status quo on the belief Phoumi will reflect on Governor Harriman's words and give in. Harriman considers this a conceivable result within the next two weeks.
e. Buy off Phoumi to gain his agreement to the U.S. position.
U.S. Actions
State is studying the various possibilities. Governor Harriman apparently has discussed the situation with the President, but there has been little consultation with DOD/JCS.
The action thus far is to continue to press Phoumi. There seems to be minimum consideration of ways and means to give Phoumi greater assurances of our fidelity after a Souvanna government is constituted. The "Troika" concept might lead us into more detailed thinking on this aspect. The inter-departmental planning on U.S. policies to strengthen and assist a Souvanna government was commenced 6 months ago; it has yet to be pursued actively. More attention to this element of our policy might offer new ideas that would help sway Phoumi.
WHB
325. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, April 6, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memorandum Series: Staff Memos, M.V. Forrestal, 1/62-5/62. Secret.
SUBJECT
Laos
The following steps should be taken to lay the ground work here for an eventual decision by the President to give stand by authority for additional pressure on General Phoumi. The timing and selection of the precise type of pressures to be used might best be left to the Department and the field.
1. Preparation of a paper for the President bringing him up to date on developments in Laos with a discussion of the pros and cons of military sanctions. (attached)/2/
/2/Not attached to the source text. A copy that was attached to a copy of this memorandum at the National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Laos 7, T-028-69, is printed here as an attachment.
2. A paper suggesting answers to the Congressional criticisms which have developed in the House Foreign Relations hearings. I thought I'd try a first draft and maybe ask Arthur to put some punch into it.
3. Congressional briefing by the President joined by Governor Harriman and General Lemnitzer. (General Lemnitzer should be asked in advance to be prepared to explain why, from a military point of view, it is not advisable to intervene with U.S. forces.)
4. Preparation of a public statement of U.S. policy and consideration of the manner in which it should be disseminated. (to be prepared)
5. White House memorandum giving the stand by authority for the selective suspension of military assistance to the R.L.G.
MVF
[Attachment]
Draft Memorandum to President Kennedy
Washington, April 6, 1962.
SUBJECT
Laos
Our immediate objective is to bring about a coalition government under Souvanna which will have enough strength to preserve Lao neutrality and independence. In order to achieve this we must transfer support from the Phoumi dominated government to a Souvanna government which has the approval of the King, without at the same time destroying the right-wing political and military strength upon which Souvanna must rely against the Communists. We have been unable to go forward towards this objective because of Phoumi's unwillingness to accept the Souvanna solution.
Our efforts to induce Phoumi to accept the Souvanna solution and negotiate realistically commenced in September and October of 1961, following the agreement to pursue the Souvanna solution reached by the U.S., U.K., and French foreign ministers in August. These efforts were confined to diplomatic pressures (except for brief delays in making the September and November payments for budgetary support) until February this year. We stopped the February payment after Phoumi again demonstrated unwillingness to negotiate on the basis of the agreements he had made in January with the other two Lao leaders in Geneva. Payments have not been made for three months and have begun to have a noticeably deteriorating effect on the economy of Laos and on the morale of the Lao people, including Phoumi's supporters.
In March Governor Harriman went to Thailand and Laos where he obtained the promise of active support of the Thais, but was unable to move Phoumi who remains obdurate. The Thais have counseled patience to give them time to work on Phoumi. We are letting them take the lead in persuading Phoumi. There is no way of telling whether the Thais will be successful or whether we may be compelled in the pursuit of our objective to apply further pressures on Phoumi, this time on the military side.
The following in summarized form are arguments for applying military sanctions:
1. Withholding various categories of military support has been regarded all along as offering the best means for shaking Phoumi and weakening his hold over his followers. Milder forms of persuasion and pressure have been virtually exhausted. Moreover, the effect of continuing to withhold financial support would be to destroy the structure of the RLG, which we have tried for so long to strengthen, with the result that the ability of the RLG to compete politically with the PL in a coalition government would be lost.
2. Military sanctions would bring home immediately and finally to Phoumi and all other Lao leaders that the U.S. is determined on the Souvanna solution. Until we take this action Phoumi can never be absolutely sure of our intentions. The history of our past dealings with him and what he regards as the logic of the situation would encourage him to hold out if there is any question. Phoumi has recently indicated that his policy has been to encourage Souvanna to abandon his mission in the hope that we would come to Phoumi's support if Souvanna were eliminated from the scene. Whether military sanctions combined with other pressures will be enough to bring Phoumi around is, of course, the great unknown. Many who have had experience with Phoumi in the past believe that if he is directly faced with incontrovertible evidence that the U.S. is determined to have the Souvanna solution with or without him, and if some face saving way out could be devised, he will give in. His instincts will tell him to try to live to fight again another day. At that point the carrots we have already offered Phoumi would have their greatest appeal.
In the event that Phoumi does not react favorably to this technique, it will, nevertheless, tend to convince the other leaders of the necessity of abandoning Phoumi. In such a situation our efforts to bring forward other political leaders would stand a far greater chance of success.
3. The political effect of the present suspension of financial assistance is necessarily slow. Military sanctions would have an immediate psychological effect on Phoumi since they strike at the source of his power.
4. Military sanctions can be applied in such a manner that they would not significantly impair the combat capabilities of the FAR for a period of several weeks.
5. If we do balk at military sanctions and Phoumi remains intransigent, Souvanna will probably sooner or later throw in his hand. The Communist side will also draw their own conclusions and the Soviets may pull out leaving us in direct confrontation with the PL/VM/ChiComs.
The arguments against authorizing military sanctions:
1. The PL/VM may take military advantage of the weakened state of the FAR. In publicly urging that the U.S. withhold military support from Phoumi, Souvanna has said that his side would not profit from the weakness of the FAR if we did so. Souphanouvong has privately not gone as far, but has told Sullivan that the PL might engage in some minor line straightening operations but would not seize larger towns. Intelligence estimates are that the Communist side will not push an attack as long as a negotiated settlement is still possible.
2. Once we have embarked on the path of military sanctions we would have to maintain them and perhaps even make them complete if Phoumi remained adamant and in power. However, up to a certain point in the process, and depending upon developments, the U.S. would still retain the choice of reversing our policy and resuming support of the RLG. A reversal would, however, mean the end of the Souvanna solution and the consequent possibility that U.S. troops would be required to support the RLG.
3. Phoumi may absorb the full force of all our sanctions but manage to maintain control of the RLG. He would, however, be left helpless against the PL/VM if they chose in the end to follow up their advantage.
Recommendation:
In summary, as matters now stand, military sanctions are the next logical step. The Thais are continuing their efforts to persuade Phoumi and it is difficult to predict when and if they may succeed. In the meantime the economic structure of the country is deteriorating under the impact of our economic pressures and this process can be expected to accumulate but without producing the desired political result on Phoumi.
It may soon be necessary, therefore, to request Presidential authority to impose sanctions in the form of suspension of military assistance. The nature, extent and timing of such suspension would depend upon the progress of the Thai efforts, the judgment of the field and developments within the RLG.
326. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, April 9, 1962, 5:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos; General, 4/1/62-4/18/62. Confidential. Drafted by Queneau on April 10. The meeting was held at the White House. The time is taken from the President's Appointment Book. (Ibid.) Michael Forrestal prepared a brief, April 9, for this meeting. (Ibid., Meetings and Memos Series: Staff Memos, M.V. Forrestal, 1/62-5/62)
PARTICIPANTS
The President
H.R.H. Prince Khampan, Lao Ambassador
M. Tianethone Chantharasy, First Secretary of the Lao Embassy
Mr. Michael V. Forrestal, White House Staff
Francoise G. Queneau, Lao Desk Officer
The Lao Ambassador called on the President today at his own request to deliver a message from the King./2/ In handing the royal letter to the President, Prince Khampan said he had been instructed to deliver it personally. When the President had quickly read it through he had the last few pages translated orally and then told the Ambassador that he would subsequently be addressing a reply to His Majesty./3/ In the meantime, he would set forth his view on the Lao problem.
/2/A translation of the King's letter was attached. King Savang complained bitterly about the state of affairs in Laos and expressed disillusionment at U.S. efforts to force Laos to collaborate with communism. The King expressed disillusionment with the Geneva Conference and criticized the U.S. suspension of economic aid to Laos.
/3/Text of the President's response to King Savang is in telegram 905 to Vientiane, April 19. The letter regretted the "fundamental misunderstanding" over Laos policy and sought to explain the reasoning behind U.S. policy "in very much the same terms as I [the President] did April 9 to Your Ambassador." (Department of State, Central Files, 611.51J/4-1962)
It was obvious, he said, that the final decision was one that the King and the RLG would have to make. On the basis of our military estimates, however, we had felt since last May that if fighting were resumed in Laos, the RLG forces would be defeated. If the RLG believed they could win out against the PL, that was their decision, but they must not think that the U.S. would intervene. From the tactical standpoint, the problem was a very difficult one. We depended heavily upon the air and upon the sea. In that area airfields were limited in number and the few that existed could easily be knocked out. This was why we felt the best security for the future of Laos lay in the solution we had suggested. The American people would not support the sending of American troops to Laos on the other side of the world. We admired the stand taken by the RLG but did not think they could maintain it successfully.
The Ambassador said he would inform His Majesty and the RLG of the President's views. He agreed that the terrain was indeed very difficult. He pointed out, however, that the RLG had been persuaded by the U.S. a long time ago that Laos should resist the Communists and believed that at that time the U.S. already knew the problems presented by the type of terrain. The RLG was, he added, fully aware of these problems and of the fact that Laos could not fight alone against the Communists. It needed the help and moral support of friendly countries.
The President replied that he was not speaking of aid or moral assistance. The Lao were receiving these from the U.S. But the situation changed early last year when the Communists had come very close to Luang Prabang and were only 60 miles from Vientiane. This was why we had felt that a cease-fire had to be achieved. We did not wish to see Laos in Communist hands; this would not be in our interest nor in that of the Free World. Our recommendations were designed expressly to avoid a Communist takeover. In our judgment, if fighting broke out again, the PL would win within a few days or a few weeks and Laos would be lost. This was why we advised the formation of a coalition government, the signing of new Accords and their implementation by stages so that we would be able to see whether the PL fulfilled their commitments. We would do everything on our part to help once the coalition government was formed.
The President repeated that the RLG should not entertain any illusions: we would not send American troops to help the RLG. Congress would not accept it, nor would the American people. It was hard enough for them to accept our intervention in the case of Korea where aggression was much more clear-cut. Furthermore, we felt that the more time passed, the less chance there was of avoiding renewed hostilities, but again the decision was up to the Lao. The President reminded the Ambassador that in Viet-Nam we were giving the same type of aid as to Laos in the form of mat[riel and advisers but were not providing troops. He hoped that the Lao would decide to accept the proposal we suggested and would form a coalition government; otherwise it would mean war. He understood that the Royal Government did not trust Souvanna. It was true, he said, that Souvanna could not hold out against the PL unless he enjoyed the full support of His Majesty and of the pres-ent RLG. The President added that he had the impression that the RLG felt it was being compelled to follow our counsel. This was not true. We simply felt that the only alternative was so much worse that it would be best for the Lao to adopt the course we proposed. We were not, however, forcing them to do so and we had been perfectly honest. Since last May we had been giving the RLG this same advice.
In replying to His Majesty, the President said he would express these same views. We wished there were another solution but we knew of none. What we were seeking was the preservation of Lao independence. Did the Ambassador see any other possible solution?
Prince Khampan replied that the RLG feared Souvanna would be incapable of controlling the PL in a coalition government. He thought they were justified in these fears because of the way that the PL and VM had violated the agreements resulting from the 1954 Geneva Conference. This time, if a coalition government were again formed and including the Communists, it would be difficult for the Lao to defend themselves against them.
The President remarked that we understood their fears but the fact was that the RLG was not trying to negotiate seriously with Souvanna. The Ambassador responded that the RLG did wish to negotiate with Souvanna but that the basic problem concerned the distribution of portfolios. The President emphasized that obviously Souvanna could not give Interior and Defense to Phoumi because then Souphanouvong would want one of those two posts. It would be fine if Souphanouvong would allow Phoumi to have both but this was hardly likely, especially as the PL were now so strong. The Ambassador said there were others besides Phoumi, people like Phoui Sananikone, who were not influenced by the PL.
The President then stated that he would sum up his views as follows:
1. First of all, we are profoundly interested in the preservation of the independence of Laos and look with sympathy upon the efforts of His Majesty, Boun Oum, Phoumi, Prince Khampan, and others to maintain it.
2. We feel, however, today that the PL are the stronger and that if the cease-fire were broken and hostilities were renewed, it would be the end of Laos.
3. We recognize the dangers of a coalition government just as the RLG does, but we feel it is the only solution that offers a chance of winning out against the Communists. If such a government is formed, the U.S. will do everything it can to help insure its success.
4. It is our opinion that the more time passes, the less chance there is of a Souvanna coalition government succeeding.
5. In the final analysis, the ultimate decision has to be made by the Lao themselves, but he must emphasize again that the U.S. will not intervene, will not send in American troops if hostilities are resumed.
The President concluded by saying he would have occasion to talk again with the Ambassador. He reiterated his appreciation of Lao fears but insisted that we believed a coalition government was the best solution for a very difficult situation. This was his considered judgment and he hoped that the Ambassador would not be angry with him, Governor Harriman or Mr. Johnson.
327. Memorandum From the United Nations Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Sullivan) to the Secretary of State's Assistant (Cutler)
Washington, April 16, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-1662. Secret. Drafted by Sullivan. A note on the source text indicates that the Secretary saw it. Sullivan's title as U.N. Adviser did not adequately explain his job, which was assistant and adviser to Harriman on Laos.
As Governor Harriman informed you last evening, the Secretary is expected to join the President and others for a briefing of Congressional leaders this morning on the subject of Laos and Viet-Nam. As I understand it, the Congressional leaders will arrive at 10:00 a.m./2/ However, the President wishes the Secretary and his group to be present in the Oval Room of the Executive Mansion at 20 minutes before 10 for a skull session.
/2/The President's meeting with the congressional leadership took place from 5:05 to 6:10 p.m., April 17. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book) See Document 329.
The Governor has asked me to see that the attached paper gets in the Secretary's hands prior to the briefing. It is not a talking paper for the Congressional briefing but contains subject matter which could possibly arise in the discussions with the President. As you will note, the original copy has been endorsed over to the Secretary by Governor Harriman. An additional copy is attached for distribution to Under Secretary Johnson, with whom I have discussed the subject matter. If more copies are required, I believe one or two others are available here in the Bureau.
[Attachment]/3/
Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)
Washington, undated.
/3/Secret; Noforn.
SUBJECT
Continuation of "Mild" Pressures on Phoumi: A Short-term Estimate/4/
/4/In a telephone conversation, April 14, Hilsman and Forrestal discussed the short session with the President prior to the congressional briefing. Hilsman described what he considered to be the basic problem: "to find some way in which the Pres. doesn't have to choose about [between?] losing Laos or intervening with American troops." Forrestal agreed and thought it would be useful to have "something other than stark alternatives." (Kennedy Library, Hilsman Papers, Countries, Laos, 4/62)
I. The Problem
A. We have been asked to estimate what will happen in the Laotian situation in the event that the US continues for a time the present general pattern of essentially mild sanctions designed to lead General Phoumi to participate in a coalition government.
B. We assume that the US would continue for the time being its diplomatic and political pressures on Phoumi directly, through Thailand, and through the Geneva Conference on Laos; its withholding of cash grants; its supply of project, logistic and military advisory support (at roughly the same level); and its contact with Souvanna and Souphanouvong.
II. Conclusions in Brief
A. Our judgment is that this course of essentially mild sanctions is not likely to force Phoumi to agree to participate in a coalition government. We also believe that the risks of this course are low and that the Communists are unlikely to increase their military pressures substantially. However, the present "nibbling" process will continue.
B. This analysis does not imply that policy decisions on our future course in Laos should not be made during the next two or three months; it says only that we have time--at moderate cost--for some reflection. The effect on the situation--beyond two or three months--of deliberately pausing in our approach is much less clear, since it entails cumulative and interlocking effects within Laos, on our allies, and on the Communists.
III. RLG Position
A. Neither US nor Thai efforts at persuasion nor the imposition by the US of economic sanctions has succeeded in convincing Phoumi that he should join a coalition government under Souvanna. The RLG has so far minimized the effects of the sanctions by borrowing from the National Bank for the payment of salaries and by using foreign exchange reserves to finance the importation of essential commodities. Phoumi has remained intransigent despite the fact that his military position relative to his adversaries has been shown to be extremely weak.
B. If the course of "mild" sanctions is continued, the fact that no additional sanctions were being brought to bear would probably confirm Phoumi in his belief that the US will not terminate all aid. (The Thais would probably come to the same conclusion and discontinue their present pressures on Phoumi.) Phoumi's obduracy is based largely on his estimate that the US will not dare terminate all aid. He represents his position as one of conviction that a Souvanna government is tantamount to an eventual Communist takeover. Phoumi apparently calculates that by holding out he enhances the possibility of direct confrontation with the Communists that would force the US to support him fully because it could not afford a Communist takeover of Laos.
C. Withholding of cash grants may not, if the RLG manages its financial resources carefully, have any drastic effect for several months. Phoumi is not likely to be budged by prospective economic difficulties.
D. There is a slight possibility that Phoumi might join a coalition if he is in fact looking for a face-saving way out for himself and believes he has some chance to retain an influential position in the government. In this case he might use this period to initiate private negotiations with Souvanna and/or Souphanouvong, or, after a decent interval, accept the presently envisaged coalition formula or a slight variant. In either case he would present the ensuing agreement as a result of his initiative or of Thai persuasion rather than of US pressure. Only the Thais appear to believe this to be a real possibility, however, and the weight of the evidence available would seem to discount it.
IV. Souvanna's Position
Souvanna might well conclude that his chances of becoming Prime Minister were nil and carry out his threats to renounce his mandate to form a government.
V. Communist Position
A. The ultimate Communist objective in Laos remains takeover of the entire country. Although there may be differences among Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi as to tactics and timing, their common objective for the immediate future is to consolidate their hold over the areas now under their control while keeping open the prospect of further gains. Because of the situation in South Vietnam, the Communists have a special interest in strengthening their hold on the Tchepone corridor area.
B. The Communists are presently committed to seeking a political solution in Laos through the agreed mechanism of a coalition government under Souvanna. Because of the risk they also see in rupture of the ceasefire and resumption of large-scale hostilities, we do not believe they would embark on this course (except in response to military action initiated by Phoumi) as long as they believed an eventual coalition possible.
C. They have nothing to lose in this approach since, if it succeeds, Phoumi will be weakened and they will have a strong position in the new Laotian government; if it fails their present favorable position is not only not weakened, but probably improved.
D. A US failure to use all available economic and military aid sanctions against Phoumi would not, in our judgment, automatically result in a Communist effort at military takeover during the next few months (for which they undoubtedly have the capability). More probable would be increased Communist pressures aimed at achieving the political solution they prefer. Within Laos these would undoubtedly take the form of increased "mopping up" actions as well as deliberate but cautious expansion of territorial holdings. Because the Communists believe we are committed to gain Phoumi's concurrence in the agreed arrangements, pressure would also be exerted on the US by actions such as a threat to withdraw from the Geneva Conference, thus raising fears of a renewal of hostilities.
E. Even if the Communists believed a coalition government impossible (as would probably be the case if Souvanna withdrew), the Soviets at least might well be prepared for reasons of their own to explore possibilities of some other international solution. However, the Chinese Communists and North Vietnamese under these circumstances would probably favor a more aggressive policy including a military solution. It is unlikely that the Soviets could restrain them from supporting the PL in seizing at least substantial additional territory.
VI. Conclusions
A. There is little likelihood that permitting the Laotian situation to simmer for two or three months would achieve effective progress toward the formation of a coalition government along the lines we now envisage. Mere continuation of pressures now being exerted on Phoumi is unlikely to induce him to participate in such a government.
B. At the same time we do not believe that the risks of this would be so great as to require an immediate decision on the adoption of strong sanctions against Phoumi or some alternative course:
1. It may be argued that the basis for agreement on the Laotian problem--a coalition government headed by Souvanna--might vanish with Souvanna's disillusionment and withdrawal as Prime Minister designate. On balance we do not believe such behavior by Souvanna likely in the next two or three months, although there is a slight possibility that the King might force Souvanna's hand by deciding himself at the Assembly in May to undertake the formation of a government.
2. It can also be argued that the Communists, if they became convinced that a coalition government under Souvanna was impossible, might decide on a military takeover of the whole country. We believe this is unlikely and that the Communists would continue to seek a political solution. They would, at the same time, make local military advances within Laos and step up their efforts to obtain more rigorous US sanctions against Phoumi.
328. Memorandum From the United Nations Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Sullivan) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)/1/
Washington, April 16, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-1662. Secret. Drafted by Sullivan. A handwritten note on the source text by Harriman reads: "To Sec. State. W.A.H."
SUBJECT
Talking Paper on Laos
If it remains possible to execute the Geneva Agreements to regulate the situation in Laos, we should attempt to obtain full credit for such a result. If this is no longer possible, we should attempt to place full responsibility for such failure upon the Communists. Our current policy should be conducted in a manner which embraces the possibility of either contingency.
The primary, and only ostensible thrust of our policy at this time should be toward the execution of the Geneva Agreements. At the current moment, we are receiving full marks for such an effort from all objective observers. This is a valuable asset which we should not willfully waste. It not only earns us a great deal of merit with allies and neutrals, but also serves to help deter the Communists from any rash military action in Laos. We must therefore continue to mount prudent pressure toward the realization of this objective. We cannot afford to do nothing at this juncture.
At the same time, there are evidences that the Communists have lost interest in establishing the Geneva regime for Laos. We must act to probe these evidences more deeply, and if they prove dominant in Communist policy, we must rapidly exploit them to accomplish a tolerable standstill in Laos, with blame for the failure to achieve the Geneva objective fixed as clearly as possible upon them, rather than upon us. It would, in this event, become necessary to rehabilitate the international reputation of friendly forces in Laos in order to permit us to sustain the semblance of a stable anti-Communist base with which to work there.
I would therefore recommend the following courses of action:
(A) A major effort by the Thais to dissuade Phoumi and his colleagues from any action which would have the effect of revoking Souvanna's mandate, and at the same time to persuade them to resume negotiations among the three forces on the basis of the following formula:
(1) Renunciation of their claim to exclusive control over Defense and Interior, provided:
(2) Troika committees are established in a Souvanna cabinet to regulate Defense and Interior affairs; and
(3) Souphanouvong gives assurances he will not attempt to improve his military position during the interim period. (This last theme should be hammered at all times.)
(B) A time limit on the Thai effort, which we can ascribe to Phoumi's announced intention of action on or about May 11. I would suggest the date of May 7 as the date against which the Thais should be working. We will inform them that, if they do not succeed by that date, we will begin to impose military sanctions.
(C) Consultations with UK and France, in which we tell them that the Thais are being given time to act; that we have fixed a time limit for their success; and that, if they do not succeed by that time, we are prepared to impose certain military sanctions. However, stressing Souphanouvong's refusal to give satisfactory assurances in the military field, we will advise them confidentially that the military sanctions we are prepared to impose will, for the time being, be limited to the withdrawal of White Star Teams from the forward field units. In order to engage our allies, and particularly the British, with some responsibility in this field, we will ask:
(D) An active British effort (perhaps using Malcolm MacDonald) to obtain from Souphanouvong concrete assurances that he will remain militarily quiescent. The purpose of this effort would be partly to probe Communist intentions, partly to relieve allied pressure on us, and partly to lead, if indications warrant, toward a bilateral meeting between Souphanouvong and Phoumi designed to stabilize the military situation along a cease-fire line to be mutually agreed.
(E) Consultations, either here or in Moscow (preferably here) to seek agreement on the level of military equipment the Soviets and we are delivering to our respective clients in Laos. While somewhat unorthodox, this might be worth attempting partly as a probe of Soviet intentions and partly as a genuine effort to avoid escalation.
I believe all the foregoing actions should be put into motion before Easter. This would give us the appearance of continuing constant attention to the problem and would retain the initiative in our hands, a factor which I consider most important. The net results of these actions should give us a somewhat clearer picture of the immediate future prior to May 7.
329. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, April 17, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 4/1/62-4/18/62. Secret. Drafted by Forrestal.
Congressional Briefing on Laos/2/
/2/See footnote 2, Document 327.
The purpose of this briefing is:
(a) to bring the Congressional leadership up to date on developments in Laos since their last briefing,/3/ and
/3/See Document 297.
(b) to prepare them for a decision to apply a mild form of suspension of military assistance to General Phoumi.
A. Secretary Rusk, General Lemnitzer and Averell will be able to discuss recent events in Laos from a political and military point of view. You may wish to refer to your conversation with Foreign Minister Thanat,/4/ which was the major factor in bringing the Thais around to help us with Phoumi, and to your recent conversation with the Lao Ambassador./5/
/4/Kennedy met with Foreign Minister Thanat on March 5 and stressed that a "solution under Souvanna Phouma was the only acceptable choice." The President stated he did not want "Phoumi to throw in the sponge, but rather support Souvanna and participate in the government." (Department of State, Central Files, 792.13/3-562) The memorandum of conversation is included in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XXIII.
/5/See Document 326.
B. The preparation for a decision is more difficult to handle, since you have not yet been given a recommendation by Averell. You may decide to postpone discussion of any future action with the Congressional leaders until a further talk with Averell. In that event you may simply wish to say that you are still studying the next steps to be taken.
If he has the chance before the briefing, Averell will probably discuss with you his recommendation that we give the Thais until about May 7th to continue their efforts to bring Phoumi to negotiate with Souvanna.
If the Thais do not succeed (and the chances are not too good), then Averell will suggest that we withdraw those of our White Star teams which are attached to RLG units in the most forward field positions. About 7 or 8 (100 men) of the approximately 18 teams (450 men) would be withdrawn to the rear areas.
The political reasons for doing this are explained in the attached memorandum,/6/ and the reasons for the choice of this type of suspension may be summarized as follows:
/6/Not found.
(a) Such a withdrawal would not have a severe effect upon the strength of the FAR; and it does not deprive the FAR of the "sinews of war," only of advisors whose advice is not always followed.
(b) Unlike the reduction of supplies, it does not commit us to go any further if Phoumi remains obdurate.
(c) It gets our own people out of an area where they might get hurt if Phoumi or the PL started new operations, and it avoids our intimate involvement in a likely defeat if such operations were started.
(d) Although such a withdrawal cannot be expected to hurt Phoumi enough to cause him to change his attitude, it may be enough to keep Souvanna and the Russians in play.
The military feel that such a withdrawal will leave us "blind" from an intelligence point of view. Averell feels that the intelligence which has been derived from the teams is probably not worth saving.
Although you may not have a chance to function on the decision today, Averell will probably ask you to do so before you leave on Thursday./7/
/7/The President left on Wednesday, April 18, for Palm Beach, Florida.
C. Averell thinks that it is important during the briefing to discuss Vietnam as well as Laos. He feels that the more flexible policy in Laos is best understood in terms of our stronger strategic position in Vietnam. He will also be prepared to discuss with you our reaction to the pressures from various sources (principally Sihanouk) for an international conference on Vietnam. Averell is opposed to such a conference at this time.
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