Docs 330-353
330. National Security Action Memorandum No. 149/1/
Washington, April 19, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 149. Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1980, 447B.
TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT
Withdrawal of Certain Military Units from Forward Positions in Laos
1. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense to plan for the withdrawal of those MAAG White Star teams in Laos which are located in forward field positions. Approximately 7 or 8 White Star teams would be withdrawn to the rear echelon and would remain in Laos until their normal tour of duty expired. Their replacement will be decided upon subsequently.
2. The withdrawal will take place at such time as the Secretary of State deems appropriate; it is not presently contemplated that this would occur before May 7th, 1962.
3. The Secretary of State will prepare an appropriate public announcement of the action at the time the withdrawal takes place. Prior to such time every effort should be made to keep this matter confidential.
McGeorge Bundy
331. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos/1/
Washington, April 19, 1962, 8:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-1962. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Cross; cleared in draft by Harriman, Sullivan, and Forrestal; cleared in substance with Heinz of DOD/ISA and David H. Henry, Deputy Director of SOV; and approved by Koren. Sent also priority to Bangkok as telegram 1601. Repeated to London, Paris, Geneva for Fecon, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Moscow, and CINCPAC POLAD.
903. Joint State/Defense Message.
Following represents decision highest level USG and constitutes instructions for dealing with current phase Laos developments.
Our policy continues to be directed toward achieving Souvanna solution and Geneva settlement. Our current efforts have not only reassured our British and French allies but have probably helped hold back Communist side from rash military actions. Therefore we are prepared to undertake further prudent pressures on Phoumi toward realizing our objectives.
Current Thai efforts with Phoumi have so far not produced any changes in attitude on his part. Moreover he continues to press forward on his King's government scheme which if initiated on May 11 could have effect of revoking Souvanna's mandate or otherwise driving him from scene. Therefore we cannot afford inaction at this juncture.
For Bangkok: You should seek special meeting with Thanat and Sarit and urge them to make more vigorous effort to:
1. Persuade Phoumi and his supporters to resume negotiations with other two factions along following lines: renunciation of their claim to exclusive control over Defense and Interior provided that (a) some acceptable arrangements along lines of troika in Defense and Interior are made, (b) Souphanouvong gives definite assurances he will not attempt extend his military positions during interim period as he is apparently doing.
2. Thais must persuade Phoumi not to pursue his King's government scheme in any way which will revoke Souvanna's mandate or drive him from scene.
3. You should inform Thais that in view our concern over dangers inherent in Phoumi's proposed actions on May 11 we are prepared impose unspecified military sanctions on him by May 7 if Thais have not succeeded before then.
For Vientiane: President has approved use if necessary of military sanction of withdrawal White Star Teams which currently in forward areas. (We understand there are 7 or 8.) Teams would be withdrawn to rear echelon and would remain in Laos until expiration their normal duty tours. Replacement would depend upon developments. In consultation with your military advisers you should prepare plans and recommendations for implementation this sanction. End for Vientiane.
Department will inform British and French in Washington of foregoing including time limit we have given Thais. However stressing Souphanouvong's refusal to give satisfactory assurances in military field, we will advise them confidentially that we will limit our sanctions for time being to withdrawal of White Star Teams from certain forward field units. We will urge active British effort to obtain concrete assurances from Souphanouvong against military actions. If indications warrant we would attempt encourage bilateral meetings between Souphanouvong and Phoumi designed to stabilize military situation and provide some form military modus vivendi.
We are also considering possibility of seeking agreement with Soviets on level of military equipment we and they are delivering to our respective clients in Laos with purpose testing them and avoiding escalation.
Rusk
332. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos/1/
Washington, April 19, 1962, 9:21 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51J/4-1962. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Koren, cleared by Cross and McGeorge Bundy, cleared in draft by Harriman and Forrestal, and approved by Koren. Sent also to Bangkok as telegram 1603.
904. For Ambassadors Brown and Young.
For Brown: In presenting the President's letter to King/2/ the President desires that you make orally following points to the King in language you consider most effective:
/2/See footnote 3, Document 326.
1. The President has consulted the Congressional leadership and neither he nor they are prepared to contemplate committing US troops in Laos. The President does not intend at this time to make a public statement to this effect. Nevertheless he wishes the King to understand fully the US will not intervene militarily in Laos and the Royal Lao Government must realize that no act or effort on their part is going to change this decision. Despite his present intention not to, the President will make this known publicly if it necessary to prevent a misunderstanding of US policy in Lao political circles.
2. US Govt. fully intends to take all steps within its power to assure a just and equitable implementation of the step-by-step measures necessary to assure a neutral and independent Laos. This includes the necessary safeguards to assure a balanced withdrawal of all foreign military forces and the proportional integration of the present three armed forces into the new organizational structure. In this process we are prepared to be of assistance to the FAR so that it may maintain its integrity during this period. The US Government will assist the coalition government to the extent possible so that the elections to be later carried out may be conducted freely and fairly. If so conducted we are confident that the majority of the Lao electorate will express their anti-Communist feelings.
3. The US Government stands ready and indeed desires to give all assistance to the coalition government in the economic, social and military fields as is appropriate under the terms of the Geneva Agreements and agreed between our respective governments.
4. The President and his government consider it important that General Phoumi take an active and prominent part in the coalition government. His forceful leadership and the principles he represents are necessary to make the coalition a viable one. As a relatively young man he should have years of fruitful and beneficial service to his country ahead of him.
For Young: You authorized give gist foregoing to Sarit/Thanat when you inform them of contents President's letter to King.
Rusk
333. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State/1/
Bangkok, April 23, 1962, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-2362. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated priority to Vientiane.
1642. Re Deptels 1601, 1603,/2/ 1604,/3/ 1610./4/
/2/Documents 331 and 332.
/3/Telegram 1604 to Bangkok, sent also to Vientiane as telegram 905, contained the text of the President's letter to King Savang; for a summary, see footnote 3, Document 326.
/4/In telegram 1610, April 20, the Department suggested that Young use the occasion of his April 23 meeting with Sarit to make the points outlined in Document 331. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-2062)
Saw Sarit this morning to carry out instructions and convey reftels. Thanat was present with Sarit's aides Gens Chalermchai and Eksakdi. Dollison of Embassy accompanied me.
I first orally gisted President's reply to King's letter, stressing need for negotiated settlement, danger of RLG obstruction leading to resumption of hostilities and unavoidable Pathet Lao capture of Laos, necessity of coalition, neutral govt with Souvanna Premiership and implementation Geneva Accords, importance of withdrawal of outside mil forces, inability of USG to continue financial and mil measures in Laos which support courses contrary to commitment publicly undertaken by Royal Govt, difficulty justifying US mil intervention if reasonable peaceful solution forfeited, and hope Royal Govt will adopt truly realistic attitude and enter serious negotiations. Then conveyed paras 1-4 Deptel 1603 and first two paras of 1601.
At that point I hit hard on dangerous implications of Phoumi's May 11 date if it threw Souvanna out of picture. I said USG seeking to persuade RLG and Phoumi not take sharp, irrevocable act at that time. USG strongly hoped PriMin and ForMin would use their considerable influence and counsel with RLG good will mission shortly due Bangkok to win them over. Thanat translated this and whole presentation fully and correctly.
Thanat then stated that letter to King and oral statement to him seemed general and even vague regarding arrangements for political settlement and particularly safeguards against Commie takeover on Souvanna failure.
I then explained I wished to convey additional points to Sarit on instructions from highest level USG and read paras numbered one and two of Deptel 1601. As to para three of Deptel 1601, I made it separate item stressing its highly sensitive top secret nature, in view of Deptel 1607./5/ Repeating USG concern over May 11 date, said USG prepared to take action in sphere mil sanctions in Laos by end of first week of May if RLG not persuaded to change its course by then. Thanat asked if this meant withdrawal of mil support to RLG. I replied that sanctions were still unspecified, but USG would have to take some action along these lines if Phoumi by May 7 indicated he intended proceed despite our representations and Thai efforts. I added my govt was therefore most anxious that face-saving solution be found before any such sharp action by US would be required. I explained further that it seemed as if Phoumi was bent on irrevocable action which would shatter Laotian negotiations like glass and produce irrevocable consequences. While I stressed the sensitive nature of this deadline date for possible USG action, I am reasonably certain that this third point in Deptel 1601 will get back to Lao Govt either through direct Thai channels or when good will mission here this week. It made full impression on Sarit and Thanat who translated it accurately, colorfully and vigorously.
/5/In telegram 1607, April 20, the Department warned that military sanctions on the RLG "must be closely held" as premature disclosure to Laos or others would dissipate the effect and could endanger personnel. (Ibid.)
Reactions of Sarit and Thanat to above presentation as follows: (a) Sarit asked for text or summary of President's letter, oral statement, and my instructions, for him to use Wed. morning when Lao good will mission calls on him./6/ Thanat suggested wrap up in aide-memoire, which I will promptly prepare and send over to him and PriMin. Sarit remarked that, after hearing extensive US Govt comments, he would have more to say to Lao mission than they would to him; (b) both Sarit and Thanat hoped US Govt would understand RTG must see Lao mission as gesture of courtesy and protocol, although they have yet no specific indication from Laos as to what mission expects propose or receive. Sarit again stated officially for USG that RTG is in no position and does not intend to agree to meeting any requests from mission for assistance. Thai role will be limited to listening and persuading; (c) Sarit asked me to be sure my govt understood none of us should expect satisfactory rest from efforts at persuasion, his, or ours or others. In fact he seemed to indicate that this whole diplomatic effort to bring RLG around may well fail. According Sarit, Lao Govt appears to have gone "wild". They have even spoken of turning country into "absolute monarchy". Thanat relayed he had received written report which indicated an arrangement along such lines with three Royal Deputies, Boun Oum, Souvanna and Souphanouvong. Thanat added that Lao officials in very difficult, obstructive mood, and do not understand situation at all. They have "one-track mind", not using their heads. Sarit commented they are all "old fashioned" with no telephones or radios (sic) and do not know what is going on in outside world or their own country; (d) Sarit emphasized to me again his reports indicate King of Laos and Souvanna Phouma remain on very bad personal terms. This is one of major reasons why Souvanna coalition is so difficult to bring about quickly or perhaps at all. Thanat also stressed this "formidable" hurdle in our joint efforts; (e) Sarit vigorously subscribed to objective of getting outside military forces removed from Laos under Geneva Accords and internal settlement. However, he remains skeptical that Chinese Communists can be negotiated or persuaded out, particularly in light of their building roads and other installations in northeast Laos, where Communists have been for over ten years without any effective way found to dislodge them. He added comment, once foreign forces withdrew, Laos would be no threat to neighbors.
/6/Prince Boun Oum and Phoumi arrived in Thailand on Tuesday, April 24, seeking support for their position in Laos. The "good will mission" continued to Malaya, Taiwan, South Korea, and South Vietnam in search of support.
Sarit and Thanat listened carefully my presentation and discussed above matters in forthright and forthcoming way. Sarit did try to explain to me that he was avoiding newspaper questions on Laos as much as he possibly could. When he cannot he said he had to answer indirectly [garble] he hoped we understood.
Am spending Monday evening with Thanat and Wallop on details.
Young
334. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/
Vientiane, April 23, 1962, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-2362. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bangkok.
1444. Deptels 904,/2/ 905./3/
/2/Document 332.
/3/See footnote 3, Document 326.
I delivered President's letter to King at 1000 April 23. He did not read it in my presence. I therefore immediately made points contained Deptel 904, adding at end of point 3, the hope that nothing would be done which would have the effect of revoking Souvanna's mandate.
King nodded comprehension after each of the sentences contained in point 1. His expression indicated skepticism with respect to all but third sentence of point 2. He showed no particular reaction to points 3 and 4.
HM expressed appreciation for President's letter and message. He said he would study the letter carefully. He said he believed he fully understood President's position and would convey it to the Govt (who landed in LP about a half hour after I did). He would inform the Govt of the President's letter and urge them to consider it carefully, to be wise in their decisions and to act in a manner calculated to regain US help. He indicated that he had been anxious to get the President's letter before receiving the Govt.
HM said that he must always act as a constitutional monarch. Lao leaders on both sides were involved in a considerable amount of dishonesty. If he got into politics and supported either side he would be supporting dishonesty. The three Princes were working for themselves, each supported by a different foreign power, and were acting in a spirit of rivalry, not of patriotism. People in north could not accept Boun Oum and south would never accept Souvanna. Result of a continuation of this state of affairs would be a division of the country.
Solution of this problem would be a govt of national union. King favors this solution. So do most responsible Lao. Such a govt would probably be headed by Souvanna. That was why King had given Souvanna his mandate to try to form a responsible govt. Such a govt should be a govt of elite. Souvanna, however, had simply presented a list of names of non-entities who had followed him to Xieng Khouang and Boun Oum had done the same in his list. During discussions in Vientiane each side stuck to their hangers-on. Even if a govt were formed of people like that it would not work and the people would not support it. The King could not make such a govt work.
The tragedy of Laos was that it had so few competent people and these would not cooperate. Much US aid had been used for personal gain, although Laos had still benefitted greatly from it. The internal problems of Laos were largely due to the failure of the Lao themselves. If the three Princes persisted as they were doing, he saw no solution. Even the King might go, voluntarily or involuntarily.
I said a considerable body of opinion seemed to feel that a govt under the King was the solution and that he might be asked by the National Congress in May to form such a govt. He said, "We will see."
At another point in the conversation he said, "We will know much more after May 11." It was time for the Assembly to take some responsibility. He would put it up to them and see what they would do. My efforts to get King to explain these cryptic remarks further and to clarify his position on accepting full powers only elicited the statement, made with emotion, that if the National Assembly gave him full powers it would be an act of "great cowardice."
At one point the King said that he wished he could be the master of his own decisions.
King said that Chinese would never abandon their imperialism. They might talk peaceful coexistence but they would continue to support wars of "liberation." Hence Laos would always be under attack. Communist China would never believe in peaceful overtures of the US no matter how sincere they were.
HM said that if the RLG decided to abandon US support that would be their decision and their responsibility.
Comment: Throughout the interview, HM was extremely friendly and gave every indication that he fully understood the nature and firmness of the President's position.
I believe that HM will bring the President's letter to the attention of the RLG today. In view of his consistent sympathy for Phoumi's position, how far he will go in urging Phoumi to follow the President's advice I cannot predict, although HM seemed to indicate more than usual concern about the loss of US aid and the possible results of the impasse reached by the Princes. In any event, however, I fear that Phoumi and his colleagues have dug themselves so far into their position that the changes of their modifying it substantially remain slight. Although I gained the distinct impression that the King was trying to tell me without specifically saying so that he would not agree to heading a Royal Govt, I still felt that this possibility cannot be excluded if he were actually confronted by a concrete action by the National Congress. HM on this occasion seemed considerably and genuinely concerned about the possibility of partition.
Brown
335. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, April 25, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-2562. Secret. This memorandum and the enclosures were drafted by Bruns and cleared by Cross, Koren, and Rice.
SUBJECT
Laos
Enclosed are answers to the questions/2/ concerning Laos that Mr. Johnson telephoned to Mr. Rice, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.
/2/These questions, according to an additional attached memorandum of April 25, were put to Rice over the telephone on April 25 by Chuck Johnson of Bromley Smith's office in the White House and originated from the President in Palm Beach, Florida.
L.D. Battle/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Warren Slater of S/S signed for Battle.
[Enclosure 1]
QUESTIONS
1. Should the President and Macmillan/4/ mention Laos in their communique?
/4/Macmillan was on an informal visit to the United States, April 25-29. For his discussions with the President on Laos, see Document 336.
2. Referring to the AP column from Vientiane, no date line, entitled "US aid loss strikes Laos a bitter blow" and Alsop's Wednesday column: What effect is loss of aid having?
3. Alsop implies Meo capability a product of Royal Laotian Army policy over last year rather than a US guided operation. Please comment.
4. Referring to your first memo to Lao overseas funds/5/ which stem from our aid, how long has procedure been in effect whereby we deposit funds in NY banks and may transfer them abroad? What about the flow of gold?
/5/There is a more extensive memorandum from Battle to Bundy, April 24, which was pouched to Palm Beach, Florida, for the President. It explains the operations of cash grants to Laos and the nature and extent of Laos Government exchange reserves. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 4/23/62-4/30/62)
[Enclosure 2]
LAOS
1. We believe it would be desirable for the President and the Prime Minister to reaffirm the present policy in Laos. Such a statement would demonstrate clearly our unanimity of views and would be especially valuable in indicating our determination to continue on the path of peaceful settlement. The developments of the next few days would, of course, have a bearing on the actual language used.
2. The suspension of economic assistance--civilian and military budget support--has not yet had major economic repercussions in Laos because of the RLG's foreign exchange reserves and the emergency economic controls the government has instituted. There has been some dislocation--price rises and shortages--but it has not yet become serious. There is, however, a limit to how long the RLG can hold out. If the controls are effective, and if the RLG can reduce its requirements for foreign exchange, this limit might be 10-12 months. It is more reasonable to assume that there will be severe economic dislocation in another 4-6 months. This dislocation might be expressed within the RLG by political pressure for a change in Phoumi's policy of "going it alone".
3. Meo capability is not a result of Royal Lao Army (FAR) policy. The Meo guerrilla operation [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] receives the advice and assistance of MAAG/Laos. Meo guerrilla operations have been very carefully worked out [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and the success of the Meo is largely a result of American participation. Because the Meo are not dependent upon the FAR, Meo operations are not hampered by FAR logistic inefficiency and poor leadership and are much more responsive to our direction.
4. Ever since we began to provide economic assistance to the Lao Government in 1955 we have used the cash grant method, which involves the deposit of dollars in New York banks for the credit of the Lao Government. For some time the RLG kept all these dollar deposits in New York banks, but after New York bankers informed the Lao of the higher interest rates paid on deposits abroad, the RLG has from time to time transferred these funds abroad. More recently we had some evidence that the RLG might be transferring funds abroad to move them from United States control.
When we deposit the cash grant to the credit of the RLG this shows up as an expenditure in the balance of payments. When the dollars are transferred abroad, no change takes place in the United States balance of payments. So long as the Lao funds are maintained as dollar balances their transfer abroad does not in itself result in a gold outflow. An outflow of gold could occur if, after the expenditure of the Lao funds outside the United States or their conversion into a foreign currency, they cause an increase in the dollar holdings of a central bank which uses its holdings to buy gold from the United States.
336. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, April 28, 1962, 11 a.m.-12:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-2862. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Burdett and approved by the White House on May 4.
SUBJECT
Laos
PARTICIPANTS
US
The President
The Secretary of State
Under Secretary Ball
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. McGeorge Bundy, White House
Mr. Pierre Salinger, White House
Mr. William R. Tyler, Acting Assistant Secretary of State
Mr. William C. Burdett, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Mr. Joseph Sweeney, BNA
British
Prime Minister Macmillan
Sir Norman Brook, Secretary to the Cabinet
Ambassador Ormsby Gore
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, Deputy Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office
Mr. Harold Evans, Public Relations Adviser
Mr. M. A. M. Robb, Information Minister, British Embassy
Mr. Philip de Zulueta, Private Secretary to Prime Minister
The President expressed the opinion that we got something at Vienna on Laos. The Russians have stuck by Khrushchev's commitment, thus he thought there may be something in a bilateral meeting. The Secretary agreed adding that the Russians seemed to be bound on Laos to some extent by what Khrushchev had said. He reported that we had received a very slight note of optimism from the Thais, with respect to their good will mission to Laos./2/ The Laotians were taking a more responsible view and more serious negotiations were now possible./3/
/2/The reference is apparently in error and is to the Lao good will mission to Thailand. Brown reported that the RLG Acting Foreign Minister in Vientiane told him that the Lao mission had been well received in Bangkok. Sarit had advised Phoumi and Boun Oum to consider their relations with the United States very carefully and to take U.S. advice seriously. (Telegram 1462 from Vientiane, April 30; ibid., 751J.00/4-3062)
/3/In telegram 1461, also April 30, Brown reported that he had a "quiet and rational" conversation with Phoumi in which it was evident that Phoumi was concerned about the deterioration in his relations with the United States and hoping to improve them. Phoumi was planning to get in touch with Souvanna in Paris and for the first time, according to Brown, thinking in terms of how the problem of the Defense and Interior Ministries might be resolved to protect his legitimate interests without insisting that the RLG should be given the posts in the cabinet. (Ibid.)
The President mentioned that he had said to Ambassador Ormsby Gore last night that our policy on Laos had just about run out. By the time we convinced Phoumi, Souvanna's power will have run out. But, we should continue along this road. We had decided to wait until May 7 to see if the Thais could do something. If nothing were done by May 7 we might give a public warning that we would not necessarily intervene. We were also considering withdrawing our forward military advisers. To cut our military aid would be too drastic and could cause the collapse of the government. He asked the Prime Minister if he was optimistic. The Prime Minister replied negatively, except for the fact that the Russians were not keen on working things up. They might not be the beneficiaries. He was sure our policy was right. The President said the only other alternative is partition.
Ambassador Ormsby Gore remarked that Malcolm MacDonald was going to see the King who was an old friend. He might be helpful. The President asked why the King hated Souvanna and if Souvanna was going to the U.K. The Prime Minister replied that Souvanna was not going to the U.K. Ambassador Ormsby Gore suggested that Souvanna was embarrassed by contacts with the West. The Secretary recalled that we had asked him to visit Washington but Souvanna was not interested. The Secretary added that we understood Kong Lee was going to visit Paris. We planned to establish contact with him and to work on him. He had been having trouble with the Pathet Lao.
The President noted that Governor Harriman had asked him to say how helpful the British Ambassador in Laos had been.
The President asked whether we should mention Laos in the communique./4/ Mr. Bundy commented that this turns on the type of communique we wish. If we mention Laos there are other problems that should be included. There was some reluctance to say something on each problem in the world.
/4/The communique, April 29, contains a statement that the President and Prime Minister discussed the situation in Southeast Asia, and "strongly reaffirmed their support for an independent and neutral Laos under a government committed to that objective." Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 631-632.
The Secretary expressed our appreciation for the job Mr. Thompson was doing in South Vietnam.
337. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State/1/
Bangkok, May 1, 1962, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-162. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated niact to Paris and Vientiane, priority to London, and to Geneva Fecon.
1691. PriMin has given me following report on agreement reached with RLG which he asked me convey quickly to President. Sarit is convinced he has gotten firm assurances from Boun Oum and Phoumi to go along with President's position outlined in aide-memoire I submitted to Sarit./2/
/2/See Document 333.
Following is gist Sarit-Phoumi understanding and Sarit's commentary:
(1) Phoumi and Boun Oum agreed to work on tripartite formula among RLG, US and Souvanna Phouma along these lines: (a) RLG accepts Souvanna Phouma as PriMin govt national union; (b) RLG and Souvanna accept troika principle for Defense and Interior Ministries but only for these Ministries; (c) Souvanna accepts cabinet divided among 4 elements of 4 each and gives assurances against letting PL-VM take over Laos; (d) if prior agreement reached with Souvanna and Americans, RLG and King will undertake have National Assembly vote full powers to King who as face-saver will then reaffirm mandate to Souvanna Phouma to form national union govt on this basis. Phoumi promised Sarit that May 10 Assembly meeting would not do anything drastic and would be formality. Sarit and Thanat are concerned over how to guarantee King in (fact) does reaffirm mandate, and believe US should cover this; (e) USG assigns US representative first to work out this formula with RLG particularly re mandate for Souvanna and then be present or available while talks are conducted with Souvanna Phouma before or after May 11. Phoumi also wants us to help persuade Souvanna Phouma return immediately to Vientiane after above has been conveyed to him by American side and also by RLG.
(2) Sarit and Thanat propose following to USG in order fulfill above Sarit-Phoumi pledge: (a) Time is of essence and right actions must be taken immediately; (b) Sarit hopes US will agree to send representative (possibly Sullivan) to Vientiane immediately and also take matter up simultaneously with Souvanna in Paris as soon as possible. Sarit hopes Souvanna and US representative would arrive in Vientiane at approximately same time before May 11. If this were to work out, Phoumi says he will cut short his foreign visits and return to Vientiane. Or US rep could meet him in Saigon. Precautions must be taken with Souvanna to keep him from making statements which would upset applecart; (c) Agreement with Phoumi is very sensitive and closely held. It must be treated with greatest caution by all of us to avoid any possible leak or reference to it publicly in this delicate interim period until it is underway; (d) Sarit recommends that USG resume financial payments as soon as possible after agreement between RLG and Souvanna Phouma firm. This would be principal face-saver for RLG after USG can be assured they make good for their part; (e) USG can accept Sarit's own assurance Phoumi and Boun Oum accept Sarit's advice that they would not defy USG and go it alone and should get back on good terms with Americans; (f) Sarit believes RLG has valid concern over whether or not Souvanna Phouma as PriMin would be able or willing enough to prevent Communists from taking over country. Phoumi wants and is entitled to satisfactory assurances from Souvanna. Therefore, Sarit recommends USG assurances to RLG and specifically to Gen. Phoumi be made part of general understanding as safeguard for contingency Souvanna cannot or does not live up to his bargain. US assurance would be promised on Gen. Phoumi carrying out pledge by RLG to Sarit and Americans. Sarit said he had to bear down with our oral and written assurances about Gen. Phoumi's role in order convince him make "concessions".
(3) As to circumstances and atmosphere of these Bangkok talks, Sarit said they were long, difficult but satisfactory in conclusion. He finally saw Phoumi alone with only Gen. Wallop present and obtained personal pledge from Phoumi which in customary Southeast Asian manner Sarit considers unbreakable. He assured me of this several times. But he had to use much persuasion, pressure and even threats of a vague kind to get this pledge. He based his case point by point lay down of our aide-memoire which was timely and helpful. Phoumi and RLG mission now see Lao problem much better. As in Thai proverb, they came like frogs thinking their little pond was big sea; now they return knowing whole ocean.
In initial three hour session Sarit's pressure for political compromise with Souvanna came as great shock to RLG mission. They returned speechless to guest house and could not eat lunch. Phoumi wept. It took additional sessions and much pressure to bring them around but only Boun Oum and Phoumi are in on final agreement with Sarit. While other members of RLG Cabinet may know now, Sarit emphasized initial secretness of understandings. Americans must realize much more than they have that Phoumi needs face-saving not only in public but with most of RLG. Sarit claims that it is other ministers who are pressing Phoumi not to agree with Americans or deal with Souvanna Phouma. Phoumi is afraid of appearing to them as surrendering to Thais and to Americans, and considers Americans hold him solely responsible for intransigence which he considers untrue and unjust. Sarit agreed with him.
As to Thai aid, Sarit said he had to concede a little help as part of his effort to bring them around successfully. They asked for free gifts of rice, sugar and salt, and credits for cement, [garble] and construction materials. Sarit said he could provide a little of some but nothing of others. If American financial aid restored, this matter would be disposed of. Then Thanat asked me point-blank if I thought USG would agree to above formula and restore aid. I replied that I could not answer with certainty but that there might be a chance if this all worked out in good faith. Thanat said it was very important for PriMin to know as soon as possible USG's reaction to this tentative agreement as well as to possibility of restoring its aid under acceptable conditions. He emphasized that his tentative agreement depended on all three parts working out in mutuality and good timing. As Thanat put it, this is all "a big troika around a little troika."
Comment: I believe Sarit's report is honest and complete. It checks in general with what Sisouk and Wallop have told me separately and privately during past few days as well as with other indications here in Bangkok. However in the case of some points it is not clear whether it is Sarit or Phoumi who is proposer.
I recommend that we respond affirmatively and quickly but define carefully with Sarit and Phoumi what is meant by assurances in (f) above. Sarit has in mind US political and military support for Phoumi group if coalition fails. Also under what circumstances we would restore financial aid. I strongly recommend that President send personal message of appreciation to PriMin and ForMin for time, care and persistence which they have shown in developing this tentative agreement./3/
/3/See footnote 2, Document 340.
Young
338. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, May 2, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, M.V. Forrestal, 1/62-5/62. Secret.
Briefing on Laos and Vietnam/2/
/2/This off-the-record briefing was from 11:35 a.m. to 12:19 p.m. According to the President's appointment book, Desmond FitzGerald, Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, and Forrestal also attended. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) No other record of this briefing has been found.
At your briefing this morning on the above subject, State Department will be represented by Under Secretary Ball, Governor Harriman and Mr. Hilsman; Defense by Deputy Secretary Gilpatric and General Lansdale. Mr. McCone will also attend.
Laos
The cable traffic yesterday indicates that General Phoumi is shifting his position. Governor Harriman believes that this is largely due to the cumulative effects of the suspension of financial aid and the recent decision to impose a mild military sanction. This last decision was undoubtedly conveyed by Sarit to the RLG. I attach a cable from Young in Bangkok (Bangkok 1691)/2/ reporting the results of Sarit's talks with Phoumi and the RLG Mission.
/2/Document 337.
Averell takes the view that:
(1) We must not restore our financial aid until a coalition government is formed (although we would not impose the mild military sanctions so long as Phoumi appears to be cooperating); and
(2) We must realize that, in the light of our past experience with him, Phoumi can be expected to throw a monkey wrench into the negotiations at any stage if we are not alert.
On the question of the "assurances" from the United States referred to in Young's cable, Averell feels we must not write any blank checks and should reserve any assurances of assistance to the new government, as distinguished from Phoumi personally.
[Here follows a briefing on Vietnam, printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume II, pages 369-370.
339. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, May 3, 1962, 6:04-6:10 p.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, M.V. Forrestal, 1/62-5/62. Secret. Drafted by Forrestal. The time of the meeting is taken from the President's Appointment Book. (Ibid.)
Notes of MVF Conversation with the President, May 3, 1962
I took up Bangkok 1701/2/ with the President this afternoon. He commented as follows:
/2/In telegram 1701, May 3, Young reported a conversation which he had sought with Thanat to clarify his discussion with Sarit as reported in Document 337. Thanat stated that the RLG were seeking the following assurances before proceeding with serious negotiations on a coalition government: (a) that Souvanna agree to the Troika principle for Defense and Interior; (b) that there be a fair distribution of other portfolios on a 4-4-4-4 basis; (c) that the United States resume economic aid to Laos; and (d) that, if the coalition was endangered by Communist pressure, the United States would step in. Thanat added that Thailand also required the understanding as outlined in "d." (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-362)
(1) This is very discouraging in the light of Bangkok 1691. /3/
/3/Document 337.
(2) It is quite impossible for the United States to give the assurances referred to in (d). The main reason we gave the commitment to the Thais last month was to gain their help in connection with Laos,/4/ and they must not try to parlay this commitment to intervene in Laos.
/4/The President is referring to the Thanat-Rusk communique, March 6, 1962, issued at Washington and printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1091-1093. Documentation on the negotiations leading up to this agreement is in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XXIII.
(3) We should stress that every week that goes by makes the solution more difficult of achievement, since Souvanna gets weaker.
(4) We cannot consider financial assistance until there is real progress towards a coalition government.
(5) While we cannot give military assistance, we can give vigorous diplomatic and economic support to a non-Communist coalition government.
The President was quite perturbed about the last 4 paragraphs of Bangkok 1701./5/ I told him I did not think it should be taken literally, it being a characteristic of Thanat.
/5/In the last four paragraphs of telegram 1701 from Bangkok, Thanat informed Young that Thailand would probably not sign the Geneva Agreements on Laos. When asked which provisions bothered Thailand, Thanat stated that there were many, and Thailand had just gone along with the conference in order not to obstruct it. Pressed further by Young, Thanat stated that the provisions for removal of foreign troops was the worse problem. He hoped that the United States "had no illusions" about getting the Viet Minh out of Laos.
I pointed out that the President would not be in tomorrow or over the week end and asked whether he would permit me to clear the subsequent cables on this subject./6/ He said he would.
/6/See Document 340.
The President stated he would like the sentence concerning "meaningful assurances" be eliminated from the draft telegrams. My impression is that a re-write of the sentence spelling out what is meant would meet the President's objections.
340. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, May 3, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 5/1/62-5/9/62. No classification marking.
The attached draft/2/ cable answers all of the points raised in Ambassador Young's first cable (Bangkok 1691)/3/ with the exception of any indication of when or under what circumstances we would restore financial assistance to the RLG. On the basis of his past experience, Averell is inclined to be a little skeptical about the arrangements between the Thais and Phoumi. While wanting to encourage the Thais to continue, he does not want to remove all pressures on them or on Phoumi at this stage.
/2/Attached was a draft telegram sent as 1687 to Bangkok, May 3, which authorized Young to express the President's appreciation for Sarit's efforts. Young was to inform Sarit that the assurances which Phoumi requested of Souvanna should be part of the negotiations rather than preconditions for giving up his claim to Defense and Interior. Assurances for FAR during the integration period and arrangements for elections were legitimate subjects for hard bargaining, and Phoumi should make concrete proposals to Souvanna on them. The cable stated that the United States was unclear what the Thais had in mind concerning U.S. assurances to Phoumi and could do little more to assure him. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-162)
/3/Document 337.
His feelings are reinforced by the British (London's 4029)/4/ and today's cable from Young (Bangkok 1701)/5/ which suggests that the Thai arrangement is not yet acceptable to us.
/4/In telegram 4029, May 2, the Embassy in London reported that the British Foreign Office viewed Phoumi's current moves as encouraging, but did not rule out that they were merely a ploy rather than serious willingness to resume negotiations. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-262)
/5/See footnote 2, Document 339.
Another message is being drafted in reply to Young's second cable, which will discuss our position on military and financial pressures./6/
/6/In telegram 1700 to Bangkok, May 4, the Department expressed disappointment with Thanat's attitude. Until the United States saw the "color of Phoumi's good faith" in his negotiations for a coalition, it was too early to discuss resumption of financial support for the RLG. Thanat's condition that the United States provide assurance in case of the failure of the Souvanna coalition was "obviously impossible." While the United States was prepared to give vigorous diplomatic and economic support, it could not give a "blank check on military intervention in Laos." On military sanctions against Phoumi, the United States was prepared, in view of Phoumi's minimally more cooperative attitude, to hold them in abeyance, but it should be made clear that they could be revived. Thanat's remarks about signing the Geneva agreements were "incomprehensible," but should not be pursued at present. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-362)
Both Mac and I feel that you may wish to advise the Thais that we will resume financial assistance to the RLG, even before the formation of a coalition government, but only when we are satisfied that Phoumi is negotiating seriously toward a reasonable settlement.
M.V.F./7/
/7/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
341. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/
Vientiane, May 3, 1962, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-362. Secret; [distribution indicator not declassified].
1478. Secretary Harriman from Ambassador. Reference: Department telegram 935./2/
/2/In telegram 935, personal for Brown from Harriman, May 2, Harriman asked about the status of the [text not declassified] Phoumi relationship. Did [text not declassified] mention that he would return to Vientiane and had Colonel Wood, Phoumi's military liaison at the Ministry of Defense, also been replaced? Harriman expressed concern that two reliable journalists just returned from Laos had told him that it was "still common gossip" in Vientiane that the military and the CIA were not in sympathy with U.S. policy and that Phoumi was convinced that the United States would eventually come to his assistance. If there was still a problem in Vientiane, Harriman suggested to Brown that he replace any individuals who gave credence to these rumors. Harriman promised to support Brown and stated that the replacement would be done without damage to the individual's career. (Ibid., 751J.00/4-1662)
Nothing specific was said to Phoumi about [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] return. Matter was left entirely indefinite.
Colonel Wood replaced by Colonel McKenzie who heads normal liaison office with small staff in MinDefense near Phoumi's office. McKenzie deals primarily with Phoumi's Chef de Cabinet, but has direct access to Phoumi at any time Chief MAAG wishes take up business with Phoumi and is from time to time called in by Phoumi when he wants to see Chief MAAG. There is no personal relationship between McKenzie and Phoumi such as existed between latter and Wood. Interviews are always on specific business. McKenzie acts as Chief MAAG's interpreter in dealings with Phoumi and is fully familiar with US policy.
Rumors about covert CIA support for RLG are again emerging in Vientiane. Because of past history, this is rumor which will die very hard and which we must expect to encounter again from time to time. It only needs one remark in the right place to bring it back to life. I would not be at all surprised if some people in the government were definitely promoting this belief. I have been told that Minister Finance Phouangphet told an Asian journalist that there was no need to worry about suspension of US aid [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Phoumi has repeatedly told Cabinet US would not abandon him.
I do not think that the belief of divided US counsels or covert US support contrary to policy is being promoted either by action or word by any of our personnel.
Before receiving your telegram, I had alerted all country teams to the recrudescence of these rumors and instructed them to keep alert to avoid any possible US behavior which could give the slightest credence to them and to any evidence of attempted sabotage by Phoumi of current negotiations.
I have no doubt that our team is fully attuned to our objectives and (aside from the fact that such rumors will be likely as long as any CAS or significant number of MAAG personnel remain in Laos) do not think that presence of any individuals lends credence to the existence of divided counsels. There is no longer anyone here on any of our staffs who has the type of historical and personal involvement with Phoumi and Savannakhet that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and Wood had. I therefore do not believe that there are grounds for change in personnel. You may be sure however that I am alert to this problem and prepared to act promptly along lines you suggest should it prove necessary.
As for Phoumi, whereas I believe that he is doing everything he can to inspire the belief that the US has not totally abandoned him, and I still have my fingers crossed about his present gesture towards Souvanna, neither I nor General Boyle see evidence that he is acting in other than a defensive manner in the military field. As far as we can judge, the initiative for such activity which is taking place is coming from the other side. FAR for example today reports loss of Muong Sing which was very lightly held by FAR and where there had been no FAR offensive action.
Brown
342. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative's Naval Aide (Bagley) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/
Washington, May 4, 1962.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Laos 7, T-028-69. Secret. Taylor's initials appear on the source text.
SUBJECT
Laos Summary
1. Ambassador Young and Foreign Minister Thanat have conversed in Bangkok/2/ as a follow-up to the Phoumi-Sarit talks./3/ Thanat confirmed the list of assurances Phoumi is seeking (Def/Int Troika; fair distribution of other portfolios; resume US economic aid; US guarantee against Commie pressures) but broadened the question of a US guarantee. The Thais desire that assurance of US action in case a coalition government is endangered by Communist pressure be a matter of clear understanding between the United States and Thailand as well as Laos. Thanat in general was in ill humor and suggested that if the Geneva agreements were finally approved there was some question whether Thailand would sign the Accords.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 339.
/3/See Document 337.
2. Ambassador Young asked that he be advised as to the Washington reaction to the Phoumi-Sarit agreement and Thanat talk for use in a forthcoming meeting with Sarit. A reply has been prepared and will probably be transmitted late today./4/ It indicates: (1) the US has no intention of giving a firm military guarantee, but reiterates the oft-repeated intention to give a coalition government as much support as possible, (2) Thanat's remarks on the Geneva Accords border on the absurd and Ambassador Young is not to discuss this subject with the Thais for the time being, and (3) resumption of economic aid will depend on Phoumi's acting on his professed desire to talk with Souvanna on a new basis.
/4/ See footnote 6, Document 340.
3. State is taking action in Paris to urge Souvanna to make a positive reply to the Phoumi proposal which, I assume, would include returning to Vientiane./5/ Souvanna so far has merely indicated that his representatives in Vientiane, who in his and Kong Le's absence are all PL, will consider the Phoumi proposals and send recommendations to Souvanna. Souvanna is now complaining of a new ailment, aching teeth, which in conjunction with the June marriage of his daughter probably means he will be very reluctant to depart from the pleasures of France.
/5/In telegrams 5129, 5138, and 5179 from Paris, May 1, 2, and 4, Charge Cecil B. Lyon reported that as instructed he had meetings with Souvanna on the morning of May 1 and the evening of May 3. In addition, Lyon had passed a message to the Lao Charge in Paris for Souvanna stating that Phoumi desired to renew consultations on a coalition and was prepared to abandon the RLG claim to Defense and Interior, given certain assurances. Lyon or Anthony C. Swezey, a long-time friend of Souvanna, were prepared to act as an intermediary between Phoumi and Souvanna. In the second conversation, Lyon encouraged Souvanna to meet directly with Phoumi and not act through his colleagues in Khang Khay. Lyon thought that Souvanna was definitely interested in an exchange of views with Phoumi. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-162, 751J.00/5-262, and 751J.00/5-462)
4. State has sent a telegram to Moscow for Gromyko, in Secretary Rusk's name, saying our pressures on Phoumi are progressing satisfactorily, but suggesting we are less than satisfied with PL activities around Nam Tha and Muong Sing./6/ This is the first time State has felt able to put some of the negotiating pressure, with a straight face, on the Soviets.
/6/Rusk (who was on an extended foreign trip) initiated the idea of a personal message to Gromyko in Secto 16 from Athens, May 3. (Ibid., 751J.00/5-362) The message, which was approved by Rusk, informed Gromyko that the United States, supported by the British, French, and Thais, had pressed Phoumi very strongly to join in responsible discussions on a coalition government under Souvanna. The United States was now encouraged to think that more realistic negotiations were likely to resume. The recent military moves by the Pathet Lao in Nam Tha and Muong Sing could endanger progress. Rusk hoped Gromyko would use his influence with Souphanouvong to prevent aggressive action by the Pathet Lao. (Telegram 89 to Athens, May 3, and Secto 72 from Athens, May 6; ibid., 751J.00/5-362 and 751J.00/5-662)
5. Unless and until these related actions in Bangkok, Vientiane, Paris and Moscow bring Souvanna and Phoumi together, things will drag on as they have in the past. Military sanctions involving White Star teams will be held in abeyance until Phoumi proves his sincerity, and will be used as a continuing means to keep the Thais active in our behalf.
WHB
343. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Among the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), Acting Secretary of State Ball, and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)/1/
Washington, May 6, 1962, 10:15 a.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Laos. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the source text.
Ball told Bundy there was an artillery barrage on Nam Tha early this morning and an infantry attack which has come into the town. There were two of a special force training team of 12 officers and men who were in Nam Tha but were taken out by helicopter. They don't think there are any other Americans in there. The boys have their track shoes on and they are moving southwest./2/
/2/Reference is to the initial stages of a Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese attack on RLG forces in Nam Tha.
Johnson said there has been nothing so far as he has seen in the last week or so that would stimulate this. It is his impression that there has been less than the usual picking at each other and this comes on the heels of Phoumi's move to Souvanna. This move he has taken at the moment is of course very bothersome. This is the first clear open breach of the cease-fire. There is no arguing about that. Phoumi has been reinforcing Nam Tha against our advice. But this is no excuse for their attacking. It was foolish on his part.
Bundy asked if there was much more than these first two reports./3/ Johnson said there was something coming in to the War Room from the MAAG. They haven't got it all yet but we should have it shortly. We should have more in the way of details in the next thirty minutes or so. Bundy said they had sent the earlier despatches down to Palm Beach but he has not heard from the President. Bundy asked if Ball was thinking of calling him--or shouldn't they wait until we know more. Ball said he was reluctant to call until we know more about it. We are getting a message for the Secretary to send on to Gromyko. Johnson said MacDonald was still out there. We could get MacDonald up to Chieng Khong (?) and ask him to work on Souphanouvong. We also need to do something with Souvanna Phouma in Paris. Bundy agreed. He does not see much more that we can do at this stage. If they pursue it, then we will have to "open the whole can of worms."
/3/Reference is to advance reports on the fighting, one of which was probably CHMAAG telegram ML 9953, sent to CINCPAC at 7:56 p.m., May 6, Vientiane time (there is a 12-hour time difference between Vientiane and Washington), and probably received in advance form in Washington on the morning of May 6. In the Department of State copy, which was repeated from the Army and not received until 5:09 a.m. on May 7, the Chief of MAAG reported that the senior U.S. Army MAAG adviser was present during the attack and did not leave until the fall of the town was imminent. He believed that FAR troops gave a better account of themselves than during any previous engagements in the face of a Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese attack, which was well-planned, fully-coordinated, and skillfully executed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-762)
Ball said he was trying to reach Averell now. Averell has nothing more than what we have in mind now. He does not think it is necessary to bother the boss with it. Bundy said he would be in his office on business in the morning.
Ball suggested they wait until after the next piece of information comes in in order to have a clearer picture and Bundy could call Ball from the country. Bundy suggested that Ball call the President at that time and before he gets on his boat, which he will probably do after church. Call him so that he has the word before he goes boating in case something comes through.
344. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and Acting Secretary of State Ball/1/
Washington, May 6, 1962, 10:45 a.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Laos. No classification marking. Transcribed in Ball's office.
Ball called the President to bring him up to date on the Laotian situation. He said to this point we have not received anything further on the Nam Tha attack. We are getting a message to the Secretary asking him to send a strong telegram to Gromyko through Thompson, and we are also having the Britisher, MacDonald, out there see if he can't get in touch with Souphanouvong and then in Paris we are having a contact made with Souvanna Phouma to inform him of the situation and see if he won't move into it. The President asked that we say we have really been working them pretty hard with some hope. Now this doesn't help./2/
/2/These steps were suggested to Rusk, who was in Greece, in Tosec 97 to Athens, May 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-662)
Ball told the President Averell's interpretation of it, and Ball thought there was a good deal to support it, was that this is a kind of counterproductive effort on the Communist side to give us a warning that Phoumi had better move and probably an effort to put pressure on Phoumi himself, although it certainly is going to make it much more difficult for us to take the very measures which are necessary to mount that kind of pressure. The President said it would be interesting to know whether there was any fighting. That gets to be very much of a gut issue in this thing. Ball told him the telegram would indicate that the boys put their track shoes on pretty promptly.
The President said he had noticed some Americans were evacuated. He asked if they could be interviewed right away, for if they did not get to fighting that's one thing. If they didn't do anything but go out of there casually, then the same old problem is you didn't fight. You have to get that out because there will be a lot of people yelling for us to do one thing or another. Ball said we would get on that.
The President mentioned this morning's New York Times article about the 200 Chinese involved in it--that it was reported from American sources. He asked if this was a correct story. Ball said he would get on it./3/ Ball asked if the President was coming back this afternoon and the President replied he was.
/3/Ball telephoned Harriman at 11:15 a.m. to inform him of the President's questions: had there been any real fighting and were the "Communists" [Chinese?] involved in the Muong Sing attack near the Chinese border? Harriman stated that there were few Americans in the area, only a handful of defenders [in Muong Sing?] and "anybody could have gone in and taken it." (Memorandum of telephone conversation between Ball and Harriman, May 6, 11:15 a.m.; Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Laos)
345. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Acting Secretary of State Ball and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, May 6, 1962, 11:20 a.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Laos. No classification marking. Transcribed in Ball's office.
Bundy told Ball that he had talked to the President/2/ after Ball's call to him. He is very concerned about the public aspect of this thing and picked off a half-dozen points which Bundy has talked to Forrestal about. Forrestal will be working with some of State's people if that is all right with Ball. Ball said that was fine.
/2/See Document 344.
Bundy said he did not think we wanted to get too high level in our comments on this--in the sense of calling the Times and telling them what we think. It is much better that all are briefed along the same line and feed it out as it comes in. Ball agreed.
Bundy said he thought it was important to have an image of our view of it along the lines of what the President has now passed on to Forrestal. In Bangkok and Saigon there will be temptation to say Phoumi was right, the fact that these fellows did fight, and the fact that we have been warning them against the fact that Pno Tie [Nam Tha] is not the area in which you make war. Ball said we had a telegram off to find out if this was the case. The Times this morning characterizes it as a possible Dien Bien Phu. Bundy said this is the kind of sheer nonsense that someone ought to get educated about.
Ball said in a sense it was the Dien Bien Phu when the military commander does not commit his forces up there. Bundy said if it was the Dien Bien Phu the magnitude was all wrong and Ball agreed.
Bundy said he thought it had to be put in perspective that this is a town of 500 which has been infested right away. Phoumi was warned that if he attacked he would get a bloody nose and he has. This does not mean that we want to sound as if we were cheering the PL along. Bundy said he had not read the Times account.
Ball said the story focused on the taking of Mun [Muong] Sing, a little town of 200 up near the border. This was a threat to Nam Tha and the most interesting thing in the Times article was the indication that there were 200 Chinese involved in it and that it was reported from American sources. Ball spoke to Harriman who says there were not more than 10 Americans anywhere around there. It is pretty hard to find the facts. That is one of the difficulties, and whether an American would know a Chinese from a Vietnamese is a little hard to tell.
Bundy said he would be available later this afternoon.
346. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, May 8, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 5/1/62-5/9/62. Top Secret. Drafted by Forrestal. The President's appointment book has an entry for a meeting from 5:10 to 6:12 p.m., which includes the participants mentioned by Forrestal, but also includes David Bell, Jerome Wiesner, Glenn Seaborg, Gerald Johnson, Carl Kaysen, Charles Johnson, Harold Brown, and R.E. Hollingsworth. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book)
SUBJECT
Meeting with the President on the Situation in Laos
Present at the meeting were the President, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric, General Maxwell D. Taylor, General George H. Decker, Messrs. Bundy and Forrestal.
The President made the following points:
1. A demarche should be made to Ambassador Dobrynin by Secretary Ball or Secretary Harriman for the purpose of conveying to the Soviet Government the information which we have on the situation in Laos./2/ We should express to Dobrynin our deep concern over the situation, particularly in light of the information suggesting that Souvanna has not been consulted and that there is no evidence that the Souvanna-Kong Le forces were involved in the hostilities in the northwest.
/2/The Ball-Harriman demarche has not been found.
2. The President will need a memorandum for his press conference tomorrow morning. (The memorandum must be available for the 11:00 a.m. press briefing in the morning.)/3/ The President speculated on what line he should take and suggested a statement that we have been advising Phoumi all along that, in the light of the adverse military situation, the longer he delayed negotiations for a coalition government, the more dangerous the situation would become. What has happened is proof of this. The President also observed that he might indicate that if the situation in Laos developed into an obvious take-over, we would have to reconsider our military posture in the area.
/3/The memorandum has not been found, but for text of the reply made by the President at his press conference on May 9, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 1070. The President stressed that the longer the negotiations for a coalition continued, the more likelihood there would be incidents like Nam Tha. But in the case of this attack, the President stated, it was a clear breach of the cease-fire. The President expressed hope that the cease-fire could be reestablished and political negotiations resumed.
3. The President wanted to be certain that Ambassador Brown had clear instructions to reiterate to Phoumi that what had happened at Nam Tha was exactly what we had told him to expect as a result of his intransigence in the negotiations./4/
/4/Brown received instructions in telegram 978 to Vientiane, May 9, "to hammer on the theme that lesson of Nam Tha is that political solution Phoumi's only salvation." (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-962) Brown reported in telegram 1530 from Vientiane, May 10, that in a call on Phoumi he had stated, inter alia, that the "experience at Nam Tha indicated vividly importance of a speedy political situation in which the force of international agreement could be brought to bear to get Vietminh out of the country." Phoumi nodded. (Ibid., 751J.00/5-1062)
4. The President wanted to be sure that our military people in the area took the same line as in (3) above.
5. The President agreed that it was important to improve our sources of information on what was happening in North Laos. Native personnel should be used if possible; but, if necessary, Americans might have to be placed with the retreating FAR forces.
347. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative's Naval Aide (Bagley) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/
Washington, May 8, 1962.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Laos # 2, 7, T-265-69. Secret. Taylor's initials appear on the source text.
SUBJECT
Summaries of action being taken re Laos
1. That which follows summarizes actions being taken on our side as a result of the loss of Nam Tha.
2. Diplomatic
a. British Ambassador Roberts in Moscow had a 20 minute talk with Gromyko at 0400 hours our time today. He had been instructed to protest the breach of the cease fire, to urge withdrawal of the Pathet Lao from Nam Tha, and to seek Soviet co-operation in obtaining an ICC investigation. The results of his talk have not yet been received in Washington.
b. Ambassador Thompson was instructed by Secretary Rusk yesterday to make a similar approach on behalf of the US. There is no indication as yet that he has seen Gromyko./2/
/2/In telegram 2883 from Moscow, May 8, Thompson reported on his meeting with Gromyko that afternoon in Moscow. Gromyko claimed that the events at Nam Tha were the result of a popular uprising in response to political and military provocations by the Boun Oum-Phoumi group. Gromyko then complained that despite assurances from Rusk, the United States had not brought pressure on Phoumi who was allowed to do what he wanted. Thompson pointed out that Americans were in Nam Tha and it was no internal uprising. Thompson suggested that the Pathet Lao used the attack to prevent an understanding between Souvanna and Phoumi which was in the initial stages. Gromyko reiterated the Soviet Union's desire for a neutral Laos, but it must be based on deeds, not words. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-862)
c. Mr. MacDonald, British representative at the Geneva conference, is in Vientiane on a personal fact finding trip. Subject to the Soviet reply to the British, he will be asked to proceed to Khang Khay on behalf of the Geneva Co-Chairmen (USSR and UK), to seek a halt to hostilities and an ICC investigation.
d. On the basis of an appointment made about a week ago, British Ambassador Addis in Vientiane, in company with the Indian member of the ICC Laos, will visit with Souphonouvong tomorrow and will make representations to halt the fighting, calling particular attention to Souphonouvong's past promises not to violate the cease fire unless provoked.
e. There is information which indicates Souvanna is informing Souphonouvong that the action at Muong Sing and Nam Tha was a mistake and that Communist forces should be withdrawn.
f. Ambassador Brown has been instructed to deliver to Sisouk (Acting RLG PriMin) Souvanna's reply to the RLG proposals on a new approach to negotiations./3/ At the same time, Ambassador Brown will emphasize our efforts to get the ICC to re-establish a cease fire, omitting reference to our representations to the Soviets for immediate evacuation of Nam Tha. This is intended to steer the RLG away from making evacuation of Nam Tha a condition to resumption of negotiations.
/3/In telegram 964 to Vientiane, May 7. (Ibid., 751J.00/5-762) Brown reported in telegram 1515 from Vientiane, May 8, that he had delivered Souvanna's reply to Sisouk who considered it the "same old proposal and did not meet the RLG's desire for tripartite decisions and maintaining forces pending agreement on integration." Sisouk stated he would discuss it with Phoumi and promised a reply in a day or two. (Ibid., 751J.00/5-862)
3. Military
No information.
4. Other Actions under Consideration
a. State has suggested to the French that Kong Le be invited to visit Paris following his current tour of the bloc countries. I suggested to Mr. Forrestal that in view of the fact Kong Le troops were not included in the recent offensive that this might be a proper time to offer him a carrot. I got the impression that such a move was under consideration.
b. The possibility of urging Souvanna to return to Khang Khay is being discussed. I have the impression this is not an active matter, but believe Mr. Forrestal intends to go over the possibility in detail with Mr. Harriman on his return to Washington at 2130 tonight.
WHB
348. Editorial Note
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, in Bangkok for discussions with Thai leaders, was scheduled to depart at 2 p.m. on May 9, but General Phoumi requested that he delay his departure so that they could have a brief meeting at the airport. Phoumi was scheduled to arrive at Bangkok from his good will mission to Kuala Lumpur at 3 p.m., May 9. McNamara was not inclined to delay his departure for Saigon, unless the Department of State advised him to do so. The Department suggested that McNamara make sure that he left Bangkok before Phoumi arrived in order to avoid a chance meeting. Ambassador Young remained at the airport to inform Phoumi that McNamara's schedule could not be changed at the last minute. Phoumi seemed genuinely upset and disappointed, according to Young. (Telegrams 1724 from Bangkok, 1714 to Bangkok, both May 8, and 1732 from Bangkok, May 9; Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-McN/5-862 and 033.1100-McN/5-962) Documentation on McNamara's trip to Thailand is in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XXIII.
349. Memorandum for the Files/1/
Washington, May 9, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 5/1/62-5/9/62. Secret. Prepared by Forrestal on May 9.
SUBJECT
Luncheon Conversation between the Attorney General and Ambassador Dobrynin on May 9, 1962
The Attorney General lunched today with Ambassador Dobrynin, who had the following comments to make on the situation in Laos:
1. It is unfortunate that the United States has taken so long to move the RLG to negotiations on a coalition government.
2. Nam Tha is an understandable event in the light of Phoumi's recently sending additional battalions there.
3. It is unfortunate that this has happened; but Premier Khrushchev has not changed his policy of achieving an independent and neutral Laos.
350. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/
SNIE 58-3-62
Washington, May 9, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 5/1/62-5/9/62. Secret. This was an advance copy and was prepared by CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and NSA. It was submitted by the CIA to the U.S. Intelligence Board on May 8. The Board concurred, with the exception of the representatives of the FBI and AEC who abstained on the grounds the topic was outside their jurisdiction. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1981, 414A.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE FALL OF NAM THA
The Problem
To assess the implications of the Communist capture of Nam Tha.
The Estimate
1. On 6 May, Communist forces attacked and quickly seized the provincial capital of Nam Tha in northern Laos, forcing the retreat of the garrison of approximately 4,500 Laotian Army troops--5 infantry and 3 parachute battalions and supporting artillery units. Available evidence indicates that the attacking force consisted solely of Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops and that it was a smaller force than that defending the town. There are indications that the "neutralist" or pro-Souvanna forces were not directly involved and were not under orders to act by Souvanna Phouma or Kong Le, both of whom were out of Laos.
2. There is no evidence that Chinese Communist troops participated in the attack, and we believe it unlikely that any were present. However, Communist China probably permitted the transit of Pathet Lao and/or North Vietnamese troops through a salient of Chinese territory to participate in the 3 May attack on Muong Sing and the subsequent attack on Nam Tha. Logistic support for the attacking forces, as for other antigovernment forces in Laos, was almost certainly furnished by the Soviet/North Vietnamese airlift.
3. The withdrawal of Royal Laotian Government (RLG) forces from the Nam Tha area virtually eliminates RLG authority in all of northern Laos and open western Luang Prabang Province and all of Nam Tha Province, which borders on Burma and Thailand, to Communist domination. The combat effectiveness of the retreating RLG troops is probably nil and in the absence of effective resistance the Communist forces will press their advance and render untenable any remaining outposts in the area, including the port of Ban Houei Sai on the Mekong, towards which the RLG forces are retreating.
4. The attack on Nam Tha was a flagrant violation of the May 1961 cease-fire agreement and a departure from the past pattern of limited and small-scale military attacks. Whatever utility the cease-fire agreement had in restraining hostilities may now be destroyed. The Communist forces in Laos could defeat the RLG Army, piecemeal as at Nam Tha or by seizing the major towns along the Mekong. We do not believe that the Nam Tha attack marks the opening of a general offensive throughout Laos; on the contrary, the Communists may await the impact of this move on the RLG and the US before initiating additional major breaches of the cease-fire. In the absence either of an effective military response to the Nam Tha action or significant progress toward a coalition government, there will be an increasing likelihood that the Communists will undertake offensive operations on the scale of Nam Tha elsewhere in Laos.
5. General Phoumi reinforced the Nam Tha garrison several times, despite MAAG and embassy advice, and he had just finished the transfer of an additional parachute battalion a week before the attack. His efforts to strengthen the defenses, however, also offered the Communists a tempting target in both military and political terms. The Laotian garrison lost considerable amounts of equipment and supplies. The Communist victory, moreover, will further weaken the Laotion Army's remaining self-confidence and willingness to fight. In view of the importance General Phoumi publicly attached to Nam Tha, and his investment of troops and equipment in its defense, the Communist victory may cause him considerable loss of prestige within the Laotian Army and government.
6. On the other hand, Phoumi would like to bring about a reassessment of the US policy of installing a coalition government under Souvanna or, failing that, to delay as long as possible the implementation of such a policy. He can now point to the Nam Tha attack as proof of Communist duplicity and disregard of the May 1961 cease-fire agreement. He will be able to cite the Nam Tha action as conclusive evidence of Souvanna's inability or unwillingness to influence Souphanouvong and the Pathet Lao, and reiterate his argument that Souvanna is under Communist control and that negotiation of a coalition government under Souvanna would be tantamount to giving Laos to the Communists.
7. The attack and the manner in which it was conducted provide further proof of the decreasing military role and strength of the "neutralist" forces in Laos and the increasing tendency for the Communist troops to assume exclusive jurisdiction. The attack underscores the weakness of Souvanna's political influence. It also reinforces the view previously expressed/2/ that Souvanna would be increasingly unlikely to be able to prevent Communist control of a coalition government./3/ His announced intention to "disapprove completely" of the Nam Tha action will leave the door open to renewed negotiations but almost certainly will have no influence on Communist military operations or plans.
/2/See SNIE 58-3-61, "The Situation and Short-Run Outlook in Laos," dated 28 September 1961 (SECRET). " [Footnote in the source text. SNIE 58-3-61 is in Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110.]
/3/The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that the prospects of a coalition government under Souvanna depend upon too many variables to be dealt with in so categorical a fashion. In the first place, a coalition government immediately after its inception would probably be presiding over a Laos still divided. The PL and the present RLG authorities probably would continue to control their respective territories; whether and when they allow the Souvanna government to exercise authority over the domains will probably depend largely upon their day-to-day observations of his actions and their assessment of the direction in which he was headed. Assumption of real authority over Laos by a Souvanna government will most probably depend upon the integration of the three military forces. Judging from past experience, this may take a long time, during which the de facto situation would remain much as it is now, but be distinguished by the facade of a coalition government governing in name only.
Among the variables which will determine whether a Souvanna coalition government can prevent Communist acquisition or control will be the posture and stated intentions of the US. Both Phoumi and Thai Prime Minister Sarit have pressed the US hard for a commitment of this matter since they realize its importance to the survival and strength of the anti-Communist elements in Laos. Whether the US makes such commitments to the present RLG and what American deterrents are maintained in the area will affect the chances for survival of a truly neutral government in Laos. [Footnote in the source text.]
8. Events of the past year have almost certainly convinced the Communist side that the risk of US intervention has lessened significantly and that they can increase the level of military operations in seeking to achieve their intermediate objectives--a negotiated "neutralist" coalition government in Laos which they could soon dominate, or the disintegration of the Royal Laotian Government and Army. With rumors of a Souvanna-Phoumi rapprochement in the air, and aware of US pressures on Phoumi to negotiate, the Communists probably calculated that the seizure of Nam Tha would not of itself foreclose possible forthcoming talks on the formation of a coalition government, while it would at the same time enhance their political and military position in such negotiations.
9. Although Bloc reaction has so far been extremely limited, there seems to be no clear distinction between the initial interpretation given the capture of Nam Tha by Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi. Almost certainly the Chinese Communists and the North Vietnamese have actively encouraged the renewed military activity against a ripe target of opportunity and an area of direct security interest to the Chinese. While the Soviets may have had some reservations over the political implications for US-Soviet relations of a violation of the cease-fire, we believe that they concurred in the operation. We continue to believe, however, that the Soviets still prefer a political settlement in Laos.
351. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, May 10, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries, Laos Security, 4/16/62-5/10/62. Top Secret. Drafted by Forrestal.
Meeting on Laos
There will be present at the meeting this afternoon the following: Secretary Ball, Assistant Secretary Harriman, General Taylor, General Decker, Mr. Hilsman, Mr. Bundy./2/
/2/In a telephone conversation between Ball and Bundy, May 8, 6:20 p.m., Ball stated that the President indicated he wanted to have a meeting to talk about Laos. Bundy remarked that "The President shares Averell's view we have to keep the hook to Moscow on this. This is a violation of the ceasefire." (Memorandum of telephone conversation, May 8; ibid., Ball Papers, Laos)
The most recent reports indicate that the situation in Northern Laos is deteriorating rapidly. Ban Houei Sai may already have fallen (Vientiane 1529 attached)./3/ This city is on the Mekong River at the Thai border. CAS and Ambassador Brown report that other areas are threatened (see CIA 32201 attached)./4/
/3/Dated May 10, received at 8:37 a.m.; not printed.
/4/Not printed.
In view of this situation the State Department, Governor Harriman concurring, has prepared a discussion paper (attached) recommending that the U.S. make certain military moves designed to impress the Russians and Chinese with the seriousness with which we view the situation. The recommendations are, first, to move a naval task force into the Gulf of Siam, and second, to send the 1000-man battle group now in Thailand up to the border opposite Vientiane.
Such steps would be designed to impress the Russians and Chinese with our concern without at the same time threatening China's sensitive interest in the northern provinces or leading Phoumi to believe that we are about to pull his chestnuts out of the fire.
If such actions are taken, the question arises of what to do if they failed to achieve the desired result of re-establishing a cease fire. I do not believe that you have to make a decision on this point, since the type of action suggested by State does not commit us to a follow up./5/ Whether or not we make a show of resistance, we are going to get a black eye if the Communists take over the country.
/5/At the White House daily staff meeting on the morning of May 9, with Bundy presiding, the following discussion on Laos took place:
"Laos: Forrestal said there is some thinking that the Russians and Communists were misled by the U.S.'s letter to the King which said we would not intervene in Laos. Forrestal wondered whether we could move a battle group to Vientiane as an indication of our determination. Kaysen said that the war game demonstrated that when we did this it led to a partition of Laos, and he didn't want this. He thought it was more useful to consider what we could do to pressure Moscow and Hanoi and to take certain steps within Laos short of intervention. He was skeptical of what we could do except to just hold South Laos. Clifton chimed in, saying you could put 30,000 troops into Laos and accomplish nothing, besides, Congress wouldn't support it; the best thing is to just let it boil." (Memorandum for the Record, May 9; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, White House Daily Staff Meetings, May to Sept. 1962)
[Attachment]
Discussion Paper for White House Meeting, May 10, 1962
SUBJECT
Laos
We believe that the deliberate violation of the cease-fire in Laos and the continuing military encroachments raise the possibility that the Communists may move on toward a military takeover of most of the country. We believe that fear of US intervention has in the past been the principal factor deterring the Communists from more aggressive military actions in Laos. We also believe recent actions imply a downgrading in their estimate of the risk of US intervention to check them and that a further downgrading is likely unless the United States takes action to reestablish the deterrent.
We have prepared for your consideration the following discussion of the current situation in Laos and its implications for US policy./6/
/6/Sections I-IV of this paper are derived in most part from a memorandum from Hilsman to Harriman, May 9. (Department of State, EA/Laos Files: Lot 66 D 457, 400.12 Laos 62, INR)
I. US OBJECTIVES
We conceive present US objectives to be:
A. To prevent a Communist takeover of all of Laos.
B. If possible, to avoid putting US forces in major combat in Laos while seeking a political settlement through an agreed neutralization formula or a de facto partition.
II. THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM
A. The immediate problem is to obtain prompt reestablishment of an effective cease-fire at a minimum along a new line reflecting the existing situation.
B. This is a prerequisite to further consideration of, let alone progress toward, a government of national union and neutralization of Laos.
C. It is also a prerequisite to the major alternative course, if a government of national union and neutralization prove impossible, of seeking stabilization in a de facto partition.
D. To reestablish a cease-fire the primary requirement is to reinvigorate the US deterrent, and make it a more effective factor in Communist calculations than it apparently is at present.
III. THE IMMEDIATE CIRCUMSTANCES
A. Phoumi indirectly invited the Nam Tha attack but the Pathet Lao/Viet Minh success means the probable loss of all of Northern Laos. The RLG is losing its best battalions.
B. Phoumi's support within the RLG will probably be weakened unless there is evidence of increased US support for him or diminished US interest in a government of national union. RLG moderates will look to the US to make a decision on whether to continue to pursue a government of national union seriously. Souvanna's impotence has been demonstrated, so there will be less desire for coalition solutions. However, if the US shows clear intention to bring about a government of national union, RLG moderates will be more receptive to US interest in replacing Phoumi.
C. Communist subversion in northeast Thailand through a newly established corridor in northwest Laos may well be begun with increasingly grave effects on Thai security.
IV. PROBABLE COMMUNIST ATTITUDES
A. The Communist action raises doubts that the communists are still seriously interested in a government of national union. However, we believe the Communists and particularly the Soviets still prefer a negotiated settlement to an all-out military solution.
B. However, the success of Nam Tha is being pursued with further encroachments in northern Laos and, in the absence of effective RLG resistance or convincing evidence of US determination to intervene if necessary, it is impossible to say with any assurance where these encroachments will stop.
C. The Chinese Communists are undoubtedly pleased at obtaining a Communist-controlled buffer zone along the entire Laos border and will be opposed to any Communist retreat from the Nam Tha area.
D. We do not believe the Communists (including the Chinese) want to accept any significant risk of US intervention in defense of the RLG. Nor do we believe that the Communists will be provoked into further escalation by US moves that clearly do not threaten their position in North Vietnam or Northern Laos but point only to a determination to defend that portion of Laos now held by the RLG. Evidence of this level of US determination would, we believe, simply make them more cautious.
V. REQUIREMENTS FOR REESTABLISHING A CEASE-FIRE
Adoption of courses such as the following would, we believe, result in a new cease-fire and a temporary stabilization of a new de facto partition without precluding the possibility of continuing to seek a government of national union and neutralization of Laos:
A. We should notify the Soviets, Souvanna, and Souphanouvong that we are still committed to the idea of negotiations for a neutral Laos through the agreed mechanism of a government of national union, but we cannot tolerate unilateral Communist military advances.
B. This diplomatic approach, to be effective, must be backed by plausible evidence that the US will not tolerate a Communist military takeover. The following moves are proposed:
1. Initiate appropriate 7th Fleet movements toward the Gulf of Siam (including special forces from Okinawa), as in 1961.
2. Send the US battle group now in the Korat area of Thailand (about 1,000 men) to the Thai border opposite Vientiane seeking parallel Thai action. Plan with the Thais for possible future joint action.
3. Toward the longer range objective of facilitating possible Thai participation in action in Laos, improved communications within Thailand are required. Roads to the Mekong River loop are critical to operations in that area of Laos (Sayaboury Province). So are access routes from Thailand to Southern Laos. Steps should be initiated toward improving these communications.
4. Begin on longer range improvements in port and transit facilities in Northern South Vietnam which would be needed for access to and support of possible operations in Southern Laos.
VI. FURTHER STEPS TO BE TAKEN
If US actions of the sort described above have the effect we expect, the way will be open to further attempts to obtain a government of national union and agreed international neutralization of Laos. The following additional moves should be taken:
A. Get Souvanna to return immediately to Laos.
B. Increase pressure on Phoumi to enter realistic negotiations.
C. At the same time take immediate steps designed progressively to undermine Phoumi's prestige and political influence and to encourage opposition to Phoumi especially in the Assembly and the Army--laying the groundwork by these and certain other actions for Phoumi's removal and replacement.
D. Consideration should also be given to the manner of notifying SEATO, and to the question of what role SEATO should play in any possible future moves.
352. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, May 10, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 5/17/62-5/25/62. Top Secret. Prepared by Forrestal on May 23, apparently from notes he took at the meeting. According to Kennedy's appointment book, this meeting at the White House did not begin until 5:05 p.m. and lasted until 6:11 p.m. In addition, it indicated that John McCone, rather than General Carter, attended. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book)
SUBJECT
Presidential Conferences on Laos
4:30 p.m., Thursday, May 10, 1962
Present were: The President, Acting Secretary of State Ball, Assistant Secretary of State Harriman, General Taylor, General Decker, General Carter, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Hilsman, Mr. Bundy, and Mr. Forrestal.
The President considered the memorandum dated May 10, 1962 with its attachments/2/ and received reports on the most recent developments from Secretary Ball, Secretary Harriman, and Mr. Hilsman.
/2/Document 351.
There followed a general discussion during the course of which Mr. Bohlen made the point that it would not be wise to approach the Soviets again. He recalled that Ambassador Thompson had already approached Gromyko in Moscow,/3/ and that Harriman had spoken to Dobrynin in Washington./4/ Further approaches, he thought, would not be productive.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 347.
/4/See footnote 2, Document 346.
Mr. Hilsman emphasized the need to take steps to indicate to the Communist side that we would not stand idly by in the face of probes such as Nam Tha. He suggested that the Communists were undoubtedly waiting to see what our reaction would be. The failure to react some way would be interpreted to mean that it was safe for the PL to press forward. He suggested that any move we make be tailored in such a fashion as not to provoke the Viet Minh or the Chinese into large-scale counter-action, but rather to suggest to them that we were prepared to resist encroachments beyond the cease-fire line.
The President observed that there was an unfortunate dearth of hard information on the situation and suggested that steps be taken to improve our intelligence from the field.
The President commented that the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were out of the country and returning on Saturday./5/ He said he wished to await their report before taking important decisions. He asked how long it would take for units of the 7th Fleet to reach the area. General Decker ascertained that it would require approximately 48 hours to bring the nearest units (2 attack aircraft carriers) to the vicinity of Bangkok.
/5/May 12.
The President decided that, purely as a preparatory move, appropriate units of the Fleet should be ordered to the Gulf of Siam. There would be no public announcement of this, and any further decisions would await the return of top government officials from the area.
The President directed that messages be sent explaining his orders on a confidential basis to the Ambassadors in Bangkok and Vientiane,/6/ the Secretaries of State and Defense, CINCPAC and General Lemnitzer. The President authorized the Department of State to inform the British in Washington on a confidential basis.
/6/The Department informed Ambassadors Brown and Young in telegram 982 to Vientiane, also sent to Bangkok as 1736, May 10. The brief telegram stated that the objective of the move was to influence re-establishment of an effective cease-fire and restore a situation in which a government of national union could be formed successfully. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-1062)
The meeting adjourned at 6 p.m.
353. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/
Vientiane, May 10, 1962, 11 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-1062. Secret; Niact. Repeated priority to Bangkok, London, Paris, Saigon, Geneva for Fecon, CINCPAC for POLAD, and Moscow.
1534. The seizure of Nam Tha and its subsequent rapid exploitation by PL/VM forces has transformed what just prior to May 5 had begun to be a somewhat encouraging situation, into a dangerous and ugly one. The collapse of the FAR on their retreat from Nam Tha has left the whole of northwest Laos open to PL/Vietminh seizure at their option. It will also have its effect elsewhere in the country, as the defeat of these relatively elite troops will add to the legend of Vietminh-Pathet Lao invincibility which already so greatly handicaps us.
There is no assurance (in fact the atmosphere at Khang Khay as reported by returning visitors of all kinds is quite the contrary) that the PL/VM will not continue its exploitation of this military advantage, in the south as well as in the northwest. Investiture of, if not attack upon, Ban Houei Sai now appears imminent, as does placing of hostile troops in a position to dominate Luang Prabang (for example, the interdiction in force of the river at Pak Beng). Seizure of Saravane and Attopeu, further activity in the Bolovens Plateau and pressures north of Paksane, cannot be ruled out. In all this, of course, the presence of the Vietminh in large numbers is of controlling importance.
On the psychological and political side, the continued suspension of US aid and the fact that the Communists have blatantly breached the cease-fire apparently with impunity, adds to a general sense of frustration which can not but have its effect on the FAR as well as in political circles.
The cumulative effect of these factors, added to the known weakness of the FAR in relation to the forces opposing them and the disadvantages of their defensive position, would indicate that as a practical matter Laos is now in a position where it can be overrun at any time and to the extent of the other side's choosing. This choice will be a PL/ Vietminh choice, since the neutralists in Khang Khay now appear to have little or no military or political influence, especially in absence of Souvanna. Politically these developments cast a shadow over the incipient negotiations for a coalition government, since they place the RLG in the position of negotiating under a gun, reinforce their suspicions about the good faith of the other side and send the RLG to the negotiating table in a greatly weakened physical and psychological position.
The refusal of the Soviets thus far to help rectify this situation is entirely consistent with the theory (Hong Kong's 1110 to the Dept)/2/ reinforced in my mind by Abramov's departing talks with the British and French Ambassadors (Embtel 1446)/3/ that the Soviet desire for a peaceful settlement here has, to say the least, substantially diminished. What this attitude really means and how the problem which it presents fits into the overall scheme of our relations with the Soviet Union is, of course, beyond my sphere of knowledge or responsibility. But so far as Laos is concerned, and I would think also our other Asian friends, I do not see how we can let this breach of cease-fire agreement and personal undertakings go without some form of positive reaction if the Russians remain indifferent to our protests and particularly if PL/VM military activity expands. If we do not react in some convincing way further aggression will be encouraged. We have certainly shown our good faith by wide-spread and almost Herculean efforts to bring about the peaceful solution for which the framework has been hammered out, in apparent good faith, at Geneva. These efforts have now been greatly compromised. If they no longer want a settlement, all our efforts will be unavailing. If they do want a settlement some action by US should help.
/2/Dated April 24. (Ibid., 751J.00/4-2462)
/3/Dated April 8. (Ibid., 751J.00/4-862)
On the brighter side, we have the fact that Souvanna has declared himself, at least privately, in opposition to this breach of the cease-fire and in favor of a restoration of status quo at the time of the cease-fire. We should exploit this as much as we can. Phoumi has indicated a willingness to continue, again at least privately, his efforts to bring Souvanna back with a view to serious tripartite negotiation. (I confess that I am surprised by this reaction from Phoumi as I expected a declaration that the seizure of Nam Tha had demonstrated Souvanna's impotence, Souphanouvong's bad faith, and the worthlessness of Soviet assurances and rendered further negotiations out of the question.)
It seems clear that whatever we do in reaction to the breach of the cease-fire, we should continue in every way possible to stimulate and nourish the exchanges between Phoumi and Souvanna. We should emphasize to each that the developments at Nam Tha vividly emphasize the need for a speedy political settlement. I have taken this line with Phoumi with the encouraging results reported Embtel 1530./4/
/4/See footnote 4, Document 346.
I would hope that pressures would also be brought upon Souvanna and everything possible done to get him back to Laos as soon as possible.
If it is not already too late, we should also give every possible assistance to the reorganization, re-equipping and retraining of the FAR forces which escaped from Nam Tha and support to these and other FAR troops--in event forces of other side do not voluntarily withdraw in response to diplomatic pressures now being exerted--in any effort which MAAG considers reasonable then [that?] they may make to recover at least some of ground lost since cease-fire breach. Same should hold for any effort to drive the enemy out of Pak Beng in order to free river access to Luang Prabang for food which MAAG considers reasonable. I have not great confidence that this will produce such military result, but I feel we should do this for its effect on the Russians, Souphanouvong, the Lao conservatives, and the public. Phoumi should be informed that this sawport [sic] is with the condition that he must at the same time continue and accelerate the discussions with Souvanna. By the same token I think it should be made known that we are also accelerating our military aid to other areas in which the FAR is threatened e.g. Saravane, and improving our techniques for ensuring its more effective use.
I think Souvanna should be urged to declare himself publicly as disapproving this breach of the cease-fire. This would be valuable support to Lord Home's efforts. (Morsky seemed surprised and much impressed when Mayrand told him that Souvanna had stated his disapproval of this action.) While risking trouble with Souphanouvong this should have some effect on the Russians and would help with RLG.
The $64 question, of course, is whether we should, in the light of the events of the past few days, resume our economic aid to the RLG and if so to what extent and under what conditions.
Sarit has suggested (Bangkok's 1691 to Dept)/5/ that we do so as soon as we have some agreement which we consider reliable with Phoumi (and hopefully with Souvanna also) as to the basis on which a coalition government could be formed. Presumably in such case we would simply inform the Soviet Union that having carried out our obligations in good faith by pressures upon Phoumi and having been rewarded by this clear breach of the cease-fire, we feel released from these obligations and while continuing to work for a negotiated Souvanna settlement we plan to resume aid since we cannot accept a position in which advantage is taken of our good faith.
/5/Document 337.
We have also toyed with the idea that if the other side continues their military pressures and tripartite negotiations fail or cannot be arranged, there might be reorganization of the RLG to eliminate weak and undesirable members, perhaps with a new Prime Minister, pledged to a policy of national reconciliation with Souvanna and Souphanouvong (see Embtel 1457)./6/ I have not thought through the mechanics, implications or even the possibility of such a move, but believe it to be an idea which deserves careful and rapid study. It might, if it proved feasible and were properly handled, provide a means of holding negotiations for a Souvanna government, and while saving face all around, permit the resumption of the economic support which this country is beginning sorely to need.
/6/Dated April 30. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-3062)
I have not had time to think all these matters through nor the advantage of your thoughts as to next steps. Events may well overtake the above recommendations in a few hours or days. Nevertheless, I consider the situation here serious and submit these thoughts for consideration in the light of our overall strategy and expert views as to Soviet angles.
I think it unlikely that we can achieve our objective of a government in which neutralists and anti-Communist forces will have sufficient influence to have a chance of keeping this country really neutral if we do not react in some unmistakable fashion should the other side refuse to act in response to our protests on the seizure of Nam Tha.
Brown
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