International Special Events
By JAMES A. MCGEE, M.S.
FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
January 2006

Image by James Tarasca: 
Olympic Flag waves at stadium.

The Summer Olympic
Games ceremoniously
concluded on August
training requirements, exercise
emergency response capabilities,
and implement appropriate
corrective actions. Multiagency
and multinational cooperation,
coordination, and communication
are critically important
pieces of the security equation.

The environment for terrorism
changed dramatically
throughout the world after
Greece was awarded the 2004
Summer Olympic Games in
1997. In fact, the tragic events
of September 11, 2001, redefined
the role and responsibilities
of the U.S. government
(USG) when addressing special
events in foreign countries, and
the threat of terrorist attacks
against U.S. citizens and interests
escalated. The risk of
deadly aggression during special
events increased as the
capability of mass media improved,
allowing live broadcasts
on a worldwide scale. Further,
an elevated tendency for terrorist
groups to resort to acts of
violence and the continued
proliferation and accessibility
of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) contributed to the
threat as well.

Terrorist attacks extended
geographically during the
T29, 2004, in the heart of Athens,
Greece. The culmination of the
event was celebrated as testimony
to peace and world unity.
In retrospect, what factors were
employed to ensure a safe and
secure athletic contest? This
question requires a close examination
of the measures taken
to address an international
special event.1 It also reveals
the necessity to begin security
preparations early, well before
the occurrence, allowing adequate
time to address potential





months leading up to the opening
ceremonies for the 2004
Summer Olympic Games. The
escalation of tension due to the
war in Iraq and the bombings in
Istanbul, Turkey, and Madrid,
Spain, raised concerns in Athens.
Under the direction of
the U.S. Department of State
(DOS), unprecedented security
measures were employed to
prevent a terrorist attack against
the Olympic Games.

Historically, the FBI fulfills
a fundamental role during
USG involvement with special
events management, including
all of those potentially requiring
federal assistance. The
FBI’s function in special events
is defined within numerous
statutes and presidential directives.
These authorities, combined
with the FBI’s responsibilities
in combating terrorism,
provide the predication for FBI
commitment.

The Olympic Games represent
the clearest example of a
special event given the international
participation and broadbased
viewing audience. Such a
scene provides the perfect stage
for a terrorist seeking global
recognition and a platform to
voice political demands. A less
obvious example of a special
event includes the trial of
Timothy McVey, accused and
convicted of the April 19, 1995,
bombing of the Alfred P.
Murrah federal building in
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
Such a setting also represents
an active target for terrorist
attack by individuals sympathetic
to antigovernment ideologies
who seek an opportunity
for mass media recognition.

DOMESTIC
SPECIAL EVENTS

FBI involvement in special
events is generally within the
continental United States
(CONUS). Given the complexities
associated with security
preparations and logistics, it is
important to understand the
protocols in place that provide
direction when addressing a
domestic special event before
examining the enhanced challenges
associated with addressing
international ones.

Each special event is evaluated
in terms of size, threat,
significance, duration, location,
attendance, media coverage,
dignitaries, and viewing
audience. The FBI assigns a
special event readiness level
(SERL) to those that require
counterterrorism (CT) support.
The SERLs are divided into
four categories. SERL I events
require the full support of the
USG and significant predeployment
of USG CT response
assets. The Olympic Games fall
within this category. Until the
2004 Olympics in Athens, this
designation applied to Olympic
Games occurring only within
the United States. The 2004
Summer Olympics demonstrated
the need to expand this
designation to international
special events.

SERL II events are of lesser
magnitude but still require
augmentation of CT response
assets. Political conventions,
presidential inaugurations, and
economic summits fit within
this category.

Portrait and quote: "Each Special
event is evaluated in terms of 
size, threat, significance,
duration, location, attendance,
media coverage, dignitaries, and 
viewing audience." -- Special Agent McGee,
FBI's Jackson Mississippi
Office.

SERL III and IV events
require minimal USG agency
support and, frequently, receive
adequate support by state and
local resources. Most special
events fall within one of these
two categories. Examples
include Super Bowls, highprofile
trials, the Indianapolis
500, the Goodwill Games, and
World Trade Organization
conferences.

Presidential Decision
Directives (PDD) 39 and 62
designate the FBI as the lead
federal agency for crisis management
and intelligence related
to terrorism during domestic
special events. Additional
authorities are delegated to the
Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) regarding
consequence management
(the first response to a terrorist
incident and the follow-on
efforts to preserve life) and
coordination. The U.S. Secret
Service is designated the lead
agency for security design,
planning, and implementation.

PDD 62 further defines and
establishes a special event
category of national special
security events (NSSE), which
require enhanced federal planning
and protection. The FBI
generally categorizes NSSEs as
SERL I or II. Further, PDD 62
promotes interagency cooperation
and coordination in CT
planning and execution by
delegating a shared lead federal
agency designation among the

FBI, FEMA, and the U.S. Secret
Service. This assignment
reduces interagency confusion
regarding who is in charge and
promotes communication
between the agencies.

Quote: "The Olympic Games 
historically  have been
an attractive target for terrorist 
attack."


INTERNATIONAL
SPECIAL EVENTS
DOS is the designated lead
U.S. foreign affairs agency. The
Bureau of Diplomatic Security
(DSS) within DOS conducts
protective security overseas.
DSS security responsibilities
closely mirror the role of the
U.S. Secret Service in the
domestic arena.

The CIA is the designated
lead USG agency for collection
and dissemination of intelligence
in the foreign environment.
Similar to the role of the
FBI when addressing a domestic
special event, the CIA coordinates
with various other intelligence
agencies, as well as the
FBI.


During international special
events, the U.S. Department of
Defense (DOD) fulfills the role
normally occupied by FEMA in
domestic ones. In addition to
consequence management,
DOD provides crisis response
capabilities. This differs from
the domestic environment
where DOD participation is
limited to areas of safety and
security. The statutory restriction
referred to as posse comitatus
prevents DOD from performing
law enforcement CT
actions inside the United States.
Within CONUS, federal law
enforcement CT response is the
jurisdiction of the FBI. Within
the foreign environment, the
FBI has responsibility for
postcrisis terrorism investigations.
This authority extends to
include the FBI’s role in terrorism
prevention and precrisis
terrorism investigations that
possibly could dismantle a plot
focused on a foreign special
event. It also consists of the
FBI’s extensive CT, crisis
management and response,
and intelligence capabilities.

2004 SUMMER
OLYMPIC GAMES

For centuries, the city of
Athens has been the crossroad
between Europe and the Middle
East. Greece traditionally
embraces aspects of European
and Middle Eastern cultures
that, in many instances, find
their origins in ancient Greece.



Renowned as the birthplace of
democracy and philosophical
academia, Greece is home to a
proud people well aware of
their role in the development
of Western civilization and
world history.

The Olympic Games historically
have been an attractive
target for terrorist attack. This
is best exemplified by the infamous
hostage crisis during the
1974 Summer Olympics in
Munich, Germany, and the
Centennial Park bombing during
the 1996 Summer Olympics
in Atlanta, Georgia. In the
shadow of the ancient Acropolis,
unprecedented security
efforts were employed to ensure
a safe and secure Olympic
Games. FBI preparations were
coordinated with the USG
interagency community, as
well as Greek authorities.
Ultimately, the FBI established
a fully operational command
post adjacent to the U.S. embassy
in Athens and prestaged
crisis response assets at three
strategic locations prepared to
deploy, with the consent of
Greek authorities, in the event
of a terrorist act.

In the wake of September
11, 2001, and the war in Iraq,
the 2004 Summer Olympics
demonstrated the necessity for
a coordinated USG approach to
Olympic security. This coordination
extended beyond the
participating USG agencies and
included representatives from
the international community,
security professionals from
corporate sponsors, and, most
important, authorities from the
host country, in this case
Greece.

The broad-based USG
security umbrella extends
beyond the traditional concerns
of physical security and protective
services associated with
venue site security, transportation,
and credentials. Security
concerns also include collection,
analysis, and dissemination
of intelligence and proactive
investigations concerning
credible and specific information
relevant to the upcoming
event. During the Athens





Text box:
FBI Capabilities 

FBI Laboratory Division provides technical 
and scientific response and forensic
support to investigations involving hazardous 
materials, including WMD. In addition, it
offers the capability to disrupt explosive 
devices and perform forensic examination of
explosives in postblast situations. The Laboratory 
Division also renders expertise in
processing crime scenes.

Engineering Research Facility (ERF) supplies 
technical support for secure and
nonsecure communications, computer hardware and 
software, and feasibility assessments
for proposed command post sites.

Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) provides 
subject-matter expertise in CT
tactics, crisis management, hostage negotiation, 
logistics, and behavioral analysis.

FBI Headquarters offers language specialists, 
intelligence analysis, and activation of
the Strategic Information and Operations Center 
(SIOC) in support of the special event.

FBI Cyber Division evaluates emerging cyberthreats 
and performs forensic examination
of digital evidence.

FBI Counterterrorism Division provides financial 
and administrative support.

End text box.





Olympics, the FBI routinely
reviewed volumes of information
looking for any link or
indication that the Olympic
Games were mentioned as a
target for terrorist attack. An
FBI-generated intelligence
report, including information
potentially relevant to the
Olympic Games, was disseminated
within the USG intelligence
community on a quarterly
basis, escalating to monthly,
then weekly, and, finally, daily
during the event.

Operating in a foreign
environment requires host
nation authorization, which
extends to the number of anticipated
USG personnel present
during the event. This covers
accreditation, diplomatic immunity,
and appropriate legislation
that allow USG representatives
to function in the host nation.

Concept of Operations
The development of a
concise concept of operations
(CONOP) is critical in the early
stages of planning for a special
event. The CONOP must clearly
articulate a mission statement
consistent with the situation,
appropriate response authorities
(approved by the host nation),
and individual agency jurisdictions
and capabilities. It should
identify available assets and
their capabilities, as well as an
execution time line and scheme
of operations, highlighting all
critical junctions leading up to
and through the special event.
An assessment of host nation
CT capabilities is mandatory,
includes varied stages of preparation,
and should be conducted
several years prior to the special
event.

Training Phase

Training represents the
first initiative in assessing host
country CT capabilities. Specialized
training, using subject
matter experts with real-world
experience, proves invaluable.
Training can be conducted in
the host country or the United
States. In-country training
results in more personnel
available to attend the seminars,
but, on the other hand, training
within the United States provides
host country representatives
the opportunity to visit and
use state-of-the-art USG facilities.
In addition, host country
representatives may be eligible
to attend one of the three International
Law Enforcement
Academies (ILEA) located in
Budapest, Hungary; Bangkok,
Thailand; and Gabarone,
Botswana. Each ILEA provides
a variety of law enforcement
training to the international
community.

None of these training
options will adequately reach all
of the personnel who require
instruction. The train-the-trainer
concept is encouraged so host
country representatives can
return and extend the training to
personnel within their individual
agencies. The FBI provides
a wide array of training in
various law enforcement disciplines.
Ranging from computer
crimes to terrorism crime scene
investigations, FBI subjectmatter
experts assist with
training relevant to special
event preparedness. The training
phase should end approximately
1 year prior to the
beginning of the event, which
allows emphasis on exercises,
the second phase of special
event preparedness.

Image of quote: "Agencies must
consider these
sensitivities when
developing exercise
scenarios."


Exercise Phase

Exercises constitute a
critical mechanism for testing
capabilities and can be conducted
in a variety of formats,
which assist with focusing on
specific areas of preparedness
and response. In the foreign
environment, diplomacy is
needed to develop the coordination
necessary to conduct
multiagency and multinational



exercises. Sensitivities exist
between agencies and even
more so between nations when
potential inadequacies or limited
capabilities may be exposed.
Agencies must consider
these sensitivities when developing
exercise scenarios.
Ultimately, the host nation will
decide exercise parameters and
participants.

The table top exercise
(TTX) allows interagency
decision makers to meet in one
location and openly discuss the
variables and options available
in response to numerous scenarios.
Many times, the TTX
may be the first time multiagency
executives meet to
discuss a coordinated response
to a crisis, and it is an excellent
preliminary exercise, allowing
decision makers the opportunity
to test individual agency standard
operating procedures and
memoranda of understanding
(MOUs) between each other
prior to the actual event.

The command post exercise
(CPX) tests command and
control and can be expanded
to evaluate all aspects of command,
control, communication,
coordination, and information
and intelligence flow and dissemination
(C4I). The ideal
setting for the CPX is inside
the event’s designated location
for the multiagency command
post. The FBI refers to this
location as the joint operations
center (JOC), and it includes
representatives from each
affected agency participating
in the special event. The JOC
includes multiagency decision
makers assigned to a command
group and prepared to make
coordinated critical decisions.

The large-scale field training
exercise (FTX) validates all
aspects of crisis response and
consequence and crisis management.
It requires a significant
commitment by participating
agencies to adequately test
relevant capabilities. Scenarios
closely portray an actual crisis,
and all elements of crisis response
are activated and tested.
First responders are dispatched
to the incident, and medical
facilities exercise mass casualty
contingencies. Expertise in
handling a hazardous material
incident, an explosive device,
and a WMD are tested and
evaluated. Appropriate personnel
staff command posts, and
lessons learned from previous
TTXs and CPXs assist decision
makers while they evaluate the
circumstances associated with
the FTX scenarios.

Image by James Tarasca of 
crowd gathered at Olympic event.

The need to conduct a dress
rehearsal proves fundamental to
special event preparations. A
smaller event that occurs prior
to the special event should be
identified. In this case, each
agency will implement the same
security preparations planned
for the upcoming major special
event. Command posts will be
staffed and response assets
prestaged in the same configuration
anticipated during the
major event, which will allow
fine-tuning of protocols internally
and between agencies.
Radio communications, emergency
response routes, and
associated logistics can be
finalized in preparation for the
larger event. If a lesser event is
not available, an FTX will
provide the adequate setting.
The dress rehearsal serves as a
final opportunity to precisely
adjust CT capabilities prior to
the special event.

Although training and
exercises provide valuable
insights regarding host nation
CT capabilities, agencies must
ensure that the host nation is
not overly saturated with them.
During large multinational
events, the host nation will be
inundated with training and
exercise options from various
participating countries. The
organization of a multinational
working group can assist in





developing a compendium of
proposed training and exercise
options for the host country.
Exercises should conclude at
least 6 months prior to the
beginning of the special event.
After the completion of all
training and exercises, the
original vulnerability and
threat assessments should be
updated and reflect improved
CT capabilities by the host
country.

Operational Phase
The operational phase is
the final step prior to the actual
event. Success during this phase
depends largely upon solid
relationships developed during
the training and exercise phases
between USG subject-matter
experts and their host country
counterparts. A secure partnership
based upon mutual trust
with the host nation and a
combined objective to achieve
a safe and secure special event
proves paramount. Such a
partnership is best represented
by embedding USG subjectmatter
experts with their counterparts
from the host nation
during the special event time
frame. From a U.S. perspective,
this configuration of USG CT
assets provides first-response
capability to a crisis situation,
promotes a timely assessment
of the incident, and delivers CT
capabilities of the USG, if
requested. On the other hand,
from the host country’s perspective,
this embedded capability
enhances on-scene expertise
and brings to bear potential
equipment previously unavailable.
Such an embedded arrangement
is solely dependent
upon the permission of the host
country.

Deployment of FBI resources
to an overseas environment
is an enormous task
requiring significant logistical
support. Securing airlift capabilities,
in-country transportation,
adequate lodging, communication
frequencies, command
post locations, staging areas,
and country clearance for all
incoming personnel requires
a minimum of 3 years of preplanning
before the special
event. The FBI is well suited
for this mission based upon
frequent international deployments
in support of criminal
and terrorism investigations.
FBI resources available for
deployment provide diverse
capabilities with extensive
experience in the foreign environment.
The FBI’s Laboratory,
Engineering Research Facility
(ERF), Critical Incident Response
Group (CIRG), Headquarters
(FBIHQ), Cyber Division,
and various field offices
contribute to the resource
requests.

Text box:

FBI Mission Statement - 2004 Summer
Olympic Games

Under the direction of the FBI on-scene commander 
(OSC) and in direct coordinationwith the 
U.S. ambassador to Greece, the FBI will 
perform crisis response and management
in the event of an act of terrorism. FBI participation 
will be incumbent upon appropriately
established legal authority, procedures, 
and coordination between the U.S. government
(USG) and the government of Greece (GOG). 
In the event of an act of terrorism that impacts
on the lives of U.S. citizens and U.S. 
interests, the FBI will assume jurisdictional lead
agency responsibility for crisis response and 
management concurrent and in coordination
with the GOG. The FBI OSC, upon notification 
of a terrorist incident in which the USG has
been requested to assist, will assume oversight 
of crisis management and investigative
responsibilities, determine a strategy for crisis 
mitigation, and marshal the appropriate FBI
resources as directed by the nature and circumstances 
of the terrorist incident.




FBI field offices furnish
rapid deployment team (RDT)
assets to international special
events. The RDTs are predesignated,
stand-alone, mobile
field offices capable of deploying
to any location. Once in
place, the RDT can provide
adequate resources to augment
an ongoing investigation.
During the 2004 Summer
Olympics in Athens, the RDT
in Los Angeles deployed to
Greece, the first such deployment
in a precrisis mode and
in support of an international
special event.

During the operational
phase, the CONOP evolves
into a concise operations order
(OPORD). Individual agency
orders should be compiled into
an overall USG response plan.
Each agency’s OPORD consists
of a statement describing the
situation and mission and an
execution time line highlighting
all personnel movements,
opening and closing
ceremonies, and any other
noteworthy occurrences during
the special event. The OPORD
also describes the administrative
and logistical support
pertinent to the deployment,
including detailed information
regarding initial mobilization
of assets, staging elements,
response, and disengagement.
Additionally, the OPORD
provides a meticulous description
of command, control, and
communication contingencies.
The OPORD is supported by
multiple annexes to include
relevant MOUs and a postinvestigation
team plan that is
activated in the event of a crisis
to establish a forward command
post at the crisis site.

The FBI command post
generates daily situation reports.
Versions are available for
dissemination to other USG
agencies, as well as corporate
security directors. Any release
of data to the host nation or
other international partners
falls under the purview of the
CIA.


After-Action Report
Following the culmination
of the special event, each
involved internal FBI entity
provides an after-action report
(AAR), a critical review of the
special event’s planning and
execution strategies. The AAR
acknowledges tactics that
worked and identifies procedures
to be corrected or changed
for future special events. All
USG agencies with roles and
responsibilities in the special
event complete an AAR as well.

No amount of special event
preparedness can anticipate
every potential CT contingency.
Ultimately, something will
happen that tests the security of
the event. Fortunately, in Athens,
the most serious disruption
involved the men’s marathon
when a spectator physically
accosted one of the race participants.
These glitches in security
are inevitable, but the lessons
learned are an important part of
the final AAR.

CONCLUSION
Special event preparedness
tests all aspects of counterterrorism
readiness. The ability
to identify, recognize, and
correct these vulnerabilities
while preparing for a special
event is of immeasurable longterm
value. The complications
increase exponentially when
addressing an international
special event—both domestic
and international ones have
unique requirements and vulnerabilities.
Host nation capabilities,
combined with international
relations and diplomacy,
are critical when assessing USG
involvement. During the 2004
Summer Olympic Games in
Athens, Greece, the USG interagency
partnership, international
community, Greek government,
and Hellenic society
came together and embraced the




spirit of the Olympic Games.
All parties tirelessly pursued
this effort that, ultimately,
resulted in a safe and secure
Olympics. Future international
special events include the 2006
Winter Olympic Games in
Turin, Italy, and the 2008
Summer Olympic Games in
Beijing, China. Numerous other
sporting events, such as World
Cup Soccer, also wait on the
horizon and surely will rise to
the level requiring international
participation.

The 2004 Summer Olympic
Games in Athens, Greece, concluded
without incident. Hellenic
dedication and determination
to the development of a
viable Olympic security plan
proved fundamental to the success.
This included a willingness
to reveal existing Hellenic
government crisis response
capabilities to international
scrutiny and accept recommendations.
Indicative of Hellenic
perseverance, the 2004 Summer
Olympic Games ultimately set a
new standard for future international
special events.

Endnotes

1 The FBI defines a special event as “a
significant domestic or international event,
occurrence, circumstance, contest, activity,
or meeting, which by virtue of its profile
or status, represents an active target for
terrorist attack.”