2	FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
3	AMENDED SUMMARY ORDER
4	THIS SUMMARY ORDER WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED IN THE FEDERAL REPORTER
5	AND MAY NOT BE CITED AS PRECEDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO THIS OR ANY OTHER
6	COURT, BUT MAY BE CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF THIS OR ANY OTHER
7	COURT IN A SUBSEQUENT STAGE OF THIS CASE, IN A RELATED CASE, OR IN
8	ANY CASE FOR PURPOSES OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR RES JUDICATA.
9 10	At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the
11	Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
12	Courthouse, Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 2nd day
13	of May, two thousand and six.
14	- '
15	PRESENT:
16	
17	Hon. John M. Walker, Jr.,
18	Chief Judge,
19	Hon. Amalya L. Kearse,
20 21	Hon. J. Clifford Wallace,*
21 22	<u>Circuit Judges</u> .
23	X
24 25	KNOWLEDGE DOWTIN,
26	Petitioner-Appellant,
27 28	- v No. 04-6181-pr
29	- V NO. 04-0181-PI
30	ARTHUR COHEN, Superintendent of Greene
31	Correctional Facility,
32	4 ,
33 34	Respondent-Appellee.
35 36 37	APPEARING FOR PETITIONER- SALLY WASSERMAN, New York, New APPELLANT: York.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

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 $^{^{\}ast}$ The Honorable J. Clifford Wallace, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.

APPEARING FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLEE: SHOLOM J. TWERSKY, Assistant
District Attorney (Charles J.
Hynes, District Attorney for
Kings County, Leonard Joblove,
Amy Appelbaum, Victor Barall,
Assistant District Attorneys, on
the brief), Brooklyn, New York.

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Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.

Petitioner-appellant Knowledge Dowtin appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Jack B. Weinstein, <u>Judge</u>) denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court granted a certificate of ("COA") on "the appealability issue of lack of identification." This phrase can plausibly describe more than one of Dowtin's claims — either his claim that pretrial identification procedures were unconstitutionally suggestive or his claim that the state's evidence was legally insufficient to prove his identity and the district court never identified "which specific issue," 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3), satisfied the standard for a COA. But Dowtin explicitly informs us that "[t]he only issue before this Court concerns the suggestive manner by which the police [secured] the identification evidence in this case," and the state discusses only this claim as well, so we understand the issue certified for appeal to be the suggestibility claim. We assume the parties' familiarity with the facts and procedural history.

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We affirm the district court's judgment because regardless of whether the pretrial identification procedures were unconstitutionally suggestive, Dowtin has procedurally defaulted this claim. did not raise the suggestiveness claim on direct appeal to the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, and thus has not properly presented it to the state courts. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). State-court remedies for this claimed violation are no longer available because Dowtin has already taken his one direct appeal and this claim is procedurally barred from consideration on a collateral attack on his conviction. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 440.10(2)(c); People v. Dowtin, No. 273/95, slip 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 28, 2003) (finding Dowtin's suggestiveness claim procedurally barred on collateral review of the conviction under § 440.10(2)(c) because it was unjustifiably not raised on direct appeal). Dowtin's claim is therefore procedurally defaulted, and Dowtin can obtain federal habeas relief

only by showing either cause and prejudice for the default or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485, 495-96 (1986).

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Dowtin has not attempted to show cause for his procedural default of this claim in the Appellate Division. Dowtin does argue that any procedural default must be excused because a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result otherwise. To prove a fundamental miscarriage of justice, Dowtin must show that a constitutional violation probably resulted in his conviction despite his actual innocence. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321-25 (1995) (linking miscarriages of justice to actual innocence); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993) ("In our collateral-review jurisprudence, the term 'miscarriage of justice' means that the defendant is actually innocent."); Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496.

Dowtin argues that he is actually innocent of the crimes at issue here, claiming that he could have been at the scene of the shooting as an innocent bystander. But eyewitness Rodrique Kelly had an unobstructed view of the shooter while pulling his car out of his shop, and Pascal Kelly's recognition of Dowtin as the shooter was based the clothes that Dowtin was wearing that day (which matched the clothes that Rodrigue Kelly saw on the shooter), evidence that would be untainted by a suggestive lineup. Further, the victim of the shooting also confirmed that the shooter was wearing the type of jacket that Rodrigue Kelly and Pascal Kelly Finally, Dowtin has not supported his claim of actual saw. innocence with any "new reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not presented at trial." Schlup, 512 U.S. at 324. For all these reasons, we find that no fundamental miscarriage of justice excuses the procedural default. Accordingly, federal habeas relief is precluded.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment is ${\bf AFFIRMED}\,.$

FOR THE COURT:
Roseann B. MacKechnie, Clerk

By:
Lucille Carr, Deputy Clerk