HON. FRANCOIS XAVIER MARTIN. 25 acting under his authority, to suspend the regular operation of the laws, and the writ of habeas corpus; and he demonstrated by unanswerable arguments, and by the highest authority both in the United States and in England, that it can only be done by Legislative authority. He showed that in England, martial law could not be declared to the extent contended for but by the authority of Parliament, and that even during the invasion of the Pretender, the Crown did not assume that power, but referred it to the decision of Parliament. The second point involved also an important question of constitutional law, and the application of that clause in the Constitution of the United States, which prohibits the State Legislatures from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts. Upon this part of the case, he argued that the obligation of the contract referred to in the Constitution consisted in the necessity every man is under, inforo legisj to do or not to do a particular thing : that the Constitution spoke of the legal obligation rather than the moral, and that any law assuming to interfere between the debtor and the creditor, and absolutely recalling the power which the creditor enjoys of compelling his debtor, in foro legis, to perform his contract, would be a law impairing its obligation : and that a law destroying or impairing the remedy is as unconstitutional as one affecting the right in the same manner. He goes on to show that a law procrastinating the creditor in his remedy, generally speaking, destroys a part of the right, on the prin-ple that he who pays later pays less—mimus solvit que serins solvit. But he continues : " It does not necessarily follow that an act called for by other circumstances than the apparent necessity of relieving debtors, one of the consequences of which is nevertheless to work some delay in the prosecution of suits, and consequently to retard the recovery and payment of debts, must always be declared unconstitutional. In making a contract, each party must know that his legal remedy must depend on the laws of the country in which he may institute his suit. That the lex loci as to his remedy, even in the States that compose the Federal Union, is susceptible of juridical improvement. That the number of Courts of original and appellate jurisdiction, the nature and extent of the respective jurisdiction of these, the number, time and duration of their sessions, must from time to time, especially in new and growing settlements, be regulated by the Legislature, according to the wants and exigencies of the country." He adds that in times of war, domestic commotion or epidemy, circumstances may imperiously demand for a while even a total suspension of judicial proceedings : that under such circumstances, ibs