Documents 78-97
The Acheson Mediation,
June-September 1964
78. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State/1/
New York, June 27, 1964, 3:25 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis-TUG.
4651. Re: Cyprus. Stevenson, Cleveland and Yost had rather discouraging conversation with SYG this afternoon.
When told that Tuomioja had informed us he intended to dispatch invitation to USG to send representative to Geneva to be available during his conversations with Greek and Turkish representatives, SYG said he had never contemplated that Mediator would go so far and that it would be most unwise politically. He repeated what he had said yesterday that this might provoke withdrawal of confidence in Mediator by Cypriot Govt.
He was, however, prepared to advise Tuomioja that, if Acheson comes to Geneva during Greek-Turkish conversations, he would recommend to both parties that they meet separately or collectively with Acheson and express view US could make unique contribution to negotiations.
In course of conversation, SYG expanded somewhat on his conversation with Papandreou yesterday, reporting that PM, while prepared to have his representative meet with Turks and Mediator at latter's request, saw no real use in meeting since he thought both parties would merely repeat known positions. As far as Greece is concerned, he added, Cyprus is independent state and UN member, and its only obligation is to decide its future by democratic principles laid down in Charter. Turks must simply accept such settlement, although there can be NATO base on Cyprus with Turkish participation and international guarantees for Turkish minority.
It was left that Stevenson would communicate with SYG after he meets with Papandreou this evening and that, unless new complications appeared, Thant would communicate with Tuomioja in Helsinki, urging him to dispatch invitations to GOT and GOG promptly, to get meetings started as soon as possible, and advising him under circumstances described above, he should recommend parties meet with Acheson.
Incidentally, it was also mentioned that Galo Plaza has informed SYG he intends to leave Cyprus end of first week in July since he believes there is nothing more he can do unless and until there is progress toward political settlement.
Stevenson
79. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, June 29, 1964, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis-TUG. Repeated to USUN.
1422. Re Deptel 978./2/ In hour-long conversation with President this morning we discussed number of subjects, principal among them the problem of Tylliria area and Grivas return. (Latter covered in separate telegram.)/3/
/2/Telegram 978 to Nicosia, June 28, instructed Belcher to convey to Makarios the reality of the danger of a Turkish intervention and the likelihood that the United States would be unable to deter such action. (Ibid.)
/3/Telegram 1427 from Nicosia, June 30. (Ibid.)
Conversation opened by my reference to recent Washington talks in which I followed point by point suggestions outlined reftel 978. I made special point of fact that my reason for bringing up subject of Tylliria was with reference to present delicate situation outlined to me by my old friend Galo Plaza and General Gyani. As in past I was again urging restraint and patience since any dramatic development might well bring on new Turkish move which we might not be in a position stop again.
In response Makarios said first of all we should not read too much into his statement to Associated Press./4/ His purpose had been to avoid possible adverse reaction to "expected failure" of Washington talks, hence his effort to play them down while at same time making clear that any decisions regarding future of Cyprus would have to be submitted to Cypriots and could not be result merely of talks between other countries. Said he quite understood US effort in context of over-all UNSYG attempt to find satisfactory solution but he wondered whether failure of Pres Johnson's efforts had not perhaps left situation worse than it had been two weeks ago. I told him that although matter would be kept confidential for obvious reason we understood Mediator had some further thoughts regarding possibility of further consultations among parties concerned (I did not mention any US involvement and he would presumably be hearing from Tuomioja upon his return). Makarios went on to make surprise statement that in any bilateral talks that might develop with Turkey, Greek Government could only discuss solutions on the basis of enosis of Cyprus with Greece and that any solution other than enosis and/or complete independence could only be reached with participation of Cypriot representatives. (This would seem to explain Papandreou's refusal consider any possible divergences from these two principles.)
/4/Apparent reference to Makarios' rejection of the U.S. offer to provide assistance to the U.N. Mediator.
Archbishop said that both Plaza and Gyani had called to impress on him need for patience and restraint but said he had told them that although he would not use armed force that the status quo could not continue indefinitely. He said he had feeling UN would consider its job well done in next three months if it could say that not a shot had been fired. Naturally this was most commendable aim but without some progress on political front basic tensions at least on Greek side could hardly be reduced. Some change would have to come before the end of the year when economic and political pressures would be severe.
President went on to say he could understand our apprehension regarding the present tense situation particularly with regard to possible Turkish intervention and all that would imply. Said he could assure me that for their part Greek Cypriots would not use force unless attacked. They were however giving serious consideration to use of other pressures which he had enumerated to me previously and he again said that if freedom of movement not restored in presently Turkish-held areas, his govt would be forced to deny freedom of movement to Turkish Cypriots.
I expressed gratification at this indication that Greek Cypriot side would do nothing to create a new crisis through military action and I urged him to give very careful consideration to nature of other pressures which he might feel were required in order not to bring on new danger of Turkish intervention which this time we might find even more difficult if not impossible to prevent. Although I had made it quite clear that US could not contemplate hostilities with an ally over Cyprus problem I am not convinced that Archbishop has accepted this as cold fact of situation.
President was more relaxed than during last meeting and seemed much less militant in his declarations of need for progress on political front. Perhaps UN reps plus Greek Amb Delivanis plus our representations have had some effect.
Belcher
80. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Washington, July 1, 1964, 9:17 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis-TUG. Drafted by Bundy, cleared by Talbot, and approved by Ball. In a July 1 memorandum to the President, Bundy commented that Ball felt a letter to Papandreou was needed as a stern reminder of the dangers created by Papandreou's resistance to real negotiations. Bundy further commented: "Papandreou will not like this letter, any more than Inonu liked your letter of June 5. But that is not the point now." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 6)
6. For Chargé. Please deliver soonest following letter from President Johnson to Prime Minister:
"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I want to tell you again how glad I am that we had an opportunity to visit together and to exchange views on the critical problem of Cyprus. I know that the course of the discussion was not altogether easy for either of us, but I am sure that it is of great importance for those of us who bear the responsibility for government within the Western Alliance to talk honestly together on such grave matters. It is out of just such hard work together that we can ensure a high degree of understanding.
Over this last weekend I have been thinking some more about our conversation and about the problem of Cyprus, and I think it may be helpful for me to continue our discussion by sending this message to you as you return to Athens.
First of all, let me say that the last week has only strengthened my deep conviction that the problem of Cyprus grows more urgent and dangerous with every day that goes by. Until we can get serious negotiations started, we must recognize that time will not work on the side of peace. Right now we are coming near to the last hour. That is why I hope our two Governments can agree in the view that in this very dangerous situation it is absolutely essential that serious and searching talks should be started promptly.
I promise you that my conviction that we are at the edge of a crisis is not lightly formed. It rests on two powerful facts: the first is that passion on Cyprus is now intense on both sides, and the second, that the build-up of armaments on the Island continues. This is a condition which is bound to become increasingly explosive; indeed, the build-up of armaments on the Island is already dangerously close to the flash point. And even without an immediate explosion the belief that danger is steadily increasing could at any time create pressures for intervention in Turkey which may prove irresistible. Having prevented such intervention by most strenuous personal efforts last month, I know very well that there is a limit to what any of us can do from now on, to prevent the Turks from exercising rights which are very real indeed to them.
I see only one way in the world to turn the course of events away from this pathway toward disaster, and that is by a prompt and determined search by Greece and Turkey for a permanent political settlement. I recognize that such a joint effort will have some critics and opponents on all sides, and I recognize also the quite understandable belief of many in your country that all that is needed is that the majority of the people of Cyprus should be allowed to settle their own future. But let me urge with all the force I can, that it simply is not enough, in this most dangerous situation, to have a belief in the rightness of one's own argument. The pressures on Turkey for action are extremely strong, and they too derive from a deep conviction that Turkish rights are at stake.
As I said in our discussions, the United States most earnestly desires to be helpful in the search for a solution, but the United States does not seek to impose any outside view, or to take sides with one of its friends against another. Our conviction is that any successful solution must derive from the agreement of the parties and cannot be dictated or imposed from outside. But we shall be just as helpful as we can to both our friends, once a serious discussion begins.
Moved by my sense of the increasing danger of this question, let me say once again, as solemnly as possible, how much I hope that the Government of Greece will be able to join in a prompt and determined effort to seek through negotiation a lasting answer to this perilous problem. It is in this spirit that I hope your representative will be empowered to discuss all aspects of the Cyprus problem with the mediator and the Turkish representative. I hope also that his instructions may be so framed that our American representative will also be able to help in bringing about a settlement. In such discussions, neither side must insist that there is only one acceptable basis for discussion; both sides--and all of us who hope to be helpful--must approach these negotiations with a resolute determination to work out a peaceful answer.
Let me say again in closing that I fully recognize your responsibility not only to join in preserving peace but to uphold the principles of your Government and the rights of your people in accordance with your duty as the leader of Greece. You can be sure that the United States, in urging negotiation and in offering help to the mediator, intends no disregard whatever of the rights of Greeks and of Turks in their homelands and on Cyprus. My conviction is simple: that the real interests of the peoples and the real responsibilities of their leaders can be met if there is real negotiation--and that if there is not such negotiation, none of us can prevent a disaster for which all of us will be held accountable.
Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson"
Rusk
81. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, July 2, 1964, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis-TUG.
18. Ref: Deptel 06./2/ I transmitted President Johnson's letter to PriMin Papandreou today at 1 p.m. As I arrived Papandreou was conferring with Defense Minister Garoufalias and Cypriot leaders Georkatzis and Illiades who excused themselves, leaving us alone.
/2/Document 80.
During reading of President's letter, PriMin's expression was serious even grim. After having read letter he commented, "more of the same." Everyone in Washington, he said, applied pressure on him to negotiate as though negotiation were the magic formula, but he had not heard one specific suggestion in Washington as to what he is to negotiate about, or what US would consider an acceptable solution. Because of danger of armed Turkish intervention, Greece is urged to make concessions. But what concessions is Greece to make, what rights are Turks giving up which require that they be compensated by Greece. Greece asks nothing from Cyprus. This is not basically a Greek-Turkish problem. There are questions of principle involved, one of which is independence, self-determination and integrity of Cyprus.
I am told, he said, that I must negotiate because if I do not negotiate the Turks will resort to armed intervention. The US has exhausted its efforts to restrain Turks and responsibility for the peace thus rests upon Greece. Mr. McNamara pointed out to me how powerful Turkish military forces are, but Greece cannot act under pressure of ultimatum. We did not accept an ultimatum from our enemies in 1940,/3/ and it is very difficult for us to accept an ultimatum today from our friends. How can a nation (US) maintain its position as the leader of free world unless it has a policy? How can it fail to continue to support principle of self-determination? How can US fail to say to Turkey--or to Greece for that matter: "the arms which you possess are arms which we have given you for the purpose of self-defense. We (US) will not accept that our arms be used in an aggressive manner, risking the danger of war, perhaps a small war, but one which could escalate into a large war." How can Greece's NATO allies fail to tell the Turks that they do not accept aggressive actions which may precipitate a war. Greece can accept a political struggle; Greece can accept debate in the UN and in NATO; but Greece cannot accept a policy which justifies the use of force.
/3/Reference is to the Greek Government rejection of an ultimatum from Italy.
Papandreou said de Gaulle had agreed that Cypriot right to self-determination must be respected and that Turkish threats of armed intervention were unacceptable. Papandreou gave no intimation that de Gaulle may have been alluding to right of both Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities to self-determination.
I replied GOG would be making a serious error in interpreting Washington's analysis of current situation as an ultimatum, and I asked whether he did not have feeling that although there may be serious differences of view regarding tactics, US and GOG were, in fact, moving in same general direction. Prime Minister did not answer directly, but excused himself for bluntness of his statement and promised that he would reply tomorrow (sic) to President's letter./4/
/4/Papandreou replied to this letter on July 6, defending Greek policy. A copy of that letter is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 6.
I inquired whether press reports that Nikolareizis (Greek Ambassador to Belgrade) would be sent to Geneva were correct. He confirmed this and added that Nikolareizis arriving in Athens tomorrow to report to him prior to going to Geneva. I said that I was confident that Washington would be very much gratified by his decision to send such an experienced diplomat to Geneva.
Comment: Papandreou made no effort conceal his disappointment at failure Greek position evoke greater understanding and sympathy in Washington, as well as certain irritation at what he considers implied US threat to stand aside in event of new Turk decision intervene militarily. Papandreou's Washington visit has probably produced some bruises which will be slow in disappearing. Although he spoke with obvious [garble--agitation] he was not abusive or discourteous.
I think we should consider appointment Nikolareizis as gesture in our direction even though it may not presage immediate substantive changes in GOG position.
Anschuetz
82. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, July 7, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 2. Top Secret. Drafted by Harold H. Saunders.
SUBJECT
NSC Meeting July 7, 1964 at 12 Noon on Cyprus
PARTICIPANTS
See Attached List/2/
/2/Not found.
Secretary Ball led off the discussion of Cyprus by telling the President he thought it would be useful to report to the NSC on a situation which was like a time bomb that could blow up any time in the next six weeks. His report largely reflected the State Department memorandum submitted prior to the meeting./3/
/3/A memorandum entitled "Talking Paper for the Under Secretary at NSC Meeting," July 6, outlined the current situation in Cyprus and the options available to the United States. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Meeting July 7, 1964)
One of the principal problems, he said, is irrationality on both sides. The Greeks figure time is on their side. They think they can work out a plebiscite followed by enosis simply by sitting tight. The threat of Turk invasion has roused their stubbornness and Athens seems blind to its long-range interest in conceding enough to Ankara to provide a basis for improved relations after a Cyprus settlement. The Turks, on the other hand, see their position being eroded day by day. They resent our having restrained them when chances for a successful invasion were best, and they are bitter over Greek and Cypriot disregard of the London-Zurich treaties. They see a political solution as the only alternative to exercising their right of intervention.
Pressures are building up, Mr. Ball went on. The Greeks have sent 4000 troops to the island (CIA believes 5-7000), in addition to their regular garrison there. The Turks, who have to put their men ashore at night from small boats, have sent perhaps 1000 in addition to their garrison. The Turks see the Greek buildup outrunning theirs and their hope of successful intervention vanishing. Meanwhile, General Grivas--a fanatic, fortunately anti-Communist--has taken over the Greek Cypriot forces and hopes to build an army of some 35,000 men. The Turks have a lurking fear that Grivas may overthrow Makarios suddenly and simply announce annexation of Cyprus to Greece. So the pressure on the Turks to act soon is increasing. Moreover, the Turks know of the Greek plan, if the situation drags on through the summer, to throw the whole question to the UN General Assembly where the Greeks are confident they will get a blessing for self-determination leading to enosis. On top of this, incidents could trigger Turk Cypriot rebellion or island-wide fighting at any time.
We are staking our bets of necessity on the Geneva talks, Mr. Ball continued. Acheson has arrived. The arrangements made for him there are not good but are the best we have been able to work out. He had his first talk with the UN Mediator yesterday and reports an atmosphere of pessimism. However, we hope his further discussions before talks with the Greeks and Turks begin early the week of 13 July may improve the atmosphere. Meanwhile, we are doing extensive contingency planning to limit the scope of a Greek-Turk war if the Turks invade and to keep bloodshed on Cyprus to a minimum. We are also considering how we should handle ourselves in the UN Security Council and how we might develop safehavens for refugees on the island. On 9 July we are holding a meeting here with the British and Canadians to see what pressure they can bring to bear on the Greeks. We are also studying seriously the problem of evacuating officials and tourists should war break out.
At that point the President broke in to ask how many Americans are in the area. Mr. Ball replied that there are about 250 on Cyprus, mostly with our communications facilities there. Since we went through an evacuation exercise earlier this year, he contemplates little difficulty there./4/ In Greece there are 5-6000 Americans and in Turkey 16-17,000. However, he felt that danger in the mainland countries of a severe anti-American reaction would not be great.
/4/In January 1964, the United States evacuated the families of officials working in Cyprus.
The President then asked whether Papandreou had replied to his letter (of 2 July)./5/ Mr. Ball said the reply had just come in and that it was simply a pro forma reiteration of the Greek position and really did not take us anywhere./6/ The President said he wanted to see that letter as soon as possible.
/5/See Document 80.
/6/See footnote 4, Document 81.
There followed a detailed briefing by Gen. Burchinal on the military forces that would participate in any hostilities on Cyprus. The attached memorandum records the substance of this briefing./7/ Mr. Ball, at the end of the briefing, highlighted the fact that the Turk goal is limited to establishing a beachhead for bargaining purposes; the Turks do not want the kind of war that complete conquest would require. Mr. Ball also estimated that perhaps 20-25,000 villagers might be slaughtered once an invasion started. General Burchinal suggested that Turk air mastery might prove some deterrent since Greek villages would be vulnerable. No one responded, but the feeling seemed to be that this would only increase the carnage.
/7/Not found.
The President summarized his understanding in these terms: The Turks have substantially greater forces than the Greeks in every respect; they could land and maintain a beachhead; and the Soviets would not intervene. General Burchinal confirmed the President's understanding, estimating Turk army superiority at 3-1 and air force at 4-1. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
Secretary McNamara elaborated on the President's last point, saying we didn't think the Soviets would intervene militarily but they would unquestionably try to make political hay out of any disorder on Cyprus. General Wheeler added that a prime Soviet objective is the fragmentation of NATO and any Greek-Turk hostilities would further that end.
The President moved on to the question of what our next steps might be and asked whether there is anything further we can do to prevent Turkish invasion and to assure the success of the Geneva talks. He pointed out that the Greeks didn't expect much to come of these talks and have shown a good deal of irritation at the way we treated them during Papandreou's visit here.
Mr. Ball felt that the President had seriously shaken Papandreou with his statement that the US would not militarily restrain a Turkish invasion. He felt we had gained some ground with the Greeks during that visit. Mr. Bundy felt less optimistic, noting Greek peevishness over the President's latest letter.
The President recalled that Papandreou had pressed for a US formula when he was here. Mr. Ball pointed out the pitfalls of providing one at the outset of discussions. He said that Mr. Acheson is well prepared to introduce the elements of such a formula in the course of the Geneva talks. However, if we presented a US solution in advance, he felt both parties would attack it and walk out. The President agreed.
Secretary McNamara brought up the desirability of using General Lemnitzer and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to bring home to the Greek and Turk military that a clash between them would be suicidal. Mr. Ball said General Lemnitzer was bearish on this idea because he did not feel the Greek military had much influence over its political leaders. His previous talks with them had netted little./8/ However, the NAC will be meeting 8 July and we expect a strong Canadian challenge to the Greeks based on reports that Greek NATO units and materiel are now on Cyprus. Both Secretaries McNamara and Ball, however, favored instructing General Lemnitzer to go ahead and tell the Turk and Greek military again what we have told the political leaders. While Papandreou seems to have absorbed the President's warning, the military leaders still apparently feel that we will stop a Turk invasion and that no move they make really risks a direct Greek-Turk confrontation.
/8/See Document 5.
The President asked General Wheeler whether we have taken into account the demands that a Turkish invasion would place on NATO. General Wheeler felt we had examined the consequences carefully. He was concerned particularly about how the Turks would receive a direct US rebuff. However, he did not feel Turkey would "fall into the Soviet Bloc." He felt the strength of Greek Communists made Greece potentially very unstable. Ultimately he saw both Greece and Turkey lost to NATO if hostilities were permitted to go on very long.
The Attorney General suggested another approach. He asked about the possibility of organizing an effort to explain to influential elements other than the military and government in Greece and Turkey what the situation would be if either country took the steps it is contemplating. In other words, would the Turks like the situation that would exist after they secured a beachhead on Cyprus--carnage in the Turk Cypriot villages, world opinion against them, Greece less willing than ever to negotiate a settlement? Would the Greeks welcome a Turk foothold on Cyprus, the economic disruption of a Greek-Turk war, possibly defeat of Greek forces? Wouldn't there be some deterrent effect in getting across to influential Greeks and Turks an objective analysis of the situation they will have to cope with if they don't negotiate now?
Mr. Bundy asked Mr. Ball whether we could not do this sort of thing through our embassies. He felt that embassy involvement might create a clearer view in Ankara and Athens of our concern. Mr. Ball felt that it would be very difficult to do anything of this kind publicly because of the irrational atmosphere in both capitals. Anything we do, he said, gives the appearance of our working for the other side. For instance, if we described the terrible consequences of a Greek-Turk war, the Greeks would simply ask why, then, we would refuse to stop a Turk invasion. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
When the President asked how much of the position we took in the Washington talks has "dribbled down to the Greek and Turk populace", Mr. Ball said that the average Greek thinks we're holding the gun of a Turk invasion at Greek heads to force a deal. The Turks feel that, because we restrained their invasion, we're pro-Greek. So the people have very stereotyped views of our position. In the current hysterical atmosphere, it is very difficult to put across a reasonable explanation of our goals.
Secretary McNamara asked whether we couldn't stimulate leading Greek citizens to brief their own press and make it more aware of the consequences of the present course of events. For instance, could we get Onassis and others of his importance to explain the economic consequences of provoking a Greek-Turk war?/9/ He did not feel we could do this directly but felt perhaps Mr. McCone might have some suggestions to offer.
/9/Documentation relating to subsequent contacts with Aristotle Onassis are in Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8, and ibid., Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Cyprus Miscellaneous and Cyprus: Proposed Solutions.
The Attorney General said he did not see any objection to our being associated with such an effort. He felt that we would be talking simply about the facts of a potential situation, not about controversial positions. Mr. Bundy asked Mr. Ball how painful it might be if such a campaign came out of Paris--from NAC members and NATO officers there. Mr. Ball agreed that the farther from Washington the better and pointed out that the UN Secretary General could also do some of this if he would.
Mr. Bundy wrapped up this part of the discussion by suggesting to the President that we draw up a program for mounting such a campaign just to see what it looks like. The President instructed him to do so with the help of the agencies involved.
Mr. Bundy then moved to the problem of how we get the Geneva talks going. He felt that the Greeks could get what they wanted if they would just sit down and talk and asked whether we shouldn't use this argument with them. Secretary Ball said he had done just this during his luncheon with Papandreou. However, he pointed out that it is difficult to carry this argument much further than private conversations because the Turks could easily construe it as a US-Greek deal.
Mr. McCone asked whether the real problem wasn't what the Turks would get out of these talks rather than how we could satisfy the Greeks. He said he hadn't seen any evidence of a formula that would meet Turk needs. Mr. Ball said he felt we could put together a package which the Turks would think pretty good if we could once get the two parties together.
The President returned to the question of how we might bring pressure to bear on the two governments. He asked Mr. Wilson how seriously concerned the people of each country are about what is going on. Mr. Wilson responded that the people of Turkey particularly are frustrated by their government's inability to act in the current situation and pointed out the danger that such frustration would lead to impulsive action. He did not feel, however, that the people had thought through the consequences of a Turkish invasion. He felt we could draw up a list of people in Paris, Athens, and Ankara who might be useful in creating a more realistic view of the consequences of invasion.
Mr. Talbot brought the discussion back to Geneva by pointing out that we can't count on the Greeks to act in their own best interests. We can't rely simply on a campaign to make people aware of the consequences of their action--especially when they are acting irrationally. Therefore, he felt our best hope was in pushing the negotiations in Geneva.
The President reacted by saying if we are to succeed there we will need more power than we have had to date. We did our best during the Washington talks to convince both Greeks and Turks to negotiate. Now we are going to make another approach to the Turk military in an effort to get them to throw their weight into the scales on the side of moderation. He saw no reason why we should not explore every way of getting a reasonable view of the situation across to important people in both countries.
In conclusion, the President outlined two courses of action: (a) our military in Paris would make clear to the Greek and Turk military what consequences they could anticipate if either nation moved militarily; (b) we should also draw up a plan for getting this understanding across to as many influential people in both countries as possible./10/
/10/Efforts to make the consequences of military action clear were outlined in a July 8 memorandum from Talbot to Bundy. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 9)
With that the meeting adjourned.
83. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, July 11, 1964, 2 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Exdis.
92. From Acheson./2/ We had amicable hour and quarter meeting this morning with Erim and Alacam. I began by suggesting we consider Turkey's security needs with regard to Cyprus. I mentioned possibility Turkish base on Karpas Peninsula. Erim countered by putting forward Turkey's desired partition line, enclosing whole northern part of island and went on to give us standard Turkish position: that first Turkish demand was implementation London-Zurich Agreements and that failing this Turkey could only consider partition or federalism. We tried to point out probable impracticality of achieving any of these.
/2/On July 4, the Department of State announced that Acheson would go to Geneva at the President's request to provide assistance in helping to resolve the Cyprus crisis. Acheson held his first meeting with Turkish representatives on July 9.
I touched on probable great cost to Turkey and Turkish Cypriots of solution which Turks would have to impose by force. Erim then took new tack, saying that after all Turkey could let Greece effect enosis as fait accompli, without fighting Greece, but refuse to recognize it and maintain continuing pressures against Greece in hope situation would change for better. I expressed great doubts Turkey's position would improve under such circumstances.
Speaking next about Turkey's concern for welfare Turk-Cypriots we broached idea that this might be taken care of without partition and within context of enosis. For example, I said, there could be a Turkish base large enough to be safe haven for those Turks unwilling to live under Greek rule, while for the other Turks a special semi-autonomous regime could be set up. This might comprise one or more areas where Turks were in majority (such as strip from northern Nicosia to Kyrenia) which would be administered directly by Turkish local authorities: for those areas where Turks remained in minority, there might still be arrangement whereby a Turk-Cypriot authority would nevertheless control and administer local affairs of Turkish villagers.
Erim seemed intrigued with this idea and said he would like to think about it. He asked whether base-safe haven area would be sovereign Turkish territory, a part of Turkey. We stretched matter a bit and said yes. He then suggested it would be desirable for a Turkish military expert come here to discuss what would be needed on Cyprus to protect Turkey from military point of view. Proposed to send for General Sunalp. I raised no objection./3/
/3/In telegram 96 from Geneva, July 13, Acheson reported that he had put forward a scheme for a semi-autonomous Turkish area that would not require geographic division. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP)
Erim flatly admitted Turks were going to expel Greeks from Turkey at end six-month period following denunciation of treaty as reprisal for Greek policies toward Cypriots. He further strongly indicated that Patriarchate would also be expelled, even though Turk Government had nothing special against Athenagoros. I said that expulsion of Greeks was not sufficient lever to affect Cyprus question at present. It would be more sensible to keep this weapon in reserve to be used in reprisal if Greeks later failed live up to guarantees they might give Turk Cypriots.
When we were discussing Turkish security problem, Erim particularly pointed out location of Kastellorizon. I asked if Turkey's security would be improved if it had this island, and he said that it would. At another juncture, Erim referred to remarks made to him while in Washington that possibly Greek islands of Lesvos, Samos or Kos might be ceded as compensation for Cyprus. We rather threw cold water on this. I do think, however, that his apparent interest in Kastellorizon may have some significance.
Expect to see Turks again early next week.
Tubby
84. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, July 12, 1964, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
76. 1. I had long talk with FonMin Costopoulos yesterday on Cyprus situation./2/ Reviewing Washington talks, he said Greek side had been struck and disappointed by rigidity of US position. Greeks had hoped for some substantive response to Papandreou's proposals for a solution and were surprised that President and Washington officials "concentrated only on procedure without touching on substance." They had feeling of great pressure exerted to force face-to-face talks with Turks, whereas they had cautioned us ahead of time they would not do so under existing circumstances, and they wanted our ideas as to a substantive solution.
/2/Labouisse met with King Constantine the same day for discussions on Cyprus. He reported on this meeting in telegram 75 from Athens, July 12. (Ibid.)
2. For my part, I explained again great disappointment in Washington over what appeared to us to be most rigid position of PriMin, going over much of ground covered in talks and stressing what to me seemed to be "unconditional surrender" nature of Papandreou's position.
3. During talk, Costopoulos acknowledged that there had been no pressure in Washington for Papandreou-Inonu meeting. (This has also been acknowledged by Andreas Papandreou in conversation with Embassy officer.)
4. Geneva talks. Although Costopoulos personally believes that Greco-Turkish talks could prove useful, he said that Papandreou still adamant against bilateral talks with the Turks so long as Turkish threat continues. "If either Turkey or the United States will remove that threat, such bilateral talks can be held."
5. I then questioned Costopoulos about Nicolareizis' instructions, saying I hoped very much that they were broad enough to permit frank discussions with Acheson. He replied that Nicolareizis' instructions included authorization to talk to Acheson, to exchange views with him and to report, but not to engage in "negotiations." Constopoulos said he would want to keep in closest touch with me as things developed in Geneva. We trust that Dept and Acheson will keep us fully informed to permit us to attempt to stimulate appropriate responses from GOG.
6. Grivas. Costopoulos believes Grivas is gaining control of irregular forces on island, and he observed that there had been no marked reaction either from the Turks or British about his presence there. He added that it was important to remember that Grivas is main hope against Communists and that Makarios had had to go along so far.
7. FonMin stated that there was no question of Grivas and Makarios acting together to establish enosis.
8. Greek troops. Costopoulos asserted figures about presence Greek troops in Cyprus greatly exaggerated. He admitted that some non-coms had gone to Cyprus in past months in effort gain control of irregulars (this stated to us some time ago by Papandreou). In addition, some 800 Greek soldiers of Cypriot extraction had gone to island--"lets call them deserters." Only others were about one thousand Greek-Cypriot students who recently returned to island as part of Grivas' following.
9. FonMin expressed irritation over Canadian criticism of Greeks, when Turks have infiltrated many more into Cyprus.
10. Suggested approach to solution. Costopoulos said that in conversation with de Gaulle, Greeks had taken same line as in Washington. But idea was developed during talks of some sort of "regionalism" on island--"something like Alsace." Costopoulos was vague as to who suggested this, but gave the impression it came from the Greek side. He was explicit in saying that de Gaulle supported this idea. I probed to find what exactly was intended by suggestion, but Costopoulos was not clear as to practical workings. His explanation was to effect that an arrangement might be worked out which would ensure Cypriot sovereignty of whole island (subject to later enosis), full protection of minorities and some "Alsatian-type regionalism" which was neither partition nor federalism. Although I am not at all certain as to the implications of this suggestion, it seems to me to be well worth exploration.
11. Costopolous repeated that territorial concessions were out of question, "except possibly something like Kastellorizon."
Recommend Dept pass foregoing Ankara and Acheson.
Labouisse
85. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, July 14, 1964, 10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
114. From Acheson. Met with Greek rep Nikolareisis for more than an hour this morning. I gave him fairly lengthy exposition of our informal ideas, prefacing my remarks by saying this should not be considered an "American plan" but rather suggests ways we would like to explore with all concerned. I spoke of the three Turkish requisites: national prestige, national security and welfare of Turkish-Cypriots. Also pointed out no solution could be pleasing to both sides and anything agreed upon in end likely to be displeasing to both. If this resulted in criticism directed at me or US Government, we were prepared to accept it.
As I had previously done with Turk, I spoke of possibility that sovereign base area on Cyprus, for example Karpas Peninsula, might meet minimum Turkish security requisites. Suggested this area should be large enough to provide sort of safe haven for Turk-Cypriots in times of communal disturbances.
I said it seemed to me that neither enosis by itself, nor double enosis nor federalism would necessarily solve problem of securing welfare Turk-Cypriots. Even under Turks own preferred solutions, there would undoubtedly still remain Turkish minorities in Greek-ruled part of island. I was inclined to dismiss double enosis or federalism in any case, I said, because I saw no way to impose these arrangements on hostile Greek-Cypriots.
Therefore, I had been thinking of arrangement within framework of some sort of enosis which would give Turk-Cypriots assurance that not only their lives but their property, business, and way of life would be safeguarded. This might be done through a special arrangement, under overall Greek sovereignty, which would take advantage of flexibility inherent in Greek administrative system. Perhaps one or two small areas on island, such as stretch north from Turkish quarter of Nicosia, might be designated as Eparchis and given local self-rule under Turkish Eparch who would, of course, be responsible to higher Greek authority. Another form of local self-rule could be devised for Turks in rest of island, also subject to overall Greek rule.
To ensure that Turks would feel confidence in arrangement of this kind, I considered it necessary that there be some international authority, possibly a UN commissioner of sort which had operated in Danzig and Saar between World Wars I and II, empowered to receive and investigate complaints and make recommendations for corrective action. In turn, there could be right of appeal to International Court of Justice.
Nikolareisis listened intently, took notes and asked number of questions. His only real comment was that he feared his government's public position was pretty far from the sort of thing I had outlined. He pointed out that so far GOG talked publicly only about full independence with right of self-determination, not about enosis. I reminded him of my earlier comment that no solution would be fully agreeable to all parties. However, if Greece and Turkey could come to meeting of minds, we could then deal with the problem of how to get a solution accepted by Makarios and Cypriots generally. Jernegan suggested that at such time GOG should mobilize all its assets (propaganda and other) to create popular demand on island for enosis.
During our polite preliminary exchanges, Nikolareisis said that he had had a long talk yesterday with Mediator who had expressed pleasure at my presence here and had asked him to discuss matters with me. Nikolareisis asked that I get in touch with him whenever I wished. We agreed that each should feel free to talk to the other whenever he had anything to talk about, but I said I probably would want to give him time to report and get reaction from Athens on what I had said. He emphasized and I agreed that these talks should be kept extremely secret.
My impression is that Nikolareisis takes his function seriously and will do his best to convey our thoughts and relay those of GOG to us, but his attitude today certainly bears out previous word that he is not authorized at this point to negotiate. Real test will no doubt come when he gets Athens view on my remarks today. I certainly went rather farther in accepting enosis as good solution than, I believe, any of us has done previously. If anything will induce Papandreou to embark on meaningful dialogue, this should do it.
Tubby
86. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, July 15, 1964, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
132. From Acheson. We met again with Turks this afternoon, and I handed them copies of piece of paper in reply to Erim's questions which he sent me following yesterday's talk./2/ My memorandum, text of which is being telegraphed separately,/3/ contained in fair detail outline compromise plan which I had previously sketched orally to Turks and to Greeks. It also contained certain arguments in rebuttal of military objections raised yesterday by Sunalp./4/
/2/Not found.
/3/Telegram 129 from Geneva, July 15. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP)
/4/Sunalp posed a series of military objections to Acheson's suggestion during a July 14 meeting. Acheson reported on these talks in telegram 117 from Geneva, July 14. (Ibid.)
After reading paper carefully, Erim opened by saying he still considered that full partition, with space for all Turkish-Cypriots, was only satisfactory answer to problem. Failing that, no safeguards could protect Turk minority against long-term pressures which would be exerted by Greek majority. Once again cited case of Crete and added Western Thrace as examples proving that Greeks always found means to make life unendurable for Turkish minority.
He then said paper I had given him, nevertheless, provided "first sign of way out" he had seen. Questioning brought out that he meant that paper accepted principle of Turkish sovereignty on part of Cyprus. Once this was granted, Turks would have firm basis for claiming full area they would need to accommodate all Turk-Cypriots. They could show, as they had explained to me yesterday, that they were entitled to an area of the island proportionate to their percentage of its population and its present land ownership, plus their proportionate share of public lands which were not privately owned either by the Greeks or the Turks. This would approximate areas they had suggested in their partition schemes.
I responded that if Turks considered full partition was only possible solution, I would of course be willing to present this to Greek rep, but I had absolutely no hope of its acceptance.
There ensued somewhat confused exchange, during which Erim once fell back on his earlier thesis that he would rather see a Greek fait accompli, which Turkey would denounce and refuse to recognize and for which it would exact political and economic revenge, than acquiesce in solution which would not be permanent and would not protect Turkish-Cypriots. I countered that Turkey would lose tremendously by such an attitude and that consequences would also be extremely rough on Turkish-Cypriots. Sunalp joined in with strong words about how Turks were ready to die for national good, himself included, and implied that it really wouldn't mean too much if a lot more Turkish-Cypriots did get killed.
At this point Erim made a calming gesture and gave me to understand that perhaps after all there might be room for a little bargaining on the basis I had suggested. Possibly, he said, we could get the Greeks to expand area of Turkish base or, as he preferred to call it, "Turkish area" to point where it would accommodate substantial number of Turkish-Cypriots. Turkey could call this partition, while Greeks might call it something else. At any rate, Erim intimated he would go back to Ankara and see what reaction there would be. We could talk again next week.
I said I would do my best with Greeks but could guarantee nothing.
We agreed that if anything developed during Erim's absence we would communicate with each other through Embassy Ankara and Turkish Mission here. (Turk Perm Rep has been present at all our talks.)
Would appreciate any suggestions Department has and especially comments on paper I gave Erim. Unless otherwise instructed, I have in mind giving Greek rep a suitably modified version of it if initial reaction from Athens to our conversation yesterday seems to warrant it./5/
/5/In telegram 136 to Geneva, July 15, the Department of State noted the Sunalp's comments indicated less flexibility in the Turkish position than the United States had been led to believe. It requested that the Embassy in Ankara sound out the Inonu government on these issues. (Ibid.)
Tubby
87. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, July 19, 1964, 11 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Geneva, Ankara, Nicosia, and London. Passed to the White House.
116. 1. In hour's talk with Prime Minister this Sunday afternoon, he elaborated on urgency with which he viewed need for solution Cyprus problem. He underlined that he wanted to facilitate Mr. Acheson's work as much as possible and pointed out that, to this end, he had in radio address last night for first time stated that security of Turkish state, as well as protection of Turkish minority, was subject for discussion. Nikolareizis had been called back from Geneva and he was seeing him in evening to give him instructions for his future meetings. He said Nikolareizis could have full and frank discussions with Acheson./2/
/2/The Embassy reported on Nikolareisis' meeting with Papandreou in telegram 126 from Athens, July 21. (Ibid.)
2. Papandreou pointed proudly to new picture of President Johnson on his bookcase and stated he felt very sorry that he had put on appearance of stubbornness in Washington in countering proposed procedure for getting on with Cyprus problem. He said that he genuinely believed then, as he does now, that until adequate preparations undertaken direct talks would very likely lead to a breakdown and possibility of a clash. He recalled Turkish riots in Istanbul in 1955 as example of what Turks do when talks not going their way. He stressed with great earnestness that he wanted to avoid Greek-Turkish clash at all costs; "war was one hundred times more serious for Greece than for the U.S.," and it was for this reason that he wanted to get on with substance of problem rather than procedures. He had therefore been disappointed that there had been no conversation as to a solution in Washington and only the stress on sitting down for talks with the Turks. With Turkey's continued threats and rigid position, this was impossible under existing circumstances. However, talks now under way in Geneva were right approach in moving toward solution and GOG intent on facilitating them as matter of urgency. The need for urgency was that Makarios was moving closer to Soviets and Nasser and was making moves without consulting GOG. He hinted that if too much time elapsed a full independent Cyprus, under strong pressure from the East, might not opt for enosis.
3. As to a solution he reiterated that Turkish minority should be provided all guarantees necessary, including UN supervision--"whatever you want." For sake of Turkish security and meeting "national prestige" aspect of the problem, he stated Greece would agree to a conversion of British bases to NATO bases with Turkish troops and commander. From Kyprianou he had heard that both Wilson in the UK and certain HMG sources were prepared to consider this solution. He said UK could either retain sovereignty or relinquish it--in either event arrangements could be made for NATO take over under a Turkish Commander. This latter point (which could be provided for in agreement between parties), in Papandreou's mind, should meet fully any claim by Turkey on security or prestige grounds. Papandreou did not see any possibility for a Turkish sovereign area on the island. After all, London-Zurich Agreements had only gotten Turkish troops onto the island; giving them a sovereign area now after nearly 100 years in which Turkey had no claim to sovereignty on the island, would be an unacceptable step for any Greek Government as well as for Cypriots. However, GOG would be prepared to turn over Kastellorizon as a base. (There was also hint that some other concession might be possible, but it was not spelled out.)
4. Papandreou touched on Greek troop increase on island, calling them volunteers and "tolerated deserters." He gave no figures but insisted that they were there to prevent violence, whether from within or without, but most importantly to check and control Makarios and other Greek-Cypriot military groups.
5. When I raised question of Makarios' harassing actions re materials for Turkish-Cypriot refugees, as well as Greek-Cypriot military moves in Temblos and Mansoura area, he stated that Makarios was being called to Athens July 26 and he would impress upon him how counterproductive these actions were in that they goaded the Turks.
6. Brewster's and my over-all impression was that Papandreou very anxious to get on with a prompt solution and that he was eager to see gap between Turk and Greek position closed as soon as possible in Geneva. He fully supported actions of both the UN Mediator and Acheson in their efforts to reach a solution. He stated Greeks and US must at all time talk like "relatives", because Makarios, USSR and especially UAR were now acting like "relatives." But he cautioned that ultimate solution must be generally acceptable to Cypriot people or else fighting could not be controlled. We consider that Papandreou seriously believes his suggestion set forth in paragraph 3 is as far as he can push Cypriots.
Labouisse
88. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, July 20, 1964, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, London, and USUN.
168. From Acheson. Erim and Sunalp reported to us this morning on their visit in Ankara, Erim discussing political aspects of problem and Sunalp expounding Turkish military point of view (although he wandered over into political elements at times).
Erim said he had given report to Prime Minister and Cabinet Thursday night. Reaction to this, as to his earlier reports on talks with me, had been one of disappointment. View of Turkish Government, he said, was that Greeks had no intention of making any concessions or negotiating seriously, because they believed that they would gain 100 percent of their objective by standing pat. Their military buildup on island would permit them to do this, defying threat of Turkish intervention, and to hold off until UNGA meets this fall, at which time they could either get two-thirds affirmative vote in support of their position for complete independence and self-determination or, if Turks took initiative, defeat any Turkish complaint against them. Meanwhile, there was continuing danger of Greek fait accompli bringing about enosis.
Erim said, however, that he had assured government of his belief in my good faith and that USG through me was making sincere effort to find way out. He thought I should be given chance to try. GOT accordingly had authorized him to return here and continue talks even though it shared his own pessimistic view of results to be expected. I thanked him for this tribute and assured him that I would not hold him here beyond moment when I became convinced there was no hope of agreement. Thought I might have good indications on this point when I next saw Greek rep after his return from Athens consultations. (Nikolareisis returned today and we have appointment to meet tomorrow at 17:00 local.) If I thought Greeks were clearly unwilling to continue discussions on basis offering some hope of success, I would feel obliged to tell Erim so.
I then asked whether they could tell me anything more specific about their consultations in Ankara. At this point Sunalp largely took over conversation. Said that Turk General Staff had been impressed by plan I had outlined in my memorandum (Mission tel)/2/ and had given it very careful and sympathetic study. As he put it, they had looked at it "with their white glasses rather than their dark glasses". He produced map of Cyprus which he said showed some of results of this study. It showed three boundary lines corresponding to three possibilities I had suggested:
/2/See Document 86.
1. A line crossing Karpas Peninsula about 2/3 of way in from Cape;
2. A line from Peristeria village on north coast running across to Boghaz on south coast and in effect enclosing whole peninsula; and
3. A line running from just west of Karavas (north coast west of Kyrenia) irregularly southeast through Nicosia and on to Famagusta and paralleling but running north of main Nicosia-Famagusta road.
Sunalp called his first line "Greek line" and seemed to dismiss it without consideration. Second line he argued would still be "unsatisfactory as giving Turkey too little territory and, from military point of view, too little maneuverability. Third line would enclose about 21 percent, 795 square miles of island area and would be acceptable from military point of view as well as providing minimum space for Turkish-Cypriots. This last boundary would give Turkey port of Kyrenia and also access to deep water port of Famagusta although this need not necessarily be Turkish port. They would be satisfied if it were NATO base, which Turkey could use in time of war.
Sunalp admitted that there were no great obstacles to construction of artificial port on Karpas Peninsula, provided we put up the money, and indicated a site around Boghaz as logical location. He also admitted construction of air strip was feasible but indicated as preferred site something in the neighborhood of village of Trikomo, which is outside second line. He continued to insist, however, on military necessity of having greater space for defensive maneuvering and argued that minimum Turkish military need would be for line taking in pass from north coast through Kyrenia range down to Lefkoniko as well as high part of ridge lying to west of that as far as Pentadaktylos Peak. This, he said, would give Turks flanking position against any enemy which might approach sovereign area across plain from southwest. Without it, Turk forces would be penned in narrow peninsula with no way of countering attack.
Sunalp and Erim were both somewhat vague in their justification for third line, and in course of conversation it became clear that they did not contend this was military necessity but rather was modification of double enosis proposal, based primarily on political considerations. Sunalp especially emphasized importance of holding Kyrenia as means of quick access to Turk-Cypriots in Nicosia in case of trouble. I got impression they probably would settle for boundary line which included pass north of Lefkoniko but stopped just west of it.
In course of conversation I raised question whether defense against major military attack from land was really important, suggesting that Turks themselves might well be able to forestall any such thing and in any case it seemed unlikely to occur. I got no satisfactory answer. I also indicated gently that I thought it would be very difficult to get Greek consideration of sort of thing they were proposing. At the end, however, I said I would not try at this time to discuss their presentation; first of all, I wanted to think about it and secondly I thought it would be a waste of time for them and for me to argue unless and until we found out that Greeks were willing to talk on basis I had suggested. I would be in touch with them again just as soon as I had anything new./3/
/3/In telegram 166 from Geneva, July 20, Acheson further reported that during their conversation Sunalp had given a "'remarkably frank" outline of Turkish plans for intervention. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP) In telegram 172 from Geneva, July 21, Acheson reported on Turkish views on the defensibility of a base area also developed during this meeting. (Ibid.)
After seeing Turks I had a talk with Mediator Tuomioja and summarized to him Turkish ideas. He had no particular comment. I told him I would be glad to meet with U Thant, who is back in Geneva, but would not want to take up his time unnecessarily. Tuomioja said he would report to SYG and let me know whether the latter wanted to see me.
Tubby
89. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, July 21, 1964, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, and USUN.
181. From: Acheson. One-hour discussion late this afternoon with Greek rep Nikolareisis may be summarized as follows:
1. He said he had been called back to Athens last Saturday and had gone expecting very negative reaction to suggestions I had put to him. He had long conversations with Prime Minister and Foreign Minister alone. Was pleased to find that they were determined to be forthcoming and conciliatory as possible. Papandreou had insisted on his great desire for peace and expressed appreciation of efforts I was making to avoid Greek-Turkish conflict. He had given him (Nikolareisis) reply to ideas I had thrown out, which PM thought really should be considered as tentative proposal rather than separate suggestions.
2. My proposal consisted of three parts: (a) minority rights for Turkish population of Cyprus; (b) international supervision of application of these rights; and (c) provision for Turkish national security. To these three points PM's reactions were:
(1) Although it would be difficult for Greece, with its excellent record of treatment of all its citizens, to give special privileges to minority on Cyprus, he nevertheless would be willing to grant substantially what I had suggested, even including two Turk-Cypriot administered Eparchis under Turk-Cypriot Eparchs, provided these latter were appointed from Athens and not by Ankara. He would also accept establishment special Turk-Cypriot courts.
(2) It would likewise be very hard to accept international supervision of this arrangement, but Papandreou was nevertheless willing to agree to type of UN presence I had outlined.
(3) Even though cession of Greek territory to foreign country would be extremely difficult to sell to Greek people, PM was prepared let Turkey have island of Kastellorizon as military base to protect its approaches. Question of sovereign Turkish base area on Cyprus, however, was another matter. Most he could contemplate in way of Turkish military presence on Cyprus would be a sharing of British base areas with Turkish forces, provided bases themselves remained entirely under British sovereignty.
3. I said that PM had indeed made genuine effort to bridge gap between Greece and Turkey and I was grateful for it. I thought this gave us real basis for continued discussion. In particular, I would now try to develop and give to parties in more concrete form ideas regarding character of minority regime and minority rights which I thought might be applied and which I had not tried to make precise in previous talks.
4. I said, however, that I should be less than frank if I did not express fears that Greek response on sovereign base question would fail to meet minimum Turkish demands.
Turks, in their conversations with me, had been arguing for a good deal more than I had proposed, whereas Greeks were not even accepting idea of Turkish sovereign area, regardless of how small. With regard to Papandreou suggestion that Turks might share British bases, I said I could not say definitely what Turkish reaction would be, since I had never put this idea to them. I doubted they would accept it, however. In any case, it was not useful for us to debate matter today since we did not even know whether British would be amenable. Nikolareisis commented that Papandreou and Costopoulos were now in London and he thought they would put the suggestion to British./2/ We agreed that we would await some report on London meetings before trying to go further along this particular line.
/2/Papandreou visited London July 20-21. The Embassy reported on his talks at the Foreign Office in telegram 362 from London, July 22. (Ibid.)
5. There followed considerable discussion of the Turkish sovereign base question. Nikolareisis was quite firm in expressing opinion that GOG could not accept it and that in any case Greek-Cypriots would never do so. He asserted it would be regarded both in Cyprus and in Greece as form of partition. Furthermore, it would "give Turks more than they had before" and would establish them in position to interfere in affairs of Cyprus in future. This would be perennial cause of trouble. I took issue with some of his argumentation, especially thesis that it would give Turkey more than she had before, but I shall not bother Department with details. I admitted that question of sovereign base area might become breaking point which would make my efforts here useless, since I believed Turks felt just as strongly on their side as Nikolareisis said Greeks did on theirs. Nevertheless, I thought we could usefully continue our efforts and explore all aspects at least for a while longer.
I said I thought I should be as candid with Turks as I had been with Greeks and would therefore tell Erim and Sunalp substantially what Nikolareisis had conveyed to me. He agreed. Am seeing Turks again late tomorrow morning./3/
/3/Acheson reported on discussions with the Turks and their initial response to the Greek suggestions in telegram 188 from Geneva, July 22. Noting that the Turks' basic demand was a sovereign base area, he commented: "It seems apparent that the hurdle of the Turkish sovereign base area is indeed very high." (Ibid.)
Comment: At least we are still moving down the track, even though there is a very high hurdle between us and the finish line.
Tubby
90. Memorandum for the Greek Ambassador (Nikolareisis)/1/
Geneva, July 27, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Exdis. Transmitted to the Department of State as an attachment to airgram A-44 from Geneva, July 27. There is no drafting information on the source text but presumably the memorandum was drafted by Acheson. The airgram indicates the memorandum was revised after discussions with Ambassador Nikolareisis and a copy was sent to the Embassy in Athens on July 27 for delivery to Prime Minister Papandreou.
After reflecting on the Prime Minister's message, I wish to repeat to you my deep appreciation of his constructive effort toward a fair settlement. I do not detract an iota of appreciation or admiration, in asking again for his understanding help. Though the gap has been narrowed, there still remains a gap. If both sides can find a way to help, it may be bridged. No one will understand the situation better than Your Excellency if I put it in Robert Browning's words:
"O, the little more, and how much it is!
The little less and what worlds away!"
The gap which from the Turkish point of view the Prime Minister's reaction to my suggestions leaves unbridged lies in the politico-military area. The protection of minorities seems in a fair way to being solved. If we look for a moment at the change in the Turkish position provided in the agreements of 1959-1960 to that contemplated by the Prime Minister's views on my suggestions, we can see what seems to them a serious deterioration in it.
May I summarize the Turkish views as follows:
When the Ottoman Empire ceded Cyprus to the British in 1878, it was ceded to a great naval power for the most part friendly to Turkey, except when in the two world wars Turkey made the same mistake as the Germans in miscalculating American intervention to change the relative military power of the embattled forces. So far as life on the island was concerned, the two ethnic groups lived peacefully together under British rule until the mid-1950s.
Under the settlement of 1959-1960, the island passed from the control of a world power to qualified independence under the guarantees and quasi-guardianship of three powers. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, to protect their relative interest, gained the following rights guaranteed by treaties:
1. A position in legislative and executive branches of the government for the Turkish Cypriots giving them veto power, the same right on questions of judicial interpretation of the constitution and separate courts for intra-Turkish Cypriot disputes.
2. A treaty right to maintain troops on the island.
3. A treaty right to reinforce those troops by intervention, after complying with specified procedures, and to use the troops if necessary to preserve the constitution, independence and territorial integrity of the island, as provided in the Treaty of Guarantee.
President Makarios maintains--and I am not here disputing the fact--that some of these provisions are "unworkable", and he is changing them unilaterally. Our present search is for a way to change them by agreement. Such a change by its very nature contemplates a diminution of the Turkish position from the present so-called "unworkable" one. The task is to gain mutual agreement to alteration by recognizing the essential elements of the various positions.
First: Turkish Position in the Government
The Greek and Cypriot views contemplate abolition of the veto power in the Government of the island as a whole. The Prime Minister has indicated a willingness to substitute for this a considerable degree of local self-government along the lines which I suggested and further spell out in an accompanying memorandum./2/ But while this is a happy contribution to protection of minorities under a constitutional system akin to that of Greece, it would not offer security against a change in the regime which would produce a communist government on the island. While we hope this is unlikely, it cannot be called absurd. This question requires further consideration.
/2/Not printed.
Second: The Legal Position of Turkish Troops on Cyprus
This right is now established by the Treaty of Alliance. The troops are to form part of a tripartite headquarters on Cypriot territory to defend the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. The Prime Minister's proposal is to abolish this treaty right and--presumably by a new treaty, either a bilateral one with Britain, or a quadripartite one with Greece and Cyprus added--to have facilities provided by the British on one or both of their sovereign bases.
One sees at once--or if one does not, the Turkish representatives are quick to point it out--that by this exchange the Turks lose a right of military presence on the island which runs directly to them, and become instead tenants of the British. They point out that the British bases are already under attack in the Cyprus House of Representatives. Should the British come to believe that a change in their Middle Eastern commitments or other considerations might render the bases on Cyprus less necessary or desirable, the Turkish position as their tenants might be tenuous indeed. They also stress the difficulty of joint use of such small bases, even should the British be willing to consider it, and the complexity of the use of the rights ancillary to the bases provided the British under the Annex to the Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom.
In this situation, I respectfully urge the Prime Minister to reconsider his position on a Turkish military presence on the island running directly to them. If the conception of a cession of sovereignty presents grave difficulty, is there another conception which might be more acceptable, such as a lease of an area, or the grant of administrative control, or something of the sort?
The Turks now have a right for their troops to be in Cyprus--and they are stationed in the heart of the island. The right to be in Cyprus, of course, carries with it a right to a location. The mere force of gravity requires it. Surely our imaginations are equal to adapting to a changed situation a new, stable and secure situs for the exercise of this military presence.
Third: The Interest, Right and Duty of Turkey to Share in Protecting and Maintaining a New Settlement
If the settlement provides for the continued independence of Cyprus, while keeping open the opportunity for the people of Cyprus to choose enosis, an agreed change in the present treaties would doubtless contain treaty assurances from Cyprus that in the meantime it would not enter into engagements with a foreign power permitting the use of its territory in a manner hostile to the interests of Britain, Greece or Turkey. Turkey, as well as Greece and Britain, would have a great interest in maintaining the new settlement. The granting of military or other facilities to unfriendly foreign powers would be contrary to the interests of the three powers mentioned above and would be inconsistent with a new settlement. Doubtless enosis would be a safeguard against this danger. But enosis is not a foregone conclusion and Turkey cannot be expected to rely on this alone. A Turkish legal military presence on the island would still be necessary for Turkish security.
These considerations underline the importance of what has been said about a proper, stable and secure location for this military presence.
91. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, July 27, 1964, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, London, and USUN.
223. From Acheson. We had go-around yesterday with Turks with Gen. Oberbeck from HQ US CINCEUR and Col. Gussie from Nicosia participating. I began by telling Erim I had made new approach to Greek rep to urge that Papandreou make greater effort to meet Turkish security need./2/ He thanked me. I mentioned that I still had no word as to whether British would be willing to share their base on Cyprus, as suggested by Greeks. Erim commented that this idea of using British bases not even within scope terms of reference given him and Sunalp by GOT; he was not prepared discuss it and hoped it would not be considered seriously. I said I had made clear to Nikolareisis my belief that bases would not do from Turkish point of view. I added that my military advisers (Oberbeck and Gussie) had agreed with Sunalp's arguments that sharing base would be very difficult and unsatisfactory.
/2/See Document 89.
At my suggestion, we then reviewed at considerable length and with considerable argumentation what Turkey's minimum needs might be. Taking idea of base on Karpas Peninsula as basis for discussion, Sunalp explained that Turkey considered it had to have on Cyprus facilities and space for one division, 14,000 men, plus a port, an airfield and one squadron of aircraft. For this, he said, TGS considered even whole peninsula would be inadequate, primarily because of its narrowness and lack of [garble--space for dispersal?] and also because it would be bottleneck from which deployment would be difficult. It also lacked major terrain feature for defense.
Oberbeck and Gussie vigorously and ably took issue with this thesis, pointing out that area of more than 200 sq. miles comprised within peninsula was considerably more than we considered necessary for all peacetime purposes for one of our own larger divisions. Gussie stressed that in fact there was good road network on Cyprus and deployment from base of peninsula should be easy. On score of defensibility, our side made point that if major attack threatened Turks would clearly not sit on base awaiting it but rather would move out into other parts of island before attack took place. Apart from this Gussie pointed out that relatively small number of men should be able to hold peninsula until reinforcements arrived.
Sunalp countered with various arguments, including: (1) political situation might not permit Turkish deployment in advance of attack (e.g., allies had repeatedly prevented Turkey from moving against Cyprus during present crisis); (2) outlets for peninsula were not in fact satisfactory despite Gussie's assertion; and (3) because of location Cyprus, Turkish establishment there could not be regarded as being on normal peacetime basis; in Turkey, Turk Army units were always kept dispersed over a wide area because of imminent possibility of attack. Therefore, greater area was needed than would be required for American division in U.S.
At one time Oberbeck made point that if Turk military on Cyprus were threatened with major attack it was inconceivable that Turkey would be alone. To this Sunalp responded emotionally that Turkey's allies had done it no good since last December.
Debate went on for some time. Finally Sunalp asked Oberbeck to give his honest opinion from point of view of member Turkish General Staff as to whether with one division on Karpas Peninsula he could fulfill three missions I had suggested in my earlier memorandum:/3/ (1) to deny island to an enemy as base of operations against Turkey; (2) to keep open approaches to ports of Mersin and Iskenderun; and (3) to provide guarantee against future mistreatment of Turk-Cypriots. Oberbeck replied flatly that he certainly could fulfill these three missions under circumstances specified, and gave reasons. Sunalp's smiling rejoinder was that if Oberbeck were Turkish officer "he would be retired tomorrow". Col. Gussie intervened along same lines and also got himself "retired".
/3/See Documents 86 and 88.
A couple of times I tried to get Turks to recognize that any arrangement would have to be compromise between what was ideal from military point of view and what was practical. I think Erim was probably fully conscious of this although he did not explicitly say so but Sunalp was stubborn to the last.
It is too soon to say what effect of all this may be; I think it was very useful exercise and probably impressed even Sunalp. Oberbeck, Gussie, Jernegan and I will meet again with Turks at lunch tomorrow./4/
/4/In telegram 241 from Geneva, July 28, Acheson reported that further discussions with the Turks had not yielded any progress. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP)
Tubby
92. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, July 28, 1964, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Exdis-TAG.
236. From Acheson and Jernegan for Talbot. Ref: Deptel 244./2/ Your telegram raises question whether (a) Sunalp and Turks and (b) Greeks believe we are suggesting a Turkish right of intervention similar to that provided in present treaties. Taking "(b)" first Nikolareisis in candid talk yesterday raised this very question and asked a change in our memo pouched to you (Geneva's A-44)/3/ to make clear that Turks military presence after enosis would be only to defend their own mainland and to help Greeks defend Cyprus against foreign attack. Before enosis Turkey would have additional right to prevent a change of regime that would bring about a Communist state on Cyprus. We are counting on Nikolareisis and our memo to make this clear in Athens.
/2/Telegram 244 to Geneva, July 25, requested that Acheson seek clarification of Turkish views regarding enosis and their rights of intervention in relation to the sovereign base question (Ibid.)
/3/Document 90.
Turning to "(a)"-(Sunalp), he undoubtedly wants to use base for protection of Turkish minority, which is not conferred in haec verba by present treaties. His method of discussion is to confuse all desirable uses of base, jumping from one to another to avoid being cornered. With the able help of our General and Colonel we have pretty well got him pinned inside the Karpas Peninsula as a base for military purpose of housing and training a military force to protect Turkey and Cyprus from foreign foe. From there we will go on to limit his other desired purposes both before and after enosis; but always aware that whatever is said on paper, Turkish military presence will be a deterrent against abuse of the minority and will be used as a corrective if large-scale abuse should occur. Sunalp does not suffer from incapacity to understand our position but from unwillingness to accept it. We shall watch out, however, that we do not give him ground for a plausible claim that he misunderstands.
Tubby
93. Summary Record of the 536th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, July 28, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 2. Top Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. McCone's notes of the meeting are in Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with LBJ, 1964.
[Here follows a report by Secretary Rusk on the OAS and Cuba.]
CYPRUS
At the request of the President, Under Secretary Ball summarized the current situation on Cyprus:
1. We put money in the bank with passing of every week without serious fighting on the island.
2. Progress is being made in Geneva negotiations being conducted by Dean Acheson. These talks are in their second round. Acheson has managed to establish close relations with both the Greek and Turkish representatives. The talks will have to enter the third round before we know exactly how they will come out. The real problem consists of getting Makarios to accept an agreed Greek-Turkish solution.
3. We are using the NATO structure in an effort to gain some hold on the military buildup on the Island of both Greek and Turkish forces.
4. We are making a serious effort to build up the UN forces in Cyprus and prompt the UN officers there to act with firmness in holding down fighting.
5. Every effort is being made to play down the Geneva talks. Acheson is working quietly and without press attention. The talks are being carried on under the cover of the UN Mediator who is cooperating in this tactic. We have a moderately hopeful attitude toward the possibility of a solution of the problem.
McGeorge Bundy pointed out the importance of not letting the press know of our current optimism. It was agreed that no optimistic noises should be made to the press.
[Here follows discussion of Laos.]
Bromley Smith/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
94. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, July 29, 1964, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Geneva for Acheson, Nicosia, and Ankara.
163. DCM yesterday transmitted to FonMin Costopoulos second Acheson memorandum to Nikolareizis (Geneva 34 to Athens and Geneva's A-40 to Dept.)/2/
/2/Telegram 34 from Geneva to Athens was not found. Airgram A-40 transmitted the first draft of the memorandum (Document 90). (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP)
Costopoulos said Makarios had been apprised of contents Acheson memo to Nikolareizis regarding Turkish minority (Geneva's A-40 to Dept) and also of Turk demand for military base.
Makarios categorically opposed both proposals. (Comment: We rather suspect Makarios has actually been shown and perhaps given copy of first Acheson memo to Nikolareizis and cannot exclude possibility these documents may some day appear in press.)
Costopoulos said he personally also disappointed in proposals regarding Turkish minority which GOG considered unnecessarily complicated and constitute in effect cantonal arrangement. He noted that Makarios had agreed to issue "Bill of Rights" for Turkish minority and that if this were done some sort of international supervision of this bill of rights would be entirely acceptable to GOG.
Costopoulos mentioned his own ideas of seeking removal Turkish minority in exchange for Turkish military base on Cyprus (Embtel 147 to Dept, 33 to Geneva)/3/ had not found favor with Papandreou who apparently considers this would be impracticable as well as inconsistent with excellent Greek record with regard to existing Turkish ethnic groups in Greece.
/3/Dated July 26. (Ibid.)
GOG concerned, he said, that concessions are being asked of GOG without any indication such concessions likely produce agreement with GOT acceptable to GOG. Nikolareizis will be instructed obtain clearer idea of what Turks actually prepared accept.
One of the most serious problems confronting GOG is fact Makarios would oppose any agreement between Greek and Turkish Govts providing for special civil organization for Turkish minority as well as Turk military base by asserting that such types of provisions would constitute only revision of London-Zurich Accords incompatible with completely independent Cyprus. Basically Makarios is opposed to enosis, but will not publicly admit it. Costopoulos did not assess possibility Makarios himself might be prepared make concessions to Turks on his own initiative in effort preempt GOG-GOT agreement, if by so doing he could preserve independent status of Cyprus.
Costopoulos, speaking very personally and confidentially, said he did not see how under these circumstances it was going to be possible to reach an agreement with Turks which would also be satisfactory to Govt of Cyprus. If agreement on basic issues could be reached by Turks and GOG, perhaps best tactical procedure would be as follows: simultaneous declaration by Greek and Cypriot Parliaments proclaiming enosis followed by plebiscite in Cyprus and possibly Greece ratifying this decision. After proclamation of enosis, Greek Govt would then be in position to honor agreements reached with Turks and US Govt as result of current negotiations. In Costopoulos' view such agreement would provide measures for guarantee of protection for Turkish ethnics as well as leased Turk military base (sovereign base unacceptable) for period perhaps as long as 25 years. Base would be purely military, probably on Karpas Pe-ninsula, limited in size, and without space required either for large number of Turkish troops or safe haven area for Turk ethnic civilians. If meeting of minds could be reached with GOT along foregoing lines perhaps prompt solution could be found before convening of UNGA and under circumstances which would avoid giving Makarios apparently valid justification publicly oppose enosis.
Comment: Obviously, Costopoulos' comments re possible GOG program involving understanding with GOT re possible lease base agreement and subsequent proclamation of enosis by Grk and Cypriot Parliaments extremely sensitive and should be tightly held pending further evolution of Greek attitude.
Labouisse
95. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Washington, July 30, 1964, 8:24 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis-TAG. Drafted by Bracken, cleared by Sisco and Talbot, and approved by Ball. Repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, USUN, and Geneva for Acheson.
165. Athens 170, 40 to Geneva./2/ Reuters story (Modiano) received prior to your telegram. Greek Ambassador was called in for explanation of leak./3/
/2/Telegram 170 from Athens, July 30, transmitted the text of the Greek press report outlining Acheson's proposals for a Cyprus settlement. (Ibid.)
/3/In telegram 265 from Geneva, July 30, Acheson expressed concern about the impact of press reports on the negotiations and stated that the Greeks had agreed to respond to inquiries with a "no comment." (Ibid.) In telegram 269 from Geneva, July 30, Acheson reported that the Turks were "disgusted" with the leak, which they blamed on the Greeks. (Ibid.)
Talbot explained we cannot understand reasoning behind "confirmation" by Greek Government spokesman of "Acheson Plan". He noted Papandreou has insisted on essentiality absolute secrecy regarding talks. We understood his desire that information be held close so that various ideas could be discussed without governments having to take firm positions on one or another. Talbot assured Ambassador Matsas Mr. Acheson has worked very closely with Mediator, has not pushed himself forward and that we have been fortunate so far in that press has not covered his activities. Talbot asked Matsas for his explanation. Ambassador said he was completely in dark.
Talbot said we had two problems: (1) how to answer press questions; and (2) what do we say to Turks. As Papandreou aware, talks have proceeded with candor and Mr. Acheson has reported back and forth to each representative. Fact that some of points mentioned in Reuters story have been reported to Turks and others not might arouse suspicions of Turks we are not playing fairly with them.
Matsas asked if there were a coherent plan. Talbot said a variety of ideas had been discussed but there was not a "plan". Matsas speculated that only first point "Union with Greece" would appeal to Greeks and other points, cession Kastellorizon, base, financial compensation, etc., would be detestable. Therefore he could not see it in GOG interest to leak this information. He surmised that since all of points at one time or another had been mentioned in press, Modiano had possibly read as "confirmation" a "no comment" reply by GOG official.
He proposed telephoning PM Papandreou for clarification and instructions. After talking to Papandreou Matsas reported that Prime Minister was very annoyed by the leak, indicating Greeks had endeavored to brief Cypriots on status of talks and Cypriots had talked too much. Prime Minister proposed to deny flatly that there was any such thing as "Acheson Plan".
Subsequently Matsas reported second telephone call with Papandreou, after latter had investigated Reuters story on Makarios' press conference. PM repeated his extreme annoyance and asked Ambassador convey to Department his sincere regret this had happened since he realized efforts at Geneva are being directed to fruitful results and this might be counterproductive.
No questions at noon briefing. Future queries will be answered: "Mr. Acheson has been discussing a whole range of ideas with Mediator, Greek and Turkish representatives. There is no such thing as an Acheson plan."
If Matsas had correctly reported Papandreou's regret and intention to deny along lines we are taking, we assume Nikolareizis will have early instructions on Mr. Acheson's memorandum and that exchanges will not be interrupted.
For Athens: Impress strongly on Papandreou our distress at possible deleterious effect this could have on talks in Geneva, and Mr. Acheson's efforts to help Mediator arrive at agreed settlement. We have understood and cooperated with Greek desire for secrecy because we recognize problem of domestic pressures on GOG as well as their difficulty in handling Makarios. The speed and forthcoming nature of Nikolareizis' next instructions will indeed be test of Papandreou's good faith and sincerity of his intentions to arrive at early negotiated settlement rather than "fait accompli" tack of Makarios, with all potential dangers of Turk resistance that approach implies. We understand Nikolareizis is returning Athens today. In order not to give Turkish public opinion leeway to suspect breakdown of talks and accelerate pressures by Turkish extremists, we hope he can return to Geneva earliest (certainly by Monday).
For Ankara: Drawing on above help Turks look at this in perspective. Mr. Acheson reports that Erim and Sunalp are calm about whole thing. Assure Turks that we hope that Makarios explosion will not have serious effect on negotiations.
As another sensitive period approaches when Turks might again think of intervention as their only alternative, we are dismayed at reports they might contemplate intervention by air bombardment. We recognize that neither Sunay nor Inonu has made such statement. However, we believe it useful if as opportunity arises you convey to appropriate quarters US position that we could not under any circumstances regard air bombardment as coming within purview of "action" contemplated under Article IV Treaty of Guarantee.
Rusk
96. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, July 31, 1964, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, Cairo, Damascus, Geneva for Acheson, and London.
141. Nicholas Farmakis (protect source), former Greek ERE Deputy, here conducting survey for Greek opposition group (composed ERE political elements and Greek military) has given Embassy his views. Farmakis has talked with Greek Cypriot leaders and has traveled extensively throughout island inspecting defense sites.
Farmakis has deep misgivings re Cyprus situation which follow:
1. Makarios intends use military force obtain political solution. He intends increase pressures on Turks and then attack Turk strongholds. He will act within forty-five days. Makarios will by-pass UN mediation and introduce resolution UNGA obtain recognition de facto state.
2. Makarios increasingly dependent upon Nasser. GOC has received UAR material and obtained Nasser's permission use UAR airfields by Greek Air Force defend Cyprus. Claims Papandreou "50 percent" in agreement. Added GOC endeavoring obtain support Syria Air Force and promise of Syrian attack Iskenderun event GOT attack.
3. Cypriots under direction regular Greek officers installing ground-to-air missiles near Nicosia. Farmakis has visited site and witnessed construction, but has not seen any missiles. He assumed they were shipped from Greece and were US origin. (This may reflect rumors we have heard other sources.)
In order prevent escalation problem, Farmakis intends recommend his colleagues that Makarios be deposed. Claims GOG being out-maneuvered. If Makarios able submit resolution UNGA Greece will face dilemma. In this event Papandreou cannot resist clamor support Makarios. Result will be further weakening Greek ties with West. He claimed Greece drifting toward neutralism and shifting its focus away from Communist threat. On July 27, for example, he informed Papandreou transferred 150 key army officers to provinces; and he afraid GOG will transfer Greek army officers sympathetic ouster Makarios from Cyprus unless action quickly initiated.
With regard Papandreou's position, Farmakis acknowledged Premier cannot be challenged at polls; and he does not wish participate any plan aimed removal Papandreou. Opposition group believes Papandreou will sanction Makarios removal if faced with threat of force by military elements. Farmakis indicated they would not, however, let Papandreou stand their way. Otherwise if situation continues civil war will occur Greece within year. Once Makarios removed enosis would be proclaimed. Farmakis said Turks would be given small part island to administer and he seemed unconcerned re Turk attitude.
Farmakis made low key pitch for US support. He emphasized Greece and United States had same interest in problem. Personally he would rather be "dead than red." Therefore, he favored action now. Added United States would be kept apprised, because United States would be expected offer its blessings.
Comment: We cannot judge extent plans described by Farmakis have progressed in Greece. We were impressed with deadly serious fashion which Farmakis revealed his views. If Farmakis' worries are based on fact, as he assured us, then Makarios with GOG being dragged along, has gone even further than we thought in playing brinkmanship game./2/
/2/In telegram 169 from Athens, August 4, the Embassy reported on further contacts with Farmakis and noted that his fellow conspirators included Nicos Sampson and Cypriot Minister of Labor Tassos Papadopoulos. (Ibid.)
Belcher
97. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, July 31, 1964, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Geneva for Acheson, Nicosia, London, Ankara, and USUN.
190. 1. I called on PriMin today at Kastri with Costopoulos, Sossides and Brewster present. We talked for about ninety minutes. PriMin received us in his bedroom (he has been in bed for several days with kidney trouble which apparently developed while on London trip). He immediately apologized profusely for unfortunate impression leak of "Acheson proposals" was bound to create. He attributed this leak entirely to Cypriots who had been here this week, with whom naturally he had had to discuss certain aspects of Geneva talks and to whom he had shown some papers but not all (he did not distinguish). He said he had just completed a call to Makarios in which he had expressed his deep indignation at this leak and at Makarios' most unfortunate press conference. He said he had come to conclusion this week that Makarios was "impossible to deal with" since he was completely intransigent on all points. He had "used" Greek press and all of this at expense of Greek Government which wants to maintain good relations with US. He had done the unforgivable by putting Greek Government in a position of looking soft and willing to bargain, whereas he (Makarios) was the hero standing up against the forces of the West. PriMin was convinced that Makarios was playing a completely "Nasser game" and wanted to set up an independent Cyprus "as an Arab state."
2. He then stated that, after this meeting with Makarios, he had concluded there was only one solution, "a dangerously simple one"--enosis must come promptly because there could be no interim period in which Cypriots had unfettered independence. It was important to follow this course in order to get rid of Makarios. Although Makarios is working against enosis, Papandreou believed if action is taken at early date it can be achieved. His proposal was that enosis be achieved by joint action of the Greek Cypriot and Greek Parliaments, while agreements could be reached within the "family group" (i.e., US, UK, Turkey, Greece) to provide for a bill of rights for the Turk minority and a NATO base with Turkish Commander granted by Greece to Turkey. He mentioned frequently that he, as PriMin, could not force concessions out of Makarios who thought he would win an independent Cyprus. Only way to be rid of this was to have Cyprus a part of Greece. Enosis with a NATO base should offer Turks security both for their minorities and strategically. A Cuba-type Cyprus under Makarios' aegis would certainly be dangerous for Turkey and for us all. GOG would also be prepared to indemnify any Turk Cypriots who might wish to leave Cyprus, and hopefully there could be some economic aid provided Turkey which would help meet its problems. He said foregoing was in essence what he would put to Nikolareizis who was arriving this evening for consultations, and which would in turn be passed on to Acheson.
3. Speaking personally, I stressed that I could not imagine Turks would accept such a proposal, even assuming that we all want to get rid of Makarios. The proposal did not take realistically into consideration the three basic factors which Turkish side considers essential to a solution. It was, in fact, asking Turks for complete and unconditional capitulation. After outlining some of events related to Makarios' visit, including his Nicosia departure statement that there could be no "agreed solution", the "complete identity of views" communiqué, and ending with Makarios' homecoming statement that Cyprus would have full support of Greek armed forces if attacked,/2/ I said that, although I accepted his assurances re the Acheson story leak and his indignation at Makarios' press conference, [no?] Turks and few others would believe this was not Greek-Makarios maneuver. He denied this heatedly, and twice said that he now considered Makarios "an enemy."
/2/Text of the Makarios-Papandreou communiqué, announcing "absolute harmony of views" was transmitted in telegram 176 from Athens, July 30. (Ibid.) In telegram 187 from Athens, July 31, the Embassy commented on both Makarios' "self-assured" press conference and the bitterness of his comments about the "Acheson Plan." (Ibid.) In telegram 136 from Nicosia, July 31, the Embassy in Cyprus reported on Makarios' public statements upon his return. (Ibid.)
4. I then pressed him on question of proposed appeal to UN on which he had apparently agreed a common line with Makarios. He replied that he agreed with Makarios on only three things: a) need to maintain peace on island (and here he said Makarios had promised him to take no military action of any importance without prior consultation); b) Greece would defend Cyprus if attacked; and c) Greece will support Cyprus in appeal to the General Assembly if no solution found. Papandreou repeated his urgent desire to reach solution before General Assembly meets, otherwise Makarios might gain his complete independence. If circumstances make appeal to Assembly necessary, Papandreou envisages that Cypriots would take initiative in trying to get resolution endorsing independence for Cyprus and right of its people to determine their own future. To this I responded that I knew of no authority whereby the UN could effectively take step which would nullify treaties entered into in good faith. I also pointed to questionable company he would be keeping and fact that, in interim, anything might happen and agreed that his proposal was "dangerously" simple. He acknowledged this, but said he saw no other course in view of intransigence of Makarios and strong public appeal of self-determination in Greece as well as Cyprus.
5. Conversation ended in friendly atmosphere, with Papandreou agreeing that next step was for him to give his instructions to Nikolareizis, who would continue talks in Geneva./3/
/3/In telegram 192 from Athens, August 1, Labouisse reported that Costopoulos had assured him that Greece desired to continue bargaining at Geneva and that Nikolareisis would return shortly to the talks. Costopoulos also outlined Greek objections to the proposals made by Acheson. (Ibid.)
Comment: Events of last few days lead us to believe that Papandreou is, in fact, fed to the teeth with Makarios and that he cannot draw any concessions from latter. Of course, this could all be Byzantine plot, but we are satisfied that only point Papandreou and Makarios have in common now is dedication to self-determination.
Many Greeks, including several officials, outspoken in their distaste for Makarios and his unreliability. However, the very strong and profound conviction among all Greeks that Cypriots should have right of self-determination is making them prisoner to Makarios' machinations and allows him, in name of what they all believe to be only just end, to call turn for Greeks. The "capital of Hellenism" is in Nicosia on this issue.
When I was pointing out to Papandreou the ways in which Greece was being "used", including giving military support to Makarios, Papandreou replied that he recognized this, but asked what would happen if Greece withdrew its support? He answered his own question by saying things would be even worse and there would be no control over possible military adventures; moreover, it would surely result in "others, particularly the UAR" giving more support "which has been promised."
Our reading of situation is that Papandreou sincerely wants to achieve enosis before matters go to the UNGA for he has come to believe it is only way to set aside Makarios and that latter is real stumbling block in all Western efforts to resolve Cyprus problem.
We realize Papandreou's present line is not compatible with Turkey's wishes, but if he cannot in fact deliver Makarios, it may well be only alternative which has a chance of being in Turkey's as well as our own interests. It may be possible in Geneva talks to pin Greeks down to specific understandings to meet some of Turk desires after enosis. However, in my opinion, we cannot expect agreement on sovereign base for Turks nor on full scale of special position for Turk-Cypriot minority envisaged in Acheson memo to Nikolareizis. Greeks consider this would lead to same type problems as exist under London-Zurich Accords.
Labouisse
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