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THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES**

**HEARING ON PROPOSED CHANGES TO
THE NATIONAL GUARD**

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WITNESSES:

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CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY**

**MICHAEL W. WYNNE,
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE**

**GENERAL T. MICHAEL MOSELEY,
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CHAIRMAN ARNOLD PUNARO: The Commission will come to order. Welcome to the third of five witness panels in this, our seventh hearing series as the Commission continues to seek input from the major stakeholders on S-2658 and HR-5200, the proposed, quote, “National Defense Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act of 2006,” end quote. Yesterday we had two very productive sessions in the morning with Undersecretary of Defense David Chu and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs Tom Hall. Then we heard from the Under Secretary for Preparedness at DHS, George Foresman, about these issues.

The proposed National Guard Empowerment Act, as you know, is a complex and multi-faceted piece of legislation and there are very strong feelings on both sides, from the supporters and from the opponents. In fulfilling its new mandate that we got from the Congress to make recommendations to the Congress by March the 1st of 2007, the Commission is seeking information from a broad spectrum of witnesses in order to get as complete an understanding as possible of the pros and cons of each provision of the bill. And in seeking to give the chief of the National Guard Bureau a larger voice in decision-making and resource allocation within the Pentagon, this legislation would alter a number of existing relationships in DOD, the Joint Staff, and the services.

So before making any recommendations, the Commission wants and needs to fully understand those ramifications from the perspective of each stakeholder. We also need guidance from witnesses, and particularly from you, chief, on the broader strategic framework that you believe should inform our decisions. And only then do I think we all feel we’ll be prepared to make some recommendations to the Congress. In particular, S-2658 and HR-5200 would significantly alter the long-standing relationship between the Army and Air National Guard and their parent services. To provide that parent service perspective, our first witness this morning is Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter J. Schoomaker. Secretary of the Army Francis Harvey was unable to be here this morning, and he’s committed to testify in January. And we’ll have the Air Force service secretary and chief on the next panel.

As we all know, in both Afghanistan and Iraq ground forces are very prominent in the war fight, not only for the combat troops but also for the large combat service support capability, which is also combat, required to sustain an effort of this magnitude. Reservists and National Guardsmen have been a critical element, at one point representing 40 percent of the forces in theater. At the same time the National Guard and, to a more limited extent the Reserve component, has had to maintain a response for domestic crises large and small within the homeland.

General Schoomaker, along with other senior Army leaders – and he’s got his chief of the Army Reserve here with him today, as well as the chief of the Army National Guard, and we welcome both of them to the hearing here as well. They’ve been a big

help to us all along. They've been at the center of these issues trying to juggle multiple competing demands for constrained resources, and I know he'll be able to offer a unique perspective on the National Guard Empowerment Act issues before the Commission.

Congressional proponents – and by the way, the sponsors of this legislation, in the Senate Senators Bond and Leahy with many, many co-sponsors, in the House, Congressman Gene Taylor and Congressman Tom Davis, with many, many co-sponsors – these are not fair-weather friends of the Department of Defense. These are not Johnny-come-lately's jumping on the Guard and Reserve bandwagon. These are long-standing supporters of the department, long-standing supporters of the Guard and Reserve – added money and resources to the Guard and Reserves in many previous administrations. So they're not coming at this from the critics of the Pentagon side of the house. So these are very serious legislators that have put a very serious piece of legislation forward. These proponents often cite what they have suggested is the Army's last-minute budget decisions in early 2006 – cutting the Army National Guard in strength is one example that the National Guard needs to have a stronger independent voice in the Pentagon's planning, programming, and budgeting process. And the proponents also cite what they believe to be a lack of National Guard representation within the senior ranks of the Army and Air Force in key combatant commands.

The Commission has made no value judgments in citing these examples but only note them to highlight the strong feelings that National Guard resources and command issues evoke from the supporters. Before making any recommendations to the Congress, the Commission wants to fully understand obviously the ramification from all perspectives. And we also want to fully understand what are the problems that we're trying to solve and what are the requirements that perhaps generate some of those problems. I would say that's one of the challenges we've all recognized as commissioners that we faced as we kind of get into this, to get a clear understanding of the problem set and to get a clearer understanding of the requirements that perhaps from which those problems flow. We're still kind of struggling with that, so we look forward to particularly getting that from the proponents of the legislation this afternoon – what are the problems they see that need to be fixed.

In any event, General Schoomaker, we look forward to hearing the uniformed Army view on this legislative proposal. We thank you for being here this morning, for the long and dedicated service. Maybe a lot of people in the audience don't know, you came out of retirement after having successfully been a combatant commander to come right smack dab back into the middle of a war and all the things that go with trying to provide highly cohesive trained combat units for a war we're in, at the same time making sure your service, the Army, is going to be ready for whatever contingency the nation faces in 5 to 10 to 15 years. So it's incredibly difficult and challenging job, and again, we appreciate your great service and contributions and look forward to your testimony here this morning. Thank you, sir.

GENERAL PETER SCHOOMAKER: Thank you very much. May I go ahead?

MR. PUNARO: Yes, sir, please.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Commission, thanks very much for the opportunity to testify here today, and as you've already pointed out, Mr. Chairman, I have two great teammates with me here, both the director of the Army National Guard and chief of the Army Reserve, who truly are great teammates and we have a great deal of mutual respect.

As I've said before many times, this is perhaps the most dangerous period in our lifetime, and I truly believe that. America's interests are threatened by an array of traditional irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges today. We are now five years removed from 9/11. The Army continues fighting this long war as part of a joint team, with high levels of force performance, while preparing for an uncertain and complex future. This effort is as unprecedented as it is critical. I therefore thank you for this opportunity to speak with you today about our Army, and specifically about the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve.

On behalf of our secretary, Dr. Francis Harvey and the approximately 1 million active Guard and Reserve soldiers that comprise our Army, more than 125,000 of whom are serving in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom today, I welcome the opportunity to emphasize our need for recurrent, assured and predictable access to the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard. This is one of the most significant challenges affecting the readiness and capabilities of our Army. The changed conditions of warfare have greatly affected our armed forces, with the significant and sustained demands for Army forces across the globe continuing to exceed the strategy set by the 2005 quadrennial defense review.

As it currently stands, the Army is incapable of generating and sustaining the required forces to wage the global war on terror and fulfill all other operational requirements without its components' active Guard and Reserve working together. I say again, without all components of the Army working together, we cannot continue to generate and sustain the required forces.

Fifty-five percent of our Army – many people don't understand this. Fifty-five percent of our Army is in the Reserve components. While our armed forces have made drastic changes adjusting to the post-9/11 strategic environment, our mobilization policies have not. As you know, the Army is steadfast in its determination to transform the total force from a Cold-War-structured organization into one best prepared to operate across the full spectrum of conflict, from full-scale combat to stability in reconstruction operations, including the irregular war that we face today. This effort includes modernization, modular conversion, rebalancing our forces across the active and Reserve components, and a force generation model that provides for continuous operations. Through the Army plan we are driving change at an unprecedented pace across the force, active, Guard, and Reserve, to provide the combatant commanders with a broad and necessary set of capabilities required to protect the nation today and tomorrow.

Today's Reserve components hardly resemble the Reserve components of the Cold War, which were by design principally elements of the nation's strategic Reserve. As such, they were organized, resourced at lower levels than most active component units. In 1970 the Army was twice as large as the force we have today, with over 2 million men and women in uniform, 1.3 million in the active component, and 667,000 in the Reserve components. Over the next decade and a half the Army was reduced its total end-strength by over half a million soldiers. In 1991, with 732,000 active soldiers, the Army had enough strategic depth to contribute 400,000 soldiers to Operation Desert Storm, while maintaining the Reserve components as a strategic reserve.

However, during the 1990's the total Army force drew down another half a million soldiers, with the active component now authorized 482,400. Today the active Army is less than 40 percent of the size it was 35 years ago, and the sustained high operational demand for volunteer soldiers is unprecedented. If you take a look over a time spectrum, you will find that we're operating at four or five times the amounts of deployments that we did in the entire period of the Cold War.

By necessity the Army's Reserve components have become an integral part of the deployed operational force. However, transforming the Reserve components to become part of the operational force, on top of their traditional role as strategic reserve, requires us to change the way the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve are organized, resourced, trained and mobilized. We recognize with great clarity that today's dangerous and uncertain strategic environment demands that all units are maintained at a high state of combat readiness and prepared to rapidly deploy as part of the total force.

Following 9/11 our Army began its most significant reorganization since World War II, to ensure that the formations of all components were fully manned, equipped and trained. We have made significant progress in this regard through modular conversion and balancing the current structure between the active and Reserve forces. Specifically the Army is building a pool of 70 brigade combat teams and 212 support brigades of various types among the three components. We have already completed the conversion of 31 brigades in the BCT's, and we are currently in the process of converting 20 more, including 16 Army National Guard brigades. Equally as important, we are rebalancing the force across all components to ensure they have the right types of units and soldiers with the right skills that are in the greatest demand today – infantry, engineer, military police, military intelligence, and Special Operations force. The Army National Guard provides a total of 106 brigades and the Army Reserve provides 58.

The ongoing force structure decisions are a collaborative process and we are working closely with the Army Reserve, the National Guard Bureau, and the adjutants general, Force Structure Committee, and others within the Department of Defense to address the right mix of capabilities across the force. The end state of this process will be a fully manned, trained and equipped force with comparable structure, equipment and capabilities balanced between active and Reserve components. Hand in hand with our modular conversion restructuring, we have implemented the Army force generation

model to synchronize the cyclic readiness of all Army forces. Better managed, the available force pool can provide some measure of predictability to our all-volunteer force.

Our goal is to generate a continuous output of fully manned, equipped and trained forces adequate to sustain one operational deployment in three years for the active component, one in five years for the Army Reserve, and one in six years for the Army National Guard. This will enable us to maintain a continuous supply of up to 19 brigade combat teams to meet the requirements outlined in the 2005 QDR. Sustaining this level of effort requires the availability of up to five National Guard BCT's during each ARFORGEN cycle, and the associated combat support and combat service support units, many of which are provided by the Reserve components.

In addition to our dramatic modular conversion and rebalancing efforts, we have made great strides increasing soldier and unit effectiveness through our modernization re-set efforts. This is improving how we equip the Army across all components, including the National Guard. Frankly, we entered this war flat-footed. Investment accounts were under-funded in the Army by approximately \$100 billion, resulting in nearly \$56 billion in equipment shortages across the Army. To make Reserve component units combat-ready, we had to pool personnel and equipment from across the force. We also cascaded older equipment to the Reserve components. This is no longer the standard. For example, we have fielded new Abrams integrated management tanks, so-called M-1A's, howitzers and communications equipment to the National Guard. The Reserve components received our best night vision equipment, GPS receivers, battle command equipment, trucks. The Reserve components are getting modern equipment at an unprecedented pace. In fact, yesterday or the day before we rolled out the new light utility helicopter, which is being principally supplied to the Reserve components to replace Vietnam-era Hueys that we want to wash out of the force and make room for Blackhawks, and a very fine aircraft it is, according to all reports.

By the way, this is the first aircraft roll-out as a result of termination of the Commanche dollars. This is the leading edge of the Commanche dollars now coming to fruition.

Given the National Guard's role as both an operational force and the state's first military responder for homeland defense and civil support, the Army is committed to resource the Army National Guard consistent with those roles. For instance, we teamed with the National Guard leadership to identify dual use equipment in their essential 10 capabilities. We have since spent (fenced?) more than \$21 billion for ground systems procurement and \$1.9 billion in the aviation equipment for fiscal years 2005 through 2011. And of course you know we're putting together the 2008 through 2013 POM as we speak, so obviously this number will increase out through the year 2013. This is right now greater than a four-fold increase over fiscal years 2003 through 2009.

In close collaboration with the National Guard, we have also fielded over 11,000 pieces of critical equipment to priority hurricane states. The Army Reserve remains the nation's first Title 10 responder to provide assistance in serious natural or manmade

disasters, accidents or catastrophes that occur in the United States and its territories. To ensure they can meet these responsibilities, we have spent more than \$1.9 billion for Army Reserve procurement in fiscal years 2005 through 2011. And again, this will be affected by the current POM that's being put together, which will extend the program years out, which will increase that amount.

Our current system of integrating the active and Reserve components is complex, and it works, as proven by the progress we have made in five short years. With the passage of this year's National Defense Authorization Act, the president can now involuntarily mobilize a soldier under the presidential Reserve call-up, PSRC, for 365 days versus 270. This measure will reduce the turbulence in mission such as those in the Balkans, which are almost exclusively dependent upon the Reserve components and is a welcome step. But we need to reexamine our mobilization policies, authorities and practices, which have evolved from laws written more than 50 years ago for a conscripted force and a strategic reserve.

Over the last five years the sustained strategic demand for deployed combat brigades and other supporting units is placing a strain on the Army's all-volunteer force, now being tested for the first time in an extended period of conflict. The dwell time between deployments for active brigade combat teams is less than one year. At this pace, without recurrent access to Reserve components through remobilization, we will break the active component. Further, because almost all Reserve component units have already been either partially or completely mobilized in support of the global war on terrorism, current mobilization policies and practices require the Army to rely on individual volunteers from the Reserve components.

All this runs counter to the military necessity of deploying trained, ready and cohesive units. In my professional military judgment, we must not perpetuate the mistakes of our past mobilization policies. The practices of listening to individual volunteers got us where we are today. In my view we must deploy our force as cohesive units, not as individual volunteers. This will require us to re-mobilize units and Reserve component soldiers, and this position is strongly endorsed by our Reserve component leaders.

While our soldiers are responding with the extraordinary commitment, particularly in the face of adversity and personal hardship, we cannot allow this condition to persist. We currently have three choices – either reduce the demand, gain recurrent predictable, and assured access to Reserve component, or grow the active component. The nation must begin by acknowledging that these are increasingly dangerous times and realize that we are actually closer to the beginning than we are to the end of the long war. The first option is to believe our current high demand will shortly be reduced. However, this situation in the Middle East and the rest of the world leads me to conclude we are on a new long-term plateau of high operational demand, and in my view we are on a dangerous path that dictates we must increase our strategic depth, increase readiness and reduce our strategic risk.

It is ill advised for us to undertake additional strategic risk by assuming a future of significantly reduced demand. Our history is replete with examples where we have guessed wrong – 1941, 1950, and 2001, just to name a few. We don't control the conditions that reduce the demand.

Our second option, which I recommend, is to gain the necessary authorities to enable recurrent assured and predictable access to the 55 percent of the Army represented in the Reserve components. Current policies restrict our ability to re-mobilize Reserve component units, and in my view the current policies are more restrictive than they need be under the law. They hamper our ability to re-mobilize the best trained, best led, and best equipped units. If left unchanged, these policies will perpetuate the dilemma we are facing. Changing these policies is the most logical, efficient, and fastest way to rectify the current situation. Aligning mobilization policies with the law and the Army Force Generation model will better enable us to meet the operational demand of a long war, and level the stress on the force.

A third option is to continue to grow the Army, most importantly the active component. Current demand on the force makes this a wise and prudent action in my view. As you know, we have been working several years just to grow the active force by 30,000. If the nation decides to further increase the size of our army, it will take a significant amount of time and commitment from our nation. Optimistically, we could add 6,000 to 7,000 soldiers per year, in my view, but perhaps with greater incentives we could do more. It's arguable.

Additionally, we will have to revise our equipment investment strategy and gain additional resources to support that strategy. We are at a critical point in generating Army forces for a long war. In my view, our nation should continue to grow the Army and fully use the Reserve components as an integral part of the total force. That would be my recommendation.

To meet current operational requirements, we must make these decisions now, and I solicit your support in doing so. In your invitation to appear today you asked for my opinion on several questions related to the proposed legislation contained in HR-5200 and S-2658. In my view these proposals would introduce unnecessary complexity and confuse lines of authority, therefore detracting from the unity of effort that we strive to achieve.

Before I close, I'd like to take a moment to highlight the magnificent performance of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers. They have proven that they are indispensable partners with the active Army in defending our nation's interests at home and abroad. Every day the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve prove their worth. Since 9/11 the Army Guard soldiers had comprised over 186,000 of the more than 650,000 soldiers who have deployed to combat terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Army Reserve has mobilized over 164,000 soldiers to combat terrorism around the world and defend the homeland against a constant threat of attack. Over 56,000 of these Reserve soldiers have served on multiple deployments. In the past five years over

192,000 Army Guardsmen have been part of the nationwide effort to secure the homeland. Last year over 50,000 National Guardsmen, along with more than 10,000 active duty and Army Reserve soldiers and Army civilians rapidly responded to assist their fellow citizens during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. And this year we have deployed nearly 5,000 Army Guardsmen to secure the nation's southwest border. None of these missions could have been fully executed without them.

Finally, as I said before, I would ask that you consider recommending authorities the Army needs for recurrent, predictable and assured access to Reserve components in a way that best readies them in the entire integrated Army in the country for war.

I look forward to working with the Congress, the state leadership and this Commission to enhance the readiness of our Army, the thousands of soldiers, active and Reserve, who willingly put themselves in harm's way away from those they love, tour after tour, deserve nothing less than the best our country can do for them. Sir, with that I conclude my statement. Thank you for the opportunity to be here, and I'd like to submit it for the record.

MR. PUNARO: Right. Without objection, your entire statement will be put in the record. And General Schoomaker, I want to say thank you for that very powerful and compelling statement here this morning. I must say to you that it's very consistent with what the Commission has been hearing and learning as we hold hearings both here in Washington and around the country about the fact that the laws, rules, regulations, policies, procedures, pay statuses, personnel statuses that may have been sufficient for a Guard and Reserve that was considered strategic certainly does not work for one that is considered operational.

Two of the key questions the Commission is looking at in terms of the future is, is an operational Reserve feasible, and if it is feasible, is it sustainable? We haven't reached any judgments on that. I take from your statement, however, that leaving the feasibility issue aside, it certainly doesn't appear that you believe it to be operationally sustainable at current pace. And I'll get in some questions with you on that in just a second. But your conclusions and recommendations I think are very consistent with what we've been hearing in our testimony.

I'm going to turn first to Commissioner Les Brownlee for a short statement. Les, as you know, is your partner; is the undersecretary of the Army and was the acting secretary of the Army for over 18 months, former staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and a highly decorated, a very highly decorated combat veteran in his own right. Commissioner Brownlee.

LES BROWNLEE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Schoomaker, General Stultz, and General Vaughn, welcome this morning. First of all, I asked the chairman if I could go first this morning, and I'm not going to ask any questions. The year and a half that we've spent together working in the Army, Pete, I was very honored to do and it was a great privilege for me to work alongside such a wonderful soldier. We worked as a

team and made decisions together, and I thought if I started asking questions about those, you might remind me that I made some of them. (Laughter) So anyway.

I did want to mention a few things about you and your leadership and the way I've observed you approaching these things. First of all, I've said many times how wonderful it was to watch you rejuvenate the warrior spirit in the Army with your own personal leadership. I still have one of your coins which I carry which has the warrior ethos on it. I'm going to read that just for the audience because it not only is a powerful message for the soldiers in the Army, but I carry it – it's amazing how it relates to daily life. It says, I will always place the mission first. I will never accept defeat. I will never quit, and I will never leave a fallen comrade. I remember a couple of times when Pete and I were headed over here for pretty tough hearings and I always looked at this before I left and I always read the last one, I'll never leave a fallen comrade. I always knew that no matter how tough it got, Pete would bring me back. (Laughter)

So anyway, Pete, as you know, when we first started – began to realize that this war was not going to be a short one, that we were going to have numbers of forces committed to Iraq as well as Afghanistan, and we started readying that second deployment of forces and activating several National Guard combat brigades, I will always remember that you told me that it was your judgment that we should move them higher on the list of priorities for the issue of critical soldier items so they could have them for training and preparation. You were going to move them higher than the active components in issue of those items. I thought that was a wonderful reflection of your attitude toward the total force concept and your high regard for Reserve components. I can just say that that was true in every decision that I saw made by General Schoomaker and those that served on the team alongside him.

It was clear that he always looked at soldiers as soldiers and not influenced at all by the components from which they originated. So I – again, I join the chairman in appreciating very much your candid statement here this morning. I knew we would get no less. I just want to thank you and all the soldiers in the Army for your great service. It's been very clear that you have always met the mission with the Army and it's been a tough one. So we thank you for that and look forward to your testimony. Thank you very much.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Les, thank you very much that. And of course it was privilege for me to be able to serve alongside you as well. You're a great leader and a great warrior and it helped that we could speak in Wyoming-ese. There was less room for error there. But thanks very much.

MR. PUNARO: Thank you, Mr. Brownlee.

General Schoomaker, I want to pick up really on what I consider to be the core of your statement here this morning. You talk about the dilemma we face in terms of getting full access to the Guard and Reserve, and you talk about unit cohesion. One of the issues that we've come across as we've gone out into the field away from Washington

to get the troop level view, and knowing, as you know, that all wisdom does not reside in Washington – current company, of course excluded – the cross leveling – that is, the practice that's been around for a long time and in peacetime, of taking units, taking people from units that are not deploying to put them in to fill out units that are deploying. In peacetime it's been around, particularly in the ground forces, but usually you're only talking about a handful of folks. In wartime, of course, I think that you point out in your statement, we're in a totally different situation.

As you know, there's a fundamental precept for the ground forces, the Army and the Marine Corps, that you train as you fight, and that unit cohesion is essential. At our hearing in San Antonio, with all the Reserve component chiefs testified, each and every one of them verified that that fundamental principle, train as we fight – and I'm going to try to get a head nod from General Stultz to make sure I don't misquote any of the RC chiefs, but that's what they testified to on the record, and he's giving me the head nod yes. And Lieutenant General Jack Bergman, the commander of the Marine forces Reserve, went on to say that cross-leveling, this practice of taking people from units that are – to fill out units that are going overseas because they aren't up to full strength had gotten so bad that we were in fact turning this issue of train as we fight on its head. And all the other RC chiefs, maybe they didn't use those words, but they essentially said the same thing. And that was on the record. I'm looking for another head nod.

General Vaughn is not with us but he's going to get his chance, and I know him well enough to know that I feel certain he'd want to be in that august body of all the other RC chiefs, and you stated that they put this on the record.

So why would they say that? When I heard that, it kind of alarmed us a little bit so we said, let's dig into it a little further. Some of our commissioners visited Ft. Hood and they visited a Guard brigade that was training up to go overseas. They needed to bring people in from 40 states to fill out that unit. We had a Marine Corps Reserve infantry battalion commander testify. We brought in battalion commanders from the Army Reserve, the Army Guard, and the Marine Corps, the ground forces. And he indicated that the current battalion that was training up at Camp Pendleton had to bring people from 21 separate cities to fill out a battalion-sized unit.

So as we dug into this a little more, the Army, which has been tremendously cooperative with the Commission, we got with the Army G-3, and they actually had been working on this for FORSCOM, for you and for mobilization. They had a briefing. They said, are we under stress. And they took a look at the size of the Army Guard and the Army Reserve and they totaled them up to 522,000, and they did sort of your reverse – the famous Schoemaker rain barrel spigot, where you did that diagram years ago where you said, we can't get at the forces. This one they've taken and bucket-ized and put in the rain barrel at the bottom and said, even if we open the spigot, we're right now at the point with 522,000 in those two components, where we can get at less than 10 percent of that force because of somebody's policies, that this only-volunteer policy and not recalling people that are previously mobilized has taken 185,000 combat-ready soldiers off the table.

They conclude, on this page, they say we're out of slits – that's their words, not mine – and they say future missions are in jeopardy. That's the words of the G-3 office of the Army. Those are not my words. And here were some examples just to give you a little better feel for it. On Army Reserve statistics, they were saying that it's getting harder and harder to cobble units together. In FY02 they were cross-leveling about six percent. In FY03 it had gotten to 39 percent. The last two rotations, according to the Army's G-3 brief, it's roughly 62 percent. And General Stultz again has given us the right, head-nod, and the implication on that is they say it's going to get worse and worse and worse. They don't see any way it's going to get better under the current policies.

An Army Guard BCT that's going to OIF608 basically had to go and pull soldiers from Minnesota 2,500, Indiana 619, Nebraska 305, New Jersey 117, Kentucky 77, Utah 18, Kansas 117. Then there was the example of a smaller unit, an Army Guard – it was Army National Guard transport company, talking about a company of 170 people. There were only 7 in that unit that could be called up because of these policies. One hundred and sixty-three had to be cross-leveled to get a company – now this is just a company-sized unit. They had to go to 65 separate units in 49 different locations. That's kind of the level of cross-leveling. And the study went on to say that they looked at what they call the OSD-mandated volunteer policy stresses the force. They said from the donor units it loses its volunteers and becomes a broken unit. So the unit that's back here that might be ready—have to go in a year or two becomes a broken unit, and the deploying unit, plus the volunteers – these again are not my words, these are words of the Army briefing chart, become a non-cohesive unit. Then they say it degrades the readiness of donor units, the unit collective training readiness, the cohesion of the deploying unit, and the readiness of the deploying unit.

You addressed this in your statement. And I would say to you, putting Marine commander – going back to my Marine Corps days and putting a Marine commander's hat on, I would say the most charitable thing you could say about this current policy is that it's badly bent. I will tell you in my professional military judgment, it's badly broken. And I can tell you in the words of the Marine Reserve infantry battalion commander who testified on the record, he said it was an evil policy. Again, those are his words, not my words.

So I guess my question to you on this, because I think it's the core of what you're talking about here today, are we out of slits? Are we degrading the readiness of donor units and deployed units, and are we putting future missions in jeopardy with this current policy?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Let me approach – first of all, thanks for your testimony. I hope that goes into the record. (Laughter)

MR. PUNARO: That was a question, I thought. (Laughter)

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: I couldn't have done it better. This is a historic problem. The United States of America historically has entered conflict unprepared. And you can go back and read Rick Atkinson's book "An Army at Dawn," and listen to George C. Marshall who said, you know, before the war I had all the time in the world and no money, and now I've got all kinds of money and no time. And it took us over two years from the time Pearl Harbor was bombed to get the first American soldier ashore on foreign soil, into North Africa. Over two years. And many of the soldiers that landed there, according to Rick Atkinson's research, landed without rifles. And many of them that had rifles had not been properly trained with those rifles. And the tanks that we had ashore were under-gunned, under-manned tanks and we lost all of them. Patton landed with training ammunition. This is a historic practice in our country. We entered Korea the same way. Fehrenback's book – you can read that one – "This kind of war." It's a lesson in unpreparedness. My father, by the way, was in World War II, Korea and Vietnam, and lived these practices.

We then come out of a Cold War, and I described to you what we did following the Cold War and the great peace dividend. And if you take a look at the investment accounts in the Department of Defense, you will find that \$1.89 trillion in investment in DOD was divided, with 16 percent of that investment going to the United States Army between the years 1990s and 2005. Thirty-three percent went to the Navy, 36 percent to the Air Force, and 15 percent went to the defense agencies. Now these are public records. I testified to this before, before the Congress.

So you now have an Army that has been downsized. Its policies, its personnel policies – for instance, what do you do when you downsize the Army? You reduce the amount of lieutenants you accept, you change the promotion, you have all kinds of things that go through. And with that kind of investment, you end up with problems in being able to provide equipment across the entire force, and that's exactly where we found ourselves in fact. When I came back on board, we were manufacturing body armor for the United States Army, 1,200 a month. It was going to take us about 48 years to equip our Army, all of our soldiers in body armor, at the programmatic rate of 1,200 a month.

Small arms ammunition the Army manufactures for all services, .50 caliber and below. We have one factory in this country, at Lake City, whose fate was determined by Harry Truman in 1940. It's literally the only place that that ammunition is manufactured. We had continuously manufactured less than 20 percent of our requirement, every year, year after year after year. We have a requirement for about 2 billion rounds and we were manufacturing somewhere down in the 300 (million) to 400 million rounds.

You do this year after year after year and you end up with a situation that we found ourselves in, again, where you now look at the force and you find on the active force we had six heavy divisions in the Army. None of them were the same because they were at various levels of modernization. We had four different kind of tanks, four different kind of Bradleys. Different kinds of radios, different kinds of repair part sets and mechanics and all the kinds of things because of the difference. The two, the airborne and the air assault division, which ideally should be the same – one of them

arrives in helicopters, one of them arrives by parachute – should have been basically the same, weren't the same. We had different numbers of soldiers in squads, different numbers of guns and batteries, different numbers of platoons and companies because of the staggered disparate modernization.

You go to the Reserve component and you find that there was more structure than there were people. It was what we call over-structured. And so now you've got 100 units and only enough people to man 80 of them. And so what happens? They get distributed across 100 units. So immediately you have hollow units. And because of the condition of equipment in the active force that I just described, and the condition of the ammunition and all the rest of that stuff, of course it cascades differently down in Reserves, and so they suffer at a greater rate than what the active force does because the active force is being starved as well.

Now you've got this over-structured Reserve and 9/11 happens. What's the first thing that happened, was we go for individual volunteers. That was the number one mistake, one. Twenty-thousand volunteers. Now, who volunteers? Well, the very best volunteer. And out of these hollow units we now take the very best individuals, so we start their clock as individuals. And so now we have more hollow units. Then we get in this business we've got to start mobilizing, and what are we mobilizing? We're mobilizing hollow units that are more hollow because of the individuals, and we start this aggregation that you talk about, and we find out we don't have the equipment, we don't have the body armor, we don't have the ammunition. And so by aggregating so many states, as you described, in increment – so now you don't have the same leaders with people, you don't have, you know, any history. This is the same way we've done it before and it's not the way to do it any more. We can't.

When I went down to Ft. Stewart, when we had the medical hold problem down there, there were 633 Reserve component soldiers that were in that hold down in Ft. Stewart, and I was appalled. I said, how could we have that many that couldn't make the medical standards? I went down there and looked at it and only 12 of them, I believe, 12 or 14 of them had been deployed. The rest of them never got out the deployment gate. I mean, there was a guy down there who's a first sergeant who had three heart attacks and he was still in that unit. We had a fellow down there that had a growth on his neck that I promise you took years to grow, and yet there he was. It just totally unacceptable. Out of 633 non-medically ready people, only 12 of them had deployed and then returned.

You know, we saw this all across the thing, and this is what we've been attacking and we've been attacking it very successfully. And I can assure you the leadership of the Guard and Reserve and the active force has rectified this. But the problem is we've got the same policies, and as individuals are pulled out of these units, it continues to aggravate the problem. We must start this clock again and we must field fully trained, equipped, well-led forces to go do the job that we're asking them to do, which fundamentally means I think we've got to start the clock again. And we've got to maintain our commitment to cohesion and to readiness because to do anything else is not right. I mean, imagine being put together into a unit that has not been together, you don't

know the leadership, and being put through a thing. And oh, by the way, because we're doing it this way, it takes more time post-mobilization to get them ready. I mean, that's why we had the 123-day post-mobilization –

MR. PUNARO: So General Schoomaker, it would be my understanding then, based on what you said, that you are recommending that the current OSD policy that says we have to rely on volunteers for additional mobilization should be changed and turned around and that we be able to mobilize Reserve and Guard units as units following the long-standing principle of unit cohesion.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: It is not a new recommendation with me. I have been recommending this all along. This is what my –

MR. PUNARO: This is not a new recommendation.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: It is not a new recommendation. We must change that policy and we must use the – you know, out of military necessity we should be making a right decision for mobilizing real units.

MR. PUNARO: Well, general, I need to move on to another question here, but I'd hope you'd put me in the amen and hallelujah chorus on this one because a Marine commander that sent his troops from the Marine Corps Reserve into battle and had some unfortunate casualties, including killed in action, and their lessons learned, told me one-on-one in confidence that he could trace those casualties back to cross-leveling and unit cohesion very specifically. So I would say – I call the policy that we're operating on now that you've recommended be changed, apparently it sounds time and time again, is badly broken. He called it fatally flawed.

And I know as a former commanding general with the 4th Marine Division that provides most of the Reserve ground forces, I would not want to take a unit and command that unit in combat if it was put together like a patchwork quilt. So when you get ready for your frontal assault on Dr. Chu's office, I hope you'll count on me kind of being in there as supporting fire, and we'll get our bayonets sharpened and go in there together because this has got to be turned around because it's not just an issue of personnel policy. It's an issue of we're sending troops into harm's way and we're not sending them in terms of the best organization, training and equipping and best led. And that's an obligation we have to all our Marines and soldiers, sailors, airmen and Coast Guardsmen.

So again, I appreciate your patience for another –

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: In the opinion of my advice, I'm not doing front assaults on anybody because we have civilian control of the military in this country. It's my job to provide advice, and that's what I'm providing –

MR. PUNARO: But it sounds to me they're not listening to the military advice.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: I'll leave it lay where it is. But I believe we should do is what I said. We have a responsibility. We have a country that can afford to put real units together, organized, train, equipped, well-led, to do the nation's bidding.

MR. PUNARO: Commissioner Eckles.

LARRY ECKLES: Yes, good morning, General. Thank you for what you and our great Army does for our country. We really appreciate every day.

As you know, presently the chief of the National Guard Bureau serves in the grade of lieutenant general. S-2658 and HR-5200 would direct that the chief serve in the grade of general. Section 529 has asked the Commission to examine as an alternative to making the chief of the Guard Bureau a member of the Joint Chiefs, and holding the grade of general, the advisability and feasibility of providing that the chief National Guard Bureau hold the grade of general but continue to perform the current duties of his office. On one hand the chief of the National Guard Bureau is responsible for a \$21.3 million budget, 54 joint force headquarters, a joint force of more than 450,000 Army and Air Guard members, and more than 200 general officers, more than 3,000 facilities nationwide. Coordinates National Guard domestic emergency, homeland defense and homeland security operations, interfaces with 50 state governors, three territories and the District of Columbia, and the combatant commanders, and manages the readiness and resourcing the Guard for their Title 10 war fight.

On the other hand, General Jones, the former commander of EUCOM, when he testified before us in October, told us, I don't see the absolute need of another four-star and another member of the Joint Chiefs. At the same hearing General Smith, commander of Joint Forces Command, when asked whether it would be helpful if the chief of the National Guard Bureau had a fourth star, said, I don't know what the benefit would be, but I don't know what the downside would be either.

Both generals cautioned against taking actions that would engender greater separateness or create more stovepipes. What criteria would you recommend the Commission use to determine whether or not a position warrants the four-star billet?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Well, first of all, I think that what we have to do is ask what the purpose and function is. All of the functions that you just described I do not believe are the statutory functions of the chief of the National Guard Bureau. For instance, he has no responsibility over a budget. He has a responsibility to provide advice on how that budget goes, but the secretary of the Army and the secretary of the Air Force provide collected budget inputs and we have a DOD budget and it's executed in a way under the direction of secretary of defense through the secretaries of the services. And that's the way that works.

Operationally we have under the Unified Command plan, under Goldwater-Nichols, we have a very clear chain of command. The chief of the National Guard

Bureau is not involved in that at all. The chain of command in the state runs from the governor through the TAG. The chain of command under Title 10 runs from the president of the United States to the secretary of defense through combatant commander. It is not run through the services. The chief of National Guard Bureau does not fit in there either.

So while I'm not arguing that what the chief of the National Guard Bureau has not been involved in those activities, those are not his principal responsibilities. So I do not think that in fact his statutory responsibilities – I agree with General Jones, I don't see where it rises to a level that would require a general. However, I have no objection to the chief of National Guard Bureau being a general but I don't think it rises to that level. It is not, you know, anything that I've got any personal angst over.

I think we ought to be very, very careful that we don't create something that isn't necessary and that we don't obfuscate what is already a very difficult, complex organizational structure, and we must remember that under the law that command is a very important function. The chief of the National Guard Bureau does not exercise any command function. He is a coordinator and advisor, and is not in a chain of command in either case, either in the Title 10 organize, train, equip case, or in an operational sense.

MR. ECKLES: Thank you.

MR. PUNARO: Commissioner Lewis.

PATRICIA LEWIS: Thank you very much for coming this morning. I too appreciate your candid views on these issues. I also wanted to take just a moment to mention that I had the opportunity to go to Ft. Dix earlier this week and I was so extremely impressed with all the troops there. Their innovation and evolutionary training techniques are just remarkable and they're saving lives and I really want to commend them for all their efforts.

I also was able to get an appreciation for the impact of the cross-leveling that was discussed earlier on the mobilization process and post-mobilization training and the leadership identification. So we have some wonderful troops who are dealing with hard circumstances and they're doing a tremendous job and I just wanted to make a public comment on that regard. I appreciate that.

You had spoken a bit earlier about the impact of our force drawdown over time on promotion policy, and we're also seeing some questions related to the increased utilization of Reserve forces and their opportunities for promotion policy. As you're aware, when an officer is recommended to the president for initial appointment as an O9 or O10, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must submit an evaluation to the secretary of defense on that officer's performance as a member of the Joint Staff and on other joint duty assignments. The Reserve component chiefs are currently exempt from joint duty experience requirement, but that waiver expires December 31 of this year. Many of the joint duty assignments, including inter-agency assignments served by

Reserve component officers, have not met the joint duty requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

The Goldwater-Nichols amendment included in the Defense Authorization Act for 07 significantly expand the types of assignments that should now qualify for joint duty credit once the legislation becomes effective October 1st of '07. As you know, the Commission is tasked by section 3 of S-2658 and HR-5200 to look at the issue of promotion opportunity for Reserve component officers to three-star positions of importance in responsibility. One of the impediments is the difficulty in meeting the joint duty requirements of Goldwater-Nichols.

Assuming that DOD implementation plan for Goldwater-Nichols amendments included in that act make it easier for Reserve component members to meet joint duty requirements in the future, do you foresee more Reserve component officers being competitive for three- and four-star positions of importance and responsibility in the future? And are there any specific positions that you believe they should be excluded from for consideration, and any other comments with regard to promotion policy for Reserve officers? I would appreciate it.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Well, as you know, the board process for promotion terminates at the selection to O8. Major General is the last level which an officer is submitted before a formal board process. In the three-star and four-star grades, these are decisions that are made under the selection that the secretary of defense ultimately makes a recommendation to the president. Under the current practice what happens is, all of the services nominate, regardless of component. We look for the best qualified that we have for those particular positions of responsibility and we forward those nominations to the secretary of defense for consideration.

I know of nothing that stops anybody from being considered, but I think realistically the – I don't – let me put it this way. I don't see it being feasible that a National Guard or Army Reserve officer would compete for every position that is out there because it's not reasonable that their experiences are equal with people that, you know, have served continuously. But there are many positions, and particularly as you take a look at the increasing responsibilities of homeland security, homeland defense, and in mobilization business, in the training business that we have where in my view it makes a great deal of sense that you would see increased numbers of Guard and Reserve personnel competing for that.

If you are asking me do I see a Guard or Reserve officer becoming a combatant commander, I do not see that. I don't think their experience – at this stage. Could be in the future. But at this stage I don't see where their total experience over a career prepares them for that level of responsibility.

MS. LEWIS: Thank you.

MR. PUNARO: Commissioner McKinnon.

DAN MCKINNON: General, I'm impressed by your testimony today. It's just a shame that the New York Times and Washington Post really don't in detail report the kind of information you're providing to the American public, and really understand – and every other newspaper, understand the seriousness of the crisis we're facing.

But with that in mind, I understand that you all, the Army, went to the Congress, asked for \$17-plus billion for equipment, and yet only spent about \$3.8 billion or so of that amount of money. Congressman Hunter, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, said the Army's got a case of the slows, that we gave them every dime they wanted yet they haven't bought the equipment. And we're concerned about equipment on this Commission. Is there a reason they haven't spent all the money?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Well, first of all, Congressman Hunter is inaccurate and it was explained to him – I can't remember whether it was yesterday or the day before. He might have thrown a hand grenade before the pin was pulled on the deal. Believe me, he's a great supporter and I don't mean to be – but what – the figures you just stated are incorrect. We in fact – first of all, the \$17.1 billion is broken down roughly in half. Half of it is going to buy new equipment, and most of that money has been obligated against contracts. But the contracts have to be written correctly, they have to be – it takes some time to do that. Actually by right after the first of the year we should have almost all of that on contract.

The other half of the money is O&M money, operations and maintenance money, that actually pays for work performed. Pays the salaries for the people in the depots and pays for the stuff. That can't be spent until the work is performed. So that is going to be spent over the year. Now we are going to – I mean, it's targeted to where it's going to be spent. The depots know they're going to get the money, but you don't spend it until the labor is performed.

MR. MCKINNON: Along that line, then, does that amount of money, general, give you the necessary funds you need to bring the Reserves in particular up to the standards they need to be? We're understanding, we heard testimony around 30 percent of what their requirements are is what they have in the way of equipment.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: First of all, I was just handed the figure here – \$9.8 billion of the \$17.1 billion has been spent. Which is about triple what was reported. And we put a public release out to do it. Unfortunately we could have had this conversation before he made the statement and we wouldn't, you know, be having this conversation. But that's the way it goes sometimes.

This re-set money is for the Army. It will repair and provide re-set equipment and new equipment across the Army. But this \$17.1 billion is, as I testified to when I said we needed it, is only the first installment that must continue to take place over the next three to five years. This will take a chip, maybe, of 25, 30 percent at most out of the need.

Because while we are doing this, we are continuing to consume equipment at a huge rate over there.

We have a Stryker – somebody gave me a figure the other day, we have a Stryker. Now we've only fielded Stryker for about three years. A Stryker down there in Anniston right now being re-set that's got over 40,000 miles on it. We program our tracked-wheel vehicles for 800 miles a year. So I mean, that is a rate – this is like building an airplane while it's flying. And while you're building it, people are ripping pieces off the wings. It is a very dynamic process we're going through right now because we are in a very high op tempo, trying to overcome this \$56 billion deficit as we're transforming this force to do what we're doing. It's very complicated.

So you know, the money that we are getting is going to the Army, and it will affect the Guard, Reserve, and active. As they come up on the Army Force Generation model, they will be getting that equipment.

MR. MCKINNON: Well, along that line, with the POM coming on, and you talk about projections on out to 2011, do you think you're really going to get all that money?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Yes.

MR. MCKINNON: Do you think the percent of budget going to the DOD should be increased with GDP?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: I do. Right now we are spending historically the lowest that we've ever spent in period of war: World War II, 38 percent; Korea, about 14.5 percent; Vietnam about 9.5 percent. We're at about 3.7, 3.8 percent. Historically low. It's affordable. My view is we should probably be somewhere around 5 percent, 6 percent of GDP if we're going to fully do the things that we're going to have to do to meet the strategy.

MR. MCKINNON: We're concentrating on our troops over in Iraq a great deal. Not much has been said about Afghanistan. What do you see going on over there, and what do you think's going to happen when the spring thaw comes?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: I think all indicators are that we're going to have a very active spring, and in this forum I wouldn't want to go much further than that.

MR. MCKINNON: Just one last question. The IED's are causing real problems from a casualty standpoint, which is making headlines in the press probably more than anything else over there. There are some advocates have said, why not have sort of a close air support operation with some kind of a light aircraft with rockets and flares on it and that type of thing, to spot, particularly in the nighttime, the planting of the IED's. Is there a relationship between the Army and the Air Force about doing such an endeavor?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Actually also the Navy. And again, I would not like to describe this very much, but there's a fairly sophisticated effort from the air, both manned and unmanned platforms with all kinds of capabilities that are being applied against this. And again, without being too specific here, we have been fairly successful. It's the large numbers of them that are being employed that's quite frankly the problem. But we've been fairly successful against this problem. We need to get better.

The specific thing you're talking about I'm very aware of, and the answer is yes. There is an effort from the air.

MR. MCKINNON: We just appreciate you being here today because – and I just hope that, once again, the American public understands the kind of things we're talking about and the seriousness of our situation.

MR. PUNARO: Commissioner Sherrard.

JAMES E. SHERRARD: Sir, I echo that. It's a real honor to have you before us.

The proponents of the legislation that we've been discussing that address the issues with reference to the National Guard are citing several cases, of which in your testimony you brought forth responses that answered those questions based on the way you're doing business today. The issue of the manpower reductions that were proposed earlier that were in fact reinstated by the Army. So I'm comfortable that your processes include the senior leadership, and they had the opportunity to make those decisions and have that discussion with you.

You also mentioned that we have a specific amount of money that is fenced for those forces. I guess my question to you is, when that money is fenced, those dual-use requirements as they come forth, if in fact they don't reach a priority level, is there a mechanism inside your service programming and budgeting cycle that the very senior leadership, i.e., the NGB chief and the director of the Army National Guard can sit down and talk with you and the secretary one-on-one about those issues before that final decision is made? Or how does that input get in to you?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Well, absolutely. I mean, my door is open to these two gentlemen and General Blum any time they want to open it. They are routinely at these meetings that – where we discuss these priorities. Part of the problem of the past issue that you're talking about, when you have requirements like we have, and then the budget that you're having to operate against is as it was at the time that we're talking about, and you have to make decisions about where you have to go with what you've been told that all you're going to have to spend, it becomes very clear to you that you have to take risk in some areas that perhaps don't provide – let me put it this way. For every active brigade that we take out of the system, we would need 2.5 or 3 brigades in the Reserve component to make up for that availability. So when somebody says, hey, you only got 80 cents to spend against a \$1.50 problem, you can't go taking down the pieces of the puzzle that give you the best return for the buck.

Now we've approached this a little differently as a result of that, and as you know we fought very hard and I think what we've got is a very balanced program, and I believe with the investments – and believe me, I've told you about what the equipment investments are, et cetera, in this force concurrent with that, or the training investments and the personnel investments and all of the other things that are required to solve this problem. Because we are building a force today that is not – you might remember the ALO construct, the Allowable Level of Organization, which means that you were required 100 for war but we can only afford 68, so that's what you're going to have on your books and you report readiness against 68. Well, that's out the window. We're not doing that any more.

What we're doing is reporting against 100 percent and we expect to build 100 percent and we expect to train 100 percent. And if we're not at that thing, the readiness level, so state. And of course this achieved a different result. So that's kind of where we are and it's probably – I tried to state it simply but it's a very complex kind of an issue.

The fact of the matter is, we believe we now have a balanced total force approach. We believe that we have an investment approach here that is not only affordable but executable and we're doing that. And we are committed to seeing this through, but we must have access to these forces that we're building. It makes no sense to put Bradleys and tanks and attack helicopters and things and have all kinds of capability there sitting over here that we can't touch. Or if we touch it, we're going to do it in a piecemeal way. So what we must do is populate the Army Force Generation model with fully ready units. Regardless of whether they're active, Guard or Reserve, they must meet the same standards. The only difference is, in your Reserve structure you have a longer time to meet the standard in terms of the training readiness. I'm not talking about the personal readiness but I'm talking about the training readiness. And access to the Reserve components is less frequent. Otherwise it has to be the same. And that's generally what we are now producing.

I think if you go and touch these units that we've got in combat today, put your finger on them, it's very, very difficult in most cases to discern, if you didn't know the patches, where they're from. They're equipped the same, they're trained the way they should be trained, and believe me, we're supporting them over there regardless of component. And my belief is, that's what this nation has to do. We've got to overcome the old paradigm.

MR. SHERRARD: I appreciate that, sir, and I appreciate your very candid response to these. I applaud your efforts because you have to have that. That relationship has got to be one, as you talk so eloquently about, it's the total army that you're talking about, and having the equipment and, most importantly, that we protect those men and women that we put in harm's way. I applaud your efforts on that and I really appreciate the dialogue we've had today.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my questions.

MR. PUNARO: Okay, we have eight minutes left on this panel, and I want to see if any of the other commissioners have a question. I know Dan has a follow-up question. Commissioner Stump.

E. GORDON STUMP: Yes, sir. A lot of discussion on the ARFORGEN model. I guess it's unfortunate we didn't have it in place on 9/11 because it activated the Guard and Reserve, not for 12 months but for 18 months, and that's what's causing the problem with the second deployment, I think, because we can't get them. But in the ARFORGEN model we call for one in six and one in five on the Reserves, and I believe that the Reserve components have bought off onto that particular model. Has the Army started looking at changing the training requirements so we can actually do just a one-year deployment of the Army or the Army National Guard or Army Reserves, boots on the ground, because I think that's key to it. The Guard and Reserve are bought off based on one-year on the ground, not 18 months on the ground.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Well, General Vaughn and I have had this conversation in spades, and the answer is yes. What we are working right now is how – you know, how much boots on the ground time can we get out of a total 12-month mobilization. Now you know that in a year of mobilization, 30 days of that by law are leave. So you automatically lose a month. We've got to have time to get the mobilization process and the shipment over there, so you're going to lose a month on that end. And on the back end you're going to lose about a month.

So my bet is the best we're going to get out of a year's mobilization is nine months probably, actual boots on the ground. We're looking at that. And I'm told by General Vaughn that with that kind of a policy that we would be very easy to sustain that kind of access routinely. But remember, the reason we had to go to 16, 18-month mobilization was because of the troubled way in which we were having to aggregate these small bits and pieces and put them together and go through training to get people up to a level and get them equipped and ready to go. Unfortunately, that's a result of the way in which we prepared and mobilized. With a different policy, I believe that we can have that kind of state of readiness, especially because the Army Force Generation model provides the predictability so people can look down the road. They know where they're going to deploy and they know what they have to do to prepare themselves prior to mobilization to reduce the amount of time that we have to do things post-mobilization.

MR. STUMP: What type of equipment will be available? The first two years of the ARFORGEN model are for re-set, and I believe there's some discussion there that you might not have very much equipment during those first two years, and we're concerned about the possible effect on the homeland defense, homeland security mission if you don't have any – if you're there for two years first without equipment, first of all it's hard to train, it's hard to retain the soldiers, and with the homeland security mission we might not have the equipment we need for the state mission.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: First of all, the dual use equipment is not the equipment at issue here. Trucks, radios, night vision, weapons, you know, those kind of things obviously are the things that are required for the homeland security mission and will be there. Re-set piece that with tanks and Bradleys and howitzers and things like that is the place that you would probably see less dense equipment, but you still have to have enough there to do crew level, individual level, crew level and perhaps up to section level training during that time to maintain proficiency on those kinds of tasks. But the principal task of those units in the re-set period would be towards being available for more of the homeland security kinds of things. As you get further in the ARFORGEN model, then of course the level of complexity and the density of equipment would increase for the wartime mission.

By the time that they're up in the final couple of years of the generation model prior to being available for deployment, they would be fully ready. This is where you reduce the strategic risk to the nation, by having those forces ready at that time that are not deployed. And by having this river flowing consistently and predictably, it takes the risk off the nation, it provides us the depth – the strategic depth that we need to deal with the unforeseen, and it gives us the output required to meet the demand that we have today. That's why we put that together.

MR. STUMP: Thank you very much.

MR. PUNARO: We're going to try to squeeze two more questions into the four minutes we have remaining on the House Armed Services Committee clock, so Commissioner Thompson, you go too long, Commissioner McKinnon's going to be mad at you.

J. STANTON THOMPSON: Yesterday Secretary Foresman and the commission kind of got in discussion of defense support of civilian authorities, and homeland security and that basic subject. He indicated that his department has provided 15 scenarios to the Department of Defense to being planning defense support of civilian authorities. And he couldn't articulate how the Department of Defense was developing requirements. Matter of fact, it kind of gave us the indicator that they didn't really give you a good slate of expectations, what the Department of defense was expected to do.

My question is, over the course of the year we've been together, it seems apparent that the National Guard is going to be a significant role player. How does the Army develop requirements and then resource those requirements specifically for defense support of civilian authority?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Well, I'm not sure I totally understand the question. We resource – we resource the Army against our Title 10 mission set, and the use of active forces in support of civil authority is kind of a lesser included set of capabilities.

MR. THOMPSON: How does that serve – let me press a little bit. Some of the overarching documents indicate that homeland defense and homeland security is the

number one priority, but I sense that it isn't in terms of the way that you resource that obligation. Am I wrong?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Well, we resource the obligation by ensuring that – from my perspective homeland defense and homeland security from the active forces side, the strategic perspective is, that starts not at home but away. Our job is to deal with that piece of it away. And as it gets closer and closer to home, we have different authorities. Active forces supporting domestic authority is an exception and it requires – it requires, you know, as you know Posse Comitatus and all the things that are there. Our system is set up so that the first responder actually is, as you know, the state and local authorities. And that's why we have National Guard is under the TAG, under the governor to respond in terms of, you know, the state authorities.

So I guess what I'm telling you is that we have a responsibility to organize and train and equip for the active, the Title 10 mission, but there's also a responsibility that some of that effort that we put into that facilitates and supports that in-state mission. With the equipment, with the training, you know. If you're teaching someone to use night vision goggles or radio or rifle or drive a truck, they can do that against any mission we give them, and that's basically what we want to make sure that we're doing. We don't train generally people to fire howitzers, attack with tanks and use Bradleys for homeland security mission, and I guess that's where the overlap is.

I believe that's why we have a chief of the National Guard Bureau, to make sure that the coordination – it's not an issue of command or control. It's an issue of advice, and making sure that these things are happening, both from the states and from the department level. And the Army is not in the driver's seat on this. As you correctly stated, these scenarios are being developed at the OSD level, I'm sure under the homeland defense department, director.

MR. PUNARO: Commissioner Thompson, I think this is going to be a good area for us. I know the Army is ready for us to kind of follow up with more detail. In the 30 seconds we have left, I'm going to let Dan McKinnon ask the last question.

MR. MCKINNON: Just to follow up on the chairman's testimony. You made the comment about you thought the infrequency – or as I understood it, you thought the frequency of the one in six on the Guard could be increased. At what point could it be increased for the involuntary activation? Before you break the Guard?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Before you break the Guard?

MR. MCKINNON: You're going to get on the downside of people volunteering for the Guard if they're too activated.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: I would have to defer to what General Vaughn and see what his feelings of it are. But my feeling is this. We've got – we are trying to organize the Army, and when we grow the Army to the point that we need it, we should be able to

do what we're doing today with the active force having about two years at home for every year deployed, and the Guard having five years at home for every year deployed, and everything would be copasetic. The problem is, I told you we're building the airplane while in flight. We don't have all of that force structure capacity yet because we are building it. And by the way, the demand is exceeding that schedule.

So now you have an active force that's one to one, and it seems to me prudent that we shouldn't hold the Guard and Reserve at one in five and one in six. It seems to me that something less than that is prudent. And to do it in something less than that, it ought to be in whole units, not as individuals because you get too much – so I don't know whether you want to hear from General Vaughn or whether he speaks to that in a different session. But I believe that we could sustain something less than that. I believe people are willing to do it. But what we have to do is decide and start the clock and get on with it.

MR. PUNARO: Thank you, sir. General Vaughn already knows he's on the dock to come back and testify in his own right, so we'll follow up with him. Thank you for your testimony – very helpful testimony this morning. And also thank you, thank General Stultz, the chief of the Army Reserve, and thank General Vaughn, the chief of the Army National Guard for what each of you do to support the nation's soldiers and their families each and every day. And we look forward to continue to work very closely with the Army on all these very important subjects. Thank you again.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Thank you very much for your support.

MR. PUNARO: We'll take kind of a one-minute break in place as the Army departs and the Air Force arrives, and we'll hear from the secretary of the Air Force, Mike Wynne, and from the chief of staff of the Air Force.

(Brief recess)

MR. PUNARO: Good morning, and welcome. We'll continue with our next panel. In particular I know the secretary has just got back from a long trip visiting the troops. I'm not sure if the chief was with you or not, but I know the chief stays pretty busy every day so we really appreciate your being willing to come after you've gotten back from a very long trip. I know you're in much better shape than Major General Carter after that trip.

SECRETARY MICHAEL W. WYNNE: It's always a pleasure to visit our airmen and their joint and coalition partners, sir.

MR. PUNARO: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. As I noted in the previous panel, S-2658 and HR-2500, in enhancing the position of the chief of the National Guard Bureau would also modify a long-standing relationship between the Army and Air National Guard and their parent services. To provide a second service perspective, in addition to the one we just heard from the chief of staff of the Army, our next panel of witnesses will

be the secretary of the Air Force, Michael Wynne, and the chief of staff of the Air Force, General Michael Moseley.

In many ways – in fact, I would say in a lot of ways, and I speak from my own experience, from my long years on Capitol Hill, in uniform as a Marine and watching this, the Air Force has always been considered a model of active-Reserve integration through their use of associate units and many other initiatives over the years, and in a lot of ways has a much different philosophy towards operational readiness than does the ground forces and how they are organized.

However, some have suggested some points of friction. The congressional proponents of S-2658 and HR-5200, and as I mentioned in our previous panel, these people are strong supporters of the National Guard and Reserve, strong supporters of a strong national defense. These are not Johnny-come-lately's or hopping on the bandwagon kind of folks. They've been voting in favor of and providing resources to ensure we have a strong national defense over a long period of time, including adding necessary equipment for the Air Force over time. So these are not – the proponents of this legislation are not critics of the Pentagon. I don't say that as making a value judgment on the legislation, just these are the kind of folks that are pushing these and they're very concerned obviously about the Air Force BRAC decisions on restructuring the air national Guard bases and the aircraft, some of which were changed by the Base Closure Commission. And they say that this is a reason why the National Guard needs to have a stronger, more independent voice within the Pentagon.

The proponents also cite what they believe to be a lack of a National Guard representation within the senior ranks of the Air Force and Army and combatant commands. So Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, we look forward to hearing the Air Force views on this legislative proposal, as well as what you see as the key components of Air Force total force integration effort. We also asked you to offer where possible any alternative approaches you see to solve any problems that need to be addressed. That's one of the challenges we're facing on the commission as we look at this legislation, is to make sure we understand with some clarity what are the requirements here, and then what are the perceived or real problems that people are trying to correct. That's one of the things we're trying to get at in these hearings.

So again, we thank you for being here this morning and for your long and dedicated service to the nation. Without objection, your prepared statements will be included in the hearing record. I'm going to get myself in trouble with the staff again, what they call the chairman's stray voltage thoughts, but it popped into my head that we never take time to thank people for their service, and I'm going to go back to my days as a second lieutenant in the United States Marine Corps in Vietnam and say thank you to the men and women of the Air Force because my little old platoon got a lot of close air support from Air Force F-4 Phantom pilots. And I hesitate to say this because I'll probably be eradicated from the commandant of the Marine Corps Christmas card list. They were a lot better at close air support in my little limited area than were the Marine Phantom F-4 pilots. I also had the privilege of flying out of Vietnam on a C-141

Nightingale flight, the forerunner of the medical evacuations that the Air Force is doing so well and saving so many lives in combat.

So it bothers me when I hear people talk about the Air Force is a Cold War air force because that certainly is not the case today, it wasn't the case then. We as military commanders, we're kind of lulled into a false sense of security because we've enjoyed air superiority for all these years and we forget how important that is and what a difference it would make on the military battlefield if we didn't have that air superiority. And the precision that all these weapons have today are due to systems that the Air Force maintains. So from one little Marine Corps second lieutenant, I would just like to say thank you to the men and women of the Air Force for the great service they provided to me and my little platoon personally, but for the tremendous contributions they're making in today's operational environment.

With that, Secretary Wynne.

SEC. WYNNE: Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Commission, thank you for the opportunity to talk with you. Mr. Chairman, we are very proud to fly wingman to wingman with our colleagues in the Marine Corps and with the United States Navy. We actually are moving A-10's to partner with the Marine Corps right now so we can better together provide close air support to second lieutenants and all of our ground forces to make sure they are fully covered.

We have in Navy A-6's partnering with us right there at Bagram to make sure they can provide the electronic suppression in attack that really helps us out so much throughout that theater of warfare. So I appreciate your, as you declared it, stray voltage comments. I think they're entirely appropriate. The interdependent fight that we're in today is vastly different than the interdependent fight that you might remember. In fact, total force integration is critical to today's national security environment, and we in the Air Force have strong feelings about legislation that would, we think, harm this.

I look forward to working with you to get the most from the legislation because there are part of the legislation that could make our nation stronger, could make our job easier, and we appreciate the effect of that.

The Air Force's active duty partnership with the Guard and Reserves has taken some decades to build. We can't do the job now without each other. Your Air Force is coming down in manpower and the only way we can do this is essentially to rely on the Guard and the Reserve in places where they in fact would help us to complete our mission. There is room for improvement, but our Air Force has already made important progress on forging a seamless relationship across this total force. We're proud of our accomplishments and we need to carefully examine any proposed change so we don't set that progress back. Some of the changes may help us, but the current system already functions fairly well. I strongly believe that legislation could reverse some of the progress we made to partner with the National Guard by separating the bureau from our

collaborative planning, physical training and oversight processes that have served us so well.

What we need is more interdependence, not less. You have probably heard that one of the pilots participating in the air strike that killed al-Zarqawi was from the Air National Guard. No one asked during the operation, was he trained and ready? Was he a Guardsman, was he a reservist? No one asked. Because that's what the mission needed. But total force integration goes deeper than the Zarqawi strike. It extends to all of our Air Force missions, from deployed combat forces to reach-back capability and humanitarian assistance. The Guard and Reserve are there, ready, capable and supportive.

The Zarqawi strike, however, shows the Air Force contribution in theater. Some of the most important Air Force contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom are provided by total force reach-back capability. For example, the California Air National Guard's new 163rd reconnaissance wing operates Predators, unmanned aerial vehicles, that are one of our prominent emerging weapons systems. Not only are these forward-deployed aircraft flown by Air National Guard pilots from the United States, but information they collect is analyzed by units like the Kansas Air National Guard's 184th air refueling wing. The 184th does far more than worldwide aerial refueling support, though they do that well. Their information operations group operates a distributed ground system, and intelligence processing and dissemination node within the broader distributed common ground system that provides actionable intelligence right back to our tactical war fighters and combatant commanders in near real-time through fused imagery and signals intelligence analysis.

Our total force also excels in the performance of humanitarian assistance. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the joint task force executed the largest search and rescue mission since the Vietnam War, saving more than 5,000 people. Units from across the total force came together to provide assistance in the area of rescue, airlift, aeromedical evaluation, communications, civil engineering, security, logistics, food services, public affairs and chaplains, just to name a few. In fact, when they were flown away from the area, they often ended up at air bases, housed and fed by airmen.

Our humanitarian commitment also extends across borders. In the Lebanon non-combatant evacuation, 13,000 Americans were rescued by 35 active duty and Reserve air mobility command air crews. Disaster relief following the Asian tsunami was one of the biggest efforts in history, and active, Guard and Reserve assets moving from more than 1.5 million pounds of cargo in just the first 10 days. These success stories happened because of outstanding Air Force leaders leading our airmen. As much as we can, we try to select them based on their performance, not on their component. We need for this legislation to pick the best person for the job. Air National Guard and Air Reserve involvement should be transparent across our total force.

We work, train and fight together on a daily basis. Our equipment is interchangeable because it comes from the same integrated acquisition process. In fact, in that Guardsmen strike on Zarqawi that we mentioned, his partner was an active duty

Air Force. The airplanes were from the 2nd Guard unit. All of the people who did the munitions and the maintenance were a combination of active and Reserve. Our air evacuation system brings together needed capabilities in the right time and place, regardless of where those resources came from.

The key to success is our integration and interdependence, and we need to be careful of the unintended consequences of stovepiping. Anything that would essentially create independence ultimately creates independent thought, ultimately creates independent structure, ultimately creates independent solutions problems. Our team can't afford to be divided. Unity of effort depends upon our current organizational structure. Islands ultimately will drift towards different alliances, weapons systems requirements, and equipment.

Portions of the proposed legislation would or could be helpful. However, in streamlining our processes and strengthening our capabilities, rather than the legislation that is current written, we need legislation that helps us make total force integration an operational reality by improving and simplifying command and control mechanisms, both authorities and processes; to speed reaction times and foster effective integration of federal and state resources by authorizing routine title 32 use of the Air National Guard in federal mission support roles; providing fiscal authority for routine federal mission support in title 32 status where the Air Force and governors agree in advance on such uses; enhancing tooth-to-tail effects by reducing the complex administrative burden of status changes and funds accounting now necessary to use the Guard in the timely operational capacity. When the bell rings, nobody asks what status you're in. Our pilots all go to the airplane, climb in, and fly the mission. If it's a domestic mission or international mission, they never ask.

Enhancing our access to volunteers by increasing flexibility, how Guardsmen, including full-time active, Guard, Reserves and technicians can move between training and federal mission support activities. Prototyping and maturing better incentives for citizen airmen, citizen soldiers and their civilian employees to voluntarily commit this shared access to a lengthy period of activation, providing them greater scheduling predictability and assuring that the Air Force – that the air Reserve component members will be available to serve as a sustainable operational Reserve. Facilitating and increasing the flexibility and efficiency of reach-back missions that provide real-time in-theater combat effects to all combatant commanders with minimal disruption to communities, business, families and states because they are improving and serving right in their own communities in a reach-back station.

In short, we need improved legislation to help us bring the active, Guard and Reserve closer together, not drive them apart. The National Guard Bureau is an agency of both the Air Force and the Army, is helpful in integrating the Guard into the force. We like the partnering we have. This would not be the case if the Bureau did not provide its services on behalf of and through the services both in planning, support and integration.

Thank you for your time, and I welcome any questions that you might have.

MR. PUNARO: General Moseley. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

GEN. T. MICHAEL MOSELEY: Mr. Chairman, if you would humor me, instead of an oral statement I would like to introduce three great Americans that are airmen that represent everything that we're going to talk to you about today.

MR. PUNARO: It would be a privilege, sir.

GEN. MOSELEY: Let me start with Brigadier General Sid Clark. Sid Clark is moving in to be the deputy director of the Air Guard. He is an experienced A-10 pilot doing that close air support that you talked about. He's an experienced F-16 pilot who was a wing commander at Montgomery in the Alabama Guard. He and I have been assigned off and on together throughout our careers. He was also an instructor at the fighter weapons school at Nellis in the A-10.

But why he's here today is, while I was privileged to command central command Air Forces for Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, one of the missions prior to the move on Baghdad that I was given was to control the western desert west of Baghdad. The one thing that General Franks and the president asked us to do right was that. I gave that mission to then-Colonel Sid Clark of the Alabama Air National Guard. All of the aircraft that performed that mission were Guard from Alabama, from Colorado, from Connecticut and from Massachusetts, A-10's and F-16's, with four to six Reserve airplanes. There was no active duty commander involved in that at all. It was all Reserve component, commanded by then-Colonel Sid Clark.

MR. PUNARO: Thank you, sir. Thank you for bringing him today, and thank you for your tremendous service to the nation and the Guard and airmen that served under you in that operation.

GEN. MOSELEY: Sir, he did an outstanding job. Next is Lieutenant Colonel Tom Prichard (ph). He's an Air National Guard UAV operator now. He has been a KC-135 instructor and evaluator pilot of the California Guard. He's been an active duty C-21 and tanker pilot. He was activated in February 2003, deployed to Suda Bay Creek, provided air bridge operations and refueling operations for all the activities crossing the Mediterranean. Flew over 30 combat missions in the tanker, providing air-to-air refueling for coalition forces. In the California Guard, as that has moved into the UAV business, he assumed leadership positions in that. He's trained with active duty, the UAV operators out at Indian Springs Creech. He currently flies Predators in Afghanistan, in Iraq from Nellis. Guard pilots, sensor operators, mission coordinators all work with active duty operators and Reserve operators in a seamless manner.

Since August 15th, California Guard has maintained 24 hours a day, 7 days a week orbits alongside active duty units, with sharing the equipment until we can move the full equipage out to March Air Force Base. They're currently in the final stages of equipping.

So Mr. Chairman, here is the leading edge of new technology within the Air National Guard and he's flying these aircraft in combat now.

MR. PUNARO: Again, thank you, sir, for being here, for your great service. And General Moseley, as I believe I heard you say, and I think maybe reiterate this point, kind of going back to my comment, this is not the Cold War Air Force. I believe I heard you say that he's flying Predators in Afghanistan and Iraq from Nellis Air Force Base, which as I recall is still in Nevada. Is that correct?

GEN. MOSELEY: That's correct, Mr. Chairman. It has not moved from the state of Nevada.

Last is another one of these experts that flies close air support for a living. This is Captain Mike Sadler. He's a reservist from Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri. He's an A-10 pilot in the 303rd fighter squadron. He's a four-ship flight lead. He's a forward air controller airborne. He's a plans and mobility officer for the squadron. He was activated in February 2003 for Operation Iraqi Freedom. He deployed to Al Jabar and Kuwait, then to Tallil, which is outside of al-Nasariyah in Iraq, for three months. He forward deployed again to Kirkuk, the northern part of Iraq, until November 2003, flew 31 combat missions in a squadron that epitomized the Air Force's total force notion. An active duty wing commander, a Reserve squadron commander, and pilots and maintainers and ammo troops from across the total force.

He was redeployed to Bagram in May of 2006 for Operation Enduring Freedom, flew 14 more combat missions doing close air support. Again, part of the total force. Expeditionary fighter squadron, active duty, Reserve, all pilots were seamlessly integrated. They flew with whoever – flight leads, wingman, didn't matter, no regard because the standards are all the same, the equipment is all the same, and this total force works.

So Mr. Chairman, here are three examples – Guard, Reserve, across the spectrum of command on big levels, the pilots, the flight leads, to the leading edge of the new world of UAV's operating from Nevada in combat in the Middle East.

MR. PUNARO: Great. Thank you, sir, for your impressive service to the nation. General Moseley, I really appreciate you bringing them here today so we can thank them personally, but also to underscore this issue of integration, which I think the Commission – we're talking about as we look at all these different legislative proposals, we don't want to walk backwards from the progress that's been made. We want to, though, make sure that the right voices are heard within that truly integrated force. So thanks again for that.

Did you have anything else you wanted to add?

GEN. MOSELEY: No, Mr. Chairman. Just thank you for the chance to bring these great Americans and these airmen here today to put a face on this issue that we're talking about today. I appreciate the time.

MR. PUNARO: Thank you. And we'll start our questioning. I'm going to pass on my round. Maybe there will be time at the end. Not sure. Because of the very long-winded question that I asked in the first panel, I'll spare you my question and turn first to Commissioner Sherrard.

MR. SHERRARD: Thank you. Mr. Secretary and General Moseley, it's really a treat to have you here. It's like coming back home, but actually I really don't miss the building.

SEC. WYNNE: We do miss you, though.

MR. SHERRARD: Well, I miss having the chance to socialize with you. I must admit that.

Sir, I've heard your testimony and have read your prepared statement. I guess the thing that I would wonder that we're still struggling with is, the proponents of this legislation, as the chairman has stated, certainly have been friends of the military and they cite various cases. And I guess what I would ask you is, if in fact the National Guard Bureau were to become a joint activity, how would that affect you as compared to it being a joint bureau today in the way we do business in the way you so eloquently described earlier?

SEC. WYNNE: Well, sir, we describe ourselves as a joint force throughout the building, through our Defense Department. I would say, though, once we create a fourth joint force then what I predict will happen is independent solutions to this problem, independent solutions mostly shaped by the dominant features of a domestic world, which essentially will begin to separate us into categories. These separable solutions will perhaps not mean that the same standards will be kept. It will not mean that the same budgets will be kept. It will not mean that the same solutions may be proposed. In fact, because we have great debates – I mean, one of the things I love about this service that I'm doing in the Department of Defense is we actually know who the bad guys are and who the good guys are. It's the approaches to the solutions of getting the bad guys that is – dominates the conversation. We then come to a consensus and we go down a path.

If we have another group who essentially are proposing solutions, in my opinion it will drive us apart. Once it begins to drive us apart, it begins to question the reliance that we have placed on it. As I mentioned, right now we trained to the same standards. If we have differing equipment, all of a sudden there will be a reliance issue. The question is, what are they doing here? And so I would say right now it isn't broke. I'm not sure of the problem we're actually trying to solve, but I do not think it is within the total force integration that we're forecasting for the Air Force.

What I am concerned about is in fact as we develop more and more reach-back activities, I worry about how the legislation would affect people switching almost immediately from a Title 10 to a title 32 back to a Title 10. I worry about making sure

they understand the command flow as well as they do when we leave CONUS, that it may still apply even though they've never left their home station. These are things that do concern me. I don't want ever somebody to get in, and the first question they have to ask in their head-up display is, are you in a Title 10 or a title 32 status?

GEN. MOSELEY: Mr. Sherrard, I believe – let me preface my answer by saying, anything that facilitates better integration and better interoperability, sign me up for. The United States Air Force is in its – approaching its 60th year as a service. As long as I've been in it, we have worked very hard to strive for complete interdependence and interoperability across the components. In fact, when the secretary or I talk about the United States Air Force, we talk about the United States Air Force as a single entity – Reserve, Guard, civilians, and active duty. Nowhere in the notion of standards or training or equipment or budgeting is there a notion of one is different than the other because they're so interdependent.

Anything that walks us away in the United States Air Force from that sense of full interdependence I believe we do at our peril. So I believe if this legislation makes the interdependence better, makes the interoperability better, makes the equipment better, standardization authorities, configuration standardization, training standards – that's what I worry about every day.

So my concern is it does not take us to a better place in the notion of interdependence, but it somehow is contrary to that.

MR. SHERRARD: Thank you. Along that line, could I ask for – and just very short because we don't want to take the rest of the commissioners' time up, but I think I would be very helpful to the commissioners who have not had the chance to see how the Air Force does business, to just tell them how the panel board and council process works and the involvement of the Guard and the Reserve leadership at those levels where they have the voice to actually sit and speak with each of you.

GEN. MOSELEY: Mr. Sherrard, that's a great question. Our panels deal across our major weapons systems and our major activities, and that leads to a two-star and a three-star level Air Force board which then leads to the vice chief of staff runs the Air Force Council that then brings the recommendations to the secretary and the chief. And at every one of those levels there's full representation by the Air Force Reserve command and also by the Air Guard.

So the financial and policy decisions made by the US Air Force as a corporate body, the Guard and Reserve are embedded into that at every level. And in fact, on some of the executive panels of that, the Guard and Reserve are represented at a higher rate by population than the active Air Force, which is okay because we have to be able to get at equipment standard, funding decisions have to be made across the endeavor. Buying pods or munitions or sensors cannot be Reserve or active or a Guard endeavor. They are truly total force endeavors. So Mr. Sherrard, that's a great question.

SEC. WYNNE: In fact, sir, right now we have asked the National Guard Bureau to integrate with our A-8 function, which for those of you who are not familiar with that function, it is a resource planning and programming function, so that they do not, if you will, have to worry about coming up with something that is disparate with us because we're going to argue it out right in the A-8, and when the budget review comes in, the leadership, Craig McKinley and John Bradley are sitting right there in the meeting and can object to the secretary right on the spot.

GEN. MOSELY: In fact, right now we have a Reserve component major general that's the deputy XP, and before him Craig McKinley was the deputy XP who is now the director of the Air National Guard. I mean, it's a seamless notion for us.

MR. SHERRARD: Well, thank you so very much. And I thank you for your service, and I would tell you that you make us very, very proud. So thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

MR. PUNARO: Thank you.

Commissioner Stockton.

DONALD L. STOCKTON: Good morning to you all, and thank you so much for being here with us today. I believe the captain was from the 302nd flying squadron, is that correct? 303rd? Which is part of the 442nd, is that correct? That's one of my old units many years ago. Before it was a fighter unit it was an airlift unit. It's good to see you here.

Looking over the written testimony, it's very apparent that one of the things in the law, this proposed law, the bill, was to make the chief the principal – the chief of the National Guard Bureau – the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and to the chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on National Guard matters. The written testimony is that you do not agree with that.

You may not be aware of this, but just three weeks ago General Blum wrote this commission and suggested that the chiefs of staff of the Army and the Air Force are able to represent the federal Title 10 war fight interests of the Army and the Air National Guard on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, he says, what they lack is the deep experience in working with civilian authorities on domestic operations. General Blum suggests that as the Department of Defense' foremost military officer with experience in employment of the National Guard of the several states, the intergovernmental and state interagency use of the Guard forces in the state active duty and title 32 status, as well as matters pertaining to domestic response and support operations generally, that he as the chief of the National Guard Bureau should have an advisory role to the Joint Chiefs of Staff when they are discussing matters related to those issues.

Do you agree with the chief of the National Guard Bureau's suggestion that he should be given an advisory role to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on those matters related to

domestic employment of the National Guard? And that that advisory role should be in addition to the representation of the Army and Air National Guard through the chiefs of staff of the Army and the Air Force on the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

SEC. WYNNE: I would start this way, sir. We just recently had a Reserve unit that helped out a state agency to solve a domestic crisis. We did not ask the question. The Guard did not ask the question about whether the Reserve could go and perform one of their missions. Your Air Force is seamless in its response. Every one of our wing commanders that are out there are integrated with the governor, and when the governor calls for them to help, they swing into action. I remember when the island of Hawaii, Kauai was inundated with a rainstorm and they had to get a high-speed pump moved from Hilo to there, they called the wing commander at Hickam Air Force Base and he put together the means and methods to get that high speed pump over there.

I would tell you that we are incredibly attuned to what the needs of the governors are. But I would turn to my partner here because I think he has grown up in this world where we actually – that's one of the things that we worry about, is making sure that we can respond to domestic, international humanitarian relief as a matter of course. Most of the 50,000 people that moved down within the National Guard were moved in fact by active, Reserve and Guard Air Forces.

GEN. MOSELEY: Sir, I would say my experience as a member of the Joint Chiefs, if there's issues that require the expertise of the National Guard Bureau, he's brought in. No different than the commandant of the Coast Guard. I would also say, though, that I take a great deal of pride in representing the Air Force Reserve, the National Guard, and the active Air Force on issues relative to air and space core competencies to the secretary of defense and to the president.

But again, I believe the unintended consequences of legislation would be to diffuse that and break down that integration. I would also say when calamities or tragedies hit this country, it is not just an issue of dealing with civil authorities. It's an issue of bringing the full throw-weight of the US government and US military to bear on that problem. Today as we assist to look for the folks that are lost up on Mt. Hood right now, that is an Air Force Reserve rescue squadron that's up there right now coordinating with local authorities. When we look at recovery operations in search and rescue operations and re-supply operations prior to and following Katrina, the Reserve helicopters were moved first into locations that could respond fastest. The Reserve C-130's and strategic air-lifters moved with the active and moved with the Guard. The first two or three calls I made prior to that after the Air Force Reserve hurricane-hunting C-130's found and tracked the storm, was to Steve Blum to see what we could do to help, and then to the TAG's at those respective states to see what the active Air Force could do to help.

Sir, I would also say, along a parallel track, at US Northern Command with Admiral Tim Keating, who's responsible for that, who also wraps up in our case active, Guard and Reserve activities as we present forces for that under his hat as commander of

US Northern Command. So I would say, I would ask what problem are we fixing, and what would this do to make it more seamless and more integrated as opposed to beginning to separate out activities?

MR. STOCKTON: That concludes my questions.

MR. PUNARO: Did you have another question, Don?

MR. STOCKTON: Well, I guess I did want to bring up one more thing. What is your belief, both of you, about the input from the governors on this civil support – or military support to civil authorities? There's been some questions raised that perhaps the governors might not have the type of opportunity to give the input that they need to give, or they want to give.

SEC. WYNNE: I would say, sir, there's another opportunity for separation. What we want to make sure of is that we retain our strategic focus as well as our domestic focus. The Air Force is a swing force. We stand Guard as a shield to provide for America's defense. We know that our Guardsmen want to be in that strategic role. We worry about them becoming, if you will, only a domestic force. We think this would be bad.

We would also note that when Texas required fuel bladders to be delivered right along the highway to avert a tragedy following Rita, they called the active Air Force. We responded. This was not a question about how do we do and deal with this. The Air Force across the board, whether it be Guard, Reserve, or active, responded to that problem and resolved that issue I think very well. So this is a case of, again, of we need to be careful of the unintended consequences of an action and ask the question, if it is not working here, what is the list of things that we could fix? And if it is not fixable by process, not fixable by policy, then I would agree it is required legislation.

GEN. MOSELEY: Mr. Stockton, I'll give you a couple of more examples. As the hurricane began to hit Mississippi, a lot of the Mississippi Air Guard guys were deployed. The C-17's and some of the folks were deployed into the combatant theater. The fact that the Air Force is a seamless operation across Guard, Reserve and active made it very easy for us to present forces to their TAG, Hank Cross (ph), so that he could plug and play because our standards are all the same, our training is all the same. We hold the units at C-1 all across each of the components so it's a seamless operation.

SEC. WYNNE: One would have wondered if he would have re-clommid (ph) the initial deployment, which would have been the perfect thing to think about, but for the seamless nature of the way that we can backfill. When we talked to him personally, he was extremely pleased with the backfill and the quality of the force structure that he got.

GEN. MOSELEY: In fact, I called him and caught him at Camp Shelby just before the storm hit and asked him, what do you need because you're probably going to be off the air here for a little bit. And we began to move things into the vicinity of

Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, Alabama, Florida as we talked to all those TAG's. So when the storm passed, we were ready.

MR. STOCKTON: The seamlessness of the Air Force has been ongoing for many years. It's been in play and constructed for many years so that it's probably, as was already stated, the Air Force is a very good example of the seamlessness of the combining of the active component and the Reserve component. Thank you very much.

MR. PUNARO: Thank you.

Commissioner Thompson.

MR. THOMPSON: Well, first of all, a little of my background. I served under General Eberhart (ph) and Admiral Keating, and I have an acute awareness of the responsibility that the Air Force had taken initially after 9/11 and the burden that, frankly of all the services, homeland security and homeland defense kind of rested on your air crews, from my Navy point of view, watching this evolve at NORTHCOM. So you've had now four or five years of having to pace that effort, and to fix that in your resourcing and budgeting process.

I don't think the other services have that experience of the same degree you all have had. So my question is, when you're prioritizing funding requirements for the Air Force, Mr. Secretary, how do you account for the needs of the Air National Guard in their homeland security, homeland defense responsibilities?

SEC. WYNNE: They have a voice in our planning process which brings up to their shortages. They know that we need them for international missions as well as we need them for domestic missions, so our standards stay the same. We recognize we need to backfill and we do not shirk the funding for our Guard forces at all. I would say that we do occasionally rotate because we wear the equipment out in the active forces and they are, I would say, excited about coming and assisting us.

As I was just in Bagram just the other day, the Alaskan Guard was running the C-130 operation. They were so proud because they were about to introduce a precision drop system that was developed in the Air Force research laboratories to Army units that were stuck up on mountains 13,500 feet high that could only get their equipment in 100-foot drop zone. And these Guardsmen, with very little additional training, were dropping these precision drops so that Army colleagues could get water, food, ammunition and clothing at that height and still fight the bad guys without having anybody haul that stuff up that mountain. It was the most remarkable thing.

To hear them talk – and by the way, this was the first deployment of a Puerto Rican national Guard, and they were appended to the Alaska air national Guard troops, all of them doing the work category one. We don't shirk the training money and we don't shirk the equipage. We believe that they are – we need to rely on them in all circumstances.

MR. THOMPSON: One of the people who testified, actually the chief of staff of the Army just prior to you all, mentioned that he had – I think he had a \$1.50 requirement and only 80 cents to spend. Wasn't that kind of what he said, Mr. Chairman?

MR. PUNARO: I'm sure if it was the Army, there were billions behind that number, not dollars.

MR. THOMPSON: And he kind of implied that he has to set a series of very serious priority levels. You don't have enough money to do what you basically think you need to do. And is it this board process that you just described that starts at the lower level, where Air National Guard and air reserve issues can be brought to your focus, Mr. Secretary? Is that the process? Is that unique to your service?

SEC. WYNNE: Throughout the entirety of the process we address the Guard. Some things we're trying to do – we realize our Air Force is getting smaller. We may not have the number of airplanes in the next 10 years that we have now. We now need to figure out how do we get and employ this total force. So here we are introducing our frontline fighter, the F-22, to an associate Guard wing down in Richmond. What had to happen is the Richmond guys had to forego being on Richmond and had to come to Langley because we just can't handle the maintenance. They have agreed to do that.

This total force integration package that we're running through has truly seamlessly integrated this. And I leave it to General Moseley to describe, but the Air Force leadership as it is currently struck is – at Hancock Field we have an AOC, and air operations center, that mirror images EUCOM. People in that AOC fall in on EUCOM in a combat zone. They train right at Hancock Field. They don't even have to leave Hancock Field. If there's a big disruptive event at EUCOM, for the most part they, with some support out of Tim Keating, could backfill the European Air Force's Command. It is – our reliance is fairly complete.

GEN. MOSELEY: Mr. Thompson, I believe the board structure does address that. There are always balances made on any component in any set of options. If chief of staff of the Army says he's getting 80 cents and he's got \$1.50 requirement, I wouldn't argue with him, but we're all in that boat. Given a global war on terrorism, given the challenges we've got in re-equipping and re-capitalizing an Air Force with the average of these aircraft to be the oldest in the history of the Air Force, and that cuts across all three components.

We've looked at ways to be able to get into new equipment for all three components. The secretary mentioned the Virginia Guard in the first wing of the F-22. We're going to do the same thing in New Mexico with the New Mexico Guard. We're going to do the Reserve operation and active forces in Alaska when the aircraft beds down in Alaska, and the Hawaii Guard unit will get the F-22 with an active association. We've looked at Guard and Reserve units to do reverse associations with active members embedded in those units, just like we have the reverse.

C-17 cuts across Guard and Reserve. The UAV systems cut across Guard and Reserve, and active and special operations. We spend a lot of time trying to normalize training standards, normalize being C-1, normalizing expectations and performance standards so that you can plug and play across this. The benefit of that is in the combatant AOR, when you walk around Balad or Bagram or Tillil or Aludade (ph) or Al Dhafra, you can't tell the difference between the Guardsman or reservist or an active duty Air Force member because they're all performing at the same standard, with as close to the same equipment as we can get. So I would say we're not perfect, but we sure try to get to that direction.

MR. THOMPSON: And finally, Mr. Chairman, our young captain from Whiteman and I live about 25 miles apart, so I live in Higginsville, Missouri, which is not too far from Knob Noster, and I would be honored to – you're a squadron commander, is that correct?

GEN. MOSELEY: (Inaudible.)

MR. THOMPSON: A flight leader? And four aircraft, am I correct?

MR. : He wants to be a squadron commander.

MR. THOMPSON: He needs help for the promotion. And your crew flies out of Whiteman normally? I would love to host a barbecue in my home for your crew and your service members some time this summer.

GEN. MOSELEY: Mr. Thompson, relative to Missouri, the Missouri Guard now is associated with the 509th bomb wing flying B-2's also. So that tells you a lot about priorities and where we put people with the right skill sets and with the right levels of core competencies.

MR. THOMPSON: Thank you.

That's it, Mr. Chairman.

MR. PUNARO: Thank you. And I'd suggest to the young captain that he take that under – that invitation under serious advisement because if you want to get tangled up with the Navy, that's okay, but I'd take it on advisement.

SEC. WYNNE: Mr. Chairman, that depends on how good the barbecue is.

MR. PUNARO: Well, I can guarantee you that it will be a fabulous barbecue because I believe Don Stockton would be providing the beef for that barbecue.

Okay, Commissioner Gordon Stump.

GORDON STUMP: Good morning. First of all I'd like to congratulate you on the great way that you worked with the Guard Bureau as the budget constraints came up and everybody had to face up to the force structure cuts, and the Air Force has taken 40,000 and there's going to be another 14,400 out of the Air National Guard. You worked very closely with General McKinley at the National Guard Bureau and were able to do some work around and still make the budget constraints. I think everybody is a lot better off for it.

I guess one of the things that is really – makes the success work is the resourcing. Now you have given the Reserves and the Air National Guard the resources they need to maintain C-1, and without doing that obviously it wouldn't be the total force. Maybe it's because you've got a little bit more money or whatever, but I think that they all appreciate that and it's really been a total force effort. And the cooperation between the Air Force, the Air National Guard and the Reserves I think is just outstanding.

SEC. WYNNE: Sir, we value every one of our Guardsmen, reservists and actives, as well as our civilian and contractors. We felt, though, that as airmen we had a duty to make sure that future airmen had access to the same quality weapons systems to support our Army colleagues. We promised our Army colleagues 53 more years of never having to look up and worry about if they're getting strafed or they're getting surveilled. We would like to make sure that we maintain the quality of equipment we have.

That having been said, we needed to essentially manage our resources so we did not run into the rocks. To that end we have forecast a reduction of 40,000 people, as you know, out of our Air Force. As I told the deputy secretary once upon a time, more in jest than in reality, I can only do that nine more times and I do not have an Air Force any more. So I know that at some point in time you can't do that. Quantity ultimately has a quality all of its own. The Guard's participation, the Reserve participation in trying to achieve these resource-constrained events so that I can move our Air Force is when the chief entered and when I left the Air Force in 1973, our equipment age was only 8.5 years old, including satellites. Right now our equipment age, as he mentioned, is over 23 years old. We need to move.

I'll tell you another thing that is going on, and that is, 53 years ago General Curt LeMay argued for strategic assets of bombers and tankers. Do you know that now I am arguing to replace those same tankers and those same bombers 53 years later? He must be spinning somewhere.

MR. STUMP: Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary. I know you're always looking for ways of creating better efficiencies, and I understand that the Air Force successfully led the effort to secure the necessary flexibility for total force integration in the FY09 National Defense Authorization Act. This Commission is aware that you can now use the Guard and Reserve to train all components. We also understand that you gained the necessary flexibility sought for the Air Force Reserve to support operations but understand that you did not get the same provision for the Air National Guard.

Now, what authority does the Air Force really need to use the Air National Guard more efficiently?

SEC. WYNNE: We need to make sure that our Air National Guard commanders, especially those here at home that are doing essentially international and strategic operations but from a CONUS situation, whether it's intel, Predator operations, or even command and control, never feel a need to question whether or not they're in a right legal status and in a right command status to do that. But we have some very specific ideas that we are in fact pushing to try to make sure that we can seamlessly use our Guardsman and our reservists in a command status, in a maintainer status, in a training status, or in a mentoring status to our active forces. We are in fact – rely on the fact – we know that our reservists and our Guardsmen have a variety of experiences, most of them more versed, if you will, than our active forces. We're using that talent all over the place to essentially cut down on our cycles and allow these Guardsmen and these reservists to provide that training and that mentorship to these young airmen, and that's across the board.

GEN. MOSELEY: Mr. Stump, let me tell you what I think about command opportunities. As the CENTAF commander for two-plus years for Afghanistan and Iraq, I had over 100 Guardsmen and reservists commanding major units and it was seamless. Didn't ask, didn't know. The people they commanded didn't know. Big main operating bases at Manas up at Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan – at Aludaid, al-Dafra, at Sheik Isa. It works like a chant when you hold the training standards and the opportunities constant.

What we don't have is the ability to have active duty officers working for Guard inside the CONUS. That's a legislation leap that I would like to see. I would like to have the same ability to pick the best officer, the best of breed to command an operation, whether it's in the CONUS or O-CONUS and have Guard, Reserve and active being seamlessly in that chain of command. We have Title 10 issues with having Title 10 people working for title 32 people inside the continental United States. I think the American military is beyond that. I think we can do better. We should pick the best of breed, we should pick the best officer, we should pick the officer with the best background for the mission task and then assign forces and people to it. And we do not have that authority right now.

MR. STUMP: I think the Commission would be very receptive to you giving us some legislation – proposed legislation that we could look at because one of our tasks is to look at legislation and changes that need to be made to more fully utilize the Guard.

SEC. WYNNE: We can certainly work with you and provide some legislative concepts. I would say that I know that this Commission has some excellent writers and I know their former background. Across the board I have a lot of respect for the fact that, given a concept, there's a lot of writing capability here.

GEN. MOSELEY: Sir, there are baby steps to take, there are initial steps to take, but at the end of the day, from my experience inside the Air Force model, I believe we need the authorities to have anybody being able to work for anybody, whether it is inside

the continental United State or outside the continental United States. And right now we do not have those authorities.

MR. STUMP: We would be more than happy to look at proposals to put into legislation for this Commission.

MR. PUNARO: Did you have any other questions?

MR. STUMP: No, sir.

MR. PUNARO: Because I notice our general counsel, Jim Swatter (ph), is drafting that legislation as we speak. Commissioner McKinnon.

MR. MCKINNON: You know, in your testimony from both of you this morning you talked about, in the written testimony, that all qualified officers, including officers of the National Guard, should be considered for appointment to deputy commander in NORTHCOM. Do you all feel that there are qualified people in the Guard that could serve as deputy commander of NORTHCOM?

GEN. MOSELEY: Absolutely, sir.

MR. MCKINNON: Do you feel there are any that are qualified to serve as commander of NORTHCOM?

GEN. MOSELEY: It wouldn't bother me a bit.

MR. MCKINNON: We had the Army testify here a little bit ago. They didn't think anybody in the Army was qualified to be a combat commander, and NORTHCOM of course is considered a combat command. So I just – we have a little difference of testimony.

GEN. MOSELEY: I wouldn't speak for the Army but I'll speak for the Air Force because I've grown up in this world of interdependence and I've grown up in this world where it's a seamless operation between Guard, active and Reserve. The commander of 1st Air Force right now, that's responsible for executing Operation Noble Eagle for Admiral Tim Keating, is a Guardsman. It wouldn't bother me a bit if we go down the list of officers and look at qualifications and competencies and be able to nominate those of best breed and best officer to do that. That's not a concern for me.

SEC. WYNNE: There is a difference, sir, between being chosen and being able to compete for being chosen. I think it's extraordinarily important that certainly the chief of staff of the Army may not have been familiar with all of the qualified officers that he might have working for him, nor all the qualified Marine officers that might be out there that he could be working for as a ground force. But I think the fact is that the opportunity to compete could in fact draw talent that it may not have – feel like they have an opportunity right now.

MR. MCKINNON: You know, as you talk about your Air Force changing, what's going to happen to all these pilots that are – if you have less airplanes down the road here and you've still got the pilots, what's going to happen to them?

GEN. MOSELEY: Sir, we're still flying the same number of flying hours that we flew 10 or 11 or 12 years ago. We just have 1,300 less airplanes. We're working them hard. We're deployed in a variety of places. At the peak of OEF and OIF we operated 30 airfields out of Hod (ph). We don't have 38 airfields worth of leadership embedded extra that we can forward deploy. That's 38 airfields and wings out of Guard, Reserve and active Hod. So, sir, I'd say for the foreseeable future we're a busy Air Force and we can use every one of them.

MR. MCKINNON: Where do you see the balance coming down the road between Predators – between manned and unmanned aircraft?

GEN. MOSELEY: Sir, I think there's a lot to be said for unmanned systems. But I would offer to you philosophically there's only two reasons to go down the road of being unmanned. One, that you believe that the threat is so severe that you won't risk the pilot. Or two, that the pilot is the limit in persistent coverage.

Let me go back to the first one. The United States Air Force has never found a threat we can't penetrate. So I'm not worried about the threat. What I am worried about, though, is the second case. The U-2, for example, we can keep airborne for 11 or 12 hours before we have to bring the human down in the space suit and decompress him. The Global Hawk that is taking the U-2's place can stay up for over 29 to 30 hours. You don't have a pilot in it to have to bring back and decompress. So when you look at persistent ISR, you look at persistent strike over long ranges, there's a lot to be said for going down the road of unmanned.

SEC. WYNNE: And then, sir, it's a question of distribution and cost, and I would tell you the way that the Predator is currently operating, and the way we are operating it in a congested air space, we are getting good use out of our rated pilots but we need to make sure that they retain their rating, if you will, so that they can operate that bird in a congested air space. We're working right now, by the way, with the Federal Aviation Administration to make sure when we want to do border patrol operations, you know, that's a heavy duty route down there at the border, people flying from LA to Dallas. We've got to be careful about how we manage that process.

GEN. MOSELEY: But sir, the Predator is leading edge. It's almost like the Wright brothers B model airplane. The UAV's of the future are much more complex, require much more expertise to operate these things. And remember, we're operating them on global scales. We're flying out of Las Vegas in Creech Air Force Base in combat, delivering ordnance in close air support from Las Vegas to activities on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq. So these are operated on a global scale and they're

going to get much more complex. So this is a wonderful future and a wonderful set of opportunities for us to look at.

MR. MCKINNON: How do you see them as being – I mean, you've got close air support as one of the Air Force's missions. If the A-10's go away, what are you going to do in that case?

GEN. MOSELEY: Sir, the A-10's are not going to go away. The 356 A-10's, Guard, Reserve and active, we've got requests in to the baseline budget that's being worked through the White House and also in the supplemental to do everything to the A-10 that we need to do. Re-wing the A-10, avionics upgrade to the A-10, precision attack on the A-10, and re-engine the A-10. So the 356 airplanes we intend to keep.

MR. MCKINNON: Okay. We appreciate your time. I've got one more, Mr. Chairman.

MR. PUNARO: Okay, go ahead.

MR. MCKINNON: On the budgeting aspect of the military, we're down around to 3.8 percent, something like that, of GDP. Does the Air Force have any opinions about what percent of GDP the Department of Defense ought to have in the way of budgeting?

SEC. WYNNE: Well, we probably can't have an opinion for the most part. I would say it this way. The reason we're cutting 40,000 people is not because we don't need the 40,000 people. We're cutting into meat, and we're doing it on behalf of the fact that we feel like we have a duty to perform to make our airmen of the future as competent, as qualified, so there's no wooden rifle issue.

This having been said, we are spending our money prudently in a joint way. Predators are joint. Global Hawks are joint. All of our satellite systems are joint systems that service all of our forces, not the Air Force. In our close combat strike or close air strike missions, these are joint operations. We don't fly the airplanes all the way to Afghanistan to fly the Air Force over there. We're flying over there to make sure that our brethren are protected in every way.

The economy of force measures that are in effect in Afghanistan are a closely coupled (ph) interdependent fight. We can service Marine Corps, we can service Army, we can service our own convoy operators who are operating over there. So we feel like at this point in time, with all the press of economics that are going on, at some point in time America's going to have to pay for the defense that they want.

MR. MCKINNON: In other words, the POM is sort of based on what the budget is available as opposed to what the threat is, is the appearance to a lot of people. I assume you share the same opinion.

SEC. WYNNE: Sir, I'll give you my opinion: 3.2 or 3.8 percent of GDP, while we're at war, is the lowest that we've ever had as a percentage of GDP. That's forcing some interesting trade space and some decisions. I would offer to you it's probably time to have a discussion about top-line, and it's time to have a discussion about what that really means long-term, not just to activities in the Arabian gulf but activities on a global scale with an unknown future.

And I'll give you only one example. All of our tankers were bought essentially in a five-year period. It's one of the reasons they're all wearing out together. We can't afford to replace them in a five-year period. In fact, we're looking at 30 years. In fact one of the quotes that I often use that General Moseley intoned one time in response to, when do you think the last pilot will be flying a KC-135? He thought about that and he said, actually the mother of the last maintainer and the last pilot has not yet been born. (Laughter)

MR. PUNARO: I know Commissioner Sherrard has one follow-up, but I want to check if any of the commissioners that haven't asked any questions yet have a question in the few minutes we have remaining. Commissioner Brownlee?

MR. BROWNLEE: First of all, Mike and Buzz, both thank you for your great service to the Air Force and the nation. And I just want to ask you, it was pretty clear from your statements and what you said here this morning that you're not an advocate of increasing the rank of the National Guard Bureau chief to four-star and put him on the JCS. But there is clearly a perception by some in the Congress and others that do believe we need to make some changes there. Are there any changes in organization that you believe might enhance the capabilities of our Reserve components that we ought to consider?

SEC. WYNNE: Well, we do know that the office of the secretary has a pretty fixed opinion upon this. And I would say that from our perspective, we just worry the future. We like the future that we have laid out. Our relationships with the National Guard Bureau and all of the governors, their relationship – I mean, the secretary of defense has not a problem. If he wants to talk to the head of the National Guard Bureau, we do not stand in the door and bar him from entry.

This is not an issue of knowledge. It appears to me to be more of an issue of do they think their voice is getting heard. I would say that within the context of the Air Force, their voice is very well heard. I could not have achieved the total force integration activities that I have without General Blum essentially banging heads within the 54 TAGs and helping me. I appreciate his coordination. Does it merit a promotion? I don't think so.

GEN. MOSELEY: Mr. Brownlee, I think representation on the Joint Staff is there. When we talk about C-17 activity, there's no discussion about whether it is a unit out of a Reserve base or a unit out of a Guard base or an active duty unit. I believe I represent the core competencies of air and space to the secretary and the president, and nowhere in

there is there a caveat that says that's only active, or that I somehow don't represent Guard equities as we discuss Operation Noble Eagle, which is mostly Guard and Reserve activities.

So my question again would be, I believe the equities of the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard are represented into the Joint Staff. And my question would be, how would this be benefited by some other organizational construct? I don't have an answer to that because I believe it would be somehow less of an imperative when you separate out a Guard from the Reserve and the active component because everything that we do, we do as a seamless service, whether it's buying targeting pods or munitions or whether it's upgrades to F-15 radars, or whether it's defensive systems on a C-17. We do that together.

So the issue of the four-star rank, I don't know. You could argue that strongly both ways. Is it an issue of command? Is it an issue of span of control? Is it an issue of atmospheric? What is it a real issue of? And I guess I could argue that strongly both ways.

MR. BROWNLEE: You're a member of the Joint Chiefs.

GEN. MOSELEY: Correct.

MR. BROWNLEE: Have you observed – there are two advisors in the office of the Chairman, one from the Guard and one from Reserves at the two-star level. Have you observed their effectiveness? Could you comment on that?

GEN. MOSELEY: Sure, Mr. Brownlee. That's a great question. My life on the Joint Staff, I spent two years being a deputy director for POM-mil (ph) affairs for Pacific-East Asia and the Middle East. There was not a meeting that I was involved in with General Ralston (ph) or the chairman that those two officers were not there because everything that we do we think in terms of what's going to be the impact long-term to the Guard and Reserve.

The issues that we've worked lately as a member of the Joint Chiefs, there were Guard and Reserve equities represented across the table. Every meeting that the chiefs go to in the tank, not everyone goes in to the tank, but that does not mean the director of the Joint Staff, or the J-5 or the J-3 has not had those conversations with everyone that has a dog in that fight relative to the issue. So I believe those two officers are very valuable. I believe their contributions are very useful in the deliberations within the joint staff. I would hate to see those two positions being taken away.

MR. BROWNLEE: Last question. I've long admired the seamless integration of your components that has been described here clearly this morning. I've been told by others that the Air Force seems to have a higher percent of full-time members serving in the National Guard and Reserve. Not active members but full-time reservists. Do you

know if that's true? Or you probably don't know beyond the Air Force, but maybe we could get the numbers for the other services.

SEC. WYNNE: I don't know. I do know that 74 percent of the total force has been deployed. I do know that at any given time we have about three-quarters of our force essentially committed to combatant commanders across this globe, whether they're in the strategic fight – i.e., permitted to STRATCOM to guide satellites or anything else, your Air Force is at work, if you will.

The other thing that's not well known is that when we deploy half the force from Davis-Monthan, we actually still run Davis-Monthan. When we deploy half the force from Whiteman, we actually continue to run Whiteman. It does not roll up and go away as a base. We do not put up the do not enter signs on the other side of the runway. We backfill with our Guard and Reserve colleagues to make sure that's a functioning, active base and it is available.

When we rotate a squadron or two from a wing, we actually rotate part of the wing over there. Like the vice commander may actually go to the deployed state. The commander, the wing commander stays back and runs that wing. They go through the same standards qualification that sometimes makes them a little upset, but they go through an ORI at Davis-Monthan. Half of their force is deployed; they still go through the same ORI. We do not relent.

GEN. MOSELEY: Mr. Brownlee, there's another part I think would be helpful. Please let us take for the record those numbers that you're asking for. We'll give you ours to break down what it is.

SEC. WYNNE: We can confer and see if there's any benefit that's not in there.

GEN. MOSELEY: But I would also offer that there are six general officer billets, three and three, that are historic Guard and Reserve – the director and the commander. We're holding now nine extra out of Air Force headroom to be able to do the things that we believe are important. There are five extra Guard guys in general officer headroom and four extra Reserve officers. So that's nine out of active duty headroom, and I'm okay with that because they're the right people in the right jobs.

And sir, it takes me back to that notion that I believe the command opportunities outside the continental United States and inside the continental United States should be the same, whether it's active, Guard or Reserve, because I believe we have the right people. Maybe I grew up in this Air Force having absolute faith in the Guard and Reserve, and so perhaps maybe I've got a different view of this, but I believe it anyway.

MR. BROWNLEE: Well, thank you again for your service and to the whole United States Air Force. And I join my chairman in thanking you for the close air support you provided a young company commander many years ago in Vietnam, and the airlift support you provide me as the acting secretary of the Army when I was privileged

to go and visit our soldiers, both in Afghanistan and Iraq every three months during the 18 months I was there. I could not have done it without the timely and effective support you all provided.

SEC. WYNNE: I am privileged to say that my trip recently to the AOR was provided by the Washington National Guard minutemen.

GEN. MOSELEY: Mr. Brownlee, thanks for that. Two of these fellows back there spent their life in this business of close air support. We take that very serious. We have since P-47 days and we still do today.

MR. BROWNLEE: Well, thank you very much.

MR. PUNARO: Thank you, Commissioner Brownlee. And Commissioner Sherrard, we've got about one minute if you can get your last-minute question in.

MR. SHERRARD: Just very quickly, General Moseley. This is a follow-up to the question that Commission Stump had asked earlier. What title status do you have the Predators operating under? Are they in Title 10, title 32 or both?

GEN. MOSELEY: They're in Title 10 because we're flying combat operations and we're doing training.

MR. SHERRARD: If you in fact had the dual status authority where they could be Title 10 as well as title 32, would that enhance your operation?

GEN. MOSELEY: It would. We would like that, like we have the JSTARS operation at Robbins. But Mr. Sherrard, that's a baby step. That's an interim step to what I think we should be looking to, and that is beyond that, that an active duty officer and equipment could be given to a Guard or reservist inside the continental United States for the conduct of a mission under US NORTHCOM or whatever tasking.

MR. SHERRARD: Thank you very much.

MR. PUNARO: Thank you. And thank both of you for your tremendous leadership of our nation's air forces in time of war. I was delighted to hear – I think I heard you talk about Creech Air Force Base. I didn't know that, but I think it's very appropriate that you've named an air base about one of our legendary tactical Air Force commanders, very representative of the three superb airmen you brought with you here to the hearing today. And again, we thank them. But mainly we thank the airmen, active, Guard, Reserve and their families serving all over this globe in defense of our nation's freedom. So we very much appreciate it. We look forward to continuing to work closely with you as we examine this legislation. Don't hesitate to get back to us if you have any additional thoughts.

The hearing will stand in recess until the hour of 2:00 p.m., when we'll hear from the proponents of the legislation, and we're in the hearing room right around the corner. So we stand in recess.

(End of session.)