HOUSE ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Research and Development in Support of the War
on Terrorism
February 21, 2002
Testimony presented by
Randy White, Nanogen
The
events of September 11th certainly
raised our awareness concerning terrorist
capabilities and determination.
Although significant strides have been
made to improve our preparedness, the nation
is unprepared for rapid detection and
diagnosis in the face of a biological attack.
The CDC (Center for Disease Control) is
currently overwhelmed with activities
connected to the most recent anthrax crisis.
Further, the potential devastation that
certain biologic agents can cause in a 24-hour
cycle is such that centralized testing
facilities like the CDC, or even regionalized
testing centers like Fort Dietrich are
inadequate in response time.
In a true biologic attack, time is of
the essence to prevent/minimize loss of life.
A recent article published in Emerging
Infectious Diseases
showed a comparison of the effects of a
10-kiloton nuclear bomb and a 10-kilogram
weapons grade anthrax release.
The report shows that the death rates
would be essentially the same.
For this reason, detection and testing
capabilities should be available in all major
metropolitan centers to provide the quickest
possible turnaround time so that proper
emergency treatment and quarantine measures
can be implemented if required, or the all
clear sounded as quickly as possible if a
false alarm.
Current
DNA testing is a three-step process:
extraction of genomic DNA from a sample
source; an amplification step; and finally a
detection system.
All of our DUST/DARPA funding has been
directed toward developing a single-step
portable sample-to-answer device.
However, Nanogen's current instrument
is capable of detecting Anthrax, Smallpox,
Yersinia pestis, Botulinum toxin and many
other pathogens using the three-step process. This is true not only with the Nanogen system, but with other
current technologies as well.
Thus, my first recommendation is to
fund establishment of testing/detection
systems in every major metropolitan area and
to link these systems via the Internet and/or
through wireless communication devices to
regional and central monitoring locations.
Nanogen has this capability today.
Historically,
DUST and DARPA funding administrations have
done an excellent job of identifying emerging
technology.
Grants have specific timeframes,
milestones and deliverables.
While funding in the several million
dollar range has been available to develop
prototypes, or proof-of-principal, no funding
has been available to continue the development
of the prototype into a commercial instrument.
This is a required prerequisite to
enter the government-contracting arena for
deployment of fully functional
sample-to-answer devices.
Thus, my second recommendation is that
DUST/DARPA begin an immediate review of
sample-to-answer prototypes that have been
produced by a variety of biotechnology
companies over the last three years. Adequate funding should then be made available to further
develop to a near commercial level those
prototypes deemed to have the best potential
for use in biowarfare.
In
summary, the San Diego biotechnology community
and indeed the nation's biotechnology
community stands ready to answer the need for
rapid detection and testing in the event of
biological attack.
DUST and DARPA grants over the last
several years have produced numerous
prototypes of sample-to-answer devices.
The following are respectfully
submitted as recommendations for increasing
the nation's preparedness for biological
attack:
- For
each major metropolitan area, fund
placement of existing technology platforms
capable of detecting biological pathogens
and provide emergency medical training
required to handle a mass casualty event.
- Facilitate
review of biowarfare sample-to-answer
prototypes developed under DUST/DARPA
grants over the last three years.
For those deemed to have the
greatest potential use in combating
biological attack, fund further
development toward a commercial instrument
The Threat of Biological
Attack, Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol
5, No. 4, August 1999,
p. 505
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