WAS ASKED ABOUT THIS STATEMENT THIS WEEK, NOW SECRETARY COHEN
           SAID WE'VE REPLACED THOSE WEAPONS WITH WEAPONS IN OUR INVENTORY
           NOW THAT ARE SAFE. I KNOW THAT DEFENSE SECRETARY COHEN WOULD
           AGREE THAT THAT IS NOT A CORRECT STATEMENT. THAT ALL OF THE
           WEAPONS IN OUR CURRENT INVENTORY LACK ONE OR MORE. THE
           ESSENTIAL SAFETY FEATURES THAT WE HAVE BEEN TALKING ABOUT HERE.
           AS THE DIRECTOR OF LOS ALAMOS LAB, DR. SIDE HECKER INDICATED IN

           A LETTER TO ME AND I QUOTE, "WITH A CTBT IT WILL NOT BE
           POSSIBLE TO MAKE SOME OF THE POTENTIAL SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS FOR
           GREATER INTRINSIC WARHEAD SAFETY DURING THE CONSIDERED 1990
           TIME FRAME. THE REASON IS MANY NUCLEAR TESTS MUST BE DONE TO
           CONFIRM THAT ONCE THEY ARE I OBJECT PRAILTED THE WEAPONS ARE
           STILL RELIABLE AND OPERATE AS INTENDED. THE CTBT MAKES IT
           POINTLESS TO TRY TO INVENT NEW I PROVED SAFETY FEATURES BECAUSE
           THEY CANNOT BE ADOPTED WITHOUT TESTING. THE WORSE, THE CTBT

           MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO CHECK INTO SAFETY THROUGH THE
           INCORPORATION OF CURRENT WELL UNDERSTO SAFETY FEATURES. THEY
           CONSIST OF INSENSITIVE HIGH EXPLOSIVE AND FIRE RESISTANT PITS.
           INSENSITIVE HIGH EXPLOSIVE IN THE PRIMARY OF A NUCLEAR WEAPON
           IS INTEND TODAY PERMIT THE PREMATURE DETONATION OF THE TRIGGER
           RESULTININ A POTENTIAL EXPLOSION SHOULD IT BE TO STRESS LIKE
           BEING DROPPED. FIRE RESISTANT PITS ARE EXRESULTING IN

           RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION OF AN AREA SHOULD IT BE EXPOSED TO A
           FIRE SUCH AS LOADING A WEAPON AN AIRCRAFT. UNFORTUNATELY, FEW
           PEOPLE KNOW MANY OF OUR CURRENT WEAPONS DO NOT CONTAIN ALL THE
           SAFETY FEATURES THAT ALREADY HAVE BEEN INVENTED BY OUR NATIONAL
           LABORATORIES. ONLY ONE IN NINE OF THE WEAPONS IN THE CURRENT
           STOCKPILE INCORPORATES ALL SIX AVAILABLE SAFETY FEATURES. IN
           FACT, THREE OF THE WEAPONS IN THE STOCKPILE, THE W-WARHEAD
           WHICH IS USED ON THE MINUTE MAN THREE ICBM, AND THE W 76 AND

           W-88 WARHEADS WHICH SET A TOP MISSILES CARRIED ABOARD TRIDENT
           SUBMARINES, INCORPORATE ONLY ONE OF THE SIX SAFETY FEATURES.
           ANOTHER WEAPON, THE W-62 WARHEAD DOES NOT HAVE ANY OF THE SIX
           SAFETY FEATURES INCORPORATED INTO ITS DESIGN. THE BOTTOM LINE
           IS THAT A BAN ON NUCLEAR TESTING PREVENTS US FROM MAKING OUR
           WEAPONS AS SAFE AS WE KNOW HOW TO MAKE THEM, AND CREATES A
           DISINCENTIVE TO MAKING SUCH SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS. MR. PRESIDENT,

           ANOTHER POINT THAT I THINK IS EXTRAORDINARILY IMPORTANT AS WE
           DEBATE THIS CTBT IS THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE TREATY CAN NOTE BE
           ACHIEVED BY ITS RATIFICATION. IN ADDITION TO UNDERMINING OUR
           NUCLEAR DETERRENT AS I HAVE JUST SPOKEN TO, THE TREATY WILL NOT
           ACHIEVE ITS GOAL OF HALTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. NOW
           SUPPORTERS OF THE TREATY SAY THE UNITED STATES MUST LEAD BY
           EXAMPLE. AND THAT BY HALTING NUCLEAR TESTS OURSELVES WE WILL
           PERSUADE OTHERS TO FOLLOW OUR EXAMPLE. YET THE HISTORY OF THE

           LAST EIGHT YEARS SHOWS THAT THIS THEORY IS FALSE. SINCE THE
           UNITED STATES HALTED TESTING IN 1992, INDIA, PAKISTAN, RUSSIA,
           CHINA, AND FRANCE HAVE ALL CONDUCTED TESTS. FURTHERMORE, THE
           CTBT WILL NOT ESTABLISH A NEW INTERNATIONAL NORM AGAINST
           NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING OR POSSESSION. THE NUCLEAR
           NONPROLIFERATION TREATY, THE N.P.T. RATIFIED BY 185 COUNTRIES
           HAS ALREADY ESTABLISHED THAT NORM. THE N.P.T. CALLS FOR PARTIES

           TO THE TREATY OTHER THAN THE FIVE DECLARED NUCAR POIRS TO
           PLEDGE NOT NO PURSUE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS. YET, NORTH KOREA
           AND IRAQ, TO NAME TWO, WHO ARE PARTIES TO THE N.P.T., HAVE OF
           COURSE VIOLATED IT. THEY PURSUED NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS
           DESPITE THEIR SOLEMN INTERNATIONAL PLEDGE NEVER TO DO SO. THE
           C.T.B.T. WILL ADD NOTHING USEFUL TO THE INTERNATIONAL NONPROPE
           LIVRATION REGIME SINCE THESE NATIONS IN EFFECT WOULD BE
           PLEDGING NOT TO TEST THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS THEY HAVE ALREADY
           PROMISED NEVER TO HAVE UNDER THE N.P.T. SO MUCH FOR THE

           NATIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL NORM. NOR WILL THE CTBT IMPOSE A
           SIGNIFICANT I AM MEANT TO ACQUISITION OF WEAPONS BY ROGUE
           STATES ALTHOUGH NUCLEAR TESTING ESSENCE TO MAINTAINING THE
           SOPHISTICATED NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE U.S. ART NAL TODAY, IT IS
           NOT REQUIRED TO DEVELOP RELATIVELY SIMPLE FIRST GENERATION
           NUCLEAR DEVICES LIKE THOSE NEEDED OR BEING DEVELOPED BY IRAN
           AND IRAQ. FOR EXAMPLE, THE UNITED STATES BOMB DROPPED ON
           HIROSHIMA WAS NEVER TESTED AND THE ISRAELI NUCLEAR ARSENAL HAS

           BEEN CONSTRUCTED WITHOUT TESTING. INCIDENTALLY THE CLRGS DOES
           NOT DISPUTE THIS POINT. IN SENATE TESTIMONY IN 1997 C.I.A.
           DIRECTOR GEORGE TENET STATED NUCLR TESTING IS NOT REQUIRED FOR
           THE ACQUISITION OF A BASIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY. I.E. A
           BULKY FIRST GENERATION DEVICE WITH BUT DID I OF CAN YOU.
           TESTING WITH NO NUCLEAR YIELD WOULD PROVIDE REASONABLE
           CONFIDENCE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF A FIRST GENERATION DEVICE.
           NUCLEAR TESTING BECOMES CRITICAL ONLY WHEN A PROGRAM MOVES

           BEYOND BASIC DESIGNS TO INCORPORATE MORE ADVANCED CONCEPTS. I
           BELIEVE DIRECTOR TENANT IS CORRECT BASED ON SECRETARY OF
           DEFENSE LETTER THAT I QUOTED EARLIER. WE CAN'T AFFORD TO
           UNDERESTIMATE THE WEAPON, THOUGH, DESCRIBED BY DIRECTOR TENANT.
           THIS BULKY FIRST GENERATION DEVICE WITH HIGH RELIABILITY BUT
           LOW EFFICIENCY. IT IS A LOT LIKE THE BOMB WE DROPPED ON
           HIROSHIMA TO CHANGE WORLD HISTORY. IT IS A STRATEGIC WEAPON. IF
           NORTH KOREA OR IRAN WERE TO BE ABLE TO DEPLOY SUCH A WEAPON,

           THEY COULD, TO PUT IT MILDLY, SEVERELY REDUCE OUR ABILITY TO
           PROTECT OUR INTERESTS IN EAST ASIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF. THESE
           ARE WEAPONS DESIGNED TO INTIMIDATE AND TO KILL LARGE NUMBERS OF
           PEOPLE IN CITIES. NOT TO DESTROY PURELY MILITARY TARGETS AS THE
           UNITED STATES WEAPONS ARE DESIGNED TO DO. MR. PRESIDENT,
           ANOTHER PROBLEM WITH THE CTBT IS THAT IT IS TOTALLY
           UNVERIFIABLE. IT CANNOT BE VERIFIED, DESPITE THE VAST ARRAY OF

           EXPENSIVE SENSORS AND DETECTION TECHNOLOGY BEING ESTABLISHED
           UNDER THE TREATY, IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR NATIONS TO CONDUCT
           MILL THAT TRLY SIGNIFICANT TESTING WITH LITTLE OR NO RISK OF
           DETECTION. EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION REQUIRES HIGH CONFIDENCE THAT
           MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT CHEATING WILL BE DETECTED IN A TIMELY
           MANNER. THE UNITED STATES CANNOT NOW AND WILL NOT IN THE NEAR
           FUTURE BE ABLE TO CONFIDENTLY DETECT AND IDENTIFY MILITARILY
           SIGNIFICANT TESTS OF ONE KILOTON OR LESS. BY THE WAY, THAT'S

           ROUGHLY 500 TIMES LARGER THAN THE BLAST WHICH DESTROYED THE
           MURRAH BUILDING IN OKLAHOMA CITY. WE CAN'T DETECT A TEST OF
           THAT MAGNITUDE. WHAT IS MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR TESTING?
           DEFINITIONS OF THE TERM MIGHT VAIRP. I THINK WE ALL AGREE THAT
           ANY NUCLEAR TEST THAT GIVES A NATION INFORMATION TO MAINTAIN
           ITS WEAPONS OR DEVELOP A NEWER OR MORE EFFECTIVE WEAPON IS MAIL
           TAIRL SIGNIFICANT. IN THE COURSE OF U.S. WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT
           NUCLEAR TESTS WITH YIELD BETWEEN ONE KILOTON AND TEN KILL TONS

           HAVE GENERALLY BEEN LARGE ENOUGH TO PROVIDE PROVE DATA ON NEW
           WEAPONS DESIGNS. OTHER WEAPONS MIGHT HAVE WEAPONRY THAT CAN BE
           ASSESSED AT LOWER YIELDS. AS WE KNOW CRUDE BUT STRATEGICALLY
           SIGNIFICANT WEAPONS LIKE THE ONE WE DROPPED ON HIROSHIMA DON'T
           NEED TO BE TESTED AT ALL. BUT FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT LET'S BE
           CONSERVATIVE AND ASSUME THAT OTHER NATIONS WOULD WANT TO
           CONDUCT TESTS AT LEVELS ABOUT ONE KILOTON TO DEVELOP A NEW
           WEAPON DESIGN. THE VERIFY KIGS SYSTEM OF THE CTBT IS SUPPOSED

           TO DETECT BLASTS ABOVE ONE KILOTON. SO IT WILL SEEM THAT MOST
           CHEATER WILL BE CAUGHT. BUT LOOK AT THE TREATY'S FINE PRINT.
           THE CTBT'S INTERNATIONAL MONDAY THING SYSTEM WILL BE ABLE TO
           DETECT TESTS OF ONE KILOTON OR MORE, IF THEY ARE NONINNOVATIVE
           SIF. THAT MEANS THE CHEATER WILL ONLY BE CAUGHT IF HE DOES NOT
           TRY TO HIDE HIS NUCLEAR TEST. WHAT IF HE DOES WANT TO HIDE IT?
           WHAT IF HE CONDUCTS HIS TEST EE VAI CIVIL?
           IT IS A VERY SIMPLE TASK FOR RUSSIA, CHINA, TO HILD NUCLEAR

           TESTS. ONE OF THE BEST NOPE MEANS OF INVASION IS DETONATING THE
           NUCLEAR DEVICE IN A CAVITY SUCH AS A SALT TOMORROW OR ROOM
           MINED BELOW GROUND. BECAUSE IT SURROUND THE EXPLOSION WITH
           MILLION SPACE, THIS TECHNIQUE CALLED "DECOUPLING" REDUCES THE
           NOISE OR SIZE OF THE DETONATION SIGNAL. THE SIGNAL OF A
           DECOUPLED TEST IS SO MUCH DIMINISHED, BY AS MUCH AS A FACTOR OF
           70, THAT IT WILL NOT BE TO RELIABLE DETECT. FOR EXAMPLE, A
           1,000 TON HIDDEN TEST WOULD HAVE A SIGNAL OF A 14 TON OPEN

           TEST. THIS PUTS THE SIGNAL OF THE EE E. ILLICIT TEST WELL BELOW
           THE THRESHOLD OF DETECTION. DECOUPLING IS A WELL-KNOWN
           TECHNIQUE. TECHNOLOGICALLY SIMPLE TO ACHIEVE. IN FACT IT IS
           QUITE POSSIBLE THAT RUSSIA AND CHINA HAVE CONTINUED NUCLEAR
           TESTING DIRT THE PAST SEVEN YEARS WHILE THE U.S. HAS REFRAINED
           FROM DOING SO BY THE USE OF DECUP RING. THERE ARE OTHER MEANS
           OF CHEATING THAT CAN CIRCUMVENT VERIFICATION. ONE IS OPEN OCEAN
           TESTING. THEY CAN PUT IT ON A BARGE, TO IT AND DETONATE IT. IT

           WOULD BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO LINK THE TEST TO THE CHEATER.
           WHILE THESE TECH TECHNIQUES ARE COMPLEX, THE COSTS ARE LOW
           COMPARED TO THE EXPENSE OF A NUCLEAR WEAPON PROGRAM AND NO MORE
           COMPLICATED THAN WEAPONS DESIGN. FURTHER ESTABLISHED NUCLEAR
           POWERS ARE WELL POSITIONED TO CONDUCT TESTING TO ENSURE
           RELIABILITY AND UNDERTAKE MODEST UPGRADE THEIR ARTS NAMS.
           RUSSIA AND CHINA DO NOT HAVE GOOD RECORDS ON COMPLIANCE WITH
           ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION COMMITMENTS. IN ADDITION,
           ACCORDING TO THE "WASHINGTON TIMES", U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
           BELIEVE CHINA CONDUCTED A SMALL UNDERGROUND TEST IN JUNE AND

           RUSSIA IS BELIEVED TO HAVE CONDUCTED A NUCLEAR TEST EARLIER
           THIS MONTH. WHILE NEITHER COUNTRY HAS RATIFIED THE CTBT BOTH
           HAVE SIGNED THE TREATY AND PROMISED TO ADHERE TO A TESTING
           MORATORIUM. AGAIN, SO MUCH FOR THE NORM. MR. PRESIDENT, THE
           BOTTOM LINE IS THAT A DETERMINED COUNTRY HAS SEVERAL MEANS TO
           CONCEAL ITS WEAPONS TEST AND THE CTBT IS NOT EFFECTIVELY
           VERIFIABLE. LET ME STRESS HERE MY ASSESSMENTS ARE NOT BASED ON
           OPINIONS. OUR INABILITY TO VERIFY A WHOLE RANGE OF NUCLEAR

           TESTING IS WELL-KNOWN AND HAS BEEN AFFIRMED BY THE U.S.
           INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. AS THE WASHINGTON POST REPORTED EARLIER
           THIS WEEK, OUR INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES LACK THE ABILITY TO
           CONFIDENTLY DETECT LOW YIELD TESTS. WEAPON WOULD BE
           IRRESPONSIBLE TO THE EXTREME TO RATIFY AN UN UNVERIFY ABILITY
           ARMS CONTROL TREATY ESPECIALLY WHEN THIS TREATY WILL REDUCE OUR
           CONFIDENCE IN OUR N NUCLEAR DETERRENT. PRESIDENT CLINTON'S
           FIRST DIRECTOR OF THE C.I.A. JAMES WOOLSEY SUMMED UP PROBLEMS

           WITH VERIFICATION STATING IN SENATE TESTIMONY I BELIEVE A ZERO
           YIELD COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY IS EXTRAORDINARY DIFFICULT
           TO THE POINT OF NEAR POSSIBILITY AND POSSIBLY TO THE POINT OF
           IMPOSSIBILITY TO VERIFY FROM A FAR. NOW, IN ADDITION TO THE
           NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES THAT WOULD RESULT FROM THE TREATY
           RATIFICATION, I WOULD ALSO POINT OUT THAT THE ACCORD IS VERY
           POORLY CRAFTED. THE CTBT IS WEAKEST AT ITS VERY FOUNDATION. IT
           ACTUALLY FAILS TO SAY WHAT IT BANS. NOWHERE IN ITS 17 ARTICLES

           AND TWO ANNEXES ARE THE TERMS "NUCLEAR WEAPONS TEST EXPLOSION"
           OR "NUCLEAR EXPLOSION" DID HE FIND FOR QUANTIFIED AND THESE ARE
           THE TREATIES USED IN THE BASIC OBLIGATIONS. ACTING UNDER
           SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN HOLLUM ADMITTED THIS IN JUNE 29 OF THIS
           YEAR STATING THE U.S. DECIDED AT THE OUTSET OF NEGOTIATIONS NOT
           TO SEEK A NATIONAL AGREEMENT ON THE DEFINITION OF NUCLEAR TEST
           EXPLOSION IN THE TREATY TEXT. THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS
           CONFIRMED OUR JUDGMENT THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY
           DIFFICULT AND POSSIBLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO SPECIFY IN

           TECHNICAL TERMS WHAT IS PROHIBITED BY THE TREATY. MR.
           PRESIDENT, WHEN I READ THAT AGAIN, THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS
           CONFIRMED OUR JUDGMENT THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY
           DIFFICULT AND POSSIBLY COUNTER PRODUCTIVE TO SPECIFY IN
           TECHNICAL TERMS WHAT IS PROHIBITED BY THE TREATY. BUT ANOTHER
           NATION MIGHT CHOOSE TO APPLY A LESS RESTRICTIVE DEFINITION AND
           CONDUCTS VERY LOW-YIELD TESTING, WHAT WE CALL HYDRONUCLEAR
           TESTING. WHILE THE UNITED STATES INTERPRETS THE TREATY TO BAN

           ALL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE TESTING, IT IS WHY THEY CALL IT A ZERO
           BAN TEST, OTHER NATIONS COULD CONDUCT VERY LOW YIELD TESTING,
           WHICH I SAID WE COULDN'T VERIFY, BUT WHICH THEY WOULD CONSIDER
           IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREE I. THE SO-CALLED HYDRONUCLEAR
           TESTING IS VERY USEFUL TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS BY HELPING
           IMPROVE THE UNDERSTANDING OF FUNDAMENTAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
           PHYSICS. IT HELPS THEM DEVELOP NEW WEAPONS CONCEPTS. ASCERTAIN
           EXISTING WEAPONS RELIABILITY AND EXERCISE THE SKILLS OF
           SCIENTISTS AND TECHNICIANS. THE ENERGY RELEASED IN THIS TYPE OF

           TEST CAN BE LESS THAN FOUR POUND OF CONVENTION AT HIGH
           EXPLOSIVES, AND AS I SAY, WOULD CERTAINLY ESCAPE DETECTION.
           THIS IS WHERE THE TREATY'S VAGUENESS IS HARMFUL TO OUR
           INTERESTS. EVEN IF WE WERE ABLE TO DETECT IT THE NATION
           CONDUCTING A HYDRONUCLEAR TEST COULD SIMPLY ARGUE IT WAS LEGAL
           UNDER THE TREATY AND THEY WOULD HAVE THE HISTORICAL CTBT
           NEGOTIATING RECORD ON THEIR SIDE. MANY GRAFTS OF THE CTBT PRIOR
           TO THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION, ALLOWED FOR LOW YIELD PERMITTED

           EXPERIMENTS. THE VAIRP IF I INDICATION REGIME OF THE CTBT
           CENTEREDED ON THE INTERNATIONAL MONITORING SYSTEM. I.M.S. BUT
           THAT CAN'T DETECT SOME TESTS. TESTS CAN BE CONDUCTED WITH NO
           DETECTION BY THER THE I.M.S. OR U.S. TECHNICAL MEANS. MR.
           PRESIDENT, THERE IS MUCH MORE TO SAY ABOUT THIS TREATY, BUT I
           BELIEVE I HAVE OUTLINED THE PRIMARY REASONS WHY THE ONLY
           PRUDENT COURSE FOR THE UNITED STATES SENATE IS TO REJECT THE
           CTBT.
{END: 1999/10/08 TIME: 10-15 , Fri.  106TH SENATE, FIRST SESSION}