[137] Scholars generally recognize, although with different accents, that the U.S. policy on the availability of launchers for European communications satellites influenced the European decision to design and build its own launchers.2 This decision, officially endorsed in July 1973, led to the construction of Ariane, which today, after more than a decade of technical reliability and good management, has assured itself the majority of the global commercial market.
What is still unclear, though, are the reasons for the U.S. position on launcher technology and facilities, and how those reasons evolved over time--from the first restrictive directive, National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 338 of September 1965, through the more flexible, and uncertain, position conceived in the second half of the 1960s, to the return to a more restrictive policy publicly announced by President Nixon in October 1972. Shaping this trajectory of changing U.S. policy were five different factors:
This chapter examines the tremendous changes that these five factors wrought, as well as how NASA tried to cope with them.
During the late 1950s and early 1960s on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, the notion of technology as a key to economic growth gained wider and wider acceptance at the highest levels of decision-making. As tariff barriers between the United States and Europe began to relax, factors other than tariffs took on added relevance to economic growth and international competition. In Europe, the chief body concerned with these questions was the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).3 OECD decision-makers, inspired by the works of such economists as Robert Solow and Edward Denison, believed that the expansion of the labor force and capital, and their relative prices, did not explain economic growth by themselves, but that a "residual factor" accounted for a remarkable percentage of economic growth. This residual factor progressively came to be identified as knowledge, science, and technology.4
A 1965 OECD study pointed out that the United States and the Soviet Union controlled the bulk of the world's financial and human resources in the field of research and technology. In particular, a "technological gap" divided the United States from its western allies. Higher U.S. spending on research and development by the state (mostly the military) in "technology-intensive" sectors seemed to have a direct positive influence not only on U.S. economic growth, but on the position of U.S. firms in international markets and on the growing number of U.S. firms investing in Europe.5 Europeans viewed a drive toward high-tech space applications, as well as electronics, computers, and atomic energy, as a possible tactic to solve the technology gap.6
[139] Europeans faced a dilemma. By allowing American capital into their countries, they were consigning their industry to a subsidiary role, at least in the technological sectors. The result would be technological dependence, uncertainty over the availability of supplies, and loss of freedom in formulating industrial policy. On the other hand, if Europeans refused to let Americans invest, they risked ending up double losers by denying themselves the capital needed to create jobs, as well as manufactured products.7
The United States recognized that the technology gap should be treated as "a problem with serious political overtones," as Secretary of State Dean Rusk reminded NASA Administrator James E. Webb in August 1966, because it was perceived as such by the Europeans.8 The U.S. trend toward space cooperation with Europe during the second half of the 1960s had its roots in a willingness by the United States to reduce the political impact--and in the long term, the economic effects--of the technology gap.
As had happened during the U.S.-European "dollar gap," the State Department suggested that it was in the interest of the United States to have a strong Europe as a partner to increase the prospects for U.S. economic growth.9 This farsighted political vision, however, came under attack during the late 1960s, as more and more American economic sectors began to face European competition. In Europe, the technology gap and the need to catch up with the United States in the space sector served one main political purpose: to convince Europeans to turn from science to technologically relevant, commercially viable endeavors and to cooperate on technologically advanced projects, such as Concorde, Airbus, communications satellites, and commercial space launchers. Authors, such as French journalist Jean Jacques Servan-Schreiber in his book Le défi américain,10 not only suggested this policy, but European space organizations also endorsed it.11
The International Telecommunication Satellite Organization (known as Intelsat) was set up in August 1964 as a single commercial global satellite system embracing voice, telegraph, high-speed data, facsimile, and television services. Early Bird, Intelsat's first successful geostationary communications satellite, confirmed the promising commercial potential of communications satellites in 1965.
Under the Intelsat interim agreements, its executive body was the American-based Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat), which, as manager, proposed and implemented projects. Investment shares within Intelsat were determined by projections of long-distance traffic likely to be carried by satellites. Comsat received an initial 61-percent share against a 30-percent share for all European countries. Because the voting system was based on investment shares, Comsat enjoyed a de facto veto power and [140] maintained that power notwithstanding subsequent decreases in its controlling share as new countries joined Intelsat.12
Although Comsat's privileged role in Intelsat, according to one analyst, "assured efficiency and speed" in setting up a global satellite system, and its resources "proved critical to attracting interest on the part of developing countries in joining the enterprise,"13 it also nourished U.S. hegemony in the field, which was rooted in an almost total monopoly of the industrial sector. The early entry into the market by such American firms as Bell Telephone Laboratories, RCA, and Hughes, combined with their ability to draw on studies performed by NASA, gave them an advantage in international competitive bidding on Intelsat contracts. One of the big controversial issues within Intelsat was Comsat's willingness to give priority to in-house research and development over international contracting. It was only under pressure from other Intelsat members that the percentage of outside contract expenditures progressively rose from 13 percent in 1968 to 50 percent by 1972.14 By that time, however, with 52 percent of its capital from the United States, Intelsat spent 92 percent of its money in the United States.15
The White House was aware of the degree of European dissatisfaction with the U.S. monopoly of commercial satellite communications, as well as the danger that, through direct assistance from U.S. firms, foreign satellite activity might proliferate the development of competitive systems.16 President Johnson, after lengthy negotiations with NASA and the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce, approved NSAM 338, "Policy concerning U.S. assistance in the development of foreign communications satellite capabilities," in September 1965.17
The aim of NSAM 338 was, in its own words, "to guide government agencies in the dissemination of satellite technology and in the provision of assistance which is consistent with overall policies." It stipulated that the United States should not provide assistance to other countries that would significantly encourage the development of their communications satellite systems. The United States, moreover, would not entertain any requests by foreign nations involving technological assistance on satellites or launchers unless the assistance obtained would be used in accordance with Intelsat's rules, and provision of such services would be "conditioned upon express (written) assurances." Nonetheless, the United States would provide its allies satellite services for their security needs.18 This was indeed a very tight political directive that did not leave much room for flexibility in future international negotiations.
The Atlantic Alliance, created in 1949, had two main objectives: social stability and military security. To fulfill both objectives, this alliance always had relied on America's arsenal of nuclear weapons. The United States postponed sharing the military burden with Europe by emphasizing the deterrent power of its nuclear arsenal.19 This position implied that the United States maintained control over the ultimate decision to use nuclear arms.
The launch of the Soviet Union's Sputnik in October 1957 made the cost of this arrangement seem very high to Europeans. U.S. territory now was open to Soviet aggression by intercontinental ballistic missiles. Europeans wondered: Would the United States be willing to risk an attack against their own territory for the sake of Europe? Sputnik epitomized the double nature of missiles: the same launcher that had put a scientific satellite in orbit could become, with some modifications, the carrier of a nuclear warhead. The United States now was caught in an inescapable nuclear dilemma: antagonizing its allies was dangerous, because it fostered the development of independent nuclear forces; however, the U.S. Constitution made the president the head of the armed forces and, therefore, the individual with the last say on the use of nuclear weapons, so sharing that decision with other states did not seem to be authorized by the Constitution.
The dilemma was quite real, for the French had requested information on an intermediate nuclear ballistic missile system from the United States. Two weeks after Sputnik, the National Security Council directed the Eisenhower administration to discourage the production of nuclear weapons outside the nuclear "club" and, specifically, to "persuade France not to undertake independent production of such weapons."20 The National Security Council was referring to General Charles de Gaulle's force de frappe and its strategy tout azimut. Upon his return to power in June 1958, de Gaulle had accelerated studies of both launchers and nuclear warheads. The first French atomic bomb (tested in 1960) was further proof of this determination.21
Between 1962 and 1965, the United States devised a hybrid formula, the Multilateral Force (MLF), to appease European requests for nuclear technology and to satisfy constitutional law and the Atlantic Alliance, but the MLF proved to be a slow, inexorable failure.22 By the mid-1960s, nuclear issues were at the core of NATO difficulties. The United [142] States strongly resented France's unwillingness to comply with Atlantic Alliance strategy and its stated wish to build up its own nuclear arsenal. The French nuclear strategy, however, was linked to its economic policy. "In politics as in strategy as in economics," de Gaulle asserted in a much publicized January 1963 speech that referred to U.S. policy, "monopoly quite naturally appears to him who holds it as the best possible system."23 In fact, de Gaulle's attacks against the dollar gold standard, launched in February 1965, when France presented its dollars for conversion into gold, were followed in 1966 by France's withdrawal from NATO and, in 1967, by that country's first nuclear ballistic missile tests.
The meaning of French behavior acquired a much more disturbing twist in the context of the new global nonproliferation policy inaugurated by the United States during the 1960s. After the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union began to ease the international tensions that had reached a climax during that long week. The two superpowers agreed on, and formalized, common codes of conduct in the nuclear arena, including limitations on the testing and production of nuclear devices to prevent their proliferation. The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water (better known as the Test Ban Treaty) and the hot-line agreements were signed in 1963, while the nonproliferation treaty was signed in 1968 only after protracted negotiations.
These international developments paralleled domestically the adoption of NSAM 294, "U.S. Nuclear and Strategic Delivery System Assistance to France," on the nonproliferation of "strategic delivery technology," including nuclear bombs and launchers.24 Enforcement of this policy was assigned to Munitions Control at the State Department--the agency also responsible for controlling technological information to be sold abroad. In the context of this memorandum, then, the French independent course was interpreted not only as a refusal of American patronage, but, more dangerously, as an attempt to disrupt the architecture of American nonproliferation policy.25
After Sputnik, and in parallel with the process that led to NASA's creation in 1958, European scientists began to call for the creation of a collaborative space organization. As a result, an agreement establishing the European Space Research Organization (ESRO) was signed in 1962, but it did not enter into force until 1964. ESRO was born out of many interest, including the scientists' desire to conduct specifically ambitious experiments that natural resources alone would not have permitted, as well as the wish of some scientists to be independent of national military authorities. The establishment of ESRO also benefited from the spirit of European unity following the Treaty of Rome that created the Common Market.26 The ESRO agreement glossed over references to technological and [143] industrial concerns. The relevance of space technology to future economic development was not indisputable at the time, notwithstanding the initial propagandistic effort of some aerospace firms; moreover, industrial policy was still perceived as a prerogative of only national governments.
Starting in 1960, political negotiations on the building of a European satellite launcher were under way, leading to the 1964 ratification of an agreement to establish the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO). ELDO was born out of Britain's willingness to "Europeanize" and convert to civilian use a military missile already in development, the Blue Streak. The mission of this launcher always had lurked in the background of ELDO, whose first concern was to acquire (or in the case of Britain to maintain) a technical expertise in a high-technology area at a bearable price.
The total spent by Europe on space in the mid-1960s was but a small fraction of the amount of money spent by the United States.27 Total U.S. domination of the satellite field (communications, meteorology, and navigation) seemed to loom ahead in the 1970s. To compete with the United States, Europe needed to shift its emphasis from science to commercial and technological endeavors. The United States had provided launchers for national and European scientific satellites for free or at low costs. Why, then, should Europe follow the more costly and risky track of applications satellites and powerful launchers? That was the heart of the debate.
The British labor government (1964-1970) was the most skeptical of the European states. As early as 1966, Britain made it clear that, as far as launchers were concerned, it favored reliance on the United States. The British opined that Europa I, ELDO's first launcher, would be "obsolescent and uncompetitive in cost and performance with launchers produced by the U.S." by the end of the decade.28 This debate disrupted ELDO negotiations in 1966 and again in 1968, and it formed the base for endless quarrels into the 1970s. British Minister of Technology Anthony Wedgwood-Benn summed up its essence when he stated that he was "very much alarmed at the thought that because a thing is European, and because a thing is international, this somehow excuses us from applying economic criteria."29
Britain eventually did stay in ELDO, which moved closer to the French position of independence from the United States. In July 1966, ELDO approved an upgrading of the European launcher; Europa II would be capable of putting into geosynchronous orbit a 170-kilogram satellite, compared to 140 kilograms with a Thor-Delta launcher.30 In addition, on the insistence of the French, ELDO transferred its launch site from Woomera, Australia, to Kourou, French Guiana, where the French space agency was building its own launch complex.31
Still, no firm decision on the building of a European communications satellite was reached until December 1971. Among the hurdles to overcome in reaching that decision was the unclear legal framework for satellite operations--the Intelsat interim agreements were under renegotiation between 1969 and 1971--as well as the availability of launchers.32 [144] Both the Intelsat negotiations and the debate over the availability of launchers were interrelated, and Europe hoped to improve its bargaining position by building up a credible industrial and technical competence--and consequently a political presence--in the field of applications satellites.
That thinking was partly behind the Franco-German Symphonie program. This binational project combined two national experimental communications satellites (called Saros 2 and Olympia) within a single spacecraft, whose launch was originally scheduled for 1970.33 Symphonie, its supporters hoped, would put German and French industry in a preferred position when Europe built a communications satellite, but it also would be an asset during Intelsat renegotiations--not to mention a test of U.S. willingness to launch European commercial satellites.34
During the mid-1960s, when space expenditures reached their historic peak, the United States sought to increase cooperation with Europe in space. The new interest in the use of space cooperation as a means toward achieving political objectives abroad put NASA in a very delicate situation. Namely, the danger was that cooperative projects would not always reinforce NASA's programmatic needs. In such instances, a NASA working group on increasing international cooperation in space reported that the State Department and the White House ought to justify such projects, "since NASA cannot itself justify a relaxation of its posture and programmatic needs."35
Cooperation in space between the United States and Europe had been developing since the late 1950s along the restrictive lines established by Arnold Frutkin, director of NASA international affairs starting in September 1959. The United States offered free launch services and space aboard spacecraft for European scientific experiments; joint undertakings were "purely" scientific. The partners considered this cooperative arrangement highly beneficial, and it gave rise to few occasions of rancor.36
Late in 1965, NASA proposed a new project to its European space partners. Known as the Advanced Cooperation Project, the proposal remained within the political directives set up by NSAM 338 (September 1965), yet raised the level of transatlantic cooperation in space. As part of the Advanced Cooperation Project, Europe would be responsible for developing a technologically advanced spacecraft for either a solar or Jupiter mission, and the United States would provide launch, tracking, and data collection services.
As a French official expressed to Charles Bohlen, the U.S. ambassador in France, the offer seemed to be but "a bone to nibble on."37 Moreover, other critics perceived the Advanced Cooperation Project not as fostering space development, but as diverting Europe from the economic benefits to be derived from developing communications satellites.38 The proposal failed to galvanize the European scientific community, and in the summer of 1966, ESRO officially declined it.
The United States, still wishing to increase international cooperation in space, transformed the Advanced Cooperation Project into a bilateral venture with West Germany known as Helios.39 Cooperation with West Germany had become more critical to U.S. diplomatic policy, particularly following France's withdrawal from NATO,40 and as West Germany came to be viewed as the "most faithful ally" of the United States in Europe.41
[146] For its part, West Germany, through its participation in U.S. space efforts, was interested in acquiring a wide range of military-related technology that strictures dating from the end of World War II prohibited that country from producing. During the early 1960s, moreover, West Germany purchased military goods and services from the United States to offset the costs of stationing American occupational troops in that country. Now, the West German government hoped to substitute for at least part of those payments the cost of procuring and licensing high-tech American equipment to establish a pattern of technical cooperation and to reestablish German technical capabilities.42
Meanwhile, the United States continued to reconcile space cooperation with high-level deliberation. In March 1966, a special ad hoc committee of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, chaired by Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, was set up to advise President Johnson on the topic. The United States favored the work of ELDO, because its rocket programs tended to serve peaceful uses, were subject to international control, and absorbed personnel and financial resources that otherwise might be diverted into purely national programs that tended to concentrate on military systems. The dissolution of ELDO, the United States feared, might strengthen national military rocket programs and lead to a proliferation of launchers.43 At the same time, argued Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, any increased emphasis on the peaceful uses of space technology would go hand in hand with a decrease in European programs of independent military applications. The aim of U.S. policy, according to McNamara, should be to stimulate "foreign involvement in space technology as a means of diverting energies from the development of nuclear systems."44 Moreover, in the case of France, encouragement to proceed with upper-stage liquid hydrogen-oxygen systems might divert resources from their force de frappe program, which used solid fuel propulsion technology.45
In addition to the dissolution of ELDO, the United States also was distressed over collaboration among ELDO, ESRO, and the European Telecommunications Satellite Committee (known by its French acronym CETS), because such collaboration could be a prelude to the creation of a combined competitive global space power. As Frutkin wrote in May 1966: "The greatest danger now is that the crises in space affairs in Europe will lead to a total redirection of European space effort in competition with the United States." If ELDO, ESRO, and CETS together established their own system of communications satellites, Europe would challenge and seriously disrupt Intelsat, which was dominated by the United States. "It seems very important," Frutkin declared, "in view of this possibility and in view of the difficult 1969 Intelsat renegotiation that everything be done to give the Europeans as little cause of concern as necessary regarding U.S. motivation. Certainly, no dog-in-manger attitude ought to be continued."46 NASA Administrator James Webb added to Frutkin's concern. Once the Europeans completed construction of the Kourou launch complex, "the European nations could, if they wish," Webb opined, "be in a position to [147] place in synchronous orbit an operable comsat spacecraft."47 If the United States could not stop the creation of a European regional communications satellite system, the new Intelsat organization, then under renegotiation, might provide a framework in which to control the European system.48
American policy was caught in a dilemma. As NASA reported to the State Department, the United States was "virtually at the limits of proposals for cooperation which [could] be made with any hope of success, unless the U.S. should relax restrictions in the two areas of prime interest, vehicle technology and experimentation with comsat."49 Those areas of interest fell under NSAMs 294 and 338, which NASA Administrator James Webb perceived were a "political irritant" to the Europeans and were "exacerbating existing political strains," especially with the French.50 Revising NSAM 338 might improve U.S.-European relations, discourage Europeans from following a potentially competitive independent route, and even help the U.S. position in Intelsat negotiations scheduled to begin in 1969.51
The underlying idea was to liberalize U.S. policy on launching communications satellites. NSAM 338 had defined that policy in very strict terms and had left to the bodies and agencies of the newly formed Intelsat the responsibility to entangle the development of competitive international telecommunications satellites through a web of legal rules.52 This idea was first embodied in a National Security Council directive approved as NSAM 354 by the president in July 1966 under the title "U.S. Cooperation with the European Launcher Organization (ELDO)."53 The document called for positive support of ELDO and the provision of launch vehicles, components, and technology under precise conditions. For example, the technology could be used to improve the capability of communications satellites only in accordance with Intelsat agreements or to participate as an ally in the U.S. military satellite system. The technology was not to be used in nuclear missile systems nor to be passed on to other countries.54
In August 1966, in applying NSAM 354, the United States offered to support ELDO's development of a European launch vehicle. That support entailed the procurement of U.S. flight hardware, as well as assistance (such as technical information and personnel) in the design of subsequent ELDO projects using liquid-propellant upper stages. The [148] United States also suggested the joint use of a high-energy upper stage to be developed in Europe, the sale of Scout, Thor, and Atlas rockets to the Europeans, and the provision for a fee for launch services for scientific and applications satellite projects.55
Formal discussions begun in September 1966 focused, at the request of ELDO, on general aspects of management (such as establishing adequate task definition, contractor selection, and contract supervision) and on certain specific technical problems relating to the injection of a satellite into geostationary orbit (namely, the ELDO-PAS program).56 Subsequently, an ELDO team visited NASA Headquarters and the Goddard Space Flight Center, and various technical problems relating to ELDO-PAS were discussed.57 Nonetheless, NASA eluded ELDO requests for technical comments on studies of the high-energy upper stages.58
In July 1967, the revision of NSAM 338, which had set strict limits on the supplying of launches for communications satellites to foreign entities, received President Johnson's endorsement.59 Although substantial changes from the foregoing document were not readily noticeable, the change in perspective was evident from the start. Whereas the original text opened by declaring that "it is the policy of the United States to support development of a single global commercial communication satellite system to provide common carrier and public service communications," the revised policy declaration read: "The United States is committed to the encouragement of international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space." In addition, the rules for transferring technology were slightly liberalized by the substitution of a more flexible expression, namely:
[149] The principal new assumption of the document was the inevitable development of new regional communications systems. If the United States did not encourage those regional systems to join Intelsat, then, predicted Edward C. Welsh of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, "I would expect that the international system will be the one which breaks up and fails."61 The goal of U.S. policy, therefore, was to attract regional systems into the Intelsat framework where they could be controlled,62 but, as a NASA paper on the dissemination of technology overseas cautioned, "The health of Intelsat is assured in part by the feeling of the major Intelsat partners that they are indeed partners and not puppets in an organization dominated by the U.S."63 If the United States were too stringent in imposing technology export controls, those nations might conclude that the United States did not intend to allow them to compete, and they might work together to create a competing satellite system, or even to defeat upcoming Intelsat negotiations.
The willingness of the United States to liberalize its space technology policy was put to a test in 1968, when the directors of the Franco-German Symphonie communications satellite program asked NASA to provide launch vehicles and service for two satellites. After consulting with the Department of State, NASA replied in October 1968 that it would launch the satellites for a fee, "if we could arrive at a mutual understanding of the experimental character of the project."64 Also, regarding the eventual future use of the satellite system, the Europeans were asked to comply with Intelsat's rules. NASA's reply, carefully conceived within the logic of NSAM 338, was interpreted by Symphonie directors as a U.S. refusal to launch European communications satellites should they advance from an "experimental" to an operational phase.65 Therefore, they endorsed the use of a European launcher, even if this prospect seemed less certain and more expensive.
The year 1969 included the confluence of the U.S. space program and Intelsat negotiations. In the spring of 1969, Intelsat renegotiations opened, and in July, the Apollo 11 astronauts became the first humans on the Moon. In addition, U.S. offers to entice Europeans into participating in post-Apollo space programs were not entirely distinct from the Intelsat negotiations.
In October 1969, NASA Administrator Thomas O. Paine offered Europeans the opportunity to participate in the development and use of an ambitious set of space transportation and exploration projects--namely, a space station module, a reusable transportation system (the Space Shuttle), a tug to transfer payloads from the Shuttle to geosynchronous orbit, and a nuclear-powered rocket (NERVA) for long-distance interplanetary travel. If Europe could be convinced to abandon its "trouble-plagued and [150] obsolescent" launcher program, Paine had argued in the summer, "European funds would be freed for more constructive cooperative purposes."66
However, as European negotiators explained during their first meeting to discuss Paine's offer held in September 1970, because Europe only had limited means, it would be unable to finance simultaneously the development of its own launchers (for communications and other applications satellites) and significant participation in the post-Apollo programs. Therefore, European entry into any such cooperative venture would have to be complemented by the granting of launchers on a commercial basis and without political conditions by the United States. The United States replied that, if Europe contributed substantially to post-Apollo programs, the Americans would provide launch services to Europe on a reimbursable basis "for any peaceful purpose consistent with existing international agreements." Furthermore, at the request of the European representatives, the American delegates clarified that the phrase "any peaceful purpose" could include commercial ventures capable of competing with American interests.67
The United States made it clear, moreover, that the Europeans would be required to contribute at least 10 percent of the overall development costs of the Space Shuttle. Those costs then were projected as being $10 billion over ten years; the European share would have been $1 billion spread out over the same period. Broadly speaking, Théodore Lef'vre (who was the president of the European Space Conference and the chief European negotiator) pointed out, that amount would correspond to expenditures on the development of the European launcher.68
At the same time as these NASA program talks were taking place, Intelsat negotiations were under way. The Europeans were striving to obtain a more equitable partnership within the system, and they succeeded in obtaining some good results.69 Among the issues under discussion was the establishment of regional satellite systems outside the jurisdiction of the Intelsat network. The United States initially argued against regional satellites, but the Intelsat Definitive Agreements of 1971 opened the way for them to meet members' needs for international public communications services. In each case, though, members were to ensure the technical compatibility of the regional satellite with the Intelsat network and to avoid significant economic harm to the global system. Furthermore, Intelsat was not permitted to enforce sanctions against violators, nor were its recommendations considered binding, as the United States originally had demanded. This clause was all the more relevant, because the Definitive Agreements deprived Comsat, the American signatory, of the veto power it had enjoyed under the Interim Agreements.70
These significant American concessions, however, were offset by a modification of the interpretation of the voting formula in Article XIV (paragraph d). Drafted in ambiguous [151] terms in order to reach a consensus on the text, the clause left Europeans wondering what kind of majority was needed for the approval of an international satellite outside the Intelsat network, a prerequisite at that time for its launch by the United States. In a letter dated 2 October 1970 to Théodore Lef'vre, Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson stated that the United States was prepared to launch European satellites "in those cases where no negative finding is made by the appropriate Intelsat organ, regardless of the position taken by the U.S. in the vote."71 The Europeans understood this somewhat "baroque" definition to mean that a two-thirds vote against the proposed satellite would be required to defeat it; if, on the other hand, less than two-thirds of the seventy-seven Intelsat members were opposed, the United States would be agreeable to launching it. In other words, Europe needed only a little more than one-third of the votes to obtain Intelsat permission to launch its satellite.
In a subsequent letter of 5 February 1971, Johnson clarified the U.S. offer, which was substantially limited. Instead of a two-thirds vote of the Intelsat assembly to defeat a proposed regional satellite, a two-thirds affirmative vote was needed to support the proposal.72 According to NASA's Acting Administrator George M. Low, this reversal, if not accompanied by a specific commitment in advance by the United States to support the regional European communications satellite proposal within Intelsat, would "effectively kill the chances for post-Apollo participation by Europe."73 The U.S. change of position was linked to pressures exerted by Comsat and the U.S. aerospace industry.74
The origin of this policy change cannot be understood without considering the role of the Office of Telecommunication Policy. Clay T. Whitehead, a young and resolute systems analyst from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, had directed this office since its inception in September 1970. The aim of the office was to define American policy vis-à-vis satellite communications for overseas civilian operations, as well as to support the American aerospace industry against what was perceived as attempts by NASA and the State Department to endanger the U.S. monopoly in communications satellites. On 7 January 1971, in the much publicized "Statement of Government Policy on Satellite Telecommunications for International Civil Aviation Operations," the Office of Telecommunication Policy called for the international utilization (as opposed to international development and utilization, as NASA had proposed) of a specialized aeronautical communications satellite system (called Aerosat) for international civil aviation operations.75 The office's statement, however, had wider implications. In February 1971, one [152] month later, Clay Whitehead heavily criticized U.S.-European negotiations on post-Apollo space programs, whose sole outcome, in his opinion, would be to give away "space launchers, space operations and related know how at 10 cents on the dollar" (a reference to the American proposal that Europe share 10 percent of the development costs).76
The Europeans reacted strongly to the new restrictive American policy. Lef'vre found it "confirmed neither by the joint preparatory work nor by the wording used in the text" (of the Intelsat agreements) and asked the United States for a further clarification of its position.77 Not until September 1971, after the signing of the Definitive Intelsat Agreements, did Lef'vre receive the clarifications he had been asking for since March.78
According to those clarifications, the new U.S. position was that the availability of American launchers was not conditioned on European participation in post-Apollo space programs. Those two issues were now, for the first time, separate. The United States would offer launch services for satellites intended to provide international public communications services, including European regional satellites, provided that the Intelsat governing body approved this by a two-thirds majority vote. The proponents of a regional satellite, then, would bear the burden of persuading the General Assembly that the proposal would not cause significant economic harm to the global network and would be technologically compatible with Intelsat. The United States would consider a vote by Intelsat to be binding, contrary to the general interpretation of Article XIV.
The geographical area to be covered by any European regional satellite system, however, was another point of contention. The preliminary provisional satellite system outlined by ESRO Director General Hermann Bondi at the European Conference in Venice in September 1970 proposed voice, data, and television services within the member states of the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunication Administrations (CEPT), but only television services to countries of the European Broadcasting Area as defined by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), which extended from Iceland to the North African coast and from Portugal to Lebanon and Israel. Representatives of the Office of Telecommunication Policy, the Federal Communications Commission, and the State Department's Bureau of Economic Affairs examined the proposal and judged that it "would appear to cause measurable, but not significant, economic harm to Intelsat." The United States, though, would not support the proposal if the services offered in the European Broadcasting Area embraced anything more than television. The United States felt that the satellite would cause significant economic harm to Intelsat and was, therefore, "clearly unacceptable" to the United States.79
Representatives of the Committee of Alternates of the European Space Conference (which included representatives of both ELDO and ESRO) warmly welcomed the "decoupling" of launcher availability and participation in NASA space programs.80 The ESRO [153] Council soon afterward adopted the so-called first package deal, which called for U.S. and European participation in Aerosat, the creation of a weather satellite program, and coverage of the communications satellite program to include the full European Broadcasting Area as defined by the ITU. The package deal also reaffirmed the priority of European launchers, although on the condition that their cost would not exceed 125 percent of comparable non-European ones. If the United States denied launch services, then the actual cost of production, as well as any development costs, would be permitted.81
Lefèvre now requested from Johnson further explanation of the U.S. stand on launcher availability, as well as American support for a European communications satellite within Intelsat, based on specific operational systems, missions, geographical coverage, frequency bands, and technical configurations.82 In his reply of June 1972, Johnson pointed to three difficulties: (1) its economic impact (higher charges to users); (2) technical incompatibility (the satellite's orbit placed it too close to the United States coastline); and, most important of all, (3) the definition of the European region. Johnson explained once and for all that the United States would not support the concept of the European Broadcasting Area as defined by the ITU, which covered the former French colonies of North Africa, the western portion of the Soviet Union, and the lands bordering the eastern Mediterranean, including Iraq, but not Saudi Arabia.83
In October 1972, President Nixon laid out the U.S. position on the availability of launchers in the following terms: "United States launch assistance will be available to interested countries and international organizations for those satellite projects which are for peaceful purposes and are consistent with obligations under relevant international agreements and arrangements." With respect to communications satellites, Nixon declared:
[154] This declaration gave rise to dissimilar interpretations in Europe and the United States. Whereas the Europeans saw it as sanctioning the de facto binding character of any Intelsat recommendation, U.S. officials, in contrast, stressed the second and third points and emphasized U.S. resolution to offer the broadest guarantee of flexibility vis-à-vis recommendations made under Article XIV.85
After the launch failure of Europa II in November 1971 and then its cancellation in April 1973, the directors of Symphonie were without a launch vehicle. They then turned to both the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Intercosmos space agency did not oppose the launch but stated it would not be technically feasible until 1976, which was too late for the Europeans. The United States, on the other hand, was able to promise a first launch window in 1975. After protracted negotiations, which remain an object of dispute today, an agreement was reached in June 1974. In this agreement, France and West Germany confirmed the experimental character of Symphonie, and if the satellite entered an operational phase, the two countries agreed to conform to any decisions reached within Intelsat.86 Meanwhile, the European Space Conference had adopted the so-called second package deal, whose three main programs included the Ariane launcher.87
Between 1965 and 1973, NASA confronted two conflicting trends: the easing of controls on launch services and overseas technology transfers and the pressure from the telecommunications industry to tighten those controls. NASA had to shape those opposing trends into a coherent policy vis-à-vis European requests for communications satellite launch services. Some U.S. officials viewed sharing technology with Europe as achieving two policy goals: (1) blunting European criticism about the technology gap and (2) diverting resources from military rockets to civilian launchers as part of a global policy of nonproliferation. The United States abandoned this strategy when France acquired its own military launching capability.
Much of the tergiversation between the United States and Europe over communications satellites and launch services took place within the framework of Intelsat negotiations for the Definitive Agreements. The ambiguous wording of Article XIV provided the United States grounds on which alternately to soften or harden its position on the creation of a European satellite system outside the Intelsat network. Behind the hardening of the U.S. position was pressure from Comsat and the aerospace industry, which exerted pressure directly or through the Office of Telecommunication Policy.
The decision to proceed with the Space Shuttle program also had an impact on U.S.-European cooperation. The Space Shuttle seemed to promise an extraordinary qualitative leap in launch systems and their cost effectiveness, and it also seemed to make any European rocket obsolescent. Thus, to a certain degree, the Space Shuttle decision reduced U.S. interest in preventing the Europeans from developing their own launch capabilities.
Equally important was a real shift in U.S. policy vis-à-vis Europe. Whereas the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had tried to appease the Europeans, as confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union played in the background, Nixon shifted from confrontation to détente, thereby weakening the political weight of the Atlantic partnership. Then, in the summer of 1971, the United States experienced its first trade deficit since 1894, as well as a severe reduction of gold reserves, which led to the decision to stop selling gold to foreign banks and to abandon the so-called Bretton Woods system (the fixed gold-to-dollar exchange rate instituted following World War II). A 10-percent across-the-board import duty was just another troubling economic signal to Europe. As often occurs, economic crisis feeds isolationism, especially in the face of an expanding, competitive European Economic Community (Britain, Denmark, and Ireland soon became new members).88
By the first years of the 1970s, efforts to liberalize American policy on launch services and the sharing of technology had come full circle. They had failed in the face of prevailing internal economic interests, increasing competition from European industry, changing priorities in U.S. foreign policy, and European developments in both the military and space fields. From the European perspective, the unwillingness of the United States to provide firm assurances of launcher availability for communications satellites was but one factor that lead to the European decision to endorse France's L-IIIS launcher (later known as Ariane). That decision has to be understood within the context of strained U.S.-French relations--itself a legacy of the dissension [156] between Charles de Gaulle and Lyndon Johnson--which endured well into the 1970s, as well as the confused nature of the European space field.
Institutional uncertainty regarding the future of the European space organization was particularly acute between 1966 and 1971. Financial commitments were weak in comparison to NASA; industrial experience with satellite technology was limited; international legislation on communications satellites was not yet defined; and the attitudes of potential satellite users were conservative because of the uncertainty of commercial revenues, the high costs of the system, and anticipated problems of technological reliability.89 Not until December 1971 did the ESRO Council endorse the start of a communications satellite program, the Orbiting Test Satellite.
Furthermore, not all the European states agreed entirely on the objectives of regional space policy. Britain always criticized proposals to build a European launcher and preferred the less expensive route of relying on U.S. satellites, while Italy was interested only in projects that guaranteed contracts for its industry (this was apparently not the case of the European launcher). West Germany, after the failure of Europa II in November 1971, was eager to assume the prime financial burden and contract management for Spacelab, while withdrawing its earlier support for an independent European launcher. France and Belgium were the only countries that never varied from their support of a European launcher.
Even within France, though, not everybody was in favor of a European launcher. Nonetheless, those who supported it--de Gaulle and then his successor, Georges Pompidou--created a strong constituency, and they made good use of American launcher policy to improve their position. Of equal importance is the fact that the technicians who first conceived Ariane did not look for a technological breakthrough, which would have been politically and economically difficult to champion given historical circumstances. Instead, they sought to design a technically easy and reliable rocket, drawing partly on knowledge acquired through the development of Diamant.90 A national launcher was neither financially possible nor strategically convenient: the project had to be European to distribute the financial burden and to secure future users.91 Also, it had to be technologically uncomplicated to prevent the cost overruns that had haunted ELDO's past.
In the end, all of the reluctant European partners were induced to participate in the second package deal. The European decision to build Ariane had many roots and motives, among which was the unwillingness of the United States to guarantee availability of launchers for operational communications satellites. The decision to build Ariane, however, was not assured until the very end. The hectic bargaining that took place in July 1973 testified to the difficulty of the process up to the very last moment, and it dramatized the central role of international bargaining. If West Germany and Britain did not have their pet projects (Spacelab and maritime communications, respectively) to protect and to garner support for, the birth of Ariane probably would have been a far more traumatic delivery.
1. The author would like to thank John Krige, head of the ESA Project at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy, and John Logsdon, director of the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University in Washington, D.C., for their insightful discussions of the topics addressed in this article. The author also thanks Richard Barnes, international space consultant in Washington, D.C., and André Lebeau, professor at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers in Paris, for their invaluable criticism and comments. The form and expression of this disputed story are entirely the author's own responsibility. A more extensive analysis of the period under examination will be found in a book-length analytical history of U.S.-European space relations that the author is currently writing with John Logsdon. The author also would like to acknowledge the extremely valuable assistance of the NASA History and Security Offices in facilitating the declassification of documents essential to this work.
2. For example, see John Logsdon, "International Involvement in the U.S. Space Station Program," Space Policy, February 1985, p. 18: "[T]he fact that there was resistance in providing that assistance reinforced the position of those in Europe (particularly in France) who were arguing for developing an independent European space capability." Peter Creola, referring to President Nixon's 9 October 1972 policy statement on the availability of American launchers in "European-U.S. Space Cooperation at the Crossroads," Space Policy, May 1990, p. 99, wrote: "The effect of this policy on Europe was decisive." See also Arturo Russo, "Launching Europe into Space: The Origin of the Ariane Rocket," paper read at the International Astronautical Federation Annual Meeting, 1995. In "La naissance d'Ariane," p. 85, in Emmanuel Chadeau, ed., L'ambition technologique: Naissance d'Ariane (Paris: Éditions Rive Droite, 1995), this point of view was expressed much more vigorously by André Lebeau (former President of CNES, the French space agency): "Il ne semble pas exagéré de dire que si les états-Unis avaient vendu sans conditions particulières les deux lancements de Symphonie, la décision d'engager le programme Ariane n'aurait jamais pu être obtenue. Une intransigeance maladroite, fondée sans doute sur l'idée que l'Europe serait de toutes façons incapable de ressusciter son programme de lanceurs, vints à point pour fournir un appui décisif aux promoteurs de L3S."
3. Jean-Jacques Salomon, Science et Politique (Paris: Seuil, 1970), pp. 51-54.
4. Edward Denison, Source of Economic Growth in the United States and the Alternatives before Us (New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1962).
5. Christopher Freeman and Anthony Young, The Research and Development Effort in Western Europe, North America and the Soviet Union: An Experimental International Comparison of Research Expenditures and Manpower in 1962 (Paris: OECD, 1965), p. 70.
6. Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, Le défi américain (Paris: Denoel, 1967), pp. 119-125; see also David Beckler, Assistant to the Director, to Philip Hemily, Science Adviser, U.S. Mission to the OECD, letter, 3 June 1966, RG 359, National Archives, Washington, DC.
7. Alfred Grosser, The Western Alliance: European-American Relations since 1945 (London: Macmillan, 1980), pp. 217-31.
8. Dean Rusk to James Webb, letter, 29 August 1966, RG 255, 70-A-3458, box 7, NASA History Office, Washington, DC. On the need to reduce the political impact of the technological gap, see also the Interim Report of the Work of the Space Council's ad hoc Committee on Expanded International Cooperation, enclosure 1, statement concerning political objectives for expanded cooperation in space activities, presented for the chairman at the working group meeting on 20 October 1966, RG 255, 69-A-5089, box 5, NASA History Office.
9. See, for example, the 20 October 1966 statement concerning political objectives for expanded cooperation in space activities, by the State Department, RG 255, 69-A-5089, box 5, NASA History Office.
10. Servan-Schreiber, Le défi américain, pp. 119-25.
11. Joachim M¸ller, "Historical Background and Start of the TELECOM Program," Space Communications 8 (1991): 105-40; John Krige and Arturo Russo, Europe in Space, 1960-1973, ESA SP-1172 (Noordwijk: ESA, September 1994), pp. 55-82.
12. Richard Colino, "The INTELSAT System: An Overview," in Joel Alper and Joseph Pelton, eds., The INTELSAT Global Satellite System (New York: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1984), p. 62. See also Marcellus Snow, The International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987), pp. 43-48.
13. Colino, "The INTELSAT System," p. 62.
14. Stephen Levy, "INTELSAT: Technology, Politics and the Transformation of a Regime," International Organization 29 (Summer 1975): 661-64.
15. Address by Professor Hermann Bondi, former Director General of ESRO, on International Cooperation in Space, Goddard Dinner at Symposium AAS, 18 March 1971, RG 255, 74-734, box 15, NASA History Office; Michael E. Kinsley, Outer Space and Inner Sanctums: Government, Business, and Satellite Communication (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976).
16. Jim D. O'Connell to Jack Valenti, Special Assistant to the President, letter, 7 May 1965, White House Confidential Files, TR 105, box 96, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, TX.
17. RG 255, 69-A-5089, box 5, NASA History Office; also in WHCF (confidential files), TR 105, box 96, Lyndon B. Johnson Library.
18. A bilateral U.S.-Britain military satellite agreement was signed in 1967, whereby Britain would build an all-British satellite for military communications with Australia and the Far East within the framework of a collaborative Skynet military space communications system. Krige and Russo, Europe in Space, p. 62.
19. Thomas H. Etzold, "The End of the Beginning . . . NATO's Adoption of Nuclear Strategy," in Olau Riste, ed., Western Security: The Formative Years (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), p. 291.
20. National Security Council 5721/1, "U.S. Policy on France," 19 October 1957, in U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-57 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), Vol. XXVII, Western Europe and Canada, pp. 189, 192. For the U.S.-French rift on nuclear issues, see McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 472-87. More generally, see Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), passim.
21. For the force de frappe and the organizational changes it implied, see Roger Rhenter, "Implications de la politique de défense dans les domaines de l'industrie aéronautique et de l'espace," in Institut Charles de Gaulle, De Gaulle et son siècle, Vol. 4, La sécurité et l'indépendance de la France (Paris: La Documentation Française-Plon, 1992), pp. 160-63. For an updated review of French nuclear policy, Maurice Vaïsse, ed., La France et l'atome (Brussels: Bruylant, 1994).
22. The MLF was intended to be a coordinated multinational deterrent nuclear force consisting of a fleet of submarines carrying Polaris missiles manned by crews of a minimum of three nationalities. Decision-making would be shared, but not the ultimate responsibility for the use of the warheads, which was in U.S. hands. See George Ball, The Discipline of Power (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), especially the chapter titled "The Unfinished Business of Nuclear Management."
23. "Excerpts from remarks by de Gaulle, news conference, 14 January 1963," New York Times, 15 January 1963, p. 2. See also Bundy, Danger and Survival, p. 492.
24. NSAM 294, 20 April 1964, NSC Records, National Archives. Good indirect information on the content of the directive are to be found in James Webb, NASA Administrator, to Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense, letter, 28 April 1966, James Webb, box 2, Lyndon B. Johnson Library.
25. Frank Costigliola, France and the U.S.: The Cold Alliance since World War II (New York: Twayne's International History Series, 1992), p. 134.
26. Krige and Russo, Europe in Space. Unless otherwise stated, all information relating to ESRO and ELDO is drawn from this work.
27. Müller, "TELECOM Program," pp. 379-81.
28. Quoted in Krige and Russo, Europe in Space, pp. 74-75.
29. Cited in John Krige, "Britain and European Space Policy in the 1960s and Early 1970s," Science and Technology Policy 5(2) (1992): 15. European cost estimations at that time made it clear that ELDO launchers were expected to be twice as expensive as their American counterparts. Müller, "TELECOM Program," p. 115.
30. Jean-Pierre Causse, "Les lanceurs européens avant Ariane," in Chadeau, ed., L'ambition technologique, p. 24.
31. Krige and Russo, Europe in Space, pp. 74-76.
32. Arturo Russo, ESRO's Telecommunications Programme and the OTS Project (1970-1974), ESA HSR-13 (Noordwijk: ESA, February 1994), passim.
33. Communiqué de presse, Symphonie, 28 April 1967, côte 81/244, article 188, liasse 517; confidential note on the revision of French space policy on European launchers, no date (post-1966), no author (CNES or Minister of Foreign Affairs), côte 82/254, article 25, liasse 80, Archives Nationales, Fontainebleau.
34. Nicholas G. Golovin to Donald Hornig, memorandum on trip to Europe, meeting with Bignier, 25 October 1967, RG 359, box 658, National Archives; White House to the President, memorandum, 8 February 1967, White House Confidential Files, TR 105, box 96, Lyndon B. Johnson Library.
35. Meeting of the Working Group on Expanded International Cooperation in Space Activities, "Summary Notes," 22 September 1966, RG 255, 69-A-5089, box 5, NASA History Office.
36. Arnold Frutkin, International Cooperation in Space (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965); Homer Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere: The Early Years of Space Science (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4211, 1980); John Logsdon, "U.S.-European Cooperation in Space Science: A 25-Year Perspective," Science 223 (6 January 1984): 11-16; Sir Harrie S.W. Massey and Malcolm Owen Robins, History of British Space Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Lorenza Sebesta, U.S.-European Cooperation in Space during the Sixties, ESA HSR-14 (Noordwijk: ESA, 1994).
37. Charles Bohlen to Department of State, telegram, 8 March 1966, RG 255, 69-A-5089, box 5, NASA History Office.
38. See, for instance, the report of the Western European Union cited in "Europe Accuses U.S. on Space Plans," New York Times, 8 June 1966, p. 4.
39. Alexander Hocker to James Webb, letter, 3 August 1966, RG 255, 70-A-3458, box 7, NASA History Office.
40. Dean Rusk to James Webb, letter, 29 August 1966, RG 255, 70-A-3458, box 7, folder 1; Daniel Margolis to Donald Hornig, memorandum, 13 December 1968, NAW, RG 359, box 755, NASA History Office.
41. Costigliola, France and the U.S., p. 148.
42. Margolis to Hornig, memorandum, 13 December 1968.
43. Committee on Expanded International Cooperation in Space Activities, "Cooperation involving launchers and launching technology," first meeting, 17 May 1966, RG 255, 69-A-5089, box 5; Arnold Frutkin to James Webb, "Visit of Sir Solly Zuckerman," memorandum, 5 May 1966, RG 255, 69-A-5089, box 7, NASA History Office.
44. Vice President Hubert Humphrey to Donald Hornig, memorandum, 6 April 1966, NAW, RG 359, box 566; James Webb to Robert McNamara, letter, 28 April 1966, James Webb, box 2, Lyndon B. Johnson Library.
45. Webb to McNamara, letter, 28 April 1966; Michel Debré, Gouverner: Mémoires, 1958-1962 (Paris: Albin Michel, 1988), p. 375.
46. Arnold Frutkin to James Webb, memorandum, 11 May 1966, RG 255, 69-A-5089, box 8, NASA History Office.
47. James Webb to James O'Connell, Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications, letter, 3 October 1966, RG 255, 70-A-3458, box 7, NASA History Office.
48. Working Group of International Cooperation Subcommittee of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, "Summary Minutes," 19 May 1966, RG 255, 69-A-5089, box 5, NASA History Office.
49. Emphasis in text. NASA to Department of State, "International Projects in Prospect," 19 May 1966, RG 255, 69-A-5089, box 5, NASA History Office.
50. Webb to O'Connell, letter, 3 October 1966.
51. No author, "Memorandum on Communications Satellite Technology," no date, 70-A-3458; Memorandum, Arnold Frutkin to Willis Shapley, 16 June 1966, 69-A-5089; both in box 7, RG 255, NASA History Office.
52. Working Group on International Cooperation, "Summary Minutes," 19 May 1966.
53. Arnold Frutkin to James Webb, "Space Council Task Group on Assistance to ELDO," supplementary notes on possible U.S. assistance to ELDO, memorandum, 14 June 1966, 70-A-3458, box 7; Third Meeting of the Working Group (to be held on 7 July 1966), 29 June 1966, and Fourth Meeting of the Working Group (to be held on 9 August 1966), 4 August 1966, 69-A-5089, box 5; all in RG 255, NASA History Office.
54. Frutkin to Webb, "Space Council Task Group on Assistance to ELDO," memorandum, 14 June 1966; U.S. Cooperation with the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO), 29 July 1966, RG 273, NSAM 354, National Archives.
55. "Possibilities and Problems of Future U.S.-European Cooperation in the Space Field," remarks by Trevanion H.E. Nesbitt, Deputy Director, Office of Space and Environmental Science Affairs, Department of State, at the Meeting of EUROSPACE, Munich, Germany, 21 June 1968, Annex to ELDO/CM(July 68)WP/2, Historical Archives, European University Institute, Florence, Italy. Atlas, already phased out as a U.S. military vehicle, had a minimum of security difficulties (it used an old radio guidance system, for example), and it compared favorably against Blue Streak as a potential first stage of the European launcher. Frutkin to Webb, Space Council Task Group on Assistance to ELDO, memorandum, 14 June 1966.
56. Interim Response by ELDO to US Offer of Technical Assistance, by Clotaire Wood, NASA European Representative, 5 December 1966, RG 255, 69-A-5089, box 7; W.H. Stephens, Secretariat ELDO, to C. Wood, NASA Representative, U.S. Embassy, letter, 23 January 1967, RG 255, 70-A-3485, box 8, NASA History Office.
57. The ELDO team consisted of W.J. Mellors, ELDO, Assistant Technical Director, ELDO-PAS Project; T.W. Wood, ELDO, Head, PAS Vehicle Section; J.C. Poggi, Société pour l'étude et la Réalisation d'Engins Balistiques (SEREB), Chief Engineer, PAS Project; and M. Lauroua, SÉREB, Head, PAS Vehicle Coordinated Department. Richard Barnes, Memorandum for the Record, 10 February 1967; Stephens to Arnold Frutkin, letter, with attached: "Annex on Questions on Injection of Spin Stabilized Satellites into Geostationary Orbits," 24 March 1967; W.J. Mellors to Gilbert Ousley, Technology Directorate, Goddard Space Flight Center, letter, 22 May 1967, RG 255, 70-A-3485, box 8, NASA History Office.
58. "ELDO-NASA relations, 1967, major events," attached to memorandum, Lloyd Jones to George Morris, 7 March 1968, RG 255, 72-A-3153, box 6, NASA History Office.
59. NSAM 338 revised, policy concerning U.S. assistance in the development of foreign communications satellite capabilities, 12 July 1967, National Security Archives, Washington, DC.
60. Foreign use of the national defense communications satellite system continued to be contemplated along the lines of the old text. A bilateral agreement with Britain along these lines was signed in 1967, whereby Britain would build an all-British satellite for military communications with Australia and the Far East within the framework of a collaborative Skynet military space communications system. Krige and Russo, Europe in Space, p. 62.
61. Memorandum for the File, "Edward C. Welsh on Questions regarding Communications Satellite Policy," 25 November 1966, RG 255, 69-A-5089, box 5, NASA History Office.
62. Working Group of International Cooperation Subcommittee of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, "Summary Minutes," 19 May 1966.
63. NASA memorandum, "Control of Foreign Dissemination of Technology," 25 April 1966, RG 255, 69-A-5089, box 5, NASA History Office.
64. The citation comes from a retrospective summary of U.S. policy on launcher availability included in NASA Administrator Thomas O. Paine to Senator Clinton Anderson, letter, 9 September 1970, box 26, Paine Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC; Arnold Frutkin, interview with John Logsdon and Lorenza Sebesta, 8 November 1993, Washington, DC.
65. Robert Aubinière, interview with Lorenza Sebesta, 12 December 1991, Paris.
66. Thomas O. Paine to the President, letter, 22 August 1969, box 23, Paine Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
67. Statement by Piers van Eesbeek relating to the Washington talks (16-17 September 1970) between the European Space Conference (ESC) delegation and ESC authorities, 8 October 1970, CSE/CS (70) 23, Historical Archives, European University Institute.
68. Declaration by Théodore Lefèvre, 4 November 1970, CSE/CM (November 70) PV/1, Annex 1, Historical Archives, European University Institute. Some disagreement seemed to exist on this point. Some observers believed that the cost of European participation in NASA post-Apollo programs would be twice the cost of developing the European launcher.
69. Levy, "INTELSAT," pp. 655-80.
70. Ibid., pp. 670-71. The text, with annexes, of the INTELSAT agreements, as well as the operating agreement and annex, all of which went into effect 12 February 1973, can be found in Space Law and Related Documents: International Space Law Documents: U.S. Space Law Documents, 101st Cong., 2d sess., June 1990, S. Print 101-98, pp. 211-318.
71. U. Alexis Johnson to Théodore Lefèvre, letter, 2 October 1970, p. 5, CSE/Comité ad hoc (71)9, 22 April 1971, Historical Archives, European University Institute.
72. U. Alexis Johnson to Théodore Lefèvre, letter, 5 February 1971, CSE/Comité ad hoc (71)10, Historical Archives, European University Institute.
73. Memorandum to the file (teleconference between Dr. George M. Low and Under Secretary Alexis Johnson), 13 January 1971, RG 255, 74-734, box 17, NASA History Office.
74. Michael Freudenheim, "Satellite Splits U.S., Europeans," San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, 7 March 1971, cited in Burl Valentine, "Europe and the Post-Apollo Experience," Research Policy 1 (1971-1972): 117. For more detail on the pressure from Comsat, see Memorandum to the file (teleconference between Low and Johnson), 13 January 1971, RG 255, 74-734, box 17; Arnold Frutkin, Memorandum to the file (Lefèvre meeting preparation, Johnson/Charyk discussions), 25 January 1971, RG 255, 74-734, box 14, NASA History Office.
75. "Nixon Administration announces policy on aeronautical satellite communications," press release, 7 January 1971, Richard Nixon Project, White House Confidential Files, Subject Files, UT 1, box 14, Executive Office of the President, National Archives. This statement was supplemented by another one issued 19 March 1971, "The National Program on Satellite Telecommunications for International Civil Aviation Operations," attached to letter, Nilson to Hammarström, 2 April 1971, folder 50771, Historical Archives, European University Institute, Florence, Italy.
76. Clay Whitehead to Peter Flanigan, memorandum, 6 February 1971, Nixon Project, White House Confidential Files, Subject Files, box 2, National Archives.
77. Théodore Lefèvre to U. Alexis Johnson, letter, 3 March 1971, CSE/Comité ad hoc (71)12, Historical Archives, European University Institute.
78. On this and other aspects relating to the American decision-making process during the Intelsat negotiations, see Lorenza Sebesta, "The Politics of Technological Cooperation in Space: U.S.-European Negotiations on the Post-Apollo Programme," History and Technology 11 (1994): 317-41.
79. Under Secretary of State Johnson to Minister Lefèvre, text of letter, 1 September 1971, Annex I, 8 November 1971, CSE/Comité ad hoc (71)18, Historical Archives, European University Institute. See also the Department of State telegram on European participation in the post-Apollo program, "Visit of Minister Lefèvre," 24 February 1971, RG 255, 74-734, box 16; Second Discussion with Representatives of the European Space Conference concerning European Participation in the post-Apollo Program, 8 February 1971, RG 255, 74-734, box 16, NASA History Office.
80. Joint Meeting of the Committee of Alternates and the ad hoc Committee of Officials, minutes, 22 September 1971, CSE/CS(71)PV/27th October 1971, Historical Archives, European University Institute.
81. Report by the Secretary General of the European Space Conference on the Status of European Space Programmes, 7 December 1972, CSE/CM (Dec. 72)5, Historical Archives, European University Institute. See also Arturo Russo, The Early Development of the Telecommunications Satellite Programme in ESRO (1965-1971), ESA HSR-9 (Noordwijk: ESA, 1993).
82. Théodore Lefèvre to U. Alexis Johnson, letter, 23 December 1971, Annex, to CSE/CS (72)1, 4 January 1972, Historical Archives, European University Institute. The entire exchange of correspondence between Lefèvre and Johnson up to this date is in CSE/Comité ad hoc (71) 22, 22 December 1971. On the European communications satellite program, see Russo, The Early Development, passim.
83. The definition of the European Broadcasting Area is cited in Availability of Launchers for the European Communication Satellites Programme, 22 September 1972, ESRO/PB-TEL(72)5, Historical Archives, European University Institute.
84. Richard M. Nixon, "United States Policy Governing the Provision of Launch Assistance," 9 October 1972, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC.
85. Creola, "European-U.S. Space Cooperation," p. 99; Richard Barnes to John Logsdon, letter, 28 February 1996.
86. Note pour le Conseil d'Administration du CNES [Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales] par le Secrétaire executif français de Symphonie, "Situation des possibilités de lancement du satellite Symphonie," 17 September 1973, and CNES, Secrétariat executif Symphonie, Rapport de présentation, 25 Octobre 1973, côte 81/244, art. 188, liasse 517; DGRST, "Note sur le programme Symphonie," 18 June 1974, côte 81/244, art. 187, liasse 515, Archives Nationales, Fontainbleau. See also the exchange of notes in United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, Vol. 25, Part 3 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975). The author is indebted to Richard Barnes for his reminder of this last publication. The two Symphonie satellites were placed in orbit in December 1974 and August 1975. Claude Carlier and Marcel Gilli, Les trente premières années du CNES: L'Agence française de l'espace, 1962-1992 (Paris: La Documentation Française, 1994), pp. 227-30.
87. Krige and Russo, Europe in Space, pp. 111-12.
88. Costigliola, France and the U.S., pp. 167-72. See also Pierre Melandri, Une incertaine alliance: Les Etats-Unis et l'Europe, 1973-1983 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1988), pp. 45-77, and the insightful account written by the American ambassador to the European Communities, Robert Schaetzel, The Unhinged Alliance: America and the European Community (New York: Harper, 1975), pp. 42-53.
89. Müller, "TELECOM Program," pp. 105-40.
90. See the illuminating contribution of André Lebeau, "La naissance d'Ariane" in Chadeau, ed., L'ambition technologique, pp. 75-91, and the ensuing debate among eyewitnesses of the time, ibid., pp. 95-108.
91. CNES, Rapport groupe sectorial 6, Programmes d'études et développement des lanceurs, 30 June 1970, côte 81/401, art. 70, liasse 179, Archives Nationales, Paris.
