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                          ISSUED: December 6, 1996
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                             GSBCA 13831-RELO


                    In the Matter of RUSSELL E. PADGETT


     Russell E. Padgett, Newport, NC, Claimant.

     D. Lisenby, Director, Financial Policy and Systems
Directorate, Kansas City, MO, appearing for Defense Finance and
Accounting Service.

NEILL, Board Judge.

     This case concerns a demand that Russell E. Padgett, a
civilian employee of the Naval Aviation Depot in Cherry Hill, North
Carolina, return $2,244.89 said to have been overpaid to him in
compensation for the transportation of his household goods.  On
examining the claim, we conclude that the payment was correct and
Mr. Padgett should not be required to return the amount in
question.  

     The facts of this case are as follows.  Mr. Padgett graduated
from the University of North Carolina at Charlotte in the spring of
1994.  In July of that year, he accepted an offer of employment as
an electronics engineer at the Naval Aviation Depot at Cherry
Point, North Carolina.  

     As a new hire, Mr. Padgett received his moving instructions
over the telephone from base personnel at Cherry Point.  He was
advised that the Government could assume total responsibility for
moving his household goods or, instead, he could assume
responsibility for moving them and be paid at an established rate
(the so-called "commuted rate") based on the weight of his
belongings.  Because he believed it more profitable to act as his
own packing and moving contractor, Mr. Padgett elected to assume
personal responsibility for his move.  

     On August 26, 1994, Mr. Padgett relocated to Cherry Point. 
His travel voucher states that he started his trip at 6:30 on the
morning of the 26th.  On that same date, travel orders were issued
for Mr. Padgett.  The orders directed him to report to his new
station by August 29 and authorized him to move from Charlotte to
Cherry Point.  The orders further authorized "SELF MOVE NOT TO
EXCEED THE COST OF A GOVERNMENT BILL OF LADING (GBL)."  

     Upon seeking compensation for relocation to Cherry Point, Mr.
Padgett received a check for $503.22.  This covered only his
incurred travel expenses.  Mr. Padgett thereupon conferred with the
base personnel who had initially advised him on how he could move
his household goods.  The individual he consulted apparently
recognized that Mr. Padgett's travel orders did not reflect the
understanding originally reached.  She, therefore, assured him that
his orders would be corrected.  In fact, on  November 25, 1994, an
amendment was issued to the original travel orders.  The amendment
changed the authorization for "SELF MOVE NOT TO EXCEED THE COST OF
GBL" to an authorization to undertake a move at "COMMUTED RATE." 
Mr. Padgett's voucher was then resubmitted, and he was paid an
additional $2,244.89 based on the use of the applicable commuted
rate.

     Approximately fourteen months later, Mr. Padgett was summoned
to the base disbursing office and given a letter informing him that
the $2,244.89 previously paid to him constituted an overpayment
which must be returned.  The agency, citing the Department of
Defense's Joint Travel Regulations (JTR), contends that the
transportation office at Cherry Point erred in authorizing him to
ship his household goods pursuant to a commuted rate. 
Authorization to use commuted rates, according to the agency, is
permitted under the JTR only after a cost comparison is made which
demonstrates that use of the commuted rate method of transporting
goods is more economical than use of the actual expense method
based on Government bill of lading rates.  In Mr. Padgett's case,
no cost comparison was made prior to authorization of the commuted
rate.  When, after the fact, a comparison was made, it was found
that the commuted rate was significantly more expensive.  Hence, in
the opinion of the agency, the use of a commuted rate should never
have been authorized for Mr. Padgett's move and, if the requisite
comparison had been made, would not, in fact, have been authorized. 


                                Discussion

     In a separate decision issued on this same date, we have
discussed at length the basic issue raised in this case.  Jeffrey
P. Herman, GSBCA 13832-RELO (Dec. 6,1996).  In that decision, we
describe the two methods for transporting household goods, namely,
the actual expense method and the commuted rate method.  The Herman
decision also examines the central question of whether an agency
can reimburse an employee for the movement of household goods using
the commuted rate schedule, if it determines, only after the move,
that the commuted rate schedule was not more economical than the
actual expense method.  

     The agency in this case, being an organizational component of
the Department of Defense (DOD), relies on a provision contained in
the DOD travel regulation, the JTR, which applies to all DOD
civilian employees.  The provisions of the JTR, however, integrate
and supplement the Government's primary travel regulation, the
Federal Travel Regulation (FTR).  The FTR, except for employees of
the judicial branch, applies to all civilian employees of
Government agencies, including civilian employees of the Department
of Defense.   41 CFR 301-1.2(a).  The provision of the JTR on which
the agency relies states: 

     A cost comparison will be made between the actual expense
     (GBL) and commuted rate methods of shipping HHG.  In the
     event the estimated cost under one method exceeds the
     estimated cost under the other method by more than $100,
     the more economical method will be used.  

JTR C8001-D3c.  It is the agency s position that this provision
applies equally whether the cost comparison is done before or after
the employee s move.    

     For reasons explained in detail in the Herman decision, we
have concluded that, under the FTR and the statute which it
implements, this cost comparison must be done before the method of
transporting the goods is selected.  This restriction likewise
applies to any agency supplement of the FTR, such as the JTR.  In
this case, as in the Herman case, we have determined that the
agency failed to perform a cost comparison before authorizing the
employee to undertake a self-move.  This effectually renders the
JTR provision inoperative and compels the agency to look to the FTR 
for guidance on how to proceed.

     Under the FTR, in the absence of a cost comparison showing
that the actual expense method is more economical, employees are to
be reimbursed for individual moves according to the commuted rate
schedule.  In this case, it is apparent that, at the time of Mr.
Padgett's move, both he and the local travel office officials with
whom he had conferred, anticipated that he would be compensated for
movement of his household goods based on the commuted rate
schedule.  The formal amendment of his orders after the move
supports this conclusion.  We, therefore, see no reason why Mr.
Padgett's claim should not have been paid, pursuant to the FTR,
using the commuted rate.  The  amounts already paid to Mr. Padgett
by the base disbursing office using the commuted rate, therefore,
need not be refunded.  If they have been recovered by the agency
through salary set-off, they should be returned to him promptly.  


                                   _____________________
                                   EDWIN B. NEILL
                                   Board Judge