IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
____________________________________
) 
ELOUISE PEPION COBELL, et al., ) 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
GALE A. NORTON, Secretary of 
the Interior, et al., 
) 
) 
)
)
)
)
) No. 1:96CV01285 
(Judge Lamberth) 
Defendants. 
)
) 
DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ NOVEMBER 26, 2003 REQUEST 
FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES AND RELATED EXPENSES 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendants file this Opposition to Plaintiffs' Request for Award of Attorney's Fees and 
Related Expenses Based Upon Findings Establishing Defendants' Litigation Misconduct, filed 
November 26, 2003 (“Request”).1 Plaintiffs ignore the ruling of the Court of Appeals, which not 
only vacated this Court's contempt rulings against Secretary Norton and Assistant Secretary 
McCaleb, but also vacated this Court’s award of fees and expenses to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' 
request for sanctions has been disposed of by the Court of Appeals, is res judicata, and may not 
be relitigated. Accordingly, this Court’s underlying factual findings provide no basis for 
Plaintiffs’ renewed request for sanctions. In addition, Plaintiffs are barred by the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity from obtaining the award they seek. Moreover, to the extent Plaintiffs seek 
to recover sanctions for matters that have not already been adjudicated, they have failed to 
provide any factual basis for their claim that sanctions are warranted. 
1 Plaintiffs also filed a fee request pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act on October 9, 
2003.
The Court of Appeals Opinion Precludes A Fee Award Against Defendants. I. 
Plaintiffs’ Request asks this Court to award fees that were previously requested by 
Plaintiffs, ordered by this Court, and then vacated by the Court of Appeals. The “mandate rule” 
prohibits the relief sought in Plaintiffs’ Request. Under the mandate rule, “an inferior court has 
no power or authority to deviate from the mandate issued by an appellate court.” Briggs v. 
Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 334 U.S. 304, 306 (1948). “The mandate rule is a ‘more powerful 
version’ of the law-of-the-case doctrine, which prevents courts from reconsidering issues that 
have already been decided in the same case.” Indep. Petroleum Ass’n of America v. Babbitt, 235 
F.3d 588, 597 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1393 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 
1996)); see also New York v. Microsoft Corp., 209 F. Supp. 2d 132, 141 (D.D.C. 2002); R.G. 
Johnson Co. v. Barnhart, No. 97-00003, 2003 WL 22273238, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 3, 2003). 
In vacating this Court's contempt rulings against Secretary Norton and Assistant Secretary 
McCaleb, the Court of Appeals also vacated the award of fees and expenses to Plaintiffs. Cobell 
v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("The Contempt Order is vacated insofar as it 
sanctions the defendants on specifications one through five and directs the payment of expenses 
and fees incurred by the plaintiffs."). Incomprehensibly, Plaintiffs spend eight pages of their 
Request2 repeating, reanalyzing, and rearguing the very same contempt specifications vacated by 
the Court of Appeals. Calling the Court of Appeals' vacatur "limited," Plaintiffs contend that 
"the Court of Appeals purposefully let stand the findings and conclusions of the Contempt II 
decision" and "took great pains to enter the judg[]ment they did and circumscribe its judgment by 
vacating only certain limited provisions of the Contempt Order . . . ." Request at 1-2. Plaintiffs' 
2 Request at 13-20. 
2
argument that the trial court findings following the Contempt II trial provide a basis for sanctions 
is meritless. The Court of Appeals unequivocally vacated the fees and costs this Court had 
awarded as sanctions against the Defendants. 
Plaintiffs argue that this Court's "litigation misconduct" findings "remain undisturbed 
after the Court of Appeals' remand" and therefore warrant relitigation of the fees-as-sanctions 
issue. Id. at 13. Plaintiffs are incorrect. Plaintiffs themselves included the issue of "litigation 
misconduct" among the issues to be tried in the Contempt II trial, they asked the Court to invoke 
its "inherent powers," and they sought an award of their attorney fees in the show cause motion 
that was the basis for the Contempt II trial and Order. See Plaintiffs' Consolidated Motion to 
Amend Their Motion to Reopen Trial One In This Action to Appoint A Receiver and 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof and Motion for Order to Show Cause 
Why Interior Defendants and Their Employees and Counsel Should Not Be Held in Contempt for 
Violating Court Orders and for Defrauding this Court in Connection With Trial One (filed Oct. 
19, 2001) ("Show Cause Motion") at 60 ("defendants and their counsel's misconduct is precisely 
the type of activity that the exercise of inherent power is intended to cure."); see also id., 
Proposed Order at 2 (seeking award of "legal fees resulting from defendants' bad faith, fraudulent 
conduct and violation of Court orders"). In its opinion, this Court clearly based its award of fees 
and expenses on findings of litigation misconduct as well as findings of contempt and fraud on 
the court. See Cobell v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1, 152-55 (D.D.C. 2002), vacated, 334 F.3d 
1128 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
Moreover, these findings of "litigation misconduct" were specifically challenged before 
the Court of Appeals. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 42 n.9 (attached as Exhibit 
3
1). Having considered this record, the Court of Appeals vacated the award of fees and did not 
limit its vacatur to fees associated with this Court's contempt findings. The Court of Appeals did 
not remand with instructions for the District Court to consider whether sanctions might be 
appropriate on any other grounds, such as "litigation misconduct." Thus, the Court of Appeals 
clearly intended its order to vacate the award of fees entirely. The Court of Appeals decision has 
resolved the question of whether Plaintiffs are entitled to fees and expenses for the conduct at 
issue in Contempt II. The Court of Appeals has decided that Plaintiffs are not entitled to fees and 
the mandate rule deprives this Court of authority to revisit that issue.3 
The cases Plaintiffs cite do not help them overcome the mandate rule. Plaintiffs rely 
heavily on Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911). Gompers, however, 
primarily addresses the distinction between civil and criminal contempt. See generally id. at 444- 
49. Gompers held that a lower court could impose monetary sanctions on remand if the 
underlying conduct was still wrong, albeit not criminal conduct justifying confinement as had 
been imposed in the court below. Id. at 451-52. But before imposing such sanctions, the lower 
court was instructed to determine whether such conduct was contemptuous. Id. at 450 ("[I]f, 
upon the examination of the record, it should appear that the defendants were in fact and in law 
guilty of the contempt charged . . . ."). Gompers has no application to this case, however, 
because the Court of Appeals has already ruled upon the bases for sanctions set forth in the 
3 The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel also preclude relitigation of the fee issue. 
See, e.g., Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 274 F. Supp. 2d 20, 23 (D.D.C. 
2003) (the principle of res judicata mandates that a district court dismiss an amended complaint 
to the extent that it asserts claims that had been reversed on appeal); see also Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments § 27, comment o (1980) (“If a judgment rendered by a court of first 
instance is reversed by the appellate court and a final judgment is entered by the appellate court 
. . . this latter judgment is conclusive between the parties.”). 
4
record of the Contempt II trial, including "litigation misconduct," and it has vacated the very 
sanctions that Plaintiffs seek in their motion. 
In Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. The Lubrizol Corp., 137 F.3d 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1998), the 
court of appeals ruled that its earlier judgment reversing the trial court did not preclude plaintiffs 
from asking for a new trial based on a new legal theory. Id. at 1478, 1484. Exxon is inapposite, 
however, because Plaintiffs here are not seeking sanctions based on new findings and 
conclusions (i.e., a new theory), but rather on the same findings and conclusions addressed by the 
Court of Appeals. Similarly, in Westwego Citizens for Better Gov't v. Westwego, 906 F.2d 1042 
(5th Cir. 1990), the Fifth Circuit ruled that its earlier vacatur did not preclude the trial court from 
considering new "developments in the two years since the case was originally tried . . . ." Id. at 
1043. Plaintiffs, however, do not seek sanctions based on new developments, but rather on the 
same record that was before this Court and the Court of Appeals in Contempt II.4 
As in Exxon and Westwego, in United States v. Bell Petroleum Serv., Inc., 64 F.3d 202 
(5th Cir. 1995), the Fifth Circuit ruled that its earlier reversal and vacatur did not preclude the 
trial court on remand from considering additional evidence, this time on a different theory of 
liability apportionment. Id. at 204, 205-06. Plaintiffs argue that Bell stands for the proposition 
that "even where an appellate court reverses a district court on all issues presented, related issues 
that not considered [sic] or directly affected by that ruling remain open and subject to separate 
adjudication." Request at 7. This argument does not help Plaintiffs here, however, because they 
4 As explained below, to the extent Plaintiffs are seeking sanctions for conduct other than that 
which was adjudicated in Contempt II or in any of the other sanctions orders that this Court has 
entered against the Defendants, they have failed to state a sufficient factual basis for their 
claimed entitlement to sanctions. See Part III, infra. 
5
seek sanctions based on the same issues and arguments considered and disposed of by the Court 
of Appeals. 
In vacating this Court's contempt rulings against Secretary Norton and Assistant Secretary 
McCaleb, the Court of Appeals also vacated the payment of fees and expenses to Plaintiffs on all 
grounds presented in the Contempt II record, including "litigation misconduct." Plaintiffs' 
Request is nothing more than an attempt to circumvent the Court of Appeals' order. It must be 
denied. 
II. Plaintiffs Are Barred By The Doctrine Of Sovereign Immunity From Obtaining The 
Fees And Expenses They Seek. 
Plaintiffs urge the Court to employ its "inherent powers" to grant their fee request.5 This 
Court expressly cited its "inherent powers" as a basis for its award of attorney fees against 
Defendants for the conduct at issue in the Contempt II trial and order. Cobell, 226 F. Supp. 2d 
at 154. Further, Plaintiffs had urged the Court to rely upon "inherent powers" to award them fees 
as sanctions in their October 19, 2001 Show Cause Motion. Show Cause Motion at 60 
("defendants and their counsel's misconduct is precisely the type of activity that the exercise of 
inherent power is intended to cure."). Thus, these arguments were included in the record that 
was presented to the Court of Appeals, and Plaintiffs are therefore precluded from relitigating 
them. 
5 Plaintiffs do not explain why they have filed this additional request for fees when they already 
have pending before the Court a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) of the Equal Access to 
Justice Act ("EAJA") for what appear to be the same fees and expenses as those sought in the 
current motion. Perhaps Plaintiffs recognize that their EAJA petition fails to meet the specific 
requirements of § 2412(d). 
6
In any event, however, Plaintiffs have failed to establish any of the grounds for the Court 
to exercise “inherent powers” to afford them the relief they seek. The Supreme Court has stated 
that "[b]ecause of their very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and 
discretion." Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (citation omitted); see also id. at 
50 ("A court must, of course, exercise caution in invoking its inherent power . . . ."). In its July 
2003 decision in this case, the Court of Appeals cautioned: 
A judicial claim to an "inherent power" is not to be indulged 
lightly, lest it excuse overreaching "[t]he judicial Power" actually 
granted to federal courts by Article III of the Constitution of the 
United States, and the customs and usages that inform the meaning 
of that phrase. Such a claim, therefore, must either be documented 
by historical practice . . ., or supported by an irrefutable showing 
that the exercise of an undoubted authority would otherwise be set 
to naught. 
Cobell, 334 F.3d at 1141 (internal citations omitted). 
Plaintiffs fail to identify a single authority that would support their claim that this Court 
may, through "inherent powers," award a monetary sanction against an agency of the United 
States in the absence of an express Congressional waiver of sovereign immunity. The doctrine 
of sovereign immunity bars the imposition of fines, penalties or monetary damages against the 
government, except to the extent that the United States has explicitly consented to such 
sanctions. The doctrine of sovereign immunity "stands as an obstacle to virtually all direct 
assaults against the public fisc, save only those incursions from time to time authorized by 
Congress." United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 761 (1st Cir. 1994). A waiver of sovereign 
immunity must be definitively and unequivocally expressed and must appear in the text of the 
statute itself. Id. at 762 (citing United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980), and United 
7
States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992)). The determinations in this case that 
sovereign immunity does not bar either Plaintiffs’ claim for prospective action or their claim for 
retrospective relief in the form of an accounting6 have no bearing on the separate issue of 
whether the government has waived sovereign immunity for monetary sanctions. A waiver of 
sovereign immunity as to one available remedy does not, by implication, waive sovereign 
immunity as to other remedies. See Brown v. Secretary of the Army, 918 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 
1990) (waiver of sovereign immunity as to back pay awards for discriminatory denial of 
promotion did not waive sovereign immunity for prejudgment interest on such back pay awards). 
Congress has enacted certain waivers of sovereign immunity to permit parties in litigation 
against the United States to seek attorney fees. The only such waiver potentially applicable here 
is found in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (“Equal Access to Justice Act” or "EAJA"), which permits an 
award of attorney fees and expenses "to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or 
against the United States or any agency or any official of the United States acting in his or her 
official capacity in any court having jurisdiction of such action." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (emphasis 
added).7 The Supreme Court has held that "[t]he EAJA renders the United States liable for 
6 See Cobell v. Babbitt, 30 F. Supp. 2d 24, 31-33, 38-42 (D.D.C. 1998) (denying Defendants' 
motion for judgment on the pleadings); Cobell v. Babbitt, 52 F. Supp. 2d 11, 21 (D.D.C. 1999) 
(denying Defendants' motion for summary judgment); see also Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 
1094-95 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (agreeing that Plaintiffs' action was not barred by sovereign immunity). 
7 As this Court acknowledged in the Contempt II Order, whether a court can order the 
government to compensate a party for losses sustained as a result of contempt has not been 
decided by the Court of Appeals in this Circuit. 226 F. Supp. 2d at 154 n.163. The District 
Court in United States v. Waksberg, 881 F. Supp. 36, 41 (D.D.C. 1995), vacated and remanded, 
112 F.3d 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1997), held that sovereign immunity barred recovery of damages as 
compensation for the government's violation of an injunctive order. The Court of Appeals 
vacated and remanded with directions to withhold a ruling on the sovereign immunity issue 
pending a determination on whether Waksberg had incurred damages. 112 F.3d at 1228. The 
8
attorney fees for which it would not otherwise be liable, and thus amounts to a partial waiver of 
sovereign immunity. Any such waiver must be strictly construed in favor of the United States." 
Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 137 (1991); see also St. Louis Fuel & Supply Co. v. FERC, 890 
F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Thus, even assuming Plaintiffs could otherwise meet the stringent 
standards for establishing "bad faith" sufficient to warrant an award of attorney fees (see Part III, 
infra), they still must meet all the requirements of the EAJA, including the requirement that they 
be the prevailing party, in order for the waiver of sovereign immunity to be effective. As 
demonstrated in Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Request for an Award of Attorney's Fees 
and Expenses Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (filed Oct. 23, 2003) at 10-11, 17-18, 
Plaintiffs cannot establish that they were the "prevailing party" in the Contempt II proceeding. 
To the contrary, the Court of Appeals found sufficient basis to revoke the award of fees that this 
Court had made to Plaintiffs based on "inherent powers" and other grounds. 
Defendants are aware that this Court has imposed compensatory sanctions against the 
United States earlier in this case and more recently in Landmark Legal Found. v. EPA, 272 F. 
Supp. 2d 70 (D.D.C. 2003); see also Cobell v. Babbitt, 37 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 1999) 
("Contempt I"). Defendants elected not to appeal the Contempt I decision, but that election does 
not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity, which only Congress can effect. Further, 
Waksberg court noted that only one other Circuit had addressed this issue, and that court decided 
it in favor of the government. Id. In Coleman v. Espy, 986 F.2d 1184, 1191 (8th Cir. 1993), the 
Eighth Circuit declined to "imply into [18 U.S.C. § 401] an express waiver of sovereign 
immunity for the federal government to be sued for civil compensatory contempt." The court 
thus held that "compensatory civil contempt actions [against the United States] are barred under 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity." Id. at 1187. In any event, the Court of Appeals has already 
concluded in this case that the allegations in the record from the Contempt II trial and Order did 
not provide a basis for an award of attorney fees to Plaintiffs. 
9
Defendants suggest that the Court's award of fees as compensatory damages for civil contempt in 
Landmark is not in accord with the July 2003 decision of the Court of Appeals in this case. See 
Cobell, 334 F.3d at 1145 (observing that an award of expenses incurred by Plaintiffs in the 
contempt trial "cannot be considered relief for the underlying contempt. . . ."). Accordingly, 
Plaintiffs are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity from obtaining an award of fees and 
expenses incurred in connection with the Contempt II proceedings. 
III. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Identify Specific Conduct of Defendants That Has Not 
Already Been Adjudicated and That Meets the Stringent Standards Required for 
Sanctions Based on "Bad Faith." 
In order to recover fees and expenses based on "inherent powers,” Plaintiffs are required 
to establish that Defendants have willfully disobeyed a court order, or acted in bad faith, 
vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45-46; Aleyeska 
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975). Yet the only conduct 
Plaintiffs identify with any particularity to support their Request is the conduct at issue in the 
Contempt II proceeding, see Request at 13-20, which, as established in Parts I and II above, 
cannot provide the basis for a renewed request for fees and expenses.8 Plaintiffs are left with 
nothing more than general and unsubstantiated accusations of wrongdoing, which – however 
often repeated by Plaintiffs – cannot support an award of attorney fees or expenses. The 
Supreme Court has made clear that “[a] court must . . . exercise caution in invoking its inherent 
8 Plaintiffs contend that the Court of Appeals left undisturbed the District Court's findings of fact 
in the Contempt II order. As explained in Parts I and II, the mandate rule and principles of res 
judicata, collateral estoppel and sovereign immunity bar the relitigation of Plaintiffs' sanctions 
request regardless of whether the Contempt II factfinding remains intact. Moreover, the fact that 
the Court of Appeals did not feel it necessary to comment upon the District Court's factfinding in 
order to reach its decision does not imply that the Court of Appeals agreed with that factfinding. 
10
power, and it must comply with the mandates of due process, both in determining that the 
requisite bad faith exists and in assessing fees.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50; see also Roadway 
Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980) (“Like other sanctions, attorney’s fees certainly 
should not be assessed lightly or without fair notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the 
record.”). Plaintiffs here have not even attempted to identify any specific conduct of the 
Defendants, other than that which they are barred from relitigating. That failure alone requires 
that their motion be denied. 
Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has held that the substantive standard 
for a finding of bad faith under § 2412(b) of EAJA is "stringent" and "attorneys' fees will be 
awarded only when extraordinary circumstances or dominating reasons of fairness so demand." 
Association of American Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 187 F.3d 655, 660 (D.C. Cir. 
1999). A finding of bad faith must be supported by "'clear and convincing evidence,'" which 
"'generally requires the trier of fact, in viewing each party's pile of evidence to reach a firm 
conviction of the truth on the evidence about which he or she is certain.'" Id. (quoting United 
States v. Montague, 40 F.3d 1251, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). Plaintiffs certainly cannot meet these 
standards, having failed to supply any particulars, backed up by evidence, of the generalized 
allegations they casually lob at Defendants. These allegations are nothing more than unsupported 
invective and cannot be the basis for sanctions under any standard, much less the stringent one 
required for a showing of bad faith under § 2412(b). 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals' July 2003 opinion on the Contempt II Order vacated this Court's 
fee award to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are therefore barred by the mandate rule and principles of res 
11
judicata and collateral estoppel from relitigating the matters that were before the Court of 
Appeals. Further, the Court's ability to employ "inherent powers" to order an agency of the 
United States to pay monetary sanctions or compensation to Plaintiffs is constrained by the 
principle of sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs have failed to establish the prerequisites for the 
waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the EAJA, and thus would be unable to pursue their 
claim even if they were not barred from relitigating a decided issue. Finally, Plaintiffs have 
failed to identify any conduct of the government that has not already been adjudicated that could 
meet the stringent standards required for a showing of "bad faith" sufficient to permit the 
imposition of attorney fees or expenses. 
Respectfully submitted, Dated: December 10, 2003 
ROBERT D. McCALLUM, JR. 
Associate Attorney General 
PETER D. KEISLER 
Assistant Attorney General 
STUART E. SCHIFFER 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
J. CHRISTOPHER KOHN 
Director 
/s/ Sandra P. Spooner 
SANDRA P. SPOONER 
D.C. Bar No. 261495 
Deputy Director 
JOHN T. STEMPLEWICZ 
Senior Trial Counsel 
Commercial Litigation Branch 
Civil Division 
P.O. Box 875 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, D.C. 20044-0875 
(202) 514-7194 
(202) 514-9163 (fax) 
12
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that, on December 10, 2003 the foregoing Defendants’ Opposition to 
Plaintiffs’ November 26, 2003 Request for Award of Attorney’s Fees and Related Expenses was 
served by Electronic Case Filing, and on the following who is not registered for Electronic Case 
Filing, by facsimile: 
Earl Old Person (Pro se) 
Blackfeet Tribe 
P.O. Box 850 
Browning, MT 59417 
Fax (406) 338-7530 
/s/ Kevin P. Kingston 
Kevin P. Kingston 
13
__________________________________________
) 
ELOUISE PEPION COBELL, et al., ) 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
GALE NORTON, Secretary of the Interior, et al., ) 
Defendants. 
)
) 
__________________________________________) 
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Request for Award of Attorney’s Fees 
and Related Expenses Based Upon Findings Establishing Defendants’ Litigation Misconduct 
(Dkt. # 2399). Upon consideration of the Plaintiffs’ motion, Defendants’ opposition, any reply 
thereto, and the entire record of this case, it is hereby 
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Request for Award of Attorney’s Fees and Related Expenses 
Based Upon Findings Establishing Defendants’ Litigation Misconduct is DENIED. 
SO ORDERED. 
Date:______________ 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
Case No. 1:96CV01285 
(Judge Lamberth) 
)
)
)
)
) 
ORDER
___________________________________ 
Hon. Royce C. Lamberth 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia
cc: 
Sandra P. Spooner 
John T. Stemplewicz 
Commercial Litigation Branch 
Civil Division 
P.O. Box 875 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, D.C. 20044-0875 
Dennis M Gingold, Esq. 
Mark Brown, Esq. 
1275 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Ninth Floor 
Washington, D.C. 20004 
Keith Harper, Esq. 
Richard A. Guest, Esq. 
Native American Rights Fund 
1712 N Street, NW 
Washington, D.C. 20036-2976 
Fax (202) 822-0068 
Elliott Levitas, Esq. 
1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800 
Atlanta, GA 30309-4530 
Earl Old Person (Pro se) 
Blackfeet Tribe 
P.O. Box 850 
Browning, MT 59417 
Fax (406) 338-7530