1086
Strongly Corroborative Circumstances
|
Congress listed examples of "strongly corroborating circumstances"
that
are "highly probative" of intent to solicit a Federal crime of violence:
- the fact that the defendant offered or promised payment
or
some other benefit to the person solicited if he would commit the offense;
-
the fact that the defendant threatened harm or other detriment to the person
solicited if he would not commit the offense;
- the fact that the
defendant
repeatedly solicited the commission of the offense, held forth at length in
soliciting the commission of the offense, or made express protestations of
seriousness in soliciting the commission of the offense;
- the fact that
the
defendant believed or was aware that the person solicited had previously
committed similar offenses;
- the fact that the defendant acquired
weapons,
tools, or information suited for use by the person solicited in the
commission
of the offense, or made other apparent preparations for the commission of
the
offense by the person solicited.
S. Rep. No. 307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 183 (1982). See United
States
v. McNeill, 887 F.2d at 450; United States v. Gabriel, 810 F.2d
627,
635 (7th Cir. 1987) ("the surrounding circumstances in general must indicate
that
the solicitor is serious that the person solicited actually carry out the
crime").
While the foregoing factors provide guidance on the question of
intent,
they are not "exclusive or conclusive indicators of intent to solicit."
Id. at 635. Indeed, the Senate Committee emphasized that "the
existence
of strongly corroborating circumstances [is] a question of fact for the
jury."
S. Rep. No. 307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 183 (1982). See United
States
v. McNeill, 887 F.2d at 450; United States v. Gabriel, 810 F.2d
at 635
n.5.
[cited in USAM 9-60.500] | |