Washington, June 28, 1961.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Folder T-636-7. Secret. Another copy is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 55. For an account of the origin of NSAM No. 55, see Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares: A Memoir (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972), p. 189. On June 26, President Kennedy appointed Taylor as his Military Representative. Concerning his assigned duties, see ibid., pp. 196-197.

TO
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT
Relations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President in Cold War Operations

I wish to inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff as follows with regard to my views of their relations to me in Cold War Operations:

a. I regard the Joint Chiefs of Staff as my principal military advisor responsible both for initiating advice to me and for responding to requests for advice. I expect their advice to come to me direct and unfiltered.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have a responsibility for the defense of the nation in the Cold War similar to that which they have in conventional hostilities. They should know the military and paramilitary forces and resources available to the Department of Defense, verify their readiness, report on their adequacy, and make appropriate recommendations for their expansion and improvement. I look to the Chiefs to contribute dynamic and imaginative leadership in contributing to the success of the military and paramilitary aspects of Cold War programs.

c. I expect the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present the military viewpoint in governmental councils in such a way as to assure that the military factors are clearly understood before decisions are reached. When only the Chairman or a single Chief is present, that officer must represent the Chiefs as a body, taking such preliminary and subsequent actions as may be necessary to assure that he does in fact represent the corporate judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

/2/The text of this NSAM is a close paraphrase of a portion of Recommendation No. 4 of "Recommendations of the Cuban Study Group," the fourth of four numbered memoranda (together known as the Taylor Report) submitted to Kennedy under cover of a June 13 letter from Taylor, in his capacity as Chairman of the Cuban Study Group appointed by Kennedy in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs incident. The Study Group suggested this directive so that the JCS would "be brought to feel as great a sense of responsibility for contributing to the success of the Cold War as to the conventional military defense of the country in time of war." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Taylor Report)

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Kennedy signed the original.

Washington, June 28, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 56. Secret. Copies were sent to Secretary Rusk, Allen Dulles, and General Taylor.

TO
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT
Evaluation of Paramilitary Requirements

/2/The paragraph is based on suggestions made in Recommendation No. 3 of the Taylor Report, "Improvement of Effectiveness in the Paramilitary Field." Concerning the Taylor Report, see footnote 2, Document 32.

"It is important that we anticipate now our possible future requirements in the field of unconventional warfare and paramilitary operations. A first step would be to inventory the paramilitary assets we have in the United States Armed Forces, consider various areas in the world where the implementation of our policy may require indigenous para-military forces, and thus arrive at a determination of the goals which we should set in this field. Having determined the assets and the possible requirements, it would then become a matter of developing a plan to meet the deficit."

/3/In NSAM No. 110 to McNamara, dated October 25, Bundy stated that in order not to lose "another year," NSAM No. 56 should be interpreted to permit initial budgetary estimates for FY 1963 "even in the absence of formal completion of the requested evaluation of paramilitary requirements." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 110)

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, June 28, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 57. Secret. A copy was sent to General Taylor.

TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, CIA

/2/The text printed below is identical to Recommendation No. 2 of the Taylor Report (see footnote 2, Document 32).

/3/Recommendation No. 1 of the Taylor Report called for creation of a Strategic Resources Group (SRG), with its own permanent staff, as a mechanism for planning, development, and coordination of Cold War strategy and individual operations. According to a memorandum for the record by Burke, a member of the Cuban Study Group, of a meeting the President held with the Group on June 13, the President "was quite taken with" the SRG proposal as outlined to him by Taylor, while Burke warned the President of "great danger" because if the SRG Chairman "became an assistant President, it would be very difficult to operate with State and Defense." He noted that the President listened to this, but he concluded: "I think he discounted the difficulties a great deal." (Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials)

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS

1. For the purpose of this study, a paramilitary operation is considered to be one which by its tactics and its requirements in military-type personnel, equipment and training approximates a conventional military operation. It may be undertaken in support of an existing government friendly to the U.S. or in support of a rebel group seeking to overthrow a government hostile to us. The U.S. may render assistance to such operations overtly, covertly or by a combination of both methods. In size these operations may vary from the infiltration of a squad of guerrillas to a military operation such as the Cuban invasion. The small operations will often fall completely within the normal capability of one agency; the large ones may affect State, Defense, CIA, USIA and possibly other departments and agencies.

2. In order to conduct paramilitary operations with maximum effectiveness and flexibility within the context of the Cold War, it is recommended that current directives and procedures be modified to effect the following:

a. Any proposed paramilitary operation in the concept stage will be presented to the Strategic Resources Group for initial consideration and for approval as necessary by the President. Thereafter, the SRG will assign primary responsibility for planning, for interdepartment coordination and for execution to the Task Force, department or individual best qualified to carry forward the operation to success, and will indicate supporting responsibilities. Under this principle, the Department of Defense will normally receive responsibility for overt paramilitary operations. Where such an operation is to be wholly covert or disavowable, it may be assigned to CIA, provided that it is within the normal capabilities of the agency. Any large paramilitary operation wholly or partly covert which requires significant numbers of militarily trained personnel, amounts of military equipment which exceed normal CIA-controlled stocks and/or military experiences of a kind and level peculiar to the Armed Services is properly the primary responsibility of the Department of Defense with the CIA in a supporting role.

Washington, July 9, 1961.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, 381 BNSP 18 Apr 61. Secret. Another copy indicates the letter was drafted in S/P. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.5/7-961) Forwarded to Rusk under a June 27 memorandum from George McGhee. (Ibid. 711.5/6-2761)

Dear Bob:

/2/See footnote 2, Document 30.

We have given specific comments on many points to the drafters. There is one point, however, which seemed important enough to warrant my writing you directly about it.

I refer to the provision that the main basis for US local war planning should be the plan for resumption of hostilities in Korea. I am informed that this provision means that no major increase in the present scale of US conventional forces is required.

I am not competent to speak to the military need, but I would like to suggest some foreign policy considerations which seem to me to be relevant.

1. There seems no assurance that future local conflicts will be confined to the scale of the Korean war. There may well be two simultaneous aggressions, whose aggregate scope will exceed that of the Korean war. It would be useful, from a foreign policy stand point, to have a military posture which did not require us to use nuclear weapons in the event of a local conflict which exceeds the scale of the Korean war, but left us free to make the decision on whether or not to use nuclear weapons at the time.

2. The Communists appear to have entered on a period of dangerous over-confidence. We must disabuse them, if there is not to be a serious risk of miscalculation on their part.

One of the steps that would be most helpful to this end would be a significant increase in the size of our armed forces. A government as traditionally preoccupied with ground strength as that of the USSR could not fail to take note. The Kremlin would surely be impressed by U.S. willingness to incur the increased expenditures and draft calls that would be involved. It might consider that this portended a U.S. willingness to assume risks--as well as costs--that the U.S. had hitherto considered unacceptable.

3. Such a U.S. move might also suggest to the Soviets that a continuation of their pressures could trigger an even further expansion of the permanent U.S. defense establishment. This would be a more effective deterrent than mobilization of reserves, whom the USSR would expect to return to civilian life at the end of the crisis. The Soviets must, even now, bitterly regret the lasting quantum jump in the U.S. armed forces which was produced by the Korean war.

4. An expansion in the size of our armed forces could also have a useful effect on our allies. It would be welcome evidence of U.S. firmness at a time of crisis. It might increase their confidence in our willingness to stand up in their defense. The U.S. willingness to incur increased defense burdens might, furthermore, encourage our allies to follow suit; this would be most helpful in carrying out our new NATO policy.

I realize that these factors may not be decisive, since important fiscal and military factors are also involved, but I thought that I should bring them to your attention before you had completed preparation of the military sections of national security policy.

Sincerely,

Dean

NIE 11-3-61

Washington, July 11, 1961.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry. Top Secret. A dissemination notice and table of contents are not printed. According to a note on a covering page, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the drafting. The estimate was concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on January 17. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction.

SINO-SOVIET AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES THROUGH MID-1966

The Problem

/2/Includes defenses against missiles and satellites. [Footnote in the source text.]

Summary and Conclusions

1. The scale of effort presently being applied to the continuing improvement and modernization of the Soviet air defense system is indicative of the high priority assigned to this mission. During the past two to three years, the Soviet air defense establishment has been undergoing a major transition which has significantly improved its capabilities. The principal aspects of this transition are: (a) the extensive deployment of surface-to-air missile sites; (b) the installation of air defense communications and control systems with semiautomatic features; (c) the deployment of new fighters and radars to Eastern Europe and areas near the borders of the USSR; and (d) a consolidation of air defense districts. Other developments include the advent of radars with better detection and height-finding capabilities, and the equipment of interceptors with more advanced electronic gear and armament, including air-to-air missiles. (Paras. 16-24)

2. The Soviets now have operational two types of surface-to-air missiles designed for defense against medium and high altitude air attacks. The first of these (SA-1), which has been operational for about five years, is deployed only around Moscow in a massive complex of 56 sites, each having 60 launching positions. This system was apparently designed to counter the massed air raid threat of the late 1940's and early 1950's. (Paras. 25-26)

3. Since late 1957, the USSR has been engaged in the extensive deployment of a second-generation surface-to-air missile system (SA-2), which appears designed to cope with the threat posed by small numbers of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons rather than a massed raid threat. Considering the pattern of deployment, the length of time the program has been under way, and the extent of our intelligence coverage, we estimate that 350-400 sites (each with six launchers) are now operational at about 70 defended areas in the USSR. By mid-1962, the Soviets probably will have deployed roughly 500 SA-2 sites at about 100 urban-industrial areas in the USSR. There is little evidence on possible requirements for defense of field forces, but we estimate that some 80-120 mobile missile units may be deployed by the end of 1963 for the protection of such semifixed targets as major headquarters and logistics centers. We believe that the USSR intends to provide SA-2 defenses for the fixed launching complexes of its long range ballistic missile forces, but we are unable to estimate the level and extent of defenses planned. (Paras. 27-33)

4. Deployment of SA-2 sites in the European Satellites has been under way for more than a year. The heaviest deployment has occurred in East Germany where as many as 20 sites may be operational or under construction. Some of these, located on a ring around Berlin, are manned by East German forces; others, which defend important Soviet military targets, are assigned to Soviet field forces. We believe that additional SA-2 sites will be deployed in the Satellites during the next year or two, and that some mobile units may be provided for Satellite ground forces. We have no reliable evidence indicating the deployment of surface-to-air missiles in Communist China, although some deployment may have taken place or be planned for the future. (Paras. 34-36)

5. The Soviets have had under development a surface-to-air system (SA-3) which we believe is specifically designed to engage targets at very low altitudes. Although no operational sites have been observed, we believe that this system will probably be available for operational use in 1961. Considering the scale and pace of the SA-2 program, we believe that SA-3 will be extensively deployed within the next three or four years, supplementing existing missile defenses of fixed targets and field forces. (Paras. 37-38)

6. To develop defenses against ballistic missiles, the Soviets have had under way for several years an extensive and high priority program which we believe to be directed primarily toward defense against IRBMs and ICBMs. We have no basis for a firm estimate on the date of initial operational deployment of a Soviet anti-ballistic missile system or its effectiveness against the various types of Western ballistic missiles. For political as well as military reasons, the Soviets probably would wish to deploy antimissile defenses in a few critical areas even if the available system provided only a limited, interim capability. Considering these factors and the present status of the Soviet research and development program, we estimate that in the period 1963-1966 the Soviets will begin at least limited deployment of an antimissile system. We believe that for some years to come, the Soviets are likely to have only a marginal capability under most favorable conditions for interference with US satellites. (Paras. 40-46)

[Here follows discussion of fighters, supporting equipment, and deployment.]

11. About 80 million Soviet citizens over the age of 16 have received some instruction in civil defense and about one-fourth of these have probably received good basic grounding in elementary civil defense techniques. The bulk of the population still lacks adequate shelters, although the USSR has a substantial lead over any of the Western Powers in the construction of urban shelters which could provide some protection against fall-out, debris, and fire. In the past two years, the Soviets have given increasing attention to preattack evacuation of nonessential civilians in the event of a threatening situation, but this program appears to be still in the planning stage. Even with limited warning, the existence of a disciplined organization, the use of shelter, and the widespread knowledge of simple techniques such as first aid would probably reduce casualties considerably, especially among key personnel. However, Soviet civil defense is not prepared to cope with the effects of large-scale nuclear attack. Moreover, it would function extremely poorly under conditions of short warning time. (Paras. 73-76)

12. The amount of warning time available significantly affects the capabilities of air defense in various areas of the Bloc. Early warning radar could now give Moscow and many other targets in the interior more than one hour's warning of medium and high altitude attacks made with Western bombers of the B-52 type. Soviet assurance of such detection would be greatly reduced by extremely low level penetrations. The supersonic bombers and air-to-surface missiles now being added to Western inventories could reduce this warning time by as much as 50 percent. Moreover, the more limited early warning time available in Bloc border areas would reduce the effectiveness of the defenses of even heavily defended targets in such areas. As the speeds of Western aerodynamic vehicles increase, and as Western ballistic missiles become a greater threat, the problem of warning time will become more critical. (Para. 78)

13. The present capabilities of the Soviet air defense system would be greatest against penetrations by subsonic bombers in daylight and clear weather at altitudes between about 3,000 and about 45,000 feet. Under such conditions, virtually all types of Bloc air defense weapons could be brought to bear against attacking aircraft. Most Soviet fighters can operate at altitudes up to about 50,000 feet, and some up to about 55,000 feet, but the capabilities of the fighter force would be reduced considerably during periods of darkness or poor visibility. In the increasingly widespread areas defended by surface-to-air missiles, air defense capabilities would be virtually unimpaired by weather conditions and would extend to about 60,000 feet, with some capabilities up to about 80,000 feet. (Para. 79)

14. Despite its recent and considerable improvements, however, the Soviet air defense system would still have great difficulty in coping with a large-scale air attack employing a variety of weapons and sophisticated tactics, even within the foregoing altitudes. At altitudes below about 3,000 feet, the capabilities of the system would be progressively reduced; below about 1,000 feet, the system would lose most of its effectiveness. At present, the USSR has little capability for active defense against very low altitude attacks. (Paras. 80-81)

/3/NIE 11-3-62, "Soviet Bloc Air and Missile Defense Capabilities Through Mid-1967," dated October 31, 1962, reached an almost identical conclusion regarding Soviet missile defenses and the overall weakness of Soviet missile and air defense capabilities. NIE 11-3-62 did, however, assign somewhat more effectiveness to Soviet defenses against bombers by the end of the projected period. Also pertinent is NIE 11-5-61, "Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles," dated April 25, 1961. (Both in Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry)

[Here follow the body of the paper and two annexes, totaling 25 pages.]

Washington, July 17, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Carl Kaysen Series, BNSP 7/61-11/61. Top Secret. Drafted by Kaysen.

/2/Undated. (Ibid.)

McNamara has decided he does not wish to push on this now. In McNamara's judgment this would result only in six-eight weeks of arguing inside the Pentagon, which he doesn't want. Nitze feels that the change in local war notions as a consequence of Berlin planning does NOT go deep enough and that the Services consider them an aberration. They have not changed their fundamental attitude and justify their resistance in terms of the old BNSP. Rowen himself has no sense of what the situation is on this point.

/3/Henry Owen of the Policy Planning Council.

/4/These paragraphs stressed the progressive adoption of "the concept of flexibility for general war" and stated that the option of engaging "in the destruction of the enemy's principal military capabilities while at the same time minimizing damage to his population, urban-industrial complexes, and government controls" would become available by November 1 and would "represent an addition to SIOP-62." No documentation has been found indicating a briefing of the President from this draft.

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, July 17, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5/7-1461. Secret.

Dear Dean:

We appreciate receiving your views on the draft military section of Basic National Security Policy, as set forth in your letter of July 9th.

I note that your principal concern is over U.S. local war planning. The pertinent provision of the draft which you reviewed stated that, "At the present time the main basis for U.S. local war planning is the plan for the resumption of hostilities in Korea. For the present, the level of forces called for in this plan, including the mobilization of U.S. reserve forces, remains the basis of U.S. local war planning outside of Europe."

/2/See Document 39.

The resolution of the order of magnitude of forces to be used in local war planning may well be the outgrowth of the present intensive re-examination of our forces now going on in the light of the Berlin situation, particularly the analysis of the ways of strengthening our forces by increasing their non-nuclear capability.

Sincerely yours,

Ros Gilpatric

In a memorandum to U. Alexis Johnson dated July 21, 1961, Kitchen discussed Gilpatric's letter to Rusk (Document 38) and commented that the Secretary of Defense had "set aside, at least temporarily," the BNSP review "partly because of the Berlin situation and party because the interagency clearance process had resulted in the document being filled with old and familiar clichés." Kitchen noted that the Department of State was not "guilty of encumbering the document as indicated since most of our comments were encouraging and imaginative." (Department of State, Central Files, 711.5/7-1461)

Activity on the project at the Department of Defense ceased for the remainder of 1961 shortly but not immediately after McNamara's decision. On July 5, the Joint Chiefs of Staff circulated a draft emphasizing retention of "free world" military superiority. In general war, U.S. forces should in the short term be "capable of emerging from a nuclear exchange with a clear military advantage," and for the longer term should "possess the highest practicable degree of alert and be capable of a range of options, including those made possible by a secure reserve, to increase control of response and enhance military flexibility." Limited war forces were to be sufficient, "in conjunction with available local forces, [to] retard aggression" long enough to permit reinforcement, "making every feasible effort to keep the war at a non-nuclear level, but being prepared to use nuclear weapons when required." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, 381 BNSP 18 Apr 61)

In a memorandum to Secretary of Defense McNamara, dated July 28, William Bundy enclosed an ISA draft of the same date. Bundy commented that the draft "had been extensively changed from previous ISA versions to embody much thinking from the JCS draft." It did, however, "retain the fundamental concepts of previous ISA versions: the stress on non-nuclear warfare and the requirement for discriminate and flexible general war operations under tight central control." Bundy concluded by requesting that McNamara recommend NSC approval of military sections of a BNSP in accordance with the ISA draft.

Regarding the outcome of a general war, the draft stated that the United States should "conduct general war so as to obtain the best achievable outcome" and that "consistent with over-all objectives, the U.S. will conduct general war so as to facilitate the conduct of negotiations to bring the war to an end." Regarding overall defense posture, the draft spoke of "the capacity to meet any military situation discriminately with sufficient, but not excessive, measures" and of having the "option to engage substantial non-nuclear forces before having to decide to initiate the use of nuclear weapons." The draft stressed that the desired flexibility, while not in being, was to be "progressively and rapidly created." (Ibid.; copies of the JCS and ISA drafts also available as JCS 2101/436 and JCS 2101/440, respectively, at National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 3001 (14 Apr 61) Sec 3)

In a July 28 note to the JCS, the Joint Strategic Survey Council recommended that the JCS "should not be drawn into discussion of what is specifically wrong with ISA draft of BNSP in manner which would place JCS draft in competition with it," or which would preclude the JCS giving a copy of their position to the President or to members of the NSC. The JCS disagreed and at their request the Joint Strategic Survey Council submitted to them on August 5 a "talking paper" in support of the positions taken in the July 5 JCS draft. The talking paper stated that the ISA draft was "negative and inhibiting in nature and tended to over-emphasize control of military forces, avoidance of casualties and damage, defense, survival, without comparable concern for combat effectiveness, the offensive, or the will to succeed." The paper further noted: "An overly inhibited BNSP could permeate the whole structure of a people and government to the point where the all-important will to win disappears." The BNSP "should reflect confidence, determination, combat effectiveness, and the offensive spirit, if the United States is to survive and prosper." The JCS believed in "control of military operations by constituted authority" but believed "that it [control] should be covered broadly and succinctly in BNSP with specific details left to technical plans and policies." The ISA draft tended "to emphasize non-nuclear weapons even more than current policy emphasizes nuclear weapons." The covering note to the talking paper recommended the Secretary's adoption of the July 5 JCS draft as the position of the Department of Defense. (Ibid.) Available records do not indicate whether McNamara saw or was briefed on the talking paper.

Washington, July 27, 1961, 4 p.m.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Chester V. Clifton Series, Conferences with the President, Volume I. Top Secret. Drafted by Clifton.

OTHERS PRESENT
General Lemnitzer
General Decker
Vice Admiral Russell
General LeMay
General Shoup
General Clifton

General Lemnitzer opened the discussion with a briefing on what happened on the Hill.

[Here follows discussion of JCS testimony that morning before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the call-up of reserves in the Berlin crisis and of aircraft procurement.]

/2/This issue was also discussed at the meeting of the National Security Council on July 20. (Memorandum by McGeorge Bundy; ibid., Meetings and Memoranda Series, 489th Meeting of the NSC)

The President then talked about the difficulty in Central Europe with a conventional war and stated that he felt that the critical point is to be able to use nuclear weapons at a crucial moment before they use them. He inquired as to our capabilities of making such a decision without letting the enemy know that we are about to do it.

General LeMay first responded to this inquiry with a description of when and how SAC could be used and the amount of warning time under various conditions that the Soviet Union could derive from our attack approach. The President then asked several questions about the Soviet capability to detect and to react.

There was a further discussion of the command and control centers which now exist especially in regard to the NATO use of nuclear weapons. General LeMay pointed out during this discussion that there is a SAC Airborne Command post which could be used in case of disaster and Admiral Russell pointed out that the Navy has a Command Post afloat.

During this latter discussion the President directed that we get out all the letters of agreement with our allies, especially the British, the French, and the Canadians, to our consulting them before a nuclear attack is launched.

During this discussion, General LeMay told the President that we could take off from the bases in Spain without any previous notification, but all the rest had strings on them, one kind and another.

[Here follows discussion of the Berlin crisis and Cuba.]

General Lemnitzer then pointed out that the program on Capitol Hill was pretty well set, but that civil defense didn't get much play in the hearing. The President asked some specific questions and General Lemnitzer said the Nike-Zeus was not mentioned, but that Senator Symington had made quite a point about manned bombers. There had been some discussion of the B-70, but the greatest concern in the Committee was the adequacy and modernization of our fighter bomber force.

One additional point from the Committee was that they feel we should take stronger measures to "fire up our production lines" for the long pull even though we may not be taking much end product from these production lines at the moment.

[Here follows discussion of Cuba and the Berlin crisis.]

/3/Apparent references to the July 5 JCS draft of military sections of a basic national security policy and the ISA draft then in preparation (forwarded to the Secretary of Defense on July 28). See Document 39.

The President directed that they discuss this more completely at their next meeting, and, in the meantime, he would probably get a look at the McNamara paper too. (Note: This matter has been deferred as the result of the developments on the Berlin situation.)

[Here follows discussion of Berlin and NATO.]

On August 18, 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent to Secretary of Defense McNamara their divergent views on the guidance for the preparation of SIOP-63. The principal divergence was over [text not declassified] for the use of strategic nuclear weapons. Generals Anderson, Decker, and Shoup all set forth a [text not declassified].

The Chiefs agreed on recommendations for increasing flexibility by providing for the possible withholding of attacks against Communist China and the satellites and/or governmental control centers in any Communist country. General Lemnitzer endorsed the views of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, stating that [text not declassified]. (Memoranda from Lemnitzer to McNamara, August 18, with attachments including draft guidance for the preparation of SIOP-63; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 3105 (8 Mar 61) (3) Sec 1)

On August 25, Secretary McNamara replied in a memorandum to Lemnitzer that in general he concurred with Lemnitzer's recommendations. However, he [text not declassified]. (JCS 2056/278, August 25, with attachments; ibid.) On October 16, McNamara submitted to the Joint Chiefs a redraft of the suggested guidance prepared primarily by Dr. Alain Enthoven, Deputy Comptroller of the Department of Defense. (JCS 2056/284, October 16, with attached draft guidance; ibid.) After further discussion between McNamara and the JCS on October 23, the JCS issued the final guidance on October 27; see Document 52.

On September 13, 1961, SIOP-62 was briefed to President Kennedy. (Enclosure to JCS 2056/281, September 13; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, CCS 3105 Joint Planning (13 September 1961)) A partially declassified text is printed in International Security, Summer 1987 (12:1), pages 41-51. For information on the origins of SIOP-62, see Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, volume III, Documents 1ff.

Washington, September 19, 1961.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, 38 500a Air Access. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Strategic Air Planning and Berlin

/2/Not found.

2. Basic Memorandum. SIOP-62 is built around two concepts that may not be appropriate in a Berlin crisis: (a) it is essentially a [2 lines of source text not declassified]. Two sets of possible circumstances suggest the need for supplementary and alternative plans, namely, we might be lured out of position by a false alarm or strategic feint by the Soviets, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

a. A false alarm, if it resulted in the launching and recall of the Alert Force, would degrade our capabilities significantly for about [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] at least. Further, the forces held back might not be prepared to attack appropriate targets, the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] having been assigned the Alert Force, now recalled.

b. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] might occur from escalation of military action around Berlin, which could force U.S. to move from the local military action to the general war level. SIOP-62 execution of Alert Force [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. This does not appear an appropriate response to the repulse of a [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] attack, especially since SIOP-62 will almost inevitably alert the Soviets and, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] they will respond in kind. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

c. Two recommendations follow:

(1) CINCSAC should look at the false alarm problem and make any necessary changes in his plans to minimize degradation of his force under such a development.

/3/General Power was also Director, Strategic Target Planning.

3. An Alternative to SIOP-62. [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

a. Reliability of present missiles is low, their accuracy uncertain, and problems of achieving simultaneity on target formidable. Therefore, ICBMs, theoretically ideal for this kind of minimum-warning attack, are ruled out at present time.

b. Bombers normally have been rejected as minimum-warning vehicles, primarily because they have operated in mass. But, if [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] DGZ's--[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]--are assumed to constitute the essential targets, the destruction of which would paralyze nuclear threat to U.S., bomber use becomes more attractive. Further, if 26 of essential targets are [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that do not need to be hit in first wave, if 42 targets, close together, can be hit by 21 bombers (each bomber striking two targets within 20 minutes of one another), then to carry out this plan the U.S. must only get [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] bombers into Soviet airspace and over their initial targets within a 15 minute period. ([less than 1 line of source text not declassified] DGZ's-[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]) Allowing a 25% attrition rate would mean that [less than 1 line of source text declassified] aircraft, instead of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], would have to penetrate Soviet airspace. It is further assumed that these aircraft could [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. This kind of attack, [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

c. Two questions arise: How valid are the assumptions, and do we possess the skill and capability for such a raid. There are reasons to believe assumptions are reasonable. (These are amplified in some detail, based on statements in NIE's, with emphasis on deficiencies in Soviet low-level detection capabilities.) The Air Force, of course, must provide the answer to the second question.

d. There are risks as well as opportunities in this approach. With the initiative, the U.S. could reduce the consequences of partial success and exercise some control over Soviet behavior. Once bombs had fallen on USSR, U.S. non-committed forces could be altered, civil defense measures instituted, air defenses alerted. Compared with SIOP-62, the small-scale minimum-warning attack--coupled with follow-on raids--has distinct advantages with respect to recall, achievement of surprise, reduction in Soviet long-range capabilities before launch, and control over the number and character of initial and subsequent attacks.

e. Appendix. Damage assessment to the U.S. from such a minimum-warning attack must deal with uncertainties, but rough calculations can be made.

(1) Damage to U.S. will be affected by the number of Soviet long range forces surviving the initial attack; the numbers and types of targets the U.S. attacked, and the influence of this on USSR war plans; the numbers and yields of USSR weapons per U.S. target, especially in urban areas; the height of burst (which determines fall-out); civil defenses available to U.S., and uses made of them.

(2) U.S. can attempt to influence Soviet behavior in peace by declaring use of nuclear weapons only against military targets unless enemy initiates a counter-city campaign. This may influence Soviet retaliatory choices by offering Soviets a powerful incentive to use whatever residual forces they command in a sensible way.

4. An Appreciation of SIOP-62. The SIOP-62 target list is constant, with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] DGZ's, of which the Alert Force hits [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

a. President Eisenhower established requirement that U.S. forces should have the capability to achieve [3 lines of source text not declassified]. To achieve specified assurance major tactics include: (1) [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Degradation factors are also calculated and allowed for. Allowing for these, the average assurance that at least one weapon will detonate on target is [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

b. Flexibility of SIOP-62 only comes from ability to withhold preplanned strikes. Once the Alert Force is launched, however, selective withholding of its forces is not presently possible.

c. Outcome of SIOP-62 execution will produce U.S. casualties of about 16 million at a minimum. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

d. SIOP-62 is a rigid, all-purpose plan, designed for execution in existing form, regardless of circumstances. Rigidity stems from:

(1) Military belief that USSR will strike cities, or urban-military targets; hence there is no need for selective U.S. targeting.

(2) Military belief that, regardless of circumstances, USSR will be able to launch some weapons against U.S. Nowhere is real consideration given to possibility of interaction between ours and their targeting philosophy.

(3) Belief that winning general war means coming out relatively better than USSR, regardless of magnitude of losses.

(4) A fear that retaliation against cities after a surprise attack may be all we can do; with U.S. command-control knocked out, alternative plans might leave residual U.S. forces uncertain as to what to attack; U.S. flexibility would become known, and decrease deterrence.

e. SIOP-62 is a blunt instrument, and its tactics almost make certain fulfillment of prophecy that enemy will be able to launch some weapons.

Maxwell D. Taylor

/4/The progress report has not been found. Also on September 19, Taylor sent the President a list of questions pertaining to the operation of the SIOP with the suggestion that they be forwarded to General Power so that he could answer them at the President's meeting with Power the following day. Kennedy agreed and the list was sent. (Memoranda from Taylor to Kennedy and Taylor to Lemnitzer, September 19; both in the National Defense University, Taylor Papers, 33 66 NATO) Regarding the meeting with Power, see Document 44.

Washington, September 20, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Chester V. Clifton Series, Conferences with the President 3/61-9/61. Top Secret. Drafted by Clifton. According to an earlier draft of this memorandum, the fourth, fifth, and sixth paragraphs are based on notes taken by General Taylor. (Ibid.)

OTHERS PRESENT
General Lemnitzer
General Power
General Taylor
General Clifton

General Power approached the President with a proposal on intelligence and in all the discussion several requirements came forth:

The President directed that General Taylor take an active hand from the intelligence viewpoint to see that General Power and General LeMay came up with an explanation of the difference in their opinion on what could be done.

General Taylor then said that, to formalize this, the requirement should be placed on General Lemnitzer to study the problem and present the President the viewpoints of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--not necessarily a Joint Chiefs' agreed position--and if General Power's estimate was different, to have his comments attached. This could give the President the necessary information on which to base a decision for or against General Power's suggestion. The President agreed.

General Power expressed great concern over the lack of information on Soviet ICBM sites, stating that we had only 10% usable photographic coverage of the USSR. Since in the photographed area 20 ICBM pads had been found, there might be many times more in the unphotographed area. Generals Lemnitzer and Taylor contested the accuracy of this estimate of useful coverage and the conclusion drawn from it.

In view of our lack of information, General Power strongly recommended the resumption of U-2 flights.

In response to questions by the President, General Power indicated his belief that the time of our greatest danger of a Soviet surprise attack is now and during the coming year. If a general atomic war is inevitable, the U.S. should strike first--presumably after locating the essential Soviet nuclear targets.

The President also directed that the group come up with an answer to this question: how much information does the Soviet Union need, and how long do they need to launch their missiles?

C.V. Clifton
Major General, USA
Defense Liaison Officer

NIE 11-8/1-61

Washington, September 21, 1961.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. A note on the cover sheet indicates that the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and prepared by the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, the Joint Staff, the National Security Agency, and the Atomic Energy Commission. The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred, except the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction. For complete text of NIE 11-8/1-61, see the Supplement.

/2/NIE 11-8/1-61 revises and updates the estimates on this subject which were made in NIE 11-8-61: "Soviet Capabilities for Long Range Attack", Top Secret, 7 June 1961. [2 lines of source text not declassified] The new estimate is issued [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] so that the reader can fully appreciate the quantity and quality of information on which it is based.

A brief summary of this estimate, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], will be included in the forthcoming NIE 11-4-61: "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1961-1966", now scheduled for completion in December 1961. In that estimate, the treatment of ground launched missiles will be incorporated into a summary of the entire Soviet long-range attack capability, including bombers, air-to-surface missiles, and submarine-launched missiles. For our current estimates on these latter elements of the long range striking force, see NIE 11-4-61, Annex A: "Soviet Military Forces and Capabilities", 24 August 1961, Top Secret, paragraphs 16-23. [Footnote in the source text.]

The Problem

To estimate current Soviet operational strength in ICBM's and other ground-launched ballistic missiles with ranges of 700 n.m. or more, to identify present areas and methods of deployment, and to estimate the probable trends in strength and deployment over the next few years.

Conclusions

1. New information, providing a much firmer base for estimates on Soviet long range ballistic missiles, has caused a sharp downward revision in our estimate of present Soviet ICBM strength but strongly supports our estimate of medium range missile strength.

/3/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur in this sentence. See his footnote following the Conclusions. [Footnote in the source text. The footnote with the position of Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, is not printed. His position was that the Soviets had about 50 operational ICBM launchers in mid-1961 and would have about 100 in mid-1962 and about 250 in mid-1963. The early availability and high performance record of the first generation ICBM launchers indicated that by mid-1961 "substantial" numbers had been deployed, and he believed that the deployed force constituted a "serious threat to US-based nuclear striking forces." He believed that the Soviets would continue to deploy first generation missiles until the second generation missiles became available.]

/4/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur in paragraph 3. See his footnote following the Conclusions. [Footnote in the source text.]

4. In addition to 700 and 1,100 n.m. missiles now available, the USSR will probably have a 2,000 n.m. system ready for operational use late this year or early next year. The USSR's combined strength in these missile categories will probably reach 350-450 operational launchers in the 1962-1963 period, and then level off.

/5/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur in paragraph 3 and the last sentence of paragraph 5. See his footnote following the Conclusions. [Footnote in the source text.]

Discussion

6. The requirement to revise our estimates on Soviet long range ballistic missile forces stems from significant recent evidence [1 line of source text not declassified] 1961 activities at the Soviet ICBM and space vehicle test range has provided information on the new types of ballistic vehicles now being developed and on the pace and progress of the developments programs. [1 line of source text not declassified] the first positive identification of long range ballistic missile deployment complexes, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] excellent guidance as to Soviet deployment methods, [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] useful evidence on the general status and organization of long range missile forces. Therefore, although significant gaps continue to exist and some of the available information is still open to alternate interpretations, the present estimate stands on firmer ground than any previous estimate on this critical subject.

[Here follows discussion of Soviet missile tests and ICBM deployment.]

/6/[Footnote in the source text (5-1/2 lines) not declassified]

20. Of the five confirmed or possible ICBM complexes [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Yur'ya, Plesetsk, and Verkhnyaya Salda were previously suspected [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. We previously had not suspected Yoshkar-Ola or Kostroma. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

/7/Not printed.

/8/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur in the estimate of ICBM force levels. For his position, see his footnote following the Conclusions. [Footnote in the source text. See footnote 3 above.]

22. We believe that our coverage of both test range activities and potential deployment areas is adequate to support the judgment that at present there are only a few ICBM complexes operational or under construction. While there are differences within the intelligence community as to the progress of the Soviet program to date and the precise composition of the current force, we estimate that the present Soviet ICBM capability is in the range of 10-25 launchers from which missiles can be fired against the US. The low side of this range allows for the possibility that the Soviets could now fire only a token ICBM salvo from a few launchers, located at the Tyuratam rangehead and an operational complex, perhaps Plesetsk. The high side, however, takes into account the limitations of our coverage and allows for the existence of a few other complexes equipped with first generation missiles, now operational but undetected.

23. The Soviet system is probably designed to have a refire capability from each launcher. The USSR may therefore be able to fire a second salvo some hours after the first, assuming that the launching facilities are not damaged by accident or attack.

24. The reasons for the small current capability are important to an estimate of the future Soviet buildup. The first generation system, designed at an early stage of Soviet nuclear and missile technology, proved to be powerful and reliable but was probably too cumbersome to be deployed on a large scale. One or more first generation sites may have been started but cancelled. [3 lines of source text not declassified] The urgent development of at least one second generation system probably began in about 1958, and an intensive firing program is now underway concurrent with the construction of simplified deployment complexes. We therefore believe that in about 1958 the Soviet leaders decided to deploy only a small force of first generation ICBMs while pressing toward second generation systems.

25. The net effect of this Soviet decision, together with whatever slippage is occurring in the development of second generation systems, has been to produce a low plateau of ICBM strength. Under emergency conditions the existing force could be supplemented during the first half of 1962 by putting some second generation ICBMs on launcher at one or two completed complexes before the weapon system has been thoroughly tested. However, the Soviets could not have very much confidence in the reliability, accuracy and effectiveness of such a force. In any event, operational ICBM strength will probably not increase substantially until the new missile has been proved satisfactory for operational use, probably some time in the latter half of 1962. Alternatively, the possibility cannot be excluded that second generation ICBMs could be proved satisfactory for operational use somewhat earlier in 1962, possibly as soon as the first simplified complex is completed. After this point, we anticipate that the number of operational launchers will begin to increase significantly.

26. We continue to believe, for the many reasons adduced in NIE 11-8-61, that the Soviet leaders have desired a force of several hundred operational ICBM launchers, to be acquired as soon as practicable over the next few years. In addition to the complexes known to be under construction, it is probable that work is under way on other undiscovered complexes and that the construction of still others is scheduled to begin soon. Taking account of this probability, together with our present intelligence coverage and our information on site activation lead-time, we estimate that the force level in mid-1963 will approximate 75-125 operational ICBM launchers. The high side of this range allows for eight complexes of eight launchers each under construction at the present time, with four more scheduled to begin by the end of the year; it would require site activation time to decrease to about 18 months by the end of the year; it builds from a present force level of about 25 operational launchers. The low side of the mid-1963 range would be achieved if six complexes were now under construction, two more were begun by the end of the year, and the present force level were only about 10 launchers.

27. As noted in NIE 11-8-61, Soviet force goals for the period to 1966 will be increasingly affected by developments in US and Soviet military technology, including the multiplication of hardened US missile sites, the possible advent of more advanced Soviet missiles which can better be protected, and by developments in both antimissile defenses and space weapons. The international political situation will also affect Soviet force goals, and there is a good chance that the Soviet leaders themselves have not yet come to a definite decision. We have not been able as yet to review, in the light of the new evidence, these and other considerations pertaining to the probable future pace of the Soviet ICBM program. Therefore we are unable to project a numerical estimate beyond mid-1963. Considering the problems involved in site activation, however, we believe that a rate of 100 or possibly even 150 launchers per year beginning in about 1963 would be feasible. To accomplish such a schedule, the USSR would have to lay on a major program of site construction within the next year, which we believe would be detected [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

28. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] confirms the large-scale deployment of 700 and 1,100 n.m. ballistic missiles in western USSR. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] approximately 50 fixed sites with a total of about 200 pads suitable for launching these MRBMs have been firmly identified in a wide belt stretching from the Baltic to the southern Ukraine. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] we are virtually certain that there are about 10 additional sites [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Taking account of indicators pointing to still other locations [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] we estimate with high confidence that in the western belt alone there are now about 75 sites with a total of about 300 launch pads, completed or under construction. (For known and estimated site locations in this area, see Figure 9.)

/9/Not printed.

30. On the basis of the new evidence and a wealth of other material on development, production, training and deployment, we estimate that in the western belt alone the USSR now has about 200-250 operational launchers equipped with 700 and 1,1000 n.m. ballistic missiles, together with the necessary supporting equipment and trained personnel. From these launchers, missiles could be directed against NATO targets from Norway to Turkey. On less firm but consistent evidence, about 50 additional launchers are believed to be operational in other areas: in the Transcaucasus and Turkestan, from which they could attack Middle Eastern targets from Suez to Pakistan; and in the southern portion of the Soviet Far East within range of Japan, Korea, and Okinawa. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the presence of some sites in Turkestan and in the Soviet Far East, north of Vladivostok.

31. On this basis, we estimate that the USSR now has a total of about 250-300 operational launchers equipped with medium range ballistic missiles, the bulk of them within range of NATO targets in Europe. This is essentially the same numerical estimate as given in NIE 11-8-61, but it is now made with greater assurance.

32. Contrary to our previous view that MRBMs were deployed in mobile units, we now know that even though their support equipment is truck-mounted, most if not all MRBM units employ fixed sites. Like the ICBM complexes, these are soft, screened from ground observation by their placement in wooded areas, and protected against air attack by surface-to-air missile sites in the vicinity. The systems are probably designed so that all ready missiles at a site can be salvoed within a few minutes of each other. Two additional missiles are probably available for each launcher; a second salvo could probably be launched about 4-6 hours after the first. There is some evidence that after one or two salvos the units are to move from their fixed sites to reserve positions. Their mobility could thus be used for their immediate protection, or they could move to new launch points to support field forces in subsequent phases of a war.

33. The Soviet planners apparently see a larger total requirement for MRBMs and IRBMs than we had supposed. While the rate of deployment activity in the western belt is probably tapering off after a vigorous three-year program, some sites of all three basic types are still under construction. There will therefore be at least some increase in force levels in the coming months. The magnitude of the buildup thereafter will depend largely on the degree to which the 2,000 n.m. system is deployed, and whether or not it will supplement or replace medium range missiles.

34. With the advent of the 2,000 n.m. IRBM, probably in late 1961 or early 1962, the Soviets will acquire new ballistic missile capabilities against such areas as Spain, North Africa, and Taiwan. To this extent at least, they probably wish to supplement their present strength. They may also wish to deploy IRBMs and MRBMs to more northerly areas within range of targets in Greenland and Alaska. Moreover, evidence from clandestine sources indicates that the Soviet field forces are exerting pressure to acquire missiles of these ranges. In general, however, we believe that the future MRBM/IRBM program will emphasize changes in the mix among the existing systems, and later the introduction of second generation systems, rather than sheer numerical expansion. Taking these factors into account, we estimate that the USSR will achieve 350-450 operational MRBM and IRBM launchers sometime in the 1962-1963 period, and that the force level will be relatively stable thereafter.

[Here follow 11 pages of tables, illustrations, maps, and charts.]

46. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, September 23, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Defense Budget FY 63, 1/61-10/61. Top Secret. This draft memorandum was received in the White House shortly after September 23. It is Appendix I to Document 50.

SUBJECT
Recommended Long Range Nuclear Delivery Forces 1963-1967 (C)

This Appendix summarizes the main factors I have taken into consideration in determining United States' requirements for Long Range Nuclear Delivery Forces in the years 1963-1967. The Appendix includes:

I. Recommended Force Levels and their Fiscal Implications;

II. The General Basis for My Recommendations on Force Levels;

III. The Basis for My Recommendations on Specific Weapon Systems.

I. Recommended Force Levels and Their Fiscal Implications

I recommend that you approve, for inclusion in the FY 1963 budget, the procurement of the following operational missiles and aircraft to supplement our Long Range Nuclear Delivery Forces:

Moreover, I recommend that we adopt, for planning purposes, the force structure summarized in the table on the next page. In those cases in which the forces I am recommending differ from those recommended by the Navy and Air Force, the latter are shown in red beneath mine./2/

/2/The handwritten numbers on the table are printed in italic type.

RECOMMENDED FORCES/a/

/a/Numbers of aircraft and missiles are derived by multiplying authorized squadron unit equipment by the numbers of squadrons. They do not include R&D, Combat Training Launch or maintenance pipeline missiles or command support aircraft. Effective 1 August 1961, approximately 50% of the bombers will be on 15 minute ground alert. ICBM numbers represent operational launchers. Numbers of Polaris missiles represent the total number of missiles in operational submarines. Approximately 67% of these submarines will be on station or at sea. The table excludes 17 Regulus missiles in operational submarines from end-FY 61 to end-FY 64 and 5 at end-FY 65.

/b/This difference is a consequence of the difference in recommended B-52 forces.

/c/1,000 by end-FY 68, 1,100 by end-FY 69, and thereafter.

/d/Bombers have flexibility in choice of weapons and yields. For purposes of this comparison, it was assumed that B-52's carry four [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] bombs, plus air-launched missiles.

The estimated Total Obligational Authority required to procure and operate these forces over this period is shown in the following table. The difference between the Total Obligational Authority required to finance the forces I am recommending and that required to finance the forces recommended by the individual Services is shown on the second line. Over the five years, 1963-67, the cost of the aircraft and missiles recommended by the Air Force and the Polaris recommended by the Navy exceeds the cost of the forces I am recommending by approximately $10 billion. As will be shown later in this paper, the extra capability provided by the individual Service proposals runs up against strongly diminishing returns and yields very little in terms of target destruction. In my judgment, it is an increment not worth the cost of $10 billion over the five year period.

TOTAL OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY
(Billions of Dollars)

The forces I am recommending for procurement in FY 1963 are compared with the recommendations of the Service Chiefs in the following table. The numbers represent operational aircraft or missiles.

INITIAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF CHIEFS

/a/45 B-52's recommended by the Air Force for 1962 procurement.

/b/The Chief of Staff, USA, agrees "to a limited procurement of the system to minimize engineering and economic risks." The CNO and Commandant, USMC, believe "research and development should continue", and "budgetary planning should proceed, but the decision to allocate substantial funds for production should be delayed…".

/c/The Secretary of Defense, along with the Chief of Staff, USA, the CNO, and Commandant, USMC, recommend a total strength of 640 aircraft; the CJCS recommends 760, the Chief of Staff, USAF, 800. In each case, command support aircraft would be in addition to the numbers shown.

/d/These recommendations are for "at most" the stated number of missiles.

/e/During a discussion between the Secretary of Defense and the Chiefs, on September 11, 1961, they stressed their concern about the reduction in our nuclear capability as the B-47's were phased-out. The Secretary of Defense therefore added 5 Wings of B-47's to his recommendation for FY 1963 and FY 1964, bringing it to the level shown on page 2. [Reference is to the table above entitled "Recommended Forces." The JCS recommendations are contained in their memorandum JCSM 620-61 to McNamara, dated September 11. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 471.61 (29 Aug 61)) The Chiefs expanded on their rationale for the September 11 recommendations in JCSM-657-61 to McNamara, September 21. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 7000 General (6 Mar 61) Sec 6) General LeMay critiqued McNamara's force levels and strategic rationale in a September 18 memorandum to Zuckert. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD (McNamara) Files: FRC 71 A 3470, Miscellaneous Budget)]

The aircraft and missiles recommended for procurement in FY 1963 by the Air Force and the Polaris submarines recommended for procurement in FY 1963 by the Navy would cost approximately $3.1 billions more to buy than the aircraft and missiles I am recommending. Of this, approximately $2 billions would require funding in FY 1962 and FY 1963.

As well as these forces, I will recommend at a later date that the Air Force be authorized to procure and operate a secure command and control system for SAC. Except for 20 KC-135's which will be available for use as airborne command posts, the cost of this system has not been included in the figures on page 3./3/

/3/Reference is to the table above entitled "Total Obligational Authority."

II. General Basis for Force Level Recommendations

The forces I am recommending have been chosen to provide the United States with the capability, in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack, first, to strike back against Soviet bomber bases, missile sites, and other installations associated with long-range nuclear forces, in order to reduce Soviet power and limit the damage that can be done to us by vulnerable Soviet follow-on forces, while, second, holding in protected reserve forces capable of destroying the Soviet urban society, if necessary, in a controlled and deliberate way. With the recommended forces, I am confident that we will be able, at all times, to deny the Soviet Union the prospect of either a military victory or of knocking out the U.S. retaliatory force. If the most likely estimates of Soviet forces prove to be correct, the forces I am recommending should provide us a capability to achieve a substantial military superiority over the Soviets even after they have attacked us.

The recommended forces are designed to avoid the extremes of a "minimum deterrence" posture on the one hand, or a "full first strike capability" on the other. A "minimum deterrence" posture is one in which, after a Soviet attack, we would have a capability to retaliate, and with a high degree of assurance be able to destroy most of Soviet urban society, but in which we would not have a capability to counter-attack against Soviet military forces. A "full first strike capability" would be achieved if our forces were so large and so effective, in relation to those of the Soviet Union, that we would be able to attack and reduce Soviet retaliatory power to the point at which it could not cause severe damage to U.S. population and industry.

We should reject the "minimum deterrence" extreme for the following reasons:

a. Deterrence may fail, or war may break out for accidental or unintended reasons, and if it does, a capability to counter-attack against high-priority Soviet military targets can make a major contribution to the objectives of limiting damage and terminating the war on acceptable terms;

b. By reducing to a minimum the possibility of a U.S. nuclear attack in response to Soviet aggression against our Allies, a "minimum deterrence" posture would weaken our ability to deter such Soviet attacks.

On the other hand, we should reject the attempt to achieve a "full first strike capability" for the following reasons:

a. It is almost certainly infeasible. The Soviets could defeat such an attempt at relatively low cost. For example, we do not now have any prospect of being able to destroy in a sudden attack Soviet missile submarines at sea. Nor would we be able to destroy a sufficiently high percentage of a large hard and dispersed ICBM force.

b. It would put the Soviets in a position which they would be likely to consider intolerable, thus risking the provocation of an arms race.

c. It would be very costly in resources that are needed to strengthen our theatre forces.

The forces I am recommending will provide major improvements in the quality of our strategic posture: in its survivability, its flexibility, and its ability to be used in a controlled and deliberate way under a wide range of contingencies.

Target Destruction Requirements

The following list of high priority targets (aim points) in the Soviet Union has been derived from studies performed in June 1961 by the Staff of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, under the direction of Lieutenant General Thomas Hickey./4/ (The estimates have been rounded to the nearest 50 in each category to avoid a misleading impression of accuracy.)

/4/"A Study of Requirements for U.S. Strategic Systems: Preliminary Report," dated June 1961. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3463, 381 Hickey Report 19 Apr 61)

These totals can be compared with the [less than 1 line of source text not desclassified] aim points included in SIOP-62, the current war plan. There are inevitably uncertainties, especially about details, when looking so far into the future. However, taken as a whole, I am satisfied with this target system as a basis for force planning.

The 200 Urban-Industrial targets and the 150 bomber bases have the highest priority in the sense of required degree of assurance that we can destroy them. The capability to destroy the Urban-Industrial targets is our power to deter attacks on our own cities. The Bomber Bases contain the part of the Soviet Forces that can cause us the most damage if not attacked, and also the part most vulnerable to attack. In the event of thermonuclear war, it is important that we destroy the maximum possible number of Soviet long range bombers. The 150 targets listed here represent a fairly generous allowance for this purpose. They include about 50 bases now known or estimated to be supporting long-range air operations, about 60 now known or estimated to be supporting light bomber operations, most of which would be usable as recovery bases for the long-range bombers, and about 30 staging bases on which the medium bombers depend for range enough to reach the United States.

However, the other targets are also potentially important and worth attacking. The Supporting Airfields (potential recovery and dispersal bases), Nuclear Storage and Production sites, and Naval and Submarine bases all can support delivery of nuclear weapons on the United States. The IRBM sites represent a threat to our Allies and our theatre forces, and are most economically attacked by a system such as Minuteman. The Defense Suppression targets, air defense control centers, interceptor bases, and surface-to-air missile sites, can be effectively attacked by the air-launched missiles Hound Dog and Skybolt. Their destruction would drastically reduce the defense opposition faced by our manned bombers. The number 300 shown here is probably a generous allowance for the purpose. For example, SAC is now estimating a requirement to destroy 160 defense suppression targets in 1968.

The size and basing (i.e. degree of hardening and dispersal) of the Soviet ICBM force in 1965 and 1967 is now a matter of considerable uncertainty. Everything we know about the Soviet long-range nuclear delivery posture to date suggests that the most likely configuration for first-generation ICBM sites will be 2 missiles per site and soft. Such sites would present attractive targets for our forces. However, hard and dispersed basing for their next generation of ICBM's would be such a logical choice for the Soviets that the possibility must be considered reasonably likely even though there is no evidence now to suggest that the Soviets are hardening their missiles.

There are also uncertainties about the performance of our forces in striking back after a Soviet attack--uncertainties associated with the weight and effectiveness of possible Soviet attacks, the ability of our forces to survive under attack, the reliability of our missiles, and the ability of our forces to penetrate Soviet defenses. But these uncertainties are not unbounded. One can place reasonable quantitative limits on them and estimate the effectiveness of our forces under alternatively optimistic and pessimistic assumptions.

This is what has been done in the following analysis. The survival reliability, and penetration factors used are all based on the general assumption that the war begins with a well planned and well executed Soviet attack, with limited warning, against our forces in a state of normal peacetime alert, and that we are hitting back after being attacked. Thus the following estimates do not represent maximum capabilities under the most favorable circumstances. For example, they exclude cases in which we strike first, or cases in which we are attacked during a period of tension and alert. These cases have been excluded because we are testing the adequacy of our forces, and therefore must look at unfavorable circumstances.

Within the general assumption of a well planned Soviet attack, optimistic, median, and pessimistic survival, reliability, and penetration factors have been chosen to reflect the range of uncertainty. It is possible to imagine outcomes lying outside this range, but their likelihood appears small. The optimistic factors represent favorable, but attainable performance. The great weight of likelihood appears to be between the optimistic and median cases. The combination of all of the pessimistic factors describes a very unfavorable and relatively improbable case. For example, it is assumed that in 1967, only [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] per cent of the manned bombers reach the bomb release line and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] per cent of the Titans and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] per cent of the fixed Minuteman missiles are destroyed before launch. These factors were chosen to produce an answer to the question "What happens if everything goes badly?" (The details of the assumed factors, together with an explanation of their choice can be found in Annex 1 to this Appendix.)/5/

/5/"Assumed Operational Factors for 1965 and 1967 Target Damage Calculations," not printed.

The pessimistic factors do not include an allowance for attrition by Soviet anti-ICBM defenses. We recognize that the Soviets do have a large R&D program in this area. However, we are pursuing a vigorous program of development of penetration aids (decoys and multiple warheads) and we expect to be able to penetrate Soviet defenses in this period. Moreover, if attrition by Soviet ICBM defenses appears at all likely, we will be able to compensate for it in large measure by concentrating our forces on the top priority targets.

The following results are shown in terms of expected percentages of the targets or value in each category destroyed. In the case of Urban-Industrial Floor Space (and Urban Blast Fatalities), the estimates are of damage to the contents of the 170 largest cities (down to a population of 90,000) which contains approximately 80 per cent of the total industrial floor space of the Soviet Union and approximately 50 million out of a total of 210 million people.

The estimates of total population fatalities are percentages of the Soviet total. The "Unsheltered" case corresponds to the effects expected in a population without extensive civil defense preparation, but taking advantage of what shelter is normally available. The "Sheltered" case corresponds to fallout shelter for 40 per cent of the urban population and 20 percent of the rural. The "At Least" reflects the fact that the estimates do not include fallout from attacks on isolated military targets. (The effects on surrounding cities of attacks on naval bases are included in the estimates.)

The assumed number of Soviet ICBM sites varies between the optimistic cases (in which the low end of the range is used) and the pessimistic cases (in which the high end is used). Therefore, the percentages shown should not be interpreted as representing fractions of the same numbers.

Two forces and two years are shown on pages 9 and 10./6/

/6/Reference is to the two tables below.

I. Those forces I am recommending for End-Fiscal Year 1965 and 1967, and

II. Those forces proposed by the individual Services (though not jointly by the JCS) for the same years.

The calculations suggest that either force would provide us with a powerful capability to carry out the objectives mentioned earlier. However, as I indicated earlier, the extra capability provided by individual Service proposals runs up against strongly diminishing returns and yields very little in terms of extra target destruction.

Moreover, the theatre forces were not included in these calculations, through SIOP '62 includes about [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] alert aircraft and missiles from these forces. On the other hand, with the exception of the defense suppression targets, no targets [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] were included. However, we do not now expect [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to develop a significant long range nuclear delivery force in the time period under consideration. If she does, and a change seems indicated, there will be time for us to increase our forces appropriately.

COMPARISON OF TARGET DESTRUCTION CAPABILITIES OF ALTERNATIVE FORCES

END FISCAL YEAR 1965

/a/Successful attack would render the bases inoperable but, of course, would leave untouched missile submarines at sea.

Alert Force Weapons Summary

COMPARISON OF TARGET DESTRUCTION CAPABILITIES
OF ALTERNATIVE FORCES

END FISCAL YEAR 1967

Alert Force Weapons Summary

Relationship of Recommended Force to Soviet Force

The direct comparison of force numbers as such is less important than the ways in which we base and operate our forces. For example, we could out-number the Soviets three to one in ICBM's and still have an inadequate deterrent posture if our missiles were soft and concentrated. However, the force increments which I am recommending are all in a protected mode, hard and dispersed, or mobile.

Given a well protected posture, relative numbers are still important for several reasons:

a. A large Soviet superiority in ICBM's could overcome the protection afforded our ICBM's by hardening and dispersal and make it possible for the Soviets to destroy most our fixed-base forces in a missile attack.

b. A large Soviet superiority in missiles would worsen the outcome of a thermonuclear war.

c. A large Soviet superiority in ICBM's would be likely to have a very unfavorable impact on Soviet aggressiveness in the cold war.

Therefore, we have no intention of letting ourselves be seriously out-numbered in ICBM's by the Soviet Union.

How many ICBM's will the Soviet Union have in the mid-1960's? The answer is intrinsically uncertain because it is still subject to Soviet decisions which may not yet have been made, and which will be influenced by our own decisions. However, we do know a good deal about their posture today. We are able to estimate that the Soviets now have from 25 to 50 operational ICBM launchers. Their ICBM build-up appears to be deliberately paced, not a crash program. On the basis of what has been observed so far, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the Soviets will have from 200 to 400 ICBM's in mid-1964. But even if the most pessimistic (Air Force) estimates prove to be valid, in mid-1964 we will still equal the Soviet Union in ICBM's at about 850 each. This will be combined with a substantial U.S. superiority in all other categories of long range nuclear delivery systems.

Moreover, if the Soviet Union exceeds our most pessimistic estimates and builds up a much larger force by 1965 or 1967, we are confident that we will find out about it in time to expand our program appropriately. As a hedge against this unlikely possibility, we are expanding our Minuteman production capacity to over 60 missiles a month. When this is done, the lead time for hard and dispersed Minuteman ICBM's will be about 26 months. Therefore, we will have a great deal of flexibility to expand the program at a later date if it should prove to be necessary to do so.

In other categories of long range nuclear delivery systems, we will have a substantial superiority. Soviet long range aviation now comprises about 1,000 medium bombers (or tankers), and about 150 heavy bombers (or tankers), equipped with air-to-surface missiles. The heavy bomber category is far more significant than the medium bomber category. We will have 630 heavy bombers, plus almost as many tankers. Because the Soviets would have to use some of their bombers as tankers, this will mean an effective U.S. heavy bomber force approximately four or more times as large as that of the Soviets.

The USSR now has about 20 conventionally powered submarines which are probably capable of launching short-range ballistic missiles (approximately 150-300 nautical miles), though not while submerged. By 1963, the Soviets could probably introduce nuclear powered submarines with a submerged launch system employing medium range ballistic missiles. There is no evidence to suggest that the Soviets have a program approaching our Polaris program, either in size or quality.

III. Basis for Recommendations on Specific Weapon System Choices

Within the general quantitative requirements for additional long range nuclear delivery systems, suggested by the above considerations, the following are the reasons for my specific program recommendations:

B-52's

The Air Force has proposed the procurement of 52 additional B-52's (45 wing unit equipment plus 7 command support) with FY 1962 funds. The cost of procuring and operating these aircraft, with (30) associated tankers and Skybolt missiles, for a 5 year period would be about $1.4 billions. My reasons for recommending against this procurement are the following:

a. We already have a large force of intercontinental bombers. In mid-1965 it will comprise 630 B-52's, 80 B-58's and, if we do not decide to phase them out sooner, 225 B-47's. The alert B-52's and B-58's alone will be able to carry about 1500 bombs plus 1,000 air launched missiles. The alert B-47's will be able to carry another 200 bombs.

b. An examination of the target system shows that most targets, and all of those of the highest priority, are best attacked by missiles; first, because the targets are soft, fixed, and of known location, and therefore vulnerable to missile attack; and second, in the case of the military targets, the missiles reach their targets much faster than do bombers, and therefore would be more effective in catching enemy bombers and missiles on the ground; and third, our missile systems have a much greater survival potential and endurance in the wartime environment, and therefore can be used with more control and deliberation.

c. The bombers are soft and concentrated and they depend upon warning and quick response for their survival under attack. This is a less reliable means of protection than hardening and dispersal or mobility. Moreover, it means that the bombers must be committed to attack very early in the war and cannot be held in reserve to be used in a controlled and deliberate way.

d. Bombers are expensive. For the same cost (in total five year system costs) as a wing of B-52's with tankers and Skybolts, we can buy 250 Minutemen hardened and dispersed, or 6 Polaris submarines.

GAM-87 Skybolt

Air defense studies indicate that the most effective means for penetrating air defenses are low altitude penetration and defense suppression, both of which are more effective than attempting to out-run the defenses at high altitude. The Skybolt is intended to provide a major improvement in the penetration capability of the programmed B-52 force at a relatively low cost. The 800 Skybolt missiles on alert bombers ought to be able to overcome almost any Soviet defense and make it possible for the bombers to go into their targets and attack them with gravity bombs. The total cost for 1150 Skybolts for the period FY 1962-1967 is estimated to be $1.6 billion.

KC-135

Twenty-seven squadrons of KC-135's (540 operational aircraft) have been procured through FY 1962. Air Force studies indicate that 800 KC-135's are required, with most of the increment going to support the B-52 force. (About 70 KC-135's are required to support TAC, 20 for command posts, and 80 to support the B-58 fleet.) However, beyond approximately 470 tankers, more KC-135 are not required to enable the B-52's to reach their targets. Rather, the basis for the Air Force stated requirement for more tankers is to improve the ability of the bombers to penetrate enemy defenses by allowing them to choose more favorable routes or to fly more at low altitude. Improved penetration capability achieved this way and Skybolt for defense suppression are not both required. Moreover, Skybolt appears to be more effective. Therefore, in my judgment, the expenditure of approximately $1.1 billions to procure 160 extra tankers and operate them for 5 years is not required. The force of 640 tankers which I recommend will provide 470 to support the B-52's; 80 for the B-58's; 70 to support TAC; and 20 for command posts.

Titan II

The 18 extra Titan missiles proposed by the Air Force would cost approximately $372 millions to procure and operate for 5 years. The Titan II has a substantially larger payload than Minuteman. It will be able to deliver [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] rather than [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] warheads now programmed for Minuteman. But the total system cost of Titan II is about four times that of Minuteman hard and dispersed. At equal cost, four Minutemen are to be preferred to one Titan because, first, they are less vulnerable, and second, they provide more target coverage. Moreover, we already plan to have a substantial force of Atlas and Titan which should be adequate for those special purposes requiring large payloads. Therefore I do not recommend procurement of additional Titans.

Minuteman Hard and Dispersed

Minuteman H & D has the lowest system cost of any of our ICBM's at about $5.5 millions per missile in 5 year costs. It is clearly the preferred way to acquire more ICBM's. However, I am not recommending that we procure more than 100 in FY 1963 because our over-all force requirements do not make it necessary. The difference between the Air Force proposed procurement of 600 missiles in FY 1963 and the 100 I am recommending, in 5 year system costs, is approximately $2.75 billions.

Mobile Minuteman

Mobile Minuteman would serve as a hedge against our being heavily outnumbered by the Soviet ICBM force, a low Soviet CEP, or unexpected failure of the hardened Minuteman to meet estimated blast resistance--conditions lowering the survival potential of hard and dispersed Minutemen. It would also serve as a hedge against unexpected advances in Soviet anti-submarine warfare capability that would reduce the security of Polaris. However, Mobile Minuteman may have troubles of its own, including wartime fallout (which may reduce substantially its wartime endurance), peacetime sabotage and espionage and operational problems associated with the transport of explosives and attempted random operation. Moreover, if we were to complete the Air Force recommended program of 300 Mobile Minutemen, Mobile Minuteman would cost about 2.5 times as much per missile as Minuteman hard and dispersed.

Therefore, we are not yet certain that Mobile Minuteman will be required. The action I am recommending is in the nature of lead time reduction on the missile production program. If the combination of contingencies favoring Mobile Minuteman does not occur, I shall reconsider the decision and recommend cancellation of the production program.

Polaris

This system has the most survival potential in the wartime environment of any of our long range nuclear delivery systems. Polaris missiles do not have to be launched early in the war, they can be held in reserve and used in a controlled and deliberate way to achieve our wartime objectives. For example, Polaris is ideal for counter-city retaliation. However, as the calculations shown above indicate, the force already programmed is large and can cause great damage to the population and industry of the Soviet Union. This reduces the urgency of more Polaris missiles. Consequently, I recommend that we procure 6 more Polaris submarines in FY 1963. The cost, on a 5 year basis, of the 6 submarines will be about $930 millions less than the cost of the 10 submarines proposed by the Navy.

Robert S. McNamara

CM-372-61

Washington, September 27, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, JCS General 1961. Top Secret. Attached to a September 28 covering note from Clifton to Taylor which reads in part: "When the President returns from Newport we can give him as much material as he needs." The President and his party arrived in Newport, Rhode Island, from New York on September 26 and returned to Washington on October 2.

SUBJECT
Reaction Time Required by the Soviets to Launch an Attack with Currently Available Medium and Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missiles

/2/See Document 44.

Condition I. --

Crews on routine standby, electrical equipment cold, missiles not fueled.

Condition II. --

Crews on alert, electrical equipment warmed up, missiles not fueled.

Condition III. --

Crews on alert, electrical equipment warmed up, missiles fueled and topped. This condition probably cannot be maintained for more than an hour or so.

There is some evidence that rapid reaction time has been a Soviet objective. It is not possible to determine the condition of readiness of Soviet missile launchers at any given time.

2. Salvo times will vary according to the type of missile and the handling capability of the associated radio-inertial guidance system. For all classes, a successful salvo includes those missiles launched within 15-30 minutes of the scheduled time.

3. Available information indicates that all Soviet missile launchers have a refire capability. Assuming that the launching facilities are not damaged by accident or by attack, a second ICBM could be launched from the same pad in about 16 hours. Two additional missiles are estimated probably available for each MRBM launcher and a second salvo could be launched about 4 to 6 hours after the first.

L. L. Lemnitzer

Washington, September 30, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Defense Budget FY 63 1/61-10/61. Secret. This draft memorandum is Appendix II to Document 50, but was circulated in advance of it.

SUBJECT
Program for Deployment of Nike Zeus

This Appendix summarizes the various factors that were considered in reaching a decision to recommend a program for deployment of Nike Zeus. The Appendix includes the following sections:

/2/Only this section is printed here.

II. Possible Courses of Action

III. Description, Status, and Technical Evaluation

IV. Reasons for Limited Deployment

V. Growth Capability of Nike Zeus

/3/This section describes the recommended program of 6 Zeus Defense Centers, each with a Zeus Acquisition Radar, and 12 Nike-Zeus batteries, each with one discrimination radar, 6 target track radars, 12 missile track radars, and 96 missiles. The mission of the system, which would take 6 years to complete installation from the time of a decision to construct it, was to defend 6 cities and "about 39 million people."

The question whether the Nike Zeus anti-missile system should be deployed has been under consideration for several years. I have now decided to recommend that funds be included in the FY '63 budget for Nike Zeus production support. This would make possible its limited deployment in the near future. The Joint Chiefs of Staff support this recommendation.

A recent technical analysis has confirmed that Nike Zeus will not provide soft targets an effective defense against large scale or sophisticated ICBM attacks. A purely technical appraisal would not lead to a recommendation for deployment of a weapon system with so limited an operational effectiveness. This has been the conclusion of past technical evaluations; the current review has revealed no important new technical factors.

On the other hand, the following considerations appear, in my judgment, to favor a limited deployment of Zeus:

a. Although the potential capabilities of sophisticated ICBMs are undisputed, they must be balanced against the expectation that the Soviets will make some errors in the design of their ICBM force and have technical, organizational, and resource difficulties which could limit the capabilities of this force. Our own experience with the development and deployment of ICBM forces has provided examples of such limitations.

b. The existence of a deployed defense may substantially increase the degree of uncertainty at the Soviet decision-making level. The offense will find it more difficult to be certain that weaknesses do not exist which may have been discovered by the defense. Recent evidence indicates that existing warheads on our ballistic missiles are subject to destruction at fairly large distances by nuclear detonations. Though this would not in fact make Nike Zeus effective against planned U.S. missile systems, it is an example of the unpredictable elements involved.

c. In Soviet planning for a military operation, there would have to be some diversion of ICBM forces to penetrate a deployed defense, even though the economic exchange ratio is unfavorable to the defense. This may take the form of extra missiles assigned to saturate, confuse, or destroy anti-missile systems or the introduction of sophisticated reentry vehicles with penetration systems and other protective devices.

d. Even limited deployment would inhibit blackmail from secondary powers, provide some protection against accidental attacks and against violations of arms control agreements.

e. Some counter may be desirable against future Soviet claims to a successful anti-missile system. Soviet efforts in the field of ballistic missile defense appear to be more ambitious than our own efforts. Even if U.S. scientists can offer claims of a U.S. capability to counter completely the USSR defense, this will not cancel out the psychological advantage gained by the USSR in announcing or demonstrating an ICBM defense capability.

f. A system in being may be used as the basis for introducing some improved performance capabilities if target identification proves to be more feasible than is now expected or if reentry vehicle vulnerability is greater than now estimated.

These factors are sufficiently compelling to recommend a limited deployment of the Nike Zeus system. An operational capability can be obtained starting in 1965 and, although other city-defense systems of somewhat greater capability are feasible by about 1970, none of the current proposals provides assurance of a truly effective defense of cities. It should be recognized that deployment of any active city defense (including Nike Zeus) presupposes a system of civilian fall-out shelters.

There is at least one danger in deployment of a defense system of doubtful effectiveness such as Nike Zeus: the Executive Branch of the government, the Congress, and the people may develop an unwarranted faith in its capability to deter a Soviet attack or to mitigate its consequences if full-scale nuclear warfare is initiated.

[Here follow sections II-VI.]

49. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to President Kennedy/1/

JCSM-697-61

Washington, October 5, 1961.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 2210 (27 Sep 61). Top Secret; Restricted Data.

SUBJECT
Comparison of Nuclear Delivery Forces of the US Vis-à-Vis the Soviet Union (U)

1. In response to your request, a comparison of nuclear delivery forces of the US vis-à-vis those of the Soviet Union has been accomplished. This comparison has been limited to two time periods, viz., 1 October 1961 and 1 July 1963. US forces in this comparison include those forces based in the CONUS and those deployed overseas which have the capability of striking the Sino-Soviet Bloc. No Allied forces have been included. Soviet forces include those capable of striking the US and US forces overseas.

2. Listed below is a comparison of the combat ready forces available to the US and USSR for the two time periods. In the attached Appendix/2/ are detailed explanations of the forces immediately available to both sides.

/2/Not printed.

/*/Notes 1, 2, 3 and 4--See Appendix.

/#/CSAF believes 65 is the correct figure as of 1 October 1961.

/##/CSAF believes 250 is the correct figure.

/###/There is some evidence, not yet conclusive, that the USSR is showing activity toward acquiring a nuclear delivery capability for tactical fighters. USCINCEUR has expressed a belief, although he has no positive proof, that about one-half of the Soviet fighter-bombers possess a nuclear delivery capability.

3. A comprehensive evaluation of the relative posture of the US vis-a-vis the Soviet Union requires that many factors be considered. One of these factors, and probably the most difficult to assess, is the intention of the USSR. Critical to the Soviet judgment is the number of ICBM's they possess. Their three to five fold increase in this category during this period will materially improve their capability to inflict serious damage upon the US. However, based on the above intelligence estimates of Soviet nuclear delivery assets, the US enjoys a military superiority over the USSR in both 1961 and 1963. Relatively speaking, the superiority is not as great in 1961 as it will be in 1963 because of the increased build-up of hardened US missile sites beginning in late 1961. In the critical period of decision between the present and mid 1963, the decisive superiority of US nuclear delivery capability would strongly influence the Soviet Union not to deliberately initiate general war. After this time, the increasing nuclear delivery capability including additional US hardened and mobile missiles will further decrease the likelihood of a deliberate Soviet nuclear attack.

4. In summary, as of 1 October 1961, despite a strong Soviet military posture, the relative strategic balance of forces is in favor of the US, and it is doubtful, except through miscalculation or misadventure, that the Soviets would initiate general war. In 1962, our strategic force levels and our relatively secure strategic weapon systems assure for the US a decisive retaliatory capability that makes it even less likely that the USSR would risk initiating general war. However, there is good evidence that the Soviets in recognition of the above imbalance are striving for weapon systems that will, in the future, provide them with a distinct military advantage. It is estimated that these research and development efforts will be in the AICBM defense system and in the military application of space vehicles./3/

/3/In a memorandum to McNamara dated April 24, 1962, Lemnitzer referred to this memorandum and stated that there had been no significant changes to "alter the conclusions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the short term." It was "highly probable," however, that recent Soviet nuclear tests had advanced Soviet "confidence and competence in the area of nuclear systems development." Any relaxation in the U.S. effort "to maintain a nuclear superiority could result in a deterioration of capability with time to a point where irreparable damage could be done." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 2210 (27 Sep 61)) A memorandum from the JCS to McNamara, dated July 28, 1962, contains a detailed comparison of U.S. and estimated Soviet nuclear stockpiles. (Ibid., JMF 2210 (3 April 62) Sec. 3)

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L. L. Lemnitzer/4/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.