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Preface The economic nature of the firm: a new introduction Louis Putterman and Randall S. Kroszner Part I. Within and Among Firms: The Division of Labor: 1. From The Wealth of Nations Adam Smith 2. From Capital Karl Marx 3. From Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit Frank Knight 4. The Use of Knowledge in Society Friedrich Hayek 5. Relational exchange: economics and complex contracts Victor Goldberg 6. From The Visible Hand Alfred Chandler Part II. The Scope of the Firm: 7. The Nature of the Firm Ronald Coase 8. Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford, and Armen Alchian 9. The Governance of Contractual Relations Oliver Williamson 10. The Organization of Industry G. B. Richardson 11. The Limits of Firms: Incentive and Bureaucratic Features Oliver Williamson 12. Bargaining costs, influence costs, and the organization of economic activity Paul Milgrom and John Roberts 13. Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm David Teece Part III. The Employment Relation, The Human Factor, an d Internal Organization: 4. Production, information costs, and economic organization Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz 15. Contested Exchange: new microfoundations for the political economy of capitalism Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 16. Understanding the employment relation: the analysis of idiosyncratic exchange Oliver Williamson, Michael Wachter and Jeffrey Harris 17. Multitask principal-agent analyses: incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom 18. The prisoners' dilemma in the invisible hand: an analysis of intrafirm productivity Harvey Leibenstein 19. Labor contracts as partial gift exchange George Akerlof 20. Profit sharing and productivity Martin Weitzman and Douglas Kruse Part IV. Finance and Control of the Firm: 21. Mergers and the Market for corporate control Henry Manne 22. Agency problems and the theory of the firm Eugene Fama 23. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure Michael Jensen and William Meckling 24. Organizational forms and decision control Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen 25. The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm Harold Demsetz 26. An economist's perspective on the theory of the firm Oliver Hart 27. Ownership and the nature of the firm Louis Putterman.