07-0224-cr USA v. Siraj

1	UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
2 3	FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
3 4	FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
5	August Term, 2007
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8 9	(Argued: June 16, 2008 Decided: July 9, 2008)
10	Docket No. 07-0224-cr
11	
12	X
13 14	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
15	UNITED STRIES OF AMERICA,
16	Appellee,
17	
18 19	- v
20	SHAHAWAR MATIN SIRAJ,
21	
22	<u>Defendant-Appellant</u> .
23 24	
25	
26	Before: JACOBS, <u>Chief Judge</u> , Straub, <u>Circuit</u>
27	<u>Judge</u> , and Jones, <u>District Judge</u> .*
28 29	Appeal from a judgment of conviction entered on January
29	ippear from a jaagmene er convretion encerea on canaar,
30	18, 2007 in the United States District Court for the Eastern
21	District of New York (Corchen I) Among other shallonges
31	District of New York (Gershon, <u>J.</u>). Among other challenges
32	to his conviction, the appellant contends that he was
33	entitled, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

^{*} The Honorable Barbara S. Jones, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

1	16(a)(1)(B)(i), to discover police reports containing the
2	substance of statements he made to an undercover police
3	officer. For the following reasons, and for those reasons
4	discussed in an accompanying summary order, we affirm.
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6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	MARSHALL L. MILLER (David C. James and Todd Harrison, <u>on the</u> <u>brief</u>), Assistant United States Attorneys <u>for</u> Benton J. Campbell, United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY <u>for</u> <u>Appellee</u> .
14 15 16 17	ROBERT J. BOYLE, New York, NY <u>for Appellant</u> .
18 19	DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge:
20	Shahawar Matin Siraj ("Matin") appeals from a judgment
21	entered January 18, 2007 in the Eastern District of New York
22	(Gershon, <u>J.</u>) convicting him of various offenses arising out
23	of a conspiracy to bomb the Herald Square subway station in
24	midtown Manhattan. Because most of Matin's arguments are
25	defeated by well settled law, we consider them in an
26	accompanying summary order. We write to resolve a single
27	issue of first impression: whether written police reports
28	that memorialize oral statements made by a defendant to an
29	undercover officer must be produced upon demand under

1	Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(B)(i). We hold
2	that they do not.
3	
4	BACKGROUND
5	Between November, 2002 and April, 2004, Matin spoke
6	many times with an undercover New York City Police ("NYPD")
7	officer who operated under the assumed name of Kamil Pasha.
8	After speaking with Matin, Pasha would relay Matin's
9	statements to his NYPD handler; and the handler would create
10	a written report containing the substance of Matin's
11	statements. The government concedes that it did not give
12	the NYPD reports to Matin in response to his pre-trial
13	discovery request under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
14	16.
15	Matin argues that he was entitled to get the reports
16	under subsection (a)(1)(B)(i) of Rule 16, and that he was
17	prejudiced by the government's failure to produce them.
18	
19	DISCUSSION
20	I
21	In determining whether the prosecutor was required to
22	disclose the NYPD reports under Federal Rule of Criminal

1 Procedure 16, we begin with the relevant portion of the

2 text:

3	(A) Defendant's Oral Statement.
4	Upon a defendant's request, the
5	government must disclose to the defendant
6	the substance of any relevant oral
7	statement made by the defendant, before
8	or after arrest, in response to
9	interrogation by a person the defendant
10	knew was a government agent if the
11	government intends to use the statement
12	at trial.
13	
14	(B) Defendant's Written or Recorded
15	Statement. Upon a defendant's request,
16	the government <u>must disclose</u> to the
17	defendant, and make available for
18	inspection, copying, or photographing,
19	all of the following:
20	-
21	(i) any relevant written or recorded
22	statement by the defendant if:
23	
24	 the statement is within the
25	government's possession,
26	custody, or control; and
27	
28	 the attorney for the government
29	knowsor through due diligence
30	could knowthat the statement
31	exists;
32	
33	(ii) the portion of any written
34	record containing the substance of any
35	relevant oral statement made before or
36	after arrest if the defendant made the
37	statement in response to interrogation by
38	a person the defendant knew was a
39	government agent
40	
41	Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1) (emphases added). Matin was

1 (concededly) unaware that Pasha was a government agent, and 2 does not contend on appeal that he was entitled to the 3 reports under subsections 16(a)(1)(A) or (a)(1)(B)(ii). 4 Rather, he characterizes his statements--as embodied in the 5 NYPD reports--as "written or recorded statement[s] by the 6 defendant," and argues that they were therefore discoverable 7 under Rule 16(a)(1)(B)(i).

Rule 16(a)(1)(B) distinguishes between two types of 8 "Written or Recorded" statements. Subsection (i) makes 9 discoverable all "relevant written or recorded statement[s] 10 by the defendant" that the prosecutor could reasonably know 11 are within the "government's possession, custody, or 12 control." Subsection (ii) makes discoverable certain 13 portions of "written record[s] containing the substance of 14 any relevant oral statement" made by the defendant -- "if the 15 16 defendant made the statement in response to interrogation by a person the defendant knew was a government agent." 17

Matin argues that he was entitled to his statements under subsection (i) because the "substance of [his] relevant oral statement[s]," Fed. R. Crim. P. [6(a) (1) (B) (ii), became "written or recorded statement[s] [0f] the defendant" for purposes of subsection (i), when

1 they were reduced to writing in the NYPD reports.

We decline to adopt Matin's proposed reading of Rule
16. <u>Accord United States v. McClure</u>, 734 F.2d 484, 493
(10th Cir. 1984). Two closely related rationales inform our
holding.

First, Matin's reading creates redundancy in the 6 7 statute. If the substance of a defendant's oral statements could be discovered under subsection (i) as soon as it is 8 embodied in a written record, then every statement 9 discoverable under subsection (ii) would also be 10 discoverable under subsection (i). Matin's proposed 11 construction would therefore violate the "'well-settled' 12 principle 'that courts should avoid statutory 13 interpretations that render provisions superfluous, " In re 14 Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 227 (2d Cir. 15 16 2006) (quoting State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Salovaara, 326 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2003)). 17

<u>Second</u>, by explicitly designating as discoverable <u>only</u> those written memorializations of oral statements made in response to interrogation by a known government agent under subsection (a) (2) (B) (ii), Rule 16 implicitly excludes from its scope written memorializations of other oral statements

such as those at issue here. Adopting Matin's reading of the term "written or recorded statement" would undermine that purpose by rendering discoverable <u>any</u> oral statement later embodied in a written report within the government's "possession, custody, or control."

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- 7

II

Our holding is not inconsistent with United States v. 8 Johnson, 525 F.2d 999, 1003-04 (2d Cir. 1975), which held 9 10 that a government agent's written summary of a defendant's oral statement was discoverable as a "written or recorded 11 statement" under the 1966 version of Federal Rule of 12 Criminal Procedure 16. Johnson does not control this case 13 14 because the 1966 version of Rule 16 differs from today's version in a crucial respect: it contained no analog to 15 16 subsection (a) (1) (B) (ii). And it is upon subsection 17 (a) (1) (B) (ii) that our holding rests.

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- 19

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and for those stated in the accompanying summary order, we affirm.