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Center for Problem-Oriented Policing 
Got a Problem? We’ve got answers! 

Log onto the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing website 
at www.popcenter.org for a wealth of information to help 
you deal more effectively with crime and disorder in your 
community, including: 

• Web-enhanced versions of all currently available Guides 
• Interactive training exercises 
• Online access to research and police practices 
• Online problem analysis module 


Designed for police and those who work with them to 
address community problems, www.popcenter.org is a great 
resource in problem-oriented policing. 


Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 
Response Guide Series 
No. 3 

Shifting and Sharing 
Responsibility for 
Public Safety Problems 

Michael S. Scott 
Herman Goldstein 

This project was supported by cooperative agreement 
#2003CKWX0087 by the Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions 
contained herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily 
represent the official position of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
References to specific companies, products, or services should not 
be considered an endorsement of the product by the author(s) or 
the U.S. Department of Justice. Rather, the references are 
illustrations to supplement discussion of the issues. 

www.cops.usdoj.gov 

ISBN: 1-932582-55-X 

August 2005 


About the Response Guide Series 

The response guides are one of three series of the 
Problem-Oriented Guides for Police. The other two are the 
problem-specific guides and problem-solving tools. 

The Problem-Oriented Guides for Police summarize knowledge 
about how police can reduce the harm caused by specific 
crime and disorder problems. They are guides to 
preventing problems and improving overall incident 
response, not to investigating offenses or handling specific 
incidents. The guides are written for police—of whatever 
rank or assignment—who must address the specific 
problems the guides cover. The guides will be most useful 
to officers who 

• understand basic problem-oriented policing
principles and methods,

• can look at problems in depth, 

• are willing to consider new ways of doing police
business,

• understand the value and the limits of research
knowledge, and

• are willing to work with other community agencies to
find effective solutions to problems.


The response guides summarize knowledge about whether 
police should use certain responses to address various 
crime and disorder problems, and about what effects they 
might expect. Each guide 

• describes the response, 
• discusses the various ways police might apply the
response,
• explains how the response is designed to reduce
crime and disorder,



• examines the research knowledge about the response, 
• addresses potential criticisms and negative 
consequences that might flow from use of the 
response, and 
• describes how police have applied the response to 
specific crime and disorder problems, and with what 
effect. 


The response guides are intended to be used differently 
from the problem-specific guides. Ideally, police should 
begin all strategic decision-making by first analyzing the 
specific crime and disorder problems they are confronting, 
and then using the analysis results to devise particular 
responses. But certain responses are so commonly 
considered and have such potential to help address a range 
of specific crime and disorder problems that it makes sense 
for police to learn more about what results they might 
expect from them. 

Readers are cautioned that the response guides are designed 
to supplement problem analysis, not to replace it. Police 
should analyze all crime and disorder problems in their 
local context before implementing responses. Even if 
research knowledge suggests that a particular response has 
proved effective elsewhere, that does not mean the response 
will be effective everywhere. Local factors matter a lot in 
choosing which responses to use. 

Research and practice have further demonstrated that, in 
most cases, the most effective overall approach to a 
problem is one that incorporates several different 
responses. So a single response guide is unlikely to provide 
you with sufficient information on which to base a 


coherent plan for addressing crime and disorder problems 
Some combinations of responses work better than others. 
Thus, how effective a particular response is depends partly 
on what other responses police use to address the problem. 


These guides emphasize effectiveness and fairness as the 
main considerations police should take into account in 
choosing responses, but recognize that they are not the only 
considerations. Police use particular responses for reasons 
other than, or in addition to, whether or not they will work, 
and whether or not they are deemed fair. Community 
attitudes and values, and the personalities of key decision-
makers, sometimes mandate different approaches to 
addressing crime and disorder problems. Some communities 
and individuals prefer enforcement-oriented responses, 
whereas others prefer collaborative, community-oriented, or 
harm-reduction approaches. These guides will not necessarily 
alter those preferences, but are intended to better inform 
them. 

For more information about problem-oriented policing, visit 
the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing online at 
www.popcenter.org. This website offers free online access to: 

• the Problem-Specific Guides series, 
• the companion Response Guides and Problem-Solving Tools
series,
• instructional information about problem-oriented
policing and related topics,
• an interactive training exercise, and 
• online access to important police research and
practices.



Acknowledgments 

The Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series is very much a 
collaborative effort. While each guide has a primary author, 
other project team members, COPS Office staff and 
anonymous peer reviewers contributed to each guide by 
proposing text, recommending research and offering 
suggestions on matters of format and style. 

The principal project team developing the guide series 
comprised Herman Goldstein, professor emeritus, University 
of Wisconsin Law School; Ronald V. Clarke, professor of 
criminal justice, Rutgers University; John E. Eck, professor of 
criminal justice, University of Cincinnati; Michael S. Scott, 
clinical assistant professor, University of Wisconsin Law 
School; Rana Sampson, police consultant, San Diego; and 
Deborah Lamm Weisel, director of police research, North 
Carolina State University. 

Cynthia Pappas oversaw the project for the COPS Office. 
Stephen Lynch edited the guide. Research for the guides was 
conducted at the Criminal Justice Library at Rutgers 
University under the direction of Phyllis Schultze. 

The project team also wishes to acknowledge the members of 
the San Diego, National City and Savannah police 
departments who provided feedback on the guides' format 
and style in the early stages of the project, as well as the line 
police officers, police executives and researchers who peer 
reviewed each guide. 


Acknowledgements 

This guide is a modified version of an article titled 
"Shifting and Sharing Police Responsibility to Address 
Public Safety Problems" by Michael S. Scott in Handbook of 
Crime Prevention and Community Safety, edited by Nick Tilley 
and published by Willan Publishing. The authors 
appreciate the cooperation of the editor and publisher in 
permitting this modification of the original article. 


Contents 

About the Response Guide Series  .i 

Acknowledgments . iv 

Introduction . 1 

Methods for Shifting and Sharing Responsibility for Public Safety Problems . 6 
Educating Victims and Offenders  . 9 
Making a Straightforward Informal Request . 11 
Making a Targeted Confrontational Request. . 12 
Engaging Another Existing Service Agency. . . . . 14 
Pressing for the Creation of a New Organization  . .. . . . 18 
Shaming Delinquent Parties . . . 20 
Withdrawing Police Services . . . . . . . 22 
Charging Fees for Police Services. . . . . . . . 24 
Pressing for Legislation. . . . . . . . . . 26 
Bringing a Civil Action  . 28 

Considerations for Shifting and Sharing Responsibility for Public Safety Problems . . . 31 
Making the Case for Shifting Responsibility. . .  . . . . 31 
Measuring the Effectiveness of New Responses . . . . . . . . 32 
Determining the Appropriate Degree of Pressure to Shift Responsiblity . .. . . 33 
Conclusion . . . . . . . 34 

Endnotes. . . .. . . . .35 

References  . . . . . . . . .37 

About the Authors . .43 

Recommended Readings  . . . .46 

Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police. . . . .50 


Introduction 

The public calls upon the police to respond to an astounding 
range of problems and to perform an extraordinary diversity 
of tasks, all the while assuming that police have the expertise 
and resources to do so. Many of these problems and tasks fall 
to the police through the default of others: from gaps in 
government services, to the abandonment of responsibility by 
private citizens, corporations, and other organizations. This 
has always been a concern. In recent years, through a more 
methodical approach to policing, police are increasingly 
pressing for a more rational distribution of responsibilities 
based upon a detailed examination of the differing facets of 
police business. 

This guide details the ways in which police can persuade or 
coerce others to address crime and disorder problems. As 
such, it differs from other guides in the Response Guides series; 
whereas most Response Guides examine the kinds of responses 
that can be used to address common crime and disorder 
problems—crackdowns, street closings, publicity campaigns, 
video surveillance, and so forth—this guide examines how 
police can get others to respond to such problems, regardless 
of the form that such responses may take, provided they do 
not violate basic standards of propriety and legality. 

Public safety problems are commonly addressed through a 
combination of responses; seldom is a single type of response 
sufficient. Of course, many public safety problems are 
adequately addressed by the police in the exercise of their 
normal authority and expertise. Increasingly, however, police 
and others are discovering that it is not only the police who 




have the authority and expertise to respond to many public 
safety problems; consequently, the police have come to 
depend heavily upon others to aid them in responding 
effectively to crime and disorder. There is growing evidence 
that by addressing the conditions that underlie crime and 
disorder problems, rather than merely looking to arrest 
offenders, police can more effectively prevent and control 
such problems.1 

† See the Center for Problem-
Oriented Policing online library at 
www.popcenter.org/libraryrecommended_readings_2.htm for 
further readings on situational crime 
prevention. 

†† The two most prominent award 
programs are the Herman Goldstein 
Award for Excellence in Problem-
Oriented Policing (administered in 
the United States) and the Tilley 
Award (administered in the United 
Kingdom). 

There is also growing evidence—much of it found in the 
literature on situational crime prevention—that demonstrates 
how public safety problems can be prevented, reduced, and 
controlled with little or no police involvement, a process by 
which police unquestionably benefit.† Indeed, the very process 
of producing the Problem-Oriented Guides for Police—particularly 
the review of police reports submitted to problem oriented 
policing award programs††—reveals that police frequently 
conclude that they must somehow get others to respond to 
problems that would otherwise be inadequately addressed if 
the police were forced to act alone. 

Once the problem and a remedial strategy have been 
identified, it is important to determine which of the various 
stakeholders is in the best position to implement and enforce 
the proposed solution. Depending on the situation, the police, 
private citizens, industry, or the government may all bear 
some responsibility for addressing a problem. In some 
instances, it is clear that the police are the best choice. For 
example, where a criminal investigation and arrests are 
necessary, the police are typically responsible, as most other 
individuals and organizations lack the authority and expertise 
to perform such tasks. In other instances, however, it is clear 
that someone other than the police should be responsible. For 
example, where changes in corporate policies or practices are 
necessary, it is the corporation, not the police, that has the 
authority to effectuate the necessary policy decisions. In still 


other instances, although the response is clear, there may be 
any number of viable actors who are able to accept 
responsibility for carrying the response to fruition. For 
example, where educating, warning, or advising citizens is 
called for, it is very much an open question whether the police 
or someone else should be responsible for developing and 
delivering the message. 


There are few firm rules that dictate who is primarily 
responsible for addressing a particular public safety problem. 
What rules, for example, dictate who is responsible for 
preventing and controlling retail theft? Is it the police? The 
shop? The consumer? The insurance carrier? The difficulty 
arises because every problem stems from a variety of sources, 
each of which can plausibly be said to bear some 
responsibility for its remediation. Much depends on who 
possesses the skill, knowledge, authority, and resources to 
implement changes that will effectively reduce or control the 
problem. However, much also depends on who possesses the 
political power to avoid accepting responsibility—leaving to 
others, including the police, the responsibility for dealing with 
the problem. Although important, the full range of factors 
that determine legal and moral responsibility for public safety 
problems, as well as the processes and sources of authority 
under which such determinations are made, are beyond the 
scope of this guide.† 

This guide focuses on problems that police accept as falling 
within their proper mandate and that they feel obliged to 
address—even though the acceptance of a measure of 
responsibility for dealing with a problem should not 
automatically burden the police with the sole responsibility for 
it. This guide does not address the problems and duties that 
police seek to transfer to others on the ground that they do 
not fall within the proper scope of police power and 
authority. Many police agencies find themselves performing a 

Introduction 




variety of duties that have little to do with their core 
functions. Some argue that tasks such as providing funeral and 
banking escorts, teaching moral values to schoolchildren, 
guarding construction sites, transporting probation violators to 
jail, investigating intrusion alarms, and the like, should not be 
police duties. To some degree, police have been the victims of 
their own success in advancing the principles of community 
policing because some outreach efforts have resulted in 
citizens bringing problems to the police that the police may 
not be best suited to address. And although police may 
encourage citizens to bring crime and disorder problems to 
their attention in the hope that other agencies will collaborate 
in addressing them, many problems that are brought forward 
result in little or no commitment to cooperation. 

† How responsibility for addressing 
public safety problems is apportioned 
in society has more far reaching 
implications than can be discussed in 
this guide. For further exploration of 
those issues, see Scott (2005). 

Although some individuals will not question the basis upon 
which the police ask others to assume responsibility for 
addressing a problem, the force of such requests can be 
greatly strengthened if police can explain persuasively the 
rationale for the request, including: 

· how compliance with the request will address the problem; 

· the basis for police knowledge about the effectiveness of 
the proposed response; 

· what measures police have already taken to resolve the 
problem; 

· the limitations of those measures; and 

· the benefits to all concerned if new practices are adopted 
voluntarily. 

Police are increasingly seeking to shift and share responsibility 
for addressing public safety problems, largely because of 
several trends within and without the police profession, 
including: 


· an increased police emphasis on prevention and proactivity; 

· an increased emphasis on and capability for conducting 
detailed analysis of police workloads; 

· the recognition that incidents often cluster around 
concentrated sources—common places, offenders, victims, 
and times—which, if dealt with effectively, can greatly 
reduce the magnitude of the problem; and 

· an increased emphasis on efficiency, especially in times of 
tightened budgets and heightened fiscal awareness. 

Determining and assigning responsibility for addressing 
public safety problems will become ever more important as 
the general understanding of what causes problems and what 
best addresses them improves. Until better arrangements are 
made within local communities and in society at large for 
determining and assigning such responsibilities, it will 
continue to fall to police to analyze public safety problems 
and to take the lead in apportioning responsibility for 
addressing them. 

Problem-oriented policing depends heavily on strong, 
mutually trusting partnerships among police and other entities 
and constituencies, partnerships in which each party assumes 
its fair share of responsibility. The overriding goal of 
problem-oriented policing is to adopt responses to 
community problems that are more equitable and effective for 
the community as a whole than are current responses. Police 
should not set out merely to divest themselves of 
responsibility for various tasks. It is only after careful 
exploration and analysis that police should conclude that 
someone else should be doing something different to better 
control a particular crime or disorder problem. 


Methods for Shifting and Sharing 
Responsibility for Public Safety Problems 

The police can apply a variety of methods to get others to 
assume greater responsibility for public safety problems.2 The 
list of methods in Figure 1 is not intended to be exhaustive or 
definitive, but rather illustrative. One way in which the 
methods differ is the degree of coercion that police apply to 
achieve their objective. The list begins with methods that are 
generally less coercive and proceeds to those that are generally 
more coercive, although the degree of coercion may depend 
upon the specific context and not necessarily on the nature of 
the method applied. 

In many instances, it may make sense to first employ the 
methods that are relatively non-coercive and to move to more 
coercive methods only if the former fail to achieve the 
desired cooperation. (See "Determining the Appropriate 
Degree of Pressure Police Ought to Bring to Bear to Shift 
Responsibility," below, for further discussion of this matter.) 

In its ultimate form, the police effort to shift responsibility 
for public safety problems entails assisting others to develop 
the capacity to identify and rectify problems without further 
police intervention. A prime example occurs where police 
work at the neighborhood level helps residents develop what 
sociologists term collective efficacy, "the ability of 
neighborhoods to realize the common values of residents and 
maintain effective social controls."3 Short of a complete shift 
in responsibility, in most instances police look to shift or 
share part of the responsibility with respect to a specific 
problem or set of problems, bounded in time and space. 


Figure 1. Methods for convincing others to accept
responsibility for community problems


· Educating others regarding their responsibility for the problem

· Making a straightforward informal request of some entity to
assume responsibility for the problem

· Making a targeted confrontational request of some entity to
assume responsibility for the problem

· Engaging another existing organization that has the capacity to
help address the problem

· Pressing for the creation of a new organization to assume
responsibility for the problem

· Shaming the delinquent entity by calling public attention to its
failure to assume responsibility for the problem

· Withdrawing police services relating to certain aspects of the
problem

· Charging fees for police services related to the problem

· Pressing for legislation mandating that entities take measures to
prevent the problem

· Bringing a civil action to compel entities to accept responsibility
for the problem


Explanations and examples of the successful application of 
the various methods for shifting and sharing responsibility for 
public safety problems follow. For many of the examples, a 
more complete and detailed account can be found in the 
original source documents, many of which are 
accessible online via the Center for Problem-Oriented 
Policing website at www.popcenter.org. 


In many instances, police and others employ a variety of 
methods to address a problem, thereby complicating efforts 
to understand precisely the effect that each method has had 
on the problem. The methods used are not mutually exclusive. 

For example, where the police succeed in encouraging another 
agency to confront the persons causing a particular problem, 
while at the same time they persuade a legislative body to 
enact a law imposing special fees for the relevant police 
services, a combination of methods has been employed. 

Two important notes of caution are in order. First, many of 
the example cited below are drawn from reports prepared by 
police agencies. Although such reports have been widely 
accepted and considered credible, few of these initiatives have 
benefited from rigorous and independent evaluation; 
consequently, the conclusions drawn should not be considered 
the sort of proof that is demanded by social science. The 
study of policing would benefit greatly by subjecting police 
initiatives to more rigorous assessment. Second, some 
methods that police may propose to persuade others to 
assume greater responsibility for addressing public safety 
problems, such as a newly-crafted ordinance, will undoubtedly 
face legal challenges. Police should make full use of legal 
counsel where such challenges are likely. At the same time, 
however, counsel would be well-advised not to reflexively nix 
all initiatives that might face such a challenge. Proper legal 
analysis in the problem-oriented context may, on balance, 
conclude that the degree of coercion inherent in the new 
alternative may be less intrusive and more refined than is 
current practice. An ordinance controlling solicitation for 
prostitution, for example, may be preferable—in both the 
resulting fairness and effectiveness—than continued overuse 
of less discriminate arrest and prosecution. 


Educating Victims and Offenders 

Police have long been involved in systematically conveying 
information to the public on how to prevent crime. They do 
this through presentations, brochures, and a variety of other 
programs. Some of these efforts are aimed broadly at the 
general public; others are targeted at specific constituencies. 
Educational messages and programs are directed either at 
potential victims, instructing them on how to avoid being 
victimized, or at potential offenders, instructing them on how 
to avoid offending. Central to all of these efforts, however, is 
the fact that those to whom the message is directed are in a 
position to take actions that will protect themselves from 
either victimization or arrest. Such educational materials and 
presentations are generally low-key; one can take the advice or 
ignore it. Educational messages to potential offenders adopt a 
helpful rather than a warning tone: they are aimed at people 
who are inclined to obey the law, but who might offend out 
of ignorance or carelessness. 

• 
San Diego, California police analysis found that a high 
percentage of sexual assault cases were acquaintance rapes 
involving teenagers. By examining and analyzing the 
relevant case files, the sexual assault unit identified the 
patterns of conduct that led to such assaults and then 
constructed a school-based curriculum designed to inform 
students on reducing the risk of victimization. The initiative 
produced brochures—different ones for males and 
females—that sought to inform students, using language 
and scenarios familiar to them, about what constitutes 
acquaintance rape, about how women can avoid being 
victimized by it, and about how men can avoid being 
accused of it.4 





• 
Based upon the analysis of their experience in dealing with 
crime and disorder in apartment complexes, some police 
agencies have developed remedial manuals for both 
landlords and tenants, and sponsor seminars at which such 
materials are presented.5 The goal is to encourage both 
landlords and tenants to assume more responsibility for 
conditions in their housing units by employing specific 
prevention measures, such as the enforcement of 
occupancy restrictions and prohibitions against illegal 
activity, control over entry and public areas, the installation 
and operation of security systems, and so forth. In many 
instances, persuading property owners and managers to 
lease only to responsible tenants, to enforce the rules that 
govern proper behavior on the premises, and to design and 
maintain properties in ways that discourage problems can 
be more effective than criminal law enforcement. 

• 
Concerned about the problem of underage drinking, police 
in Plano, Texas developed an informational presentation for 
the owners and managers of stores licensed to sell alcoholic 
beverages outlining the measures that could be taken to 
help store clerks comply with laws prohibiting the sale of 
alcohol to minors. Although stern warnings and 
enforcement were essential components of the initiative, 
police found that some clerks were confused about the law 
and about how to detect fraudulent attempts to purchase 
alcohol. Consequently, the informational programs were 
more than a way of issuing a polite warning; they in fact 
helped people who were inclined to obey the law to do so.6 

• 
Police in Lancashire, England and in Portland, Oregon have 
conducted and supported programs designed to educate 
hotel and motel owners on how to recognize common 
crimes—ranging from burglary to prostitution to drug 
manufacturing—and how to prevent them from occurring 
in their establishments.7 



• 
To address the problem of children being hit by cars, police 
in Hamilton-Wentworth, Ontario spearheaded an initiative 
to develop educational materials and programs designed to 
teach children how to cross streets safely. The materials and 
programs were based upon a careful understanding of how 
young children best learn and apply new rules and skills 
and was informed by advice from traffic engineers, 
educators, childcare professionals, parents, and public 
health officials.8 

• 
Police in Blackpool, England, in partnership with local 
government, health, and transportation authorities, liquor 
licensees, community groups, and the media, developed an 
educational campaign to inform visitors on how to behave 
in and around licensed establishments in order to avoid 
becoming either an offender or a victim.9 



Making a Straightforward Informal Request 

The use of straightforward requests is a natural first step that 
police take when seeking to have specific individuals or 
organizations take responsibility for addressing a crime or 
disorder problem. Naturally, a positive response to the initial 
request obviates the need for any increased pressure. 

Here, the police are not simply broadcasting prepared advice 
on prevention to a large audience. Rather, they are focused 
upon asking citizens to resolve an immediate problem by 
taking a specific remedial action. Although the fact that the 
police are making the request may imply that consequences 
will follow if the request is ignored, it is often the case that 
police are merely informing a citizen of something of which 
she was not aware, and the citizen gratefully and graciously 
complies with the request. 


• 
Police in Chula Vista, California concluded that new housing 
developments were vulnerable to burglary simply because 
many of the homes were not designed to safeguard against 
it. Based upon their analysis of the problem, police 
developed a series of recommendations on how new homes 
could be designed and built to deter burglary and made a 
complete presentation of their findings to executives of the 
largest housing development companies in the target area. 
Ultimately, the developers entered into a memorandum of 
understanding whereby they agreed to install recommended 
locks and windows in all new houses and to assist the police 
with other burglary prevention measures. Although the 
developers did not accept all of the recommendations, the 
police achieved some improvement without resorting to 
confrontation or coercion. Early indicators suggest that the 
new measures are contributing to significantly improved 
burglary rates in the target area.10 

• 
After an exhaustive analysis of the problem of appliance 
thefts from houses under construction, police in Charlotte-
Mecklenburg, North Carolina concluded that the best 
method of preventing such thefts was for builders to delay 
the installation of appliances until after a house had been 
purchased and properly secured by its new owner. Police 
presented their analysis to area builders, several of which 
voluntarily agreed to adopt the proposed policy. As a 
consequence, appliance thefts in the target area were 
reduced significantly.11 


Making a Targeted Confrontational Request 

One of the clearest results of recent changes in policing is the 
increased tendency of police agencies to confront aggressively 
those adjudged responsible for a large volume of incidents 
that fall to the police to handle. Police typically resort to this 
more confrontational mode when straightforward requests are 
ignored. 


Typically, police document both how a problem is caused and 
how it is aggravated by the actions or inactions of others. The 
resulting documentation is then presented to the offending 
party, together with a request that preventive measures be 
taken. The hope is that when confronted with such 
documentation the party will feel obliged to assume 
responsibility for taking the requisite preventive measures. 
However, depending on the specific situation, the confrontation 
may be bolstered by either a subtle implication or a more overt 
threat that failure to comply will result in more coercive 
measures. The potential for more coercive measures argues for 
a high standard of accuracy by police in documenting 
conditions. 

Community policing efforts, which place a great deal of 
emphasis on cultivating relationships with citizens affected by 
problems, also contribute to an increase in confrontational 
requests. Whether confronting a drug house, a troublesome bar, 
or disorderliness in a park, police may feel empowered to be 
more confrontational by virtue of the support they receive 
from aggrieved citizens. 

• 
Police in Peel, Ontario identified establishments with a high 
incidence of serving persons subsequently arrested for 
drunken driving and forwarded the information to the local 
liquor licensing board. Armed with these data, licensing 
officials confronted the owners of the problem 
establishments, advised them to take preventive measures, and 
offered detailed advice and training for management and staff 
on how to meet their legal obligations. These confrontational 
requests were made prior to the initiation of any formal 
investigation in order to allow the proprietors to comply 
voluntarily with the law.12 

• 
Police in St. Louis, Missouri informed a finance company that 
a property it had financed was being used for illegal drug 
trafficking. This suggested to the company that their 



investment was at risk, perhaps of being seized by the 
government. Realizing that an outright foreclosure and 
eviction of the property's elderly resident might bring 
adverse publicity, the company instead opted to pay the 
offending resident to relinquish the property and move out. 
The finance company then took possession of the property, 
thereby eliminating the drug trafficking problem.13 In this 
case, police did not need to ask the finance company to take 
remedial measures; merely bringing the matter to its 
attention suggested the proper course of action. 

• Police in Miami, Florida persuaded wholesale fruit and 
vegetable merchants to improve their method for disposing 
of discarded produce, to clean up and improve the 
appearance of the commercial area in which they operated, 
and to improve the traffic flow and parking of commercial 
vehicles, all as part of an effort to reduce crime and 
disorder in a large outdoor produce market. These 
improvements helped to reduce the population of transient 
criminals in the area and to alleviate traffic congestion.14 

Engaging Another Existing Service Agency 

Much police business consists of handling problems and 
cases that fall through holes in the social safety net or that 
constitute an overflow stemming from the limited resources 
of other agencies: mentally-ill persons who are not adequately 
cared for in the community; drug addicts who do not receive 
adequate treatment services; parks, playgrounds, and housing 
developments that are not adequately maintained; cars and 
homes that are abandoned; and so forth. In such cases, police 
sometimes attempt to shift the responsibility for crime 
prevention to another government agency or 
nongovernmental organization that provides relevant services 
in the community. 


In-depth inquiry of the type called for in problem-oriented 
policing often identifies a default or a gap in services that, if 
corrected, would reduce or eliminate a problem. Although a 
particular situation or circumstance may initially be 
characterized as a crime or law enforcement problem, 
penetrating inquiry often redefines the problem and more 
clearly identifies the conditions that contribute to it. Thus, a 
problem initially reported as disorderly, threatening teenagers 
may upon further analysis turn out to be a case of strained 
relationships between senior citizens and teenagers that is 
brought on by the policies of a neighborhood school. 
Engaging school authorities in exploring preventive strategies 
may well result in their taking responsibility for the problem. 

Brokering preventive strategies to another agency can create 
tension if the agency perceives the police initiative as an effort 
to set the agency's agenda or to off-load work onto it. This is 
particularly true during periods of government retrenchment 
when budgets may be limited. Other agencies might not be 
precisely positioned to provide the type or level of service 
recommended by police and may need additional resources to 
meet these new service demands. 

Often, public health and safety departments and 
nongovernmental organizations that serve the disaffected and 
disenfranchised must weigh the initiatives recommended by 
the police against other priorities. Therefore, the 
documentation of the case by the police and the links they are 
able to establish between their findings and their 
recommendations can be critically important. 

It is equally important for police to establish an atmosphere 
of trust and mutual understanding between themselves and 
agencies with overlapping interests; applying more coercive 
measures to shift responsibility is warranted only when trust 
and mutual understanding have broken down. The whole 


movement toward greater institutional partnerships has been 
tremendously important in this regard. Whether such 
partnerships are mandated by legislation, as is the case in the 
United Kingdom, or are either wholly voluntary or compelled 
by executive decree, as is more common in the United States, 
police requests that other agencies change their policies and 
practices are better received if the members of those agencies 
understand and trust the police. Indeed, some individuals and 
organizations may see such police requests as helpful rather 
than coercive. In some cases, police documentation of a 
problem has been used by local authorities and governmental 
organizations to justify programs they have long advocated. In 
other cases, private groups have used police documentation to 
justify expansions in their programs and supporting budgets. 


• 
A police constable in Lancashire, England succeeded in 
resolving a longstanding problem in which a scrap yard was 
used to sell stolen vehicles and generally was a source of 
nuisance to the community. The constable did so not by 
enforcing the criminal law, as had been tried before, but 
rather by referring the matter to the local environmental 
protection agency. That agency found, upon inspection, that 
the scrap yard was inadequately protected against the 
emission of hazardous pollutants. Rather than complying 
with new environmental protection requirements, the scrap 
yard operator opted instead to close the business.15 

• 
Relying on careful data analysis, police in Blackpool, 
England persuaded outside agencies that the most prolific 
drug-addicted criminal offenders ought to receive intensive 
drug treatment and other social services immediately upon 
release from incarceration. This ran counter to conventional 
practices, wherein many newly released offenders were 
forced to wait long periods for drug treatment, by which 
time most had resumed using drugs and committing crime. 
Police engaged probation officials, prosecutors, social 



workers, and drug treatment providers to ensure that
qualifying offenders who were willing to accept such
services received them in a timely and reliable fashion. 
A
12-month evaluation indicated that the initiative yielded a 30
percent reduction in reported crime in the target area, no
evidence of geographical displacement, and evidence that
most offenders participating in the program had committed
fewer offenses while receiving treatment than they had in 
a comparable period before treatment.16

• 
Police in Fremont, California succeeded in persuading the 
local domestic violence victim assistance program to accept 
direct referrals from police officers. Police demonstrated 
through analysis that there was a critical need to give high 
priority services to repeat victims of domestic violence. 
Previously, victims themselves had had to seek out such 
services. An assessment of the intervention indicated a 
demonstrable reduction in repeat calls for police services to 
victims of domestic violence. In this instance, although the 
police assumed a greater responsibility for dealing with 
chronic domestic violence victims and offenders, their 
closer working relationship with other service providers 
enabled them to concentrate limited police and social 
service resources on the most problematic individuals.17 

• 
Police in Charlotte, North Carolina initiated discussions with 
the Mexican consulate and local banks to persuade recent 
Mexican immigrants to use secure financial services for 
bank and checking accounts, wire transfers, and so forth, in 
order to reduce the amount of cash carried by—and stolen 
from—immigrants. The police recognized that a lack of 
trust and understanding of U.S. financial institutions 
discouraged recent immigrants from adopting safer and less 
expensive financial practices and further recognized that the 
consulate and banks were better positioned to convey this 
message to immigrants than were the police.18 



Pressing for the Creation of a New Organization 

Police are not always in a position to implement measures that 
will best address a specific problem, and there may not be any 
other appropriate entity to do so. Police may then find 
themselves advocating the creation of a new organization 
with the mandate and resources to address the problem. 

With the increase in efforts to organize neighborhoods, 
especially in large urban areas, it is frequently not necessary 
for police to be the primary catalyst of such efforts; instead, 
police often assume a supportive role. There are also 
situations in which a community organization grows 
organically out of concern for a given problem, with the 
police enlisted in support of the objective. However, as 
organizations come into existence and are sustained, police 
find that they are gradually transferring responsibility for 
specific prevention strategies to the new organizations. 

• 
In an effort to reduce the large demand upon police 
resources created by divorced parents seeking assistance 
with the enforcement of child custody orders, police in 
Fresno, California helped establish and promote the use of 
the privately owned and operated Child Custody Program. 
The Child Custody Program assists parents with child 
custody exchanges by providing a safe facility where parents 
can exchange children without the need for interaction. The 
Child Custody Program also mediates disputes between 
parents about custody orders. Police worked with the courts 
to develop a process that allowed parents to file their own 
court reports alleging breaches of custody orders. The new 
program and procedures reduced the volume of calls for 
police service for this problem by about half. Thus, the 
police interest in preventing domestic disputes and violence 
related to child custody was met in a more efficient 
manner.19 


• 
Police in Glendale, California organized an effort to create 
a new center for day laborers as a means of eliminating the 
disorder, drunkenness, fighting, loitering, noise, litter, and 
traffic congestion attendant to an unregulated day labor 
market. Police secured commitments from private charitable 
organizations to operate the center and its programs, which 
included social services, language improvement classes, and 
legal and labor negotiation services. The local 
transportation authority provided the land and a local 
building supply company donated the materials to construct 
the new facility and the staff to help operate it. An advisory 
board comprising representatives of the various 
stakeholders was created to oversee the center. Police then 
persuaded local authorities to pass an ordinance that 
required all day laborers to secure employment through the 
center. The net result was a dramatic reduction in all aspects 
of the problem, a marked improvement in the 
employability, wages, and working conditions of laborers, 
and a substantial reduction in demands on police and other 
emergency services.20 

• 
Police in Racine, Wisconsin concluded that one solution to 
cleaning up drug-infested neighborhoods was to purchase 
problem properties and either convert them for use as 
community police stations or refurbish and sell them to 
responsible occupants. In order to accomplish this, police 
convinced local business leaders to create a private not-forprofit 
organization that could buy and sell real estate for 
the purposes espoused by the police and city government. 
This new arrangement led to the purchase and 
rehabilitation of a significant number of residential 
properties and inspired other private redevelopment in 
troubled neighborhoods. The initiative yielded dramatic 
reductions in violent and property crime, a concomitant 
reduction in calls for police services, and a substantial 
improvement in the housing stock in the target areas.21 



• 
Police in Fontana, California worked with over 20 local 
charities, churches, and businesses to form a new network 
of services for homeless individuals, many of whom were 
creating extraordinary problems for police by their criminal 
and disorderly behavior. The so-called Transient 
Enrichment Network consolidated services for the 
homeless, providing a central facility where each individual's 
special needs—whether mental or physical health, job 
placement, housing, food and shelter, or substance abuse— 
could be diagnosed and addressed. This new network 
inspired police officers to deal more directly with homeless 
individuals, confident that doing so would lead to 
improvements in the individual's behavior and 
circumstances. Early results were overwhelmingly positive: 
over 500 individuals benefited from the program in its first 
two years of operation. Moreover, crimes and calls for 
police service attributed to homeless individuals declined 
substantially.22 

Shaming Delinquent Parties 

Public shaming is often an intermediate step between the type 
of private confrontation described earlier and resort to legal 
action. The stakes in resorting to public shaming are high for 
both the police and those against whom it is directed. The 
police must obviously be on solid ground. Public reputation is 
of great value to individuals, businesses, and agencies; hence, 
having police publicly discredit them can have significant 
long-term consequences. This method of shifting 
responsibility can be perceived as the most coercive. 
Consequently, police typically resort to it only after more 
private methods of persuasion have failed. The police goal is 
to call to public attention the nature of the problem, the 
factors that cause or contribute to the problem, the 
reasonableness of police requests, the refusal or failure to 
respond to less coercive measures, and the arguments for 
holding others accountable for their contributions to the 
problem. 


• 
Police in Lancashire, England sent letters to the registered 
owners of vehicles spotted cruising around areas in which 
street prostitution was a problem.23 Although the tone of 
the letters was purely educational, the unspoken effect—and 
no doubt intention—of the letters was to expose "curb 
crawlers" to possible shame by creating a risk that others 
might read the letters. Similarly, police in many jurisdictions 
collaborate with local media outlets to publicize the arrests 
of persons caught soliciting prostitutes.24 

• 
In an effort to reduce alcohol-related problems in Green 
Bay, Wisconsin, police officers persuaded local media outlets 
to expose both the irresponsible practices of certain tavern 
owners and the reluctant enforcement of alcohol licensing 
sanctions by certain public officials. This effort, in 
combination with other actions, resulted in the closing of 
several problem taverns through stricter enforcement of 
liquor licensing provisions and a concomitant reduction in 
calls for police services, all of which inspired new economic 
development in and a nearly complete transformation of the 
target area.25 

• 
Police in a number of jurisdictions have developed ranking 
or rating systems by which they communicate to the general 
public the relative security of different vehicles, alarm 
systems, houses, apartment complexes, and parking 
facilities.26 Operated by British police, the Secured by Design 
program is a prime example of how publicity for meeting 
safety and security standards can become institutionalized. 
This sort of publicity both rewards the manufacturers and 
operators of responsibly designed and managed products 
and properties with favorable ratings and penalizes those 
with unfavorable ratings. 

• 
Seeking to persuade a reluctant owner to improve the 
management and design of a video arcade in the hope of 
reducing the problems associated with its disorderly 



clientele, police in Delta, British Columbia recruited a local 
university's environmental criminology students to conduct 
a detailed study comparing the problematic arcade with 
others in the area. The findings, which clearly demonstrated 
the inadequacies of the arcade's design and management, 
were presented to local government officials and reported 
in the media. As a result of the adverse publicity and 
persuasive findings, the arcade owner agreed to the 
requested changes and the city council enacted a new bylaw 
requiring minimum safety and security provisions for all 
arcades in the jurisdiction. Attendant calls for police service 
declined substantially. Perhaps the ultimate measure of 
success was achieved when the arcade owner began 
advertising that his arcade was safe and secure because it 
adhered to the highest industry standards.27 

Withdrawing Police Services 

Police occasionally seek to force the adoption of preventive 
strategies by refusing to respond, investigate, arrest, or take 
other official action where an individual or organization has 
refused to implement measures that are designed to reduce 
the likelihood of victimization. If a complete service 
withdrawal is not feasible, police may respond with fewer 
resources, which can be done by lowering the priority given to 
certain types of incidents, by putting more of the reporting 
burden on the complainant, or by reducing the level of 
follow-up service after the taking of an initial report. 

Typically, the withdrawal or modification of police services 
occurs in the context of a business operation, where there is 
overwhelming evidence that a problem would be eliminated if 
certain measures were put in place, measures which the 
business owner or operator will not implement based upon a 
belief that doing so would reduce sales. 


The decision to withdraw services should only be made after 
a consideration of the disparate impact withdrawal might have 
on those who cannot afford even the most elementary 
remedial measures. For example, where imposing such a cost 
forced an already marginal business to close its doors, an 
additional consequence might be to deprive a depressed 
neighborhood of a vital business or service. 

Complete withdrawal of police service is rare, most likely 
because police are reluctant to be seen as refusing to perform 
what others perceive as “their job.” Police may also worry that 
the failure to respond to a simple request for assistance may 
result in their failing to attend to a more serious infraction 
than the one that was originally reported. 

Most service withdrawals arise out of commercial transactions 
that are arguably civil rather than criminal matters. A few 
typical examples follow. 

• 
Some police agencies refuse to respond to reports of 
motorists who drive away from self-service gas stations 
without paying where a station has experienced a high 
volume of drive-offs but has refused to install a prepayment system. Alternatively, police may merely refuse to 
send an officer to take the report of such an incident, 
instead requiring station staff to file a form with police. 

• 
Police may refuse to investigate a case in which a diner 
leaves a restaurant without paying, particularly if the 
restaurant has a poor system for monitoring customers and 
collecting payments. 



• 
Police may advise shops that have checks returned for lack 
of sufficient funds that they will not investigate the 
incident, especially if the store does not require proper 
identification or does not maintain a registry of those from 
whom checks will not be accepted. Alternatively, police may 
require merchants who expect the police to process bad 
check cases to obtain a fingerprint on the back of the 
cashed check. 

Other than commercial transactions, the most common 
incident that police refuse to provide service for is intrusion 
alarms that have not been verified as suspicious. (See the 
example and reference under "Pressing for Legislation," on 
page 26). 

Charging Fees for Police Services 

Some police agencies seek to recover the cost of providing a 
particular service from the individuals who benefit from the 
service. The rationale for cost recovery is that those who 
make excessive claims are consuming more than their fair 
share of public resources, or at least more than their tax 
payments reasonably entitle them to. In some jurisdictions, 
legislation authorizes police to recover the actual cost of 
police investigations from defendants. In 2003, for example, 
police in Oakland, California successfully recovered $35,000 
in investigative costs from the owners of a problematic 
motel.28 Elsewhere, police and emergency rescue agencies 
charge thrill-seekers for the costs of rescue if their adventures 
go awry. Increasingly, police are extending the cost recovery 
principle to owners whose properties generate an inordinate 
volume of calls, such as taverns and apartment complexes. 


Such fees are not intended as penalties; therefore, recovery is 
typically limited to the actual cost to the police agency. 
Nonetheless, the fees provide an economic incentive to 
individuals and businesses to keep the cost of police services 
under control by keeping problem behaviors under control.† 

• 
Among the most common problems with which police deal 
are security alarm systems installed in homes and businesses, 
which account for an extraordinarily large percentage of 
police business in many areas. In fact, well over 90 percent of 
all such alarms are false, whether the result of system 
malfunction, triggering by animals, or operator error. In this 
situation, the business person or private citizen has taken 
responsibility for a prevention strategy, but ends up imposing 
a major portion of the cost associated with that strategy on 
police. In response, police in many jurisdictions have 
arranged for the enactment of a fee schedule that escalates 
based upon the number of false alarms that are handled, 
thereby pressuring the user to take actions to prevent the 
alarm from registering falsely. In other areas, an annual fee is 
assessed in anticipation of whatever services the police may 
be called upon to render in connection with an alarm, 
including simply maintaining their readiness. 

• 
Police in Halton, Ontario successfully addressed chronic 
problems involving alcohol-related crime and disorder— 
including several full-scale riots—at a large dance club, in part 
by shifting some of the cost for police service back to the 
club's owners. After strict law enforcement and efforts to 
close the club had proven impractical and ineffective, police 
successfully lobbied for a change in the liquor licensing law so 
that licenses stipulated that the cost of any excessive 
consumption of police resources resulting from efforts to 
ensure safety and security in the neighborhood of a licensed 
establishment would be charged to the license holder.29 


† Fees differ from fines in that fees 
merely recoup the government's 
costs while fines may exceed the 
government's costs, imposing 
punitive costs. Either fees or fines 
can be effective incentives to 
encourage those required to pay 
them to change their policies and 
practices so that police are less likely 
to be needed. 


Pressing for Legislation 



In addition to having recourse to the many laws that directly 
proscribe illegal and harmful conduct, police have long been 
aided by a variety of municipal ordinances and administrative 
regulations that are designed to manage and control the 
conditions that foster and engender offending and harm. 
These reflect a legislative judgment that certain businesses, 
organizations, and individuals are responsible for ensuring 
that the activities in which they are engaged are carried out in 
a safe and orderly fashion; a prime example is the extensive 
regulation of the sale of alcoholic beverages. Police now 
commonly establish conditions for issuing permits for public 
events such as parades, festivals, demonstrations, and street 
parties—conditions that require event organizers to provide 
for the public's safety and to prevent disorder and crime. The 
primary responsibility for such measures rests with the license 
or permit holder. The police role is secondary: to reinforce 
the responsibility of the license or permit holder through 
regulatory enforcement. By virtue of the special knowledge 
they have acquired by analyzing crime and disorder problems, 
police are often in a position to propose specific new laws 
and regulations that assign responsibility for controlling 
criminogenic conditions to certain individuals, businesses, or 
groups, and that impose penalties upon those who fail to do 
so.† 

† Legislative enactments of this sort 
are to be distinguished from those 
which merely give police more 
authority to arrest offenders, 
provisions which while potentially 
useful, reinforce the notion that 
police bear primary responsibility for 
controlling problems. 

The adoption of such measures is typically preceded first by 
informal public discussions and later by formal public 
hearings. The police may be among the proponents; 
occasionally, they are the initiators. And in the typical scenario, 
the individuals upon whom the new regulatory burden will fall 
oppose the proposal. The evidence in support of such a 
proposal is sometimes more anecdotal than statistical and 
efforts may be made to introduce data that are imprecise or 
unverifiable. One exception to this pattern is the heated 


debate over whether to require convenience stores to keep 
two or more staff on duty at specified hours of the day; this 
debate has drawn heavily on studies that measure the value of 
the strategy, and has been especially contentious because of 
the conflicting results of those studies. 


• 
To reduce residential burglaries, some cities have 
implemented building codes that mandate design and 
construction features that prevent burglary. Some codes, 
such as the one implemented in Overland Park, Kansas, in 
2003, go well beyond simply requiring locks on doors and 
windows and regulate features such as lighting, natural 
surveillance, and door and window strength.30 

• 
As part of an initiative to reduce assaults with glass objects 
on the streets of Liverpool, England, police in Merseyside 
persuaded the Liverpool City Council to enact a regulation 
making the proprietors of licensed establishments 
responsible for preventing bottles and drinking glasses from 
being removed from their premises. Police then persuaded 
the Home Office to approve new legislation authorizing 
police to confiscate glass containers carried on the streets in 
the city center of Liverpool. These legislative actions helped 
to reduce dramatically the number of glass-related injuries 
in the target area.31 

• 
Police in Salt Lake City, Utah persuaded the city council to 
enact an ordinance requiring companies that sell home and 
business intrusion alarm systems to respond and investigate 
any alarm activation prior to summoning the police. Known 
as "verified response," this policy nearly eliminated police 
responses to false intrusion alarms. Evidence to date 
suggests that this policy has had no adverse effect on the 
underlying problem that intrusion alarms are intended to 
address—burglary—and has yielded substantial savings in 
police resources that are then available for more productive 



activities.32 Interestingly, the verified response policy 
supplanted a more commonly-used means of shifting 
responsibility for false alarms: charging customers fees to 
offset the cost of police response. The fee system reduced 
the volume of false alarms, but not to the same degree as 
verified response. 

• Police in Fresno, California assumed a primary role in 
reviewing applications for business licenses and permits and 
in recommending general and specific conditions under 
which such licenses and permits could issue. The conditions 
were tailored to the public safety problems posed by the 
particular business. Fresno police concluded that their new 
and more active role in the licensing process had resulted in 
significant reductions in calls for police services to a number 
of businesses.33 

Bringing a Civil Action 

There are several avenues by which police and others can 
bring legal actions to force individuals and organizations to 
implement measures to prevent crime and disorder.34 This 
strategy is normally reserved for the most egregious 
conditions and is employed only as a last resort, because, with 
some exceptions, the process is difficult and the costs are 
high. Among the numerous forms of civil actions police may 
either initiate or support are nuisance abatement orders (in the 
United States), anti-social behavior orders (in the United 
Kingdom), civil injunctions and restraining orders, civil asset 
forfeitures, civil fines, enforcement of codified regulations, 
and evictions. 

Studies relating to the problem of drugs inevitably focus 
attention on drug houses. The search for an alternative to 
simply acquiring evidence and making arrests has led police to 
dust off largely unused abatement proceedings and to obtain 


new specifically tailored legislation that enables them, through 
a court proceeding and upon the presentation of adequate 
evidence, to seize properties associated with a high incidence 
of crime. Their authorization to do so, punctuated by some 
successful efforts, is intended to force landlords to take 
greater responsibility for controlling the activities that take 
place on their properties. It is the threat of an abatement 
action that often renders targeted confrontational requests 
effective. 


In one of the more novel uses of civil actions, the Safe 
Streets program, based in Oakland, California, trains local 
citizens to acquire the evidence needed to petition in small 
claims court for the abatement of a drug house, without any 
need for a lawyer; any receipts from sale of the premises are 
distributed among the petitioners. Police involvement in this 
process is limited to cooperating with community members 
seeking police documentation of criminal activity occurring in 
or near the subject premises. 

An emerging, although unsettled, development in the United 
States is for police to support civil lawsuits against gun 
manufacturers and distributors as a means of controlling gun-
related violence. Regardless of what one thinks of the merits 
of such suits, their success would provide an extraordinary 
example of how police and local government could compel a 
large industry to assume a significantly greater responsibility 
for the harm associated with its products. 

• Police in Oakland, California filed a civil suit against the 
parent corporation of an international motel franchise for 
failing to control drug dealing, prostitution, and assorted 
crime and disorder on its property.35 The suit followed 
repeated attempts by police to educate the property 
manager and corporate executives about the problems at the 
motel, requests for improvement, and warnings of 


possible legal consequences. In this case, police steadily 
increased the pressure on the corporation in a careful and 
measured manner. Indeed, the special unit of the Oakland 
Police Department that brought the civil action had 
developed a formal process for documenting such problems 
and for bringing increasing levels of pressure to bear upon 
property managers and owners. 


• 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police in Burnaby, British 
Columbia collaborated with tax, fire, building, health, 
immigration, and licensing officials to inspect and file code 
violation charges against the owner of three blocks of flats 
that were being used for large-scale illegal immigrant drug 
trafficking. The owner resisted efforts to improve the 
management of the properties, which were later closed by 
the government and emptied of tenants. This led to the 
geographic displacement of the drug market to a nearby 
public transport station—where police persuaded the 
managers to make design improvements to deter drug 
dealing—and the displacement of the base of operations to 
other nearby blocks of flats—where police helped property 
managers form an information sharing network to prevent 
problem tenants from securing leases. An assessment by 
police concluded that drug trafficking, related crime, and 
citizen complaints all declined substantially.36 


Considerations for Shifting and Sharing 
Responsibility for Public Safety Problems 

Making the Case for Shifting Responsibility 

The process leading up to police efforts to shift or share 
responsibility typically involves: 

• documenting the magnitude of a specific problem; 
• identifying the conditions that contribute to the problem; 
and 
• establishing a link between those conditions and the 
individual, business, or organization deemed responsible for 
them. 


Thus, gathering detailed information, including statistical data, 
is an integral part of the process before it moves forward. 
Because the police are using gradually increasing degrees of 
government power, such studies must be carried out 
meticulously to assure accuracy and fairness, and, when 
resulting in a proposal, to present the strongest possible case.†

† For guidance on conducting good 
problem analysis, see Crime Analysis 
for Problem Solvers in 60 Small Steps and 
Problem-Solving Tips: A Guide to 
Reducing Crime and Disorder Through 
Problem-Solving Partnerships, both listed 
in the Recommended Readings at the 
back of this guide. 

Much of the body of knowledge that police rely upon to 
argue for shifting and sharing responsibility for addressing 
problems is based upon insights they have acquired through 
years of experience and, less commonly, upon rigorous 
research. The value of police expertise is sometimes 
underestimated by those who rely only upon the highest 
standards of social science and policy analysis to inform 
policy decisions; conversely, such expertise is sometimes 
overestimated by those who believe that "street smarts" 
outweigh research-based knowledge. Much police knowledge 
about the prevention and control of crime and disorder is 



largely untested. That does not totally diminish its value, and 
there remains a critical need to capture, test, and refine police 
expertise, thereby contributing to a more formal body of 
knowledge to support police practices. 

Measuring the Effectiveness of New Responses 

Quantifying claims of effectiveness can be tricky, because 
police often apply several different responses to a problem, 
some involving direct action (police enforcement, police 
presence) and others involving indirect action (persuasion and 
coercion of the type described earlier). Determining the 
effect of each response in isolation can be methodologically 
challenging. For more detailed guidance on measuring 
effectiveness, see the companion guide in the Problem-Solving 
Tools series, Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory Guide 
for Police Problem-Solvers. 

Some people may feel uncomfortable about the police dealing 
with citizens in so heavy-handed a manner. Such concerns are 
certainly justifiable where requests and threats are made 
without supporting facts. Thus, a high standard of care in 
gathering and examining the facts can be an effective 
protection against abuse. In addition, in-depth inquiry into a 
specific problem may isolate its cause and may even identify 
specific measures that have the potential to effectively prevent 
it. Collecting hard data about a specific problem can play a 
central role in convincing others of the seriousness of the 
situation and can also serve as evidence where the preventive 
strategy involves legal action. Police should realize that efforts 
to shift responsibility can become an adversarial process in 
which they had best be prepared to document thoroughly 
both the conditions being exposed and the evidence that the 
person named is indeed responsible for them. And they 
should be confident that the measures they are proposing are 
likely to be effective. This is particularly true where the 


proposed shift in responsibility has the potential for a major 
economic impact, because in such cases police can anticipate 
that their activities will be challenged in the courts, where 
judges will weigh the adequacy of the evidence offered in 
support of the proposed regulation. 


Determining the Appropriate Degree of Pressure to 
Shift Responsibility 

Much of the art of policing consists of determining and 
applying the degree of pressure or coercion that is 
appropriate to a particular situation. Police officials who seek 
to shift or share responsibility for public safety problems 
should consider, among other factors: 

• 
the justification for the pressure in the first instance, 
including the cost to the police and to the community of 
maintaining the status quo; 
• 
the reasonableness of police requests, including the 
standards of proof police must carry to establish such 
reasonableness; 
• 
the probability that a new set of responses to the problem 
will have long-term preventive value; 
• 
the likelihood that key constituents will endorse or accept 
the new proposals, which is influenced by the complexity 
of the issue at hand; and 
• 
the nature, degree, and consequences of resisting police 
attempts to share or shift responsibility, including the 
potential risks and costs to the police organization and its 
officials for pressing controversial proposals.† 

† See Buerger (1998) for an 
interesting discussion of the new 
political landscape that police will 
find themselves in as they press for 
indirect action to control crime and 
disorder. 

No single factor will dictate which method or degree of 
coercion should be employed. Rather, the decision should be 
based upon a comprehensive analysis of the breadth and 




seriousness of the problem, the likely effectiveness of the 
proposed solution, and the probability both of cooperation 
from the various stakeholders and of support from the 
general public. 

Conclusion 

As police come to better understand the conditions, practices, 
and behaviors that give rise to specific public safety problems 
and can determine with greater certainty the responses that 
are most effective in preventing and controlling them, they 
will be in a better position to shift and share the responsibility 
for dealing with such problems. Doing so will strengthen the 
police as an institution by increasing their capacity to perform 
the functions that are legitimately within their mandate and 
expertise and will also reduce the need for police to attempt 
to solve problems that are beyond the limits of their 
experience and resources. Most importantly perhaps, it will 
move society toward a style of policing that is more effective, 
efficient, and equitable. 


Endnotes 

1 
National Research Council (2004); Weisburd and Eck 
(2004); Sherman et al. (1997); Tonry and Farrington (1995); 
Goldstein (1990); Eck and Spelman (1987). 

2 
Goldstein (1996). 

3 
Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997), p. 918. 

4 
San Diego Police Department (2001). 

5 
Bureau of Justice Assistance (2000). 

6 
Plano Police Department (2003). 

7 
Lancashire Constabulary (2000); Campbell Resources, Inc. 
(n.d.). 

8 
Hamilton-Wentworth Police Department (1994). 

9 
See Lancashire Constabulary (n.d.), at 
www.lancashire.police.uk/nightsafe.html. 

10 
Chula Vista Police Department (2001). 

11 
Clarke and Goldstein (2003a). 

12 
Peel Regional Police (1996). 

13 
Hope (1994). 

14 
Miami Police Department (2002). 

15 
Lancashire Constabulary (1999). 

16 
Lancashire Constabulary (2003). 

17 
Fremont Police Department (1997). 

18 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (2002). 

19 
Fresno Police Department (1999). 

20 
Glendale Police Department (1997). 

21 
Racine Police Department (1999). 

22 
Fontana Police Department (1998). 

23 
Lancashire Constabulary (2003). 

24 
Buffalo Police Department (2001). 

25 
Green Bay Police Department (1999). 

26 
Clarke and Goldstein (2003b). 

27 
Delta Police Department (1997). 

28 
Oakland Police Department (2003). 


29 Halton Regional Police Service (2003)
.
30 City of Overland Park (2003)
.
31 Merseyside Police (2001)
.
32 Salt Lake City Police Department (2001)
.
33 Fresno Police Department (1997)
.
34 Mazerolle and Roehl (1998)
.
35 Oakland Police Department (2003)
.
36 Royal Canadian Mounted Police (2002)
.



References 

Buerger, M. (1998). "The Politics of Third-Party Policing." In 

L.G. Mazerolle and J. Roehl (eds.), Civil Remedies and Crime 
Prevention: Crime Prevention Studies, Volume 9. Monsey, N.Y.: 
Criminal Justice Press. 

Bureau of Justice Assistance (2000). Keeping Illegal Activity Out 
of Rental Property: A Police Guide for Establishing Landlord 
Training Programs. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of 
Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance. 

Campbell Resources Inc. (n.d.) Clandestine Drug Labs: What 
Every Hotel and Motel Operator Should Know. Portland, Oregon: 
City of Portland and Campbell Resources Inc. 

Charlotte-Mecklenburg (North Carolina) Police Department 
(2000). "Hispanic Robbery Initiative: Reducing Robbery 
Victimization and Increasing Trust of Police and Financial 
Institutions in a Hispanic Community." Submission for the 
Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-
Oriented Policing. 

Chula Vista (California) Police Department (2001). 
"Designing Out Crime: The Chula Vista Residential 
Burglary Reduction Project." Submission for the Herman 
Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented 
Policing. 

City of Overland Park (2003). Ordinance No. BC-2459, 
Section R328 (Physical Security). Overland Park Municipal 
Code. Overland Park, Kansas. 

Clarke, R.V., and H. Goldstein (2003a). Reducing Thefts at 
Construction Sites: Lessons From a Problem-Oriented Project. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services. Accessible at 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=804 


(2003b). Theft from Cars in Center City Parking Facilities-A 
Case Study. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Accessible 
at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=768 

Delta (British Columbia) Police Department (1997). "The Elite 
Arcade: Taming a Crime Generator." Submission for the 
Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-
Oriented Policing. 

Eck, J., and W. Spelman (1987). Problem-Solving: Problem-Oriented 
Policing in Newport News. Washington, D.C.: Police Executive 
Research Forum. 

Fontana (California) Police Department (1998). "Ten-4: The 
Transient Enrichment Network. A Community Collaboration 
to Reduce Homelessness." Submission for the Herman 
Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented 
Policing. 

Fremont (California) Police Department (1997). "Domestic 
Violence Revictimization Prevention. Improving Police 
Response to Repeat Calls of Domestic Violence." Submission 
for the Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-
Oriented Policing. 

Fresno (California) Police Department (1999). "A Multiagency 
Approach to a Community Problem: Stemming Calls-for-
Service Related to Child Custody." Submission for the 
Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-
Oriented Policing. 

(1997). "Local Ordinances and Conditional Use Permits: 
The Empowerment of Law Enforcement." Submission for 
the Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-
Oriented Policing. 


Glendale (California) Police Department (1997). "Day 
Laborer Project: a Community's Response to the Problems 
of Casual Laborers." Submission for the Herman Goldstein 
Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing. 

Goldstein, H. (1990). Problem-Oriented Policing. Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania: Temple University Press. 

(1996). "Establishing Ownership of Inquiries and 
Responses to Problems in the Context of Problem-
Oriented Policing." Unpublished draft on file with author. 

Halton (Ontario) Regional Police Service (2003). "Let's 
Dance: a Community's Collaborative Response to the 
Problems Created by an All Ages Nightclub." Submission 
for the Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in 
Problem-Oriented Policing. 

Hamilton-Wentworth (Ontario) Police Department (1994). 
"Kidestrian. Child Pedestrian Safety." Submission for the 
Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-
Oriented Policing. 

Hope, T. (1994). "Problem-Oriented Policing and Drug-
Market Locations: Three Case Studies." In R.V. Clarke (ed.), 
Crime Prevention Studies, Vol. 2. Monsey, N.Y.: Criminal Justice 
Press. 

Lancashire Constabulary (2003). "The Tower Project. 
Blackpool Community Safety Project." Submission for the 
Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-
Oriented Policing. 

(2003). "Operation Curb: Multi-Agency Problem 
Solving Approach to Street Prostitution in Preston." 
Submission for the Tilley Award Program for Excellence in 
Problem-Oriented Policing. 


(2000). "Operation Adelphi: A Problem-Oriented 
Approach to Hotel Burglary Reduction." Submission for 
the Tilley Award Program for Excellence in Problem-
Oriented Policing. 

(1999). "The Nook Scrap Yard: a POP's Initiative." 
Submission for the Tilley Award Program for Excellence in 
Problem-Oriented Policing. 

(n.d.). "Nightsafe: Reducing Alcohol Related Violence 
and Disorder." 
http://www.lancashire.police.uk/nightsafe.html 

Mazerolle, L.G., and J. Roehl (1998). Civil Remedies and Crime 
Prevention: Crime Prevention Studies, Vol. 9. Monsey, N.Y.: 
Criminal Justice Press. 

Merseyside Police (2001). "Operation Crystal Clear." 
Submission for the Tilley Award Program for Excellence in 
Problem-Oriented Policing. 

Miami (Florida) Police Department (2002). "Allapatah 
Produce Market Power Play: Revitalizing a Produce Market 
through Cooperation." Submission for the Herman 
Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented 
Policing. 

Oakland (California) Police Department (2003). "The 
Oakland Airport Motel Program. Eliminating Criminal and 
Nuisance Behavior at a Motel." Submission for the Herman 
Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented 
Policing. 

Peel (Ontario) Regional Police (1996). "The Last Drink 
Program: Targeting Licensed Premises to Reduce Impaired 
Driving." Submission for the Herman Goldstein Award for 
Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing. 


Plano (Texas) Police Department (2003). "Underage Drinking: 
More Than a Minor Issue." Submission for the Herman 
Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented 
Policing. 

Racine (Wisconsin) Police Department (1999). "The Power of 
Partnerships: Revitalizing Neighborhoods through 
Community Policing Houses." Submission for the Herman 
Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented 
Policing. 

Royal Canadian Mounted Police (2002). "Project Metrotown: 
Reducing Drug Trafficking and Related Crime through 
Multiagency Cooperation and Community Partnerships." 
Submission for the Herman Goldstein Award for 
Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing. 

Salt Lake City (Utah) Police Department (2001). "The False 
Alarm Solution: Verified Response." Submission for the 
Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-
Oriented Policing. 

Sampson, R., S. Raudenbush and F. Earls (1997). 
"Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: a Multilevel Study of 
Collective Efficacy." Science 277: 918-924. 

San Diego (California) Police Department (2001). "Sexual 
Assault: Educating a Community About Non-Stranger 
Sexual Assault." Submission for the Herman Goldstein 
Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing. 
http://www.popcenter.org/Problems/PDFs/men_web%20 
rev.pdf 
http://www.popcenter.org/Problems/PDFs/women_bookl 
et.pdf 


Scott, M. (2005). "Shifting and Sharing Police Responsibility 
to Address Public Safety Problems." In N. Tilley (ed.), 
Handbook of Crime Prevention and Community Safety. Devon, 
U.K.: Willan Publishing. 

Sherman, L., D. Gottfredson, D. MacKenzie, J. Eck, P. Reuter 
and S. Bushway (1997). Preventing Crime: What Works, What 
Doesn't, What's Promising. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department 
of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. 

Tonry, M., and D. Farrington. (1995). "Strategic Approaches 
to Crime Prevention." Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 

19: 1-20. 

Weisburd, D., and J. Eck (2004). "What Can Police Do to 
Reduce Crime, Disorder, and Fear?" The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 593: 42-65. 


About the Authors 

Michael S. Scott 

Michael S. Scott is the director of the Center for Problem-
Oriented Policing, Inc. and clinical assistant professor at the 
University of Wisconsin-Madison Law School. He was 
formerly chief of police in Lauderhill, Florida; served in 
various civilian administrative positions in the St. Louis 
Metropolitan, Ft. Pierce, Florida, and New York City police 
departments; and was a police officer in the Madison, 
Wisconsin, Police Department. Scott developed training 
programs in problem-oriented policing at the Police Executive 
Research Forum (PERF). He was the 1996 recipient of the 
Gary P. Hayes Award for innovation and leadership in 
policing. He is a judge for the Herman Goldstein Award for 
Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing. Scott holds a law 
degree from Harvard Law School and a bachelor's degree 
from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. 

Herman Goldstein 

Herman Goldstein is Professor Emeritus at the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison Law School and the original architect of 
the problem-oriented approach to policing. His first 
experiences in working with the police were in Philadelphia as 
a graduate student in governmental administration at the 
University of Pennsylvania and subsequently as an assistant to 
the city manager of Portland, Maine. He spent two years 
observing the on-the-street operations of the police in 
Wisconsin and Michigan as a researcher with the American 
Bar Foundation's Survey of the Administration of Criminal 
Justice, and then participated in the analysis phase of that 
landmark project. From 1960 to 1964, he was executive 
assistant to the superintendent of the Chicago Police 
Department, O.W. Wilson, the widely recognized architect of 


the professional model of policing. Goldstein has published 
widely on problem-oriented policing, the police function, police 
discretion, the political accountability of the police, and the 
control of police misconduct. He was co-author of the 
American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Urban Police 
Function. His 1977 book, Policing a Free Society, is among the most 
frequently cited works on the police. He first described the 
problem-oriented approach to policing in a 1979 article, which 
he expanded upon in his 1990 book, Problem-Oriented Policing. 



Recommended Readings 

• 
A Police Guide to Surveying Citizens and Their 
Environments, 
Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1993. This 
guide offers a practical introduction for police practitioners 
to two types of surveys that police find useful: surveying 
public opinion and surveying the physical environment. It 
provides guidance on whether and how to conduct cost-
effective surveys. 
• 
Assessing Responses to Problems: An 
Introductory Guide for Police Problem-Solvers, by 
John E. Eck (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services, 2001). This guide is 
a companion to the Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series. It 
provides basic guidance to measuring and assessing 
problem-oriented policing efforts. 
• 
Conducting Community Surveys, by Deborah Weisel 
(Bureau of Justice Statistics and Office of Community 
Oriented Policing Services, 1999). This guide, along with 
accompanying computer software, provides practical, basic 
pointers for police in conducting community surveys. The 
document is also available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs. 
• 
Crime Analysis for Problem Solvers In 60 Small 
Steps, by Ronald V. Clarke and John E. Eck (U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services, 2005). This easy-to-use 60-step manual 
prepares crime analysts to become key members of a 
problem-solving team. The volume is packed with vital and 
sophisticated information, making it one of the most 
significant publications addressed to the policing field in 
several decades. 



• 
Crime Prevention Studies, 
edited by Ronald V. Clarke 
(Criminal Justice Press, 1993, et seq.). This is a series of 
volumes of applied and theoretical research on reducing 
opportunities for crime. Many chapters are evaluations of 
initiatives to reduce specific crime and disorder problems. 
• 
Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing:The 1999 
Herman Goldstein Award Winners. This document 
produced by the National Institute of Justice in 
collaboration with the Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services and the Police Executive Research Forum 
provides detailed reports of the best submissions to the 
annual award program that recognizes exemplary problem-
oriented responses to various community problems. A 
similar publication is available for the award winners from 
subsequent years. The documents are also available at 
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij. 
• 
Not Rocket Science? Problem-Solving and Crime 
Reduction, 
by Tim Read and Nick Tilley (Home Office 
Crime Reduction Research Series, 2000). Identifies and 
describes the factors that make problem-solving effective or 
ineffective as it is being practiced in police forces in 
England and Wales. 
• 
Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory for 
Crime Prevention, 
by Marcus Felson and Ronald V. 
Clarke (Home Office Police Research Series, Paper No. 98, 
1998). Explains how crime theories such as routine activity 
theory, rational choice theory and crime pattern theory have 
practical implications for the police in their efforts to 
prevent crime. 





• 
Problem Analysis in Policing, by Rachel Boba (Police 
Foundation, 2003). Introduces and defines problem analysis 
and provides guidance on how problem analysis can be 
integrated and institutionalized into modern policing 
practices. 
• 
Problem-Oriented Policing, by Herman Goldstein 
(McGraw-Hill, 1990, and Temple University Press, 1990). 
Explains the principles and methods of problem-oriented 
policing, provides examples of it in practice, and discusses 
how a police agency can implement the concept. 
• 
Problem-Oriented Policing and Crime Prevention, 
by Anthony A. Braga (Criminal Justice Press, 2003). 
Provides a thorough review of significant policing research 
about problem places, high-activity offenders, and repeat 
victims, with a focus on the applicability of those findings 
to problem-oriented policing. Explains how police 
departments can facilitate problem-oriented policing by 
improving crime analysis, measuring performance, and 
securing productive partnerships. 
• 
Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on the 
First 20 Years, by Michael S. Scott (U.S. Department of 
Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 
2000). Describes how the most critical elements of 
Herman Goldstein's problem-oriented policing model have 
developed in practice over its 20-year history, and proposes 
future directions for problem-oriented policing. The report 
is also available at www.cops.usdoj.gov. 
• 
Problem-Solving: Problem-Oriented Policing in 
Newport News, by John E. Eck and William Spelman 
(Police Executive Research Forum, 1987). Explains the 
rationale behind problem-oriented policing and the 
problem-solving process, and provides examples of 
effective problem-solving in one agency. 








• 
Problem-Solving Tips: A Guide to Reducing Crime 
and Disorder Through Problem-Solving 
Partnerships by Karin Schmerler, Matt Perkins, Scott 
Phillips, Tammy Rinehart and Meg Townsend. (U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services, 1998) (also available at 
www.cops.usdoj.gov). Provides a brief introduction to 
problem-solving, basic information on the SARA model 
and detailed suggestions about the problem-solving process. 
• 
Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case 
Studies, 
Second Edition, edited by Ronald V. Clarke 
(Harrow and Heston, 1997). Explains the principles and 
methods of situational crime prevention, and presents over 
20 case studies of effective crime prevention initiatives. 
• 
Tackling Crime and Other Public-Safety Problems: 
Case Studies in Problem-Solving, 
by Rana Sampson 
and Michael S. Scott (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services, 2000) (also available 
at www.cops.usdoj.gov). Presents case studies of effective 
police problem-solving on 18 types of crime and disorder 
problems. 
• 
Using Analysis for Problem-Solving: A Guidebook 
for Law Enforcement, 
by Timothy S. Bynum (U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services, 2001). Provides an introduction for 
police to analyzing problems within the context of 
problem-oriented policing. 
• 
Using Research: A Primer for Law Enforcement 
Managers, 
Second Edition, by John E. Eck and Nancy G. 
LaVigne (Police Executive Research Forum, 1994). Explains 
many of the basics of research as it applies to police 
management and problem-solving. 




Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 

Problem-Specific Guides series: 

1. 
Assaults in and Around Bars. Michael S. Scott. 2001. 
ISBN: 1-932582-00-2 
2. 
Street Prostitution. Michael S. Scott. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-01-0 
3. 
Speeding in Residential Areas. Michael S. Scott. 2001. 
ISBN: 1-932582-02-9 
4. 
Drug Dealing in Privately Owned Apartment Complexes. 
Rana Sampson. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-03-7 
5. 
False Burglar Alarms. Rana Sampson. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-04-5 
6. 
Disorderly Youth in Public Places. Michael S. Scott. 2001. 
ISBN: 1-932582-05-3 
7. 
Loud Car Stereos. Michael S. Scott. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-06-1 
8. 
Robbery at Automated Teller Machines. Michael S. Scott. 2001. 
ISBN: 1-932582-07-X 
9. 
Graffiti. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-08-8 
10. 
Thefts Of and From Cars in Parking Facilities. Ronald V. 
Clarke. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-09-6 
11. 
Shoplifting. Ronald V. Clarke. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-10-X 
12. 
Bullying in Schools. Rana Sampson. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-11-8 
13. 
Panhandling. Michael S. Scott. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-12-6 
14. 
Rave Parties. Michael S. Scott. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-13-4 
15. 
Burglary of Retail Establishments. Ronald V. Clarke. 2002. 
ISBN: 1-932582-14-2 
16. 
Clandestine Drug Labs. Michael S. Scott. 2002. 
ISBN: 1-932582-15-0 
17. 
Acquaintance Rape of College Students. Rana Sampson. 2002. 
ISBN: 1-932582-16-9 
18. 
Burglary of Single-Family Houses. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 
2002. ISBN: 1-932582-17-7 
19. 
Misuse and Abuse of 911. Rana Sampson. 2002. 
ISBN: 1-932582-18-5 
20. 
Financial Crimes Against the Elderly. 


Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2003. ISBN: 1-932582-22-3 

21. Check and Card Fraud. Graeme R. Newman. 2003. 
ISBN: 1-932582-27-4 


22. 
Stalking. The National Center for Victims of Crime. 2004. 
ISBN: 1-932582-30-4 
23. 
Gun Violence Among Serious Young Offenders. Anthony A. 
Braga. 2004. ISBN: 1-932582-31-2 
24. 
Prescription Fraud. Julie Wartell and Nancy G. La Vigne. 2004. 
ISBN: 1-932582-33-9 
25. 
Identity Theft. Graeme R. Newman. 2004. 
ISBN: 1-932582-35-3 
26. 
Crimes Against Tourists. Ronald W. Glensor and Kenneth J. 
Peak. 2004. ISBN: 1-932582-36-3 
27. 
Underage Drinking. Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2004. 
ISBN: 1-93258239-8 
28. 
Street Racing. Kenneth J. Peak and Ronald W. Glensor. 2004. 
ISBN: 1-932582-42-8 
29. 
Cruising. Kenneth J. Peak and Ronald W. Glensor. 2004. 
ISBN: 1-932582-43-6 
30. 
Disorder at Budget Motels. Karin Schmerler. 2005. 
ISBN: 1-932582-41-X 
31. 
Drug Dealing in Open-Air Markets. Alex Harocopos and Mike 
Hough. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-45-2 
32. 
Bomb Threats in Schools. Graeme R. Newman. 2005. 
ISBN: 1-932582-46-0 
33. 
Illicit Sexual Activity in Public Places. Kelly Dedel Johnson. 
2005. ISBN: 1-932582-47-9 
34. 
Robbery of Taxi Drivers. Martha J. Smith. 2005. 
ISBN: 1-932582-50-9 
35. 
School Vandalism and Break-Ins. Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2005. 
ISBN: 1-932582-51-7 


Response Guides Series: 

• 
The Benefits and Consequences of Police Crackdowns. 

Michael S. Scott. 2003. ISBN: 1-932582-24-X 

• 
Closing Streets and Alleys to Reduce Crime: Should You Go 
Down This Road? Ronald V. Clarke. 2004. ISBN: 1-932582-41-X 
• 
Shifting and Sharing Responsibility for Public Safety 
Problems. Michael S. Scott and Herman Goldstein. 2005. 
ISBN: 1-932582-55-X 



Problem-Solving Tools series: 

• 
Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory Guide for 
Police Problem-Solvers. John E. Eck. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-19-3 
• 
Researching a Problem. Ronald V. Clarke and Phyllis A. Schultz. 
2005. ISBN: 1-932582-48-7 
• 
Using Offender Interviews to Inform Police Problem Solving. 


Scott H. Decker. 2005. ISBN: 1932582-49-5 

• 
Analyzing Repeat Victimization. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 2005. 
ISBN: 1-932582-54-1 

Upcoming Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 

Problem-Specific Guides 
Domestic Violence 
Mentally Ill Persons 
Student Party Disturbances on College Campuses 
Drunk Driving 
Bank Robbery 
Witness Intimidation 
Drive-by Shootings 
Runaway Juveniles 
Human Trafficking in Women 
Disorderly Day Laborers in Public Places 
Internet Child Pornography 
Crowd Control at Stadiums and Other Entertainment Venues 
Traffic Congestion Around Schools 

Problem-Solving Tools 
Forming and Sustaining Problem-Solving Partnerships with Businesses 
Risky Facilities 

Response Guides 
Crime Prevention Publicity Campaigns 
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design 
Video Surveillance of Public Places 


Other Related COPS Office Publications 

• 
Using Analysis for Problem-Solving: A Guidebook for Law 
Enforcement. Timothy S. Bynum. 
• 
Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on the First 20 Years. 


Michael S. Scott. 2001. 

• 
Tackling Crime and Other Public-Safety Problems: Case 
Studies in Problem-Solving. Rana Sampson and Michael S. Scott. 
2000. 
• 
Community Policing, Community Justice, and Restorative 
Justice: Exploring the Links for the Delivery of a Balanced 
Approach to Public Safety. Caroline G. Nicholl. 1999. 
• 
Toolbox for Implementing Restorative Justice and Advancing 
Community Policing. Caroline G. Nicholl. 2000. 
• 
Problem-Solving Tips: A Guide to Reducing Crime and 
Disorder Through Problem-Solving Partnerships. Karin 
Schmerler, Matt Perkins, Scott Phillips, Tammy Rinehart and 
Meg Townsend. 1998. 
• 
Bringing Victims into Community Policing. The National 
Center for Victims of Crime and the Police Foundation. 2002. 
• 
Call Management and Community Policing. Tom McEwen, 
Deborah Spence, Russell Wolff, Julie Wartell and Barbara 
Webster. 2003. 
• 
Crime Analysis in America. Timothy C. O’Shea and Keith 
Nicholls. 2003. 
• 
Problem Analysis in Policing. Rachel Boba. 2003. 
• 
Reducing Theft at Construction Sites: Lessons From a 
Problem-Oriented Project. Ronald V. Clarke and Herman 
Goldstein. 2003. 


For more information about the Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series 
and other COPS Office publications, please call the COPS Office 
Response Center at 800.421.6770 or visit COPS Online at 
www.cops.usdoj.gov. 


FOR MORE INFORMATION: 

U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 
1100 Vermont Avenue, NW 
Washington, D.C. 20530 

To obtain details on COPS programs, call the 
COPS Office Response Center at 800.421.6770 

Visit COPS Online at the address listed below. 

ISBN: 1-932582-55-X Created Date: August 4, 2005 


www.cops.usdoj.gov