U.S. Department of State

Washington, July 6, 1967, 1855Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 33. Secret.

CAP 67678. The Israelis have been pressing us for several days to allow them to buy 6,000 rounds of two types of tank ammunition ($220,000) and a rotary coupler for a radar set ($20,000). They could either draw down the $14 million credit you have already approved or use some other credit arrangements.

/2/Document 330.

/3/The memorandum from Rusk and Nitze to the President, July 5, is filed with Rostow's draft of this message. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VII)

I can add a personal note from my talks with Evron. He exhibited great concern when he learned indirectly that we were suspending military shipments, especially in view of the continuing Soviet shipments to the Arabs. I checked with Bob McNamara and put the Israelis back into regular Defense-State channels on a case-by-case basis. They must prove real need. I informed Mac Bundy in New York who approved.

/4/Neither the approve nor disapprove option is checked.

Washington, July 6, 1967, 2058Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Committee, Whirlwind. Secret. Received at the LBJ Ranch at 4:40 p.m. A handwritten note by Jim Jones on the telegram, July 6 at 5:30 p.m., recorded Johnson's instruction: "Be sure Anderson gets w/Bundy immediately & see what steps we should be taking." Another note, July 6, indicates that Jones told Rostow.

CAP 67681. Bob Anderson called to report the following, which I shall be taking up with Mac Bundy and our other Middle Eastern hands.

1. The intelligence available to the oil companies suggests that the future of Jerusalem may be the critical and truly explosive problem in the Middle East. Arabs regard the Syrian Heights as a Syrian problem; the West Bank as a Jordanian problem; Gaza as an Egyptian problem; but the Old City of Jerusalem is capable of stirring the mobs in the streets to the point where the fate of our most moderate friends in the Middle East will be in jeopardy and the basis laid for a later holy war.

2. Specifically, they report:

--Feisal is worried about his own future on this issue;
--The Lebanese Government is similarly worried;
--Anti-Americanism is rising due to our abstaining on the Pakistan resolution on Jerusalem.

3. Bob underlined that no government should rely on private intelligence sources; and we should make up our own mind in this matter. He understands that you made a public statement on the Jerusalem question; but he believes we must do more both to press the Israelis and to clarify our own position.

4. He also told me that he has come to the conclusion that the European oil problem is going to turn out to be more serious than in 1956-57, due to increased European requirements and the unavailability of Mediterranean oil. (On the latter, however, an item has just come over the ticker saying that Libya will resume shipments to France, Japan, Turkey, Greece, and Italy, that would narrow the major problem down to Britain and Germany.)

Washington, July 8, 1967, 3 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Kohler and approved in S on July 10. Another memorandum covering the conversation was on the subject of arms limitation in the Middle East. According to this, Rusk raised the subject of the desirability of limiting the supply of arms to Israel and the Arab countries. He said the United States was not trying to freeze the situation as it was June 12 after the Arab arms losses, but thought it would be important if the Soviets, British, and French could agree not to contribute to a renewed arms race in the Middle East. He asked, "What are the Soviet Union's real purposes in the area?" He noted that Moscow was supporting regimes they call "progressive," in Algiers, Egypt, and Syria and asked if Moscow was "out to topple the conservative governments." Dobrynin replied that the Soviets were prepared to sell arms to Jordan and Morocco. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

SUBJECT
Middle East Discussion in UNGA

The Secretary received Ambassador Dobrynin at the latter's request and had a conversation lasting roughly two hours and ten minutes.

The principal purpose of the Dobrynin visit and the main subject of conversation was the question of the consultations going on in the UN corridors with respect to a resolution on the Arab-Israeli crisis at this Special Session of the General Assembly.

Ambassador Dobrynin said that the Soviet Delegation had been consulting with other delegations in an effort to find a compromise resolution which could be approved by the General Assembly and which would cover the essential point of withdrawal of Israeli forces and at the same time cover other aspects and receive general acceptance. It did not seem possible to refer specifically to the term of non-belligerency because of Arab opposition. However, it would seem possible to turn this formula around and to meet the point by language which would perhaps in several paragraphs refer to non-use of force and necessity for a peaceful solution and the like. However, yesterday the Soviet Delegation had learned that the US opposed a compromise resolution and Gromyko had asked him to come to Washington to check with the Secretary very frankly about this.

The Secretary replied that we were not opposed in principle to a joint or compromise resolution. However, we would be opposed to a horse and rabbit stew, if the Ambassador understood that term. Our attitude would depend on what combination of language could be found. He felt that the position of the Arabs made it difficult to find a real compromise; we, for example, felt it important that we be clear on the subject of belligerence. Ambassador Dobrynin interjected that compromise language could refer to the non-use of force. The Secretary resumed, saying that we do not control the situation in the UN. For example, many of the Latin Americans have strong views of their own. As far as we are concerned, if some substantive points could be satisfactorily combined in a resolution, this would be acceptable to us in the General Assembly. If not, we felt it was better to get the matter back to the Security Council. The Secretary repeated that we are not opposed in principle, but he could not discuss detailed language. He knew that various versions had been put forward in consultations in New York, and he was not informed in detail.

Ambassador Dobrynin pressed his version that several points could be covered and that in their efforts to find a compromise the Soviet Delegation had in fact even got some ideas from the Latin Americans.

The Secretary commented that at the beginning of the Session a great effort had been made to separate out simply the question of Israeli withdrawal.

Dobrynin resumed to say the resolution they contemplated might refer to Israeli withdrawal and refer the matter to the Security Council for further detailed examination with specific reference to several points which had arisen during the discussion. The Secretary asked whether the Soviets had examined further the question of the formula that they had found to end their State of War with the Japanese which had arisen in his discussion with Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York. He commented in this connection that the term armistice in itself implies a continuing State of War. Dobrynin said that there could be phrases relating to a State of Peace. He then said they had not gone further in examining their formula with the Japanese.

In reply to a question from the Secretary, the Ambassador confirmed that the Soviets had had a meeting yesterday with the Latin Americans, specifically with the Chairman of the group and with two other Ambassadors. He would not say that there had been agreement at that meeting, but the Soviets considered that the Latin Americans had advanced some reasonable thoughts.

The Secretary said that the main difficulty was that it would be hard to find suitable language if it were obscure on the question of a continuance of a State of War. There was a danger that a formula would be found which some members would say meant an end of belligerency, but this would be denied by the Arabs. He would repeat that we were not opposed to a General Assembly resolution from a doctrinaire point of view, but there must be some substantial meaning in such a resolution. It would be very difficult to have a specific call for action by Israel combined with only vague promises as to what would happen on the other side. The Secretary then inquired of Dobrynin as to who was most active on the Arab side.

Ambassador Dobrynin replied that Foreign Minister Gromyko was seeing UAR Foreign Minister Fawzi today, so he could not comment on UAR views. On the whole, none of the Arabs seem to be very "eager". However, the Soviets felt that it was worthwhile to try to find compromise language. The Secretary interjected that we are prepared also to try. Dobrynin then repeated that Gromyko had been disturbed when he had heard that the US was opposed. The Secretary responded that we are opposed to a resolution which would be basically the Yugoslav-Indian resolution with a minimum amount of cosmetics applied. Dobrynin then said again that the Soviets were seeking a version which without mentioning the word belligerence would still in several sentences cover the point.

The Secretary said in principle we are prepared to look at anything. Basically, we are not only concerned with our interest of the Middle East situation itself, but we have some interest in not having the UN General Assembly come out with a zero.

The Secretary then interpolated that he had had trouble in matching his thoughts with Gromyko as to the position of UAR Foreign Minister Fawzi. Personally he had found Fawzi vague and very hard to get a hold of. It was not clear, for example, whether Fawzi was speaking with any authority; even on the question of free passage through the Strait of Tiran, Fawzi had said maybe something could be arranged secretly and the like, which was obviously impossible.

Ambassador Dobrynin commented that Fawzi was supposedly speaking as Foreign Minister and authorized to speak for the UAR Government. He then went on to refer to his approach to Ambassador Goldberg about the 48-hour delay and took some pains to explain this was all the Soviets had sought and that the week's delay was strictly the work of the Assembly President Pshwak and not of the Soviet Delegation.

Concluding the conversation on this subject, the Secretary said that he would phone Ambassador Goldberg and make sure that he would be available and ready to discuss with the Soviet Delegation any possibilities of finding suitable compromise language.

New York, July 9, 1967, 2023Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VII. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow. Received at the White House at 2353. The telegram was sent to the President on July 10 at 8:30 a.m. with a covering memorandum from Walt Rostow that reads: "Herewith Dobrynin, having sounded out Sec. Rusk on the steadiness of our position, probes Amb. Goldberg in a highly civilized way, looking for one compromise or another on a Middle East resolution." (Ibid.) A handwritten "L" on the telegram indicates the President saw it.

134. Department please pass White House.

This morning at 10 a.m. I was called by USUN COMSEC and advised that request had been made by Sov mission for urgent meeting with me by Amb Dobrynin. I asked that USUN COMSEC immediately call and advise Sov mission I would be willing to meet with Amb Dobrynin at his convenience this morning. Call was made and 12 noon at USUN was fixed for time and place of meeting. I met with Amb Dobrynin alone for one hour and ten minutes. He stated to me that his call was aftermath of his meeting with Secy Rusk yesterday and was designed to explore whether there would be common ground between Sovs and US for compromise res to wind up Assembly.

I said that throughout whole Middle East crisis we had been seeking common ground with Sov Union to restore peace and stability to Middle East but that up to now we had been unsuccessful in working out common language to this end. I reminded Amb Dobrynin that at the last meeting between Secy Rusk and FonMin Gromyko at which I was present both Secy and I had referred to language of Kosygin speech to GA where he had spoken in terms of common language but that until now there had been no effort by Sov del to explore with US possibility of common agreement.

Amb Dobrynin then said that this was their present desire and I said that we welcomed this effort and would be glad to hear any concrete proposal on his part. Amb Dobrynin said he had no concrete language to offer but that in general he wondered whether the ideas he had put forth to the Secy yesterday provided basis for common understanding.

I told him there was nothing I really could add very much to what Secy had said to him yesterday with respect to his general ideas and I thought Secy had made it very clear that US feels it very important that both Sov Union and ourselves be very clear that in order to restore conditions of peace in ME an equal-handed approach addressed both to Israel and Arab nations was required. This, as Secy stated and as the President made clear at Glassboro to Chairman Kosygin, involved on one hand withdrawal of troops by Israel and on other hand termination by Arab States of their state or claim to belligerency.

Amb Dobrynin then inquired whether we were fixed to the word "belligerency". I said we were not attached to the word. We were however dedicated to principle that time had come for permanent peace in ME and not merely the fragile patchwork of fragile armistice agreements within the context of belligerency which had produced three wars in 20 years.

Amb Dobrynin then inquired as to whether I thought there was any possibility in a res such as suggested to the Secy that contemplated Israeli withdrawal and referral to SC for further consideration detailed examination of other points which were involved in ME crisis.

I said this was the approach in Yugo res and that I did not believe this offered any possibility of common ground. I emphasized that in our view this would not bring about peace and indeed realistically it would not bring about Israeli withdrawal. I repeated to him what President had said at Glassboro and what Secy has frequently said that while we were prepared to use our influence with Israel and the Arab countries involved, none of these countries was puppet of US and we could not dictate terms obviously unacceptable. He at this point interjected that Arab States were not puppets of Sov Union and I said I recognized this but that real question was whether Sov Union and US were prepared to take stand in this Assembly which might have impact upon various parties concerned.

Amb Dobrynin then said language had been discussed with LA's presumably emanating from Spanish del about some prohibition against use of force. I in turn replied that this language was taken almost verbatim from Armistice Agreements and that we conceived this approach to be merely reformulation of language in Yugo res calling for observance of General Armistice Agreements. I read to Amb Dobrynin from 1951 SC res which contained fol passage: "Considering that since the Armistice Agreement which has been in existence for nearly two and a half years is of a permanent character, neither party can reasonably assert that it is actively belligerent." I pointed out that if this was true in 1951 in a res which the Sovs had supported, it was obviously true in 1967.

Amb Dobrynin then inquired as to whether I had any language ideas in mind. I said that I did and if the word "belligerency" was stumbling block we were prepared to consider with them another formulation as follows:

"(A) Without delay, withdrawal by Israel of its forces from territories occupied by them;

"(B) Without delay, recognition by Arab States that Israel enjoys the right to maintain an independent national state of its own and to live in peace and security, and renunciation of all claims and acts inconsistent therewith."

/2/An extract from Kosygin's June 19 address before the General Assembly is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 534-537.

Amb Dobrynin then inquired as to whether it is fair summary for him to report to Gromyko that we were in disagreement as the principles which might be formulated in final substantive res to Assembly. I said that based upon our exchange of views and his exchange of views with Secy as well as conversation President had at Glassboro and subsequent conversation between Secy and Gromyko, this was correct assessment unless at this stage Sovs were prepared to move in direction of recognizing that peace would not exist in ME with parties in area professing right to make war against each other.

Dobrynin then asked whether LA res had represented our essential position. I said to him that despite doubt which appeared in his facial expression, LA res had been developed without participation on our part and that from our stand point it was compromise res. US basic view was expressed by President in his five points but nevertheless we had supported LA res as at least recognizing interrelationship between elements of withdrawal, belligerency and other problems in the area. In this connection I told him that President, as he had indicated to Kosygin, was still very much interested in pursuing with him regardless of outcome at Assembly question of arms limitation in ME. I reminded him of Kosygin's statement in his speech about this. He made no reply to me on this subject.

Amb Dobrynin then asked me if my assessment was that if we could not agree on substantive res whether, notwithstanding, the Assembly would agree. I then said that despite their intensive lobbying, to which he interjected, "and your own", I did not see that situation had changed the basic position of parties.

Dobrynin inquired as to whether res could be redrafted in terms of principles. I replied that indeed it could provided both principles were incorporated into res. Specifically I said res could declare (1) that no state could continue to maintain forces on territory other than its own or (2) pursue policy of war or other threat or use of force against sovereign existence of another state. This declaration of principles could be then followed by referral of matter to SC to implement. I added however that we could not support declaration which would call upon Israel for withdrawal as specific act and then follow it with mere declaration of principle that state of non-belligerence should exist without calling upon Arab States to implement this principle. Dobrynin then correctly commented that this meant again that our basic positions remained unchanged and I again agreed.

Dobrynin then asked whether we had any ideas about procedural disposition of Assembly's work if it turned out it would be impossible to have substantive res. I asked whether he had and he said he had no language to suggest. I then said we had further considered matter and we did have some ideas about procedural res and handed him copy of fol procedural res:

"The GA,

Taking note of the views expressed and the resolutions considered by the GA in its extraordinary session,

1. Requests the SYG to appoint a UN mediator for the ME;

2. Empowers the mediator to perform the following functions:

(A) To use his good offices with the parties concerned for the restoration and consolidation of peace and security in the ME;

(B) To assure the protection of the Holy places, religious buildings and sites in Jerusalem;

(C) To promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation in the area;

(D) To assure that the parties fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter, and in particular,

(1) That they shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered, and

(2) That they shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN Charter.

3. Requests the mediator to report periodically through the SYG to the SC and members of the UN.

4. Transmits the records of the proceedings of the session to the SC for its further consideration of the matter and request the SC to deal with the situation as a matter of urgency."

After reading res Dobrynin asked me whether we had any further thoughts about who mediator ought to be.

/3/Goldberg's July 5 conversation with Secretary-General Thant was reported in telegram 59 from USUN, July 5. Thant said he would prefer a resolution rather than a statement such as Goldberg had suggested to Dobrynin in their meeting that morning reported in Document 342. He was consulting with various delegations and would be prepared to act pursuant to an appropriate resolution, which he agreed should avoid substantive elements in order to be feasible. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

Dobrynin then asked about origins of procedural res. I said we took it largely from general mandate given to Count Bernadotte in 1948. He seemed to note this with some interest but then said that as things now stand he did not believe that mandate was explicit enough. I asked in what respects. He replied it did not refer to withdrawal to which I replied that if it referred to withdrawal it would also have to refer to belligerency and we would then be going around in circles.

He then made very interesting observation that perhaps it would be best for us to consider together procedural res when it would be clear that Assembly could not at resumed session on Wednesday agree upon substantive res. I said that we were quite agreeable to talk with them at any time about either substantive or procedural res to which he replied that by our exchange it would not appear that we could agree upon substantive res but that we should reserve further consultations on procedural res if Assembly took no further action on substance. I said this was agreeable and again repeated we would be glad to consult with them at any time. Dobrynin suggested that perhaps in the procedural res the reference back to SC could refer to peaceful ways and means for solution of problems underlying situation, legal, political and humanitarian. This obviously was taken from Yugo res. I said that in procedural res we would be glad to negotiate with him on precise language.

Comment: As always with Dobrynin conversation was very cordial in tone and frank in its appraisal of situation. It is quite apparent however that they will continue their lobbying in attempt to obtain reversal of votes taken last week and it is also quite apparent they understand we will continue to stand on position we have taken. How successful they or we will be will depend upon LA's. If LA's remain firm it is my view they will not press for another vote. If however LA's fall into disarray then we can anticipate another res which will reflect views of so-called Spanish draft as possibly revised by some LA's. It is also apparent that Dobrynin really did not expect us to change our position and that he had reached this conclusion following his conversation with Secy yesterday. In any event exercise was useful one since (1) we gave him alternative draft which did not use word "belligerency" but which as I pointed out is nevertheless unacceptable [acceptable], and (2) it would indicate willingness to explore procedural disposition with us in event Assembly takes no further action on substance.

Goldberg

Tel Aviv, July 12, 1967, 1200Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. The date of transmission is incorrect; the telegram was received on July 11 at 9:31 a.m.

/2/Telegram 124 from Amman, July 7. (Ibid.)

1. We did not gather from our conversation with Safran that he had any strong personal commitment to idea autonomous Palestine state. His impression that autonomous state idea had edge over other schemes for disposition West Bank seemed to us reasonable as reflection informed comment, though not necessarily official GOI position.

2. We believe that GOI has not yet made any definitive decision re ultimate disposition West Bank or Gaza; if it had it would be moving much more decisively in many realms than it is. It is waiting--and has been waiting for over a month--for Arabs to decide to talk peace.

3. It will not wait indefinitely. In our contacts with middle level Israelis concerned with West Bank and Gaza we sense a growing feeling of impatience and frustration at being unable, in absence of basic policy decisions, to attack many problems outstanding. We would expect this feeling to become more pervasive as Israelis generally became aware of cost and complications Gaza and West Bank mean for them. Being rational people they will surely seek to minimize them. In one area, refugees, Israeli problem solvers are already at work: Eban told Senators Gore and Bayh Sunday Israel is planning to resettle at least token number of refugees on West Bank. This kind of action, as long as number is limited, can be taken without knowing the ultimate political disposition of West Bank. Others cannot. Steps to integrate Gaza and West Bank economies into Israeli economy would minimize economic costs, including foreign exchange costs.

4. Policy questions posed in para 3 of reftel are not for us to answer. We would observe only that any USG efforts to persuade GOI return of West Bank is "must" are going to be increasingly unavailing the longer Jordan seeks to avoid dealing with Israel on the issues. The more time passes the more faits accomplis Jordan and the Arabs will find themselves facing.

Barbour

Washington, July 11, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Arms Limits. Secret. Sent through Walt Rostow. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates it was seen by the President. Bundy sent a copy to McNamara with a July 11 covering memorandum noting that it might be relevant at the Wednesday luncheon meeting of the President's Tuesday luncheon group scheduled for July 12. Bundy's memorandum to McNamara states that he had tried to make the three recommendations to the President consistent with the discussions Bundy and McNamara had had earlier. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 72 A 2468, Middle East 092)

SUBJECT
Pending Middle Eastern Decisions

I see three issues which are ripe for consideration. They are:

I. The arms registration proposal;
II. Selected military aid approvals;
III. Limited extension of PL 480 Title II aid (voluntary agencies) to some of the radical Arab countries--especially Algeria and the UAR.

/2/The attachments, which include a July 11 memorandum from the Control Group to the Special Committee on Arms Control for the Middle East and an undated memorandum from the Control Group to the Special Committee on Exceptions to Interim Arms Policy for the Middle East, are not printed.

The gut issue here is that while everybody prefers the notion of arms restraint in principle, nearly everyone opposes public lists that might inhibit his own sales or procurement. Because people need our weapons, we can override these objections if we wish, but only at some costs in terms of political sniping from the Israelis, moderate Arabs, and sellers like the British. Most of the State and Defense people advise against an early unilateral disclosure, and I reluctantly conclude that they are right. The alternative which they propose is essentially as follows (although I have sharpened it up a little):

1. We should press the case for general arms registration on every diplomatic line and at the UN. While we should begin by consultation with our friends, we should not let this consultation delay us and we should aim at creating a diplomatic situation in which Goldberg can make a formal proposal at the UN within the next month.

2. Even before such a proposal is made, we should begin to call attention in quite specific terms to the large-scale Soviet resupply operation. We should not overstate the military meaning of these shipments, because we do not want to paint the Soviets as ten-foot high protectors of the Arabs. It should not be hard to find language which tells the facts without fanfare, and which points the finger of responsibility politely but firmly at those who are in danger of starting up the arms race all over again.

3. At the same time, or a little later, we should let it come out that we ourselves are continuing very much more modest and carefully chosen assistance programs, mainly agreed before June 5--first to moderate Arabs and second to the Israelis. The language of any such backgrounding should be carefully drafted to emphasize the fundamentally restraining purpose of these very limited shipments. We should note that in total they represent only a small fraction of what others have done. (There are some who think we should not minimize our contributions, because that will simply lead to further requests, but I think on balance they are wrong. Especially in the United States and on Capitol Hill we need to have a picture of great restraint and selectivity in our arms shipment policy.)

4. Beginning now it should be our understanding, on all new arms agreements, that the recipient will support the principle of arms registration in the UN. We can get this agreement if we ask for it, even though we must accept the fact that most of those who agree will do so in serene confidence that they will never have to honor their promise because of the continuing refusal of the Soviet Union to play ball.

/3/None of the options in this memorandum is checked, and there is no indication of the President's reaction.

Go ahead on this basis
Hold for discussion in Tuesday lunch group
Call a Special Committee meeting

There are two interlocking forces here which lead to a need for a reasonably prompt decision. The first is Israeli pressure for additional shipments under the agreement you approved on May 23, together with an intense Israeli desire to buy about $300,000 worth of tank ammunition and an $18,000 radar coupler-items which they claim to need urgently in the wake of the June fight. Bob McNamara and I reviewed these items last week and he and I agreed that we should be responsive on the May 23 agreement so as to prove that your decisions stick, and that the tank ammunition and the radar coupler are such small items that it would be a mistake to hold them up for long. We have some very major issues to settle with the Israelis when they come in for new major military agreements, and I have already warned Abba Eban that you are not the sort of man who will wish to separate fundamental questions of Israeli defense from major political issues in which we have a legitimate interest--like Jerusalem and the refugees. But these bargains are of a different scale altogether from tank ammunition, and we believe we can negotiate them more effectively if we can point to a record of meticulous and timely fulfillment on the May 23 agreement. So there is an Israeli package that is ready to move.

On the other hand, we do not want Israeli military supplies to hit the papers ahead of limited actions for the moderate Arabs if we can help it. We already have three such limited actions which you approved at the end of June for fiscal year reasons--a $14 million Moroccan program; a $15 million sale of four C-130s to Saudi Arabia, and a $9.9 million weapons repair and maintenance program also for the Saudis. Now we would like to thicken this package with some further limited actions for Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Libya. The items involved are well summarized at Table II. None of them involves heavy combat equipment. The only large items are sales (to the oil-rich Saudis), and there is no USG financing which was not already in prospect before the war. I would emphasize especially the Jordanian item--which would resume shipments of about $2 to $4 million over the next six months under previously approved grant and sales programs. The Jordanians need this small action in order to quiet their military, and we have already received grudging acknowledgment from the Israelis (Eban) that we are a better supplier than the Soviets. This Jordanian list includes nothing that would scare the Israelis in the current balance of power.

I think it is really very clear that on policy grounds both the Israeli package and the moderate Arab packages are highly desirable. The only difficulty is in possible Hill resistance. Bill Macomber has checked leaders of the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committee in both Houses and says that there is reluctant acceptance of the argument, although without enthusiasm. McNamara thinks we can expect a similar result in the Armed Services Committees. I have checked myself with Russell, who says go ahead, with Symington, who says OK if I say so (but reluctantly on Jordan), and with Fulbright, who says we should do nothing and try for an agreement with the Soviets (I answered that we were trying and would keep trying, but could not let places like Jordan sink or swim while we waited). I conclude that we should go ahead, but that Luke Battle should have one more session with the Symington Mid-East Subcommittee before the actions are final.

Go ahead on this basis
Hold for discussion in Tuesday lunch group
Call a Special Committee meeting

As you know, we allowed Title II aid to continue to all Middle Eastern countries as long as the voluntary organizations could oversee offloading and distribution. Now we face a decision on similar action for FY-68, and at Tab III there is a good summary memorandum drafted for me by Howard Wriggins of Walt's staff. In essence what it amounts to is an authorization for Catholic Relief and CARE for $4.5 million for the first quarter, almost $4 million to go to Algeria and nearly all the rest to UAR. We owe nothing to Boumediene or Nasser but on balance I think the value of the humanitarian shipments outweighs the marginal economic usefulness to demagogues.

Go ahead on this basis
Hold for discussion in Tuesday lunch group
Call a Special Committee meeting

Washington, July 11, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VII. Top Secret. Also sent to Bundy and Rostow.

SUBJECT
Intelligence Collaboration with Israel

/2/Saunders' memorandum states that he had learned that there was a large mine of intelligence information in the experience and the captured Soviet materiel that the Israelis had acquired during the recent fighting. The Defense Attaché had obtained agreement for a senior American team to go to Israel to take advantage of this but was afraid that road blocks would be thrown in its way. (Ibid.)

As you know, the attaches of various countries in Israel are kept under a very tight rein and shown only what the IDF wants them to see. The Americans get no special favors in this channel. Thus, particularly aggressive U.S. personnel feel frustrated.

There is a certain amount of gamesmanship between what the Israeli attaches are allowed to do here and what ours can do there.

There is also a slight resentment in a tightly disciplined country [1 line of source text not declassified].

In regard to captured Soviet equipment, I am informed that everything is on order [1 line of source text not declassified]. The Defense attaché, an eager beaver, is a capable officer, and his implication that there may be roadblocks apparently refers only to a larger project under consideration by the JCS to send a 12-man team for exploitation on the spot of both equipment and experience.

Meanwhile, the current relationship is proceeding with the reports and packaging of items for further study here, and I have no reason to believe that a thorough job will not be done and the benefits will be spread through the community.

I think the matter of the 12-man team should be left to the JCS, and it would be inappropriate of the White House to enter any pleas on its behalf at this time. You know the old saw, the job is being accomplished but a special task force will give it momentum, etc., etc., etc.

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Jessup signed the original.

Washington, June 10, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. No classification marking. The note, dated June 10, is a revised version of Document 256. It was revised by Katzenbach, Meeker, and Walt Rostow on July 11. Most of the revisions were made to correct incorrect times and incorrect statements in the original note. According to a handwritten note by Wriggins on a copy of the draft revised note, Rostow cleared it and deleted the word "wanton." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, Israel, 6/l/67-10/31/67) The note is filed, together with Document 383, and a covering memorandum of July 20 from Walsh to Walt Rostow stating that they constituted the true, corrected versions of the exchange and that all other copies should be destroyed. Battle gave the revised note to Harman on July 11. In discussing the incident, Battle emphasized the "irate reaction" that the incident produced in Congress and the continuing strong interest of many members of Congress in the outcome of the investigations into its cause. (Airgram A-15 to Tel Aviv, July 14; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Israel and has the honor to refer to the Ambassador's Note of June 10, 1967 concerning the attacks by Israeli aircraft and torpedo boats on the United States naval vessel U.S.S. Liberty, which were carried out shortly after 1400 and 1430 hours local time, respectively, on June 8, 1967 while the U.S.S. Liberty was engaged in peaceful activities in international waters.

At the time of the attack, the U.S.S Liberty was flying the American flag, and its identification was clearly indicated in large white letters and numerals on its hull. It was broad daylight and the weather conditions were excellent. Experience demonstrates that both the flag and the identification number of the vessel were readily visible from the air.

Beginning at about 0515 hours local time on June 8, 1967, and at intervals thereafter prior to the first attack, aircraft believed to be Israeli circled the U.S.S. Liberty on a number of occasions.

Accordingly, there is every reason to believe that the U.S.S. Liberty was or should have been identified, or at least her nationality determined, prior to the attack. In these circumstances, the later military attack by Israeli aircraft on the U.S.S. Liberty is quite literally incomprehensible. As a minimum, the attack must be condemned as an act of military irresponsibility reflecting reckless disregard for human life.

The subsequent attack by Israeli torpedo boats, substantially after the vessel was or should have been identified by Israeli military forces, manifests the same reckless disregard for human life. The silhouette and conduct of the U.S.S. Liberty readily distinguished it from any vessel that could have been considered as hostile. The U.S.S. Liberty was peacefully engaged, posed no threat whatsoever to the torpedo boats, and obviously carried no armament affording it a combat capability. It could and should have been scrutinized visually at close range before torpedoes were fired.

While the Ambassador of Israel has informed the Secretary of State that "the Government of Israel is prepared to make amends for the tragic loss of life and material damage," the Secretary of State wishes to make clear that the United States Government expects the Government of Israel also to take the disciplinary measures which international law requires in the event of wrongful conduct by the military personnel of a State. He wishes also to make clear that the United States Government expects the Government of Israel to issue instructions necessary to ensure that United States personnel and property will not again be endangered by the wrongful actions of Israeli military personnel.

The United States Government expects that the Government of Israel will provide compensation in accordance with international law to the extent that it is possible to compensate for the losses sustained in this tragic event. The Department of State will, in the near future, present to the Government of Israel a full monetary statement of its claim.

On July 12, 1967, at 2:45 p.m., President Johnson met with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Walt Rostow, and George Christian at luncheon at the White House. According to notes of the meeting by Deputy White House Press Secretary Tom Johnson, who was also present, there was some discussion concerning the Middle East.

The President said that he was "still concerned about the Middle East situation" and was "more concerned about the Soviet position in the Middle East than Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk appeared to be." He said he wanted a "report on what U.S. posture should be concerning the arms shipment situation into the Middle East." Secretary McNamara said he would favor "a unilateral report to the United Nations on U.S. arms shipments to Middle East countries even if the Soviets did not decide to make public their arms shipments into the area."

After some discussion concerning Vietnam, they returned briefly to the subject of the Middle East. Rostow reviewed three proposals by Bundy. According to Johnson's notes, they concerned Soviet arms shipments to the Middle East, arms registration with the United Nations, and an Israeli request for more arms. The President asked that Rostow "confer with Rusk and McNamara and come back to the President with a report on these issues." (Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings)

Rostow's agenda for the meeting indicates that Bundy's three proposals were the arms registration proposal, selected military aid approvals, and limited extension of PL 480 Title II aid through voluntary agencies to some of the radical Arab countries, especially Algeria and the UAR. Rostow's handwritten notations on the agenda indicate that there was to be a meeting the next day on the first point, that on the second point they should "wait on Hill," and that on the third point the answer was "no-on Hill." (Ibid., National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow)

Washington, July 12, 1967, 8:26 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Eugene Rostow on July 11; cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs J. Wayne Fredericks, Davies, and Wriggins; and approved by Rusk. Sent to Amman, Jidda, Kuwait, Beirut, Rabat, Tunis, Tripoli, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, USUN, Tehran, Rawalpindi, Djakarta, New Delhi, Ankara, Tokyo, Belgrade, Moscow, Sofia, Rome, Madrid, Brussels, and Bonn.

5731. Subject: U.S. Position on a Near East Settlement.

Department wishes to maintain a dialogue on Near East crisis with host governments of addressees to promote understanding U.S. objectives and enlist support for steps necessary for settlement. The following points should be drawn upon as appropriate in discussions or incorporated in follow-up aide memoirs with host government officials and opinion makers.

1.The U.S. position on the Near East crisis was outlined in the President's statement of June 19 and, we believe, provides the basis for a just and equitable settlement between the Arab states and Israel. In that speech, the President clearly called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces as essential element NE settlement. We believe the continued presence of Israeli troops on the territory of neighboring states is an unnatural situation. To create the conditions which will assure earliest withdrawal, all parties must take action to guarantee the future security and integrity of all the states involved. Otherwise another war would be probable.

2. In our view, the root of the problem is the claim of some states that a state of war continues with Israel and that they have right to the status of belligerents under international law with respect to Israel. The claim of belligerent rights works both ways. If Egypt claims belligerent rights, it can hardly deny belligerent rights to Israel. Egypt cannot claim the right to mass overwhelming military forces on Israel's borders, issue threats of liquidation, and then deny Israel the right of counter-measures. In 1951, 1956, and in 1957 the Security Council declared that belligerent rights could not be asserted in the Near East. Surely, the time has now come to see if better ways to resolve differences can be found than those which have led to diversion of needed resources to sterile armaments, to nineteen years of fear and suspicion, and to needless death and destruction.

3. The United States believes firmly that termination of the state of belligerency coupled with withdrawal of troops from occupied areas is the only practical and realistic way to achieve that end and thus to initiate a constructive and agreed solution to other problems of peace in the area: justice for the refugees, the status of Jerusalem, unobstructed passage through international waterways, arms limitations, and peaceful progress for all the peoples of the area. In this way, and, in our opinion, only in this way, can the world achieve a condition in which independence, integrity, and security, which rightfully inhere in every nation in the area, can be fully respected and protected.

4. We are deeply concerned for the full and direct protection of the interests of Islam and the other great religions in Jerusalem. We are pledged to firm action with all interested parties to make certain that the interests of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity are fully respected and protected. The public statements made in Washington reflect our determination.

5. Our delegation abstained in the vote on the Pakistani Resolution about the future of Jerusalem at the General Assembly last week for sound reasons. As Ambassador Goldberg said, the Pakistani Resolution assumed that Israel has annexed Jerusalem. The Resolution asked that the supposed annexation be rescinded. But the Government of Israel had announced that its arrangements for the administration of Jerusalem as a unified city were not an annexation. Jordanian officials and municipal councillors will participate in the administration of the city during the period of occupation. And Israel is consulting with religious representatives and others about possible plans through which the deep interests of Islam and Christendom in Jerusalem can be permanently protected. The Prime Minister of Israel has said that Israel has no need or interest in the ownership of Christian or Moslem Holy Places. It therefore seemed to us that the Pakistani Resolution was not directed to the situation on the ground. We tried to get agreement on amendments that would have made it possible for us to support the Resolution, but we failed.

6. We are not wedded to any particular words or procedures in order to move toward achievement of a just and durable peace. The essential assurances can be given publicly or privately, through mediators, or through agreements. In the last analysis, a solution cannot be imposed from outside: The basic responsibility for achieving peace lies with the governments and peoples of the area. We, with other members of the United Nations, stand ready to help in any way our friends in the Near East deem helpful.

7. The United States has sought and continues to seek the best possible relations with all the states of the Near East on bases of mutual respect and mutual interests. To the extent we had the capability we have extended our assistance over the years in efforts to resolve disputes and prevent conflict. We have undertaken to seek to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of all states in the area. Our influence has been exerted in behalf of many states in the Near East in recent years--of Egypt in 1956, of Lebanon in 1958, and of other states when subjected to pressures on the part of their neighbors. We have sought through programs of economic assistance to help develop the well-being that gives substance and strength to independence.

8. The U.S. used every resource of diplomacy to prevent the outbreak of hostilities between Israel and her Arab neighbors in the present crisis. The closure of the Strait of Tiran, reversing international understandings through which Israel's agreement to withdraw troops from Sinai in 1957 was obtained, clearly was the major factor in heightening the tensions which led to conflict.

9. It should be clear to all that the U.S. does not and cannot control the actions of any nation of the Middle East. If it had such control, hostilities would not have occurred. Not only did we exert our utmost efforts with all parties to avert hostilities, but also we had no prior knowledge they would occur. The calumnies alleging a U.S. role in the preparation or execution of these hostilities are totally and deliberately false, and are deeply resented by the people of the United States. These charges have caused damage to our friendly relations with some countries of the Near East, a fact we regret and deplore.

10. In this bitter and tragic conflict, we have neither supported nor opposed any country. Our energies have been engaged in seeking to achieve and protect peace, in the interest of all. We seek a peace in which the just rights of all the nations and peoples of the area will be safeguarded. We seek to strengthen bonds of friendship and understanding with all the peoples of the Middle East.

[Omitted here is a message for the Ambassador in Libya authorizing him to use the above as the basis for a presentation and aide-mémoire to the Prime Minister.]

Rusk

New York, July 13, 1967, 0059Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Confidential; Limdis. Received at 10:14 p.m. on July 12.

193. Riad (UAR) buttonholed Sisco in back of GA hall and asked to speak to him very privately and confidentially. He said he was concerned there had been insufficient contact between US and UAR since last discussion between Secty and Fawzi and felt it would be well for two of us to take a current reading on where matters stand at GA.

Said he wished to describe candidly how American position is being portrayed to them in corridors. It was being said that we wanted no res, that this Assembly was an unwanted Assembly called by the Sov Union and that US wanted to deny Sovs any possibility that something constructive would come out of GA. He said we felt that time would be required before any solution could be achieved, and that we wanted nothing to come out of Assembly in meantime. He concluded by saying our policy was being characterized as one designed to topple Arab regimes in ME.

Sisco said we have not been and are not against a GA res as a matter of principle. Principal, though not only, problem had been that in all of negots non-aligneds, in their discussions with LAs during this past week's recess had been unwilling to accept as a matter of equity a para in which a call on Israel to withdraw would be balanced by a call to Arab States to renounce belligerency. Sisco pointed out it had not been possible to bridge this gap, and that we had been told by numerous dels that it was because UAR, Syria and Jordan unwilling or felt unable to renounce a state of belligerency. Sisco asked Riad whether this is an accurate assessment of the Egyptian position, whether in fact it could renounce belligerency in a res at this time. Sisco added that if LAs and non-aligneds could not agree on principles to be included in a substantive res, we would be prepared to support a simple procedural res devoid of substance, requesting SYG to designate a world statesman to make contact with the parties and to discuss whole situation. What was Egyptian position on this point?

We have been receiving conflicting info but most delegates have stressed unwillingness of Egypt to consider this kind of a suggestion.

Alternatively if in fact Egypt and other Arab States do not want this kind of a proposal to come out of GA, would a simple referral of records of GA to SC for further consideration be a possibility?

Finally, Sisco rejected view that our policy is to topple Arab regimes and said that our policy remains unchanged: We wish to have friendly relations with all countries in area, and we are prepared to do what we can to help bring about a durable and stable peace, as Pres Johnson indicated in his June 19 statement.

Riad asked whether there was some other form of words which might be agreed to on belligerency question. Sisco said if Riad was referring to the Spanish text, LAs had not accepted this proposal, and we felt it fell far short of mark. In particular, it did not contain kind of balance described above.

Sisco said important thing is what are Egyptian intentions. Are they prepared to renounce belligerency and all that this implies and to agree to it explicitly in a res?

Riad urged that Sisco get together with Fawzi and Riad later this evening to see if language could be worked out. Sisco said that we, of course, are always ready to talk and to consider any suggestions from any dels, including UAR. However, negots on this matter were presently in hands of LAs who were meeting with non-aligneds and that any suggestions which Egyptians might have might better be funneled though that channel.

In response to Riad's query as to whether he should seek responses from Fawzi to questions raised, Sisco said he was not asking Riad to do so but if Fawzi could shed some light on these points it might be helpful, if not in the present tactical situation at least at some future time. Sisco concluded by saying he available to continue to exchange views should Riad have any further thoughts on matter.

Goldberg

Washington, July 12, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VIII. Secret.

/2/A resolution submitted by Pakistan on July 12 deplored the Israeli failure to implement resolution 2253 (ES-V) (see footnote 2, Document 344), reiterated the call to Israel in that resolution to rescind measures already taken and desist from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem, requested the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council and the General Assembly on the situation and on the implementation of the resolution, and requested the Security Council to ensure its implementation. For text of the resolution and a revised version submitted the next day, see UN documents A/L.528 and A/L.528/Rev. 1 and Rev. 2.

Chris Herter telephoned to express to me the acute concern that he and his other oil colleagues have regarding possible repercussions if for a second time we do not support the Jerusalem resolution.

He reports that the effects in the Arab countries of our abstention on the Pak resolution were devastating. None of the Arabs can understand what to them was a technical position which we took--a position which they see as clearly favoring Israel and giving Israel the benefit of the doubt.

He urged us most earnestly, therefore, this time to consider the political effects throughout the Middle East of a second abstention. No amount of technical discussion on the terms of the resolution would help within the Arab world. He sees this largely as a question of passion and posture, not of specific textual language.

Howard

Washington, July 13, 1967, 10:30 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VIII. Confidential. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates it was received at 11 a.m.; a handwritten "L" indicates the President saw it.

Mr. President:

I have just had a long talk with Mac Bundy on Jerusalem. We have one day to turn around since the UN vote will not come until tomorrow.

1. Ambassador Goldberg feels we should not shift off our position of abstention on the Pakistani resolution. He says we have taken our lumps in the UN General Assembly and the international community on this issue. And, in his judgment, the Jewish community here would be up in arms if we switched. He adds a technical argument; namely, that the language of the present Pakistani resolution calls for the Security Council "to take measures" to enforce the General Assembly resolution. This means at the UN that Article 7 of the United Nations Charter be applied; and this involves sanctions or force. That aspect of the resolution has apparently scared off the Canadians and the UK. It may be modified via UK and Canadian pressure on the Paks in the course of the next 24 hours.

/2/Foreign Minister Eban's reply of July 10 to the Secretary-General is reproduced in the Secretary-General's report of July 10 to the General Assembly and the Security Council. For text of the report, see UN document A/6753 (S/8052).

3. We face, therefore, three choices:

--to go with Arthur Goldberg and abstain again;

--to switch our position to support for the Pak resolution, using the unsatisfactory character of the Israeli response as a justification;

--to stay with abstention and make two statements: one by Amb. Goldberg, the other by the Secretary of State in Washington. The statements would make the following points:

a. The pre-war position in Jerusalem was unsatisfactory;

b. The actions taken by the Israelis and their proposals are also unsatisfactory in terms of your statement of June 19: ". . . there must be adequate recognition of the special interest of three great religions in the Holy Places of Jerusalem."

c. This is not an issue which can be settled by abstract resolutions in the UN or by the use of force. It requires negotiation among all the interested parties. In the meanwhile, we cannot accept as definitive the actions and position thus far taken by the Government of Israel.

4. Mac thinks, and I agree, that to get the proper attention and hardness into our position before our own people, the moderate Arabs, etc., a statement from Washington by the Secretary of State is essential. It is his judgment that Amb. Goldberg cannot really swing it politically.

5. Moreover, this is the one immediate issue on which we could begin to balance our accounts somewhat with the moderate Arabs; and it is a good issue because we believe that this position is right both for the U.S. and, in the long run, for the Israelis themselves.

/3/There is no indication of the President's reaction on the memorandum.

7. The issue will be discussed in the course of the day by those working on the Middle East; and you may wish to discuss the matter with Secretary Rusk. I will keep you informed.

Walt

New York, July 14, 1967, 0131Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Received on July 13 at 10:34 p.m.

203. Mid-East Crisis.

Riad (UAR) met with Sisco again today as follow-up to confidential discussions of yesterday. Riad said he had some comments to make regarding Sisco's queries of yesterday as to whether UAR in position now to renounce belligerency, and that if gap on substantive res unbridgeable whether UAR would believe time propitious for GA to decide upon some high level rep to make contact with parties.

/2/See Document 327.

Riad said they unable to mention belligerency in res because of its implications with respect to Suez Canal.

/3/Telegram 198 from USUN, July 13; not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

During course of day there appeared shift in UAR position. About 4 p.m. this afternoon Riad sought out Sisco to inform him that it might be possible for UAR to accept word "belligerency" in res provided it is appropriately modified. In saying this Riad was referring to fol Indian formulation which we have already informed Indians is not acceptable to US.

"Further affirms that the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states in the Middle East allow them a rightful freedom from threats or acts of belligerency and consequently urges all states in the Middle East to refrain and desist from threats or acts of war."

Sisco focused principally on advantages to everybody concerned in closing down GA promptly so that principal parties could begin to address themselves realistically to serious questions and arrangements that must be sorted out if durable peace is to be achieved in ME. Sisco said as long as public debate continues it will be difficult for parties to begin discussions, indirect or otherwise, and that in our judgment since gap between two substantive positions has been found unbridgeable it would be well to get matter back to SC for further consideration at some appropriate stage. Sisco stressed too advantages of getting some third party involved so that there can be realistic focus on fundamental elements of settlement. Riad did not disagree with this view but dwelt at some length on some need for "something to come out of GA" and in particular expression by Assembly in favor of withdrawal of Israeli forces.

Conversation then turned to internal situation in UAR. Riad said situation very difficult indeed, particularly from economic view. However he felt progress was being made in "reshaping military" and that he personally felt it was very important for influence of US to return to area at earliest possible moment. He said somewhat emotionally that this was in everybody's interests, including US. Implication of what Riad said was concern over possible expansion of Sov influence in area.

Riad concluded by saying Fawzi felt it important that we keep in touch on regular basis. Sisco agreed and said he readily available at any time.

Goldberg

Washington, July 13, 1967, 10:34 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Eugene Rostow and Brewer; cleared by Battle, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs William C. Trimble, and Kohler; and approved by Rusk.

6578. From the Secretary.

/2/Telegram 145 from Rabat, July 11, reported a conversation with Foreign Minister Laraki, who told the Ambassador that the Kuwaiti and Jordanian Foreign Ministers, plus the Saudi Arabian equivalent, were leaving for the United States, where they hoped to see the President to state that it was absolutely essential to the Arab moderates that U.S. actions in the General Assembly give them something on which to base continued cooperation with the United States. (Ibid., POL MOR-US)

/3/Not found.

2. Our policy has indeed been based on clear realization that world community has little time in which prevent Arab-Israel problem from again lapsing into dangerous immobility. Our conviction that time is short underlies our efforts to produce a solution in which Israel would withdraw and the Arabs--and, of course, Israel--would give up warfare. Whatever the Arabs may think, the former cannot be brought about by USG without some reciprocal concessions on belligerency question. Provided genuine, these could no doubt be formulated in manner which would take account Arab sensibilities.

3. We would like to end this situation now, before myths take over and a new arms race becomes inevitable. However, while Arab moderates might well accept (and even be grateful for) any imposed solution of the problem on which we and the Soviets could agree, the Soviets have made it clear to us that they will not sacrifice their credibility in Arab eyes. We recognize that the Arab moderates are probably the prime Soviet target in this crisis. To a considerable extent, so do the moderates themselves. But so far they seem neither able nor willing to do anything about it. No doubt this is because they fear Arab radicals, notably Syria and Algeria, even more than Israelis or Russians. But it is difficult for us to help those who will not help themselves.

4. I want to assure you, however, that we fully understand the difficulties in which the Arab moderates find themselves. We know we need them for the future and are seeking to get across the message that they need us sufficiently to do something in their own behalf. This would involve neither "recognition" of Israel nor "dealing directly" with Israel. Some recognition of the need to avoid a return to the Arab-Israel status quo, as well as willingness on part one or two Arab states to restore relations with us, and to remove discriminatory oil curbs, would materially help us in our continuing efforts to assist good friends like King Hassan in riding out the storm.

Rusk

Washington, July 13, 1967, 11:06 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis; Sandstorm. The telegram indicates Battle as the drafter and that the text was revised at the White House; cleared by Walt Rostow; and approved by Rusk. Repeated Flash to Tel Aviv. "Sandstorm" is written by hand on the telegram. Telegram 6593 to Tel Aviv and USUN, July 14, stated that all cable traffic relating to telegram 6581 should be designated Nodis; Sandstorm, because the Department wished to give it maximum security. (Ibid.)

6581. Please deliver at once following message from Secretary of State to Foreign Minister Eban reported at Plaza Hotel.

Dear Mr. Minister:

/2/Telegram 4941 from Amman, July 13, reported a conversation between King Hussein and Ambassador Burns in which the King stated he was prepared to make a unilateral settlement with Israel, and that he had discussed this with Nasser, who had said he would raise no objections if Hussein raised this with the Americans. The King said he would like to know what the Israelis would be likely to do vis-à-vis Jordan if he were prepared for a settlement. He said Jordan would have to get back substantially all it lost in the war, including the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem. He also said it was essential that Jordan obtain some arms immediately. (National Archives and Records Administration, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM)

In our opinion this is a major act of courage on the part of King Hussein and offers the first important breakthrough toward peace in the current period following active hostilities. It is an opportunity in our judgment that must not be lost, offering as it does a chance to embark on a course in the Arab world which could lead to an acceptance of Israel by its neighbors and to steps which could well change the whole course of history in the Middle East.

We wish that time were available for us to consider abstractly and unrelated to immediate problems all of the issues that are involved in this offer. But we believe we have tomorrow in the vote in the United Nations on the Pakistan resolution an opportunity to pave the way for positive steps in the days ahead--an opportunity that must not be lost. With the knowledge of King Hussein's willingness to risk a very great deal, certainly including his own security, it is imperative, we think, that your government take a step in connection with the consideration of the future of Jerusalem that would be in harmony with the courage shown by the King and which will facilitate negotiations in the days ahead of us. We urge that you attempt to make the broadest kind of gesture possible with respect to the future of Jerusalem. We urge especially that you make a generous offer with respect to the future of Jerusalem that would in effect explicitly interpret as interim the administrative arrangements recently placed in effect with respect to that city. We would also hope that your country could offer more explicitly to enter into international arrangements for a city which would assure that all religions and all faiths have access to the holy places. The offer might include a willingness to discuss with Jordan directly or otherwise the future of the old city based on the concept of universality, possibly pointing to Jordan as the spokesman for the Arab world in view of its location in relation both to Israel and to Jerusalem itself.

Let me add that as you know our own position on Jerusalem has for some years supported its international character, a position to which we still adhere.

The matter is urgent. The events of tomorrow in the General Assembly may have an important bearing on the greatest opportunity we have yet seen to achieve what you and your country have wanted and have suffered through two wars to achieve. I urge your most careful and urgent consideration of this matter. The more moderate and generous the position of Israel tomorrow, the greater the chance that there can be a good result from Hussein's new readiness.

To save time and emphasize importance we attached to this message Ambassador should deliver it at once to highest available official with urgent informal suggestion it go at once to Eskhol if Eban has not yet had time to report it.

Rusk

No. 1367/67

Washington, July 13, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VIII. Secret. Sent to the President with a covering memorandum of July 14 from Walt Rostow. A handwritten "L" on Rostow's memorandum indicates the President saw it.

MAIN ISSUES IN A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT

Note

This paper assumes that Arab-Israeli hostilities will not be resumed, at least at any early date. It explores the main issues facing Israel and the Arabs in the post-hostilities phase. It is intended to describe briefly the respective points of view of the adversaries, the considerations which affect their attitudes, and to assess the likelihood of resolving particular issues and the terms on which this might be done; in short, to suggest where there might be some room for compromise, and where not.

1. The outlook for settlement between Arabs and Israelis is dim indeed. Their respective positions on almost all questions are poles apart and emotions are running high. Arab policy toward Israel remains adamantly hostile. For many years, no Arab leader--except Bourguiba, who scarcely counts in this context--has considered it politically possible to contemplate the recognition of Israel. The Arab leaders are fully aware of magnitude of their defeat, but they do not draw the conclusion that they must acknowledge it. Hence, anything in the nature of peace negotiations is highly unlikely. The Arabs may feel compelled to sign some form of armistice agreements, but they may for a long time resist even this step if--as is likely--the price is significant concessions to Israel. But the shock of their swift and overwhelming defeat has, for the moment, probably prevented them from making decisions on all but immediate matters, and they are reduced to hoping that international pressures will somehow force the Israelis to withdraw from occupied territory.

2. As for the Israelis, promptly after their dramatic victory, they began talking about direct negotiations leading to Arab recognition of Israel and an overall settlement. Israel's great objectives are to break the pattern of the last two decades, to gain Arab recognition of its right to exist, and assurances against further terrorism and other harassment. There are clearly divided counsels within Israel on the strategy and tactics of achieving these goals. The hardliners, represented by Dayan, have the advantage of being identified by many Israelis as the architects of Israel's victory, and their positions have strong domestic appeal because they emphasize what Israel wants and feels it has won, with little regard to what might have to be conceded in the face of international pressures or opinion. Even if Dayan is forced out of the cabinet, Israel will probably remain largely impervious to external pressures to withdraw from occupied areas for months to come, unless there is unexpectedly quick progress toward a settlement tolerable to Israel. The short-term costs of holding captured territories are not high, around $10 million monthly, and are more than compensated by an extraordinary influx of hard currency since early June.

3. In the longer run, however, Israel faces a painful dilemma. The Israelis may hope that the Arabs (and the Soviets) will draw the "correct" conclusion from the recent war, and that a new order will emerge in the area which will involve acceptance of the Israeli state and assurances for its security. But so far there are few indications that any such new order is emerging, and unless it does, Israel must sooner or later face the problem of how to assure its security. Eventually, Israel is probably prepared to trade much of its captured territory in return for security arrangements. Experience does not incline the Israelis to put faith in guarantees by the great powers and certainly not in the effectiveness of UN arrangements. And while the Arabs may reluctantly enter into some more formal armistice arrangements, the chances remain slight that any significant Arab leader will undertake to associate himself with the kind of binding agreements that Israel wants and feels it must have.

4. Soviet actions will probably help to confirm the Arabs in this attitude. Nothing in the events of last month is likely to have altered the USSR's conviction that Soviet interests in the area are best served by an alignment with radical Arab forces. There have been Arab defeats and Soviet miscalculations, and the principal instruments of Soviet policy--diplomatic, economic, and military--have either been damaged or at least had their efficacy called into question. But the Soviets have maintained their strong presence in the area. They are currently engaged in a noisy campaign to convince both the Arabs and the world at large that their ability and determination to maintain this presence has not been undermined by the outcome of the recent war and that among the great powers the USSR represents the only hope for the Arabs.

5. It is true that the USSR is the only major power the radical Arab states--Egypt, Syria, and Algeria--can depend on for meaningful support. It is no less true, however, that Moscow's policies in the Middle East can only be served by the maintenance of ties with these states. For their own purposes, the Soviets and the Arabs thus need each other. In practical terms, this probably means that, within certain limits, the Soviets will in the main have to go along with Arab policies. While they would probably encourage an Arab disposition to compromise on issues such as Israeli passage of the Strait of Tiran, the Soviets would probably support Arab refusal to compromise, on most issues. For their part, the Arab states will simply have to recognize the limits on Soviet support, viz. the USSR's determination to avoid direct involvement in active hostilities or to risk seriously a confrontation with the US.

6. No matter what the Israelis offer by way of a new order in Palestine or movement on the refugee question, the Arabs will press for a return to something as close to the status quo ante as they can get. In the process, there will be intense maneuvering, not only between Arabs and Israelis, but also among the Arab states. Husayn and Nasir have neither the same interests at stake nor the same attitudes, and the Syrians are something else again.

In addition, there will be considerable controversy and haggling between the regional adversaries and the great powers. The overall outcome is obscure, but it is possible to isolate and analyze contrasting positions on certain of the main specific issues, and to suggest where chances of accommodation now appear best, and where they do not. The following paragraphs are not an exhaustive analysis, and it should be noted that, except in a few obvious cases, they do not explore the relationship between specific issues, i.e., how bargaining over one question might affect any negotiations over another.

[Omitted here are sections II-VII, which show in tabular form the Israeli position, the Jordanian or Egyptian position, and the possibility of compromise or lack thereof on the issues of Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, access to Eilat through the Strait of Tiran, the Suez Canal, Sinai, the Syrian highlands, and the refugee problem.]

Washington, July 14, 1967, 11:30 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VIII. No classification marking. Sent through Walt Rostow.

SUBJECT
Revised agenda for Special Committee, 12:15, Cabinet Room

/2/Rusk's July 13 memorandum to the President, with Rostow's covering memorandum, is not attached but is filed ibid. A draft statement on Jerusalem and a brief agenda for the Special Committee meeting are attached to Bundy's memorandum.

Unfortunately the statement itself will pose tough problems. I drafted a possible statement yesterday at the Secretary's request, and he found it a bit strong. I am now trying a softer version for size on people who know how Israel and her friends may react. I am not optimistic at the moment that we can find language which suits the Arabs and does not outrage the Israelis, but I am still trying.

/3/"OK" is written in the margin in an unidentified handwriting.

The most important Middle Eastern item at the moment, of course, is Hussein's feeler, but I do not suggest that it be discussed in the Special Committee. I hold to the view I suggested to you last night, namely that we should undertake to pass communications back and forth but should not appoint ourselves as umpires. If we are in the main line of communications, we can judge for ourselves when the moment is right to press one side or another for a concession. Meanwhile, we can and should be asking ourselves how much of an economic blessing we could give, or get the World Bank to give, to a real settlement. This may be of great importance to both sides as they look at the detailed future of the Palestinian Arabs on the West Bank.

Washington, July 14, 1967, 12:30-12:51 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, Box 1. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted July 14 at 6:10 p.m. Brief notes of the meeting by Wriggins are ibid., National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, #2, July 1-31, 1967. Concerning the topic of Resuming Diplomatic Relations with Selected Arab Countries, they read: "The President agreed that the Department should be flexible on this and proceed where there seemed to be opportunities or interest. The first instance would be the Sudan."

Attached is a report of the President's Meeting in the Cabinet Room with Special National Security Council Panel on the Mideast.

ATTENDING THE MEETING
The President
Secretary Robert McNamara
Under Secretary Nicholas Katzenbach
Secretary Henry H. Fowler
General Earle Wheeler
Mr. Richard Helms
Mr. Clark Clifford
Under Secretary Eugene Rostow
Mr. Lucius Battle
Mr. Walt Rostow
Mr. Harry McPherson
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. David H. Popper
Mr. John Devlin
Mr. Tom Johnson
Mr. George Christian

The meeting began at 12:30 p.m. It ended at 12:51 p.m.

McGeorge Bundy outlined the agenda of the meeting:

1. Arms Registration Policy being examined.
2. Agreed that discussion of selected military aid agreements would be delayed until after Secretary Rusk talks with the Congress.
3. Position on the U.N. General Assembly vote on Jerusalem.

On the matter of the General Assembly vote on Jerusalem, Secretary Katzenbach said that the State Department recommendation still holds. That is to abstain from voting, issue a clarifying statement which would be put out at the White House or at State.

Bundy said there should be a formal statement issued at State in the Secretary's name or by the Secretary himself.

Bundy said a vote on the issue was expected in the U.N.

/2/The proposed statement was the draft statement on Jerusalem attached to Document 362.

/3/In Bundy's draft, the sentence reads: "The United States joins in deploring the administrative actions on Jerusalem which have been taken by the government of Israel in recent weeks."

There were several suggestions for other changes by Secretary Fowler, Secretary Katzenbach, and Bundy. Bundy said the statement would not cause a violent explosion among the moderate Arabs or the Israelis.

After much discussion of the precise language of the statement, the President said:

"What I want to say is that we regret their unwillingness to budge."

There was laughter.

Bundy said that the Israelis are going to budge according to reports from Eban.

Secretary Fowler proposed: "The U.S. regrets the failure of the Government of Israel to make clear that its actions in recent weeks is only provisional." Bundy objected because of the reaction to this.

Clark Clifford said do not be too specific. He said he preferred to approach this in a general way rather than tying ourselves down to specific language.

/4/Bundy sent the approved statement to Read with a covering memorandum of July 14. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VIII) The draft resolution on Jerusalem was adopted by the General Assembly on July 14 as Resolution 2254 (ES-V) by a vote of 100 to 0, with 18 abstentions, including the United States. The statement sent from Bundy to Read was released on July 14 by Rusk. For texts of the statement, the resolution, and a statement made by Goldberg in the General Assembly on July 14, see Department of State Bulletin, July 31, 1967, pp. 148-151.

On another area, McGeorge Bundy said that feelers should be stimulated to the weaker hangers-on of the Arabs to the effect that if they will come back into diplomatic relations with us, we will get back into relations with them. He mentioned specifically Sudan.

The panel argued that this was a good idea. The feelers should be that "if you will get back into business with us we will get back into business with you."

Clark Clifford explained that a group of leading New York citizens, including David Rockefeller, Eugene Black, and John McCloy, were joining to form a group called The American Committee for Arab Refugee Relief.

The goal of the group is to raise $10 million. Clifford wanted to know if the President considered the approach a wise one. Clifford said the idea has some psychological value among the American people.

The President asked Secretary Fowler for his opinion. The Secretary said IRS Commissioner Sheldon Cohen should look at it, that there are tax considerations, and he was somewhat skeptical about getting the President tied to a program which gave tax benefits to a group. He said many other similar groups have a way of popping up.

Bundy said the proposal should be kept on a staff level. The President said that Cohen should be put in touch with Clifford directly after the meeting to discuss the matter.

New York, July 14, 1967, 1907Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis; Sandstorm. Repeated Flash to Tel Aviv. Received at 3:44 p.m.

/2/Document 360.

Eban accompanied by Rafael informed Goldberg, accompanied by Sisco and Buffum, of Israel's response to Secretary's message. Eban said Israel's response is positive and he wished us to know that Israel is prepared to enter into discussions with Jordanians at convenient time and place.

Eban said in their judgment Secy's description of situation is more "enthusiastic" than Israeli. In this connection he recalled Hussein has made similar statements to other Western leaders (UK and Italy). Nevertheless he attached considerable importance that Hussein's desire to make contact with Israel has been conveyed to US. Eban said question is whether this is genuine utterance on part of Hussein and whether in fact it will result in contact. Israel reserves its position on what may be true significance of Hussein's private message. Eban said he assumed US would convey to Jordanians Israel's positive reply and its willingness to enter into discussions at appropriate time and place, This was in form of quick oral reply on Israel's part and Eban presumed there would be written reply forthcoming to US.

Eban then turned to question of immediate situation confronting us in GA on Jerusalem res. Since this matter was raised in Secy's message to him, Eban said he wished to convey Prime Minister Eshkol's plea and hope that US would not change its vote on Jerusalem question. Prime Minister feels US in position to play important mediatory role and he fears if we should vote for Pakistan res, Hussein would interpret this as identifying US with his position. Eban said he would hope that we would not abandon position of neutrality we had adopted.

Remainder of discussion devoted to statement Eban expects to make in GA hall on Jerusalem this afternoon. We are expecting text momentarily but statement will say that present situation in ME and all of questions relating to it are provisional until they are ratified by agreement. Eban will say that Israel is willing to examine alternative proposals. He will add specifically that administrative measures taken do not prejudice Israel's intention to work towards solution in keeping with spiritual and universal interests. He will say that Moslem Holy Places should be in hands of traditional Moslem authorities near and far. Goldberg suggested that in place where Eban refers to administrative measures Eban should consider adding phrase "which are not of a constitutional nature" and thereby get closer to saying that what has been done does not constitute annexation. In addition Goldberg suggested where reference is made to spiritual interests that phrase "and other appropriate" be added so as to get at political and territorial aspects that are involved. Goldberg asked Eban whether he could say specifically that administrative measures taken in Jerusalem are interim or provisional. Eban's response was that if he did this in such specific terms, "government in Tel Aviv would become interim."

Goldberg

Washington, July 14, 1967, 4 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL JORDAN-US. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by Wiley and approved in S on July 20. The time of the meeting is from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library)

SUBJECT
Jordan

PARTICIPANTS
Secretary Rusk
Foreign Minister Ahmed Touqan of Jordan
Ambassador Shubeilat of Jordan
Ambassador-designate Sharif Sharaf of Jordan
Deputy Assistant Secretary Davies, NEA
Marshall W. Wiley, NEA/ARN

Foreign Minister Touqan referred to the traditional ties between the US and Jordan and to the ideals which were shared by the two countries. He said that Jordan had been criticized at various times for its pro-Western attitudes, and now other people are asking the Jordanians why their traditional friends were not helping them. The Arabs came to the UN with the attitude of "give and take" but there was a limit to how far they could go. Jordan had lost much of its territory but the Jordanians did not feel that they, the Arabs, had been totally defeated. They admitted they had lost a battle but they did not admit they had lost the war. The Jordanians were not able to forget they were Arabs and they hoped the US had not adopted the theory that Jordan should now be isolated from the rest of the Arabs and pushed into accepting a settlement.

The Secretary said that there were three basic issues now operating in the Middle East.

1) Israel versus the Arab states. During his experience at the UN in 1948 he had tried to negotiate a stand-still agreement between the Arabs and Israelis at the end of the British mandate. He was aware of the deep roots of the Palestinian problem and the deep feelings which it engendered. He understood these feelings even though he did not fully share them. The US and the Arabs did have some differences in their attitudes towards Palestine and he hoped that both sides could put these differences to one side and get on with the business of living.

]

2) The struggle between the radical and moderate Arab states. The Secretary said that as he looked back over the history of US actions in the Middle East he was impressed by the extent to which we had supported the principle of territorial integrity and political independence for all nations in that area. We supported the UAR during the Suez crisis and acted to insure Lebanon's independence at a somewhat later date. President Kennedy had sent a squadron of aircraft to support the independence of Saudi Arabia and we had, on several occasions, supported Libya against possible interference from the UAR. We had protested strongly against Arab subversion by infiltration into Israel and had also protested strongly to Israel after the unfortunate raid on Samu last November.

3) Soviet efforts to penetrate the area. The Secretary said that the Soviets were attempting to increase their influence in the area by shipping arms to certain Arab states. We had tried on many occasions to encourage the Soviets to tone down the arms race. He had personally talked about this with Gromyko but the Soviets were interested only in discussing nuclear weapons as a subject for limitation. He realized that Jordan was not responsible for the recent situation getting out of control. There were two things that had contributed directly to the development of the hostilities. First, the speed of the removal of the UNEF forces and second, Nasser's closing of the Strait of Tiran. The closing of the Strait of Tiran had been more important than most people in the Arab world realized. It was not only a casus belli for Israel, but it also ran directly counter to commitments we had made in 1957 in order to get Israel out of Sinai. The UAR had not signed these commitments but had been aware of them. Nasser had based his action on the right of belligerency against Israel, but this cuts both ways. The Arabs are not consistent if they complain of Israeli aggression while simultaneously asserting belligerent rights against Israel. By his action in closing the Strait of Tiran Nasser had undercut our position with Israel. If we now ask the Israelis to withdraw they would say that they did so in 1956 on assurances from the US which had not been carried out in 1967.

The Secretary said that we attached great importance to the ending of the state of belligerency. We had no fixed formula but one useful precedent might be the formula used by the Soviets and Japanese to end the state of belligerence after WW II. They were able to do this without a formal peace treaty. He regretted that Jordan had been caught up in the hostilities since the major participants in the actions leading up to the fighting had been Syria, the UAR and Israel. He said he was not trying to lecture on this but he did wish that Jordan could have avoided the fighting. He had the feeling that apart from Jerusalem, which we all knew would be a "wrestle" the territorial problems involved in the settlement were not too serious. The basic and fundamental problem was the ending of the state of belligerency.

Foreign Minister Touqan said that the arms build up was not limited to the Arab side. On Jerusalem, he said that the US position should be the same as that of Jordan, i.e. unilateral actions by Israel were not acceptable. Jerusalem had a very special status with the Arabs as with all Moslems. It was false to say that Jordan had prohibited the Jews from reaching their Holy Places. The demarcation line which had ended the fighting in 1948 prohibited travel by both Israelis and Jordanians to the territory of the other. The Jordanians had had no desire to prevent adherents of the Jewish religion from reaching their Holy Places and, in fact, had allowed many Jewish tourists to enter Jordan.

The Secretary said we had our reasons for abstaining on the Pakistani resolution. The false UAR charges of complicity with Israel had made us very sensitive. Big powers had their sensitivities as well as little powers. These false charges had made several countries break relations with us. We would also have liked to have had an opportunity to negotiate the language of the Pakistani resolution prior to the vote, but we had not been given the opportunity. The Pakistanis had apparently felt that they had enough votes to carry the resolution so there was no need to negotiate with us. We also had not been happy with the Jordan vote on the Cuban amendment to the draft resolution, although our vote on the Pakistani resolution had not been directly linked to Jordan's vote on the Cuban amendment.

Ambassador-designate Sharaf said that the Cuban amendment condemned Israel and Jordan automatically voted for any resolution condemning Israel. He also said that Jordan unfortunately had to vote first on the Cuban amendment before they had realized that some of the other Arab delegations would not vote for it.

Foreign Minister Touqan said that he had become very angry at the way Ambassador Goldberg had acted during the UNGA session. Ambassador Goldberg had tried to undermine every measure taken by the Jordanian delegation and had obviously used considerable pressure to reduce the number of votes for the non-aligned resolution. Secretary Rusk pointed out that the US could not tell other countries how to vote. The primary US interest was to find some way to bring about an Israeli withdrawal to a state of peace and not to a continuing state of war.

The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister what it was that the Jordanians had objected to in the Latin American resolution. The Foreign Minister replied that the resolution made Israeli withdrawal subordinate to too many other things. Secretary Rusk said it might still be possible to work out a compromise between the Latin American and the non-alignment resolution which would be acceptable to all.

Ambassador-designate Sharaf said that he wished to make two specific points. 1) The often reiterated US assurances on territorial integrity and political independence had been made without conditions. The Jordanians had been shocked to find that so many conditions were now attached to our commitments. 2) Jordan expected more from the US as a result of our past friendly relationship.

The Secretary said that there was one important difference between today and 1956. Nasser had completely undermined our position vis-à-vis Israel by closing the Strait of Tiran. If we were to ask Israel to withdraw now they would say that they had heard this before and our assurances on free navigation in the Strait had not held up. The Secretary then said that as far as Jordan was concerned if they were looking around the world for a friend in terms of Jordan's independence, safety and well being, they could find such a friend in the US.

Ambassador Shubeilat said it would be impossible for Jordan to negotiate directly with Israel. Secretary Rusk said there was some flexibility on this. Working out the procedures of negotiation may be as difficult as agreeing on the substance. One possibility was the use of a UN representative as an intermediary. There were always other possibilities for unpublicized contacts. Ambassador-designate Sharaf said it was not feasible for Jordan to engage in open unilateral dialogue with Israel as Jordan cannot risk being completely isolated from the Arab world.

The Secretary said it was not necessarily true that Jordan should take the lead in the negotiations. It might be better if President Nasser or one of the other Arab states made the first move. It was difficult for us to talk to the Arabs because the Arabs themselves cannot seem to get together except on their opposition to Israel. It was always the extremist voices that were the loudest and which came to the front when we tried to talk to the Arabs. Secretary Rusk then asked if there would be some advantage for Jordan if the situation on the Syrian-Israeli border could be clarified before Jordan made any diplomatic move. Ambassador-designate Sharaf then said that a formal peace treaty was not possible and he hoped the US could understand this. It would be difficult for both Jordan and the US if Jordan were pushed in this direction since Jordan was well known in the area as a friend of the US. He said that in the Arab world form was very important as opposed to the US where people adopted a more pragmatic approach. The Secretary agreed that there were many ways to renounce belligerency. A Security Council resolution, for example, might be one possibility. The important thing was that the state of belligerency somehow be renounced.

Ambassador-designate Sharaf pointed out that the General Armistice agreement had neutralized the state of war and that the Israelis had undertaken aggression by violating the Armistice Agreement whether or not a state of non-belligerence had been agreed to by the concerned parties. The Secretary conceded that the accusation of aggression applied more to the UAR than to Jordan. The Secretary asked the Jordanians not to discount US support for the principle of territorial integrity. Although the question of Jerusalem was a difficult one the Jordanians can be assured that we intended to stick to this principle. We were interested, however, in seeing that Israel withdrew to international boundaries and not to armistice lines. We must find a way to end the exercise of the rights of war in the Middle East and to stop the recurrent outbreak of hostilities.

Tel Aviv, July 14, 1967, 2135Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Sandstorm. Repeated to USUN. Received at 7:17 p.m.

/2/Document 360.

1. At his request I called on P.M. Eshkol at his house in Jerusalem this afternoon for what developed into one hour dialogue. He started by indicating considerable agitation over Secretary's message contained in reftel. His concern also corroborated by fact this Sabbath eve and he supposed to be on vacation.

2. Eshkol welcomed overture from Hussein. However, he professed inability to understand our apparent surprise at Hussein's step. Recalling various recent statements by King which he interpreted to effect King would attempt achieve Arab summit and failing that would feel free to proceed on his own, Prime Minister said move should not have been unexpected. What disturbed Eshkol was tenor of Secretary's message that Israel should respond with concessions on Jerusalem and specifically indicate a willingness to regard renunciation of city under Israeli control as subject modification. He averred most positively that he had stretched his cabinet like a rubber band on a number of problems which had been considered in last few weeks but that rubber band would break immediately if he authorized Eban to make any statements that measures to reunify city only "interim" and subject further debate. As to GA debate and resolution on Jerusalem he urged that we not support resolution calling for retrogression. His argument was that such U.S. support would be disservice to Hussein who would then be expected to achieve more in negotiation than any Israeli Government could ultimately give. He differentiated Holy Places from fundamental attitude toward Israeli control and sovereignty of city and stressed success he believes he is achieving in realistic discussions with Vatican as to suitable arrangements to safeguard religious interests.

3. I said that despite his apparent optimism that Hussein would come forward and seek discussions with Israel, my feeling was we were less sanguine in this regard which might explain our seeming surprise at King's overture. I noted Hussein's public posture had not been uniformly receptive to idea of settlement and obvious hazards such step entailed, as exemplified by fate of King's grandfather. I also stressed significance King's move as possible opening wedge to peaceful discussions with other Arab states, obviously in all our interests. As to Jerusalem, I made clear our non recognition unilateral renunciation, in fact our non recognition over twenty years of Israel's position on Jerusalem and Hussein's claim to West Bank. I urged in strongest terms that what we need is some sort of helpful gesture on part Israel in response to major courageous initiative King is taking. I said I appreciated that Israel's position on fundamentals of unification of Jerusalem under Israeli aegis apparently could not be reconciled with our position that administrative steps Israel has already taken should be regarded as of interim nature and subject international recognition or modification later. I added what we seemed to need was indication of flexibility as to legitimate international interests in city, particularly the interests of Moslems.

4. After considerable back and forth along above lines, Eshkol appeared somewhat more inclined seek formula of more helpful import. He still adamant on fundamentals, but, focusing on religious interests, said he prepared go limit in establishing practical and legal jurisdiction of various religious persuasions over sites their legitimate concern. Specifically he quite willing accept Hussein as guardian Moslem interests if in fact King could make such position stick in Moslem world. He referred to Islamic concept of caliphate of which many Arab monarchs had claimed right wear mantle. Finally, he concurred in thought that universality of city could well be most productive approach.

5. I cannot, after this meeting, predict that Eban's response to Secretary will, on basis instructions he will receive from P.M., be as forthcoming as we might like. However, within limits of basic issues as Israelis see them, I hope Eshkol will approve instructions authorizing Eban to direct his reply in as positive a direction as his drafting ingenuity, which is not inconsiderable, will permit.

Barbour

Washington, July 15, 1967, 11 a.m.-12:03 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Davies. The time of the meeting is from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) Eban met with Eugene Rostow over lunch. Rostow stated that the preceding weeks had demonstrated the need for consultation on a continuing basis on subjects in which both sides had a vital interest and in which the United States could be drawn into "difficult situations" as a result of Israeli actions. Pressed for an example, he cited Israel's actions with respect to Jerusalem. Eban said that Israel had also learned lessons from the preceding weeks; the Israeli Government "now recognized that it had no real alternative to self-reliance militarily." (Memorandum of conversation, July 15; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

SUBJECT
Near East Settlement

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Abba Eban, Foreign Minister of Israel
Ambassador Avraham Harman, Ambassador of Israel
Mr. Emanuel Shimoni, Private Secretary to the Foreign Minister

The Secretary and Under Secretary
M--Mr. Rostow
NEA--Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary

Mr. Eban began the discussion by expressing hope that the General Assembly would adjourn and consideration of the Near East problem revert to the Security Council. He did not think a compromise resolution was possible, noted a mood of general resignation among delegations, and said the Francophone African states were playing with the idea of a resolution returning the problem to the Security Council.

The Secretary thought some formula for bridging the gap between withdrawal and termination of belligerency might be found. The Soviets have kept pushing for this in corridor conversations. He noted that a simple move for adjournment of the General Assembly might win a majority, thus returning the issue to the Council.

Mr. Eban said Israel was anxious to move toward a settlement with the Arabs. Its priorities were Jordan, the UAR, Syria, and then Algeria. Hussein's indication that he was interested in terms for a settlement was an important but not entirely new development. He had been responsive to suggestions that he explore terms when raised by the British and by Sarragat, and the Pope. Israel considers Hussein's approach through the U.S. as important since it was made through a great power and after his visit to Cairo. Israel recognizes that Nasser may only want to get Hussein into trouble by not interposing objection. There is, of course, much vagueness in what Hussein has proposed. Definitive arrangements to untangle himself from his mess are essential. As a matter of fact, the Jordanese have been showing themselves realistic on an ad hoc basis. The Prime Minister has been negotiating through UN agencies on practical matters. Through UNRWA's Assistant Commissioner General Reddaway, the Jordanese have proposed an exchange of wheat which is surplus on one bank for vegetables which are surplus on the other bank of the Jordan. The policy of return of refugees is being negotiated in the same channels. These are, however, indirect contacts. Israel hopes Hussein can be brought to something more substantive in the form of a dialogue. It might be possible for Hussein to appoint one or two people to meet either in the area or in Europe to explore modalities. The increased mixing of Arabs and Israelis in the West Bank may make it feasible to maintain secrecy of meetings in the area.

The Secretary said that assuming bilateral arrangements between Israel and Jordan could be arranged, it would be extremely dangerous to Hussein if these surfaced in advance of arrangements with others. Subversion and, possibly, assassination might result.

Mr. Eban said that in preliminary stages he felt the negotiators need not be conspicuous, but they should be capable of defining issues and the limits of policy and concessions ad referendum to their principals. In the case of Egypt and Syria, Israel had a clear idea of what settlement it would work for. With respect to the West Bank and Jordan, however, the situation was more difficult. There is a plurality of thinking in Israel. Some advocate a Palestinian solution: an autonomous Palestine tying the West Bank to Israel or associated with both Israel and Transjordan. Others doubt this is feasible or desirable and urge a Jordanian solution.

The Secretary said that the Palestinian solution would seem to involve a second-class status for the Arabs and could lead to Palestinian demands to become the 14th Arab state.

Mr. Eban responded to Mr. Rostow's comment that a binational secular state might provide a solution by saying this would be the most dramatic of all. He doubted, however, that the 1.3 million Arabs could be mixed successfully with the 2-1/2 million Israelis. In any event, this would mean an entirely different concept than that of Israel as a state embodying Hebrew concepts. In any event, Israel needs an internal decision on whether to seek a Jordanian or Palestinian solution. If the Jordanian formula is decided on, Israel would require better and more viable boundaries and economic association.

Israel would be willing to compensate for the loss of Jerusalem by economic help and access to the sea.

The Secretary said he felt there were advantages in the U.S. avoiding being used as an intermediary between Israel and Jordan. Mr. Eban agreed and thought Israel would not like the U.S. at Hussein's side with the latter hoping the USG would press his claims.

The Secretary saw real trouble ahead on Jerusalem. There are strong feelings in many places on this issue. The USG had never agreed with either the Israeli or Jordanian positions on Jerusalem, and there had been sharp, adverse reaction to recent Israeli steps in Jerusalem. The question of Jerusalem must be kept open for further discussion and negotiations. The U.S. sought solid international arrangements, and this would not be satisfied by scattered rights over a few holy places.

The Foreign Minister indicated that there were some 40,000 Arabs in the old city and 60-75,000 in the Jerusalem area.

Mr. Eban said Israel was much more conciliatory to international interest as opposed to Jordanian interest. Israel was close to agreeing on a formula with the Vatican by which diplomatic status of the holy places would replace the extraterritorial enclave formula previously sought. The Pope expressed interest in having jurisdiction over his prelates in Jerusalem. Rome clearly was moving away from a dogmatic approach, and a practical solution assuring an international presence was in the offing. The Vatican and Israel did not wish UN control over any part of Jerusalem since UN mechanisms in the Near East implied fragility and had been of a transitory nature. The universal interests of the Church were much more permanent.

The Secretary said this formula was interesting but did not exhaust all possibilities.

Mr. Eban said the question of the Haram ash-Sharif (Dome of the Rock) was more difficult. It was inconceivable that Jordan could return to Jerusalem. Hundreds of people had been killed by Jordanian soldiers when there was no need for the King to move on the city. He must now bear the consequences of his unacceptable action. Nevertheless, Moslem interests would be part and parcel of discussions with the King.

/2/Secretary-General Thant reported to the Security Council on July 11 that the UAR and Israeli Governments had accepted the stationing of UN military observers in the Suez Canal sector. (UN document S/8053) Both Israel and the UAR complained of cease-fire violations in letters of July 12, 13, 14, and 15 from the UAR and letters of July 14 and 15 from Israel. (UN documents S/8054, S/8061, S/8057, S/8062, S/8059, and S/8060) Telegram 1081 from USDAO Tel Aviv, July 16, reported that a cease-fire had begun at midnight, July 15/16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) Telegram 149 from Jerusalem, July 17, reported that General Bull had informed Consul General Wilson that he had instructed his two teams of UN military observers at Ismailiya and Qantara to commence cease-fire supervision as of 1600 GMT that day. (Ibid., POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/UN)

There was some prospect of settlement of refugees in the El Arish area. Surveys going back to 1902 indicated some water resources.

Mr. Eban thought that Soviet frustration at tactics which blocked their arms in the UNGA may be causing them to advise the Arabs to revise their positions away from intransigency.

In response to the Secretary's question, Mr. Eban said President De Gaulle's views were in sharp contrast to French public opinion. In the latest polls, Israel rated greater popularity than did the General himself. In his conversation with the General on May 24, Mr. Eban was told Israel had a good case, but a solution of its problem could be obtained only in the context of four-power agreement. The French viewed their Near East policy as part of their global policy. De Gaulle felt then that there was a disequilibrium between U.S. and USSR power and, undoubtedly, Soviet reverses in the Middle East made him feel that the gap now was even greater. De Gaulle sought to restore equilibrium by throwing support to the weaker power. He is not able to understand or to recognize the rebuffs he has received from Kosygin. He has refused to accept evidence that the Soviets will work in a two-power but not a four-power context. Despite General De Gaulle, there had been some resumption of military supplies from France. These are enough to keep Israel's Mirages flying.

Washington, July 15, 1967, noon.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The meeting is also recorded in a July 15 memorandum from Wriggins to Walt Rostow and Bundy, which lists the participants as Ambassador Burns, Katzenbach, Eugene Rostow, and Kohler. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VIII)

SAND STORM
(First Special Meeting)
(12:00, July 15, 1967)

1. Amb. Findley Burns, who had just returned from Amman, assessed the situation currently existing in Jordan, the mood of King Hussein, his desires for military equipment, his intent to reach an agreement with Israel, and his optimum terms for such a settlement.

2. This provided a basis for a general discussion of the Jordanian situation, Hussein's relationship with Nassar, and the outlook for a peaceful settlement. It was noted Nassar had recommended that Hussein endeavor, with US assistance, to reach an agreement with Israel. His two expressed conditions were that there should be no peace treaty and no direct negotiations.

3. It was agreed that the US would have to play a major role if the peace effort were to succeed. A danger exists that Nassar would booby-trap us as the intermediary who sold out Hussein. Therefore, we should be very careful if we become engaged.

4. In this respect (1) we should determine whether there is sufficient flexibility in the Israeli position on Jerusalem to justify us to advise Hussein to negotiate; (2) we should support a GA or SC resolution authorizing U Thant to send a Mediator to the Near East with a broad mandate; and (3) we should operate behind the scenes.

5. Hussein and General Khammash have approached Ambassador Burns with requests for military equipment. Khammash has expressed a need for selected spare parts and non-lethal equipment. This could be encompassed within the approximately $1.8 million in MAP grants earmarked for FY 1968 and the $5.9 million outstanding under the sales program. The Jordanians apparently wish to shift from F-104s to F-5s. They also wish to obtain 18 Hawker Hunters from the British. Khammash apparently has a list of the equipment he desires and wishes to come to Washington to discuss it. The King supports this proposal.

6. The question of the resumption of military supplies to Jordan should be staffed-out expeditiously with the DOD.

Washington, July 15, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VIII. Secret. Drafted on July 17. Sent to the President on July 17 with a brief covering note by Rostow. A handwritten "L" on Rostow's note indicates the President saw it.

PARTICIPANTS
Abba Eban, Foreign Minister of Israel
Avraham Harman, Ambassador of Israel
Emanuel Shimoni, Private Secretary to the Foreign Minister
W.W. Rostow

1. Following guidance from Sec. Rusk, I mainly listened; but made strongly the two points he wished to leave with Eban:

--their unsatisfactory posture on Jerusalem and its long-run dangers for Israel;

--the need to accelerate movement back to the West Bank, with respect to both numbers and speed.

2. With respect to the West Bank, he said they were doing a good deal but it was hard for Israel to invest much long-run resources in West Bank development until they knew the long run disposition of the West Bank. There is much debate among the Israelis on this question covering four options:

--Take the West Bank Palestinians into an expanded Israel as citizens.

--Make the West Bank an Israeli protectorate with representation in the Israeli Parliament but essentially the status of Algeria in relation to France before Algeria achieved independence.

--Make the West Bank an autonomous state, with its own parliament, economically linked to Israel, but with no military force.

--Give the West Bank back to Jordan as part of the negotiation but develop very close economic relations between Israel and Jordan.

3. I said that I had no confident feel for the region but thought that the desire of those who live there, as well as the negotiation with Jordan, should weigh heavily with Israel in this matter. He said that the people of Israel and its leaders were split in this matter. There is no consensus. One reason the government does not wish to push the question to anything like a firm decision is because their judgment would be affected by Palestinian Arab and Jordan government positions. With respect to the attitudes of the Palestinian Arabs, he said in the immediate wake of Jordan's defeat there was considerable talk of autonomy but, as Hussein found his feet, sentiment was moving back to reincorporation of the West Bank into Jordan. He also noted that those responsible for the Israeli economy were all for a prompt return of the West Bank to Jordan.

4. I questioned him on the political and economic situation in Cairo. He didn't seem to know any more than we did. He said that Nasser was in something like Sukarno's position; but one could not identify a Suharto, if, indeed there was one.

5. With respect to a negotiation with the Jordanians, he believed it should be direct and without intermediaries. The critical question for Israel was: Is Hussein serious?

6. With respect to the situation in the UN, he felt that the problem was to get the issue out of the General Assembly as soon as possible and into the Security Council. Prolonged discussions in the General Assembly were postponing other forms of action with higher constructive potential.

7. Eban asked me to inform Sec. Rusk that the Israeli government would like to send a military mission to the U.S., in great discretion, to discuss additional supplies of aircraft, helicopters, and tanks. He said that it looked as though France would supply sufficient spare parts to maintain their Mirage fleet. I simply took note of this.

WR

Washington, July 16, 1967, noon.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The meeting is also recorded in a July 16 memorandum from Wriggins to Walt Rostow and Bundy, which describes it as a meeting of the "inner circle of the Control Group"--Katzenbach, Eugene Rostow, Battle, Kohler, and Wriggins, plus Walsh and Burns. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VIII)

SAND STORM
(Second Special Meeting)
(12:00, July 16, 1967)

/2/Not found.

1. Hussein has informed us of his desire to reach a settlement with Israel. He has staked out a negotiating position of a return to the political lines of June 4, including Jordanian control of the Old City of Jerusalem. He is prepared to accept some border rectification, accompanied by over-flight rights and port facilities in Israel. He wishes us to determine whether this would be in the Israeli ball park. The Israelis, in turn, have informed us that they are ready to talk to the Jordanians although they are uncertain about the seriousness of Hussein.

2. The key to a negotiated settlement is Jerusalem. We need a better assessment of Israel's flexibility on this subject before giving a definitive reply to Hussein. Three immediate steps should be taken in this respect:

a. Ambassador Barbour should be recalled for consultations;

b. We should follow up the separate conversations of the Secretary and Walt Rostow with Eban with another approach, preferably by the Secretary, along the following lines:

c. We should probe the Jerusalem issue carefully with selected leaders of the American Jewish community who may be more flexible on this issue than the Israelis.

3. Assuming that we are unable to get a definitive reply from the Israelis on July 18, we should transmit an interim reply to Hussein informing him that, while we are not yet in a position to assess the chances of success, the Israelis have authorized us to tell him that they are ready to discuss a settlement. We would also inform him that we would endeavor to provide a more definitive response by the end of the week.

4. There is a Jordanian requirement, particularly of a political and psychological nature, for assurances that military supplies will be available from the West. The Jordanian request for non-lethal arms should be reviewed urgently with the DOD. Until our position is firmly established and approved by the President, General Khammash should not be invited to visit Washington. Consideration should be given to diverting him to London to discuss his desires for Hawker-Hunters.

5. If a political settlement can be brought about, we will have to play a basic role, preferably behind the scenes. The cover could be a UN mediator. If possible, he should have a blanket authorization to see what can be done to bring peace to the area, reporting to the Security Council. Ambassador Jarring would be an acceptable mediator.

6. We should complete our study of alternative settlement proposals for Jerusalem, including an optimum solution from the US viewpoint without consideration to its acceptability by the contending parties. NEA will complete this in time for circulation on July 17.

7. Luke Battle will brief Ambassador Dean on the conversation with Eban and the report of Ambassador Burns.

8. The presence of the Iraqi forces in Jordan is dangerous. Necessary measures should be taken to get them out.

Washington, July 16, 1967, 3:51 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Battle on July 15, cleared by Davies and Berg, and approved by Katzenbach.

/2/Telegram 216 from Ankara, July 14, reported that Foreign Ministry Secretary General Zeki Kuneralp, at the request of Foreign Minister Caglayangil, had informed the Deputy Chief of Mission in Ankara that on July 10 El Zyyat, a high-ranking UAR Foreign Ministry official, had visited the Turkish Ambassador in Cairo and told him Egypt would have to follow the path followed by Turkey under Ataturk: to give up its empire, retire to Turkey's natural boundaries, and pursue a strong, stable, and dignified national policy. El Zyyat said there were only two ways to do this: one was to be perfectly neutral; the second, and the only feasible course now open to Egypt, was to rely on the Soviets. (Ibid.)

1. We are greatly interested report conversation Turk Ambassador Cairo with El Zyyat. El Zyyat known to Battle and others in Department who consider him reliable, relatively pro-Western. Although somewhat out of power structure in UAR, still possible that he is speaking under instructions.

/3/Telegram 290 from Ankara, July 18, reported that the Ambassador saw Kuneralp that day and passed on the substance of telegram 7611 to Ankara. (Ibid., POL 17 US-UAR)

Rusk

New York, July 17, 1967, 2345Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Moscow, Tel Aviv, and the White House. Received at 8:58 p.m. and passed to the White House at 11:18 p.m.

258. Early this afternoon I received a telephone call from the Soviet mission stating that Amb Dobrynin would like to meet with me later this afternoon. We arranged a meeting for 4 p.m. at the US mission. Amb. Dobrynin and I then met for approximately 50 minutes.

Amb. Dobrynin opened the conversation by asking me whether the United States desired a constructive result from the Assembly which might lead to a peaceful composition of differences in the ME. I replied that the answer to this was evident. We had been trying since the very inception of the extraordinary session of the Assembly to concert with the Soviet Union and all others in the effort to bring about a just and lasting peace in the ME. I further said that any rumors he had heard to the contrary were unfounded. I added that if it was the Sov's notion that we desired the Assembly to adjourn without adopting any res, this also was unfounded. As proof of this I pointed out that on Sunday, July 9, I had offered alternative suggestions to him both of a substantive and procedural character looking towards a constructive conclusion of the Assembly./2 /I also pointed out that on July 5 and today I had agreed with Sov requests for additional time to permit further consultation about an appropriate res.

/2/See Document 348.

Amb Dobrynin replied that he was glad to get this reassurance about our point of view and that he wld convey this through FonMin Gromyko to his govt. He then said they were puzzled that we had not participated in the discussions that the LA's had been holding with the Sovs during the past several days, and inferred that the Sovs assumed from this that we were disinterested in the outcome.

/3/Circular telegram 242 from USUN, July 16, reported a meeting between Goldberg and a Latin American negotiating committee concerning discussions between the Latin Americans and the Soviets and conveyed the texts of Latin American and Soviet draft resolutions. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

I reminded him of my earlier comments to him that the LA's had developed their draft without consultation with us and that we supported it notwithstanding that it did not fully meet our views for reasons which I had explained to the Assembly. I then reaffirmed that I and the members of my del were ready and willing to have additional further talks with FonMin Gromyko himself, and other members of the Sov del about the outcome of the Assembly.

Amb Dobrynin then turned to the LA text of July 14. He made the initial observation that LA text of July 14th was somewhat different from other LA texts which had been circulated. I said I did not know specifically what other texts he had in mind but that it was my understanding that the LA text of July 14 represented the agreed LA view of what a final substantive res shld contain.

Amb Dobrynin then inquired whether we would object to adding the words "without delay" to para 2 of the LA text affirming the principle that the withdrawal of Israeli forces to their original position is expected. I replied that we would have no objection to this if the words "without delay" were likewise added to para 3 which stated that the termination of a state or claims of belligerency by all states in the Middle East is expected. Amb. Dobrynin then observed that this of course was consistent with our established position and I acknowledged that it was.

/4/Document 348.

He then asked whether any other word than belligerency could be used and I said perhaps another formulation could be employed with the understanding that the concept would be the same, and I then suggested this formulation in para 3: "Termination of all states of war and any and all claims thereto is expected". He in turn inquired if we could accept words which he said had been suggested by Amb. Ruda of Argentina "Renunciation of the legal capacity to wage acts of war by such states is expected." I told him that this language was not appropriate and could lead to great confusion. In fact, I pointed out that it might be construed as a disarmament measure which would not be acceptable to either of the parties and indeed to the Soviets. I added that we had proposed registration and limitation of arms and had not been supported by the Soviets and certainly not by the Arab states or Israel. Amb. Dobrynin contended that this was not the intention of the language to deal with disarmament. I said that in the English version this was a logical interpretation. Moreover, I said that what had to be understood was the concept that all states of war and any and all claims thereto had to be terminated rather than renunciation of the concept of waging "acts of war".

/5/On June 23; see Document 321.

/6/For text of the Joint Declaration signed by Japan and the Soviet Union on October 19, 1956, which terminated the state of war between them and restored diplomatic relations, see 263 UNTS 99.

Amb. Dobrynin then turned to the language of the LA text relating to guaranteeing freedom of transit through international waterways. He then inquired whether instead of "guaranteeing" we could accept the language "settling the question of transit through international waterways". I said this would be unsatisfactory because it would not expressly acknowledge the principle on which I thought both our govts were in agreement--that the innocent right of passage through international waterways should be guaranteed and protected. I added that if a state of war or belligerency were to be renounced or terminated, then the only problem to settle in the SC would be to guarantee freedom of transit through some appropriate means.

In summing up, Amb Dobrynin inquired whether we regarded the LA text with the change I suggested which was semantic rather than substantive to be the irreducible minimum insofar as we were concerned today. I said that it was, although as I previously pointed out I did not exclude further conversations with the Sov del if they desired further mtgs, and believed them to be fruitful.

I then asked Amb Dobrynin if there was any difference in Sov terminology between a state of war and state of belligerency, and he replied that there was and gave me the foll Russian words to indicate this difference: "state of war--sostoyaniye voyny. State of belligerency--sostoyaniye vrazhdebnosti".

Amb Dobrynin then said that he would communicate my thoughts to his FonMin and I in turn reiterated once again that I wld be glad to meet with the FonMin at any time convenient to him and I wld be glad to call upon him at the Sov mission since Amb Dobrynin now on three occasions had done me the courtesy of calling upon me at the US mission. I also emphasized that our govt was quite prepared to extend any appropriate type of hospitality to FonMin Gromyko and his party during their continued stay here.

Amb Dobrynin said he wld be glad to communicate the substance of our entire talk as well as this hospitable gesture to FonMin Gromyko and to the Sov Government.

Comment: It seems obvious from my conversation with Amb. Dobrynin as reported above that Amb. Dobrynin was conducting a probing operation rather than a genuine negotiation. But this may not be the last word. In the announcement made by Pres Pazhwak, Soviets have until Thurs morning to make further moves and their disposition to wait until the last minute is well known.

Additional comment: I briefed Amb. Rafael on the substance of the above.

Any comment AmEmb Moscow would wish to make on above would be appreciated.

Goldberg

SC No. 07445/67

Washington, July 18, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Intelligence Cables. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. Rostow forwarded the memorandum to the President on July 18 at 5:40 p.m. with a covering note stating that it was Clifford's "brief but definitive analysis" of the attack on the Liberty, and was "based on the study of literally thousands of pages of evidence." A handwritten "L" on Rostow's note indicates the President saw it.

SUBJECT
The Israeli Attack on the USS Liberty

In accordance with your request, I have reviewed all available information on the subject.

Based thereon, I submit the enclosed memorandum which deals with the question of Israeli culpability. In the event additional significant information is received concerning the foregoing, I will submit a supplementary report.

Other questions involving U.S. command and control of the Liberty are being investigated by responsible officials in the Executive Branch.

Because of discussions held on this subject within the Special Committee, I am sending copies of this memorandum to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.

Clark M. Clifford

THE ISRAELI ATTACK ON THE USS LIBERTY

On the afternoon of June 8 (2:05 p.m., Israeli time), the USS Liberty while in international waters in the Eastern Mediterranean suffered an attack by Israeli aircraft and motor torpedo boats. When attacked the Liberty was approximately 15.5 nautical miles north of Sinai and was traveling in a westerly direction at a speed of five knots.

The initial attack consisted of five or six strafing runs by jet aircraft and was followed twenty-four minutes later with an attack by three motor torpedo boats.

The attack was executed with complete surprise, remarkable efficiency, devastating accuracy and deeply tragic results.

Israel's explanation of the attack is summarized as follows:

a. The attack was an "innocent mistake--no criminal negligence was involved."

b. Israel's Navy and Air Force had received a number of reports that El Arish was being shelled from the sea. These reports were later determined to be erroneous but, at the time they were received, they were accepted at face value by Israeli Naval and Air Force headquarters.

c. Israeli officers who knew the Liberty had been identified earlier the same day did not connect her with the unidentified ships said to be shelling El Arish (and apparently the fact that a U.S. flag vessel was in the area was not communicated to subordinate elements of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)).

d. A second "mistaken report"--that the Liberty was steaming at thirty knots--was received by the IDF. When the Liberty was identified on the morning of June 8, the IDF determined from Janes Fighting Ships that the Liberty's maximum speed was eighteen knots. The second "mistaken report" led to the conclusion that the earlier identification of the Liberty was erroneous and that the vessel allegedly traveling at thirty knots was an enemy ship.

e. IDF standing orders provided that any ships in the area cruising at speeds above twenty knots may be brought under attack without further identification. Thus the air attack was launched.

f. A third "mistake" resulted in the execution of the second (motor torpedo boat) stage of the attack. This third error of the IDF was its mistaken identification of the Liberty as the Egyptian supply ship El Quesir.

g. Immediately following the air attack, serious doubts began to arise concerning the true identity of the ship, but these doubts were not communicated to the commanding officer of the motor torpedo boats before he launched the second stage of the attack.

h. Prior to launching the torpedo attack one of the Israeli boats sent an "A-A" signal (meaning "what is your identity?") to the Liberty. The Liberty, instead of identifying herself, responded with an "A-A" signal. Officers on the Israeli boats interpreted the return signal as an evasion and concluded that the vessel in question was Egyptian, whereupon the torpedoes were launched.

i. The Liberty acted with lack of care by approaching excessively close to shore in an area which was a scene of war, without advising the Israeli authorities of its presence and without identifying itself elaborately. The Liberty tried to hide its presence and its identity both before it was discovered and after having been attacked.

Based upon a thorough review of all information on the incident which has become available thus far, I wish to submit the following findings of fact:

a. At all times prior to, during, and following the attack, the Liberty was in international waters where she had every right to be. As a noncombatant neutral vessel she maintained the impartial attitude of neutrality at all times prior to the attack.

b. Prior to the attack no inquiry was made by the Israeli Government as to whether there were U.S. flag vessels in the general area of the Eastern Mediterranean adjoining Israel and the United Arab Republic.

c. The weather was clear and calm in the area at the time of attack and throughout the preceding hours of June [8]. Visibility was excellent.

d. At all times prior to the attack the Liberty was flying her normal size American flag (five feet by eight feet) at the masthead. The flag was shot down during the air attack and was replaced by a second American flag (seven feet by thirteen feet) five minutes prior to the attack by motor torpedo boats. The Liberty did not endeavor to hide her identity or her presence in international waters at any time prior to or during the attack.

e. The Liberty's U.S. Navy distinguishing letters and number were printed clearly on her bow. The Liberty's number was painted clearly in English on her stern. (Egyptian naval ships such as the El Quesir, with which the Liberty was allegedly confused, carry their names in Arabic script.)

f. The ship's configuration and her standard markings were clearly sufficient for reconnaissance aircraft and waterborne vessels to identify her correctly as the noncombatant ship Liberty.

g. At the time she was attacked, the Liberty was making only five knots. Her maximum capability is eighteen knots, a fact which had been ascertained by IDF personnel when she was identified on the morning of June 8.

h. Prior to the torpedo attack the Liberty neither received nor dispatched an "A-A" signal. The Israeli claim that the Liberty transmitted an "A-A" signal prior to the torpedo attack is demonstrably false. The Liberty's signal light capability was totally destroyed in the air attack which occurred some twenty minutes before the torpedo boats appeared on the scene. Intermittently prior to the attack Liberty personnel observed a flashing light coming from the center boat. The first intelligible signal received by the Liberty was an offer of help following the torpedo attack.

i. The Liberty was reconnoitered by aircraft of unidentified nationality on three separate occasions prior to the attack--5 hours and 13 minutes before the attack, 3 hours and 7 minutes before the attack, and 2 hours and 37 minutes before the attack. Personnel on the Liberty, who observed and in some instances photographed the reconnaissance aircraft, were unable to identify them fully. Positive evidence concerning their nationality is still lacking, however, there are several grounds for assuming they were Israeli: (1) when the aircraft orbited the Liberty on three separate occasions the Arab-Israeli war was in its fourth day, the Egyptian Air Force had been substantially destroyed, and the Israeli Air Force was in effective control of the air space in the area; (2) [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Tel Aviv, received information from a reliable and sensitive Israeli source reporting that he had listened to IDF air-to-ground transmissions on the morning of June 8 indicating Israeli aircraft sighting of a vessel flying the U.S. flag; (3) in the course of advancing its explanation for the attack, the Israeli Government acknowledged that the Liberty had been identified by IDF officers early on the morning of June 8.

j. COMINT reports that shortly after the torpedo attack, the Israelis began to have doubts as to the identity of the vessel and efforts were intensified to verify its identification. Ten minutes after the torpedo attack an Israeli ground controller still believed it to be Egyptian. Identification attempts continued, and forty-five minutes after the torpedo attack, helicopters were checking the masts, flag and bow number of the Liberty. By this time, there appears to have been no question in Israeli minds as to what had happened. The weight of the evidence is that the Israeli attacking force originally believed their target was Egyptian.

Based upon a thorough review of all information on the incident which has become available thus far, I wish to submit the following conclusions:

a. The information thus far available does not reflect that the Israeli high command made a premeditated attack on a ship known to be American.

b. The evidence at hand does not support the theory that the highest echelons of the Israeli Government were aware of the Liberty's true identity or of the fact that an attack on her was taking place. To disprove such a theory would necessitate a degree of access to Israeli personnel and information which in all likelihood can never be achieved.

c. That the Liberty could have been mistaken for the Egyptian supply ship El Quesir is unbelievable. El Quesir has one-fourth the displacement of the Liberty, roughly half the beam, is 180 feet shorter, and is very differently configured. The Liberty's unusual antenna array and hull markings should have been visible to low-flying aircraft and torpedo boats. In the heat of battle the Liberty was able to identify one of the attacking torpedo boats as Israeli and to ascertain its hull number. In the same circumstances, trained Israeli naval personnel should have been able easily to see and identify the larger hull markings on the Liberty.

d. The best interpretation from available facts is that there were gross and inexcusable failures in the command and control of subordinate Israeli naval and air elements. One element of the Israeli air force knew the location and identification of the Liberty around 9:00 a.m. and did not launch an attack. Yet, hours later, apparently a different IDF element made the decision to attack the same vessel that earlier flights had identified and refrained from attacking.

e. There is no justification for the failure of the IDF--with the otherwise outstanding efficiency which it demonstrated in the course of the war--to ensure prompt alerting of all appropriate elements of the IDF of the fact that a U.S. ship was in the area. There was ample time to accomplish such alerting because the Liberty had been identified as a U.S. flag vessel five hours before the attack took place.

f. The unprovoked attack on the Liberty constitutes a flagrant act of gross negligence for which the Israeli Government should be held completely responsible, and the Israeli military personnel involved should be punished.

Washington, July 18, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Settlement. Secret.

THE U.S. AND A JORDAN-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT

King Hussein has told us that he wants to negotiate a settlement with Israel. His opening terms are a return to June 4 with Jewish access to the Wailing Wall and Jordanian access to the Mediterranean. This is obviously an opening position.

The Israelis have told us that their response is positive and that they are ready to meet with Hussein at a convenient time and place.

We are consulting Ambassador Burns (now in Washington) and Ambassador Barbour (who arrives this evening). In the next day or so we must give Burns instructions on what to say to Hussein when he goes back to Amman. This situation confronts us with both short-run tactical and long-run strategic questions. On the tactics, there is considerable agreement that we need to proceed cautiously and that we should not urge an immediate top-level direct negotiation between Hussein and the Israelis. Both sides need ways and means to communicate back and forth from their opening positions, which are very far apart. Hussein needs an adviser or advisers he can trust. Whatever our eventual position, we should not now be the obvious middleman in the first discussions.

The tactical decisions should await our discussions with Barbour and perhaps should go no further than the initial guidance to Burns on his reply to Hussein. Under Secretary Katzenbach has been on top of this problem and will be presenting matured recommendations to the Secretary and the President over the next day or so.

But he joins me in feeling that the really urgent question before the President and Secretary at the moment is not technical but strategic. It is whether and to what extent the United States is prepared to use its own influence with Israel and Jordan to increase the prospect of a serious settlement between them. Nobody can be certain that such a settlement is possible even if we use all our influence. But it is reasonably certain that it will not come about if we do not. We are the people with the carrot in the form of economic support for an Israel-Jordan partnership. We are also the people with the stick, in that we are the one really big friend of both of these countries, and our weapons, for example, are at present essential to both.

There are many issues between Jordan and Israel--the termination of hostilities, the degree of mutual recognition, the level of economic interconnection, the division of tourist revenues, the degree of common concern for Palestinian Arabs. But the two crucial political issues are those of control of the Old City of Jerusalem and sovereignty over the West Bank of the Jordan. The more King Hussein can get on these two issues, the more likely he can be an enduring force for peace as Israel's eastern neighbor. The less he gets on these two questions, the more risky his future and the less the likelihood of an agreement which can survive.

/2/In a July 17 memorandum to the President, Bundy stated that he thought they would soon face the question of whether to use U.S. influence to promote a settlement between Israel and Jordan, especially whether Israeli access to U.S. weapons should be linked to a settlement with Jordan. He concluded: "If we take a passive role, I doubt if there will be a settlement between Israel and Jordan. Indeed there may not be a settlement in the works no matter what we do. But the worst course of all would be for us to embark on a course which requires pressure on Israel if in fact at the moment of truth we are likely to conclude that it is unwise to apply such pressure." (Ibid., U.S. Position--Discussion)

This memorandum betrays my own beliefs in favor of a strong U.S. role--not now but later. But it is not designed to produce an answer so much as to start a discussion from which top-level guidance can emerge.

McG. B.

Washington, July 18, 1967, 6:06-7:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, Box 1. The document bears no classification marking but is marked Literally Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House.

NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH

Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Walt Rostow
McGeorge Bundy
George Christian

/2/Leonard Unger's appointment as Ambassador to Thailand was announced on July 19.

/3/Document 374.

Secretary Rusk said he did not know if the U.S. wanted to be a secret mediator. He suggested somebody else, Sweden or Switzerland, would be more appropriate in getting the parties to a "meeting of the minds."

The President said he would be receptive to finding somebody to put it together before "we can't put it together again." The President said he thinks the U.S. should do it. The President said if you can get somebody to front for you that is well and good.

McGeorge Bundy said he agreed with the President. He emphasized the urgent need to "get at it with the Israelis."

The President said he felt we were going to be in a war out there before we know it. Secretary Rusk said he agreed with that.

The President said, "The clock is ticking. There is no question but what the Arabs have no confidence in us. We can't sit and let these things go."

The President said the question before the group is who is the best person to undertake the task as a mediator with the U.S. behind him.

The President said that DeGaulle is saying to the Arabs to confiscate all of the holdings in their area and that they (France) will come in and help. The President said that report came to him from Robert Anderson on Monday night.

The President said it did not appear the Arabs were willing to sit down and talk. McGeorge Bundy said that King Hussein is prepared to do that, and that his position is unique in that regard.

The President wanted to know who the nominee of the group was to undertake this role as mediator. Bundy recommended the U.S. because "Israel will not listen to anybody else except us." The President asked about Prime Minister Pearson of Canada and Prime Minister Wilson of Great Britain. The President said he wished that we could find something for Wilson to do. Walt Rostow said that Oliver Franks could do it.

The President said that he agreed that we must act quickly. The issue now is who will coordinate all of this. Bundy said that the group would meet together and come back with a scenario for the President on how to proceed. The President asked Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk to "watch this very carefully."

On the matter of armed shipments to the Middle East countries, Secretary Rusk [said] that there was going to be a very tough time on this issue with the Congress.

The President said, "We must tell them (the Congress) that we will be out of business in that area if we don't make a sale." The $6 million of economic aid was approved. The $1.8 million in non-lethal aid was approved.

[Omitted here is discussion of unrelated subjects.]

Washington, July 18, 1967, 8:20 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VIII. Confidential. Rostow sent the memorandum to the President with a covering memorandum of July 18. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

Minister Evron is back from Israel and asked to see me briefly today.

1. His formal message to the U.S. Government is that the Israeli government is carefully examining all the alternatives for a Jordan settlement. It has not made up its mind. It will have a definitive position in about two weeks. He said that they are all conscious that this is an historic matter which will affect the shape of Israel and the Middle East for a long period and requires detailed study, including economic and demographic estimates.

2. He reported vividly the impact on him of being in Israel. He said it is impossible to understand at this distance the extent to which Israeli emotions and political life have been changed by the war. First, the extraordinary physical facts of the victory. He says, for example, that well over 700 tanks were destroyed or abandoned in the Sinai and incredible tonnages of ammunition were found in the fortresses on the Syrian Heights.

But, above all, the fact of Israeli access to and control of Jerusalem. He said he found himself getting caught up in this fever. He is now convinced that just as it will take the Arabs some time to come to grips with reality, it will also take the Israelis some time to recover from euphoria and grip the difficult real problems that lie ahead. (The latter remark he said was one that would not be approved by his government but was, in his judgment, a fact.)

3. Israeli politics is in complete ferment with men taking positions not so much on traditional party alignments as on an age basis. The war is bringing to the front a new younger lot of people. The results and new directions in politics cannot be predicted.

4. I confined my response to two substantive comments:

--So far as Jerusalem is concerned, Israeli euphoria is no better guide as to what will be wise for the long pull than Arab humiliation and despair;

--The Israelis have a duty to come to grips with the Hussein offer promptly, whatever the rhythm of their staff work.

Walt