Docs 327-363
Washington, November 17, 1961, 9:49 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 739.00/11-1761. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Crimmins, cleared by Coerr, and approved by Woodward.
606. Contel 964./2/ Our ability arm you with additional specific pressures limited at present to positioning one to three naval units at point just below horizon from Ciudad Trujillo, on call to move within sight of shore immediately should you so request. Ships will be on station morning eighteenth. You should not make this known for present.
/2/Document 326.
Secretary made following voluntary statement in press conference today:
"In OAS there are two questions immediately in front of us. One has to do with the Dominican Republic. Question before OAS is whether there could be now a partial lifting of so-called sanctions against Dominican Republic. This possibility is directly related to events in Dominican Republic itself. Those turn on events which may change on hour-to-hour basis.
On one side we have been encouraged by tendencies in Dominican Republic to move toward more moderate and constitutional government embracing broader elements of population in political and constitutional affairs and moving toward kind government which Dominican people themselves could respect and which would win esteem international community states. Just as there has been some confusion in last few hours as to exactly what is happening in Dominican Republic I would not anticipate that OAS would feel itself in position act immediately upon suggestions which our representative made this week that subject."
We are urgently considering other means pressure and will advise you further.
Rusk
328. Editorial Note
On November 18, 1961, the Department of State issued press release 799, a statement by Secretary of State Rusk, which reads as follows:
"It has been confirmed that leading figures who were closely associated with the repressive measures of the former dictatorship in the Dominican Republic and who had departed from that country returned to Ciudad Trujillo on November 15.
"Moreover, it appears that they may be planning an attempt to reassert dictatorial domination of the political and economic life of that country, threatening the recent gains of the Dominican Government and people toward democratization.
"On the recommendation of the United States, the Special Committee of the Organization of American States has already postponed further consideration of a proposal on withdrawing the suspension of trade with the Dominican Republic in certain products.
"In view of the possibility of political disintegration and the dangerous situation which could ensue, the Government of the United States is considering the further measures that unpredictable events might warrant." (Department of State Bulletin, December 4, 1961, page 931)
The Department of State subsequently released two similar statements of concern: press release 829, November 30, and a statement read to the news correspondents by a Department press officer. The texts of both those statements are ibid., page 1003.
329. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in the Dominican Republic/1/
Washington, November 18, 1961, 7:12 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 739.00/11-1761. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Coerr; cleared by Jamison, Achilles, Crimmins, Schlesinger, L, and S/S; and approved by Woodward.
609. Embtel 976./2/ Department today determined following actions in response your telegrams present situation:
/2/Not printed. (Ibid.)
1. Secretary has issued statement confirming our opposition to reimposition dictatorship and continuing support democratization (unclassified Deptel 608)./3/
/3/Not printed. (Ibid., 739.00/11-1861) For text of the statement, see Document 328.
2. You should immediately inform Balaguer we would respond affirmatively and promptly should he request courtesy visit US Naval unit. Cruiser now in position below horizon out of ground sight. (Code word "hospitality." We would suggest covering statement by USG along following lines "President Balaguer who has been playing an active role in working toward the democratization of the DR has invited units US Navy which have been on maneuvers in nearby waters pay courtesy call at CT. This invitation has been accepted." We would gear release of such statement to your recommendations which would of course take into account optimum timing from point of view of Balaguer's safety. Comment: We prefer courtesy visit at invitation GODR as more immediate, more moderate and more generally acceptable measure than USG show of force. Obviously it would also serve show US strength soonest. (Personnel would not go ashore without further instructions.) We tend to believe presence Naval unit in harbor might have calming effect and might provide element of security for President Balaguer whose physical safety highly important to successful USG operations this difficult situation.
3. You are authorized request Navy make active demonstration force "Wave High" in international waters (not within DR jurisdiction) at your discretion. You may make request directly to Navy with info Washington or to Navy through Washington. Navy will respond soonest. Planes on strip alert commencing dawn 19th. You are authorized similarly request Navy move vessels into sight international waters. (Code word "Sea Gull.")
4. We would be prepared consider active demonstration of force such as "Grass Cutter" within Dominican jurisdiction only if President Balaguer explicitly requests (preferably in writing).
Rusk
330. Editorial Note
On November 19, 1961, following the appearance of U.S. warships off the coast of the Dominican Republic, Dominican Air Force General Rafael Rodriguez Echavarria declared in favor of the Balaguer government. Hector and Arismendi left the country on November 20. It was learned afterward that Ramfis, who had resigned as chief of the Dominican armed forces and police on November 14, had slipped away on his yacht the night of November 17. U.S. talks with the Balaguer government resumed on the questions of ending sanctions, establishing a provisional government leading to OAS-sponsored elections, and the resumption of full U.S. diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic. The talks bogged down due to civil unrest in the Republic and the reluctance of Balaguer to leave office. (Department of State, Central Files, 739.00/11-2261 through 739.00/12-1561; Martin, Overtaken by Events, pages 82-83)
331. Telegram From the Consulate General in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State/1/
Ciudad Trujillo, November 19, 1961, 9 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 739.00/11-1961. Secret; Niact. Relayed to the White House, OSD, Army, Navy, Air Force, and CIA.
990. Situation as of 0700.
1. Ships now visible and making two runs before city.
2. Alvarez/2/ came in to say UCN has word that their contacts with military in Cibao area have been successful and there is now joint military opposition understanding which controls Santiago-San Francisco-LaVega. UCN also has news from Sanisidro General Rodriguez Echavarria, who still there took charge in middle night and issuing communique--this not verification or direct news of situation.
/2/Braulio Alvarez Sanchez.
3. Yesterday Vidal Torres, Governor Santiago, appointed Secretary Interior and Pedro Jorge, popular with moderate opposition. Vidal replaces Herrera Bellini, moderate, who took over Partido Dominican of Rommercado who took off for Miami and reportedly Europe on Thursday 16.
4. Military liaison officer has just called R/Admiral Valdezvidaure who assures Navy behind Balaguer and that Trujillos have to go. He is certain he is in effective control Navy. Has not been in touch with Sanisidro but believes Air Force also behind Balaguer.
5. Remaining question is Army.
Hill
332. Telegram From the White House to the Department of State/1/
San Juan, Puerto Rico, December 16, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 739.00/12-1661. Secret. No time of transmission is indicated on the source text. President Kennedy, en route to Venezuela and Colombia, met with Woodward, Bowles, Morales-Carrion, Hill, and Goodwin at the Governor of Puerto Rico's mansion, La Fortaleza, to discuss the Dominican negotiations.
PRWHO5. From Naval Aide to the President. To Mr. Bundy, WashDC, Sec Rusk, State Dept. Following instructions were given to Mr. Hill by the President.
Memorandum for John Calvin Hill, Consul General, Santo Domingo
For your use immediately on your return to Santo Domingo on December 16, 1961, there are attached:
1) Instructions for a conversation with President Balaguer on my behalf.
2) Instructions for a conversation with General Rodriguez Echavarria.
3) General instructions for your guidance in these conversations.
s/John F. Kennedy
December 16, 1961
La Fortaleza
San Juan, Puerto Rico
1. The President has personally instructed that you make the following known to President Balaguer.
The Government and people of the United States have great admiration for President Balaguer's heroic and courageous efforts to effect a peaceful transition to democratic government in the Dominican Republic whatever the feelings of the moment in the Dominican Republic. The President is confident that if Balaguer's efforts are successful he will endure as one of the great figures of his country's history and an important figure in the history of this hemisphere. Because of this admiration for President Balaguer the President is greatly disturbed at the current course of events in the Dominican Republic. If the current impasse is allowed to continue then violence and terror are certain to rise--the problems of peaceful transition will be complicated--and the efforts to achieve democracy will be endangered. As long as President Balaguer continues without indicating a definite decision to turn over the office of President to a successor--then the entire atmosphere in the Dominican Republic will continue to grow hostile and dangerous--and distrust for the regime and for President Balaguer will increase. Thus, unless immediate steps are taken to set a date for departure the dangers of a new dictatorship will increase and the prestige of President Balaguer will decline. If he leaves early and on his own initiative then he undoubtedly will be known as one of the few men in any country to have brought about a peaceful transition to democracy. If he does not do this, and if he is forced out at some later date, then his prestige and his position in history will be damaged or even destroyed.
We realize the difficulties which President Balaguer faces. And we admire the skill with which he has handled the enormous problems of his country. Therefore we have, at all times, supported his efforts to bring about constitutional government. We believe that the following suggested course of action will bring final success, after which we are confident President Balaguer can return to an important official position of some prestige--as well as to a secure position in the history of his country and of western democracy:
(A) We suggest that the President make it clear that the announcement of his final solution was not forced on him by others--but was arrived at his own free will and after careful thought for the welfare and future of his country.
(B) That the President announce his intention to resign on February 27, 1962. He should state that in the interim he intends to carry out the program of establishing the Council of State, reorganizing the cabinet etc. To create a government of national unity. We believe it is essential to announce a definite date for President Balaguer's resignation. Not to do so would create distrust of his intentions, make it impossible to form a bona fide coalition government, and make it very difficult for the United States to lift sanctions or recognize the government until after his departure. On the other hand, if he announces a date the sincerity of his intentions will be recognized. His position and prestige in his own country and elsewhere will be strengthened, and it will be his government that will achieve not only democratic government, but the restoration of diplomatic relations and an end to sanctions. If he does not announce a date then it will appear as if he were forced out, as if others had made the decision as to when he should leave, whereas if he does set a date then he will appear to be in control of the situation, to have made his own decision, and be shaping his country's future.
(C) Balaguer should also announce--on his own initiative--his intention to create a Council of State, a representative cabinet, and to take other measures necessary to assure a government of national unity with elections.
(D) That President Balaguer announce the appointment of these bodies including the appointment of the members of the Council of State as advisors to the President pending enactment of the necessary constitutional and legal change to establish the Council. That he also announce his intention to resign February 27, 1962 in favor of the person who will be elected Vice-President of the Council.
(E) The United States will then proceed to move to lift sanctions and re-establish diplomatic relations so that these things will be accomplished before President Balaguer leaves office.
2. The President has instructed the Consul General of the United States, in his discretion, to seek an interview with General Rodriguez Echavarria and state the following points on behalf of the President:
(A) The United States believes the Armed Forces of the Dominican Republic are deeply interested in supporting the democratic evolution of the republic and in its reincorporation into the Inter-American community at the earliest possible time.
(B) The United States considers that the support of the armed forces to a political and constitutional solution as may be reached between President Balaguer and the responsible opposition will greatly help in overcoming the present crisis and will pave the way for quick international action on behalf of the government and people of the Dominican Republic.
(C) Were the armed forces to give their unequivocal support to the solution accorded by President Balaguer and the responsible opposition, the United States, on its part, will:
(1) Take or support an initiative in the OAS to revoke immediately the sanctions imposed by the San Jose conference.
(2) Restore diplomatic relations as soon as formal action is taken by the COAS and,
(3) Consequently authorize the additional "windfall" sugar quota for the Dominican Republic.
(4) Give immediate and sympathetic consideration to bilateral programs between the United States and the Government of the Dominican Republic under the Alianza Para el Progreso, with particular reference to the social development of the Dominican people.
(5) Be prepared to discuss, upon request by a government of national unity of the Dominican Republic the conclusion of a suitable military agreement for military cooperation including the provision, if desired, of a United States military mission.
(D) Were the Armed Forces of the Dominican Republic to deny their support to the political solution reached by President Balaguer and the responsible opposition, the United States will be unable to support the lifting of sanctions or will consider inadvisable to grant the "windfall" quota or enter into any agreements related to the extension of the Alliance for Progress to the Dominican people.
3. The President instructed the Consul General of the United States in the Dominican Republic to seek an immediate interview with President Balaguer on his return to Santo Domingo on December 16 and to convey the message which he has been instructed to give to President Balaguer. In addition, the Consul General may make any or all of the following points:
(1) The United States is anxious that there be an early solution to the political impasse between the Government of the Dominican Republic and the anti-Communist opposition at the earliest possible date.
(2) When an accord is reached, the United States is prepared to take, or support, an initiative in the OAS to revoke the sanctions imposed by the Conference of San Jose, to restore diplomatic relations and, consequently to authorize the additional ("windfall") sugar quota for the Dominican Republic. The United States, upon the restoration of diplomatic relations, is further prepared to give sympathetic and immediate consideration to bilateral programs between the United States and the Dominican Republic, under the Alianza Para Progreso program, in such fields as economic, cultural and military cooperation as well as give sympathetic support to Dominican requests to international institutions for the financing of sound programs and projects for the economic recovery and development of the Dominican Republic.
(3) The United States, however, considers that it will not be in a position to take these actions in benefit of the Dominican Republic until such time as the Dominican Government is broadly representative of national opinion on the basis of an accord between the government and the main political groups representing the Dominican people. Therefore, the United States believes that reaching such an accord is of the greatest urgency.
(4) The United States further considers that delay in reaching an accord not only enhances the possibilities of the growth of leftist and Castroist agitation and disturbances or of the growth of military influence in the civil affairs of the Dominican Republic, but also does serious damage to the international reputation of the United States, of President Balaguer and of the Dominican Armed Forces. The United States, and its President, fully recognize and appreciate the role which President Balaguer has taken in setting the course of his nation towards a democratic system and towards the restoration of good relations with the United States and other American Republics. The United States is prepared to use its influence in order to assure that, upon leaving office, President Balaguer is treated with the consideration due to the efforts he has made towards these objectives.
(5) While recognizing that the nature of an accord between the government and the opposition is essentially an internal matter, the United States is prepared to lend its support in the OAS and bilaterally to a government consisting of
(a) A President.
(b) A Council of State composed of distinguished citizens mutually acceptable to the opposition and to the government including the armed forces.
(c) A cabinet divided among nominees of the present government and the opposition and
(d) The armed forces, responsible under the constitution solely to the President and responsible under him for their own self-administration without political interference.
(6) The United States does not consider that the completion or non-completion of President Balaguer's term of office should be an obstacle to reaching an agreement. On the contrary, the United States believes that President Balaguer has a unique opportunity to successfully set his country on the road to democracy, but that his position would become untenable in the eyes of the hemisphere if insistence on completing his term of office became the sole obstacle to reaching an accord and that such serious damage would be done to the reputation of the President and to the present Dominican Government that it would be impossible for the United States to lift sanctions or resume diplomatic relations.
(7) Note: In reporting the results of this conversation and of other developments in the Dominican Republic, the Consul General will forward his recommendations on the desirability of having Deputy Assist-ant Secretary Morales Carrion return to the Dominican Republic and on the advisability of having OAS Secretary General Mora go there./2/
/2/Printed from an unsigned copy.
333. Telegram From the Department of State to President Kennedy, at Caracas/1/
Washington, December 16, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Dominican Republic, September-December 1961. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. The President was in Caracas December 16-17 to meet with President Betancourt.
707. Presidential Visit. Following from Santo Domingo, is repeated "Number 1298,/2/ December 16, 2 p.m., signed Hill". Niact. Presidential Handling. Limit Distribution.
/2/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 739.00/12-1661)
In accordance President's instructions, called on President Balaguer late this morning and--after generally describing talks in San Juan and President Kennedy's great personal interest in early solution which would preserve President Balaguer's stature before history--conveyed to him the President's message. Only change from text was substitution of "a date in January or February" for "February 27" since, on my return, was informed opposition negotiators still hopeful of January retirement and I did not wish place President Kennedy in position of undermining it by firmly suggesting a later date.
President Balaguer expressed appreciation for President's message, which he said accorded with his own thinking except that point re announcement of his resignation unresolved. He listened attentively to passage in President's message and to my amplifying explanations, including allusion to fact that President had found in 15 years experience that it was better to retain initiative with clear-cut solution than to be exposed to continuing pressures which would make decision, when finally announced, appear to have been taken under pressure. I also added that it was my own judgment that leaving this key question open would at same time make it difficult present clear-cut convincing solution to OAS and result here in continuing attacks by opposition which could be avoided if definite decision announced.
President Balaguer indicated he was personally convinced, but would have to talk to Armed Forces because it was they, not he, who opposed naming a fixed date, but he thought they could be persuaded. He was disposed to make speech and send necessary constitutional changes to Congress concurrently. He described negotiations as being in advanced state, with only unresolved issues being who should succeed him, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and when his withdrawal should be announced.
During conversation, General Rodriguez Echavarria sauntered in on another matter, and joined talk. He was obviously relaxed and on his best, most respectful manners with President. After President and I had briefed him, I conveyed to him President Kennedy's message which obviously pleased him and also flattered him. In ensuing discussion, General neither approved nor disapproved of President making announcement but indicated generally he would agree to whatever President decided about plan and offered to make concurrent public announcement Armed Forces supported solution. However, he quietly firm that Rafael Bonelly not only should be but must be "Vice President of Council of State and President Balaguer's successor as the person having confidence of Armed Forces". [2 lines of source text not declassified]
As President and General saw it, agreement could be announced and sent Congress on Monday if opposition negotiations agreed to above. I myself am not sure Bonelly's name will sit well with UCN because of his friendship with General.
Amiama, Bonelly and possibly Imbert to see President later in day and we shall see then whether agreement in sight and whether or not it would be desirable for Morales Carrion to return."
Ball
334. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Caracas, December 16, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 739.00/12-1661. Secret. Drafted by Charles A. Stewart of the Embassy, Fernando van Reigersberg (LS), and Sam Moskowitz (ARA/ESA) and approved in the White House on February 6, 1962.
SUBJECT
Conference Between President Kennedy and Venezuelan President Betancourt--Dominican Republic Situation
PARTICIPANTS
The President
Ambassador Chester Bowles
Mr. C. Allan Stewart, Charge d'Affaires ad interim
Mr. Robert F. Woodward, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Mr. Teodoro Moscoso, Assistant Administrator for Latin America of the Agency for International Development
Mr. Richard Goodwin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs
Mr. Harold Linder, President of Export-Import Bank of Washington
Mr. Fernando van Reigersberg, LS staff interpreter
President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela
Dr. Marcos Falcón Briceno, Foreign Minister of Venezuela
Dr. Andres German Otero, Minister of Finance of Venezuela
General Antonio Briceno Linares, Minister of Defense of Venezuela
Dr. Jose Antonio Mayobre, Venezuelan Ambassador to the United States
Dr. Alejandro Oropeza Castillo, Governor of the Federal District of Venezuela
Dr. Manuel Perez Guerrero, Chief, Office of Coordination and Planning, Venezuelan Government
The meeting convened at 5:15 p.m. on December 16, 1961, at Los Nunez, began with a discussion of the Dominican Republic situation and the Cuban problem. Other subjects were discussed subsequently.
Dominican Republic Situation
The Dominican question was the first topic discussed. President Kennedy outlined United States efforts to bring the Dominican Republic toward a provisional democratic government, which would rule until free elections could be held later in 1962. He said that he had talked to Deputy Assistant Secretary Morales Carrión and Consul John Hill the night before in Puerto Rico, that they had returned to Santo Domingo immediately afterwards and that Mr. Hill was to meet with President Balaguer this very day. He discussed the difficulties in bringing the democratic opposition parties into agreement with the Balaguer government and said that agreement appeared to be near for naming a provisional junta. President Kennedy thought that the opposition parties should unite and agree to present a common front and that President Balaguer should form a provisional junta immediately. He should also make a speech to the nation stating that he would resign on a certain date but that his resignation would be the result of his own decision and not forced on him by the opposition parties. After a coalition government is formed, the United States would support the lifting of economic sanctions and the resumption of diplomatic relations.
President Kennedy indicated that it was very useful for the United States, Venezuela, and Colombia to work together in this matter. In twenty-four or forty-eight hours he would know more about the success or failure of Mr. Hill's mission. The United States would keep in touch with President Betancourt and keep him informed of the latest developments. Unquestionably, the difficult man to deal with would be General Rodríguez Echevarría. It would be necessary to persuade Balaguer and Rodríguez of the need for Balaguer to resign. The opposition parties would have to be persuaded to form a workable coalition and a date for Balaguer's resignation would have to be set. If Balaguer refused to resign or if General Rodríguez opposed the plan, the problem would be much more serious and acute than at the present time.
President Kennedy said there would be, in any case, a waiting period before sanctions were lifted and in the meantime, efforts would continue to be made by the United States to induce Balaguer to leave the presidency some time during the winter if the provisional junta idea were accepted by the negotiating factions. He requested President Betancourt to use his influence to persuade Balaguer to leave office and to persuade the opposition groups to cooperate in reaching a satisfactory solution.
President Betancourt stated that he had followed Dominican developments very closely. His prediction that the death of Trujillo would not be followed by Castroism had proven to be correct. When the United States sent its destroyers to the Dominican Republic, Venezuela considered sending some of her ships but decided that it would not be necessary.
President Betancourt said the procedure indicated by President Kennedy met with the approval of the Venezuelan Government. He said he was disposed to send a personal message to President Balaguer and General Rodríguez Echevarría urging them to accept the proposal presented by the opposition parties with United States approval. He stated that General Rodríguez is a very ambitious man. There is a clear and present danger that he may wish to follow in Trujillo's footsteps. It is very fortunate that the three main parties opposing Balaguer are on excellent terms with him (Betancourt) and have written to him on several occasions. He had sent his personal envoy to Santo Domingo recently to inquire into the situation and would send him again if it were necessary to induce Balaguer to remain as President only transitorily. It was decided to wait at least 48 hours before any action be taken in view of present indications that some arrangement might be reached between Balaguer and the opposition parties.
335. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Bogota, December 17, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 721.00/12-1761. Confidential. Drafted by Dearborn on December 20 and approved in the White House on January 8, 1962.
SUBJECT
Developments in the Dominican Republic
Planning for Foreign Ministers' Meeting on Cuban Problem
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
President Kennedy
Mr. Chester Bowles, President's Special Assistant
Ambassador Moscoso
Assistant Secretary Woodward
Deputy Assistant Secretary Goodwin
Ambassador Freemen
Mr. Henry Dearborn, Counselor of American Embassy, Bogota
Colombia
President Camargo Lleras
Foreign Minister Castilla Caicedo
Minister of Finance Mejia
Director of National Planning Dept. Gutierrez
President Kennedy called at President Lleras' office at 5:30 p.m. on December 17. Each President was accompanied by advisers as recorded above. Press photographers were invited in and pictures taken. President Kennedy then suggested that the group sit down for conversations and the Presidents, together with their advisers, held a discussion for over an hour.
Developments in the Dominican Republic
President Kennedy had just been handed a cable from the Consul General in Santo Domingo/2/ with information on developments there and the Dominican situation was the first item of conversation. He gave President Lleras information from the cable to the effect that President Balaguer had agreed to announce his withdrawal from the presidency before the end of February, actually intending to leave on January 26. Balaguer had agreed in the meantime to set up a Council of State consisting of Jose Maria Cabral Bermudez as First Vice President, Dr. Rafael Bonelly as Second Vice President and with the following as members: Monsenor Perez Sanchez, Sr. Amiama Tio and Sr. Imbert. Presidents Kennedy and Lleras and others present discussed the characteristics of this group and it was generally agreed that the information in the telegram was encouraging.
/2/See Document 333.
[Here follows discussion of the preparations for the Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States; see Document 128.]
336. Editorial Note
On December 17, 1961, following U.S.-brokered negotiations between the Government and the Dominican opposition parties, President Balaguer announced that a 7-man Council of State would take power in the Dominican Republic January 1, 1962, pending OAS-sponsored elections for both the legislature (August 16) and the Presidency (December 20). The Council took office with Balaguer as its President. The other members were Rafael Bonelly, Eduardo Read Barrera, Antonio Imbert Barrera, Nicolas Pichardo, Luis Amiama Tio, and Elisco Perez Sanchez. On January 4 the Council of the OAS voted to lift the sanctions imposed on the Dominican Republic on August 20, 1960. On January 6 the United States reestablished full diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic. John C. Hill remained as Charge d'Affaires ad interim.
On January 16 Balaguer resigned as President of the Council following street demonstations in the capital by those opposed to his continued participation in the Dominican Government. Later the same day General Pedro Rafael Rodríguez Echavarría ousted the Council of State and established a military civilian junta. (Department of State, Central Files, 739.00/1-1662 through 739.00/1-1962)
337. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State/1/
Santo Domingo, January 16, 1962, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 739.00/1-1662. Secret; Niact. Passed to the White House, OSD, CIA, CNO, CINCLANTFLT, COMCARIBSEAFRON, Chief of Staff USAF, Chief of Staff USA, COMNAVBASEGTMO, COMSECDELT, and CMC.
1494. Imbert called Shaw/2/ urgently to Palace at 6 p.m. to inform that as result afternoon's incidents (Embassy telegram 1490)/3/ Balaguer had informed entire Council he would resign immediately. Formal commitment will be taken at Palace meeting in session now, of Balaguer, entire Council, Rodriguez Echavarria and other armed forces chiefs. Amiama and Pichardo (who later joined conversation) plus Imbert all agree situation has reached decisive moment: Balaguer would definitely go and Rodriguez Echavarria--who they said [would] either accept or not accept Bonelly as chief of state. Latter case would result in military coup. Asked point-blank whether senior military would support General in takeover, Amiama gave fairly firm negative. Obvious that he and others nervous though self-possessed. They all agree, however, that General plans eventual complete takeover. Net impression was they feel better than even chance exists Bonelly will be accepted for moment at least.
/2/David G. Shaw, political officer.
/3/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 739.00/1-1662)
Imbert privately urged that Embassy Service Attaches encourage General to obey constitutional authority, they urged US fleet again be displayed to insure he did so. Amiama, just entering, agreed with latter. Was answered that no country could continue to rely on foreign solutions to its internal problems, to which both agreed. Further indicated that critical factor was lack of confidence by general inability and disposition of Council to maintain order, which all three recognize. They said would attempt guide meeting to create best possible impression on General. Conversation closed as military chiefs arrived with massive bodyguard heavily armed officers and NCOs numbering in dozens.
Hodge/4/
/4/Charles L. Hodge, consular and economic officer.
338. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic/1/
Washington, January 17, 1962, 7:41 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 739.00/1-1762. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Goodwin and Crimmins, cleared by McGhee, and approved by Ball.
885. As soon as possible upon your return and unless your estimate current situation suggests different course action (in which case you should advise Dept immediately) you should speak to Rodriguez Echavarria along following lines:
We believe that with departure Balaguer he may be only man in position to move DR rapidly along road to democratization. This is great historical opportunity which we are hopeful he will take. Any other course will inevitably lead to increasing tension, unrest, etc., and make it impossible for US follow through on intention assist social and economic development DR. These conditions will not only prevent him from gaining stature in hemisphere as friend of democracy, but, by setting the military against the people, will seriously endanger position of military establishment when, as is inevitable, civilian rule is restored. On other hand, if he acts rapidly to restore civilian rule he and military will be credited for having preserved order and constitutional government.
His action in removing six-man council and setting up new council evidently under his control is compelling us to reconsider entire range of our political and economic policies toward DR. Raises such basic questions as recognition of government established by apparently unconstitutional means; desirability and legal possibility, under existing circumstances, of authorizing further purchases under windfall quota, which once lost cannot be recaptured by DR; and desirability furnishing economic and military assistance. You may indicate that we are giving serious study to immediate withdrawal AID mission currently in DR, and plans for military assistance now in abeyance. In this discussion, you may draw on substance your conversation with General after your visit San Juan.
You should add that, although we have taken note his anti-Communist statements and his intention have Punta del Este delegation/2/ take firm anti-Castro stand, we are convinced his actions which appear constitute military coup without any popular support will strengthen Castro-Communists in DR, drive moderate opposition in desperation into alliance with them, and gravely weaken, if not destroy, effectiveness posture at MFM of GODR. You should state that several democratic nations hemisphere will almost certainly raise present Dominican situation at MFM, including civil rights situation, particularly arrests and deportation non-Communist leaders. You may draw parallel between current situation and that created by return Hector and Arismendi.
/2/Reference is to the Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the OAS at Punta del Este, January 22-31.
You should state our belief best solution present situation would be restoration former Council under presidency Bonnelly. This return status quo ante would enable us proceed with programs already at point execution. At minimum, solution must be found that permits genuine participation moderate opposition in government. You should emphasize that we recognize necessity maintenance effectiveness armed forces, and that he may have legitimate basis for fears of future status of armed forces under civilian rule by opposition. Accordingly we prepared assist both sides in working out appropriate guarantees re armed forces role and rights. You may add that as first step this effort we prepared receive from him definition guarantees sought by armed forces. However, we strongly believe his continuance present line action, by setting armed forces against people, can only destroy former, open country to Castro-Communism and thwart indefinitely hopes for orderly progress in DR.
You should also inform leaders moderate opposition who still free (including, as you see fit, Amiama and Imbert) we are attempting restore situation. However, in order have any chance success, our efforts must be accompanied by exercise by them of flexibility and moderation, avoidance provocative actions and recognition necessity for guarantees to armed forces./3/
/3/On January 18 General Echavarría's coup ended when he was arrested by his own men. The original Council of State was reinstated and Rafael Bonnelly was sworn in as its President.
Rusk
339. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State/1/
Santo Domingo, March 4, 1962, noon.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.39/3-462. Confidential. John Bartlow Martin was sworn in as Ambassador to the Dominican Republic on March 2; he presented his credentials on March 9.
1860. Upon relinquishing responsibility for US-Dominican relations here after nine months, should like record following observations and recommendations:
1. Government of this country is now in hands of moderate, anti-dictatorial and anti-Communist group which if anything is over-friendly to and dependent on US in this age of nationalism. It is accepted or supported by vast majority of politically conscious elements of population as transition to elections at end of year.
2. Sentiment toward US is, on whole, good. US is widely credited with having played key role in ending Trujillo dictatorship and its vestiges and with being principal bulwark against a possible new Communist dictatorship. Active anti-American feeling and actions have been concentrated in juvenile delinquent groups receiving exaggerated publicity in downtown area, whose unrepresentative character demonstrated by recent success of anti-Communist students in gaining control of university. This, however, should not obscure equally important fact that there is deep seated and growing nationalism which resents patronism or bear-hug by US and which could flare up into more active anti-American feeling.
3. Stability of Council of State is reasonably well assured against any direct attempts to overthrow. The extreme left does not have control of or significant influence over labor unions, students or civic organizations, or armed forces and thus does not have instrument to take power. The Union Civica National (UCN) and Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) which control upwards of 85 percent of organized political party members are both avowedly anti-Communist though some lower echelon leftist infiltration exists in both through country offsetting to some degree government's ineptness to date in internal security matters since destruction Trujillo's security apparatus. The Castro-lining "14 June" party is currently torn by internal dissension though maintaining a high degree of Communist infiltration, while the Castroist MPD is underground with its leader Lopez Molina fugitive from police. However, firm and sometimes unpopular measures will be required by Council of State with US support if sparks of Communist infiltration in this volatile transitional period are not to set off a conflagration. Softness and timidity can be fatal.
4. The armed forces profess complete loyalty to constitutional government and to the Council. Experience of General Rodriguez Echavarria's attempted January coup has provided officers corps with convincing evidence that neither Dominican people or USG would support military government at this time. However, armed forces remain uneasy, disoriented, in need of restraining [retraining?], reorganization, and some regroupment but most of all in need of feeling that Council State, Dominican populace and USG support them in their constitutional role of preserving security of state. At future date, should civilian government stumble and population become tired of disorders and inefficiency some elements of armed forces will be ready to move in.
5. The economic situation of Dominican Republic is manageable and vigor and imagination can make it into a showcase of democratic as against Communist revolution. Our 25 million dollar credits should tide country over balance payments difficulties caused by Trujillo family's looting. Difficult problem will arise in maintaining internal fiscal soundness in view of $35 million plus (almost quarter of budget) deficit if taxes not raised by May and of wage increase of 100 percent in sugar industry, perhaps 40 percent nationally in what must be greatest redistribution of income this year in any country participating in Alianza para el Progreso. Against manageable danger of inflation, however, must be set politically-stabilizing upspurt in commerce and business.
6. In international relations, present Dominican Government can be counted on to remain firmly aligned with us on key international security questions although it may well have tendency to show token independence on lesser issues and on issues in which developing countries stand against industrialized countries. The success of regime is dependent on cooperation with US and it knows it.
7. I foresee following as areas which will spell success or failure of US policies here:
A. US sugar quota: if US adopts global sugar quota paying world market prices this year, in my judgment results would be psychologically, politically and economically virtually disastrous to our policy objectives here. Even to attempt to press for this would hand Castro/Communist one thing they most lack, a convincing issue on which to sell Dominican opinion on thesis US is working against Dominican interests and imposing a new, exploiting colonial occupation on country. Loss of sugar income cannot be compensated for [by] government to government loans and grants under Alianza para el Progresso, since sugar industry under new wage structure cannot break even without US premium price.
B. Return of $22 million of sugar preferential "withheld" by USG under sanctions which Dominicans view as being rightly theirs. Dominican opinion across spectrum unlikely acquiesce in "retention" this money and left is sure exploit issue as long as it lasts. As setting country on feet likely cost another $22 million, we would be well advised move forward swiftly to restore this money.
C. Anti-Communist measures. Council of State may hesitate from time to time to take energetic measures to control Communist infiltration and agitation because of public sensitivity to any methods reminiscent of Trujillos. However, a strong hand in this field is a must and GODR will need extensive encouragement and help in reorganizing its security services and policies along modern humanitarian lines within the framework of constitutional democracy adapted to local conditions.
D. Armed forces are in need of immediate US encouragement and help in reorientation and adaption to new missions under Council. Military assistance agreement should be signed early this month, missions arrive immediately afterward, and grant-aid uniforms and other soft goods be airlifted in as soon as possible.
E. Labor organizations are divided and FOUPSA, originally intended as free labor movement, has been infiltrated by anti-American leftist elements at top. Although these have cagily not yet brought in significant number leftists at lower echelons and are strongly opposed by FOUPSA libre, creation of unified, independent and anti-Communist labor movement should be first objective and one from which we should not be diverted because of agitation re AFL-CIO or Embassy personalities or tactics.
While above and other pressing problems will require energetic US actions in coming weeks, leave these responsibilities with basic sense of optimism that both Dominican nation and USG have already demonstrated ability to meet greater challenges in effort thus far successful to prevent reversion to Trujillo-type tyranny or Communist take-over.
Hill
340. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, April 2, 1962, 3:30-4:22 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Torrey and approved in S on April 13. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library)
SUBJECT
The Secretary's Conversation with Dr. Jose A. Bonilla Atiles, Dominican Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Dr. Jose A. Bonilla Atiles, Dominican Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Mr. Edwin Martin, Assistant Secretary, ARA
Mr. C. P. Torrey, O-in-C, Dominican Republic Affairs, CMA
The Secretary opened the conversation by expressing his appreciation for Dr. Bonilla's helpful position at the Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers and Punta del Este and for his more recent initiative in the OAS which resulted in a Resolution calling for fair treatment for the Cuban prisoners captured following the April 17, 1961 invasion of Cuba. Dr. Bonilla stated that he felt it was his duty to initiate action on the latter point and that he intends to try to obtain the same resolution at the United Nations. He said these efforts would be based on humanitarian rather than political grounds. The Secretary commented that Dr. Bonilla's efforts in the UN would be more difficult because of the Afro-Asian countries which have little interest in or do not understand the Cuban problem.
Dr. Bonilla brought up the question of the return to the Dominican Republic of the $22 million in fees levied by the United States against the importation of Dominican sugar in 1960-61 stating that the Dominican Government is under heavy pressure from the Dominican leftists concerning these fees. The Secretary and Mr. Martin explained that the return of the money was complicated by the law suits pending against the United States Government. They stated, however, that the return of the fees was under study and that the money may be made available to the Dominican Government from FY 1963 AID funds.
Dr. Bonilla inquired about the status of the soft-goods which the United States had promised to provide the Dominican armed forces. It was explained to Dr. Bonilla that the shipment was at present in New Jersey awaiting shipment and that it should arrive in the Dominican Republic in a very short time.
The Secretary and Dr. Bonilla discussed briefly the situation in Haiti and Haitian-Dominican relations. Dr Bonilla stated that the situation in Haiti is serious and that the activities of Haitian President Duvalier and former Trujillistas in Haiti are a source of great concern to the Dominican Government. Dr. Bonilla said that he is thinking of taking the Haitian problem to the OAS Human Rights Commission but that he would do nothing until the United States has had a chance to consider the situation. The Secretary agreed that the conditions in Haiti are not satisfactory and said that the Department is now studying the situation.
On the general political and economic situation in the Dominican Republic, Dr. Bonilla stated that conditions are slowly improving. He said that the morale of the armed forces is better and that jobs are becoming available to civilians. He said that he wanted the Secretary to understand the problems involved in holding elections in December of this year as now scheduled. Dr. Bonilla said that there are now five main political parties in the Dominican Republic--the National Civic Union, the Dominican Revolutionary Party, the 14th of June Party, Dominican Revolutionary Vanguard, and the Revolutionary Social Christian Party--in addition to about fifteen other smaller parties none of which are well organized. He said that most of the parties realize that fair and democratic elections cannot be held this year. He has been authorized by the Council of State to request the same OAS Electoral Committee which visited the Dominican Republic last fall to advise on whether the necessary conditions can be established in time to hold elections this year. He said the Council of State is willing to follow the advice of the Electoral Committee. Dr. Bonilla stated his belief that national elections should be postponed for at least one year to enable elections to be held first for municipal and provincial offices and thereby establish a firm base for a true democracy.
341. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, April 4, 1962, 12:56 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Confidential. Drafted by Donald F. Barnes (LS) and approved by the White House on April 16. The meeting was held at the White House.
SUBJECT
Dominican Republic: President's Conversation with Dominican Foreign Minister
PARTICIPANTS
For the United States:
The President
Assistant Secretary Edwin Martin, ARA
For the Dominican Republic:
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Bonilla Atiles
Also present:
Mr. Francisco Aguiere
In reply to a question by the President as to what the prospects were for elections, Dr. Bonilla replied that at present the situation was confused. He said that he would like the OAS Election Committee to help draft an election law and prepare election procedures. He said that under present conditions the success of elections was questionable. Dr. Bonilla said that he would prefer that elections be held after the Government had made progress in reducing unemployment, improving economic conditions, and in providing housing for peasants under the "Techo, piso y letrina" program.
The President said that he was aware that the present time might be a difficult one for election purposes.
Dr. Bonilla said that the Unión Cívica had originally sought a two-year period before holding elections, but that Balaguer had set the one-year period. He said that the Government's hope was to be able to set up local municipal elections prior to national elections. The work of the Peace Corps would be very useful in preparing for municipal elections.
The President inquired about the work of the Peace Corps in the Dominican Republic. Dr. Bonilla praised Mr. Hernendez, Director of the Corps in his country, and said that Mr. Hernendez had picked fifteen young Dominicans to study municipal government at the University of Puerto Rico.
The President said that he was interested in seeing that the sugar money should reach the Dominican people, and that the United States was willing to have it reach them through the aid program. He realized the problem of the suit brought by the South Puerto Rican Sugar Company.
Dr. Bonilla said that this was more a political than a technical problem for his Government, which was only interested in getting the money as soon as possible. This was important in view of Communist pressure concerning this matter. He said that any solution put forward by the United States Government would be satisfactory.
The President said that if it were said that the money would go to the company, it would mean that $7 million would not reach the Dominican people. He said that the Dominican problem would seem to be met if the United States made this money available to the Dominican people.
Dr. Bonilla said that the Government could exert pressure on the company to prevent this money from being distributed among its stockholders and to have it go to the Dominican people instead. They were under pressure from the Communists to see that this was done promptly.
The President said that the United States, together with the other Governments of the Hemisphere, had taken measures against the previous Dominican Government of its own volition. He said that the United States Government was under no compulsion to pay the subsidy, and had no reason to apologize to the Communists for its stand.
Dr. Bonilla said that in referring to Communist pressure, he had meant that his Government wanted to use the money for the benefit of the people, to improve their standard of living and to reduce unemployment, in order to deprive the Communists of issues they could exploit.
Dr. Bonilla said that with regard to elections, a satisfactory outcome for democracy was in doubt at the present time, in view of emotional pressures on the people and of the need for providing more employment and housing. He said that the outlook for democracy would be brighter if the people had an opportunity to see achievements by the Government before they went to the polls. He said that in any case, he did not want to have in his country anything like what had taken place in Argentina./2/ Dr. Bonilla said that his Government's project was to have elections to local and municipal offices before the Presidential elections, in order to have the people accustomed to casting votes.
/2/On March 29 the Argentine military replaced the government of President Arturo Frondizi with one led by Senate President Jose M. Guido. See Documents 179 ff.
The President asked if the people would be opposed to a postponement of Presidential elections, and Dr. Bonilla replied in the negative, adding that this postponement had been requested by the political parties themselves.
The President inquired as to the position of the 14th of June Movement, and Dr. Bonilla replied that it was in open opposition to the Government and was following a Castro line, and that its leaders were pro-Castro.
342. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic/1/
Washington, April 4, 1962, 8:32 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 739.00/4-462. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Crimmins and approved by Martin.
1332. Deptel 1331./2/ In conversations with President, Councillors, leaders moderate parties and possibly military leaders, you should draw on following as appropriate:
/2/Dated April 4. (Ibid.)
(a) As its actions have demonstrated, USG supports and intends continue support present GODR as representing best hope for further progress toward viable free society. FYI. This of course does not imply we committed present composition Council. End FYI.
(b) USG would view with grave concern replacement present Government by elements of, or allied with, far left or far right.
(c) In event overthrow Council from any direction, USG would be obliged reexamine its entire policy toward DR.
(d) In view current uneasy situation created in part by ill-considered and demagogic actions by moderate elements which have only given opportunities for exploitation by extremists, it appears essential these elements, in their own interest and in interest country in general, should assume more responsible attitude.
(e) Instead of exacerbating situation, UCN as principal democratic party has special obligation to follow realistic and moderate course.
(f) While opposition to Government natural and desirable in democratic society, such opposition should be responsible, reasoned and constructive. In present circumstances, neither country nor moderate parties can afford luxury of indiscriminate, destructive attacks against Council nor can Council afford actions of its own which justify such attacks.
(g) In view common interests Council and moderate parties and threat to both from extremes, basic orientation of both should be to seek accommodation of differences rather than magnify them.
(h) Release of energies now expended by Council members in political maneuvering and in defense against attacks from those who should be its friends would permit Council to settle down to task governing country and enable it confront its and country's real enemies.
(i) Violent attacks against armed forces can only increase current tension and impede progress toward acceptance by them of their legitimate role in a free society.
Guidance for speech will follow./3/
/3/Printed from an unsigned copy.
343. Editorial Note
On May 1, 1962, President Kennedy chaired a White House meeting on the Dominican situation according to the President's Appointment Book. (Kennedy Library) Present were Under Secretary of State McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edwin Martin, Ambassador to the Dominican Republic John Bartlow Martin, Rafael Pico, temporary U.S. coordinator of economic aid to the Dominican Republic, Teodoro Moscoso and Newell Williams of AID, [text not declassified] of CIA, and Ralph Dungan of the White House staff. No formal record of the meeting was kept. During the meeting, which lasted from 4:30 to 5:27 p.m., the President inquired about the Dominican sugar quota, the upcoming Dominican elections, the activities of the recently established MAAG in Santo Domingo, and the chances of a military coup in the Dominican Republic. He asked that the Dominican police force receive U.S. instruction in riot control techniques. (Martin, Overtaken by Events, pages 121-122)
344. Department of State Policy Directive/1/
PD/ARA-5
Washington, May 15, 1962.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: PLAN OF ACTION FOR PERIOD FROM
PRESENT TO FEBRUARY 1963
A. Reference:
National Security Action Memorandum No. 153 of May 15, 1962, Subject: Policy Statement on Dominican Republic.
B. Objectives:
1. The maintenance of the Council of State in effective power until it is replaced by an elected government;
2. Control of the threat from the far left (Castro/Communist) and the far right (Trujillistas);
3. Resolution of the current Dominican economic and financial difficulties;
4. Sound preparation of the Dominican people for participation in the electoral process.
C. Plan of Action:
1. Immediate (within 2-4 weeks)
(a) Go beyond the present statement of the U.S. position in the event of the overthrow of the Council to make clear to all concerned, especially key military figures and Amiami and Imbert, that the United States Government would find it extremely difficult to recognize and to provide assistance to any government installed as the result of a coup against the Council.
(b) Advise the Council to proceed carefully on the "purge" of Trujillista elements in the armed forces, to assess closely the risks involved before moving, and to establish if possible a definite cut-off point for a "purge" so as to avoid unnecessary apprehension and consequent reaction among the military.
(c) Continue to press the Council to act on: agrarian reform (if the new law is sound), holding elections as scheduled, and the establishment of a specific administrative entity to receive claims against the Trujillo properties.
(d) Urge the Dominican Government to request the immediate return of an OAS electoral mission whose first task would be to assist in preparations for the August and December elections, and whose subsequent task would be to observe the elections.
--Be prepared to consider very carefully a delay in the elections, if the OAS mission so recommends.
--Be prepared to seek a delay in the elections if it becomes apparent that the results would be contrary to our interests, and attempt to influence the OAS mission in that direction.
--Encourage the political parties to hold their conventions and begin normal political work in preparation for the elections.
--Urge that the Dominican electoral law be so drafted as to avoid the creation of a multi-party system with consequent political fragmentation.
(e) Urge the Council to use the administrative entity set up to receive claims as a means of relieving pressure against it and of avoiding any further claims settlements until an elected government has established a sound procedure for financing payments against claims.
--Advise the Council to announce, simultaneously with the creation of the claims tribunal, that a percentage (perhaps 25 percent) of the net profits, if any, from all the Trujillo properties will be placed in escrow to be used for payments of claims when an elected government has taken the action mentioned above.
--Urge the Council to cease the sale of any Trujillo properties except those which are generally recognized as uneconomic.
(f) Complete immediately the consultations with Congress on the use of AID FY 1963 contingency funds as the equivalent of the $22 million in sugar fees so as to enable Ambassador Martin soon after his return to the Dominican Republic (May 3) to advise President Bonnelly confidentially of the United States Government decision.
--Make no public announcement of the decision before the Dominican reaction is received. (The announcement, which must be carefully worded, should be released simultaneously by Ambassador Martin and AID headquarters.)
(g) [1 line of source text not declassified] improve intelligence collection on the activities of the far left and the political attitudes and activities of the military as their highest priority task. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
--Have the Service Attaches and senior MAAG personnel increase their efforts to gather intelligence on the political activities and attitudes of the Dominican military as their highest priority task.
(h) Assign competent, Spanish-speaking AID experts in riot control procedures to Santo Domingo immediately.
(i) Arrange for a public relations adviser to the Council (preferably, he should be a qualified Latin American under contract to the Council: failing that, an American under contract to the Council; and only as a last resort, an American paid from AID funds).
(j) Take immediate steps to reduce Embassy Santo Domingo's visa backlog to the point where it is no longer a political liability.
2. Continuing (present to February 1963)
(a) Promote an agreement between the Council on one side and the UCN and PRD on the other on a minimum program of action by the Council which the parties would at least not oppose. (Such a consensus might encompass initially the principle of agrarian reform, specific economic and social projects under the Alliance for Progress--perhaps with special reference to the $22 million--and the OAS role in the preparations for elections.)
(b) Maintain pressure on the Council to continue to move forward, suggesting new tasks as the Council demonstrates its ability to perform.
--Publicize in the Dominican Republic through U.S. information channels positive accomplishments by the Council.
(c) Begin immediately to develop an anti-guerrilla capability in the Dominican armed forces.
--Bring about a reduction in the size and cost of the Dominican armed forces consistent with the provision of suitable internal security, coastal surveillance and anti-guerrilla capabilities.
(d) Maintain pressure on the Council for prompt action to reduce the budget deficit by sound tax measures and by the elimination of unnecessary expenditures.
(e) Urge the Council to rationalize the present control structure for the Trujillo properties. (An appropriate breakdown would appear to be an agency for the sugar properties, another for non-sugar agricultural lands, another for industrial enterprises, and a fourth for commercial and service enterprises.)
--Arrange for a request from the Dominican Government to the IDB or AID to finance a thorough inventory and analysis, by a first-class U.S. management group, of all the Trujillo properties. (The group would be expected to determine the present condition of each of the properties and its future earning prospects. This report would furnish the factual basis for sound decisions by an elected government concerning the final disposition of the properties.)
--Help the Dominican Government in obtaining technical assist-ance to operate the properties efficiently, and provide such assistance through AID, if private consultants are not available or desired.
--Discourage U.S. interests from seeking to invest in the Trujillo properties until an elected government has made basic decisions on disposition.
--Discourage U.S. management of (as distinct from technical assist-ance to) politically sensitive properties such as the sugar holdings, until an elected government has made basic decisions on disposition.
--Keep constantly before the Government the necessity that the properties should be so operated as to maximize the economic and social benefits they can provide the Dominican people whose patrimony they are.
--If, as is likely, the new constitution contains provisions concerning the handling of claims against the Trujillo properties, urge that these provisions be kept general in order to assure the new, elected government maximum flexibility. (Subject to conditions existing at the time of the drafting of the constitution, provision might be made in the constitution for the creation of a claims tribunal or commission which would begin operations under the new government and to which the administrative entity previously set up would turn over the claims it had received.)
(f) Be prepared to meet, and, if necessary, stimulate a Dominican request for a well-qualified adviser for the constitution-drafting process. (The adviser should be a Latin American jurist of suitable experience and acceptable political background. If no appropriate Latin American can be found, any American chosen would have to have extensive background in Latin American constitutional law.)
(g) Be prepared to provide very substantially increased economic assistance to the Dominican Government if, as a result of changes in U.S. sugar legislation, Dominican sugar ceases to earn the U.S. premium price.
--If such changes are not made, impress upon the Dominican Government the necessity for planning its economic and financial policies so as to take into account the temporary nature of the preferential U.S. market.
(h) Country team collaborating with Washington agencies develop promptly an outline of social and economic objectives and specific programs to reach them.
--Allocate responsibility for implementing programs to various agencies cooperating in the Alliance for Progress (AID, IDB, OAS, etc.) and set up mechanism to insure follow through.
(i) Expand, coordinate and improve the technical assistance and training programs of the Alliance organizations in the economic and financial agencies of the Dominican Government, as the priority element of a public administration program.
(j) Continue to press the IMF to raise the Dominican quota in the Fund so as to make available $13.5 million to bolster the Dominican reserve and foreign exchange positions.
(k) Provide AID financing for a privately prepared and presented "political literacy" course to teach, through radio and television, the basic principles and procedures of democratic government.
(l) Continue, with all available means, to control and reduce Castro/Communist influence in the student and labor movements.
(m) Assign without delay one or two political officers to Santiago to cover the important area of political activity centered on that city.
(n) Assure that all U.S. personnel assigned to the Dominican Republic be of the highest quality obtainable.
Action By:
Immediate
Department
(d)--paras 2 and 3
(f),(g)--para 1
(i),(j)
AID
(f),(h),(i)
[2 lines of source text not declassified]
Embassy Santo Domingo Country Team
(a),(b),(c),(d),(e),(f),(g),(i),(j)
DOD
(g)--para 2
Continuing
Department
(e)--paras 3 and 4
(f),(g),(h),(j),(m),(n)
AID
(e)--paras 2,3,4,5
(g),(h),(i),(j),(k),(l),(n)
USIA
(b)--para 2
(k),(l),(n)
Embassy Santo Domingo Country Team
All paragraphs
DOD
(c),(n)
[2 lines of source text not declassified]
345. Editorial Note
On May 16, 1962, the Kennedy administration moved to abandon the country quota system for the purchase of sugar abroad by having legislation introduced in the House of Representatives that would establish a world quota system. Negative reaction in the Dominican Republic was immediate and voluble. Dominican sugar had been purchased at a premium price above the world price and its quota had been protected under the current Sugar Act (set to expire June 30). The new legislation would drastically reduce the Republic's quota and profits. On June 15 the House Agriculture Committee, chaired by Harold Cooley, passed its own sugar bill significantly different from the administration's but still unsympathetic to the Dominican Republic.
On June 17 Ambassador Martin spoke with Second Vice President of the Council of State Donald Reid Cabral. Reid said that in the absence of a favorable sugar bill, the Council would cancel all AID agreements made under a $25 million loan the United States had made to the Dominican Government in January. All Alliance for Progress reforms in the country would be suspended. On June 19 the House voted in favor of the Cooley Bill. (Martin, Overtaken by Events, pages 161-164)
346. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State/1/
Santo Domingo, June 20, 1962, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.39/6-2062. Confidential; Niact.
2460. For Assistant Secretary Martin from Ambassador Martin pass to White House. Embtels 2438, 2439, 2444, 2448, 2455 through 2459./2/ Would be difficult to overstate the depth, power and danger of Dominican reaction to the Cooley sugar quota legislation and the continuing uncertainty over the $22 million.
/2/Telegrams 2438, 2439, 2444, 2448, 2455-2459, dated June 18-20, are ibid., 411.396/6-1862 through 411.396/6-2062.
Even our best friends here feel betrayed. They feel the US Executive has, by its promises of help, put them out on a limb--and now Congress has sawed the limb off.
Despite sporadic riots led by leftist agitators, the Dominican people at large are basically friendly to us. They have clung to their somewhat childlike faith in us despite the Marine occupation and what many regard as our support of Trujillo. More, they have looked to us almost desperately for help. They tend toward dependency. Their history since 1844 is replete with their attempts to make themselves the protectorate of a larger power--Spain, France, England, US. This spring their most constant theme has been, "you must help us."
President Kennedy said in January he would. Pico came and did./3/ So did the Embassy. News stories pointed with pride. The shaky Council of State, with our guidance, survived and began to grow stronger. Of late uneasiness has spread because neither Council nor AID has made any improvement in the daily life of ordinary Dominican. To counteract this we had planned to present to Council Friday important program to put Dominican fiscal house in order and crash program in housing and roads to speed progress and create employment during critical September layoff period. We cannot do so now. For now in the Dominican view the worst has happened: the quota is being cut.
/3/Following its resumption of full diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic, the United States, through the Agency for International Development, made a loan of $25 million to the Dominican Government. Puerto Rican banker Rafael Pico was sent to administer the aid temporarily.
According to Finance Secretary Ramon Caceres Troncoso, proposed quota would reduce GODR revenue this year by RD $20,000,000. This is made up of RD $14,000,000 in reduced income from sugar, estimated RD $5,000,000 from reduced customs duties due to lower imports, and RD $1,000,000 in reduced income from other taxes due to lower level of economic activity. Figures assume that DR expected to sell 950,000 tons to US in 1962, that DR would have received the $22 million in any case, that DR would sell only 175,000 tons to US in the second half 1962, and that prices would be 5.29 cents per pound on US market and 2.66 cents on world market. These estimates depend on costs, and no one really knows what they are. Also they do not allow for shortfalls and may anticipate too low world price. Bramble/4/ says the Cooley quota would bring total this year $82,000,000 and shortfalls might raise total to $89,000,000, a reduction of $11 million, not the $20 million Caceres estimated. (A 950,000 ton quota would yield $100 million.) Next year, Cooley quota would yield only $77 million, a drop of $23 million from what Dominicans had expected this year. Whole question of course is greatly complicated by heavy ownership of government itself in sugar industry, a legacy of Trujillo. Bramble concludes overall that the purely economic effects of Cooley quota are not so serious as represented in public statements here. Responsible Dominicans know they must diversify out of sugar. But they need time (5 years, most say).
/4/Harlan Bramble of AID was sent to administer the $25 million loan in late spring.
But economic effects aside, the political effects are all but disastrous.
The Council of State has staked everything on US support. Now that that support has, in Dominican view, been suddenly withdrawn, some Councillors instinctively feel that Council can save self only by setting its face against US and going it alone. Others do not go so far but feel need to somehow disentangle Council from US. Councillors therefore propose to shut the sugar mills, cut wages, tighten belts, and go it alone. They propose to stop--and in fact have already stopped--spending any more of the $25 million US loan made in January on ground they cannot obligate future government to debt it cannot pay since its sugar quota is cut. They propose to repay that portion of the loan already spent from the $22 million. This has not been voted formally by Council but is sense of Councillors and they have already stopped projects. President Bonnelly is attempting stave off formal vote and frozen position. If vote taken now, Council would probably vote to stop projects.
Formal vote or no, this stops Alliance dead. It threatens suicide of Council, since if Council tries to go it alone, it will probably fail. Austerity--isolation policy can bring only more unemployment, misery and unrest. Will open door to left, and if left rises, military right probably would take over. So ends moderate democracy here.
Of course, if AID had gotten off ground and projects were already actually employing people, Council would have difficulty stopping them. But AID has not. So Dominican pressure to continue program--which might be termed by critics only a pile of papers anyway--is likely to be minimal.
But although this amounts to a strike by the Council against the Alliance and against itself, it would be mistake to regard it as calculated attempt to blackmail Congress. Method of going about it refutes that theory. Moreover, explanation lies in Dominican character, history and current political situation. Like children, they feel betrayed, and so are sulking. Danger is their sulk may carry them to suicide. Time and again in their history they have shown unconscious tendency to destroy their country when unable give it away. And they genuinely fear foreign debts, for once foreign debts led to Marine occupation and previously had several times led to deep trouble. In current politics, left has recently made headway with anti-American campaign. Council has resisted, aligning self with US. Now its position has been totally undermined. So is ours. In past when $22 million seemed in jeopardy or when world quota system was proposed, I have reassured Dominicans that US would never abandon DR. These assurances sound hollow now. Our policy has envisaged further loans or grants if needed. Council now would reject further loans and perhaps even grants.
Amid near-panic here, President Bonnelly is attempting to hold firm, restrain impetuous Councillors and get through next 2 weeks. He alone is keeping head.
Best thing that could happen from Dominican standpoint would be stalemate in Senate, with present legislation extended. Impossible estimate effect here if world quota bill wins out. Passage Cooley bill as stands would be disaster. (If Cooley bill fails, we must move with lightning speed to salvage the $22 million provision by separate bill or by immediate (repeat immediate) aid grant, for Dominicans working to defeat Cooley bill overlook fact it alone at present contains their $22 million.)
Whatever happens in Senate, much of the damage done this week cannot be undone. For faith in our support has been eroded, and Dominicans, who thought all would be well when Trujillo fell and thought we would not let them down once they got rid of him, will not now feel quite the same firm faith in us.
We may not like Dominican emotionalism. But all we have here are Dominicans. And it is really too much to expect any people, after 31 years of tyranny, in the world today, with communism on the move, to build democratic society without massive US guidance and support.
We face here dangerous forces. The Castro-Communist forces are mobilizing. The military right is biding its time. Only the Council is on democracy's side. And however much it may fumble and disappoint and irritate us, it is nonetheless democratic government which sees the Dominican future alongside the US. We helped create it. If it falls, we may not get another such chance.
Congressional action on sugar has dealt an extremely heavy blow to our efforts to build democratic bastion in the Caribbean. We could scarcely have handed better weapon to Castro and Moscow. They must be delighted. They have said all along that only bloody revolution, not peaceful democratic evolution, could solve Latin America's problems. To those on sidelines at times like this we must appear to be helping prove them right.
I understand something of complexities and difficulties of sugar legislation. I am confident Congress understands the vital importance to us of this republic in our own back yard. But I wonder if Congress understands fully how seriously its current action is undermining our policy here.
Martin
347. Editorial Note
Ambassador Martin kept President Bonnelly apprised of the U.S. sugar bill as it made its way through Congress. The political repercussions of the legislation were made clear to the Ambassador by Council members Imbert and Amiama who on June 25, 1962, told him that if the sugar problem were not resolved he "had better find them a home outside the Dominican Republic." (Telegram 2486 from Santo Domingo; Department of State, Central Files, 411.396/6-2562) The same day the Senate Finance Committee passed a sugar bill much like the Administration's but which contained a special quota for the Dominican Republic. On June 30 a conference committee sugar bill still unfavorable to the Dominican Republic was passed. On July 2 Ambassador Martin was authorized to make a compromise proposal to the Dominican Government. "It said, in substance, that the conference bill's quota, plus the Cuban windfall, was worth, at current prices, about $31 million less in profit than the Republic would have received [that] year under the present law. President Kennedy, recognizing the special case of the Republic, would undertake to make up the difference--to establish a special economic readjustment fund over three years . . . provided the Consejo [Council] would use this special 'Kennedy Fund' to diversify out of sugar. As for the $22 million, it would be paid as a grant, probably out of AID funds." (Martin, Overtaken by Events, page 169) On July 4 a slightly refined proposal was accepted. Ambassador Martin's memoirs trace the progress of the "Great Sugar Crisis" on pages 161-163.
348. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State/1/
Santo Domingo, October 15, 1962, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 739.00/10-1562. Secret; Limit Distribution.
570. Policy. Reference: Airgram A-173./1/
/2/Not printed. (Ibid., PER)
Part One: Background
1. Political situation still fluid but developing rapidly. Deadlines approaching. By this Saturday, October 20, any Council member intending run for president or vice president should resign in accordance with gentlemen's agreement among themselves. UCN held national district convention and PRSC organizational convention last weekend. UCN will hold provincial nominating conventions October 19. PRD will hold national nominating convention this Friday-Sunday, October 19-21. All candidates must declare selves by November 5. Political tensions rising. Strikes occurring or threatened various places. Saturday October 13 Fiallo meeting Puerto Plata stoned and UCN photographer shot dead, possibly by sniper actually aiming at Fiallo himself.
2. Cass, Fandino, and I spent long weekend aboard yacht Exangelita with President Bonnelly, Imbert, Reid, Freitas, Ramon Caceres, prosecutor Garcia Vasquez, General Luna, Commodore Rib, President's daughter and son-in-law, an Imbert chum, others, and the wives of most. Collective impressions, supported by other recent observations and interviews, are that (a) Imbert and Amiama are in effect virtually running country; (b) Bonnelly knows they are; (c) Bonnelly has not joined them nor begun actively supporting them but probably does not intend oppose them and is only trying maintain tranquility to end; (d) Imbert indifferent to Bonnelly; (e) Bonnelly joins all aboard in appallingly deep contempt [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and all political parties, hardly mentioning Bosch at all; (f) all seem to assume neither Fiallo nor Bosch will become President; (g) Imbert controls police; (h) Imbert controls administration criminal justice; (i) military dislikes Imbert but is afraid of him and unless rapidly stiffened may not stand up to him in any move he may make; (j) Imbert and Amiama maneuvering furiously to try to put together coalition ticket possibly including Vanguardia, Juan Isidro Jimenez Grullon's party, and minor parties; (k) candidate unknown, though Imbert himself, Fernandez Caminero, Tabare Alvarez, and others have been mentioned; (1) Imbert determined not relinquish power in any case; (m) Amiama working with Imbert, though keeping in background; (n) they emerging publicly as strongmen who can maintain order.
3. Military, always the key, has been suddenly deprived of its own defenses and its non-political role by (a) Fiallo's blunder of two weeks ago (Embassy telegram 515)/3/ and (b) Bonnelly's blunder in response to that blunder and (c) Bonnelly's semi-withdrawal from power. This appears to give Imbert opportunity to move in on military.
/3/Not printed. (Ibid., 739.00/10-362) "Fiallo's blunder" refers to Viriato Fiallo's speech of September 30 to the UCN Women's convention in which he said that he had been in contact with senior military figures who had assured him that they would "guarantee" the December elections. Bonnelly, angered, threatened to fire the chiefs of the military serv-ices or resign himself.
4. Imbert's intentions uncertain except that he does not intend relinquish power. He has several roads open: (a) Put together coalition and try to win or steal the election, or, failing to win or steal, cry "fraud" and knock over winner; (b) abstain from election then confront winner with his control of police and military and demand government posts making his control official; (c) direct coup before or after elections; (d) create sufficient bloodshed and terror in streets and in strikes, with or without help extreme left, to force Council to declare state siege and suspend elections, with possible new Council of State including perhaps himself, Amiama, Bonnelly. He is now trying (a). If it fails, he may try (b). We can probably continue to deter (c). He could try (d) as alternative to (b). Either (b) or (d) would confront us with extremely difficult situation. We do not believe he himself knows just what his moves will be. We had hoped he could reach accommodation with one or, preferably, several parties. But he is not negotiating with them and has indicated to me he will not.
Part Two: Immediate Action
1. In this situation, we can (a) support Imbert; (b) support free election contest between PRD and UCN; (c) stay out completely. I favor (b).
I would much prefer to reach an accommodation with Imbert. But if that proves impossible because he is intransigent and bent on total power, as he seems, I would prefer to oppose him than to yield, even if we lost.
2. After much difficult maneuvering, it now appears possible to hold meeting of Fiallo and Bosch, plus aides, at which they will agree that (a) the loser will support the winner; (b) the winner will permit the loser to exist as loyal opposition; (c) the winner will offer Cabinet posts to the loser. It may prove necessary for me to participate as mediator. If so--but only if my presence is essential--I propose to do this no later than Thursday, October 18. (Imbert and Bonnelly know I favor such an agreement. They consider it impossible.)
3. At this meeting, I would also hope that Fiallo and Bosch could agree on making their best joint offer to Imbert. (They have separately offered him pension, bodyguard, honors. They might go higher but it is doubtful they will give him more than senate seat or ministry without portfolio; and they might not offer that much.)
4. I consider it desirable after this meeting that Imbert understand immediately that this meeting was held, that we support free elections, and that we intend to see that the winner takes office and the loser survives. (Others also should know that this is our position, to avoid any impression we supporting Imbert.)
5. Concomitantly, we will do what we can to make it difficult for Imbert to put together his coalition by trying to keep the lesser parties out of his hands.
6. Obviously I am proposing we stand up to Imbert (since no one else, with possible exception Fiallo, will). To make it stick, we should work to (a) encourage the military to resist any effort by Imbert to enlist them for his cause; (b) give moral support to Bonnelly as he confronts Imbert's increasing encroachment on his power; (c) make clear to all hands, including Imbert and Amiama, that we oppose their taking power and support an honest election between PRD and UCN. Rumor says Imbert is about to remove Rivera Cuesta, commander army. This would increase Imbert's power and fear of Imbert among the officers. I propose we immediately tell military leaders, Imbert, Amiama, and Bonnelly we would look with disfavor upon any further arbitrary changes in high military command before next government takes over. I propose we tell them now that we support free elections, including elections free from pressure by anyone in present government.
7. We shall probably need to take further steps later. These represent what we deem present needs.
Martin
349. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic/1/
Washington, October 17, 1962, 7:33 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 739.00/10-1562. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Crimmins and approved by Martin.
433. Your 570./2/
/2/Document 348.
1. On basis your analysis, we concur in course action outlined Part Two reftel. Wish make following comments which you should bear in mind in executing steps called for your plan.
a. Support free election contest between PRD and UCN clearly only one of three alternatives posed which serves our current interests.
b. We consider it essential thwart efforts by Imbert (with or without Amiama) to : (1) interfere with holding of elections; (2) nullify results of elections (if they are satisfactory to us); and (3) dominate elected government.
c. It is most important Imbert and his associates be informed unequivocally of our position that we support free elections held in as calm an atmosphere as possible, that we intend to see the winner (provided he is not committed to left extremists or Trujillistas) take office, and that we expect to use our influence to see that the elected government can govern free of domination by the military or police or by elements controlling them. It should again be made unmistakably clear to Imbert that we would find it extremely difficult to recognize and provide assistance to any government installed by a coup against the Council or its elected successor. If you consider it helpful, Assistant Secretary Martin prepared go Santo Domingo to reinforce your approaches. In addition, we will work on Freites here on grounds he may be able influence Imbert, his cousin and associate. We believe we should avoid playing too heavily with Imbert and Amiama on theme GODR, Dominican people and parties owe them special debt because of danger this may only confirm intransigency.
d. Our position should also be made known critical elements in Council, parties, military and police.
e. On three-point agreement between UCN and PRD, we assume second point (survival of loser) will be presented not as special concession by winner but as natural feature democratic system. We also hope that Social Christians can still be brought into agreement.
f. Re best joint offer to Imbert, we consider agreement by parties to name him or Amiama Secretary for Armed Forces or Secretary Interior would put elected government at their mercy. We recognize Imbert may not settle for less, in which case clear warning of our general position would be only brake on his plans.
g. Not only should we do what we can to keep lesser parties out of Imbert's hands but we should also try to induce acceptable parties (PNR clearly not acceptable and Vanguardia and perhaps others presumably so) which are potential participants in coalition manipulated by him to align themselves with UCN or PRD. Efforts with Social Christians particularly important, although we assume chances their association with Imbert coalition comparatively small.
h. We believe military should be encouraged to maintain neutrality and to resist not only Imbert's but any other's efforts embroil them in elections. We agree further arbitrary changes military high command should be strongly discouraged. Is Imbert hold over police so strong as to make efforts break or weaken it fruitless?
i. We consider that you should take every appropriate occasion to build up Bonnelly's stature and stiffen his spine gainst Imbert's encroachments. As we read Embassy's reporting, only Council member clearly resisting Imbert is Reid. Can he play any significant further role in our confrontation with Imbert? Where does Pichardo stand in relation to Imbert?
2. Your current estimate voting strength in percentages total vote of UCN, PRD, PRSC, far left (14 June, MPD, PNR, FNR, PSP) and possible Imbert coalition would be very helpful. We recognize, of course, that any such estimate would have to be at best very rough guess subject to substantial change.
Rusk
350. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Goodwin) to the Under Secretary of State (McGhee)
Washington, December 4, 1962.
[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 739.00/12-462. Secret; Sensitive. 5 pages of source text not declassified.]
351. Airgram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State/1/
A-261
Santo Domingo, December 9, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 739.00/12-962. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.
SUBJECT
Interim Political Assessment
[Here follow sections entitled "The Campaign," "Amiama and Imbert," "The Extreme Left," "The Trujillos," and "The Government."]
As to our own position: Cuba helped us here, unquestionably. The left faltered, the government rallied, the people applauded. A certain letdown occurred when it became clear we were not going to invade immediately, as many had at first surmised; but although we have to restrain the warhawks and counsel patience, we have not yet heard accusations of paper-tigerism, and everyone agrees Castro's position has been seriously eroded while the forces of democracy, under firm U.S. leadership, have advanced far.
"U.S. intervention" in Dominican affairs has not yet become an issue in the electoral campaign to any significant extent. We have heard that one candidate, Horacio Julio Ornes, intends to make it so.
Except for support of President Bonnelly, we intend to lie low till after the elections, when we must make clear our support of his successor-elect.
I am encouraging responsible U.S. journalists to come here and cover the elections. We should prod the OAS to send its observors in for the same purpose. In every way possible, we should remind Amiama-Imbert, the candidates, and the Council that the world is watching them these days, and expects them to behave responsibly. Forlorn hope, I fear; but we should try.
In sum, I think we have a reasonably good chance of standing aside while the Republic holds reasonably clean and peaceable elections; I think we shall then face a dangerous interregnum when we must be prepared to move in; and I think we stand a fair to reasonably good chance of getting the president-elect into the Palace without bloodshed.
Summary of Recommendations
1. Except for previous recommendations and commitments, stand aside and let anybody win.
2. Work now among all political parties, military, and government to persuade them to recognize the winner as the president of all the people.
3. Work now to moderate such dangerous issues as de-Trujillization and to stop attempts to lay a foundation for a charge of fraud.
4. Lay plans to make our support of the winner publicly clear immediately the result is known, including perhaps an invitation to the White House.
5. Continue our policy of containing Amiama-Imbert if necessary.
6. Be prepared to give new evidence of our support for Bonnelly.
7. Continue our attempts to frustrate plans of Balaguer, the Trujillos, and Echavarria.
8. Encourage journalists to come here now and to stay.
9. Get OAS observers here for the election.
10. Lie low ourselves till time to congratulate the winner.
John Bartlow Martin
352. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Dungan) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, January 10, 1963.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series, Dominican Republic, Section B. No classification marking.
Dr. Juan Bosch, the newly elected president of the Dominican Republic (60% plurality), has been visiting the United States since before Christmas. He is now concluding about a week's conversations with various people in Washington, both in and out of the Government./2/
/2/In Washington and New York January 4-11, President-elect Bosch met with Secretary Rusk and other State Department officials, members of the Supreme Court, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, and, informally, with U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson, among others.
In general, these conversations have gone very well, particularly those with Government people. I believe that Bosch feels that his reception here has been warm and friendly. I believe that it is accurate to say that most of us feel somewhat tentative about making an appraisal of Bosch at this point. He is undoubtedly sincere about his desire to raise the standard of living of the Dominican people but he does seem to be quite confused on a variety of important points and, most importantly, seems to lack any sense of the administrative or operational difficulties involved in the kind of a program which his philosophic notions indicate are necessary in the Dominican Republic. He appears to be totally bereft of any substantial and well-trained people ranging from public relations advisors to economists and lawyers--it is strictly a one-man show.
From our point of view, there are certain encouraging signs. For instance, he has most strongly indicated his desire to have us assist in the training of his internal security force upon which he places a high priority. He recognizes the danger of Communist subversion and, although he desires to maintain an open society (see comments below on internal security), he does believe in the maintenance of a strong internal security system.
Points which might be brought up by Bosch in your discussion:
1. The Imbert problem
Bosch is very preoccupied with Antonio Imbert who is a member of the Council and, as you will recall, one of the Trujillo assassins. Imbert has been a bad actor during the whole period prior to the election--he has been involved in graft and is driven to assume as much power as he can. He now controls the police but is intensely disliked by the military. He and his cohort, Amiana, have recently been made Generals of the Army. There is a possibility, although I think remote in view of the heavy vote and the obvious support which Bosch has gotten in the United States, that Imbert might try to take power before Bosch's inauguration on February 27th.
2. The Internal Security
In addition to requesting training for his own internal security force, Bosch has requested of the Secretary, Defense and me assistance in a Naval patrol of his northern coast. He is also interested in strengthening the entire guerrilla capability of his Army and the coastal patrol capability of his Air Force.
3. Economic Aid
In keeping with his independent attitude, Bosch is not entirely satisfied with our aid program. Naturally, as a politician, he emphasizes strongly impact type projects although, at the same time, he talks very strongly about the need for infrastructure--roads, heavy industry, etc. He has no clear idea of what his priorities are although he quite sensibly will set up a planning board in the Presidency at an early time. He has no idea as to whom he will ask to serve in this capacity.
4. Standard Oil Refinery
He may bring up the question of a contract between the Council and Standard of New Jersey to build a refinery. This contract, he maintains, he will have to overturn. We are already working with him and Standard to see if this potential trouble spot can be moderated.
RAD
353. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, January 10, 1963, noon.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 739.00/1-1063. Secret. Drafted by Crimmins and Van Reigersberg. Approved in the White House on February 15.
SUBJECT
Conversation Between the President and Dr. Juan Bosch, President-Elect of the Dominican Republic
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The President
Mr. Ralph Dungan--Special Assistant
Assistant Secretary Martin--ARA
Ambassador Duke--U/PR
Mr. Van Reigersberg--LS
Dominican Republic
Dr. Juan E. Bosch
The President congratulated Dr. Bosch on his campaign victory.
Dr. Bosch replied that it was now up to the new Administration to prove to the people and to the whole hemisphere that democracy really works. He briefly analyzed his political campaign, stressing its educational contents and objectives. He said that, economically, the situation in the Dominican Republic was better than that of other countries since its balance of payments situation was good and its public financial standing reasonably sound. He added that the main problem was the lack of "working capital" which is needed to increase employment and production as soon as possible. He described himself as "cautiously optimistic" with regard to the economic future of his country.
The President asked what the United States could do to assist the Dominican Republic.
Dr. Bosch responded with a strong endorsement of the Alliance for Progress, emphasizing the value of its long-term goals. He noted, however that the country had short-term needs as a result of unemployment, under-investment, a lack of farm-to-market roads and inefficient and slow production. Continuing, he said that if the Dominican Republic could obtain from 35-40 million pesos (1 peso is equal to $1) to begin with, it would be able to handle effectively most of these problems. He referred to the inflationary pressures that would be created by the recent increase in the Dominican budget from 136 million pesos to 168 million pesos, while production remained static. Clearly, production must be increased substantially. Dr. Bosch cited a recent conversation with the Director of the Dominican Agricultural Bank who had suggested that he needed from 20-24 million pesos for small loans to farmers, whereas the bank had only 9 million pesos. He pointed out that during 1962, the Agricultural Bank, with the assistance of the Inter-American Development Bank, had made 47,000 loans of 100-250 pesos each for a total of 11 million pesos. Dr. Bosch argued that although five million pesos had not yet been recovered and this might appear as a loss to the bank, it also represented a net gain to the people. If the bank were to operate at a level of 24 million pesos, it could make 100 thousand loans in 1963, and while it might lose from 6-8 million pesos, the people would gain 18 million pesos. He indicated that he realized that the Alliance for Progress did not intend to lose money, but that, in certain circumstances, money had to be lost as had been the case in the United States during the first Franklin Roosevelt Administration, when the Treasury lost money but the American people had gained it.
The President observed that the Dominican Republic was now getting some 40 million pesos in loans and grants and asked whether this assistance was effective enough.
Dr. Bosch replied affirmatively, but declared that most of it was devoted to long-term projects. Two million pesos he said, had been devoted to small loans to farmers but more money would be needed to satisfy the farmers' need for credit. He referred to his conversations with Mr. Moscoso and indicated that there appeared to be a possibility that 12 million pesos out of the 22,750,000 pesos grant could be set aside for small farm loans. He added that although he had not yet received a final answer from Mr. Moscoso, he expected it to be favorable.
The President briefly discussed the American balance of payments problem and the sizable gold and dollar drain of the last few years. The United States, he said, finds it easier to provide assistance that does not represent a net gold loss. Therefore, loans devoted to the construction of roads are more difficult to provide.
The President then asked what would happen to the former Trujillo properties.
Dr. Bosch stated that the sugar mills would be placed in the hands of the workers and administered through cooperatives. He expressed concern about the sugar situation and the gradual decrease in preferential prices on the U.S. market. He commented that the basic property question was complicated by such factors as the high cost of Dominican sugar production, world competition, domestic corruption and the Dominican people's firm belief that the properties should not return to private hands. He added, that each enterprise would be considered on its own merits. He stated that some of the Trujillo land would be administered by the Development Corporation, some would be devoted to the agrarian reform program and some would be placed in the hands of the Property Recovery Ministry. He explained that the measures to be taken would have to be eclectic. The guiding philosophy would be that while these properties should not be in government hands, they could not be in private hands, therefore, they would be run "in a way that is similar to that of a private enterprise which is not completely private."
The President inquired as to the military needs of the Dominican Republic.
Dr. Bosch indicated that he needed equipment and training scholarships for members of the Armed Forces. Specifically, he said that there was a need for patrol vessels and Grumman (amphibious) aircraft for coastal surveillance, and helicopters for transporting troops into mountainous areas where roads were not available. The number of helicopters, he added, could be small. Dr. Bosch insisted that the U.S. Military Mission could and should play a vital role in stressing to their Dominican counterparts the need to support democracy. This concept should be extended to the police whose situation was very delicate. He pointed out that police strength had more than doubled since Trujillo's time so that it now includes some 15,000 members. This expansion, he stated, had been the result of General Antonio Imbert's desire for power and of his need for a group of armed men who will be personally loyal to him. In this connection, Dr. Bosch declared that the police item in the new budget had been increased by $10 million over 1962. Dr. Bosch stated that the most delicate and urgent task for his administration would be to reduce the size of the police force and to appoint new leaders for it. He recognized that this might well lead to a crisis, and, if so, the sooner it came the better. In Dr. Bosch's judgment, Imbert considers himself the natural heir of Trujillo not only as a political leader but also with respect to his wealth, methods and allegiances.
Returning to military needs, Dr. Bosch stated that the Armed Forces also need communication equipment, such as micro-wave and telephone facilities, and transport. He pointed out that he wants to decrease the number of men in the Armed Forces and increase their efficiency. In this context, he referred briefly to the very bad situation in Haiti and to President Duvalier's readiness to destroy everything he has rather than to act rationally.
The President asked whether the military forces were stronger than the police.
Dr. Bosch replied that the police, spread out in the countryside, were in close touch with the people and that the armed forces were on their best behavior and very discreet. He explained that there was nothing intrinsically wrong with the police unless they are used by Imbert to further his own ambitious purposes. Commenting that the whole question was an internal political affair, Dr. Bosch expressed the belief that he could cope with it.
[Here follows discussion of the proposed Standard Oil refinery in Santo Domingo and of Cuba.]
354. Airgram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State/1/
A-308
Santo Domingo, January 13, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.39/1-1363. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by J.B. Martin.
SUBJECT
U.S. Policy in Dominican Republic
The year 1962 was a critical one in Dominican history and for our policy in that country. This is a recap on 1962 and a look ahead at 1963--at what lessons we can derive from past crises, at what future problems may arise. (It is written without knowledge of what happened when Mr. Bosch went to Washington. I assume the Department will wish to assess his visit and may want to put this local piece into the assessment pot.)
Results: 1962
We started the year with three basic objectives--to keep the provisional government in power, to hold free elections, and to install the winner in the Palace.
We have accomplished the first two. As of now, the prospects for the third are good.
We can take some satisfaction in these results, considering that they were constantly imperiled by the Castro-communist left and the Trujillista right, that they had to be undertaken in the enormous vacuum created by the crashing fall of Trujillo, that there was almost nothing but wreckage and rubble to build on--a stagnant economy a looted treasury, vast unemployment, no free voluntary institutions, no democratic tradition, few experienced people in government, an ignorant submerged populace, and a miasmatic fear which prevailed everywhere, for Trujillo had destroyed people's confidence in each other and in themselves.
[Here follow sections entitled "The Council of State," "Crises and Lessons," "Successes and Failures," "The Election's Meaning," "Bosch's Opportunity," and "The Opposition."]
Our Role--and Our Dangers
We have a whole new ballgame. We may have as many problems now as under the provisional government--but they will be different problems. (Of one thing we can be sure: we can never really predict what our problems will be. Who would have thought that the only bloodshed of this year would have been the Palma Sola massacre? Incidentally, I do not think we have heard the last of that sect.)
The perils from left and right that plagued the Council are likely to subside for a time in the face of Bosch's mandate--unless he stumbles badly and loses popular support. Then look out.
This seems unlikely to happen soon, perhaps not this year. Therefore, our real problem is the PRD and Bosch himself. We do not know nearly enough about them--especially about the party directorate, the provincial leaders, the candidates, the Senators, the Deputies, and the local leaders of the PRD. We do not know whether Bosch has commitments to the extreme left.
It seems to me that Bosch presents us with several possible dangers. I am aware that our agencies have been checking on Bosch and Miolán/2/ for many years. But after Castro, nobody can ever be really sure of anything. So I would list all these as possible dangers:
/2/Angel Miolán, Party Chief of the Parti Revolucionario Dominicano.
1. That Bosch has been a deep-cover communist for many years.
2. Ditto Miolán.
3. That Bosch and Miolán might lose control of the PRD to the Castro-communists. (But Miolán is a pro, thank God.)
4. That for unforseeable reasons Bosch might turn toward support of Castro.
5. That Bosch's campaign demagogy might turn into presidential charlatanism, transforming him ultimately into a personal homegrown nationalistic extremist who, though neutral and not tied to Havana or Moscow, would almost surely be anti-American as well as ruinous to the Republic. (I can easily envisage his using us as a whipping boy if things go wrong. He must maintain the underdog role to hold the masses. And having smashed the oligarchs, and being afraid to whip the military, he can only turn on us.)
6. That Bosch, a plunger, might miscalculate, lose a fight, and resign.
How do we defend against these possibilities? I think we do several things. We hang onto the military. We save Imbert and Amiama as an ace in the hole. And of course we do all the nice things to build for the future and strengthen democratic institutions--Peace Corps, CARE, CARITAS, schools, university, voluntary institutions, all by way of going over the head of the government to the people themselves, to align ourselves with them. We should, of course, support Bosch until he goes wrong. We should help him lead, should never impede, his advance into his own revolutionary new frontier. We should hope he goes straight, and takes the people with him, and us too.
But if he ever goes wrong--and I mean if his basic loyalties ever belong to another country than his own--we had better have the military on our side and, if it happens soon, Imbert and Amiama as well. That might pit us against the people, and the results would not be pretty to contemplate. But we can have no new Castro in the Caribbean.
Let me say at once I do not believe this will happen. But I think we would be foolish to ignore the possibility.
Meanwhile, we should tie him so closely to us that he cannot wriggle loose. At the same time, however, we should try to avoid tying ourselves too tightly to him--should not build him up too much, should not bet on him too heavily, should not propagate the idea that the Alliance is sure to succeed here if anywhere. The prospects here seem dazzling--but we must not be bedazzled, for the inherent difficulties are still enormous. Let us not, and let us hope the Dominican people will not, repeat the mistake of a year ago. All the Republic's problems were not solved because Trujillo fell. Nor are they solved because Bosch won. In every province, in every town, in every village, in the Dominican character itself, you can see the ruin Trujillo wrought. You do not repair in one year, nor perhaps in five, the ravages of 31 years. And we do not yet really know whether Bosch is up to the task at all.
We rejoice, with the people, at the victory of the people's hero. We are grateful for his strengthening the democratic left in Latin America. We can work with him, and we will. But we must not forget what we know about him--[5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. He won--but he is still the same man. As a candidate, he was an enigma. As a president, he is an unknown quantity.
All this means, I suggest, that we avoid in the American press over-optimistic statements about the prospects here. It means that in the Dominican press we express our confidence in the future of Dominican democracy and our support for Bosch in his efforts to build a better life for his people.
Moreover, it means we really do support him here. I consider that during the months ahead the emphasis of our work will shift from the political to the economic. Alongside Bosch, the Alianza should do better than alongside the Council of State--the Council was a semi-caretaker, and its oligarchs shrank from some Alianza goals. Tactically, however, I believe we must guard against smothering Bosch with advice and help. We should offer him everything--and not press too much on him. He reacts badly to pressure--though he will take it if forced to in a real crisis. At least at the outset, he will not operate as the Council did, seeking our help at every turn. A prima donna, he will try to do it himself, suffering us to assist. We should accept this role gracefully. And when he makes mistakes and comes to us for advice, we should give it in a spirit of magnanimity.
None of this will be easy. But if we can help him pull it off, we can create a better life for the Dominican people and a modest triumph for ourselves in the Caribbean.
John Bartlow Martin
355. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic/1/
Washington, January 19, 1963, 8:05 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 739.00/1-1963. Secret; Priority. Drafted and approved by Crimmins and cleared by Dungan and S/S.
682. During Bosch conversations in Washington (full accounts being pouched) it became evident he and his associates have not yet developed concrete plans for positive action in economic and social field to be put into effect upon assumption power. Bosch, however, extremely conscious need make maximum impact immediately. When pressed for info, Bosch usually limited himself to reference to various portions PRD program of govt. which as Embassy knows is little more than generalized statement broad intentions.
As result our concern that in absence establishment of at least basic outlines specific programs new government will flounder about badly in critical initial period, and in order seize opportunity that planning vacuum affords us to shape Bosch course, further conversations were held in New York in effort pin Bosch down and get him and associates started on hard task of getting concrete plans in condition for execution very early in new administration.
Bosch agreed to our assisting him officially or unofficially in at least blocking out plans for action in major fields, although he remained quite vague regarding his own ideas on actual targets and priority among them.
Specifically Bosch agreed to having technical advisers made available from US to PRD "planning committee" to work on plans in several areas. He stipulated that association these experts (who might come from Embassy or AID mission Santo Domingo, USG agencies here or private sources) with PRD "planners" would have to be handled carefully and quietly, that joint group would not discuss plans with or request any assistance from present government except as agreed by Miolan and that consequently group would have to rely largely on published data and resources Embassy and AID Santo Domingo. He said he would inform Miolan of this understanding and instruct him to take personal charge PRD side joint effort. Embassy/AID would be expected use Miolan as point contact this undertaking.
Since New York talks/2/ we have learned Bosch has taken to Europe with him Mario Diza, Venezuelan official IDB who has been in Santo Domingo working with Banco Agricola. Diaz designated by Felipe Herrera following Bosch request for economic advisor. Not clear whether he supposed provide general economic advice or deal only with agricultural credit. In addition, Bosch made number approaches various international agencies and private groups (including foundations) for technical assistance. Although precise nature and status these requests not clear, most if not all, will take effect only in post-inauguration period.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 352.
While we recognize great difficulties (not least of which is uncertain qualifications PRD personnel) in working this out in short time before inauguration, we consider it essential in our own interest that vigorous effort be made. We prepared take special steps to carry out our part arrangement.
On basis Bosch statements and our own appreciation requirements, we believe areas listed below should be attacked by joint group. Country team requested provide own views soonest on general concept, suggested areas, and personnel and information resources available in Country Team to meet requirements. In its evaluation, Country Team urged indicate other areas, even if outside present AID programs, which in its judgment should be given higher priority attention by Bosch administration. In reviewing list, Country Team should assume no increase present or projected FY 64 funding levels.
On receipt these comments, which should be furnished by opening business Jan 22, we will revise list and instruct Embassy approach Miolan referring to New York understanding, offering proposed list as reflection New York talks, and stating our desire and readiness to meet Bosch's request for cooperation. Meanwhile, we will be arranging for experts on standby basis.
Suggested list follows:
1. Impact programs: As indicated above, Bosch wants be able announce immediately impact program or programs that would give substance to his promises of improved economic and social levels. Tended emphasize road construction (particularly farm-market) on which he said PRD engineers in Ministry Public Works have necessary data. Hopes be able cite on inauguration specific links to be constructed. Also wants put into immediate effect "people's dining room" idea.
2. Public finances: Bosch very concerned short-term difficulties this sector: IMF debt, commercial arrears, sharp increase in FY 63 budget, large internal debt which he believes to be 41 million, and Central Bank policies (compounded in his view by antonomy issue). Appears recognize need advice in developing coordinated policy in budget, currency and foreign exchange management and in tax reform and collection. (Has arranged for IBM survey of possibility mechanization revenue collection and expenditure control.)
3. Agrarian reform: Bosch acknowledges progress made but wishes step up pace. Wants exempt grazing, mineral and coffee lands from reform in order promote diversification.
4. Trujillo properties: FYI. This not specifically agreed to and represents our own suggestion. End FYI. Bosch intends use non-sugar land in agrarian reform program, with sugar properties organized along cooperative lines. Wants use best Puerto Rican experience in sugar coops.
He is very indefinite on industrial and commercial enterprises except for general emphasis on cooperative approach. Claims he wants government out of business.
5. Diversification: Heavy Bosch emphasis on development cattle and minerals industries, with accompanying technical skills (e.g. veterinarians). Considerable but less emphasis on poultry and fishing industries. (Made formal request for 26 Peace Corps Volunteers to assist in developing fishing.)
Rusk
356. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
OCI No. 1564/63
Washington, June 14, 1963.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Dominican Republic, June 14-July 31, 1963. Secret.
PRESIDENT BOSCH AND INTERNAL SECURITY IN THEDOMINICAN REPUBLIC
President Juan Bosch of the Dominican Republic rightly considers that he has a popular mandate to bring about a radical transformation of political, economic, and social conditions in the Dominican Republic. He hopes to accomplish this purpose by such measures as agrarian and tax reform, economic development primarily through private foreign investment, and a more equitable distribution of earnings than has been the case hitherto.
There is currently under way a concerted campaign to discredit Bosch by charging that he is himself a crypto-Communist engaged in establishing a Communist dictatorship, or else that his ineptitude will lead to a Communist take over in the Dominican Republic. Manifestly, this campaign represents the reaction of vested interests who see their privileged position threatened by Bosch's revolutionary purposes. It also reflects genuine concern regarding Bosch's remarkably tolerant attitude toward Communist activities.
With reason, Bosch believes that the principal immediate threat to the accomplishment of his mission is the possibility of a reactionary coup. In this context, he has not hindered Communist organizational and agitational activities, so long as the Communists have avoided direct interference with him. He argues that to crack down on these activities would only precipitate a campaign of urban terrorism and guerrilla resistance like that in Venezuela, which would hinder the accomplishment of his constructive purposes.
Bosch understands that the security of his regime depends ultimately upon continued US support, particularly as a restraint upon the Dominican military. At the same time, he is nationalistic, egotistic, and aware of the political inexpediency of appearing to be a US puppet. Consequently, he is not readily amenable to US advice regarding his policy with respect to Communist activities.
The Communist danger in the Dominican Republic is not immediate, but potential. It is none the less serious. Given present freedom to organize and agitate, the Communists will become better prepared to exploit some future opportunity. If Bosch should fail to satisfy the expectations of the Dominican masses, or if he should be overthrown by a reactionary coup, the Communists would have an opportunity to seize the leadership of the popular revolutionary movement. This does not mean that they would directly come to power--the Dominican military have the will and ability to prevent that for the foreseeable future. It does mean that the Communists would have gained the advantage of identification with the popular side in a continuing class struggle.
[Here follows a table of basic facts on the Dominican Republic.]
357. Airgram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State/1/
A-131
Santo Domingo, September 22, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 DOM REP. Secret; Air Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by J.B. Martin.
SUBJECT
Six Months in a Qandary
[Here follow 13 pages concerning the domestic politics of the Dominican Republic.]
What Next
We are entering--indeed, we are in--quite a delicate period. Bosch has to decide whether to try to regain the initiative by enacting serious substantive legislation at this time--high political legislation that would redistribute wealth (or at least appear to do so, such as land expropriation), and/or put people to work--or, alternatively, whether to lie low a while longer (as he has been doing in the last few weeks.) He has to take this decision at a time when unemployment is high, the cost of living is high, and the military is restless. It is not an easy decision, and probably will depend on his estimate, on returning, of the military problem.
If he should show signs of trying to regain the initiative by spectacular revolutionary legislation, such as land expropriation, I intend to exert what influence I can to avoid explosions both here and in the United States. In this connection, a long memorandum from Abram Chayes/2/ will be very helpful--and I may need more help if things really seem to be headed that way.
/2/Reference is to the Legal Adviser to the Department of State. No memorandum was found.
The Prospect Before Us
As of now, we have a hard way to go, for we confront Bosch's personality, the long-run leftist threat, the imminent rightist danger, and the problems endemic in the Republic. And we confront our own limitations, principally in two areas: Financial assistance (AID and Congress), and intelligence (CAS).
I think the difficulties are likely to increase in the next two months. Seasonal unemployment is upon us, and we have done little or nothing to help. It will get worse. Military pressures are rising.
I think if Bosch survives this calendar year, he may survive for four--but I emphasize: Prediction beyond tomorrow is ridiculous in this country.
I think that at best his tenure is likely to be a holding operation--not the peaceful democratic revolution we had hoped, certainly not the "showcase" some had advertised.
Although in the present political milieu it is difficult to envisage what comes after a four-year term for Bosch, I think we should regard Bosch's government as a transition government. Under him we will likely never really make a nation here. But we should try to lay the groundwork for one.
Our Present Position
In spite of everything, I continue to believe at this time that our interests lie in supporting the Bosch Government. It is non-communist, tied to the West, friendly to the United States; it is committed to the principles of the Alliance for Progress (though Bosch blows hot and cold in public on the Alianza); it is the freely elected and the constitutional government; it respects individual liberties, human rights, and freedom of expression.
Furthermore, the alternatives are unacceptable.
I agree fully with Deptel 172/3/ and have for the second time laid down its line to all Embassy section chiefs and mission component chiefs.
/3/Dated September 13. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 DOM REP)
We are paying something for holding firmly to our position.
Some individuals in the mission disagree with it. (I have no firm evidence that any are downright disloyal to it, though Bosch tells me some members of AID and MAAG are. I have told him if he gets me a name and proof, I will send the individual home. I have discussed the question with the AID and MAAG chiefs, and they are cooperative.)
A good many American private citizens think we are mistaken (or worse).
The attaches report that increasingly the Dominican military will not talk to them, since they simply replay the record: "We support constitutional government." We are arming the attaches with economic and political facts for rebuttal.
I have, as said above, been attacked publicly as a communist. (Other mission members have been accused privately.)
It is becoming increasingly difficult for us to get information out of opposition political leaders and out of the important business-professional group.
All this is not to say that we are now isolated. We have good ties to the oligarchy; good ties to the PRD; good ties to the PRSC; reasonably good ties to the labor movement; reasonably good ties to the military (I think); good ties to Bosch and his government. We are weak with students, campesinos, the far left, the far right, and some important business-professional men.
There is no question that we are losing contacts and even some support. (So are the Nuncio and others who work with us.) But we are far from isolated.
What I hope to do is to split off the rightist extremists now, while they are active, and the leftists extremists later, when they become active, leaving Bosch and me a broad center. This is probably an unattainable ideal; but it's worth a try.
There have been for months almost no signs of anti-Americanism. I regard this as ominous; it simply confirms my view that the Castro/communist left as going along with Bosch and, so, with us. To gain time, they will permit him short-term victories over FENEPIA and the Electricidad and short-term association with us. When it behooves them, they will move hard. I would like to precipitate this, unless unemployment worsens seriously.
Our ability to influence events is probably waning. It was far greater in 1962 than in 1963--memories of the fleet (November, 1961) and the Echavarria coup (January, 1962) were fresh; we had helped install the provisional Council of State and everyone knew it. But today, time has passed, memories of 1961-2 are fading, and, moreover, Bosch was not installed by us, he was elected by the Dominican people. So, as time passes, our influence declines. And events elsewhere--Peru, Guatemala, Cuba, and, especially, Haiti--tend to undermine our influence here, for regardless of whether our policies in those places were wise, Dominicans see them as evidence of our growing reluctance to send the fleet.
Nevertheless, barring some reckless adventure, anyone who thinks to overthrow Bosch will, if he takes thought at all, find himself obliged to consider our views in advance. If he has a map.
In the final analysis, our ability to influence events here depends upon our willingness to bring the fleet to the horizon. By saying this, I do not mean we are at that point, or near it. I do mean to say that it was one thing to bring the fleet to eject the Trujillos; it would be quite a different thing to bring the fleet to stop an anti-Bosch coup. Unhappily, things are not so simple as of yore.
Simple or not, I reiterate that I believe at the present time that our policy interests are best served by maintaining Bosch in power. (A contingency paper accompanies this piece.)/4/
/4/Not found.
Recommendations
As a general policy, I believe that we should recognize Bosch is not much of a president, that we should recognize most of his opposition is almost equally incompetent, and that we should attempt to take his government away from him, insofar as possible. This involves what amounts to an extension of activist diplomacy. That is to say, we should woo his own supporters, ministers, and advisors ardently; use every means--or almost every means--to get rid of those whom we cannot control; exert every pressure to put our own people close to him and the other levers of power and, to the extent possible, though these people run his government without his knowing it. (Carried to its furthest length, this would mean subverting his government. That would require a most elaborate clandestine apparatus. Even should we decide to give this country the highest priority in Latin America, I doubt we could do it. And even so, such a policy would entail grave risks, enormous difficulties, and considerable likelihood of failure.) Nevertheless, somewhere short of such an elaborate exercise lies an extended activist diplomacy that should be possible now.
I recommend that we:
1) Move immediately on intelligence problem as I outlined in my recent [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] telegram./5/
/5/Not further identified.
2) Step up immediately our [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] effort. It is not good enough. We do not know enough about the far left, the ministries, or the military. We are preoccupied by Haiti. I continue to believe, as I have said previously, that our single most urgent need here is for surveillance of the left now and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], for it is our only safeguard against communist infiltration. I welcome the advent of the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
3) Make every effort to split [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].
4) [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
5) [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
6) Identify people and elements of the other shattered parties with the hope that we can build an alternative party. [Action] Embassy.
7) Survey and, if feasible, develop the Yaque del Sur, as envisaged in Embtel 236 and Deptel 154./6/ I feel very strongly that TVA should take this on and it should become ours. We badly need a major U.S. project here. And the people here need the valley.
/6/Embtel 236, September 11, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 DOM REP) Telegram 154, September 4. (Ibid., AID (ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS) DOM REP)
8) Get AID approval if possible, at least on a standby basis, of either the $15 million or the $ 17 million loan applications. Action AID/W.
9) Kill Luna's Hawker-Hunter deal. Action Embassy.
10) Get coastal patrol boats. Action Embassy MAAG/SD, Dept/DOD.
11) Get MAAG agreement ratified. Action Embassy.
12) Straighten out Haina. I will keep pressing Bosch on this. If he asks us for technical help, I may want to request a change in our former policy preventing U.S. management of ex-Trujillo properties. Action Embassy.
13) Get hold of the only three really strong men I have been able to identify in the Republic--Wessin y Wessin, Imbert, and Miolan. Action Embassy.
14) If travel between here and Moscow, Havana, or Prague increases, I propose to press Bosch hard to stop it, pointing out that it contravenes United States policy and is very dangerous to his own government. Action Embassy.
15) Press Bosch to close Dato Pagan's school. Action Embassy.
16) If Bosch tries to regain the initiative through legislation involving private property, I intend to exert what influence I can to avoid explosions both here and in the U.S. Action Embassy.
17) Work for establishment of a Dominican Peace Corps. Action Peace Corps and AID, Washington.
18) Watch Haiti. Action Embassy-[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and Washington.
19) Work to help the Parvin Foundation carry out its program. Action Embassy.
20) Try continuously to get better people into the Bosch Government. Action Embassy.
21) Perhaps bring the Boxer in and take Bosch and his military aboard for lunch as splashy evidence our support.
Tactics
As above, I recommend a stepped-up effort at activist diplomacy. I envisage this as a long-range policy, something we will have to pursue for the forseeable future, perhaps even throughout Bosch's term.
However, in the short run, as a temporary policy tactic, I am inclined to think we should, in the near future, execute briefly a contrary policy of pulling out. Let me explain.
Right now things seem to be stuck on dead center, with opposing forces in balance and at stalemate. Our influence appears in danger of waning, in part because we have so continuously exerted it in the last 2-1/2 years. Perhaps if we were to withdraw for awhile, the contentious Dominicans might all surrender to each other. They look to us too much. We are a lightning rod. And our continual intervention gives them a sense of importance they do not intrinsically possess or deserve. Tensions get screwed tight in part because of our presence. They have no conception of what our withdrawal, our relaxation of pressure, would do. I think they would be shocked. I think they would miss us. They might even come to us. I would like to give them a taste of it.
Therefore, once we get through, say, the next month, I think we should seriously consider a sudden tactical withdrawal. I want first to set in train certain of the above recommendations--[less than 1 line of source text not declassified], the TVA-Yaque del Sur, the patrol boats, Luna's Hawker Hunter fighter deal. This done, we might execute a sudden tactical pullback--adopt a policy of hands-off for a period of, say, three or four weeks or even longer. It would deprive both left and right of a target, force the military to look to its own problems; and might even force Bosch to govern.
To be effective, this policy would have to go all across the board-- MAAG, AID, USIS, Embassy (not CAS or Peace Corps). For several weeks, we would all just stop pressing. The public symbol of this policy would be my own departure. I could accept, for example, a long-de-ferred invitation to visit General O'Meara's headquarters in Panama, perhaps in the last half of October, and I might extend this trip to visit our base at Guantanamo and several democratic countries around the Caribbean with ties to Bosch--Costa Rica, Honduras, Colombia, Venezuela, Puerto Rico.
All this of course would be subject to the Department's approval and to unfolding events here during the next month. But as of now, I think such a sudden relaxation of pressure might have a cold-shower effect that could prove healthy. This would be, I wish to emphasize, only a temporary tactical deviation from the long-haul activist policy.
John Bartlow Martin
358. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Washington, October 4, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 DOM REP. Top Secret. The source text was transmitted under cover of a memorandum from Department of State Executive Secretary Read to the Secretary for his information.
The events of the past few days in the Dominican Republic and Honduras/2/ show that the situation could develop in the Caribbean which would require active United States military intervention. I am not sure that we are prepared for this satisfactorily as there is a large area involved; for example, how many troops could we get into the Dominican Republic in a 12-24-36-48 hour period? How many into Honduras? How many into Venezuela?
/2/On September 25 Air Force Chief of Staff Miguel Atila Luna and Colonel Elias Wessin y Wessin ousted President Bosch from power. They cited Bosch's ineptitude, corruption, failure to keep electoral promises, and the growth of Communist influence within the Dominican Government as reasons. The following day it was announced that a "Triumvirate" composed of Emilio de los Santos, Ramon Tapia, and Manuel Tavares would assume power in the Republic. On September 28 Ambassador Martin; Newell F. Williams, Director of the AID mission in Santo Domingo; and Colonel David C. Wolfe, Chief of the Military Assistance and Advisory Group were recalled to Washington. Spencer King, Deputy Chief of Mission, was left as Charge d'Affaires. On October 3 the government of President Ramon Villeda Morales in Honduras was overthrown.
I think this matter deserves the highest priority. The State Department should be informed of the results of your study as they may be under the impression that we are prepared--which might be unwarranted.
After you have surveyed the matter I think we should have a meeting on this./3/
/3/No record of any such meeting was found.
J.F.K./4/
/4/Kennedy's initials appear in an unidentified hand, indicating he signed the original.
359. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic/1/
Washington, October 4, 1963, 10:06 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 DOM REP. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by J.B. Martin, cleared by E.M. Martin, and approved by Cottrell. This telegram constitutes a revised version of a Department of State policy proposal contained in a paper submitted to the President on October 4. (Ibid., POL 20 DOM REP) The proposal was discussed the same day at a meeting chaired by the President from 5:05 to 6 p.m. Present were Under Secretaries of State Ball and Harriman, Assistant Secretary Martin, Ambassador J.B. Martin, David Bell and Teodoro Moscoso of AID, and Colonel J.C. King of CIA. No minutes were kept. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book)
237. Re Department circular 629./2/ Following is for Santo Domingo distribution only to King and Shlaudemann. Sections E and F are for Embassy action now; remainder is FYI only at present.
/2/Dated October 4. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 DOM REP)
A. USG objectives in DomRep are:
1. Return the Dominican Republic to constitutional representative democracy as soon as possible.
2. Give the Dominican people the best possible government meanwhile, with particular reference to preparations for a new election.
3. Prevent an open military dictatorship or the growth of communist strength.
4. Discourage the military in the Dominican Republic and in the Hemisphere from military attacks on constitutional and free democracies.
B. To achieve these multiple objectives, you should open informal negotiations with representatives of present regime (probably through Reid to Tavares, then to Triumvirate plus Reid, at your discretion), to secure their agreement prior to our recognition or resumption of aid on following main points:
1. Free political activity of all non-Communist parties in preparation for OAS supervised elections in not more than one year, with provision for drafting new constitution thereafter.
2. Restoration of some semblance of constitutionality to present regime and recognition of normal role of PRD in DomRep by substituting for one member of the triumvirate Juan Casasnovas as President.
3. Reconstitute present cabinet to include some of best members of Bosch cabinet and others.
4. Restoration of military to proper role by removal from country of Luna, Wessin y Wessin, and such other changes in command structure as country team may propose (e.g., send Rib abroad, replace Vinas, upgrade young US-trained officers, transfer Armed Forces Training Center and Air Force Infantry to Army).
5. Decrees to control communist and Trujillo threats.
6. Assurances of appropriate controls to improve honesty and efficiency of government activities, including especially of Trujillo properties.
7. Commitment to institutional reforms of AFP including agrarian reform and stimulation private enterprise, domestic and foreign.
C. In opening these discussions, you should state clearly and emphatically that USG will not recognize or deal with this regime as it stands. This regime and the politicians who named the cabinet represent a minority of the Dom people. Regime must find some way to return toward representative constitutional democracy.
D. Timing of essence. Dept believes at present that these negotiations should be initiated in a week or ten days and then pursued to a conclusion promptly, i.e., in a month. Regime should be given some time to sit and worry. However, too long delay may result in deterioration of situation in DomRep and Hemisphere; specifically, non-recognition for several months could result in bloody struggle between military and people led by leftist extremists, with military dictatorship winning. Dept requests Embassy's comments and recommendations on when to start negotiations.
E. Because of our sympathy and friendship for Dom people, who should not suffer from misdeeds of golpistas, we will continue CARE, CARITAS, and Peace Corps. FYI, means of continuing food shipments under PL-480 without giving financial assistance to regime being sought.
F. Embassy general view on entire program requested.
Ball
360. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic/1/
Washington, October 13, 1963, 10:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by J.B. Martin, Cottrell, and Ball; cleared in draft by the President; and approved by Ball.
264. For Charge from Under Secretary.
1. Cables received today from Casasnovas addressed to President and Secretary state that Casasnovas has been designated by the National Assembly as provisional President during absence of Bosch./2/ Diplomatic recognition is requested and agrement for del Rosario as Ambassador.
/2/Not printed. Telegrams 262 and 263, from Santo Domingo, October 13. (Ibid.)
2. Bosch cabled President last night and suggested this compliance with constitutional provisions makes Casasnovas provisional President and therefore legitimate head GODR with which US already has relations.
3. We do not know who has put together this Bosch-Casasnovas-Assembly maneuver, and it is essential you get firmest evidence possible on this point. We are particularly concerned lest it reflect effort by the PSP or other Castro-Communist elements. If you are satisfied, however, that this is basically a PRD operation and that Casasnovas is not being used, knowingly or unknowingly, as tool of Castro-Communists, this appears to create new situation requiring revision of time schedule. Possibly it offers a chance for immediate restoration higher degree constitutionality than we had envisaged.
4. We recognize considerations which lead you to conclude that waiting a few days more will not materially harm our interests. However, as result of PRD action, positions may rapidly polarize. Situation appears to be that triumvirate represents power without legitimacy whereas Casasnovas represents color of legitimacy without power. The problem is to fuse two elements before irrevocable polarization. To this end approach to triumvirate should be made now.
5. Against foregoing background, you are instructed to approach Tavares unofficially as soon as possible Monday morning along following lines:
A. You should state that it is possible the triumvirate has been misled by Lear Reed. We have just become aware of his unauthorized activities. He is a private citizen, purely a volunteer with no official or unofficial standing with USG and he does not and cannot represent views of USG. Whatever has been said to Lear by triumvirate, he has not passed along to USG, and any opinions he has expressed as to USG position should be totally ignored.
B. As indicated in Secretary's statement of October 4,/3/ USG will not collaborate or normalize relations with de facto government under existing conditions. There should be no ambiguity on this point. Actions taken by USG for removal of personnel are continuing and will be continued unless prompt return to constitutionality assured.
/3/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, October 21, 1963, p. 624.
C. USG would like to know plans of present de facto government to return to constitutionality.
D. If Tavares describes triumvirate position as you have predicted, that a constitutional assembly will be elected within a year, followed by joint municipal and constitutional elections, with presidential election at end of triumvirate term, you should say that this whole proposal inadequate and unacceptable and that USG could not work with triumvirate on this basis.
E. You should state that USG has been asked to recognize Casasnovas as legitimate provisional President under constitution given substance by action of Assembly. This matter being seriously studied by USG. FYI: However, we are not anxious to act in manner that could exacerbate confusion and polarization or provoke civil disorders. End FYI.
F. We would be interested, therefore, in attitude triumvirate to acceptance of Casasnovas as head of government on assumption Bosch and Gonzalez Tamayo will not return to Dominican Republic. Triumvirate would dissolve and Casasnovas would then have right to select own Cabinet.
G. This would mean immediate restoration of constitutional government with military withdrawing from political control and resuming proper constitutional role. Would also mean withdrawal of certain political parties or party leaders who have forced themselves or their men into key cabinet posts.
H. If triumvirate and their military backers would agree to this arrangement prompt restoration of USG cooperation could be effected.
I. You should make clear to triumvirate that if they agree to Casasnovas takeover, triumvirate will be publicly recognized as having preserved civilian control in most difficult circumstances and provided bridge back to constitutionality thus performing indispensable service of statesmanship to Republic. You should make clear to triumvirate that we would insist that Casasnovas take effective measures to closely restrict Communist travel and internal activities and ensure country against Communist infiltration and subversion, which together with ousting Bosch, was after all ostensible reason for coup. If you think it helpful as sweetening for Triumvirate, we should have no objections to your suggesting that we might try to persuade Casasnovas to make use their talents in new cabinet.
FYI: Throughout discussions, you should bear in mind that important objective is to bring about an effective as well as a constitutional government, at cabinet level and below. You should hold strongly all major points of position. However, if Tavares or other spokesmen for triumvirate indicate possibility of accepting national government in which Casasnovas would agree to include representation of some other parties in Cabinet, we would be prepared to canvass this with them as possible alternative solution. End FYI.
6. Since key appears to be military acceptance, immediately after talking to Tavares on Monday you should approach Vinas Roman (in company with other DR military leaders if you deem others' presence advisable) and make same points to him or them as you made to Tavares (Para 5 above).
Rusk
361. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic/1/
Washington, October 17, 1963, 6:33 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 DOM REP. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by J.B. Martin. Approved by Cottrell.
290. A. Subject your discretion suggest attaches draw on following explanation of what lies behind our position in informal discussions with Dom military:
Secretary statement and President press conference mean exactly what they say/2/ but should be understood in light of following background--we have our problems too.
/2/References are to the Secretary's statement of October 4 (see footnote 2, Document 360, and the President's press conference of October 9 (see footnote 2, Document 65).
Coup raised important questions far beyond DomRep involving not only Dom democracy but cause of constitutionality and representative democracy--right of people to choose own ruler--throughout hemisphere and indeed beyond.
US was deeply involved, materially and morally, in agonizing transition from dictatorial oppression to representative democracy in DomRep. Transformation achieved remarkably quickly and peaceably (with help Dom military--which makes present situation doubly tragic).
Although USG had misgivings about Bosch as ideal president, nevertheless, he won that office with overwhelming majority in a free election which was great source satisfaction to hemisphere and to Dom and Am people in particular. US pointed with pride to its role in these historic events, predicting that in DomRep would arise a clear demonstration of advantages to common man of peaceful democratic evolution as contrasted to violent communist revolution.
Perhaps in time US would have become completely disenchanted with Bosch's fumbling mismanagement and fully alarmed over freedom he allowed Castro/Communists. But even some his severest US critics felt that seven short months provided wholly inadequate basis for final judgment. And coup seriously set back cause democracy throughout hemisphere. These are salient considerations for US, and nothing gained now by arguing whether coup "necessary." Problem is what next.
Military's dominant role in coup presents special problems for US. Regardless of merits, fair or unfair, LA military are seen in US as arbitrary perpetrators of endless series of coups against elected civilian government, thus preventing progress and democratic evolution. Timing of Dom coup made matters far worse--it followed Peru, Guatemala, and Ecuador, and Honduras followed it, arousing widespread alarm in US of chain reaction that might endanger democracy in other struggling LA nations.
Therefore, US reaction against coup very strong, as reflected in editorials and Congress. Moreover, some distinguished members Congress who in past have opposed military assistance to Latin America were so outraged they are now pushing for legislation denying both US military and economic assistance to any government springing from a military coup. Their feelings are understandable, for they represent precisely the same forces which have been most disposed to extend generous helping hand to Dom people in efforts to build a democracy on ruins tyranny.
Dominicans should not underestimate strength or importance of public reaction to coup. USG can never disregard public opinion, as Dom military trained here can appreciate.
US does not seek to impose unacceptable--or any single--solution in DomRep. We recognize Communist dangers; we will insist on its being curbed, in our own interests as well as DomRep's. But we must ensure in so far as realistically possible that would-be golpistas in other LA countries take no encouragement from Dom coup, and we must ensure that any solution to present impasses takes fully into account the desire of Dom people (and US people) that control over their destiny shall be returned to hands of a government responsive to their will.
In this connection, well to remember that all PRDers, just like all military, not bad per se, and not "brainwashed" (JANAF 162116Z)./3/ We must stop thinking in labels and bogeymen, face realities and individuals.
/3/Not found.
Finally, DomRep, for historical, geographic, cultural reasons occupies special position vis-à-vis US. US feels nothing but friendliness and sympathy for Dom people and Dom problems.
B. This background, of course, does not in any way presage a new "softer" position. It is an attempt to explain our present firm position, and to give attaches something to keep talking to military, especially, perhaps, junior officers, about.
Rusk
362. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, November 1, 1963.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Dominican Republic, October 31-November 22, 1963. Confidential. Drafted by Dungan.
SUBJECT
Presidential Meeting on Honduras and DR--November 1--5:00 p.m.
PARTICIPANTS
The President
AID--Mr. David Bell, Mr. Reuben Sternfeld
Defense--Dr. Mountain
CIA--Mr. Richard Helms, Col. J.C. King
State--Mr. Edwin M. Martin
White House--Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Ralph Dungan
The current situation in the Dominican Republic and Honduras was discussed.
With respect to Honduras, it was observed that the conversations with regard to the return to constitutionality are still going on in the country, that an orderly withdrawal of U.S. personnel is underway, that there is no imminent threat of counter-coup or insurgent activity, and therefore our posture for the moment should be to stand pat.
With regard to the DR, it was decided (1) to dispatch Colonel Simmons and the President approved a general instruction for his mission, (2) the President requested a memorandum to be drafted for use in our Latin American embassies in the event that we recognize the new regime in Saigon, and (3) the President directed that the Charge in Santo Domingo be brought back to the U.S. for consultation early next week.
RAD
/2/Lieutenant Colonel Ed Simmons, former U.S. military attache in the Dominican Republic, was dispatched from Washington to New York to talk to General Rodriguez Echavarr#a and to the Dominican Republic to talk with representatives of the Dominican military. (Martin, Overtaken by Events, pp. 612-613)
363. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Venezuela/1/
Washington, December 13, 1963, 8:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Moskowitz; cleared by Cottrell, ARA/EST, ARA/CMA, ARA/OAP, and S/S, and approved by E.M. Martin. Also sent to San Jose as telegram 226.
516. Embtel 725./2/ We can assure you decision recognize Honduran and Dominican regimes at this time only after exhaustive consideration all foreign and domestic aspects./2/ In cases both countries our principal objective in withholding recognition has been return at earliest possible date constitutionally elected government. We have also sought (a) give pause incipient plotters in other parts hemisphere, (b) minimize violence and opportunities for extreme leftists expand their strength and (c) secure fullest possible respect for civil liberties and non-communist party activity pending new elections. While our non-recognition has yielded some success, we convinced that prospects for further influencing situation by non-recognition both countries in direction our objectives are virtually nil and continued non-recognition likely nullify gains thus far achieved.
/2/Dated December 13. (Ibid.)
/3/The United States recognized the new Dominican Government on December 14.
We airpouching for your information detailed memoranda setting forth basis on which decision reached./4/ Meantime following are factors in addition those cited Depcirtel 1065/5/ favoring proposed US recognition which you may draw upon in further discussions with Betancourt and Oduber and/or Orlich to clarify our position:
/4/Not found.
/5/Dated December 12. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 US)
Dominican Republic
1. Our ability influence DR developments along course we favor during short and mid-term future will tend decrease if we continue withhold recognition since high world sugar prices and lack general Dominican popular reaction against coup support conclusion de facto regime does not need US recognition to survive.
2. Regime's personnel are not strong and lack popular support and thus would be easy targets for extreme leftist violence and/or military coup should serious difficulties arise. US recognition and support will significantly increase regime's ability withstand extremists' attacks and maintain commitments on free elections.
3. Withholding recognition can be expected strengthen regime's resistance our suggestions for measures to improve its national and international acceptance making eventual accommodation more difficult and increasing risk seriously damaging basically friendly relations between US and DR.
4. Recognition will significantly enhance prospects for promoting replacement of less desirable elements now in government with more acceptable men since non-recognition is factor which has created cohesive political front against such changes. Triumviate believes US support will enable it take firm stand against party hacks and incompetents in cabinet and enlist able non-party civilians to replace them to improve regime's capabilities for effective government beneficial to Dominicans and for adherence election schedule.
5. Extreme leftists have started small scale guerrilla action against regime supported by suspected arms from Cuba. Recognition will enable us help Dominicans stop possible Cuban arms shipments and strengthen regime's position suppress guerrilla and other extremist-provoked disorders which were being used as pretext by rightist civilian and military elements to suppress free political activity or to seize government and cancel election schedule. Situation this latter respect was deteriorating rapidly.
6. Number of hemisphere governments favor early recognition and have held off this long only in deference our initiatives.
[Here follows discussion of the recognition of the new Honduran Government and instructions to the Embassies in Caracas and San Jose.]
Ball
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