05 March 2003

Iraq: Still Failing to Disarm

Secretary Colin L. Powell Remarks at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies Washington, DC

March 5, 2003

SECRETARY POWELL: Well, thank you very much, Zbig, for that short and
generous introduction. I am deeply honored as a former National
Security Advisor to be introduced by yet another former National
Security Advisor, somebody who almost hired me once to work for him
when he was National Security Advisor and I was a Brigade Commander in
the famous 101st Airborne Division. And I showed up for the interview
wearing my green uniform and jump boots, which clearly indicated to
Dr. Brzezinski that I really did not want to come to the NSC at that
time. (Laughter.) But I subsequently did return to the NSC in another
capacity.

And I am very pleased to be here at CSIS and look around the room and
see so many, many old and dear friends, and especially David Abshire.
And this gives me a chance to, once again, thank CSIS for all the work
that it has done over the years to research issues of interest to
Americans, of interest to people around the world; and, through the
hard work of the many people who have been here over the years,
produce products that have helped shape the times in which we live. So
it's a great pleasure to be back at CSIS, and, in that regard, then,
it makes it the perfect place, really, to discuss the issue of the
day, to address the grave and growing danger posed by Saddam Hussein
and his continued pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.

Let me put the question to you directly and clearly in the simplest
terms that I can. The question simply is: Has Saddam Hussein made a
strategic political decision to comply with the United Nations
Security Council resolutions? Has he made a strategic political
decision to get rid of his weapons of mass destruction? That's it, in
a nutshell. The question is not how much more time should be allowed
for inspections. The question is not how many more inspectors should
be sent in. The question simply is: Has Saddam Hussein made a
strategic decision, a political decision, that he will give up these
horrible weapons of mass destruction and stop what he's been doing for
all these many years?

That's the question. There is no other question. Everything else is
secondary or tertiary. That's the issue. It's an issue that's been on
the table for 12 years. It's the issue that was put to Saddam Hussein
in 1991 after the Gulf War. And over a period of years, and resolution
after resolution after resolution, the same question was put to him,
the same challenge was given to him, the same instruction was given by
the international community, by the Security Council, to Saddam
Hussein: Disarm, give up these weapons of mass destruction, stop
threatening your people, let your neighbors live in peace, no longer
fearful of these kinds of weapons. And for 12 years, Saddam Hussein
has given the same answer back repeatedly: No, I will not.

On September 12th of last year, President Bush took the issue, once
again, to the United Nations, and before the General Assembly on that
day, the 12th, he challenged the world community to act, to act in a
definitive way to deal with this threat to international peace and
security that was being posed and had been posed for so many years by
Saddam Hussein and his regime.

We then went into a spirited debate for the next seven weeks after the
President's speech to come up with a resolution that would lay it out
clearly once and for all. It's interesting to note that as soon as
this debate began and Saddam Hussein recognized that something might
come out of it, he started to respond. Within a few days after the
President's speech, he said, oh, I'll let the inspectors in, after
years of saying, no, you can't come back in, after he caused them to
leave in 1998.

Was he doing that because he had suddenly made a strategic decision to
comply or disarm? No. He was doing it because he began to feel the
pressure. And once again, he started to play the game that he had been
playing for the last 11 or so years, to divert attention, to distract,
to throw chaff up, to confuse, to cause us to lose our way in applying
our will.

Nevertheless, the debate went forward, even though there were people
who said, well, gosh, why do we need a new resolution? We have all
these other resolutions, and he's now going to let the inspectors back
in. But we went right ahead. We ignored all of that. We ignored the
letters that went back and forth between he and the United Nations and
the inspectors as he tried to see if he could derail a new resolution.
And he failed.

And after some seven weeks of the most intense negotiations, intense
diplomacy imaginable, last November, the Security Council unanimously,
15 to zero -- people thought it couldn't be done -- 15 to zero, the
Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1441.

And let's be clear what Resolution 1441 is all about. It's not just a
bunch of meaningless words. Every one of those words was fought over.
It's not about inspectors. It's not about an inspection regime. It is
about Saddam Hussein, in the first instance, in the first part of that
resolution, being found guilty again, reaffirming his guilt over the
preceding 11 years of possessing and developing with the intention of
having and potentially using weapons of mass destruction.

That resolution, in the first instance, was about Saddam Hussein
continuing to be in material breach of multiple previous resolutions,
16 of them, that demanded his disarmament. It was about giving Saddam
Hussein, in the next instance, one last chance to come clean and
disarm. That was the clear purpose of the resolution. One last chance.
You have been in material breach. You have been guilty. You still are
guilty. We're giving you one last chance to make that strategic
choice, make that political decision to give up these horrible weapons
that threaten humanity, to give them up, come into compliance. Once
again, join with your neighbors in trying to build a better
neighborhood. Come into compliance, one last chance. But the drafters
of that resolution and all of the ministers and ambassadors who worked
on it knew who we were dealing with. We have seen the record of the
past 11 years.

So we made it clear that there had to be certain other elements in the
resolution. One of the other elements had to be an inspection regime
that would be tough, demanding, that would allow the inspectors to go
anywhere, anytime, anyplace. It also said that Hussein had to provide
them everything they needed to do their job, had to cooperate, provide
people for interviews, all the other things that you have heard
discussed. That was an essential part of the resolution.

And then the final element of that resolution, so that there could be
no doubt about what would follow in the absence of compliance, it made
it clear that if he missed this one last chance, if he committed new
material breaches, then serious consequences would follow.

Nothing we have seen since the passage of 1441 indicates that Saddam
Hussein has taken a strategic and political decision to disarm;
moreover, nothing indicates that the Iraqi regime has decided to
actively, unconditionally and immediately cooperate with the
inspectors. Cooperate for the purpose of showing everything they have,
not cooperate for the purpose of seeing how little we can show them.

Process is not performance. Concessions are not compliance. Destroying
a handful of missiles here under duress, only after you're pressed and
pressed and pressed and you can't avoid it, and you see what's going
to happen to you if you don't start doing something to deceive the
international community once again, that's not the kind of compliance
that was intended by UN Resolution 1441. Iraq's too little, too late
gestures are meant not just to deceive and delay action by the
international community, he has as one of his major goals to divide
the international community, to split us into arguing factions. That
effort must fail. It must fail because none of us wants to live in a
world where facts are defeated by deceit, where the words of the
Security Council mean nothing, where Saddam and the likes of Saddam
are emboldened to acquire and wield weapons of mass destruction.

Saddam's response to Resolution 1441 is consistent with his answers to
all the previous resolutions. He has met each one of them with
defiance and deception, with every passing year since 1991 and with
every passing day since the adoption of Resolution 1441. Saddam, as a
result, has taken Iraq deeper and deeper into material breach of its
international obligations.

It was precisely because of his long history of defiance and deception
when the Security Council's members voted to pass Resolution 1441, we
were expecting to see this all again. And we carefully included in the
resolution some early tests to see whether or not we were wrong. Maybe
he had changed. Maybe this time it would be different.

One of those early tests was 30 days after the passage of the
resolution we wanted to see from Saddam Hussein something we were
supposed to have seen back in 1991, but didn't, and that was a
current, accurate, full and complete declaration of its banned
programs. The Iraqi regime was to give inspectors immediate, unimpeded
and unrestricted access to any site and any person to help them do
their job of verifying whether Iraq was disarming. In that first 30
days, wait for the declaration, see if this kind of access was
granted.

1441 spelled out very clearly that false statements or omissions, and
failure to cooperate with these inspectors, as they started to do
their work, these two elements combined, would constitute a further
material breach, a further finding of guilty, not complying.

No one has seriously claimed that Iraq provided a currently accurate,
full and complete declaration on December 8th when they met the 30-day
schedule. No one has stood up to defend them. So many of my
colleagues, unfortunately, on the Security Council don't even want to
remember that. Well, that was back in December. We know we don't have
to think about that now. Well, that was December. That's not worry
about that now. Let's not discuss that at our next meeting. Let's just
let bygones by bygones. Let's see what we can get him to do today that
might make us feel a little better.

It's not going to work. We cannot ignore it. The things that are not
in the declaration are things that we have to know about. Instead, we
got a mixture of lies and deceit, falsities. Chief UN Inspector Blix
and International Atomic Energy Head ElBaradei both told the Council
on December 19th that there was not much new in that Iraqi
declaration, and we shouldn't have been surprised. Indeed, the
12,000-page document that they tried to pass off as the whole truth
was nothing but a rehash of old and discredited material, with some
new lies thrown in for good measure to make it look fresh. Fresh lies
on top of the old lies.

It repeated the biggest lie of all, the claim that Iraq has no weapons
of mass destruction, thereby setting the stage for further deception
of the inspectors as they went about their business.

You know, it's illustrative just to look at a couple of examples. You
take VX nerve agent. VX nerve agent is the most deadly chemical weapon
imaginable. Horrible to contemplate. As a soldier, I had to
contemplate it, both as a battlefield commander, as Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and it was a weapon that I never wanted to see
used in battle, I would never like to see used in a terrorist
operation, I would never like to see used against any human being. A
few drops and you're dead.

Back in 1991, Iraq was required then to declare and destroy its
arsenal of all these kinds of materials and VX. And what did Iraq do
back in 1991? It denied it had any. And it stuck to that denial for
four long years, all the way through 1995. Inspectors were all over
the country. Inspectors were there looking. Inspectors were doing what
inspectors are supposed to do: verify what they have been told. And
they were told there was no VX.

In 1995 or thereabouts, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, who knew a lot,
defected, and he spilled the beans. He let it be known that the Iraqi
regime had VX. And as a result of what he told the international
community, what he told the inspectors, the Iraqi regime was forced to
admit it. Forced to admit that it had produced large amounts of this
terrible, terrible poison.

If it hadn't been for that cueing from his son-in-law, who
subsequently paid with his life when he foolishly went back home, if
you have any doubts about the nature of this regime, if it hadn't been
for the cueing that he provided, who knows where Saddam Hussein might
be today with VX? The fact of the matter is, we don't know where he is
today with VX because the latest declaration is still inadequate.

Even now, eight years after that discovery, he continues his
deception. He still claims that Iraq has never weaponized its VX
stocks. He wants us to believe that while he has had some VX, he can't
use it.

The inspectors aren't buying it. Dr. Blix reported to the Security
Council on January 27th that there are indications the Iraqis have
made more progress on weaponizing VX than they have admitted.

Just a few days ago now, the Iraqis suddenly have come forward and
said they will provide a report on their VX, where he's going to look
for a new report to come in a week or so, they said. I'm not going to
hold my breath. We've been waiting for these reports to come for years
and they have not come. Why do they come now? They are trying to get
out of the glare of the light. They're trying to get off the stove.
They're trying to, once again, put us off the case. How many lives
would you risk, innocent lives would you risk on the veracity of such
a report coming from Saddam Hussein? He still hasn't made the
strategic choice to comply and disarm.

The saga of Iraq's prohibited missile programs offers another example
of how he weaves his web of deceit. Missiles in and of themselves are
not weapons of mass destruction, but they can deliver such warheads.
Shortly after the end of the Gulf War, in order to contain Saddam
Hussein and as part of that early series of resolutions, missiles with
ranges of more than 150 kilometers were banned, were banned from Iraq
by Security Council Resolution 687. He's not supposed to have missiles
that will go beyond 150 kilometers, but he does.

In its voluminous declaration of December 8th, Iraq flatly stated that
it had no such missiles. We don't have any. But data from flight tests
for two missiles, the al-Samoud II and the al-Fatah, showed that they
traveled more than 150 kilometers. They were clearly trying to upgun
these missiles so that they go far beyond their prohibited range. And
why would one want to do that? To reach out, that's why they wanted to
do it.

So Iraq quickly shifted tactics and said, well, you know, that's
really not the case, let's talk about this, let's show you why you've
got the wrong data, and they tried to throw the inspectors off the
track. But the inspectors insisted, Dr. Blix insisted, that these
missiles be destroyed.

You should see the first letter that came back from the Iraqis, when
Dr. Blix's letter went to them. It was an attack, once again, saying
well, you know, you shouldn't be doing this, it's wrong, we're
innocent. Once again, denial. Once again, trying to deceive. Once
again, only going along with the destruction because they were trying
to keep us divided, keep us confused, and try to delay what might well
be heading their way.

Nobody should be quick to declare a victory for compliance in the
missile department. And from recent intelligence, we know that the
Iraqi regime intends to declare and destroy only a portion of its
banned al-Samoud inventory and that it has, in fact, ordered the
continued production of the missiles that you see being destroyed.
Iraq has brought its machinery that produces such missiles out into
the daylight for all to see. But we have intelligence that says, at
the very same time, it has also begun to hide machinery it can use to
convert other kinds of engines to power al-Samouds II.

Once again, he plays the double game. Even as he orders some to be
destroyed, he is continuing with activities that will allow more to be
produced. We can see no real improvement on substance. Iraq is far
from disarming.

But what about process? People talk about process. Shouldn't we be
pleased about the cooperation we have seen with the inspectors?
Unfortunately, we don't find Baghdad's performance much better in that
regard.

Since my presentation to the Security Council on February 5th, we have
received further intelligence from multiple sources showing that Iraq
is continuing in its efforts to deceive the inspectors. Much of this
intelligence from a variety of sensitive sources, many of these
sources I cannot share with anyone in any greater detail than I am
here today, but it's reliable and shows that the Iraqi regime is still
moving weapons of mass destruction materials around the country to
avoid detection.

Why should we be surprised? This has been his pattern. This has been
what he's been doing for 12 years. For example, we know that in late
January, the Iraqi Intelligence Service transported chemical and
biological agents to areas far away from Baghdad, near the Syrian and
Turkish borders, in order to conceal them, and they have concealed
them from the prying eyes of inspectors.

In early February, fearing that UNMOVIC had precise intelligence about
storage locations, the Iraqis were moving prohibited materials every
12 to 24 hours. And in mid-February, concerned about the surveillance
capabilities of the U-2 overflights that they finally were going to
permit, Iraq was transferring banned materials in old vehicles and
placing them in poor, working class neighborhoods outside the capital.

If Baghdad really were cooperating, if they really wanted to comply,
if it really was disarmament that they were interested in, they would
be bringing all of these materials out, not scattering them for
protection.

We also know that senior Iraqi officials continue to admit in private
what they continue to deny in public, that Iraq does, indeed, possess
weapons of mass destruction. A senior official stated in late January
that Baghdad could not answer UNMOVIC's questions honestly without
causing major problems for Iraq.

Another senior official said that allowing UNMOVIC to question Iraqi
scientists outside of Iraq would prove disastrous. Why? Because free
of intimidation, free from the risk of loss of life, they might tell
the truth. And we also know that Saddam Hussein has issued new
guidance to key officials saying everything possible must be done to
avoid discovery of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

If Iraq was serious about disarming, it would encourage, it would
order, it would tell all of its scientists: Step forward, those of you
who know anything about what we have been doing for the last 10 years.
come forward so that information can be made available so we can
convince the international community of our claims.

That is not what is happening. Instead, Saddam's security officials
have been working aggressively to discourage or to control interviews
between Iraqi scientists and inspectors and we should not be deceived
because a few, a few have made themselves available without minders.

Last month, a senior Iraqi official told an Iraqi scientist not to
cooperate with the UN inspectors. He threatened the scientist with
grave misfortune if the scientist did not obey. Iraqi security
officials have required scientists who have been invited to interviews
with the inspectors to wear concealed recording devices. Hotels where
the interviews are being conducted have been bugged.

Resolution 1441 was meant to end this kind of action. It was intended
to end 12 years of deceit and manipulation. It was intended to give
him one last chance to comply. And that's why the Security Council
demanded full and immediate compliance, not piecemeal gestures of
cooperation, not more documents of deception, not more half-measures
and half-truths.

The inspectors are very, very dedicated professionals. I've gotten to
know Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei very, very well and I've met with some
members of their teams. These are terrific people. We should be so
thankful that there are international civil servants such as they who
are willing to undertake these kinds of missions under difficult
circumstances, and I give them all the credit for their willingness to
do this. None of this that I am talking about is of any fault of
theirs.

They are working hard. But unfortunately, the inspection effort isn't
working. Why? Because it was never intended to work under these kinds
of hostile circumstances. It was intended to help the Iraqis comply.
They were not intended to be detectives that went around seeking out
things in the absence of genuine Iraqi cooperation. Inspections cannot
work effectively as long as the Iraqi regime remains bound and
determined to hold on to its weapons of mass destruction instead of
divesting itself of these terrible items.

In recent weeks, we have seen a dribbling out of weapons -- a warhead
there, a missile there -- giving the appearance of disarmament, the
semblance of cooperation. And in recent days, they have promised more
paper, more reports. But these paltry gestures and paper promises do
not substantially reduce Saddam's capabilities, they do not represent
a change of heart on his part, and they do not eliminate the threat to
international peace and security.

Nor do they come because Saddam is worried about hordes of additional
inspectors being sent into Iraq armed with work plans and benchmarks.
They have everything to do, these process efforts on their part, they
have everything to do with the fact that Saddam faces an ever nearer
prospect of defeat by overwhelming military force. It is the threat of
force -- and no one will deny this -- it is the threat of force that
is causing him to comply, not the threat of inspections or the threat
merely of resolutions. In the absence of his willingness to do what he
has to do, it is only the threat of force that is getting him to do
anything at all.

If, at this late date, Saddam were truly to decide to come clean and
comply with 1441, the current number of inspectors could do the job of
verifying Iraq's disarmament and they wouldn't need an enormous amount
of time in which to do it. Inspectors have said so. The amount of time
needed to verify all this is a function of how much cooperation and
the willingness there is to comply with the resolutions, not the
number of inspectors. What is now needed is that strategic and
political decision which we have not seen over the past 12 years.

Inspections will amount to little more than casting at shadows unless
Iraq lifts the fog of denial and deception that prevents inspectors
from seeing the true magnitude of what they're up against. It is for
Iraq to prove to the Security Council and to the world that it has
disarmed.

We know that true disarmament looks like. We saw it with South Africa.
We saw it with the Ukraine. The leaders of both of those countries
made solemn political commitments to disarm and they worked with the
international community. And even then it took a lot of time, but at
least you knew that they were in union with you to disarm. Those two
nations did everything possible to ensure complete cooperation with
inspectors, and an expeditious, rigorous, transparent disarmament
process was put in place.

What would it look like in Iraq? Instead of letting the inspectors
grope for answers in the dark, Iraq would bring all of its documents
out and all of its scientists into the light to answer the outstanding
questions. Indeed, Iraq would be besieging the inspectors with
information. Mobile labs would be driven up and parked outside of
UNMOVIC headquarters. All of the missiles of the al-Samoud variety
would be destroyed immediately. They wouldn't be hesitating. They
would go and find the infrastructure for these missiles and what
machinery they have hidden to produce more and make them available for
destruction.

I return to the fundamental question: Is he complying? That's it. Is
Iraq complying with 1441? And the only reasonable answer is no.

Last November, when 1441 was passed, the international community
declared Saddam Hussein a threat. In four months since, that has not
changed; he is still a threat. He was given one last chance to avoid
war. If Iraq complies and disarms, even at this late hour, it is
possible to avoid war.

He is betting, however, that his contempt for the will of the
international community is stronger then the collective resolve of the
Security Council to impose its will. Saddam Hussein is betting that
some members of the Council will not sanction the use of force despite
all the evidence of his continued refusal to disarm. Divisions among
us -- and there are divisions among us -- if these divisions continue,
will only convince Saddam Hussein that he is right. But I can assure
you, he is wrong.

So those who say that force must always be a last resort, I say that I
understand the reluctance to use force. I understand the hesitation to
undertake human -- human -- to take human life. I have seen the
horrors of war. I have been where the dying is done. I agree with
those who say that lives must only be sacrificed for the greatest of
causes. We should do everything possible to avoid war. We have done
that, and no one believes that more deeply than President Bush. That's
why he went to the United Nations. That's why he persuaded all 15 of
us on the Security Council to give Saddam Hussein one last chance.

It is always a hard thing for citizens to accept the prospect of war,
and it should be. But consider the chilling fact that Saddam Hussein
also knows what war is like. He has used war and weapons of mass
destruction against his neighbors and against thousands of his own
citizens. And in this post-September 11th world, getting those
appalling weapons out of his hands is the only way to guarantee that
he won't use them again, or he won't make common cause and pass them
on through his terrorist connections for use practically anywhere in
the world.

Consider what could happen if Saddam Hussein, a tyrant who has no
scruples and no mercies, concludes that the governments of the world
will not condone military action under any circumstances, even as a
last resort, as at least one member of the Security Council feels.
Under those circumstances, he will never comply with his obligations.
All he has to do is wait us out. And a terrible message will go far
and wide to all those who conspire to do harm, to all those who seek
to acquire weapons of mass destruction. It is now for the
international community to confront the reality of Iraq's continued
failure to disarm.

The Security Council resolution put forward last week by the United
Kingdom, Spain and the United States says precisely that: "Iraq has
failed to take the final opportunity afforded it in Resolution 1441."
That is a simple statement of fact, as well. Iraq has refused to
disarm and cooperate. It serves the interest of no one for Saddam to
miscalculate. It doesn't serve the interest of the United States or
the world or Iraq for Saddam to miscalculate our intention or our
willingness to act. By passing this new resolution, the Council will
remove any doubt that it will accept anything less than Iraq's
complete disarmament of its weapons of mass destruction and full
cooperation with the inspectors to verify its compliance.

If Saddam leaves us no choice but to disarm him by force, the United
States and our coalition partners will do our utmost to do it quickly,
do it in a way that minimizes the loss of civilian life or destruction
of property. We will do our utmost in such circumstances, should they
be forced upon us, to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people.
And we would take responsibility for the post-war stabilization of
that country. We would be responsible for establishing and maintaining
order, destroying Iraq's weapons of mass destruction once and for all.

Dismantling terrorist networks with nodes in Iraq would also be a
priority.

And soon after these immediate needs are met and internal security is
established, we would want to move as quickly as possible to civilian
oversight of the next stages in the transformation of Iraq, working
with the many coalition partners we will have, working with all the
elements of the international community that would be willing to play
a role in such an effort. Then, legitimate Iraqi institutions
representing all Iraqis, representing the people, can be raised up;
institutions created and a formal government put in place that will
make sure the nation does not rearm, that the treasure that exists in
Iraq in the form of its oil is used for the benefit of the people of
Iraq. The United States has a superb record over the past 50 or 60
years of helping countries that we found it necessary to do battle
with or in, put themselves on a better footing for a brighter future.

To be sure that there will be lots of work to do. The work of
reconciliation and rehabilitation and reconstruction will be a long
and hard one, but we are up to the task. But the true test of our
collective commitment to Iraq will be our efforts to help the Iraqi
people build a unified Iraq that does not threaten international
peace, one that is a welcome presence among the nations of the world,
not an international pariah.

For 30 years, Saddam has fed off the blood, sweat, and tears of his
people. He has murdered, tortured, and raped to stay in power. He has
squandered Iraq's vast oil wealth on lavish palaces and secret police
and weapons programs.

The United States and the international community want to help free
the Iraqi people from fear, freedom from want. We in the world
community desire to help Iraqis move their country toward democracy
and prosperity. We want to help the Iraqi people establish a
government that accepts principles of justice, observes the rule of
law and respects the rights of all citizens. In short, we want to see
an Iraq where people can look to the future with hope, and not be seen
as a pariah on the world stage.

We aren't just thinking about that famous day after. We know it's not
going to be just one day after, but many days after a long, formidable
challenge that will lie ahead of us and our coalition partners, until
such time as Iraqis are prepared to govern their own land.

Even as the Iraqi people are liberated, we are determined to do all we
can to renew hope in other parts of the region. To strive for peace
between Israelis and Palestinians. President Bush has recently again
emphasized his own personal commitment to achieving the vision of two
states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace, security
and dignity, and to implementing the roadmap, the Quartet roadmap,
that will help make that vision a reality.

We stand ready to lead the way to this better future. To get there,
all those in the region who yearn for peace -- the Palestinians, the
Israelis, and their Arab neighbors -- will have to fulfill deep
commitments and make difficult compromises. But the tough choices will
be worth it. While the process of peacemaking poses obligations for
all, the benefits of peace will be felt for generations to come by
millions of people.

But if the international community wants the hopeful prospects for the
days, months and years ahead to materialize for Iraq, we must confront
the reality of Saddam Hussein's intransigency. We must confront that
reality here and now. We must face the reality that Saddam's Iraq is
Exhibit A of the grave and growing danger that an outlaw regime can
supply terrorists with the means to kill on a massive scale.

Last November, the entire Security Council declared his weapons of
mass destruction to be that threat to international peace and
security. And if that threat existed last November when we voted for
1441, it certainly exists now. If the international community was
resolute then, it must be resolute now.

Resolution 1441 was not just President Bush and the United States
saying Saddam is a menace to the world. It was France, Britain,
Russia, China, Syria and all the rest of the Security Council going on
record saying so. We spent seven weeks working over and weighing every
single word of that resolution. All of the members of the Council knew
when they passed 1441 that the time might come when we would have to
meet our responsibility to use force in the absence of Saddam
Hussein's strategic decision to disarm and comply.

For the past four months, he's been trying to avoid the consequences
of his noncompliance, to escape the moment of truth. Now is the time
for the Council to come together once again to send a clear message to
Saddam that no nation has been taken in by his transparent tactics.
Now is the time for the Council to underscore its unanimous conclusion
that Saddam remains in material breach of his obligations.

Now is the time to tell Saddam once and for all that the clock has not
been stopped by his machinations, that the clock continues to tick,
and that the consequences of his continued refusal to disarm will be
very, very real.

The goal of the United States remains the Security Council's goal:
Iraq's disarmament. One last opportunity to achieve it through
peaceful means remains open to Saddam Hussein, even at this late hour.
What we know for certain, however, is that Saddam Hussein will be
disarmed. The only question before us now is how. The question remains
as it was at the beginning: Has Saddam Hussein made that strategic
choice? He has not and we will see in the next few days whether or not
he understands the situation he is in and he makes that choice. And
that is the argument we will be taking to the Secretary Council.

Thank you very much.

(Applause.)

SECRETARY POWELL: Thank you very much. I have a few moments to take a
couple of questions before I have to get to a meeting, if there are
any questions. There shouldn't be after that presentation.

(Laughter.)

Anyone? Yes, sir.

QUESTION: Sir, if the case was that you wanted to make the Security
Council resolution as you said, now what the Security Council is
saying, they do not see this suitable. So why don't you want to
respect the will of the Security Council in this?

SECRETARY POWELL: At this point, we are respecting the will of the
Security Council. There's a lot of speculation about what the Council
might or might not do when it meets next week. I think that's when it
is more than likely that action will be taken on a resolution, if that
seems like the appropriate step after we hear from Dr. Blix and Dr.
ElBaradei.

But at the same time, we have also made clear that we believe that the
threat is so great that if the Security Council is unable to take
action, despite our best efforts to work with it, we must, in the
interest of our own safety and, we believe, the safety of the region
and the world, reserve the option to act with a coalition of willing
nations if the Council does not act.

We believe the situation is that clear and the situation is that
dangerous.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you said at the beginning, you pointed out
that 1441 demonstrated in its 15-0 vote a common perspective on what
needs to be done to disarm Iraq. Yet right now we seem to be
perceiving a completely different sense of the imminence of the threat
between those very same members of the Security Council. How do you
explain the difference in the perception of the imminence of the
threat that seems to have emerged right now?

SECRETARY POWELL: There was always a difference in the perception of
the threat. Some of my colleagues in the Council have never quite seen
it as strongly as we have seen it and that was the case during the
seven weeks of the debate and before the debate. There are even some
members of the Council who argue most vociferously now for delay or
something else, who were anxious to see sanctions go away years ago
when it was clear there was something still going on in Iraq.

The one thing that we all agree upon is that there is no doubt that
Iraq has weapons of mass destruction and the capability to develop
them, or else I don't think we would have gotten a 15-0 vote. The
debate really is, well, how much should we be concerned it, how much
should we worry about it?

What we came together and said in 1441 is that they're in breach,
continue to be in breach, they have not accounted for so much of this
horrible material that they have, they have not allowed the inspectors
in to verify the claims that they have made, and that this is a threat
to the security of the region.

We believe what highlights the threat, at least in our eyes, is the
nexus that now exists in the post-9/11 world that it was one thing,
and it was a bad enough thing for Saddam Hussein to have these weapons
of mass destruction available to him, but if, per chance, he also
served as a source for these weapons of mass destruction, either
accidentally or deliberately putting them in the hands of terrorists,
we would all look back on this moment in time and feel awful if, at
some future moment in time, a horrible attack took place and we
discover one of these weapons was used, and when we had the chance to
do something about it and we had the obligation to do something about
it, we didn't do something about it.

But there certainly is a difference in perspective among the members,
some of the members, as to the seriousness of this threat. And many of
my colleagues agree with us on this issue. Some of my colleagues,
three of whom I was watching on television earlier today, believe that
the problem is there, the threat is there, but the solution to it is
just, oh, let the inspectors keep going.

What I didn't hear in their press conference today is for how long,
and how many more inspectors do you think will do, will do what the
number of inspectors there are unable to do. And there was very little
comment from them today or in earlier days about the basic fact that
you still don't have somebody who is complying. He is not -- he has
not made that strategic choice. And I don't think any one of them
would argue that he has.

One final, then I do have to go.

QUESTION: You just said that you didn't hear your colleagues be very
concrete on what needs to be done. Suppose they were to agree with you
and others to set a series of very specific benchmarks with very
specific deadlines, almost in the form of ultimatum, focusing on
specific items, such as the VX, or the anthrax, or the biological
labs, with the presumption that if there is not a concrete response on
these specific items, as to some extent there has been on the rockets,
then there would be common action for the purpose of disarming Iraq?

SECRETARY POWELL: I'm not sure that even some of them would find that,
or if we laid out such a series of benchmarks now, and a month or two
or three months later we found some of them had been met and others
had not been met, we'd be right back in the same boat, in my judgment.
Let's give them some more time.

I don't think it's a question of additional benchmarks. All of these
benchmarks have been out there for years. Some of the benchmarks that
are spoken of and some of the elements that I'm sure we'll be hearing
about later in the week are not new elements. They have been there all
along. They have been the basis of previous resolutions. They've been
there all along.

And it is not the need for new specific benchmarks to measure Saddam
Hussein. I think we have a lot to measure with -- against -- with him
-- to measure him with already. As a result of his lack of performance
on the declaration, his lack of answering the basic questions that
people have been asking repeatedly with respect to VX, with respect to
botulinum toxin. He doesn't need to have these benchmarks repeated. He
knows what they are, and he has not demonstrated a willingness to
answer the questions that have been out there for so many, so many
years.

And that's our -- that's the reason we are reluctant to yet see
another resolution come forward that starts listing benchmarks in that
resolution as a new measure of merit. We've given him enough measures
of merit and I think we can pretty much judge now that he is not
compliant, not made that decision, and is not cooperating in a way
that would verify if he had made that decision.

I do regret that I have to get to a meeting, so thank you very much.

(end transcript)

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