From the Office of Senator Kerry

Saturday, April 17, 1999

The most enduring lesson of Vietnam - seared into me as a soldier - is that when the United States decides toemploy force, it must have a clear national interest and objective, commit to doing whatever it takes to achievethat objective, and do so with debate and ultimately the consent of the American people.

No one can deny this nation's strong connection to the tragedy in Kosovo. We have committed 50 years andtrillions of dollars protecting the security of Europe through the Marshall Plan, hundreds of thousands ofAmerican troops - a high-water mark of 500,000 - stationed in Europe since World War II, and our continuedleadership in NATO. We must not allow Slobodan Milosevic's "ethnic cleansing" to undermine our hard-foughtpeace or spill over into neighboring countries, precipitating the further destabilization of the region.

Broader national interests are at stake as well. There is cause enough for American intervention on the basis ofsecurity issues, our commitment to NATO, and overwhelming humanitarian needs. To shirk our responsibilitiesin a conflict we can win, in a region whose future is connected to American interests, would send a signal todictators from Baghdad to Pyongyang that it doesn't take much to put the United States and the world on therun.

That is a dangerous possibility we cannot afford to risk. But more important, the United States and its NATOallies are working to preserve international law and a standard of civilized behavior shared by the vast majorityof our neighbors and allies around the globe.

Holocaust Rememberance Day this week offered a poignant reminder of the moral imperative of strong anddecisive action taken before it is too late. The killing fields of Cambodia and the massacres in Rwanda areeven more recent evidence of the human price the world suffers when we avert our eyes from internationalatrocities. We must not allow Kosovo to become another cause for collective guilt.

We must oppose the oppressive policies of the Milosevic regime: the displacement, pillaging, rape, andsystematic murder of members of a clearly identifiable ethnic group, the Kosovo Albanians, carried out topreserve a despot's political power. NATO is standing as a firewall against "ethnic cleansing," barbarism, andthe instability they create.

Our goals should remain limited and clear: to end Serbian assaults against the 750,000 ethnic Albaniansdisplaced inside Kosovo and to create a secure environment that allows for the return of Kosovar refugees.These goals are just. We must do whatever it takes to achieve them. We must also make clear that we are nottrying to alter Kosovo's historical relationship to the Serbs; we have no quarrel with the Serb people; and wemust not tie our future to the removal of Milosevic.

It is premature to debate whether we need ground troops or should deploy them. But the option never shouldhave been taken off the table. American soldiers assume tremendous risks in serving this country, but thoserisks should not be intensified by the failure of political leaders to promise full commitment to victory. We have aresponsibility to make clear estimates of the costs, measure our strategic and logistical capacity to deployground troops, and prepare the rapid-lift capacity required to reach this potential next level of action in Kosovo.We need to be explicit about what this commitment entails, but we also must be unequivocal in our resolve topursue the most effective strategy to achieve victory.

If success can only be achieved by use of American ground troops, we must be prepared to move forwardfollowing congressional authorization.

The conflict in Kosovo will not be won overnight or without loss. Still, we should ask ourselves whether wewould prefer to be in our strategic position, or that of Milosevic. We are 19 nations strong, and international lawis on our side, fortified by the most powerful military in the world. Milosevic stands alone: His asset is hisresolve. A lack of resolve is the only potential obstacle that could stand between NATO and success.

We must also forcefully pursue diplomacy to end the crisis. The truth is that the Rambouillet agreement wasflawed. Insistence on a NATO ground presence combined with the uncertain future of the independence issuemay have been an impossible equation for any Serb leader. A renewed diplomatic effort, while the bombingcontinues, may succeed in creating a more acceptable international peacekeeping structure.

Kosovo is not another Vietnam - unless we decide to make it so, for lack of resolve or a willingness to submitto the terror of Milosevic and leave our humanitarian mission unfinished. There is no doubt that we have themilitary capacity to permit the Kosovar refugees to return to their homes and rebuild their lives in a safe environment. It is long past due that we explore every option to complete that mission.