Program Effectiveness and Compliance

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General Observations | Operational Constraints of the Cuba Program Program Effectiveness by Intermediate Result | Effectiveness of Program Administration Overall Effectiveness and Compliance of Grantees Program Effectiveness and Compliance General Observations USAID must attempt to please diverse constituencies, some of which view the Program in almost completely opposite ways. This is an extraordinarily difficult challenge. Almost any aspect of or decision about the USAID Cuba Program is likely to be attacked or criticized from one side or another or by one group or another. The lack of agreement on the basics of the Program makes it doubly hard to agree on what constitutes Program effectiveness (see Section 3.3). Major areas of contention follow below: Program Purpose. The purpose of the Program is the subject of sharply divergent views that emerged at its inception and continue today. Some argue that the Program should promote gradual and peaceful change in Cuba by expanding civil society's diversity, capacity, and ability to make demands on the regime, position the country for a "soft landing" at the time of government transition, and eventually take part in that transition. In sharp contrast, others contend that the Program should pursue an aggressive public relations strategy and engage in activities abroad and in Cuba to force the Government of Cuba to change its repressive practices. Approach to Cuba. Those who disagree with a more aggressive approach on Cuba policy tend to view the Program as too provocative. Those supporting a more confrontational approach portray the Program as far too timid, lacking in imagination, and marked by foot dragging intended to subvert the purpose of the Program. Focus of Activities. The disagreement about the types of grants and cooperative agreements funded by the Program range across four main (at least partly mutually exclusive) preferences: (1) that grants should be more diverse than at present, promoting more people-to-people contact, more studies of Cuban society and politics, and more engagement with government-sponsored and government-operated NGOs; (2) that grants and agreements should focus more on thoughtful, coordinated transition planning and political risk analysis for Cuba; (3) that grantees' efforts should concentrate more on Cuba's dissidents, human rights activists, and fully independent civil society; and (4) that the Program should include a major public diplomacy thrust to engender political change in Cuba through external and internal pressure. Nature of Program Grantees. There exists considerable disagreement over the nature and breadth of Cuba Program implementing partners. One oft-expressed opinion is that Cuban-American and explicitly anti-Castro groups should predominate among the Program's grantees because of their intensity, commitment, contacts, and knowledge of Cuba. Others hoping to ease bilateral tensions or promote specific areas of expertise or cooperation, advocate an even greater broadening of the range of Program grantees to include additional broadly focused democracy-promotion groups, public policy organizations, universities, and associations not specifically focused on Cuba. Number and Size of Grants. Some observers and stakeholders argue that the average size of Cuba Program grants should increase and the total number of partner groups should be reduced to concentrate resources and increase the effectiveness of the groups whom they view as most successful. Others contend that the Program should increase the number of grantees and reduce average grant size in order to encourage diversity and innovation within the Program. Funding for Cuban Partners. Some critics of the Program complain that the policy against cash assistance to Cuban groups or individuals interprets the law excessively narrowly so as to hamper necessary assistance to dissidents in Cuba. They refer to the following provision of the Helms-Burton Act to support their contention that sub-grants and cash assistance to dissidents and independent NGOs in Cuba could be provided: Notwithstanding any other provision of the law...the President is authorized to furnish assistance and provide other support for individuals and independent nongovernmental organizations to support democracy building efforts for Cuba.11 Further, they argue, it is not unusual for USAID to provide cash assistance to individuals and organizations cooperating with its programs in other countries. Other stakeholders and senior USAID personnel have contended that the Agency should maintain its current policy of not permitting partners to directly transfer USAID funds to independent groups or individuals in Cuba. They argue that any change in policy might decrease USAID's already limited ability to account for assistance provided on the island itself, might further jeopardize Cuban partners, and might attract Program clients more interested in obtaining funding than promoting democracy in Cuba. Operational Constraints of the Cuba Program The section above summarizes the difficulties arising when evaluating the Program given the politics and lack of consensus. But even if all stakeholders could agree on basic goals, it is clear that it is difficult to operate any type of program in the current environment in Cuba. In addition, legal and institutional constraints limit the Program to operating within a smaller space and with a more limited number of tools than other USAID democracy and governance programs: U.S. Law. The Helms-Burton Act bars assistance to the Cuban state or its dependencies. U.S. law also restrains promoting change by other than peaceful means and bars broader economic engagement with Cuba. Because the regime is highly centralized and penetrates most of the society, there remains little institutional, economic, or organizational space that is not part of or dependent upon the Government of Cuba. This restriction is operationally interpreted to include all but Cuba's most clearly independent institutions, NGOs, and individuals. Partners in Cuba. The legislation on which the Cuba Program rests heavily emphasizes independent civil society. However, Cuban independent civil society organizations appear divided, weak, and repressed. There is disagreement among analysts studying various aspects of the development of civil society organizations-including their actual number, membership, resources, and ability to confront the regime. Expert observers agree that the political space allowed for NGOs waxes and wanes. Most of those interviewed suggest that independent civil society organizations and even government-sponsored NGOs with a somewhat reformist bent are substantially weaker and more repressed than they were in the mid-1990s. USAID Restrictions on Sub-granting and Cash Assistance. The Cuba Program policy adopted by USAID prohibits sub-granting or sending even small amounts of USAID funding to independent Cuban civil society organizations, dissidents and their families, or other individuals on the island. Cuban Law. Finally, as noted, Cuban law specifically criminalizes Cubans' cooperation with USAID. The environment within Cuba obviously impedes the implementation of the Program to varying degrees depending upon the type of grantee activity. Day-to-day Work with Independent Cubans. Most difficult is direct cooperation on the island with or assistance to Cuba's human rights activists, political dissidents, and independent journalists, independent cooperatives, independent NGOs, and other individuals and groups not dependent upon the regime. By criminalizing cooperation with the Program and by other repression and information restrictions, the Government of Cuba forces Program grantees to use costly, discreet means and raises the risks for the grantees' Cuban interlocutors. Delivery of information, materials, and equipment to Cuba. Somewhat less difficult is the provision of informational materials and equipment to the island. Cuban information controls and repression considerably elevate delivery costs for materials and assistance, and restrict the flow of information into and out of the island. Possession of these materials is also illegal under Cuban law, the application of which is arbitrary and capricious. However, some of the information, materials, and equipment intended for distribution on the island do make it into hands of Cubans who then continue the process of information dissemination. Transition Planning and Work in the U.S. or Third Countries. The least difficult of activities to implement are those that involve transition planning research or promoting international awareness and criticism of Cuba's labor or human rights policies. While these activities face some barriers such as the lack of reliable information or access to Cuban officials and other informed sources, they can be conducted with limited active opposition by the Government of Cuba. Although it is easier to work outside of Cuba, there are still some serious difficulties. It has been reported that some of the Program's grantees' offices in the U.S. have been broken into and vandalized, and that some grantee personnel have received death threats from individuals assumed to be working on behalf of the Government of Cuba. Program Effectiveness by Intermediate Result The evaluation team reviewed activities under each of the six Intermediate Results relating to the USAID Cuba Program Strategic Objective to "increase the free flow of accurate information on democracy, human rights, and free enterprise to, from, and within Cuba." Despite the aforementioned constraints imposed by the nature of the Program itself, and despite the evaluation team's inability to gather important information from within Cuba or from U.S. Government classified materials, the evaluation team was able to collect substantial information related to the strengths and weaknesses of the Program during its interviews and review of grantee files at USAID. Work toward each programmatic result is examined below. Building Solidarity with Cuba's Human Rights Activists Grantees working directly to build solidarity with human rights activists in the United States, Cuba, and in third countries include the Center for a Free Cuba, the Cuban Dissidence Task Group, Freedom House, the Institute for Democracy in Cuba, and the International Republican Institute. As noted in Section 2.4, $3.65 million, more than one half of total Program funding, has supported activities in this area. USAID gauges its progress in building human rights solidarity by tracking the number of human rights organizations operating in Cuba that are providing information to the Cuban people. The Agency relies upon estimates of the numbers of these groups provided by the Dutch NGO, Pax Christi. The Pax Christi estimates build upon a baseline developed by the Cuban Christian Democratic Party that established the number of "dissident" groups in Cuba. In 1999, an estimated 380 groups were providing information to the Cuban people. USAID anticipated an increase of 5% to 400 active groups by the close of Fiscal Year 2000 and as many as 500 groups in FY 2001.12 Findings Program Result Indicator. The team questions the Program's reliance upon an increase in the number of NGOs in Cuba as a measure of effectiveness. It is possible, for instance, that a decrease in the number of groups might actually be a positive development as it could represent a uniting of human rights activists in larger, more effective organizations. In addition, commonly cited estimates of the number of independent NGOs in Cuba appear questionable in that they may fail to subtract from the estimated totals those groups that become defunct or inactive. The estimates also may fail to account for fragmentation and overlapping membership among NGOs. In addition, the Government of Cuba appears to tolerate at least some dissidence and independent NGOs for international public relations purposes and to permit the security apparatus to keep tabs on regime critics. The Government of Cuba may have even encouraged the formation of some of the groups that are believed to be independent and are included in Program estimates. Grantee Activity Indicators. In addition to the Agency's result-level performance indicator, the grantees working in this area use, at least informally, several activity-level indicators to measure their progress. Several of these grantee indicators in this and other sections should prove useful to USAID in developing new Program-level result indicators. Examples provided to the team in grantee interviews include: Participation of respected third-country leaders and human rights organizations in promoting human rights solidarity Linkages developed between third-country organizations and independent civil society in Cuba Organization and cooperation among human rights activists and organizations within Cuba Ownership of Program activities by human rights activists within Cuba Ability of Cuban human rights activists to remain in Cuba Willingness of Cuban human rights activists to remain in Cuba Distribution and appropriateness of informational materials, food, medicine, and equipment International acceptance of grantee and Cuban partner work products, analysis, and information Reaction of the Government of Cuba and state institutions to Program activities Use of information developed under the Program by the U.S. and International media and in official decision-making Sustainability of efforts through the leveraging of non-USAID funding State of human rights activism based on Eastern European transition models Moral and Material Support. Various sources suggested that the provision of moral support and modest material aid to prisoners of conscience, outlets for dissident writings, and information to Cubans does produce some of the intended effect. That is, independent NGOs, dissidents, and human rights activists in Cuba are reportedly encouraged and protected by the attention of USAID partner groups, and Cuba's human rights record receives increased inter-governmental scrutiny. Some Program grantees have collected direct evidence of this sentiment among leading dissidents on the island. On several occasions, USAID and U.S. Interests Section personnel have been able to confirm that at least some of the items sent to Cuba are arriving at the intended destination. Efficiency of Material Support. The Government of Cuba contends that all organizations "outside of the Revolution" are illusory, insignificant, or manufactured by forces outside of Cuba. Opponents of the regime and their families suffer loss of employment, continual harassment, and imprisonment in inhumane conditions. Human rights activists are considered enemies of the state and have few resources to effect change. The USAID Cuba Program policy prohibiting sub-granting or providing cash in local or hard currency to Cuban citizens or independent organizations limits the ability of grantees to provide necessary material support for human rights activists and their activities on the island. While it may be possible for these activists to purchase many of the materials they need to conduct their activities, thereby cutting down on confiscation of materials and equipment at the border, USAID policy serves as an impediment and appears to be contributing to an unnecessary inefficiency within the Program. Potential for Exporting Internal Opposition from Cuba. Some observers contend that because active dissidents in Cuba are relatively few, mutually isolated, and subject to repression, they tend to become discouraged and exhausted. The USAID Cuba Program clearly seeks to provide encouragement and solidarity to Cuba's dissidents, and to give some of them very modest assistance to help them carry on, and to encourage others to join them. It is possible that this support may have the unintended consequence of hastening departure of dissidents from the island. The Castro regime has established a pattern of allowing dissidents to self identify, and then allowing them or encouraging them to emigrate after a period of observation and harassment. International Awareness. Recent United Nations Human Rights Commission criticism of Cuba's human rights performance came about in part because nations previously supportive of Cuba withdrew that support. Several USAID Cuba Program partner organizations have effectively built awareness of Cuban human rights problems in both these countries and around the world. They have provided information to senior policy makers in several countries who have become increasingly engaged with regard to the state of human rights in Cuba today. In addition, linkages between Cuban activists and third-country organizations have been strengthened during Program implementation. Planning for Transition Transition planning accounts for the second largest share of Program funding, totaling $802,000. The grantees that have conducted transition analysis include the International Foundation for Election Systems, Rutgers University, and the U.S.-Cuba Business Council. USAID measures results in the transition planning area by tracking the cumulative number of transition plans that are communicated to the Cuban people in hard copy, by radio, and other means as reported by Program grantees working in this and other areas. In Fiscal Year 1999, one transition plan had been communicated to the Cuban people. USAID planned to have two additional plans transmitted by the close of FY 2000 and as many as five transmitted by FY 2001. Findings Program Result Indicator. USAID is not measuring an actual result by tracking the number of plans communicated to Cuba. The evaluation team realizes the difficulty in measuring the impact of planning until the time an actual transition is underway in Cuba. Perhaps new measures could aggregate some of the grantee activity indicators listed below through an index or other means. Grantee Activity Indicators. Grantees active in this area provided the following examples of activity-level performance indicators: Evidence of sound empirical research in transition plans produced by grantee staff and consultants Evidence of sound technical recommendations related to transition in Cuba Understanding of the current situation in Cuba and history of Cuba as evidenced in transition plans Evidence of input by the Government of Cuba and/or independent Cuban actors into transition plans Provision of equipment to independent Cuban actors cooperating in transition planning Demonstration of the applicability of lessons learned and parallels in Cuba to regime change in other countries Evidence of consideration of transition planning efforts with past and present efforts funded by USAID and other donors Publication of transition plans in the United States and third countries Distribution of transition plans within Cuba Reaction of the Government of Cuba to transition plans Reaction of future leaders of a peaceful transition in Cuba Reaction of democracy-minded people in Cuba Reaction of bilateral and multi-lateral organizations that might play of role in a peaceful, democratic transition in Cuba Reaction of the international media to transition plans Eventual use of transition plans during a peaceful change of regime in Cuba Raising Awareness of the Need for Planning. USAID and its grantees have raised awareness within the U.S. Government and the international donor community of the importance of advance planning for an eventual transition in Cuba. Research Agenda. The Program lacks an explicit research agenda. Transition studies do not appear to be coordinated among Partners to maximize their utility, impact, and contribution to overall Program goals. Several grantees appeared to be unaware of the research that had been conducted by other grantees and think tanks not associated with the Program or to have specific knowledge of USAID's Cuba Program research agenda and how that might be driving current and future programming. Delayed Distribution of Work Products. Some of the materials funded in this area appear to have not been distributed outside of Cuba Program grantees, and in some cases U.S. Government circles, until several months after their publication. This delay has deprived grantees working in other Program areas as well as other actors of information that might have increased the appropriateness and effectiveness of their activities. Informational Materials Provided to Cuba. As noted elsewhere in this report, those products intended for people on the island do not appear to have been market tested to gauge the appropriateness, relevance, and potential impact of the message and delivery vehicle. Giving Voice to Cuba's Independent Journalists Support for independent journalism totals $670,000. Grantees working directly in the area of journalism include CubaNet, Cuba Free Press, and Florida International University's International Media Center. USAID has measured Program progress in this area by tracking the number of original-content stories published via the Internet by CubaNet and Cuba Free Press. With the addition of Florida International University, a grantee focusing on the training of independent journalists, USAID has also begun to consider the quality of those published articles as a measure of performance. In Fiscal Year 1999, 3,000 articles were published via the Internet. USAID planned an increase to 4,000 in FY 2000 and 5,000 in FY 2001. Findings Program Result Indicator. USAID is currently measuring sheer numbers of articles published by two of its grantees but is transitioning to include a more qualitative measure. Grantee Activity Indicators. The grantees carrying out activities in this area report the use of the following measures of success: Awareness of the activities of independent civil society and journalists within Cuba Direct contact between U.S. and third-country nationals with representatives of independent civil society and journalists within Cuba Distribution of information processing and communication equipment into Cuba Number of subscribers to grantee e-mail newsletter Number of visits to grantee web site Number of downloads from grantee web sites Number of visits to grantee web site from unique Internet Uniform Resource Locators Material distributed to international dailies Perception of neutrality and professionalism of reporting by independent journalists Reaction of the Government of Cuba to grantee and grantee Cuban partner activities Recognition by major media outlets and multi-lateral organizations of grantee and grantee Cuban partners as credible sources of information Reaction of recent arrivals from Cuba to the Spanish-language content published by the grantees Publicity and awareness generated surrounding partners on the island rather than the grantee itself Sustainability of independent civil society within Cuba Moral Support. Due to the repression they suffer and the focus of their activity, independent journalists within Cuba can be considered to be a sub-set of human rights activists. Although communication with independent journalists is often difficult and uncertain, the Program appears to have provided important moral support to these individuals. Use of the Internet to reach Audiences outside of Cuba. Program grantees are effectively using the Internet to reach those interested in Cuba outside of Cuba. However, the restrictions imposed by the Government of Cuba on access to the World Wide Web, e-mail, and other Internet resources appear to prevent most information from being delivered electronically to Cuba. Quality of Work Product. There are very few professionally trained independent journalists in Cuba today. As a result of this limited training, repression, and the constant flow of disinformation from the Government of Cuba, extensive assistance to these individuals will be required before their work products are widely credible. One relatively recent Program grantee, Florida International University, is working to address this problem by developing a cadre of emerging journalists through correspondence-course techniques and other means of distance learning. Defending the Rights of Cuban Workers USAID has provided $393,575 to advance Cuban workers' rights, encourage independent unions, and promote international better business practices by foreign firms investing in Cuba. The two grantees working in this area are the American Center for International Labor Solidarity and the National Policy Association. USAID follows the progress of its grantees working to defend the rights of Cuban workers by tracking the number of international advocacy efforts related to labor rights in Cuba. The State Department also provides USAID with the number of official demarches issued by the American Regional Organization (ORIT) of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. In 1999, no demarches had been issued. USAID planned for two demarches to be issued by the close of FY 2000 and for four to be issued in FY 2001. Findings Program Result Indicator. The evaluation team believes that the performance indicator related to the issuance of demarches is too high level and is outside of the Agency's manageable interest. It seems unlikely that the Agency and its grantees could substantially influence the actions of the ICFTU through the small amount of activity in this one Program area. Grantee Activity Indicators. Grantees working to defend labor rights in Cuba report using the following activity-level indicators: Quality of analysis and diagnostic studies produced on the state of labor rights and trade unions in Cuba International awareness of repressive labor practices in Cuba International condemnation of repressive labor practices in Cuba Engagement of union centrals and multi-laterals on the issue of Cuban labor rights Confrontation of Cuban labor officials in international labor forums with evidence of repressive labor practices in Cuba Unified stances taken by and solidarity of international labor activists and officials with regard to repressive labor practices in Cuba Engagement of individual U.S. and third-country labor unions with regard to repressive labor practices in Cuba Identification of partners within independent labor sector in Cuba Delivery of material aid to the independent labor sector in Cuba Visits to the United States and third countries by representatives of the Cuban independent labor sector in Cuba Formation of international coalitions to examine business practices in Cuba in the joint venture sector Awareness and advocacy of internationally recognized practices such as the Arcos Principles and OECD agreements Changes in Cuban laws and regulations to reflect internationally recognized principles of labor rights Involvement of a Leading Labor Organization. The AFL-CIO has a demonstrated ability to raise international awareness of worker rights in countries around the world. The AFL-CIO's willingness to bring its operational knowledge to bear through its affiliate, ACILS, represents an important asset of the Cuba Program. Absence of a Partner within Cuba. The Communist party-affiliated Cuban Workers Confederation (CTC) continues to dominate Cuba's organized labor and supports regime policies and practices harmful to workers' rights and in direct contravention to international labor treaties. While it is possible to raise international awareness of the labor situation within Cuba, the absence of an on-island partner hampers work in this area. Development of International Awareness of Repressive Cuban Labor Practices. The Program has supported the formation of an international working group to examine the joint venture sector in Cuba and to advocate for the application of internationally accepted labor practices. Helping Develop Independent Cuban NGOs USAID has provided a total of $408,700 to the Pan American Development Foundation and Partners of the Americas to assist them in their efforts to help develop independent NGOs in Cuba. USAID measures Program progress by tracking the number of Cuban NGOs that are independent of the Government of Cuba with respect to membership, direction, policies, and financing, as assessed by the U.S. State Department. Cuban dissident and other human rights organizations are not included in this measure. USAID is in the process of determining baselines and targets for this indicator. Findings Program Result Indicator. As with USAID's approach to measuring success in the Intermediate Result area of solidarity with Cuba's human rights activists, the team believes that more comprehensive, qualitative measures could be adopted to measure work in this area. Grantee Activity Indicators. Grantees active in this area report using the following informal measures of success: Information collected by grantee personnel with regard to the state of independent civil society in Cuba Cooperation from partners in Cuba Cooperation from the Government of Cuba Ability to leverage USAID funding as seed funding for other grantee activities Number of exchange visits between Cuba and the United States or third countries Capacity Building of U.S. NGOs. Some capacity building appears to have taken place within the two grantee organizations in the United States as they implement their activities, build, and work with contacts in the international community, and to a more limited extent, in Cuba. Government of Cuba. Work in this area has been hampered by an initial optimism on the part of USAID that the Government of Cuba might not work effectively to thwart assistance to truly independent NGOs. As activities unfolded, the Government of Cuba blocked much of the planned cooperation between the independent sector and grantees working in this area. Providing Direct Outreach to the Cuban People USAID has provided a total of $385,000 to Cuba On-Line and Sabre Foundation for direct outreach activities. USAID measures Program-level results in this area by tracking the percentage of Cuban citizens who have received information through foreign newspapers and books as measured by USAID-funded purposive sample research of recent arrivals from Cuba conducted by the University of Florida. An additional $110,000 in Program funding was provided to the University of Florida for the purpose of the survey. In FY 1999, the survey findings stated that 40% of recent emigrants from Cuba had received information from foreign newspapers or books. The target for FY 2000 was 45% and increases in 5% increments each subsequent year until FY 2003 when it reaches 60%. Findings Program Result Indicator. The University of Florida survey of recently arrived Cuban immigrants was conducted from December 1998 through April 1999. 1023 interviews were conducted among a sample of recent arrivals located through the Immigration and Naturalization Service as they entered the U.S. at Miami international airport, and through charitable relief agencies. Several factors complicated this survey and call for caution in the use of information gathered through the study. Recognizing that such a sample could not represent the Cuban population, the questionnaire attempted to decrease the survey's margin of error by asking respondents to speculate about the opinions of other Cubans, including those who support the Castro regime, and by statistically weighting the samples to better approximate Cuba's population. The methodology employed failed to compensate for the survey's major problem: the extremely high selection bias of the emigre sample. Various distortions are evident in the resulting sample: Most notably, 87% of the interviewees were white and 13% black, vastly under representing blacks. Males and younger Cubans were over represented. Projective questions (asking respondents to guess about others' opinions) cannot compensate for such error. The questionnaire also had shortcomings. The lack of anonymity of respondents would almost certainly reduce their candor and increase the likelihood of affirmative response bias (saying what the respondent believes the interviewer wants to hear). Many questions seemed worded to induce particular responses and discourage others. The answer arrays on some items forced falsely dichotomous choices upon respondents. Other items were presented in a confusing manner. The write up of the data analysis suffered from tendentious presentation that calls into question the analysts' objectivity. Further emigre surveys would likely suffer some of the same biases and inherent limitations. Some problems could be overcome with careful instrument design, but the enormous selection bias could only be corrected by surveying a probability sample of island Cubans-reportedly an impossibility in Cuba today. A more reasonable means of supplying information to Program grantees and USAID might be to conduct small focus group sessions among recent emigres on a regular basis, with discussions tailored to elicit information about the environment in Cuba and USAID Cuba Program and grantee operational concerns. Grantee Activity Indicators. The grantees working in this area measure their success through several activity-level measures: Identification of a Cuban partner for on-island distribution of informational materials Cost-sharing by a Cuban partner related to on-island distribution of informational materials Requests by a Cuban partner for specific informational materials Distribution of informational materials sent directly to the Cuban people Quality and professionalism of reporting included in informational materials Refutation of Government of Cuba propaganda and disinformation Reaction of the Government of Cuba Delivery of literature and other small items to Cuba. While it has proven impossible to deliver large quantities of information to Cuba by container or other wholesale means, activities in this area are taking advantage of innovative channels for delivering literature to Cuba which appear to be both effective and efficient. Lack of a partner within Cuba is a particularly important obstacle in distribution of large quantities of informational materials within Cuba. Informational Materials Provided to Cuba. As noted elsewhere in this report, the products funded in this Program area do not appear to have been tested in focus groups with recent arrivals from Cuba or through a similar research methodology to test the appropriateness, relevance, and potential impact of the message and delivery vehicle. Effectiveness of Program Administration The evaluation team agrees with most commentators and stakeholders who consider the administration of the Cuba Program to be satisfactory and effective, particularly in recognition of the fact that it takes place in such a difficult political context and is subjected to constant cross-cutting pressures. Several of those interviewed stated that USAID and the USAID Cuba Program staff are in a difficult and unenviable position as they manage this complex program. The vast majority of the Program grantees made very positive comments about the support and day-to-day guidance received from USAID Cuba Program staff and USAID's Office of Procurement. Administration with Limited Resources. The IWG and USAID Cuba Program's administration do an appropriately careful, patient, and satisfactory job of vetting proposals and grantees/partners. This is no small accomplishment given the limited staffing of the Program and the potentially embarrassing consequences of possible missteps. Monitoring of Grantee Reporting. USAID monitoring of reporting appears effective. Tardy quarterly reports elicited prompt USAID notification of grantees urging compliance. Oversight of Financial Reporting. USAID's financial administration of the Program appears effective and satisfactory. One grantee for which compliance issues arose has been dropped from the Program. Support of U.S. Interests Section. Despite absence of personnel for this purpose, and despite major operational obstacles to monitoring grantee activities in Cuba, both USAID and Department of State staff at the U.S. Interest Section in Havana nevertheless conduct spot checks and monitor client feedback to grantees to evaluate Program impact and receipt of materials. There are some aspects of Program administration that the evaluation team believes require attention by USAID Cuba Program staff. Knowledge of Cuba throughout USAID. USAID Cuba Program personnel interviewed by the team are knowledgeable with regard to Cuba despite limited direct exposure to the country. However, USAID's base of knowledge, as an agency, on Cuban affairs is growing slowly. Further, the Agency seems to have underutilized information resources generated by its own grantees. This problem partly stems from USAID's steep learning curve regarding Cuba, the Cuba Program's limited staffing, the relative newness of the Program, and the absence of a clearly articulated information development, analysis, and dissemination agenda. Staffing. The two full-time Cuba Program staff positions in Washington, D.C. are occupied by the Senior Advisor/Coordinator for Cuba and a junior officer. There continues to be no USAID personnel at the U.S. Interest Section in Havana, a situation that has existed since the start of the Program. Despite the relatively small amount of funding provided under the Cuba Program, the unusual nature of Program makes huge demands of USAID staff time. In light of the heavy workload related to administration, monitoring, and communication with a multiplicity of stakeholders, the Cuba Program is understaffed both at USAID headquarters and, especially, in Havana. Evaluation Capacity. USAID's ability to assess Cuba Program effectiveness is limited in several respects. Assessment capability becomes weaker the more the Program involves partner activity or clients within Cuba. This problem is inherent in the difficult operational environment-end-use monitoring of delivery and receipt of materials is very difficult because of the closed nature of Cuban society and necessarily discreet nature of some of Program activities. In addition, the Agency should expect a positive-response bias from end users as those asking the questions are those providing the assistance itself. Some grantees working with people on the island have been able to establish systems by which e-mails are sent and receipts delivered to confirm delivery of Program resources. USAID Cuba Program staff and staff members of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana have also worked to monitor end use and report uniformly positive results in so doing. However, the limits on time and attention to the Program at the Interests Section and the limited amount of time spent by USAID Cuba Program staff in Cuba make end-use monitoring sporadic. Performance Measures. USAID Cuba Program performance indicators require additional work before they will provide the information the Agency requires for effective management and communication of results to stakeholders. Baseline data and targets used to measure Program-level performance (percent of Cubans receiving "accurate information on democracy and human rights," estimated number of dissident groups, estimated number of independent NGOs, independent NGOs developed, and the "number of transition plans communicated to the Cuban People")13 are drawn from limited data sources. The performance measures appear to have limited utility for monitoring and evaluating the activities of some partners and clients operating under the strictures of Cuban repression. Unstructured Grant Application Process. The Program operates with a relatively unstructured grant application procedure governed by few explicit rules. The Agency does not currently solicit interest in the Program through a Request for Applications (RFA) or a Request for Proposal (RFP). The current procedure has caused slowdowns in the application process as several grantees went through protracted negotiations with USAID and the IWG to define acceptable Program activities. Burdensome Grant Requirements for Smaller Grantees. USAID rules and procedures for grantees and contractors impose high overhead costs for some of the smaller grantees which report having to dedicate much more energy and time than they expected to complex grant administration and reporting.14 Sustainability of Grantees. The Program does not appear to emphasize the importance of eventual self-sustainability of grantees. Some grantees make their almost complete dependency upon continued Program funding explicit. Termination of USAID funding would end their activities and perhaps strand their clients in Cuba. Ability of Grantees to Absorb Funding. Some grants made by USAID appear to have been too large for some groups to absorb within a short duration, especially for those groups just beginning operations. Some grantees have had to seek extensions while they struggled to develop the capacity to implement their activities or gain greater understanding of the Cuban context. Overall Effectiveness and Compliance of Grantees In addition to the findings outlined above, the evaluation team identified several items related to overall Program effectiveness and grantee compliance that cut across a number of the six Program areas: Reliance on Independent Civil Society in Cuba. Given the small amount of support provided to date, some of the partners working with dissidents and NGO clients in Cuba have held inordinately optimistic estimates of their clients' prospects for evading the control of the Government of Cuba and for shaping events in a change-of-regime scenario. The Government of Cuba expends substantial resources to undermine independent forces in Cuba. Work in this area must take into account the active hostility of the Government of Cuba towards activity outside of the state or its dependencies as well as the apparent weakness of truly independent civil society in Cuba today. In addition, there appear to be few activities that focus on encouraging solidarity or coalition building among human rights activists within Cuba. To the extent that the democratic opposition is splintered, it is vulnerable to repression, penetration, and manipulation by Cuban government forces. Difficulty Countering Cuban Propaganda on Civil Society. The Government of Cuba contends that independent civil society within Cuba is either non-existent or manufactured by external forces. Grantees working with independent groups and individuals have worked to refute the impression created by the Government of Cuba. However, the team encountered several conflicting accounts by grantees and observers of the Cuban scene with regard to actual state of independent activity on the island. Disagreement on this important aspect of Cuban political life allows the Government of Cuba to more effectively pursue its line of argument with regard to the character of civil society in Cuba. Reliance on Country Transition Parallels. The team probed for possible country parallels to Cuba, and concluded that there are virtually none that are instructive in the case of Cuba today. Reasoning by analogy to Eastern Europe and particularly to Poland in the 1980s, something several observers and Program stakeholders seem prone to do in the Cuban case, is fraught with potential for error. While there might be some similarities, Cuba has nothing akin to the Solidarity labor movement; its Catholic Church appears institutionally weaker than was Poland's and much less willing to confront the regime. Finally, unlike the case of Poland, the regime has for decades exported many of its dissidents from the island nation. The team was persuaded, however, that some of the methods used by internal and external actors to encourage change within the Eastern Bloc in the 1980s and early 1990s are applicable in Cuba today. These approaches must be tailored to the Cuban case and reviewed for effectiveness during the implementation of future activities. Informational Materials Provided to Cuba. This Program is about information. Yet there is little test marketing or rigorous message development (e.g. through focus groups with recent arrivals from Cuba) to gauge the appropriateness, relevance, and likely impact of grantee messages and delivery vehicles. Several grantees appear to sharpen their messages through their interactions with intellectuals, dissidents, journalists, and others from the island as well as through their review of the Cuban press. However, a more systematic approach would serve the Program well. Distribution of Materials. Some grantees have experienced operational problems in their attempts to deliver information, equipment, and materials to Cuba (e.g. a few cooperating individuals have been detained by Cuban authorities or had important materials and equipment confiscated). Overall, the Program's grantees seem to suffer from a weak, tenuous, and uncertain capacity to deliver materials into Cuba. There are notable successes among certain grantees but it remains much easier to get information (e.g., dissident journalists' writings) out of Cuba than it is to send and disseminate information within Cuba. Parallel Funding for Materials. As noted, some grantees receive non-USAID funding which they employ to promote activities other than those funded through their USAID grants or cooperative agreements. In some cases these materials (non-USAID funded) are sent into Cuba alongside USAID-funded materials, creating the appearance that they are one and the same and potentially suggesting U.S. Government endorsement of them. While many of these materials are appropriate, some may not be entirely compatible with the goals of the Program. Capacity Building of Grantees. Through its very implementation, the Cuba Program contributes to the capacity of its grantees working in the U.S. and in third countries and to a certain extent Program clients in Cuba. Compliance with Grant Terms and Conditions. With some exceptions, grantees of the Program appear to have adhered to the terms and conditions of their grants over the course of the Program. Program personnel with the Latin America and Caribbean Bureau and the Office of Procurement report minimal compliance problems among grantees as measured through pre-award and subsequent reviews. Further, the evaluation team's interviews and review of grantee files maintained by the Cuba Program indicate few compliance problems. Organizational Overlap of Grantees. There exist various interconnections among several Cuba Program grantees. Various partner organizations have significant overlaps or ties among them, sharing members of boards of directors, advisory boards, operating personnel, technical support subcontractors, consultants, and to some extent clients on the island. While this overlapping could be considered to be a source of strength and cohesion for the Program, it could also eventually lead to a stifling of innovation within the Program. Cooperation Among Grantees. Despite the sharing of some resources, there has existed openly expressed antagonism among certain Program grantees. There appear to be untapped synergies among those groups focused on Cuba and those with broader mandates. While competition for scarce resources is not unusual and reflects many of the political conflicts previously mentioned, this Program does involve advancing the foreign policy of the United States to promote freedom in Cuba. A culture of cooperation and information sharing among grantees would help all partners support the Program's goal. Absorption of Funds. Several grantees found themselves unable to absorb Program funds in the time allotted due to staffing levels, knowledge of Cuba, or operational difficulties. Frustrated Activities. A small number of grantees have been unable to finish their proposed projects, and have had to redefine their activities with the assistance and cooperation of USAID's Program administration, or in one case to abandon project activities and return funds. Most problems have stemmed from the opposition to the activities by the Government of Cuba or an inability to find an appropriate partner in Cuba itself. Dependency on USAID. As noted above, some grantees openly express their dependency on the USAID Cuba Program for future funding and survival. This may not be problematic for certain types of grants or cooperative agreements (for instance, to deliver one-time training or provide narrowly circumscribed and services or to conduct an explicitly defined research activity). However, for other activities such as encouraging on-island NGOs, dissidents, or human rights activists, self-sustainability seems important so as not to strand clients should the Program falter. 11 Helms-Burton Act, Section 109(a). [Return to text] 12 The U.S. Government's fiscal year runs from October 1 to September 30. [Return to text] 13 USAID Cuba Program Assistance Strategy, pp. 36-39. [Return to text] 14 USAID requirements are described on USAID's Web site: http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/ads/300/303.htm [Return to text]

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