45. Telegram 1634 From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State, April 7, 1973, 1218Z.
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ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 /026 W
--------------------- 008359
O 071218 Z APR 73 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1634
INFO AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
USDEL JEC PARIS IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 1634
EXDIS
E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MARR, VS, PL, MU
SUBJECT: ICCS: POLISH AND HUNGARIAN OBSTRUCTIONISM
REFS: ( A) STATE 064299; ( B) STATE 059898
1. IN ABSENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTER ( WHO IS EN ROUTE
HOME TODAY FROM BELGRADE), I SAW ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER
TREPCZYNSKI AT 11:30 A. M. LOCAL AND MADE REPRESENTATION
TO HIM AS INSTRUCTED, CLOSELY FOLLOWING LANGUAGE OF
REF B. TREPCZYNSKI TOOK CAREFUL NOTES.
2. RESPONDING, TREPCZYNSKI SAID THAT POLISH GOVERNMENT
WAS INTERESTED IN FULL RESPECT FOR THE PARIS AGREEMENT.
THEY HAD ENTERED INTO ICCS ROLE AT THE INVITATION OF THE
INTERESTED PARTIES BECAUSE THEY WISHED TO SERVE THE CAUSE
OF PEACE, OF GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN THEMSELVES AND ALL THE
PARTIES, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES, AND THE DETENTE
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. THEY WERE AWARE THEY WERE
ENTERING INTO A COMPLICATED SITUATION. IT HAD
PROVEN TO BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE ICCS TO ACCOMPLISH
ITS MISSION. THERE WERE ONLY 1200 PEOPLE INVOLVED,
A SMALL NUMBER IN VIEW OF THE OBJECTIVE OF ASSURING PEACE
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IN SOUTH VIETNAM. MOREOVER, CONDITIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
WERE VERY DIFFICULT. THERE HAD BEEN MANY VIOLATIONS BY THE
SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES. SECURITY CONDITIONS FOR THE
POLISH DELEGATION WERE VERY DIFFICULT. BUT THE POLISH
GOVERNMENT WAS INTERESTED IN CLEARING THIS SITUATION UP
AND OF FULFILLING ITS INTENTION OF MAKING A CONTRIBUTION
TO PEACE. AMBASSADOR WASILEWSKI HAD ARRIVED IN WARSAW AND
IN CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM, THE POLISH GOVERNMENT
WANTS TO SEE WHAT CAN BE DONE TO CLEAR THE SITUATION UP.
TREPCZYNSKI EXPECTED TO SEE HIS HUNGARIAN COUNTERPART, VICE
MINISTER JARJAI, IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS FOR CONSULTATIONS.
THE POLES WANT TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION, BUT THE
COMMISSION HAS VERY LIMITED POSSIBILITIES. THAT IS WHY THEY
WOULD NOT LIKE TO SEE A LINK MADE BETWEEN THE WORK OF THE
ICCS AND US- POLISH BILATERAL RELATIONS. TREPCZYNSKI ADDED
THAT HE HAD BEEN INFORMED ONLY A FEW MINUTES BEFORE MY CALL
THAT A HELICOPTER HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN " SOMEWHERE IN SOUTH
VIETNAM" WITH THREE POLISH OFFICERS IN IT; DETAILS WERE
LACKING SO FAR. THIS ILLUSTRATED THE DIFFICULTIES UNDER
WHICH THE ICCS WORKED. MOREOVER, THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT DOES
NOT SEEM TO BE MOVING TO FULFILL THE POLITICAL
PROVISIONS OF THE PEACE AGREEMENTS. WE WOULD NOTE
THAT THE POLISH PRESS HAD STOPPED PUBLISHING THE KIND
OF REPORTS ON THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM WHICH WE HAD
CHARACTERIZED AS TENDENTIOUS. THERE HAD BEEN SOME
INACCURACIES IN THESEREPORTS AND THAT KIND OF PRESS
COVERAGE HAD BEEN STOPPED. IN CONCLUSION, TREPCZYNSKI
HAD SAID, THE DIFFICULTIES WERE GREAT, BUT THE POLISH
GOVERNMENT WAS NOW MOVING TO SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE TO
CLEAR THEM UP.
3. I SAID THAT WE HAD BEEN OVER THIS GROUND BEFORE, BUT
I WISHED TO POINT OUT: ( A) WE HAD NEVER CONTENDED THERE
WERE VIOLATIONS ON ONE SIDE ONLY. THE POINT WAS THAT
THERE APPEARED TO BE NO GREAT DIFFICULTY IN THE ICCS IN
AGREEING TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGED VIOLATIONS ON THE SAIGON
SIDE. THE DIFFICULTY AROSE WHEN THE CHARGES DEALT WITH
DRV/ PRG VIOLATIONS. THEN THE POLES AND HUNGARIANS FOUND
WAYS TO DELAY, OBSTRUCT, AND FRUSTRATE THE HOLDING OF
INVESTIGATIONS AND THE SUBMISSION OF REPORTS. WITH THE
EXPERIENCE THE POLES HAD HAD IN THE OLD ICC, WE HAD
EXPECTED THEM NOT TO FALL INTO THE OLD TRAP WHICH HAD FRUSTRATED
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THE EFFORTS OF THAT BODY. IT WAS NECESSARY THAT JUSTICE SHOULD
BE DONE IMPARTIALLY AND OBJECTIVELY TO CHARGES REGARDING ALL
VIOLATIONS. ( B) TALKS HERE, AND IN SAIGON, ABOUT ADMINISTRATIVE
AND SECURITY DIFFICULTIES LOOKED TO US LIKE YET ANOTHER MEANS
OF AVOIDING THE ISSUE. THE CANDADIANS AND
INDONESIANS WORKED UNDER THE SAME CONDITIONS AS THE
POLES AND HUNGARIANS. SO THE MINISTER COULD UNDERSTAND
OUR CONVICTION THAT INVESTIGATIONS COULD BE UNDERTAKEN
AND IMPARTIAL REPORTS PRODUCED, IF THE WILL EXISTED TO
DO SO. ( C) NO ONE HAD EXPECTED THAT THE ICCS WOULD
FIND ITS TASK AN EASY ONE. BUT THE POLES HAD
UNDERTAKEN THIS OBLIGATION, A CONCRETE SITUATION NOW
EXISTED IN VIETNAM, WHICH MUST BE DEALT WITH, AND WE
EXPECTED THE REVIEW THE POLISH GOVERNMENT WAS NOW UNDER-
TAKING TO RESULT IN IMPROVEMENTS. I COULD ADD ON A
PERSONAL BASIS THAT I HAD HEARD IN WARSAW SOME CYNICAL
COMMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE PEACE AGREEMENTS WERE
SIMPLY DESIGNED TO COVER RELEASE OF US PRISONERS AND WITH-
DRAWAL OF US FORCES FROM VIETNAM, FOLLOWING WHICH WE WOULD
WASH OUR HANDS OF THE WHOLE SITUATION. NOTHING COULD BE
FURTHER FROM THE TRUTH. INDEED, THE RETURN OF OUR
PRISONERS AND TROOPS HAD ONLY INCREASED THE FEELING
OF OUR PEOPLE THAT THOSE WHO WERE NOT SO FORTUNATE AND HAD
DIED IN VIETNAM MUST NOT HAVE DONE SO IN VAIN. ( D) WITH
REGARD TO THE CONNECTION BETWEEN POLISH PARTICIPATION IN
THE ICCS AND US- POLISH BILATERAL RELATIONS, I REGARDED THIS
AS A POLITICAL FACT OF NATURE, AS I HAD EXPLAINED TO SPASOWSKI
EARLIER. THE MINISTER COULD NOT EXPECT THAT SUCH A CONNECTION
WOULD NOT BE MADE. WHEN I THOUGHT OF ALL THE ACTIVITIES NOW
GOING ON, E. G., THE VISIT OF EX- IM BANK PRESIDENT
KEARNS, AND THE PROMISE THEY HAVE FOR THE FUTURE, IT
SEEMED TO ME ALL THEMORE IMPERATIVE THAT EFFECTIVE STEPS
BE TAKEN TO IMPROVE DECISIVELY THE WORK OF THE POLISH
DELEGATION IN THE ICCS.
4. THE MINISTER REPEATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD
BE ACTIVELY REVIEWING THIS WHOLE QUESTION IN THE NEXT
FEW DAYS.
DAVIES
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