



*Federal Railroad Administration
Office of Safety
Headquarters Assigned
Accident Investigation Report
HQ-2005-13*


*Amtrak/Canadian National
Roseland, Louisiana
February 13, 2005*

1. Name of Railroad Operating Train #1 Amtrak [ATK]				1a. Alphabetic Code ATK				1b. Railroad Accident/Incident No. 095529			
2. Name of Railroad Operating Train #2 N/A				2a. Alphabetic Code N/A				2b. Railroad Accident/Incident No. N/A			
3. Name of Railroad Responsible for Track Maintenance (single entry) Canadian National				3a. Alphabetic Code CN				3b. Railroad Accident/Incident No. 0000			
4. U. S. DOT-AAR Grade Crossing Identification Number 300152A				5. Date of Accident/Incident month 02 day 13 year 2005				6. Time of Accident/Incident 03:23: AM <input type="checkbox"/> PM <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
7. Type of Accident/Incident (single entry in code box) 1. Derailment 4. Side collision 7. Hwy-rail crossing 10. Explosion-detonation 13. Other Code 2. Head on collision 5. Raking collision 8. RR grade crossing 11. Fire/violent rupture (describe in narrative) 07 3. Rear end collision 6. Broken Train collision 9. Obstruction 12. Other impacts											
8. Cars Carrying HAZMAT 0		9. HAZMAT Cars Damaged/Derailed 0		10. Cars Releasing HAZMAT 0		11. People Evacuated 0		12. Division Central			
13. Nearest City/Town Roseland				14. Milepost (to nearest tenth) 840.6		15. State Abbr. Code LA		16. County TANGIPAHOA			
17. Temperature (F) (specify if minus) 65 °F		18. Visibility (single entry) Code 1. Dawn 3. Dusk 2. Day 4. Dark 2		19. Weather (single entry) Code 1. Clear 3. Rain 5. Sleet 2. Cloudy 4. Fog 6. Snow 2		20. Type of Track Code 1. Main 3. Siding 2. Yard 4. Industry 1					
21. Track Name/Number Single Main Track				22. FRA Track Class (1-9, X) Code 4		23. Annual Track Density (gross tons in millions) 20.30		24. Time Table Direction Code 1. North 3. East 2. South 4. West 1			
OPERATING TRAIN # 1											
25. Type of Equipment Consist (single entry) 1. Freight train 4. Work train 7. Yard/switching A. Spec. MoW Equip. Code 2. Passenger train 5. Single car 8. Light loco(s.) 3. Commuter train 6. Cut of cars 9. Maint./inspect. car		30. Method(s) of Operation (enter code(s) that apply) a. ATCS g. Automatic block m. Special instructions b. Auto train control h. Current of traffic n. Other than main track rules c. Auto train stop i. Time table/train orders o. Positive train control d. Cab signals j. Track warrant control p. Other (specify in narrative) Code(s) e. Traffic control k. Direct traffic control f. Interlocking l. Yard limits		26. Was Equipment Attended? Code 1. Yes 2. No 1		27. Train Number/Symbol 58/ATK		30a. Remotely Controlled Locomotive? 0= Not a remotely controlled operation 1 = Remote control portable transmitter 2 = Remote control tower operation 3 = Remote control portable transmitter - more than one remote control transmitter 0			
28. Speed (recorded speed, if available) Code R - Recorded E - Estimated 74 MPH R		29. Trailing Tons (gross tonnage, excluding power units) 0		e		N/A		N/A		N/A	
31. Principal Car/Unit (1) First involved (derailed, struck, etc) ATK-148		a. Initial and Number		b. Position in Train 1		c. Loaded (yes/no) N/A		32. If railroad employee(s) tested for drug/alcohol use, enter the number that were positive in the appropriate box. Alcohol Drugs N/A N/A			
(2) Causing (if mechanical cause reported) 0		0		0		N/A		33. Was this consist transporting passengers? (Y/N) N/A			
34. Locomotive Units		a. Head End		b. Manual		c. Remote		d. Manual		e. Remote	
(1) Total in Train 2		0		0		0		0		0	
(2) Total Derailed 0		0		0		0		0		0	
35. Cars		a. Freight		b. Pass.		c. Freight		d. Pass.		e. Caboose	
(1) Total in Equipment Consist 0		9		0		0		0		0	
(2) Total Derailed 0		0		0		0		0		0	
36. Equipment Damage This Consist \$10,684.00		37. Track, Signal, Way, & Structure Damage \$0.00		38. Primary Cause Code M302		39. Contributing Cause Code N/A					
Number of Crew Members						Length of Time on Duty					
40. Engineers/Operators 1		41. Firemen 0		42. Conductors 2		43. Brakemen 0		44. Engineer/Operator Hrs: 3 Mins: 40		45. Conductor Hrs: 3 Mins: 40	
Casualties to:		46. Railroad Employees		47. Train Passengers		48. Other		49. EOT Device? 1. Yes 2. No N/A		50. Was EOT Device Properly Armed? 1. Yes 2. No N/A	
Fatal 0		0		0		4		51. Caboose Occupied by Crew? 1. Yes 2. No		2	
Nonfatal 0		0		0		0					
OPERATING TRAIN # 2											
52. Type of Equipment Consist (single entry) 1. Freight train 4. Work train 7. Yard/switching A. Spec. MoW Equip. Code 2. Passenger train 5. Single car 8. Light loco(s.) 3. Commuter train 6. Cut of cars 9. Maint./inspect. car		57. Method(s) of Operation (enter code(s) that apply) a. ATCS g. Automatic block m. Special instructions b. Auto train control h. Current of traffic n. Other than main track rules c. Auto train stop i. Time table/train orders o. Positive train control d. Cab signals j. Track warrant control p. Other (specify in narrative) Code(s) e. Traffic control k. Direct traffic control f. Interlocking l. Yard limits		53. Was Equipment Attended? Code 1. Yes 2. No N/A		54. Train Number/Symbol N/A		57a. Remotely Controlled Locomotive? 0= Not a remotely controlled operation 1 = Remote control portable transmitter 2 = Remote control tower operation 3 = Remote control portable transmitter - more than one remote control transmitter N/A			
55. Speed (recorded speed, if available) Code R - Recorded E - Estimated 0 MPH N/A		56. Trailing Tons (gross tonnage, excluding power units) 0		N/A		N/A		N/A		N/A	

OPERATING TRAIN # 2 (CONTINUED)

58. Principal Car/Unit (1) First involved (derailed, struck, etc)		a. Initial and Number 0		b. Position in Train 0		c. Loaded (yes/no) N/A		59. If railroad employee(s) tested for drug/alcohol use, enter the number that were positive in the appropriate box.			Alcohol N/A	Drugs N/A														
(2) Causing (if mechanical cause reported)		0		0		N/A		60. Was this consist transporting passengers ? (y/n)			N/A															
61. Locomotive Units		a. Head End	Mid Train b. Manual c. Remote		Rear End d. Manual e. Remote		62. Cars			Loaded a. Freight b. Pass.		Empty c. Freight d. Pass.		e. Caboose												
(1) Total in Train		0	0 0		0 0		(1) Total in Equipment Consist			0	0	0	0	0												
(2) Total Derailed		0	0 0		0 0		(2) Total Derailed			0	0	0	0	0												
63. Equipment Damage This Consist		\$0		64. Track, Signal, Way, & Structure Damage		\$0		65. Primary Cause Code			N/A		66. Contributing Cause Code		N/A											
Number of Crew Members						Length of Time on Duty																				
67. Engineers/ Operators		68. Firemen		69. Conductors		70. Brakemen		71. Engineer/Operator			72. Conductor															
0		0		0		0		Hrs: 0 Mins: 0			Hrs: 0 Mins: 0															
Casualties to:		73. Railroad Employees		74. Train Passengers		75. Other		76. EOT Device?			77. Was EOT Device Properly Armed?															
Fatal		0		0		0		1. Yes 2. No N/A			1. Yes 2. No N/A															
Nonfatal		0		0		0		78. Caboose Occupied by Crew?			1. Yes 2. No N/A															
Highway User Involved						Rail Equipment Involved																				
79. Type		C. Truck-Trailer		F. Bus		J. Other Motor Vehicle		Code			83. Equipment															
A. Auto		D. Pick-Up Truck		G. School Bus		K. Pedestrian		1. Train (units pulling)			3. Train (standing)		6. Light Loco(s) (moving)		Code											
B. Truck		E. Van		H. Motorcycle		M. Other (spec. in narrative)		D			4. Car(s) (moving)		7. Light Loco(s) (standing)													
80. Vehicle speed (est. MPH at impact)		03		81. Direction (geographical)		Code		84. Position of Car Unit in Train			1															
82. Position		1. Stalled on Crossing		2. Stopped on Crossing		3. Moving Over Crossing		4. Trapped		Code			85. Circumstance													
								3			1. Rail Equipment Struck Highway User			2. Rail Equipment Struck by Highway User		1										
86a. Was the highway user and/or rail equipment involved in the impact transporting hazardous materials?		Code		1. Highway User		2. Rail Equipment		3. Both		4. Neither		4			86b. Was there a hazardous materials release by	Code										
												1. Highway User			2. Rail Equipment		3. Both	4. Neither	4							
86c. State here the name and quantity of the hazardous materials released, if any.		n/a																								
87. Type of Crossing Warning		1. Gates	4. Wig Wags		7. Crossbucks		10. Flagged by crew		88. Signaled Crossing Warning			Code		89. Whistle Ban		Code										
		2. Cantilever FLS	5. Hwy. traffic signals		8. Stop signs		11. Other (spec. in narr.)		(See instructions for codes)			1. Yes		2. No		3. Unknown	2									
		3. Standard FLS	6. Audible		9. Watchman		12. None		Code(s)			07	12	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A								
90. Location of Warning		Code		91. Crossing Warning Interconnected with Highway Signals		Code		92. Crossing Illuminated by Street Lights or Special Lights			Code		1. Both Sides		2. Side of Vehicle Approach		3. Opposite Side of Vehicle Approach		1	1. Yes	2. No	3. Unknown	2			
93. Driver's Age		31		94. Driver's Gender		Code		95. Driver Drove Behind or in Front of Train and Struck or was Struck by Second Train			Code		96. Driver			Code		1. Drove around or thru the Gate		2. Stopped and then Proceeded		3. Did not Stop		4. Stopped on Crossing	5. Other (specify in narrative)	2
97. Driver Passed Standing Highway Vehicle		Code		98. View of Track Obscured by (primary obstruction)		Code		5. Vegetation			7. Other (specify in narrative)		Code		1. Permanent Structure		3. Passing Train		6. Highway Vehicles		8. Not obstructed		7			
1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown		2		2. Standing Railroad Equipment		4. Topography		99. Driver Was			Code		100. Was Driver in the Vehicle?			Code		1. Killed 2. Injured 3. Uninjured		1		1. Yes 2. No		1		
Casualties to:		Killed		Injured				102. Highway Vehicle Property Damage (est. dollar damage)			\$4,500		103. Total Number of Highway-Rail Crossing Users (include driver)			4										
101. Highway-Rail Crossing Users		4		00				104. Locomotive Auxiliary Lights?			Code		105. Locomotive Auxiliary Lights Operational?			Code										
								1. Yes 2. No			1		1. Yes 2. No			1										
106. Locomotive Headlight Illuminated?		Code		1. Yes		2. No		107. Locomotive Audible Warning Sounded?			Code		1. Yes		2. No		1									

108. DRAW A SKETCH OF ACCIDENT AREA INCLUDING ALL TRACKS, SIGNALS, SWITCHES, STRUCTURES, OBJECTS, ETC., INVOLVED.



109. SYNOPSIS OF THE ACCIDENT

On February 13, 2005 at 3:23 P.M. (CST) a northbound Amtrak (train # 58) traveling from New Orleans to Chicago on the Canadian National Railroad's (CN) Mc Comb Subdivision of the Central Division collided with a pickup truck. The recorded train speed was 74 mph. The highway-rail crossing collision happened at CN milepost 840.9 and Tangipahoa Avenue in Roseland, Louisiana in Tangipahoa parish.

The 31 year old male motor vehicle driver along with three female passengers, ages 6,8, and 11, were killed. The truck, a 1998 Chevolet extended-cab pickup with tinted windows, was completely destroyed.

The mother of the 11 year old passenger who was following the truck in her vehicle, witnessed the accident.

There were no injuries to the Amtrak personnel or passengers. There were no derailment of any locomotives or cars, only minor damage to the lead locomotive.

The Canadian National Railroad who is responsible for track maintenance reported no track or signal damage. There were no Hazardous materials involved.

After a delay of one hour and thirty minutes, the engineer was able to proceed to Jackson, Mississippi for a crew change.

At the time of the accident the roadway was wet, no rain at time of accident, with cloudy skies.

No warning devices are present, only cross bucks.

The collision was caused by failure of the motor vehicle driver to yield to the train. The driver having to encounter a 90 degree curve just 35 feet from the highway-rail grade crossing may have been a contributing factor.

110. NARRATIVE

LOCATION AND METHOD OF OPERATION

The area of the highway-rail grade collision is located in Roseland, Louisiana (population 1185). Roseland is located two miles north of Amite, Louisiana, the parish seat of Tangipahoa parish.

Amtrak was operating on the Mc Comb Subdivision, the Central Division of the Canadian National Railroad. In this area (CN milepost 840.9) the track structure consists of a single main track. The timetable directions are north and south. Authority for train movements is by Traffic Control System (TCS), controlled by the dispatcher who is located in Homewood, Illinois. The maximum authorized timetable speed is 79 mph for passenger trains and 60 mph for freight trains.

CIRCUMSTANCES PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT

The crew of Amtrak passenger train # 58 North included a locomotive engineer, a conductor, an assistant conductor and eight on board service employees. They first went on duty at 11:30A.M. (CST) on Sunday February 13, 2005 at the New Orleans Union Passenger Terminal (NOUPT) in New Orleans, Louisiana. This was the home terminal for all crew members and all received more than the statutory off duty period prior to reporting for duty.

Their assigned passenger train, train symbol Amtrak # 58, consisted of two locomotives (ATK 148, lead locomotive, and ATK 124, trailing locomotive) and nine cars (#34006 Deadhead-Brighton Park, #1247 Baggage, #39022 T/Dorm/Passenger Sleeper, #38001 Diner, #33024 Lounge, #34084 Coach, #34039 Coach, #34058 Coach, and #32062 Sleeper). This train was to travel from New Orleans to Chicago, Illinois with schedule stops to embark and disembark passengers while en route. The train received an initial terminal train air brake test and departed New Orleans passenger terminal at 1:46 P.M. (CST) with 129 passengers. The Amtrak # 58 traveled north bound to East Bridge Junction interlocker to enter the Canadian National Railroad's Mc Comb Subdivision at milepost 904.4. After entering the Traffic Control System the Canadian National Railroad Dispatcher in Homewood, Illinois placed Amtrak # 58 in the Frenier siding to meet Amtrak # 59.

After meeting Amtrak # 59, the engineer of Amtrak # 58 had to reduce his speed to 40 mph for a temporary speed reduction at milepost 868 as listed in the Canadian National temporary slow order report for February 13, 2005. After a scheduled stop in Hammond, Louisiana and a permanent speed reduction to 30 mph between milepost 842.3 and 844.4 as posted in Canadian National timetable #1 dated December 12, 2004. the engineer started to steadily increase his speed. In throttle # 8 and approaching the highway-rail grade collision area his recorded train speed was 74 mph. Amtrak was traveling 108 feet per second..

On the approach to the highway-rail grade crossing collision the locomotive engineer was seated at the controls on the east side of the leading locomotive, the conductors were in the passenger cars. The engineer encountered, in succession, a storage track of about 4600 feet with track switches on both ends, a slight curve to the left of about 579 feet, followed by tangent track of 1330 feet to the point of the collision and considerable distance beyond. There is a 3% ascending grade between milepost 840.5 and milepost 842.

The operator of the red pickup truck with his two daughters, ages 6 and 8 came to visit his girlfriend and her 11 year old daughter around 11:00am. The driver and the mother of the 11 year old started seeing each other about six months and started dating steady about three months prior to the accident. The driver of the vehicle used the highway-rail grade crossing many time during the three months prior to the accident and even mention to his girlfriend that the highway-rail grade crossing was dangerous.

At about 3:15 P.M. everyone started to leave the residence at 62632 Holloway Road. The 31 year old male pickup driver and his 8 year old daughter sat in the front seat while his other 6 year old daughter and his girlfriend's 11 year old daughter sat in the back seat. The 11 year old was seated behind the driver. Her mother was to follow them in her car. She was heading to work at a near by truck stop (4 to 11 shift). The driver was heading to Tickfaw, Louisiana (10 miles away) to return his children to their mother. His visitation with his children was over at 5:00 pm.

The highway-rail grade crossing is 24 feet wide at the crossing boards. This crossing is also the dividing line for the two named streets. On the west side is Tangipahoa Avenue. It starts at the crossing and goes west across Highway 51 or Commercial Street. It is a tangent road with an asphalt surface. On the east side is Holloway Road. The road starts at the crossing making a 90 degree right turn and goes south one and a half mile to Duncan Street. This road is an asphalt surface road then turns into a gravel road about 182 feet from the crossing. Holloway Road is also used as the main entrance to a cypress mill.

The driver of the vehicle approached the crossing in the following succession, traveled 204 feet west from a side street to Holloway Road, made a right turn, traveled 182 feet north, approached an advance railroad warning sign at 161 feet from the crossing. After encountering a left hand curve with an ascending grade near the crossing, the driver had to stop to yield, at which point he was roughly 27 feet from nearest rail. After stopping to yield, the driver had a site distance of about 1788 feet for a train approaching the crossing from the south. The posted speed limit for Holloway Road is 20 mph.

THE ACCIDENT

Passenger train ATK # 58

The train was being operated at 74 mph approaching the collision area. After the train came out of a slight curve the train engineer started sounding his sequential horn at the whistle board for two crossing located at milepost 840.9 and milepost 840.5. The whistle board is located 1335 feet south of crossing. The engineers view of the highway-rail grade crossing was not obstructed. Holloway Road, however, was partially obstructed by shrubs near the east side of Canadian National Railroad's property line. When the engineer was well within the whistle boards approach to the crossing he reported seeing a red pickup truck traveling northbound on Holloway Road. The train engineer remembers seeing the vehicle's brake lights coming on as the driver was maneuvering around a 90 degree curve onto the crossing. After the train engineer realized the driver of the vehicle was not going to yield to his train, he initiated an emergency train air brake application about two or three second from the crossing. The engineer, because of the tinted windows

on the pickup could not tell if the driver saw him or if the driver was looking straight ahead. The train struck the pickup truck on the driver side doing a recorded train speed of 74 mph. After stopping about 1837 feet north of the crossing the train engineer made radio communication contact with the Canadian National dispatcher in Homewood, Illinois.

The dispatcher notified the local police and emergency responder for that area along with Canadian National and Amtrak official. The conductor of Amtrak # 58 tried to render assistance to the people at the crossing but after reviewing the collision site returned to the train and asked to be relieved of his duties. At that time, the assistant conductor returned to the collision site to render assistance to the emergency responders and police officer on site. The conductor of Amtrak # 58 had just return to work in January, 2005 after being involved in a derailment in Flora, Mississippi on April 6, 2004. After the train proceeded on to Chicago the conductor disembarked in Mc Comb, Mississippi. After a few days off, he returned to work.

The assistant conductor after rendering assistance to the emergency responder escorted a local police officer to the lead locomotive to interview the engineer. While proceeding to the lead locomotive the assistant conductor inspected the train for damage or derailed cars.

The Engineer, after making contact with the Canadian National dispatcher, inspected his engines. He noticed minor damage to the lead locomotive with only one auxiliary light broken from the collision. After making his statement to the Canadian National Railroad and local police and after one hour and a half train delay, permission was given by local authority to proceed. He proceeded north to Jackson, Mississippi where a scheduled crew change took place.

1998 CHEVY SILVERADO PICK UP TRUCK

The driver was also the owner of the red 1998 Chevy Silverado extended cab, model 1500 pickup truck, Louisiana license plate number 9773669, Serial number 1GCEC19W2WE230855. The pickup had tinted windows with an automatic transmission. The driver purchased the Chevy pickup Friday, February 11, 2005 from an auto dealer in Independence, Louisiana.

The 31 year old driver of the 1998 Chevy Silverado pickup truck along with three female passengers ages 6,8, and 11, had just left the residence of the mother of the 11 year old passenger. They were in route to Tickfaw, Louisiana. Because all the people in the vehicle was fatally injured, the only eye witnesses, the mother of the 11 year old passenger and the train engineer, could give their statement of what happened.

The train engineer saw the driver approaching the crossing from Holloway Road. He noticed the driver's brake lights come on and thought the driver was stopping for the crossing. Then, the driver started to proceed across the crossing.

The mother of the 11 year old passenger stated that she was following the pick up truck and noticed the truck stopping at the crossing then proceeded across the crossing. She knew the train had hit the truck but had hoped no one was injured.

The train struck the left side of the pick-up about midpoint near the extend cab . The pick-up was hit clear of the tracks in a northwest direction and came to rest 190 feet from the crossing. The impact ejected the 11 year old female victim 35 feet west of the pickup truck. The ejected female victim was sitting in the rear seat of the extended cab behind the driver at the time of the collision.

The Roseland police chief and a deputy arrived on the scene at about 3:30 p.m. CST. The Amite emergency response team along with the Roseland emergency response and Arcadia Ambulance arrived at 3:31 p.m. After they coordinated the emergency response they responded to the victim in the pickup. After no respirations or pulse signs were noted on any of the victims the corner was notified. Upon arrival of the corner, two female victims were removed from the vehicle. The male driver who was entangled in the vehicle had to be extricated from vehicle using power tools.

The corner's office obtained a blood sample from the deceased driver and forwarded it to the St. Louis University Toxicology Laboratory at 6039 Helen Ave. Berkley, Missouri 63134 for alcohol/drug testing.

Canadian National Railroad's claim agent, police, along with Amtrak officials were dispatched out of New Orleans and Kenner, La. They were dispatched at 3:30 p.m. and arrived around 4:30 p.m. They ascertained the condition of the train and track structure and reported only minor damage to the train. There was no hazardous materials involved.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

Analysis

The driver was a 31 year old male. The other three passengers of the pickup were female ages 6,8, and 11. The Tangipahoa Parish coroner ordered a toxicological and drug tests be performed on the driver by the Louisiana State Police Crime Lab. And the results were Negative.

The highway-rail grade crossing had no active warning signals but was equipped with cross buck signs. Additionally, there is an advanced railroad crossing warning sign 161 feet from crossing.

The railroad had a whistle post in place about 1335 feet south of crossing. The engineer said he started sounding the whistle when the train neared this post. This was later validated by analysis of the event recorder data.

The lead locomotive was equipped with a headlight, the auxiliary lights, whistle and bell as required by Federal regulations. The locomotives engineer tested these devices at the collision site in the presence of Canadian National Railroad Police; they functioned as intended.

The locomotive was also equipped with a speed indicator and a Wabrec Railway Electronic event recorder as required. The relevant event recorder data was downloaded by an electrical technician at Sixteenth Street Station in Chicago, Illinois. February 14, 2005 at 2:45 p.m. (CST) and the print out of the

event recorder was distributed by the mechanical supervisor at the Amtrak locomotive facility in Chicago, Illinois. The original disk is stored in the central reporting building at West Van Buren street in Chicago, Illinois. The information provided by the data disclosed that the locomotive engineer was in compliance with all applicable railroad operating and train handling requirements. FRA reviewed the results of this data and concurred with the conclusions.

The information provided by the train engineer and the witness who was following the pickup was not enough to determine if the driver was distracted causing the driver not to yield the right of way.

The Louisiana Department of Transportation is having the Louisiana State Police do a Highway Grade Crossing reconstruction site analysis. The information from the reconstruction site analysis is still pending.

PROBABLE CAUSE & CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

The collision occurred because the driver of the pickup truck failed to stop at the highway-rail crossing at grade, as required by Louisiana Statute 32:175. The driver having to encounter a 90 degree curve with an ascending grade just 35 feet from the highway-rail grade crossing may have been a contributing factor.